Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals

TEXTS IN G E R M A N PHILOSOPHYTheIS/lctaphysks of Morals Immanuel Kant T h i s is the only c o m p l e t e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n of K a n t ' s m a j o r w o r k in applied m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m w h i c h h e deals w i t h the basic principles of rights a n d of v i r t u e s . It s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), a n earlier w o r k w h i c h is s o m e t i m e s t r e a t e d as if it were t h e definitive s t a t e m e n t of K a n t ' s m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y b u t w h i c h , in fact, m e r e l y lays t h e f o u n d a t i o n lor the l o n g e r w o r k It is in the l o n g e r w o r k that K a n t tries to give c o n t e n t to his f o r m a l principle, the categorical imperative. The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) c o m p r i s e s two parts: the Doctrine of Right, w h i c h deals with t h e r i g h t s t h a t p e o p l e h a v e o r can a c q u i r e , a n d the Doctrine of Virtue, w h i c h d e a l s w i t h the v i r t u e s t h e y o u g h t to acquire. P a r t s have b e e n translated b e f o r e , b u t this n e w e d i t i o n is the only c o m plete translation of the w h o l e w o r k . A s u b s t a n t i a l i n t r o d u c t i o n considers t h e relation b e t w e e n the two p a r t s , a n d t h e r e is extensive a n n o t a t i o n o n the u n f a m i l i a r a n d s o m e t i m e s difficult vocabulary. G i v e n K a n t ' s status as o n e of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s of all t i m e , the p u b l i c a t i o n of this n e w t r a n s l a t i o n will b e ol critical i m p o r t a n c e to all s t u d e n t s of ethics a n d ol legal a n d political philosophy. C o v e r D e s i g n by K e n Farnhill CAMBRIDGE U N I V E 1 S I T Y FftgSS T E X T S IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY The Metaphysics of Morals This is the only complete English translation of Kant's major work in applied moral philosophy in which he deals with the basic principles o f rights and of virtues. It should not be confused with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), an earlier work which is sometimes treated as if it were the definitive statement of Kant's moral philosophy but which, in fact, merely lays the foundation for the longer work. It is in the longer work that Kant tries to give content to his formal principle, the categorical imperative. The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) comprises two parts: T h e Doctrine of Right, which deals with the rights that people have or can acquire, and the Doctrine of Virtue, which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Parts have been translated before, but this new edition is the only complete translation of the whole work. A substantial introduction considers the relation between the two parts, and there is extensive annotation on the unfamiliar and sometimes difficult vocabulary. Given Kant's status as one of the most important moral philosophers of all time, the publication of this new translation will be of critical importance to all students of ethics and of legal and political philosophy. T E X T S IN G E R M A N General Editor: PHILOSOPHY R A Y M O N D GEUSS T h e purpose of this series is to make available, in English, central works of German philosophy from Kant to the present. Although there is rapidly growing interest in the English-speaking world in different aspects of the German philosophical tradition as an extremely fertile source of study and inspiration, many of its crucial texts are not available in English or exist only in inadequate or dated translations. T h e series is intended to remedy that situation, and the translations where appropriate will be accompanied by historical and philosophical introductions and notes. Single works, selections from a single author, and anthologies will all be represented. Friedrich Nietzsche Daybreak J. G. Fichte The Science of Knowledge Lawrence S. Stepelevich (ed.) The Young Hegelians: An Anthology Wilhelm von Humboldt On Language Heinrich Rickert The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science Friedrich Nietzsche Untimely Meditations Friedrich Nietzsche Human, All Too Human Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature Friedrich Schleiermacher On Religion IMMANUEL KANT The Metaphysics of Morals Introduction, translation, and notes by Mary Gregor SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY Cambridge University Press New York Cambridge Port Chester Melbourne Sydney Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge T h e Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 L R P 40 West 20th Street, New York, N Y 10011, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1991 First Published 1991 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. [Metaphysik der Sitten. English] The metaphysics of morals / Immanuel Kant ; introduction, translation, and notes by Mary Gregor, p. cm. - (Texts in German philosophy) Translation of: Metaphysik der Sitten. Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N 0 - 5 2 1 - 3 0 3 7 2 - 9 (hardcover). - I S B N 0 - 5 2 1 - 3 1 6 5 7 - x (pbk.) 1. Ethics — Early works to 1800. 2. Duty - Early works to 1800. 3. Virtue - Early works to 1800. I. Title. II. Series. B2785.E5G74 1991 91-17329 i70-dc20 cip A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN ISBN 0-521—30372—9 0-521-31657-x hardback paperback How to Have Something External as One's O w n Chapter II. How to Acquire Something External Section I. O n Property Right Section II.Contents Translator's Note on the T e x t Translator's Introduction Notes to Translator's Introduction METAPHYSICAL FIRST PRINCIPLES RIGHT page ix 1 29 OF T H E D O C T R I N E OF Preface Introduction to the Metaphysics o f Morals Introduction to the Doctrine o f Right Division of the Doctrine of Right I Private Right 35 40 55 62 68 68 80 82 90 95 96 96 98 100 101 108 Chapter I. Right of a Head o f the Household Dogmatic Division of All Rights T h a t C a n Be Acquired by Contract Episodic Section v . Parental Right Title III. Marriage Right Title II. O n Rights to Persons A k i n to Rights to T h i n g s O n the Right of Domestic Society Title I. O n Contract Right Section III. Perfect Duties to Oneself 214 218 Chapter I. Man's Duty to Himself Merely as a Moral Being Section I. Public Right Section I. O n the First C o m m a n d o f All Duties to Oneself Episodic Section Book II. f o r a Pragmatic Purpose 239 . O n Acquisition T h a t Is Dependent Subjectively upon the Decision o f a Public C o u r t o f Justice II. Cosmopolitan Right Conclusion A p p e n d i x . Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics Part I. O n Man's Duty to Himself as His O w n Innate J u d g e Section II. On Man's Imperfect Duties to Himself 218 225 233 236 237 239 Section I. Man's Duty to Himself as an Animal Being Chapter II.vi Contents Chapter III. O n Man's Duty to Himself to Develop and Increase His Natural Perfection. T h e Right of a State Section II. T h a t Is. T h e Right of Nations Section III. On Duties to Oneself as Such 214 214 Introduction Book I. Explanatory Remarks on The Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right 113 123 123 150 158 160 163 METAPHYSICAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF T H E D O C T R I N E OF VIRTUE Preface Introduction to the Doctrine o f Virtue 181 185 I. Teaching Ethics Section II. Ethical Ascetics Conclusion Notes to the T e x t Selective Bibliography Index 243 243 254 260 261 265 266 266 273 275 281 295 301 . O n Man's Duty to Himself to Increase His Moral Perfection. f o r a Moral Purpose Only Part II. T h a t Is. O n Duties o f Virtue toward Other Men Arising f r o m the Respect D u e T h e m Chapter II. O n Ethical Duties o f Men toward O n e A n o t h e r with Regard to T h e i r Condition Conclusion o f the Elements of Ethics Appendix II Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics Section I. Duties of Virtue to Others 241 243 Chapter I. O n the Duty o f Love to Other Men Section II. O n Duties to Others Merely as Men Section I.Contents vii Section II. . edited by Paul Natorp. A s regards the Latin words and passages. to provide such historical material as might clarify the text. during Kant's lifetime but without his cooperation. and to identify authors Kant mentions but does not quote. the Doctrine of Right probably in January 1797 and the Doctrine of Virtue in A u g u s t of the same year. I have used such notes f o r a n u m b e r of purposes: to discuss problems o f translation f r o m the G e r m a n text.Translator's Note on the Text The Edition T h e two parts o f The Metaphysics of Morals were first published separately. accordingly. in Volume V I (1907) of the Prussian A c a d e m y of the Sciences edition o f Kant's works. Kant's revisions to the text were apparently limited to a d d i n g a parenthetical explanation o f his term Läsion (Ak. translated only those which are not m e r e repetitions o f the G e r m a n or which are identifiable quotations. I have followed N a t o r p in relegating to notes any substantive emendations that clarify the text. A m o r e extensively revised edition was published in 1803. 249) and an a p p e n d i x in reply to Bouterwek's review of the Doctrine of Right published on February 18. I have. 1797. T h e present translation is based o n the text o f The Metaphysics of Morals. My notes that are indicated by letters and also appear at the bottom o f the page are limited to p r o v i d i n g the substantive emendations discussed in the preceding p a r a g r a p h and such material as seems to me h e l p f u l f o r merely r e a d i n g the text. Natorp's decision not to use the " i m p r o v e d " edition o f 1803 was based on his conviction that such alterations in the Doctrine of Virtue as are improvements d o not justify the use of a text in the production o f which K a n t was not involved. Kant's notes are indicated by asterisks and appear at the bottom o f the page on which they occur. Additional editorial notes are indicated by numerals and are to be f o u n d at the end o f the book. All references to ix . to cite other works of Kant relevant to the text. In the edition of 1798. I have also m a d e use o f his notes in identifying authors whose works Kant cites. Such laws." to the distinction between external and internal lawgiving. Douglas P. in other words. Rechtslehre.. However." A t the beginning of his Introduction to the Doctrine of Right.e. I am also indebted to Karen Mungie f o r her care and patience in typing the manuscript through its numerous revisions and to Betty Kiehl f o r her assistance in compiling the index. I am indebted to the University o f Pennsylvania Press f o r releasing the rights to that translation and so making the present revision possible. 1 9 7 1 . 1984). Kant devotes the third division of his Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals. by which the legislator puts those subject to his laws under obligation to do what they could not know a priori to be obligatory. references to his other writings can be readily identified in the various translations available. I am deeply indebted to Lewis White Beck. 1980. who read earlier versions of this translation and o f f e r e d numerous very helpful suggestions. and in the fourth discusses the concepts of positive law and natural law and of right and wrong. in the concluding sentence of § D.x Note on the Text Kant's works are to the Academy edition. T h e r e is unfortunately no common English word that would translate Recht. Dryer. are positive laws." In the translation. " O n the Division of a Metaphysics of Morals. positive laws have empirical content chosen by the legislator. and Raymond Geuss. Since most translators of Kant's works provide the Academy pagination. 1964. I take it. reprinted by the University of Pennsylvania Press. Kant says. I have incorporated much of their advice in the present translation. . if actually given by a legislator. But insofar as they are moral laws they are based on a priori principles that Kant calls "external natural laws. he specifies more precisely what external laws have to do with and." T h e system of such laws is natural Right (Naturrecht) or "the metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of Right. T h e present translation of Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals is a revision of my earlier translation. The Doctrine of Virtue (New York: Harper & Row Torchbooks. "Right" is used f o r Recht and "right" for recht. In the third division he explains that duties in accordance with external laws can be only "external actions. T h e pagination of the Academy edition of The Metaphysics of Morals is given in the margins of the present translation. The Terminology of The Metaphysics of Morals T h e most serious problems of translation occur within the Doctrine of Right. I am solely responsible for whatever errors remain. in order to distinguish the substantive Recht or das Recht from the adjective recht (i. 229). is "the sum of laws f o r which an external lawgiving is possible" (Ak. what it is "right" to do in accordance with such laws). w h i c h a p p e a r e d occasionally in the I n t r o d u c t i o n to The Metaphysics of Morals. 2 7 1 ) . " w h e n h e speaks. are h e l p f u l . I h a v e translated Sachenrecht (ins reale) in the sense o f a system o f principles as " p r o p e r t y R i g h t . das auf dingliche Art persöhnlichen Recht (ius realiter personale). c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y . " a n d das Recht in einer Sache or ein Sachenrecht (ius in re. A t o t h e r times the translation o f t h e t e r m is problematic. which h e has a p p a r e n t l y obtained by analysis o f the c o n c e p t o f Right. Kant's p r e l i m i n a r y notes f o r the w o r k . seems to be a system o f laws. a n d unless o n e assumes an uncharacteristic consistency o n his p a r t s o m e interpretation s e e m s u n a v o i d a b l e . its cognates. such as rechtlich and rechtmässig. Within the Doctrine of Right. the p r o b l e m is f u r t h e r complicated by Kant's f r e q u e n t use o f a n u m b e r o f terms. K a n t is to s o m e e x t e n t f o r g i n g his o w n v o c a b u l a r y . A p a r t f r o m the Doctrine of Right. O n c e this c o n c e p t o f a r i g h t has b e e n i n t r o d u c e d . I n the e x a m p l e that c o n c l u d e s § E. T h i s is also true o f s u c h c o m p o u n d terms as Rechtssatz. a n d such c o m p o u n d terms is to s o m e extent a m a t t e r o f emphasis. I h a v e translated das persöhnliche Recht (ius personale) as "contract R i g h t " a n d as "rights against p e r s o n s . ein Hecht is clearly a right. a legislator o r legisla- . 237. I h a v e not inserted the G e r m a n w o r d in s u b s e q u e n t occurrences. Kant f o r m a l l y distinguishes these t w o senses o f Recht in A k . Later. ein strictes(enges) Recht. f o r e x a m p l e . as K a n t seems to hold. the c o n c e p t o f a right is c o n t a i n e d in the c o n c e p t o f Right. S o m e t i m e s the c o n t e x t seems to suggest the sense in w h i c h a term is to b e taken. I h a v e discussed these terms in editorial notes as they o c c u r in the text." A f t e r i n t r o d u c t o r y sections A—E. ius reale) as "rights to things. I h a v e translated this. In the case o f s o m e terms the Vorarbeiten zu Die Metaphysik der Sitten ( A k . B u t in t h e title o f § E. it seems a p p r o p r i a t e to s p e a k o f " m o r a l laws" a n d o f "the moral law" . h e again d r a w s the distinction with r e g a r d to rights to things and the s u m o f laws or principles h a v i n g to d o with s u c h rights ( A k . 261) a n d so too with r e g a r d to rights against p e r s o n s ( A k . h o w e v e r . In view o f the f r e q u e n c y w i t h w h i c h they are u s e d . Rechtsbegriff a n d Rechtsgesetz. o n e that is not m i x e d with ethical precepts. the "laws" that K a n t is c o n c e r n e d with are not sufficiently d e t e r m i n a t e to b e given by an e x t e r n a l lawgiver. it is not always clear w h e t h e r Recht is to b e t a k e n as R i g h t or as a r i g h t e v e n in these introductory sections.Note on the Text xi introduces the c o n c e p t o f a right.the categorical imperative. T h e o n e p o i n t in w h i c h I h a v e consciously deviated f r o m Kant's t e r m i n o l o g y is in substituting " p r i n c i p l e " f o r "law" in "Private R i g h t ." C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y . X X I I I ) . o f Rechtsgesetz. A—E. a n authorization to use coercion. the translation o f Recht. as "domestic R i g h t " a n d "rights against persons akin to rights to things. " T h e r e is n o E n g l i s h w o r d f o r Kant's t h i r d division. B u t if. for example. I have." T o d o so. the translation of a very ordinary term. it is obviously used in the sense o f "a male. In view o f Kant's distinction between a passive capacity (. seems to me anachronistic. Finally. it would be philosophically correct throughout Kant's moral philosophy to translate der Mensch as "a h u m a n being. that "contracts are to be kept" is not a law in the sense o f what a legislator could enact. o f "the law (pacta sunt servanda). itself derived f r o m the three basic principles of the Doctrine of Right: the universal principle o f Right." For the most part. A l t h o u g h Kant may r e f e r to these indifferently as "laws" or "principles. sometimes i g n o r e d this distinction in the case o f "the law [or laws] o f f r e e d o m . translated Vermögen as "capacity. " which is prominent in both the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. T h e translation o f der Mensch as " m a n " should occasion n o misunderstanding. I have. The Metaphysics of Morals is concerned primarily with active capacities or powers rather than with susceptibilities to being affected." I have substituted "principle" f o r some occurrences o f "law" [Gesetz]. f o r example. a n d the postulate o f public Right." except w h e n it is used in the sense o f "means. suggesting that Kant was m o r e advanced in this respect than his English-speaking contemporaries and that he was. A problem o f translation c o m m o n to both parts o f The Metaphysics of Morals." B u t " p o w e r " in the sense o f " f o r c e " (Macht. those having to d o with marriage. and indeed to most o f Kant's writings. Rezeptivität) for being a f f e c t e d or acted u p o n and an active capacity (Vermögen. . however. A l t h o u g h Kant speaks. has become somewhat problematic. in fact. I should have p r e f e r r e d to translate Vermögen as "power. wealth. Spontaneität)." O n the whole. and Kraft occurs both there and in the Doctrine of Virtue.Fähigkeit. T h e context indicates w h e n the latter are u n d e r discussion. writing in the twentieth century." It is the "metaphysical first principle" of contract law. however. Gewalt) plays a crucial role in the Doctrine of Right. and I have so translated it. In a few passages.xii Note on the Text ture. accordingly. der Mensch. practical reason's postulate with regard to rights. but rather a principle u n d e r l y i n g and providing the basis f o r what a lawyer would call "contract law. is the translation o f Vermögen. resources." which ethics o r the Doctrine of Virtue accepts as given by the Doctrine of Right. and 3) to apply this principle in a "metaphysics of morals. a m o n g the tasks of a moral philosopher. assuming that they recognize . and The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). It was not his purpose. Kant was only laying the f o u n d a t i o n f o r a system of duties. the discovery of duties other than those recognized by " c o m m o n h u m a n understanding" or. in other words. not building the system u p o n it. In the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason Kant's concern was not with "morals" ( Sitten ) but with "morality" (Sittlichkeit. to give an account of what duties h u m a n beings have. to show that it actually holds f o r o r is binding upon imperfectly rational agents such as h u m a n beings. 2) to justify this principle.Translator's Introduction In his Preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant outlined the three main tasks o f a moral philosopher: 1) to clarify "the supreme principle of morality. as he does in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Perhaps the duties discussed would have been m u c h the same as those set forth in The Metaphysics of Morals. A s the title o f that work indicates. the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Only after the Critique of Pure Reason was he in a position to distinguish purely rational f r o m empirical concepts and principles and to argue. that is." the principle on which a rational agent is t h o u g h t to act insofar as his action is morally g o o d . B u t the sort o f foundation laid indicated that the system must be obtained by p r o v i d i n g empirical content f o r that principle." so as to obtain "the whole system" of h u m a n duties. Moralität). as having its source in reason alone." 2 But his arguments that they are duties would have been very different. Instead. Kant never included. that the supreme principle o f all duties. Kant had long intended to write a "metaphysics o f morals". in Lewis White Beck's apt phrase. as early as 1767 he was working on a book with that title. T h e s e three tasks c o r r e s p o n d roughly to Kant's three major works in moral philosophy: the Groundwork (1785). must be a f o r m a l one. 1 O n e can only speculate r e g a r d i n g its content. "common sense moral knowledge. "the moral law. he investigated. he must be constrained to act in accordance with the moral law. If " c o m m o n sense moral k n o w l e d g e " is not merely a high-flown fantasy. Since the agent's incentive is a nonempirical concept. the t h o u g h t o f the objective validity or rationality 3 o f his maxim. never a f f e c t e d by impulses contrary to the principle o f reason expressed in the moral law. a l t h o u g h decisive f o r his derivation o f h u m a n duties. his maxim. cannot o f themselves yield any specific duties. first. f o r such an agent. For him the law is an imperative. B u t the . the action prescribed by it is his duty. In such an action we conceive an agent as considering w h e t h e r the subjective principle on which he proposes to act. By making explicit what is present in " c o m m o n sense moral knowle d g e " Kant reached the conclusion that moral philosophers had u p to now failed to account for o u r most basic moral concepts. second. then.j For a rational agent whose volition is a f f e c t e d by such impulses. an unconditional o r categorical imperative. It is.i o Translator's Introduction duties prescribed by moral laws. the m a n n e r of willing that distinguishes a morally g o o d action f r o m a merely lawful one and. could hold for everyone and as determining himself to act or to refrain f r o m acting on the basis o f whether his m a x i m so qualifies. A perfectly rational agent. Implicit in our concept o f a morally g o o d action is the conviction that the supreme principle of morality. the action that is objectively necessary is subjectively contingent. they would not be free. what is presupposed by the principle prescribing this sort o f volition. it exercises constraint u p o n us to act in conformity with this principle. I f an agent's volitions were determined f r o m without. we shall be able to see m o r e clearly what was accomplished and what remained to be done. O u r awareness o f moral constraint or obligation thus provides us with the positive concept o f f r e e d o m ." is a f o r m a l principle the thought of which is sufficient f o r determining oneself to act in accordance with it. would necessarily act u p o n this principle. and his consciousness of being subject to a categorical imperative is awareness o f being u n d e r obligation. he determines himself to act independently of his experience of natural inclination f o r the results of his action. o u r volitions are subject to an unconditional imperative. requiring that we determine ourselves to actions by the t h o u g h t o f the rationality of o u r maxims. and since the rational necessity o f the action required is not d e p e n d e n t u p o n its being a means to an antecedent end — one a d o p t e d on the basis o f his inclinations — the moral law does not counsel the action but c o m m a n d s it. T h e results o f these investigations. Reason itself gives the law to us. merely by holding b e f o r e us its own principle. by some impulse extrinsic to his will. B y recalling briefly the main conclusions o f these earlier works. 441). o u r incentive in a c t i n g . But he would not even be able to think of himself as u n d e r obligation unless he t h o u g h t of himself as capable of d o i n g what the moral law prescribes unconditionally that he do. striving to make the law. for purposes o f action t h o u g h not o f theoretical k n o w l e d g e . T h u s his consciousness of obligation both provides the concept o f f r e e volition and assures him that." its formulation o f the categorical imperative that refers specifically to ends and prescribes that "the subject of all ends" never be treated as a m e r e means to the ends o f others or even to his own ends. Kant's use o f "humanity" t h r o u g h o u t The Metaphysics of Morals suggests that duties are to be derived f r o m the Groundwork's treatment o f humanity as an "objective end. in search of its principle (IV. So far. the concept has objective reality. We also need to explore f u r t h e r the implications o f the Groundwork's puzzling assertion that whereas all "spurious" principles o f morality require the will to "go out of itself. but also as an end in itself. we know o f only one duty. 427).i o Translator's Introduction concept o f a will not determined by natural causes is only a negative concept o f a f r e e will. their qualification to hold for everyone. T h a t we o u g h t to adopt o u r maxims on the basis of their rationality. rather than o u r natural desires and aversions. A n agent w h o conceives himself as u n d e r obligation must conceive himself as free. conceived as a faculty of merely theoretical knowledge." to some object already desired. In moral philosophy we are not to think that reason. tells us what f o r m they are to have. Yet within "the will" there must be some structure. that there is something c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the concept. 4 In considering . expressed in "obligation. since it says nothing about the law o f its operation. Pure practical reason is the will. and the distinction by which Kant resolves the puzzle about "the relation o f a will to itself" is essential to his derivation of duties. W h a t Kant's analysis has disclosed is that the law in question is the moral law. however. But we need a criterion f o r deciding what maxims could hold as universal laws and hence what the duties are that we should strive to fulfill f r o m the m e r e thought that they are duties. the will. obligation involves instead "the relation o f a will to itself so far as it determines itself only by reason" (IV." T h e two problems are closely related. F r o m this cryptic account o f Kant's conclusions in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason it can be seen that duties are to be derived not f r o m man's natural desires but f r o m his capacity f o r f r e e volition. T h e positive concept of f r e e d o m is that o f "the p o w e r of p u r e reason to be of itself practical" or to determine the agent to action by the principle of practical rationality itself. and hence some differentiation. which will eventually be specified as that of striving for moral perfection. guides a conative faculty. and whereas laws issue f r o m his will. Kant's definition o f a "thing. In being aware of obligation to act only on maxims which meet this requirement. But it can d o so only t h r o u g h the agent's maxims. which was notably absent f r o m the Groundwork but is essential to its cardinal concept o f obligation. t h o u g h affected by his natural impulses and so "not o f itself pure. which explicitly presents p u r e practical reason as giving the moral law. a f f e c t e d by impulses that could induce him not to comply with it.6 which Kant introduced in the second Critique and exploited fully in his derivation of duties. the subject imposing obligation is a person r e g a r d e d as having p u r e practical reason. it cannot be determined to actions by impulses arising f r o m sensible nature but can be ." and thereby exercises constraint u p o n his capacity f o r choice. "a capacity f o r f r e e choice" (freie Willkür). first. It is because o f these two activities that Kant can speak of "practical reason putting itself u n d e r obligation" (440). With the hindsight p r o v i d e d by The: Metaphysics of Morals. "So act that y o u r m a x i m could become a universal law. But a law must be given to someone. I f one reads back into the Groundwork a distinction between Wille and Willkür. T h e Groundwork investigated at length the first o f these. an agent regards himself and others as free and hence as having a "dignity" — the status o f a person as distinguished f r o m a "thing. maxims issue f r o m his capacity for f r e e choice (226). Pure practical reason as lawgiving merely presents to an agent the formal principle expressed in the categorical imperative.i o Translator's Introduction whether one's m a x i m could hold as a universal law. capable of c o m p l y i n g with the law and. the principles on which he proposes to act. If p u r e reason is to be practical it must be able to determine actions. o n e is already thinking of it as a principle on which everyone could act." any "object of f r e e choice" which itself lacks f r e e d o m (and can therefore be used as o n e pleases) (223). T h e subject to w h o m the law is given must be. B u t this is to say that practical reason has two functions or activities: that o f giving laws a n d that o f adopting maxims o f action. 5 For obligation involves two terms: a subject imposing obligation or exercising constraint and a subject put u n d e r obligation or constrained (417—19)." taken f r o m The Metaphysics of Morals. that a moral agent cannot consistently will to prevent persons f r o m willing. whereas the subject put u n d e r obligation is the same person r e g a r d e d as having a capacity for free choice. Because his capacity for choice. second. introduces a term. this formulation might be interpreted as saying. most notably in its formulation of the categorical imperative as the principle o f autonomy. and to give a law is to connect with it constraint to d o what it presents as objectively necessary." is his practical reason as directed to actions. Kant adds the qualifications that distinguish h u m a n beings as moral agents f r o m all other beings capable of exercising such causality. is that the concept of f r e e d o m . I have suggested that this distinction between a moral agent's will and his capacity for f r e e choice is f o r e s h a d o w e d by the formulation of the categorical imperative that requires us to treat "humanity. c o m m o n to h u m a n beings and other animals. c o m m o n to both." But to adopt a maxim is to d e t e r m i n e oneself to a certain kind of action by setting an end for which one acts. requires a division o f duties into those o f "outer" or "external" f r e e d o m and those o f "inner" or "internal" f r e e d o m (406)." in o u r own person and in every other. the representation o f which determines it to an action (by which the object is b r o u g h t about)" (385. what ends he adopts cannot be d e t e r m i n e d by psychological laws o f nature. as the need arises. the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. its act is called a "wish"). as an "end in itself. If a being can conceptualize such objects and determine itself to actions by f o r m i n g rules f o r its conduct. to act for the sake of some e f f e c t foreseen and desired. A capacity for free choice is. If a moral agent's actions cannot be determined by incentives extrinsic to his practical reason. Starting with the concept o f a "capacity f o r desire" in the broadest sense.i o Translator's Introduction so determined t h r o u g h the principle intrinsic to practical reason itself. Kant occasionally speaks of "brute . 381). a capacity to set ends f o r oneself. by a " p u r e will. The Metaphysics of Morals begins with a discussion o f what is required on the part o f the h u m a n mind if it is to be subject to moral laws. Dividing The Metaphysics of Morals into its two parts. that is. T h i s concept o f free choice is explicated gradually. is d e f i n e d as a being's capacity to be by means of its representations the cause o f the object of those representations. is called Willkür (apart f r o m such consciousness. a being's capacity to exercise causality by p r o d u c i n g an action. then. and an end is "an object o f free choice. w h e n accompanied by consciousness o f its ability to p r o d u c e the object. and it might be well to e x p l o r e it f u r t h e r at the outset. W h a t requires a division o f the system into two parts. he later adds. Because duties having to d o with the act o f free choice itself b e l o n g to the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant reserves his discussion of ends f o r the second part o f The Metaphysics of Morals. the capacity to set any end whatever for oneself is "what characterizes humanity (as distinguished f r o m animality)" (392). then its capacity for desire." A c c o r d i n g to The Metaphysics of Morals. Kant remarks in a footnote that the highest concept in the system is that of "the act of free choice in general" (2i8n). Yet this concept of f r e e choice is what distinguishes Kant's conceptions o f both Right and virtue f r o m those of his predecessors as well as most o f his successors. A capacity for desire. 7 T h e Groundwork. T h e will. 412) — distinguishes h u m a n beings f r o m other animals and is a necessary condition of moral agency. that we have a capacity f o r f r e e choice. It would not be surprising that his thinking about h u m a n f r e e d o m continued to develop d u r i n g the next twelve years. there is nothing it can make the supreme law and d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d o f choice except the f o r m . raises him above the o r d e r of natural causality and subjects his capacity f o r choice to moral laws. our consciousness o f being u n d e r obligation reveals. it is not of itself sufficient to m a k e them moral agents (418). the task he set himself in the Groundwork was a very limited one. T h a t a h u m a n being has desires f o r objects which he knows f r o m experience will satisfy his inclinations is an operation o f nature. Moreover. the fitness of maxims of choice to be universal law" (214). But maxims contain "objects o f choice. or to adopt a maxim. But although this "capacity to act according to the conception o f laws" — "a will" as traditionally conceived (IV. and can formulate general rules f o r their conduct. for practical purposes. to the capacity f o r f r e e choice. in accordance with psychological laws o f nature the object represented produces in him a feeling of pleasure which elicits a desire for that object.i o Translator's Introduction choice" (tierische Willkür). It is t h e r e f o r e u n f o r tunate that this work is often taken as his definitive position in moral philosophy and as virtually identical with "Kantian moral philosophy. From experience they can learn which o f their natural impulses are settled desires o r "inclinations. was essentially to show that the moral law. cannot be derived f r o m ends adopted on the basis of inclination." as well as what sort o f thing satisfies them. since animals may be d e t e r m i n e d to act f o r the sake o f some end. "as p u r e reason applied to the capacity f o r choice irrespective of its objects does not have within it the matter o f the law. the categorical imperative. involving k n o w l e d g e o f what kinds o f actions will p r o d u c e the results intended. instead. however. O n the whole. was Kant's first "critical" work in moral philosophy. the "matter" of volition. . so . that he applies the categorical imperative. It is not by means o f introspection that we know that we ourselves have set our ends. and his capacity to set any end whatever." both in the sense of ends (central to the Doctrine of Virtue) and in the sense of what can be put to use in e f f e c t i n g whatever ends one has (central to . But that he himself makes it his end to satisfy that desire by p r o d u c i n g the object represented is an act of f r e e choice on his part (385). ." A l t h o u g h the Groundwork indicated in a general way that an agent's maxims would supply the content required for applying the f o r m a l principle o f all duties. published f o u r years after the Critique of Pure Reason. Yet it is by considering the relation o f laws to ends. there Kant's concern with ends. he reserves Willkür f o r h u m a n beings. W h e t h e r Kant's moral philosophy is an "empty formalism" can be decided only after a c a r e f u l study o f The Metaphysics of Morals. T h e r e is no indication that "external perfect duties" will require a separate part o f a metaphysics o f morals. the will gives rise to laws enabling us to put d i f f e r e n t kinds o f objects to use — that is. he departs f r o m it in recognizing "internal" as well as "external" perfect duties. t h o u g h it would be m o r e difficult to foresee that a doctrine o f virtue will be a doctrine of ends. 9 T h e early portions o f its most basic division. a doctrine o f Right comprising duties that a moral agent can be constrained by others to fulfill. one might suppose that Kant's ethics would be an ethics o f "rules" as distinguished f r o m an ethics o f "virtues. the book to which Kant gave that title is not without its difficulties. However. will be a doctrine of virtue. at least part o f the problem seems to be that although Kant had lectured at least twelve times on Naturrecht or Natural Right. In a footnote to his examples of duties obtained f r o m the principle he has clarified. reserving it f o r his f u t u r e Metaphysics of Morals (IV. having to d o with one's moral disposition. and this is not the work one would have expected on the basis o f the Groundwork alone. K a n t remarks that. T h e text o f the Doctrine of Right is corrupt. to an extent that may here be left undecided. he will not a r g u e f o r this division." the second part of the system of duties. it was not until shortly b e f o r e the actual writing o f The Metaphysics of ." are exceptionally cryptic. T h e question raised is a very general one: May I make a promise with the intention of not k e e p i n g it? It is not the question o f w h e t h e r I may break a specific kind o f promise m a d e by me and accepted by another — that is. His example of an "external" perfect duty. 42 m ) .i o Translator's Introduction the Doctrine of Right). "Private Right. although he follows the customary division o f duties into those to oneself and to others and into perfect and imperfect duties. is that o f not making a lying promise. determining what rights we have or can acquire — and laws prescribing what ends we o u g h t to set f o r ourselves — that is. one might anticipate that "ethics. what virtues or moral dispositions we o u g h t to acquire." A l t h o u g h The Metaphysics of Morals was originally intended to be a "popular" work. a contract. especially in its first part. A p p l i e d to the capacity f o r choice with respect to its objects. In fact. A p a r t f r o m such a division. Kant's references there to his f u t u r e "metaphysics o f morals" would suggest that he had not given serious consideration to how he would g o about applying the f o r m a l principle o f all duties so as to obtain "the whole system. a perfect duty toward others. Given such a division." 8 I shall mention only one respect in which the Groundwork gives no indication o f Kant's p r o c e d u r e in The Metaphysics of Morals. as an " e n d " has been d e f i n e d . "the act o f f r e e choice" becomes the highest concept o f the system. In the remainder o f this Introduction I shall attempt to give an overview o f Kant's p r o c e d u r e in deriving the two systems of h u m a n duties. which states that something is to be done o r makes it a duty. and so o f the kind o f . a d d i n g that the f o r m e r are "indirectly ethical. makes demands u p o n his readers that seem excessive even by his standards. is what is in conformity with or contrary to some duty. he cannot prescribe what incentive they are to have. which the lawgiver connects with it by furnishing an incentive. its Introduction makes much o f what distinguishes the second part of the system o f duties f r o m the first (and retrospectively throws a g o o d deal o f light o n it). T h i s initial division is admittedly rather vague. For if the lawgiver is external. By 1797 Kant was in a hurry to p r o d u c e his l o n g awaited "metaphysics of morals" and. as we have seen. In so d o i n g I shall attempt to indicate what is distinctive about Kant's conception of both Right and virtue. in its most original a n d crucial part. in turn. T h e second element turns out to be decisive. Because the Doctrine of Virtue assumes that the r e a d e r has mastered the Doctrine of Right. Recht orlus. he cannot include his subjects' incentive within the law. B u t Kant's general criticism of moral philosophers w h o relied on "spurious" moral principles extends to those w h o w o r k e d primarily within this sphere. In The Metaphysics of Morals. the first division o f this concept being that into "right" and " w r o n g " generally. and would be generally acceptable within the tradition of Natural Right. O n this basis Kant distinguishes two kinds o f duties. m o r e precisely. unified by the f o r m a l principle of all duty and distinguished by the sort of lawgiving in which they originate. and constraint u p o n those subject to the law. perhaps deliberately so. someone other than those subject to the law. T h e system of laws prescribing duties comprises two subordinate systems.i o Translator's Introduction Morals that he saw how to explicate the concept of "what is mine or yours" — the concept of a right — by means of a distinction between the empirical and the rational concepts of possession. W h a t is right or w r o n g . they are duties and are t h e r e f o r e "taken u p " into ethical lawgiving. their disinclinations or aversions. Dividing a metaphysics of morals (218 — 22)." A l t h o u g h they arise in external lawgiving. with all that is entailed by this distinction. in the h o p e that the issues raised will e n c o u r a g e reflection on w h e t h e r he has provided a viable f r a m e w o r k for the discussion o f rights and virtues. His division o f a metaphysics o f morals in terms o f lawgiving. T h e sphere demarcated f o r the first part of a metaphysics of morals is the sphere o f Right. 1 0 H e can try to deter them f r o m breaking the law only by measures directed to their inclinations or. duties o f Right a n d duties o f virtue. no matter what its content or origin may be (223—4). which connects with them its o w n incentive. Kant distinguishes two elements in any lawgiving: a law. and thereby "spoiled" our commonsense moral k n o w l e d g e o f obligation. the Doctrine of . Kant's reply to the problem o f how an external legislator can put others u n d e r obligation "by his m e r e choice" is.i o Translator's Introduction constraint or obligation involved in external lawgiving. T h e y would readily a g r e e with him that. which the latter involves." Kant's way of resolving the p r o b l e m of how those moral principles which are the basis of positive laws can be binding sharply reduces the sphere o f Natural Right in the sense o f moral laws that would be binding in a state of nature. in fact. For the most part he avoids their term "natural law. In other words. they were not concerned with any particular system o f positive laws but with the "natural law" or "the law o f nature" that is the basis of all positive law and makes it binding in conscience. A l t h o u g h recognizing the d i f f e r e n c e between giving counsel and giving law. there must be a "natural law" establishing the authority o f a legislator to enact positive laws (224). Traditionally. K a n t seems in this text to be relating his project to theirs. How can this sort o f lawgiving put others u n d e r obligation to comply with it? Second." in the sense o f a moral principle which can be known a priori to be binding. which immediately precedes the division of the system in terms of external and internal lawgiving. the content of positive laws is contingent and chosen by the legislator (227). and one's counsel leaves them f r e e to ignore it at their own risk. I n d e e d . singles o u t a concept that had given traditional Natural Right theorists a great deal of trouble. reduced the doctrine of morals to the doctrine o f happiness. Kant's Doctrine of Right presents his own resolution o f the problems that troubled them. a legislator connects with a law constraint by natural means to comply with it. to a divine " c o m m a n d " was n o solution. to a law o f natural causality. T h i s is the theme of the second division of the Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals. O n e does not provide an altogether d i f f e r e n t incentive. traditional natural law theorists were hard put to account for the distinctive constraint. First. given a system of positive laws." p r e f e r r i n g to contrast "laws o f nature" with "laws o f f r e e d o m " or moral laws. O n e may help them to clarify what this e n d is and. as some did. they reduced a "natural law. In giving counsel one assumes that those to w h o m it is given already have some end. advise them that it would probably not be in their long-term interests to satisfy some pressing desire. he would include the traditional "natural lawyers" a m o n g those philosophers w h o failed to distinguish b e t w e e n empirical and rational concepts and principles. since it merely a d d e d constraint t h r o u g h the subjects' aversion to sanctions to the principle of prudence. T o resort. Like Kant. in giving positive law. obligation. In fact. positive laws were specifications of "natural laws" and derived their binding force f r o m that o f "the law of nature. but one must allow for exceptions. on the basis of experience. h u m a n beings must be able to acquire rights. t h r o u g h the incentive o f duty (223). A s f o r the contingent or "chosen" content of positive laws. Kant says. w h e r e there is a legislator to enact laws. an executive to e n f o r c e them.io Translator's Introduction Right. he w o r k e d u p most fully (209) establishes the authority o f a legislator to put others u n d e r obligation "by his mere choice. an agent can always r e g a r d laws based u p o n it as laws of his own will and determine himself to actions t h r o u g h the t h o u g h t of their lawfulness. We may first consider Kant's treatment o f the c o m p l e x p r o b l e m in broad outline. Since it is the f o r m a l principle o f right actions. But the universal law o f Right (Rechtsgesetz). it is that in external lawgiving the will provides the rule but not also the incentive f o r actions (Ak. as Kant notes." It does so by a r g u i n g that Natural Right is deficient with regard both to specifying laws and to an incentive to comply with such laws. His account of how one can be put u n d e r obligation t h r o u g h external lawgiving is derived f r o m the concept of obligation as constraint u p o n the capacity f o r f r e e choice by the will. T h e law is h e r e r e g a r d e d not specifically as the law of one's own will but as that of "will in general. the division o f The Doctrine of Right that. one that puts us u n d e r obligation. and consideration o f what rights they have or can acquire provides the criterion for any use of coercion within a civil society. In very general terms. . to use coercion in accordance with moral principles. Natural Right is not the body of laws that would be binding in a state of nature but instead the nonstatutory "metaphysical first principles" e m b o d i e d in a civil constitution (306). In accordance with principles o f Natural Right. T h e laws he gives can be fulfilled by actions independently of the subjects' moral disposition. But it is only within a civil condition." which could also be the will of another (389). "So act externally that the free use of y o u r choice can coexist with the f r e e d o m of e v e r y o n e in accordance with a universal law. Since external lawgiving has to rely u p o n constraint t h r o u g h the subjects' natural aversions. 392). but an external lawgiver cannot make any use o f his subjects' consciousness o f constraint by their own lawgiving reason (232). Kant's position is considerably m o r e c o m p l e x than that expressed in the dictum that laws may have any content whatever or in the dictum that "natural laws" are binding apart f r o m any h u m a n laws. not the act o f free choice itself. that h u m a n beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with moral principles. external laws can prescribe o r forbid only actions. and a j u d i ciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public laws. T h i s principle is indeed." is the f o r m a l principle o f the will applied to the sphere o f actions in which o n e agent's exercise o f f r e e choice could a f f e c t another's. Its principle must therefore be derived f r o m that exercise o f an agent's f r e e d o m which can be subject to external laws. it follows that external laws can prescribe or forbid only actions.that is. combined with his distinction between a moral agent's will and his capacity f o r choice. T h a t anyone is . Such compulsion is w r o n g or inconsistent with the external exercise o f everyone's freedom. the condition u n d e r which his actions. C o e r c i o n exercised in accordance with a law limiting everyone's external f r e e d o m to the condition o f its compatibility with the f r e e d o m o f every other is t h e r e f o r e right . Coercion used to check such compulsion is not only consistent with everyone's external f r e e d o m but. or deception others may compel someone to p e r f o r m actions that are not means to his own ends but only to theirs. It also follows that the restriction o f the sphere o f Right to actions does not of itself adequately characterize this sphere. an authorization to use coercion. consistent with outer f r e e d o m u n d e r universal law. threats. external laws are moral laws only insofar as their principle can be r e g a r d e d as the principle of his own will. If "well-being" is intended in the sense of "happiness" — a m a x i m u m long-term satisfaction o f their natural desires or. A system of external laws has as its function that of allowing h u m a n beings to exercise their capacity for f r e e choice. that is. H e n c e someone is authorized to use such coercion. merely by virtue o f their "humanity. a condition o f f r e e d o m in accordance with a law for everyone's exercise o f f r e e d o m . 1 1 merely by specifying the condition u n d e r which one agent's external use of his f r e e d o m can be compatible with that o f every other. to act for the sake of whatever ends they have set f o r themselves. A l t h o u g h the sphere of Right excludes consideration o f an agent's incentive.i o Translator's Introduction F r o m Kant's distinction between external and internal lawgiving. 58) — Kant's conception o f a moral agent rules out this view. as means to whatever end he has adopted. as a check u p o n the obstacle to f r e e d o m . and has very o f t e n been said." have one and only one innate right: the right to f r e e d o m o f action. It could be said. F r o m the concept o f a right K a n t immediately concludes that human beings. A system o f laws for everyone's external exercise o f f r e e d o m involves someone's being authorized to use coercion. that is. Analysis o f the concept o f Right thus yields the concept o f a right. perhaps. an integrated whole of their satisfaction (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. By force. Kant derives his universal principle of Right independently of distinctively ethical considerations. that the need f o r a system of external laws is derived f r o m considerations of h u m a n well-being and that the laws of that system should be measures f o r p r o m o t i n g the citizens' well-being. V I . will leave all others free to act f o r whatever ends they have set f o r themselves. T o say that he can be w r o n g e d in this way is to say that he possesses the object merely by his act o f choice. the f o r m s o f objects o f which we can have experience. Kant determines that the concept is that o f nonphysical or intelligible possession of something distinct f r o m oneself. T h i s imperative is the principle Kant calls "practical reason's postulate with regard to rights. T o analyze a concept.i o Translator's Introduction authorized to use coercion against someone w h o would interfere with such o f his actions as are compatible with everyone's external use o f f r e e d o m follows directly f r o m considerations of what is right in accordance with an external law. A s a concept o f what can be done rightly. of an object he is not holding. By analyzing the concept of an external object o f choice that belongs to someone by right (meum iuris). A s f o r this principle. he must possess that object independently o f his physical connection with it. Kant points out that to deny it would be to make one's external exercise o f f r e e choice d e p e n d e n t u p o n something other than its accord with its o w n f o r m a l principle. and that his control over the object. the concept o f nonphysical possession of an object distinct f r o m oneself cannot be justified f o r theoretical purposes. without his consent. something usable." which states that it is possible for someone or other to have as his own anything that can be put to use and which requires that everyone act accordingly. is consistent with the f r e e d o m of everyone. But if he can be w r o n g e d by someone's use. one is in rightful possession of one's own person and (apart f r o m any right someone else has acquired) of objects one is h o l d i n g or possesses physically: No one can hinder him in his exclusive use o f them without w r o n g i n g him by i n f r i n g i n g u p o n that outer f r e e d o m o f his which is compatible with everyone's use of free choice. however. G r a n t i n g one's innate right to f r e e d o m o f action. his use o f coercion to prevent others f r o m using it. or that something corresponds to it. it cannot be shown that we are entitled to use this concept. In o r d e r to use something one must possess it in some sense. and Kant is far more concerned with how someone can rightly be coerced to refrain f r o m d o i n g what would not interfere with anyone's innate right to f r e e d o m o f action. simply could not be put to any use would be to say that one's use o f it would be w r o n g even if it were consistent with the universal principle of . by b r i n g i n g it into relation with space and time. is not to show that we are justified in using it. T o say that an object o f choice. T h e only way to justify o u r use of this concept is to show that it is presupposed by a moral imperative. H e n c e he relegates this one nonacquired right to the " p r o l e g o m e n a " to the Doctrine of Right and devotes "Private Right" to the problem o f how s o m e o n e can acquire a right to an "external" object o f his choice. All other rights must be acquired by acts o f choice. someone w h o is willing to submit to an external lawgiving while others are not is entitled to use coercion to prevent their encroaching u p o n what he possesses provisionally and to make them enter along with him into the civil condition. B u t only in the civil condition can someone's act of choice to exclude others f r o m using an object he does not possess physically be consistent with the universal principle o f Right. If he asserts a right to it. and this is self-contradictory. gives no assurance of being effectively constrained by the f o r m a l principle o f the will. But public laws are positive laws. H e n c e practical reason's postulate with regard to rights leads to "the postulate of public Right" — the c o m m a n d to enter civil society — and so yields the "natural law" establishing the authority o f a legislator to give public laws. anything he can use in acting for the ends he has adopted. or to have a right to. S o m e o n e w h o can put an object to some use apart f r o m his physical connection with it. that is. and this obligation is supposed to arise f r o m his act o f choice to make the object his own. or that I will use coercion only in accordance with such a law. the content o f which is contingent and chosen by a legislator w h o is the author o f the law (227). w h e t h e r this be a thing. But obligation is constraint in accordance with a law binding u p o n everyone and cannot arise f r o m a "particular capacity f o r choice" which. B u t this is possible only if my choice and that of every other w h o could be a f f e c t e d by its exercise is " i n c l u d e d " in a "general will" giving laws f o r such an exercise o f choice. T o act in such a way. In the . Since one's f r e e d o m o f choice cannot be limited by objects o f choice as such but only by the will's f o r m a l principle f o r its exercise a f f e c t i n g others' external f r e e d o m . however. he asserts not merely that he intends to use force but that he is authorized to use coercion. cannot be simply f o r b i d d e n to d o so. If I am to have something external as my o w n I must assure others that I too am bound by a law to refrain f r o m encroaching u p o n what is theirs. the postulate in question is f o r m u l a t e d as the imperative to act toward others in such a way that whatever is usable can belong to someone or other. that others are u n d e r obligation to refrain f r o m using it without his consent. within the civil condition. f o r example. another's capacity f o r choice. W h a t makes the civil condition necessary is the act o f b r i n g i n g an external object u n d e r one's control or making it one's own. or another person. grow crops on a field without b e i n g constantly present on it. In a state o f nature. is possible only within the civil condition. B u t in taking control o f the field he proposes to exclude others by force f r o m d o i n g what they could otherwise rightly do. being a f f e c t e d by natural desires. physical possession can bring with it the presumption of a right.i o Translator's Introduction Right. H e n c e it must be possible f o r someone to be in intelligible possession of. that is. H a v i n g considered what is involved in having an external object of choice as one's own. e m b o d i e d in a legislator. both parties to a contract agree to being coerced should they fail to p e r f o r m what they promised. that is. Kant has indicated." A c q u i r i n g a thing by a contract presupposes that the thing already belongs to someone. B u t in o r d e r to have an external object as one's own it is necessary to acquire an empirical object by means o f actions in space and time. T h e problem with regard to contracts has to d o . Because the way in which someone may use these objects differs in each case. moreover." as distinguished f r o m the very high level metaphysical first principles that can be k n o w n a priori. a body o f contract law as distinguished f r o m the metaphysical first principle pacta sunt servanda. unlike a contractual right. since a n y o n e to w h o m the parties might appeal could in turn decide the issue only according to his own concepts (312). three kinds o f objects that can be put to use: things. another's capacity f o r choice. No matter how well-disposed and lawabiding they m i g h t be. In that case what would be n e e d e d is essentially an executive power. So too. in his discussion o f "how to acquire something external" Kant stresses acquiring things "originally. and other persons themselves. W h a t is n e e d e d is a j u d g e w h o can e f f e c tively decide disputes by reference to.i o Translator's Introduction above account o f how one can have or possess something external as one's own it might seem that what someone has — the external object of his choice — is quite clear and that the civil condition is necessary only to guarantee his possession. a right to a thing is a right against everyone. So too there are three ways in which someone can acquire a right to empirical objects by actions p e r f o r m e d in space and time. T o establish the n e e d for civil society one need not assume that h u m a n beings are p r o n e to violence. and w h e n a dispute arose there would be n o one to decide it effectively. in a state of nature each would be entitled to proceed according to his concepts o f rights. his discussion of how someone's act o f choice could put all others u n d e r a contingent obligation suggested that having a right to a thing is what makes a general will. Kant discusses how someone can acquire these three kinds o f rights. which lies at the basis of contractual rights. there are three kinds of rights that can be acquired. In his discussion o f "how to have something external as one's o w n " Kant's l a n g u a g e indicated that he was thinking primarily o f rights to things. property rights. 1 2 In fact. f o r example. constitutive of civil society ( 2 5 5 . T h e r e are. In this context Kant's emphasis is on the need f o r a judiciary to apply "laws. which is a right against a particular person or persons. For.6 ) . f o r unless such objects could be acquired in this way there would be nothing to which reason's concept o f intelligible possession is applicable. Disputes about what someone has acquired have been settled in accordance with public laws. and f r o m acquiring it. A p a r t f r o m a contract. T h e problem o f original acquisition is m o r e challenging. for otherwise someone else would already have acquired it. A s far as the members of a state are concerned. T h a t someone must be able to do so follows f r o m practical reason's postulate. A s f o r the physical actions requisite to acquiring a separate piece o f land: If it can be acquired by physical actions one must be the first to take control o f it. which in their relation to one another are still in a state of nature. in their relation to one another. and such original acquisition must have taken place by unilateral acts of choice. H e n c e Kant's concludm g remark is that until "the original contract" that establishes the civil condition extends to the whole h u m a n race. It might be thought that. Such actions establish one's apparent or empirical title to a separate piece o f land. its implications are far-reaching. what belongs to each has been determined and is secured to him. Hence. which the fiction of a tacit historical contract cannot account for. possession o f a piece o f land brings with it possession o f the movables on that land. the problem o f original acquisition has been solved and this provisional acquisition has been made conclusive. if only in principle. But states. given the existence o f nations or states. their submission to an external lawgiver guarantees that disputes about rights are settled by legal proceedings. pursue what they take to be their rights by war. It would seem that what states possess is even provisionally theirs only insofar as they are willing to leave the existing state of . T h e r e must have been an original acquisition of things. as they could otherwise rightly do. But if an inference is to be m a d e f r o m physical to intelligible possession o f it — if. one must give others a sign of what one intends to do. Kant's examples indicate that he is thinking not only of individual persons but of nations and states. original acquisition is only provisional." and is solved t h r o u g h the parties' intelligible possession o f each other's declarations o f choice. everyone on it is unavoidably involved in relations of rights with everyone else. However. the physical possessor is to acquire a right to it — a general will is required to put all others u n d e r a contingent obligation by the possessor's act o f choice. A l t h o u g h Kant's p r o c e d u r e in handling the p r o b l e m can be foreseen. and since an acquired right is a relation of someone's contingent choice to the choice of others.i o Translator's Introduction with how successive actions of promising and accepting a promise could. Given the finite surface of the earth. anyone's acquisition of a tract of land prevents all others f r o m using it. constitute a "meeting o f minds. that is. Kant's concern is with how someone can originally acquire a separate piece o f land or remove it f r o m c o m m o n use (261—2). A l t h o u g h "Public Right" reads relatively well. is a p o w e r f u l means f o r b r i n g i n g all the nations o f the earth into peaceable relations (VIII.i o Translator's Introduction nature. In comparison with "Private Right. they do have duties corresponding to the rights of the authorities in a state. A g a i n . as a people already organized u n d e r laws. Kant then discusses the rights these authorities must have in o r d e r to fulfill their function. as Kant notes in his essay " T o w a r d Perpetual Peace." the spirit of commerce. to adapt its laws to the needs o f the judicial authority and to enforce the judiciary's decisions in disputes about rights. In " T h e Right o f Nations" Kant discusses what rights a state could be said to have in a condition such that there are no rights strictly speaking: w h e n it has a right to go to war and what rights it has during a war and a f t e r a war. and to p e r f o r m military service w h e n this is necessary for its preservation." W h a t laws the legislator enacts will d e p e n d u p o n contingent circumstances and cannot be specified a priori. Kant made his division of a metaphysics o f morals in terms of two kinds o f duties: those required by laws that can be given externally and those required by laws that can be given only by the internal lawgiving of p u r e practical reason. T h e transition f r o m "Private Right" to "Public Right" (305—8) is a transition to the whole of "Public Right": " T h e Right o f a State. f o r example. Yet the s u p r e m e authority in a state is said to have such duties as to give its laws in accordance with principles o f private Right and to bring the f o r m of the state into accord with the Idea o f the original contract. and the prospect of a permanent peace. which is inimical to war." T h e legislative authority needs an agent or o r g a n . T h e s e duties d o not seem to consist in actions so m u c h as in adopting maxims." " T h e Right o f Nations (or States). to pay taxes to support its institutions f o r determining and securing their rights. but they will e m b o d y the principles established in "Private Right. Legislative authority ("sovereignty") belongs to the united will o f the people: "No o n e is w r o n g e d by what he consents to. 368). and there does not correspond to them a right on the part of another to use coercion. "Cosmopolitan Right" has to do with someone's right to attempt to e n g a g e in c o m m e r c e with people in other countries. In " T h e Right o f a State" Kant first discusses the organization o f a state required by its function. A m o n g the guiding principles h e r e are the right an existing state has." "Public Right" reads smoothly. at another level it raises difficulties." and "Cosmopolitan Right. A l t h o u g h the m e m b e r s of a state have no other duties to one another than those they have by principles o f private Right (306)." It has been said that w h e n Kant is dealing with familiar subject matter he writes well. states in their relation to one another are in a state of nature . the executive authority. for example. it shows. H e r e it is a question of the agent's moral disposition. hence that their natural desires could influence their capacity f o r choice and could. must be applied to it. they cannot rightly be coerced to enter into the confederation o f states which would be the f o r m o f civil society appropriate f o r them. keeping the treaties he has made. W h a t anthropology reveals is. the system of duties based on "inner f r e e d o m " or f r e e d o m in the act of choice itself. B u t only their actions were in question. be counteracted by measures directed to their natural aversions. Perhaps these duties must be classified as duties o f virtue. 14 A f t e r introducing the concept o f free choice. that "affects" can indeed coexist with what the Groundwork called a " g o o d will." now specified as a virtuous disposition. and. 388—9) and in The Metaphysics of Morals (217) K a n t maintained that a metaphysics of morals. unlike individuals in a state o f nature. But Kant's conception o f virtue as "moral strength o f will" requires consideration. Kant took issue with those w h o would define f r e e choice as the capacity to choose for or . It is. In the Doctrine of Right it was assumed that h u m a n beings might try to infringe u p o n one another's f r e e d o m .his disposition to fulfill his duties f r o m duty — is o f crucial importance. that all is not well with the h u m a n capacity f o r free choice. however. it is not a question o f single actions but of lasting dispositions. in general. first. whereas "passions" enter more readily into kinship with vices. If so . T h e second part o f The Metaphysics of Morals is the Doctrine of Virtue. Closer investigation into human nature shows what propensities in it are particularly relevant to virtue. Kant's discussion o f such issues is not in The Doctrine of Right but rather in his essays on politics and history. while not based u p o n "anthropology" or experiential k n o w l e d g e of h u m a n beings.if only self-constraint t h r o u g h the t h o u g h t o f duty can lead heads o f state to fulfill them — the world's prospects seem very dim. p r o m o t i n g trust a m o n g states.i o Translator's Introduction but. of the virtues to be acquired and the vices to be avoided. It was not necessary to inquire into the possibility of their deviating f r o m the law except insofar as it would be relevant in court whether and to what d e g r e e a crime was committed "voluntarily. however. But just as an individual can constrain himself t h r o u g h p r u d e n tial considerations to include a m o n g his ends those which are in fact duties. Both in the Groundwork (IV. in turn. the duty o f a head o f state to strive for perpetual peace by seeking to establish such alliances." 1 3 In the Doctrine of Virtue. one in which there is no supreme coercive authority. hence f o r h u m a n beings ethics must be a doctrine of virtue. and the agent's "state o f m i n d " . so it would seem that heads of states may be motivated by self-interest to adopt ends that are in fact objectively necessary. which are incompatible with a virtuous disposition (407—8). t h o u g h i n f l u e n c e d or a f f e c t e d by natural impulses. I shall take note of specific duties only in relation to the principles discussed in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue. 47). T h e h u m a n capacity f o r free choice must. the struggle to carry it t h r o u g h continues. the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue is simplicity itself. O n one level. 22n. A l t h o u g h a virtuous disposition would rule out any vice in the strict sense — a principle of deliberately violating a duty (380." in which he discusses the teaching and the practice of virtue. A l t h o u g h the "Elements of Ethics" presents a n u m b e r of problems. c o m p a r e 385 " R e m a r k " and 390). Religion V I . In B o o k I o f Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant discussed at length "the radical evil in h u m a n nature" and located its ultimate d e g r e e in a " s u p r e m e m a x i m " of making the conformity of duty with one's inclinations the condition of one's compliance with duty (compare 384 " R e m a r k " with Religion V I . taken "once and f o r all. o n e cannot include in this rational concept itself the empirically k n o w n conditions o f its exercise.i o Translator's Introduction against the law (226).). A moral "revolution" is required — a considered and firm resolution. cannot be determined by them. where Kant contrasts duties o f virtue with duties o f Right and indicates how the f o r m e r are to be derived f r o m the formal principle o f all duties. By contrast. but that they have a propensity to pay m o r e h e e d to their inclinations than to the law (28gn). and the "Methods of Ethics. since to explain an event is to relate it to a preceding event as its cause. which treats o f the internal . must be i n d i f f e r e n t to the subject's incentive. A l t h o u g h experience shows that h u m a n beings o f t e n choose in opposition to their lawgiving reason. H e must still contend with the lesser degrees of evil that Kant calls the "frailty" and "impurity" o f h u m a n nature. In acquiring a morally g o o d disposition h u m a n beings d o not begin with a clean slate. T h e possibility of someone's choosing to act contrary to the law cannot be explained. But what e x p e r i e n c e indicates is not merely that h u m a n beings occasionally choose to deviate f r o m the law. O n e can only say that the agent himself has freely chosen to give some natural desire ascendancy over the law. ethics." in which he derives specific duties of virtue. instead. In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant does not explicitly discuss his theory o f the tendency to evil present in h u m a n beings. Even after this revolution has been made. but this theory is the b a c k g r o u n d of both its parts: the "Elements of Ethics. H e n c e the Doctrine of Right. T h e r e are two things that others cannot coerce one to do: to act f r o m some specified incentive and to set an end. be d e f i n e d as a capacity for choice which. which treats of external lawgiving. however." to make conformity with duty the condition f o r satisfying one's inclinations (477. 408) — the agent's choice remains exposed to the influence of his inclinations (409 " R e m a r k " . i o Translator's Introduction lawgiving o f p u r e practical reason, must take account o f the incentive provided by one's own will. Constraint by means o f an incentive to comply with a law is obligation. F r o m the perspective o f obligation, therefore, ethics is distinguished f r o m the Doctrine of Right. A g a i n , one can be coerced to p e r f o r m an action but not to set an end. One's duty is that which is prescribed by a law. H e n c e the duties prescribed by external laws, laws that can be given by another, can consist only in actions. O n l y internal or ethical lawgiving can prescribe as duties the adoption o f ends. From the perspective o f duty, ethics is again distinguished f r o m the Doctrine of Right. I f obligation can be called "what is f o r m a l " and duty "what is material" in any lawgiving, ethics is a separate division of moral philosophy with regard to both the f o r m and the matter o f the moral determination o f choice. T h i s accords well e n o u g h with Kant's division of a metaphysics of morals. T h e Doctrine of Right brings outer f r e e d o m u n d e r laws: People's compliance with the system of laws comprising Right brings the external use o f their free choice into accord with that of every other. T h e Doctrine of Virtue brings inner f r e e d o m u n d e r laws: C o m p l i a n c e with the system o f laws comprising it brings one's capacity f o r free choice into accord with one's will. One's inner f r e e d o m is in direct proportion to the responsiveness o f one's choice to moral constraint and in inverse proportion to its responsiveness to constraint by natural means ( 3 8 2 ^ . O n l y a virtuous disposition can lead one to adopt ends on the basis o f their being duties and, in turn, fulfillment o f duties o f virtue strengthens one's virtuous disposition. A s might be expected, however, Kant's discussion becomes considerably m o r e complex. B e g i n n i n g with the cardinal concept o f "virtue," I shall try to deal briefly with a few o f these complexities. "Ethics considered in terms of its formal principle is [for h u m a n beings] the science of how one is u n d e r obligation even without regard for possible external lawgiving" (410). It is, accordingly, a doctrine of virtue, virtue being conceived as strength o f will. But, Kant points out, "strength of will" is not an adequate account of "virtue." In the case of a finite holy being, one whose capacity for choice would not be influenced by inclinations contrary to the law, the will w o u l d be "strong" in the sense that it would simply present the law and thereby determine choice. V i r t u e is rather the strength o f a h u m a n will in o v e r c o m i n g the obstacles (vices) that we ourselves put in the way of our moral maxims (394> 4°5)- Because o f o u r propensity to determine o u r choice on the basis of o u r inclinations, it is appropriate to speak o f the h u m a n will as having to acquire strength in determining choice, in o r d e r to restore the capacity f o r choice to the f r e e d o m involved in its concept. We may even speak o f virtue as an acquired aptitude or facility if we specify i o Translator's Introduction that it is not a habit, a facility in p e r f o r m i n g actions that c o n f o r m with duty, but instead a facility of the will in determining the capacity f o r choice to such actions (383—4; 407; 409). From the perspective of obligation, there is only one virtue: the strength of one's moral incentive (395)But f r o m the perspective of what human beings must do in order to acquire a virtuous disposition, there are a number of virtues, which can be specified by considering the ends or objects of choice that reason prescribes and the various tendencies toward vice that experience shows to be present in human beings. Not surprisingly, Kant points out that we ourselves create the obstacles to a moral disposition through our tendency to adopt our ends exclusively on the basis of our natural inclinations. In order to counteract this tendency we must subordinate our subjective ends, the sum of which we call our happiness, to objective ends, ends prescribed by lawgiving reason independently of our inclinations. Such ends will be ends that are "also" or "at the same time" (zugleich, that is, "by their very concept" [383]) duties, and will be called "duties of virtue." Within ethics, considered in terms of its distinctive concept of being under obligation, there is no conceptual impossibility involved in the concept o f an end that is also a duty. Within the Doctrine of Right duties can consist only in actions, since it is conceptually impossible that someone should be constrained by natural means to set an end for himself; this would be "a contradiction, an act of freedom which is nevertheless not free" (381). Someone who has adopted an end on the basis of his inclinations, as included in his happiness, can be constrained by natural means to p e r f o r m or refrain f r o m actions. This is not only conceptually but morally possible; he can be so constrained consistently with his external freedom. But only the agent can constrain himself to adopt an end. If he does so by natural means — if, for example, he constrains himself to make another's happiness his end f r o m prudential considerations — this self-constraint is not moral constraint or obligation. T h e only sort of moral constraint that can be exercised upon him to adopt an end is self-constraint by his lawgiving reason (383). Hence one's own will could prescribe as duties the setting of ends for oneself. But it is one thing to show that a concept contains no contradiction and another to show that it has objective reality, that there are in fact ends which it is one's duty to set for oneself. Kant justifies our use of the concept of an end that is also a duty by arguing that it is presupposed by an imperative — in this case, simply by a categorical imperative. By categorical imperatives actions are unconditionally necessary rather than necessary as means to some end. But to adopt a maxim is to determine oneself to action by setting i o Translator's Introduction an end f o r oneself. I f all ends held only as means to f u r t h e r ends, o r were necessary only o n the condition that an agent already had some end independently o f his lawgiving reason, then no action would be unconditionally necessary and a categorical imperative would be impossible. I f there were no ends that are also duties, there would be n o duties at all (407). H e n c e there must be ends that are simply necessary, or ends the concept o f which involves the concept o f duty ( 3 8 4 - 5 ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t is all too brief, but it can perhaps be fleshed out by what has been previously said about a capacity f o r f r e e choice, as a capacity to determine oneself to action by setting an e n d f o r oneself. If the rational necessity of actions must always presuppose some e n d antecedently given, that end would ultimately have to be given to us in accordance with psychological laws of nature. We would have to be determined to action t h r o u g h some end (included in the "natural e n d " of o u r conception o f happiness) that we have not set f o r ourselves by an act of f r e e choice, and p u r e reason could not be practical. A m o n g o u r ends there must, then, be some that are also duties. H e n c e Kant formulates the " s u p r e m e principle" o f the Doctrine of Virtue as "act in accordance with a m a x i m of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have," and his brief formal " d e d u c t i o n " or justification of this principle presents p u r e practical reason as a "capacity f o r ends," which could not determine maxims f o r actions if it were indifferent to ends (395). 1 5 T h e question may be raised: I f there were no ends that are also duties, n o objective ends, w o u l d there not at least be duties o f Right? O n one level, it may be said that only by being aware o f constraint upon o u r capacity f o r choice by o u r own will do we know (for purposes o f action) that we are not d e t e r m i n e d by psychological laws o f nature. A l t h o u g h we might entertain a negative concept o f f r e e d o m , 1 6 we could not know w h e t h e r o u r choice had such a property and so whether there are any duties at all. O n another level, however, Kant's distinction between "what is f o r m a l " and "what is material" in the Doctrine of Virtue raises a n u m b e r o f problems r e g a r d i n g the relation o f obligation and duty. Section X V I I both summarizes the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue and prepares the way f o r Kant's problematic division o f duties o f virtue. It t h e r e f o r e requires some attention. O n its formal side, in terms o f obligation, Kant concludes f r o m the impossibility of external lawgiving f o r duties o f virtue that, as he maintained in V I , "Ethics does not give laws f o r actions ( Ius does that) but only f o r maxims o f actions." T h e only actions prescribed o r forbidden by moral laws are those that are right o r w r o n g in accordance with external laws. Laws that can be given only by one's o w n will prescribe not actions but only maxims o f a d o p t i n g objective ends. A n d i o Translator's Introduction f r o m this it follows in turn that ethical duties "must be thought as wide" or broad duties that are, as he maintained in V I I , duties o f "wide obligation," whereas duties o f Right must be t h o u g h t as narrow or strict duties that are duties o f "narrow obligation." For if a law prescribes as duty only the adoption of an end, this is "a sign" that it leaves a latitude f o r f r e e choice with r e g a r d to "what and how m u c h " is to be d o n e toward that end. Second, on its material side ethics is not merely a doctrine o f duties in general, connecting with every duty the incentive o f duty, but has its own duties: It is also a doctrine o f ends. Finally, as f o r the distinction between obligation and duty, K a n t adds that not every ethical obligation or obligation o f virtue is a duty o f virtue, since respect for law in general "does not yet" establish an e n d as a duty. A n u m b e r o f such qualified comments r e g a r d i n g this distinction appeared earlier. T h e r e are "ethical duties" that are not o n that account duties of virtue because they have to d o "not so m u c h " with a certain end as merely with one's incentive (383). W h a t it is virtuous to d o is not on that account "a duty of virtue strictly speaking," since the f o r m e r can have to d o merely with that which is formal in maxims (394). A duty is that which is prescribed by a law; obligation is constraint to comply with a law. Kant wishes to maintain a sharp distinction between duties of Right "taken u p " as duties into ethical lawgiving (219— 20) and duties o f virtue (and, m o r e generally, between duties and the ethical obligation connected with both). Yet, given his definition o f an "end," there seems to be a problem involved. T o approach the subject f r o m a slightly d i f f e r e n t perspective, Kant noted that in the Doctrine of Right it is not expected, still less required, that I make the universal law o f Right, "the principle o f all maxims, itself my maxim; this is a d e m a n d that ethics makes o f m e " (231). In the Doctrine of Right it is not required that I adopt any maxim, but only that whatever maxims I have issue in right actions; in the Doctrine of Virtue, however, I am required to adopt as my m a x i m "the m a x i m o f such actions, as duties, that is, respect for Right," and this is meritorious since one thereby "makes the Right o f humanity, or also o f m e n , one's end" and goes beyond what can be required by right (390—1; see also 394). 1 7 If, as the above quotation suggests, "the Right o f humanity" is to be taken in terms o f the innate right o f others to f r e e d o m o f action and "the Right o f m e n " in terms o f their acquired rights, 1 8 the problem may be rephrased as follows. In accordance with ethical obligation, one is to m a k e the universal law of Right one's maxim. T h i s is a c o m m a n d to d o something, 1 9 to adopt a m a x i m or principle o f acting f r o m duty, and K a n t refers to it as "a duty." B u t to adopt a m a x i m is to set an end f o r oneself, and an e n d is an object that one intends to p r o d u c e by one's action. T h e question arises as to what e n d one is to i o Translator's Introduction adopt in m a k i n g respect for Right or, m o r e generally, f o r law, one's incentive, and why respect f o r law does "not yet" establish a duty o f virtue "strictly speaking." Perhaps some light can be thrown on the distinction between "what is f o r m a l " and "what is material" in the moral determination o f choice by Kant's distinction between "the one virtuous disposition" and the n u m b e r o f virtues to which it leads, together with his discussion of one o f the ends which, he maintains, it is a duty to have. A m o n g the latter, "the highest, unconditional e n d " (396) is one's moral perfection, which, in terms of the subject's incentive, consists in the purity of his disposition and, in terms o f what is required by the law, in fulfilling all his duties (446). T h i s e n d prescribed by reason does not of itself specify what o u r duties o f virtue are: T h e s e will be derived in broad outline by considering maxims one would a d o p t on the basis of one's inclinations and then, in greater detail, by considering the more specific obstacles we tend to put in the way o f o u r moral maxims. Since there are "various moral objects to which the will is led by the one principle o f virtue" (406) — that is, various ends it prescribes as duties — there will be a n u m b e r of virtues. T h e law prescribing a m a x i m of striving for purity in one's incentive does not prescribe an " e n d " on the same plane with other ends that are also duties, one's natural perfection and the happiness o f others. Yet, given that a virtuous disposition is something to be acquired, it fulfills the definition o f an end. " W h a t is formal" in virtue seems to have b e c o m e the e n d or "matter" in every act o f free choice, whether it be fulfilling a contract or promoting another's happiness. It is then less surprising that Kant speaks o f ethics as providing "a material d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d " o f choice (Ak. 381), f o r this material basis f o r d e t e r m i n i n g choice is just the thought that the action or the end prescribed is a duty. In the Doctrine of Right Kant derived empirical content f o r the formal principle of Right by considering objects of choice and determining, to the extent possible in "metaphysical first principles," what rights h u m a n beings have or can acquire. In the Doctrine of Virtue he derives empirical content for its formal principle by considering what ends can hold f o r everyone or what virtues are required of a h u m a n being, again to the extent possible in "metaphysical first principles." I f an end is f o u n d to have the required f o r m , then the will, which is "a capacity for desire that, in adopting a rule, also gives it as a universal law" (407), contains a law prescribing the adoption o f that end. With regard to ends as the "matter o f choice" properly speaking, Kant's p r o c e d u r e is to begin with ends that we would a d o p t merely on the basis o f inclination and submit o u r maxims o f p u r s u i n g such ends to the test of whether they could qualify f o r a giving o f universal law. i o Translator's Introduction W h e n they fail the test, the will gives a law prescribing the adoption o f an end. In this way, Kant argues that the happiness o f others (393) and one's own natural perfection (391—2) are ends that it is one's duty to adopt. A s f o r the first, his cryptic a r g u m e n t turns o n two points: that every h u m a n being, as a being with needs and hence with inclinations, makes his own happiness his e n d and that, in so d o i n g , he makes himself an e n d f o r others. Strictly speaking, someone cannot m a k e himself an e n d f o r others; only they can make his happiness their end. B u t he wants others to have a m a x i m o f benevolence toward him that, in case he needs their help to attain some e n d essential to his happiness, will lead to beneficence, and he cannot know w h o the others might be. Insofar as he makes his own happiness his e n d he cannot r e n o u n c e the means to it, since he would then be merely wishing rather than a d o p t i n g a maxim (according to 213). H e n c e he wants others to be b o u n d to benevolence toward him independently of their natural feelings. But since obligation is constraint in accordance with a law binding u p o n everyone, he can consistently will his m a x i m o f m a k i n g his own happiness his e n d — his maxim o f benevolence toward himself — only by including his happiness in the happiness o f h u m a n beings generally. Hence, Kant concludes, I am permitted to d o what I unavoidably and gladly do, namely make my own happiness my end, only by d o i n g what I may be reluctant to do, namely a d o p t i n g as my e n d the happiness o f h u m a n beings in general. So too, the a r g u m e n t that my o w n natural perfection is an end which is also a duty begins with a m a x i m that I would adopt on the basis o f my inclinations. It is m o r e comfortable not to exert oneself to develop one's natural capacities; it is at least arguable that we w o u l d all be better o f f in terms o f happiness if we were to be content with what nature gave us (445). C a n I t h e r e f o r e will as a universal law that h u m a n beings in general (and myself in particular) not make it their e n d to develop their natural capacities? I cannot d o so. For what distinguishes h u m a n agents f r o m other animals is their capacity f o r f r e e choice, f o r a d o p t i n g maxims, and to adopt a m a x i m is to determine oneself to action to e f f e c t an end. T h u s the adoption o f a m a x i m to exclude f r o m one's ends that o f having the capacity to e f f e c t and hence to set ends would be incompatible with one's " humanity" or capacity f o r rational agency. A s f o r one's moral perfection, Kant does not a r g u e that this is an end that is also a duty but only states what is involved in the moral perfection o f a h u m a n being. Since a virtuous disposition is acquired by practicing the virtues, he reserves for " T h e Elements of Ethics" his discussion o f what obstacles or tendencies to vice must be combated and what virtues o p p o s e d to t h e m must be cultivated. T h e f o r m e r is the virtue of benevolence.tendencies to take delight in diminishing others' well-being which. H e n c e they fulfill his description o f "wide" or " b r o a d " duties. a benevolent person. however. T h e r e is. benevolence. Kant thinks that experience shows the presence in h u m a n nature o f tendencies toward ingratitude and malice . but it would seem that the practice of a virtue also precludes such actions as would manifest the opposite vice. If a duty o f virtue consists in the adoption of a certain end. Kant's discussion o f these duties o f virtue as "imperfect duties" makes it clear that what the will prescribes as laws is only the adoption of maxims. . includes not only the various dispositions to be cultivated but also those to be g u a r d e d against. His scattered remarks suggest a possibility that he does not explicitly discuss. Perhaps he cannot help feeling jealous o f others' good f o r t u n e w h e n he c o m p a r e s their state o f well-being with his own. T h i s does not suggest that ethical laws directly prescribe or forbid specific actions. Yet a m a x i m o f f u r thering others' happiness of course precludes a m a x i m of destroying it.i o Translator's Introduction From the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue w e k n o w o f two maxims a virtuous person will adopt: that o f being h e l p f u l to others and that o f being worthy of the humanity in his o w n person. not definite actions ( 3 9 1 . one's own perfection and the happiness o f others. and the duty of respect is expressed only negatively or indirectly. one duty o f virtue to others. but he will not "brood u p o n " his displeasure and "get it rooted deeply" (408). instead. he will take measures to counteract it. and at one point Kant includes this duty u n d e r "the happiness o f others" on the g r o u n d that one might lead them to incur pangs o f conscience (394). hence the practice of a certain virtue. he does not attempt to include duties of respect u n d e r either of the two very broad virtues o f benevolence and love o f honor. they prescribe that one strive to be a certain kind o f person. T h e duty not to give scandal is akin to respect in that it involves a. H e n c e his more detailed account ( 4 4 8 . duties o f respect have their basis simply in the status o f others as moral agents rather than as beings having natural needs and wants (462). But there are certain kinds o f things a benevolent person does not do. for example. rightful claim on the part o f others as moral beings (464). by forbidding its opposite (464. 467). however.6 1 ) o f what might be called the p a r a d i g m of a duty o f virtue. would be specific f o r m s o f the vice of hatred o f others. O n the whole. the latter might be called "love o f honor" — although the word Ehrliebe is used f o r a special class o f duties to oneself (420). respect.4 ) . that does not fit neatly into Kant's broad classification o f ends that are also duties. if a d o p t e d as principles. there will be a "latitude" involved in fulfilling it. Unlike duties o f love. like matters o f equity. T h e maxims p r e c l u d e d — arrogance. H e did not subsequently discuss such matters as equity.i o Translator's Introduction Duties o f respect." Perhaps duties of respect. the cultivation of one's natural and moral perfection precludes such actions as would manifest the vices o p p o s e d to these virtues. t h o u g h " n a r r o w " in comparison with duties o f love. Yet. T h e s e are "perfect duties to oneself. would be included u n d e r "Right" in a b r o a d e r sense. to violate such duties is analogous to encroaching u p o n what belongs to them ( 4 4 9 . 2 0 No virtue o f "justice" was explicitly discussed in the Doctrine of Virtue. In the case o f perfect duties to oneself considered as a moral being only. they are duties o f virtue. A t one time Kant t h o u g h t o f treating them as "the Right o f humanity in one's own person" (see note 18 above). as well as o f the "casuistical questions" that follow his discussion o f each duty. B u t the duty o f respect is also " f r e e " in the sense that manifestations o f disrespect are not matters o f strict Right. W h e n K a n t speaks o f the duty o f " f r e e " respect he is apparently distinguishing the m a x i m o f respect f r o m feelings o f respect (449). and . a n d ethics. but his division o f duties to oneself specifies that these "duties of omission. and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g virtue o f justice would go bey o n d "strict Right. and ridicule — are particular manifestations o f a disposition o f contempt f o r others. he notes. avarice. with the latitude allowed by its laws (233)." Perfect duties to oneself are limiting and negative. such as could be taken to court.5 0 . W h a t is prohibited are the vices o f lying. Kant's treatment of these duties. In eliminating f r o m the Doctrine of Right what he called "equivocal rights. suggests that. are analogous to duties o f Right in that they have to d o with what is o w e d or d u e to others. r e g a r d e d first as a moral being having an animal nature and then as a moral being only. 4 6 2 ." A n o t h e r class o f duties is m o r e problematic in that such duties might seem to be prescribed by "laws f o r actions" rather than merely f o r maxims o f actions. presumably because it was handled as "respect f o r Right. makes it clear that what is at issue h e r e is the accord o f one's maxims with the inner f r e e d o m that characterizes a moral agent." to which Kant devotes half of the "Elements o f Ethics. the opposite virtue is a disposition to restrict one's d e m a n d u p o n their esteem by the t h o u g h t o f their dignity as moral agents. h e r e again.3 ) ." like the positive and "broadening" duties of perfecting oneself. in which it belongs in the intermundia or spaces between the spheres o f strict Right. backbiting. with its precisely determined duties. and have to do with preserving (as distinguished f r o m perfecting) oneself. "belong to virtue as duties of virtue" (419). Kant's treatment o f such duties. as well as his preliminary characterization o f them (420)." Kant noted that we also use "right" in a broader sense (ins latius). W h a t is prohibited is not an action. B u t that one should be in control o f one's desire f o r wealth rather than controlled by it does not specify w h e t h e r one should spend or save in any given situation. 42n). T h e assumption is questionable. he adds that they may be used only as medicines (428). are such clear manifestations o f this vice that they are excluded by the virtue o f "love o f honor.Translator's Introduction 27 servility. It would be contrary to one's moral disposition. H e does not give his answer to this question. In the case o f servility Kant apparently thinks that certain kinds of actions. what is f o r b i d d e n is m u r d e r i n g oneself. f o r the sake o f pleasure or avoiding pain. such as killing oneself or drinking to the extent that one is incapacitated f o r acting rationally. It is clear that what the law prohibits is not particular actions but vices." A s f o r lying. and one of his casuistical questions poses just such a conflict between preserving one's life and not h a r m i n g others (423—4). f o r example. he thinks. Having noted that such narcotics as opium are worse than alcohol. "441—2. It is not the act of killing oneself that is f o r b i d d e n . each o f which. a m a x i m o f avarice. f o r example. prostrating oneself in the presence of "sacred objects" or "bowing and scraping" b e f o r e another h u m a n being. T h a t it would be permissible to stultify oneself should this be necessary f o r preserving one's health indicates that Kant is dealing not with a law f o r actions but with the law prescribing the adoption of an end. but the duty o f not lying is derived f r o m that o f making one's moral perfection one's end. Kant maintains that there can be a conflict of g r o u n d s o f obligation (224). Kant's discussion o f duties of omission to oneself as a moral being having an animal nature indicates that what is prohibited is the vice of disposing of one's physical being as if it were not the body of a moral being. the "principle o f i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m everything except the law. is a principle of deliberately "throwing away" one's inner f r e e d o m by subordinating one's choice to ends adopted on the basis o f one's inclinations alone. but a maxim o f destroying oneself totally or partially. departing f r o m life as one pleases. one's natural perfection and so indirectly one's moral perfection. hence the question o f w h e t h e r in such a case one might be authorized to take one's own life. since one would then be dominated by a passion f o r accumulating riches. they d o not prescribe precisely what is to ." to have. he may well be assuming that any lie told to another has its ultimate basis in the self-deception that would m a k e a virtuous disposition impossible (431 "Remark. but in the case of drunkenness he makes it clear that what is f o r b i d d e n is a maxim o f incapacitating oneself f o r the sake of the pleasure it involves. 38. So too. "as if n o authorization were n e e d e d f o r this action" of withdrawing f r o m all obligation (422). s ee Religion V I . permanently or temporarily. Laws prescribing duties of virtue require only that one have maxims o f p r o m o t i n g certain ends. it is excluded by the duty to acquire and strengthen that virtue. " f r e e d o m f r o m the i n f l u e n c e o f his inclinations to determine his capacity f o r choice by his will. unlike the doctrine of Right." B u t what he has p r o d u c e d seems to m e highly relevant to contemporary discussions of rights. j u d g m e n t has to decide which o f two conflicting g r o u n d s o f obligation is stronger. in which the agent must decide what the law requires o f him in a given case (411). In his Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason K a n t called the concept o f f r e e d o m . In still other cases. it seems to m e a remarkable system.i o Translator's Introduction be d o n e toward that end. I think. falls into a casuistry. but leave this to the agent's j u d g m e n t . T h e latter is an account o f duties of "inner f r e e d o m . in terms o f a h u m a n being's capacity f o r f r e e choice. which he had b e g u n to e x p l o r e in the Groundwork. T h e precise nature o f "wide" duties is one o f the many problems posed by The Metaphysics of Morals in both its parts. If an action must be j u d g e d incompatible with some virtue. A l t h o u g h The Metaphysics of Morals raises a g o o d many problems. A s far as the system o f duties promised in the Groundwork is concerned. H e n c e ethics. the keystone o f the whole structure o f a system o f p u r e reason. would maintain that Kant has p r o d u c e d a definitive "metaphysics o f morals. 3). My h o p e is that this translation of the complete work will stimulate discussion of such issues. No one. even o f speculative reason (V. there is a "latitude f o r f r e e choice" in which one's inclinations may be consulted. " f r e e d o m f r o m compulsion by others to act in pursuit o f whatever ends he has set. It also shows what a nonprudential account o f the virtues might be. The Metaphysics of Morals is his attempt to give an account. T h e f o r m e r is an account o f duties of "outer f r e e d o m . o f what can be required o f him both in terms o f rights and in terms o f virtues. In some cases. . T h u s . correlated with a motive (Bewegungsgrund) or objective ground of volition (427). and 2) resting on an incentive (Triebfeder) or subjective ground of desire (427). which serves as the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends (431)." which is something to be produced by one's action. 248 n. References to Kant's writings other than The Metaphysics of Morals include the volume as well as the page number of the Academy edition. simply. His conception of reason as the source of Ideas of the unconditioned is clearly relevant to his discussion of freedom. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press." 5 It is also essential to Kant's account of moral evil. In The Metaphysics of Morals. "what everyone knows about morality. "common sense" should not be taken as a technical term." see Lewis White Beck. an 'incentive" may be either "subjective" or "objective. Kant: Selections (New York & London: Macmillan. A n "objective end. Paton." Traditionally. 1767 (X. 1947). J . refers to The Metaphysics of Morals' distinction between Willkür and Wille. if no volume is indicated. 71). which makes a "doctrine of morals" for human beings a "doctrine of virtue. See The Categorical Imperative (London: Hutchinson's University Library." and an "end." As Beck points out. in his classical commentary on the Groundwork. One of Kant's ways of moving from concepts of the understanding to Ideas of reason in his technical sense of "reason" is the traditionally recognized division of syllogisms. PP-5-!32 Or. is an independently existing end (428. 3 Or "consistency." not merely an autonomy but also an autocracy of practical reason (383). O n the history of Kant's long delayed project of a "metaphysics of morals. 426—31). 213. Kant seems to characterize a "subjective end" as an end 1) to be produced by one's actions. i960). 1988). p. asks "Is only the good will free?" and. H . 4 It should be noted that Kant's use of "objective end" and "incentive" in The Metaphysics of Morals differs from the Groundwork. may be "objective." by contrast. in reply to the question. p. 437). In the Groundwork (IV. reason's function is to make inferences and its principle is that of noncontradiction. .Notes to Translator's Introduction 1 See Kant's letter to Herder of May 9. the reference is to volume V I . our consciousness of obligation is the ratio cognoscendi of our freedom. Kant notes that it makes a difference whether a deed was done in a state of agitation or with cool deliberation (228). . An external lawgiver needs only the negative concept of freedom. put forward in his Introduction pp. would be relevant to what Montesquieu called "the spirit of the laws.i o Translator's Introduction 6 On this distinction. see Beck's Commentary. it is worth noting that. being that of the compatibility of one person's external use of his freedom with that of every other. 8 Compare his assertion that the Metaphysics of Morals would be "capable of a high degree of popularity" (IV. Kant's Introduction to his lectures on Physical Geography is illuminating. 10 In view of his relation to other Natural Right theorists. 215—29. that is. 7 In Kant's terms. xxvii—xxx. that is. that Kant's instructions regarding the preparation of his manuscript for publication were misunderstood. Such factors as terrain and climate contribute to forming what Kant sometimes calls the "character" of a people and so. 392) with Schiller's letter to Eberhard of October 26. Political geography. But our freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law (Critique of Practical Reason V. he makes it clear that what he says is applicable to a divine external legislator as well (219). although Kant is thinking primarily in terms of an external human legislator." 13 Discussing the concept of "imputation" in general. can be adopted into ethics. it may be supposed. 164). he suggests. pp. since the first principle of a civil society requires submission to a supreme coercive authority whose laws will be relative to the features of the country and its inhabitants (IX. 4 n). ownership of land (265—6 and 323—4). Hamburg: Meiner. whose actions are "voluntary" in the sense of not determined by natural impulses and who can therefore be constrained to resist such impulses. hence the comment Kant adds to the definition of "moral personality. and his expectation of the ease with which the supreme principle of morals could be applied (IV. p. as well as his "Kant's Two Conceptions of the Will in Their Political Context" in Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. is based on physical geography. This is taken for granted in The Metaphysics of Morals. with the result that some paragraphs were misplaced and some of his preliminary notes were included. 1986. pp. 11 Thus. 177—81. 391) with his reservation regarding Garve's requirement of "popularity" (206). 1965). where the positive concept of freedom comes into play and a person is regarded as a subject of lawgiving reason. xxi). the concept of "a person" common to both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals is simply that of a subject whose actions can be imputed to him (223). 1794 (cited in Bernd Ludwig's Introduction to his Philosophische Bibliothek edition of the Rechtslehre. 9 Ludwig's edition of the Rechtslehre referred to in note 8 above is a reconstruction of the text on the hypothesis." 12 "Property" (Eigentum) is not to be taken in the sense of "real property" as the term is commonly used. With regard to the content of positive laws. Yet the principle on which external laws are based. 251—77). sometimes called Actus (as. combined to obviate a "court of equity." produced by consciousness of the law. See A Treatise of Human Nature. 20 In the Civil Law a number of factors. once the facts of a case had been determined. Kant insists upon it. in Religion (VI.' " (391). ethica)." Instead. as well as with his assertion that perfect duties to oneself are duties of virtue (419).g. 240). the Critique of Pure Reason calls apperception Actus in B is8n and 423n). 17 This. which is itself a maxim. for which an agent could not be held responsible. i—ii. . is also the case with "the universal ethical command: 'Act in conformity with duty from duty. the law of the land was to be so precise that. be open to Hume's objection that such "freedom. he adds." involving no causal law. 18 In his Introduction to the Doctrine of Right Kant referred to "the Right of humanity in one's own person" and proposed to treat perfect duties to oneself as "internal duties of Right" (officia iuris interna) (236—7. would be equivalent to a random occurrence. which produces duties of Right (officia iuris) and duties of virtue (officia virtutis s.. It seems strange that in discussing the basis for thinking of an end that is also a duty Kant uses Akt for a categorical imperative (385). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. the only duties that have been derived are those to which rights of others correspond. VIII. This is quite at variance with what follows from his division of a metaphysics of morals on the basis of the two kinds of lawgiving. including the theory of a strict division of the powers within a state. e. III. however. 16 Such a concept would. that reason gains ascendancy over the inclinations (399—403 and 408). (So far. however. however. a judge need only find the applicable provision.i o Translator's Introduction 14 In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant discusses the affects and the passions in considerable detail (VII. 21—3) he used Actus in referring to the basis for the adoption of maxims.) Compare the diagram of duties of virtue in XI. 15 Far from denying the role that feeling plays in virtue. It is through "moral feeling. ig What is prescribed is not an "action" (Handlung) but instead an "act" (Akt). . Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right . . the metaphysics o f morals. Accordingly. for otherwise it would be hard to distinguish what is metaphysics here f r o m what is empirical application o f rights. o f the empirical variety of such cases. already published. for in the application of these principles to cases the system itself cannot be expected. I cannot better anticipate or forestall this charge than by readily complying with a duty that Garve. (This is the counterpart o f the metaphysical first principles o f natural science. lays d o w n f o r all writers. a metaphysical system o f Right would also have to take account. the first part o f the doctrine of morals. B u t what is empirical cannot be divided completely. and if this is attempted (at least to approximate to it). a philosopher in the true sense o f the w o r d .) 2 T h e Introduction that follows presents and to some d e g r e e makes intuitive the f o r m which the system will take in both these parts. which will sometimes be extensive. which falls into metaphysical first principles o f the doctrine of Right1 and metaphysical first principles o f the doctrine of virtue. that Right which belongs to the system outlined a priori will go into the text. B u t since the concept of Right is a p u r e concept which still looks to practice (application to cases that come u p in experience). there is required a system derived f r o m reason which could be called the metaphysics of Right. in its divisions.Preface T h e critique o f practical reason was to be followed by a system. indeed deliberately unclear. [205] [206] 35 . Philosophic treatises are o f t e n charged with being obscure. while rights taken f r o m particular cases o f experience will be put into remarks. but only approximation to it. So the only appropriate title f o r the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals will be Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right. For the doctrine of Right. but especially f o r philosophic writers. empirical concepts cannot be b r o u g h t into the system as integral parts of it but can be used only as examples in remarks. in o r d e r to affect an illusion o f d e e p insight. in o r d e r to make its division complete (as is essential in constructing a system o f reason). it will be dealt with as in the (earlier) Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science: namely. f o r only by this means can precipitate reason be b r o u g h t to understand itself. considered objectively. In o r d e r to decide about this apparent presumption. the critical philosopher is no more responsible f o r that than the grammarian is f o r the folly of those w h o quibble over words (logodaedalus). Not only have there been d i f f e r e n t ways o f philosophizing and o f g o i n g back to the first principles o f reason in order to base a system. chemists. that is. that there is only one principle f o r systematically classifying diseases (Brown's). and teachers o f medicine. o n the contrary. m o r e or less successfully. conceited.36 Metaphysics of Morals My only reservation is imposed by the nature o f the science that is to be corrected and extended. 4 the teacher of medicine. T h i s wise m a n rightly requires (in his work entitled Vermischte Aufsätze. But if pedants presume to address the public (from pulpits or in popular writings) in technical terms that belong only in the schools. H e r e ridicule can touch only the man. it need but be asked whether there could really be more than one philosophy. T h i s can never become p o p u l a r — n o formal metaphysics can — although its results can be m a d e quite illuminating for the healthy reason (of an unwitting metaphysician). there can be only one h u m a n reason. I gladly admit this with the exception only o f the systematic critique o f the capacity f o r reason itself. but there had to be many experiments o f this kind. 5 A l t h o u g h the new system excludes all the others. Popularity (common language) is out o f the question here. that there is only one chemistry (Lavoisier's). the chemist. of being made sufficiently clear to the senses to be communicated to everyone) if the teacher is not to be suspected o f being m u d d l e d in his own concepts. It sounds arrogant. scholastic precision must be insisted u p o n . Yet since. in however many d i f f e r e n t and even conflicting ways men have philosophized about one and the same proposition. a single system that connects all duties o f virtue by one principle. and belittling of those w h o have not yet r e n o u n c e d their old system to assert that b e f o r e the c o m i n g o f the critical philosophy there was as yet n o philosophy at all. not the science. pages 352 ff. even if this is censured as hair-splitting (since it is the language of the schools)-. b e f o r e m a k i n g its dogmatic assertions. each of which made its contribution to present-day philosophy. there cannot be many philosophies. along with all that can be established only by means o f it. in other words. So the moralist rightly says that there is only one virtue and one doctrine of virtue. f o r this has to d o with the distinction o f the sensible in o u r k n o w l e d g e f r o m that which is supersensible but yet belongs to reason. it does not detract f r o m the merits o f earlier moralists.) 3 that every philosophic teaching be capable o f being made popular (that is. upon them. since [207] . there can be only one true system o f philosophy f r o m principles. a construction made by the intellect. * I leave it to a n y o n e to j u d g e w h e t h e r the w o r d s intellectualis quaedam constructio c o u l d h a v e yielded the t h o u g h t o f the presentation of a given concept in an a priori intuition. cum ne possint quidem sensibiles figurae ad rigorem definitionem effingi. p . quae intellectualis quaedam constructio est. quibus absolvitur formatio. I a m sure that H a u s e n h i m s e l f w o u l d not h a v e allowed his w o r d s to be i n t e r p r e t e d in this way. there w o u l d t h e n b e two d i f f e r e n t a n d t r u e philosophies o n the same subject. the critical p h i l o s o p h y calls itself a philoso p h y b e f o r e w h i c h t h e r e h a d as yet b e e n no p h i l o s o p h y at all. Mathes. w o u l d already h a v e f r i g h t e n e d h i m o f f . A r e v i e w e r in T ü b i n g e n claims to h a v e discovered that the d e f i n i t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h the a u t h o r o f the Critique of Pure Reason gives o u t as his o w n . t h e r e f o r e . since sensible figures cannot be devised in accordance with the strictness of a definition. knowledge of what goes to make up the figure. w h i c h is selfcontradictory. rather.]6 . C . f o r the possibility o f an a priori intuition. A s f a r as the spirit o f the critical p h i l o s o p h y is c o n c e r n e d .The Doctrine of Right 37 w i t h o u t their discoveries a n d e v e n their u n s u c c e s s f u l attempts w e s h o u l d n o t h a v e attained that unity o f the true principle w h i c h u n i f i e s the w h o l e o f p h i l o s o p h y into o n e system. not inconsiderable. discovery h a d b e e n p u t f o r t h m a n y years earlier by s o m e o n e else in almost the same w o r d s . Pars I . F o r if he w e r e willing to a d m i t that there h a d b e e n a n o t h e r (and a true) one. H a u s e n . as can also b e p e r c e i v e d in equalities c o n s t r u c t e d in g e o m e t r y . the leastl m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n is the mischief that certain imitators o f it h a v e *Porro de actuali constructione hie non quaeritur. T o this acute m a t h e m a t i c i a n the presentation made as it were by means of the understanding m e a n t n o t h i n g m o r e than an (empirical) drawing o f a line c o r r e s p o n d i n g to a c o n c e p t . If. w h i c h at o n c e completely distinguishes p h i l o s o p h y f r o m mathematics. [208] [Moreover. a n d i n d e e d m u s t b e d o n e by a n y o n e w h o d r a w s u p a p h i l o s o p h y o n his o w n plan. sed requiritur cognitio eorum. T h e c h a r g e that o n e t h i n g w h i c h essentially distinguishes the critical p h i l o s o p h y is not original to it b u t was p e r h a p s b o r r o w e d f r o m a n o t h e r p h i l o s o p h y (or f r o m mathematics) w o u l d b e less i m p o r t a n t but not a l t o g e t h e r negligible. a n d that space is an a priori intuition a n d not (as W o l f f explains it) a j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f a variety o f items outside o n e a n o t h e r given m e r e l y to e m p i r i c a l intuition (perception). and this is. Elem. since he w o u l d h a v e felt that this was g e t t i n g h i m e n t a n g l e d in f a r .r e a c h i n g philosophic investigations. it d o e s no m o r e than has b e e n d o n e . as it were. So a n y o n e w h o a n n o u n c e s a system o f p h i l o s o p h y as his o w n w o r k says in e f f e c t that b e f o r e this p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e was n o n e at all. A . in which attention is paid only to the r u l e a n d abstraction is m a d e f r o m u n a v o i d a b l e deviations in c a r r y i n g it out. will b e d o n e . 8 6 A ( i 7 3 4 ) . what is required is. what is in question here is not an actual construction. partly because it seems to m e that they can be easily i n f e r r e d f r o m the earlier ones and partly. T o w a r d the e n d of the book I have worked less thoroughly over certain sections than might be expected in comparison with the earlier ones. a fate they cannot avoid. although in c o n d e m n i n g it Nicolai 7 reserves j u d g m e n t as to whether such terms can be entirely dispensed with in their o w n p r o p e r field. I h o p e to have the Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue ready shortly. Meanwhile it is m o r e amusing to laugh at an unpopular pedant than at an uncritical ignoramus (for. even t h o u g h he willfully ignores what he does not want to let spread since it does not b e l o n g to his older school of thought). that they can well justify postponing a decisive j u d g m e n t f o r some time. which in the Critique of Pure Reason itself cannot well be replaced by m o r e customary words. can be classed as an uncritical ignoramus. too. as Shaftesbury asserts. outside the Critique in public e x c h a n g e o f thoughts. But if it is true. then the critical philosophy's turn must finally come to laugh last and so laugh best w h e n it sees the systems of those w h o have talked big f o r such a long time collapse like houses of cards one a f t e r another and their adherents scatter. and still so important. T h i s certainly deserves to be c o n d e m n e d . a metaphysician w h o clings obstinately to his own system. as t h o u g h they were used e v e r y w h e r e merely to hide poverty of thought. heedless o f any critique. because the later sections (dealing with public Right) are currently subject to so m u c h discussion.38 Metaphysics of Morals [20g] made by using some of its terms. in fact. 8 that a doctrine's ability to withstand ridicule is not a bad touchstone o f its truth (especially in the case of a practical doctrine). 9 . The Doctrine of Right Table of the division of the Doctrine of Right Part I Private Right with Regard to External Objects (the Sum of Laws That Do Not Need to be Promulgated) Chapter I How to Have Something External As One's Own Chapter II How to Acquire Something External Division of External Acquisition Section I Property Right Section II Contract Right Section III Domestic Right Episodic Section Ideal Acquisition Chapter III Acquisition That is Dependent Subjectively on a Court of Justice Part II Public Right (The Sum of Laws that Need to be Promulgated) Section I T h e Right of a State Section II T h e Right of Nations Section III Cosmopolitan Right 39 [210] . as susceptibility to such a representation. is sense. susceptibility to w h i c h is called feeling. r e d .[an] Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals i. since there can be a p l e a s u r e that is not c o n n e c t e d with any desire f o r an object but is already c o n n e c t e d with a m e r e r e p r e s e n tation that o n e f o r m s o f an object (regardless o f w h e t h e r the object o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n exists o r not).. b u t the c o n v e r s e d o e s not always h o l d . i.g. p l e a s u r e or d i s p l e a s u r e in an object o f desire d o e s not always p r e c e d e the desire a n d n e e d not always b e r e g a r d e d as the cause o f the desire b u t can also b e r e g a r d e d as the e f f e c t o f it. What is subjective in our representations may be such that it can also be referred to an object for knowledge of it (either in terms of its form. in which case it is called pure intuition. T h e capacity o f a b e i n g to act in a c c o r d a n c e with its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s is called life. *One can characterize sensibility as the subjective aspect of our representations in general. 40 [212] . in this case sensibility. Second. W h i l e e v e n sensations. O n the Relation of the Capacities of the Human Mind to Moral Laws T h e capacity for desire is the capacity to be by m e a n s o f one's r e p r e s e n tations the cause o f the objects o f these representations. a p a r t f r o m the quality (of. First. and then susceptibility to the representation is called feeling. or in terms of its matter. for it is the understanding that first refers representations to an object. which is the effect of a representation (that may be either sensible or intellectual) upon a subject and belongs to sensibility.e. pleasure o r displeasure.. even though the representation itself may belong to the understanding or to reason. in which case it is called sensation). only it thinks something by means of them. is always c o n n e c t e d with desire or aversion. e. Or else what is subjective in our representations cannot become an element in our knowledge because it involves only a relation of the representation to the subject and nothing that can be used for knowledge of an object. T h e capacity f o r taking p l e a s u r e o r displeasure in a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is called feeling b e c a u s e b o t h o f these involve w h a t is merely subjective in the relation o f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d contain n o relation at all to an object f o r possible k n o w l e d g e o f it* (or e v e n k n o w l e d g e o f o u r o w n condition). B u t if a pleasure can only follow u p o n an antecedent determination o f the capacity f o r desire it is an intellectual pleasure. accordingly. So if a pleasure necessarily precedes a desire. and so is not at bottom a pleasure in the existence o f the object o f a representation but is attached only to the representation by itself. We call feeling o f the latter kind of pleasure taste. f o r if the interest were based on the senses and not on p u r e rational principles alone. A l t h o u g h w h e r e a merely p u r e interest o f reason must be assumed no interest o f inclination can be substituted f o r it.The Doctrine of Right 41 sweet. Concupiscence (lusting after something) must also be distinguished f r o m desire itself. and so forth) they have because of the nature o f the subject. the practical pleasure must be called an interest of inclination. Concupiscence is always a sensible modification o f the mind but one that has not yet become an act o f the capacity for desire. O n the other hand. pleasure or displeasure (in what is red or sweet) expresses nothing at all in the object but simply a relation to the subject. so as to make them recognizable in practice. T h e capacity f o r desiring in accordance with concepts. insofar as the g r o u n d determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object. that determination of the capacity f o r desire which is caused and t h e r e f o r e necessarily preceded by such pleasure is called desire in the narrow sense. yet in order to c o n f o r m to ordinary speech we can speak o f an inclination f o r what can be an object only o f an intellectual pleasure as a habitual desire f r o m a p u r e interest o f reason. and we could call it a sense-free inclination (propensio intellectualis). as a stimulus to determining desire. that pleasure which is not necessarily connected with desire f o r an object. are still r e f e r r e d to an object as elements in our k n o w l e d g e of it. 1 0 habitual desire in this narrow sense is called inclination. [213] . T h a t pleasure which is necessarily connected with desire (for an object whose representation affects feeling in this way) can be called practical pleasure. speaks o f contemplative pleasure only in passing. can be called merely contemplative pleasure or inactive delight. one can only specify what results they have in certain circumstances. w h e t h e r it is the cause or the e f f e c t o f the desire. A s f o r practical pleasure. Practical philosophy. and the interest in the object must be called an interest o f reason. but an inclination o f this sort would not be the cause but rather the e f f e c t o f this p u r e interest of reason. instead. and a connection o f pleasure with the capacity f o r desire that the u n d e r standing j u d g e s to hold as a general rule (though only f o r the subject) is called an interest. For this very reason pleasure and displeasure cannot be explained m o r e clearly in themselves. sensation would then have to have pleasure connected with it and in this way be able to determine the capacity for desire. not as if the concept belonged within it. insofar as it is determined by laws o f reason. these laws o f f r e e d o m are called moral laws. stimulus) would be animal choice (arbitrium brutum). T h e will itself. but the f r e e d o m to which the latter r e f e r is f r e e d o m in both the external and the internal use o f choice. this is the negative concept o f freedom. being based on subjective causes. H u m a n choice.11 if it is not j o i n e d with this consciousness its act is called a wish. T h a t which can be determined only by inclination (sensible impulse. reason can prescribe this law only as an imperative that c o m m a n d s o r prohibits absolutely. and then one says that conformity with juridical laws is the legality of an action and conformity with ethical laws is its morality. so. In theoretical philosophy it is said that only objects of outer sense are in space. but if they also require that they (the laws) themselves be the determining g r o u n d s of actions. however. T h e capacity f o r desire whose inner d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d . T h e will is therefore the capacity f o r desire considered not so m u c h in relation to action (as the capacity for choice is) but rather in relation to the g r o u n d determining choice to action. hence even what pleases it. it is instead practical reason itself. T h e f r e e d o m to which the f o r m e r laws refer can be only f r e e d o m in the external use o f choice. is a capacity for choice that can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses. In contrast to laws o f nature. has no d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d . strictly speaking. they are ethical laws. there is nothing it can m a k e the supreme law and determining g r o u n d of choice except the f o r m . hence a lawgiving capacity). T h e positive concept o f f r e e d o m is that o f the capacity o f p u r e reason to be o f itself practical. For as p u r e reason applied to the capacity f o r choice irrespective of its objects. do not o f themselves c o n f o r m with those objective principles. insofar as it can determine the capacity for choice. Freedom of choice is this i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m being determined by sensible impulses. Insofar as reason can determine the capacity for desire in general. the fitness of maxims of choice to be universal law.42 Metaphysics of Morals is called the capacity f o r doing or refraining from doing as one pleases. as a capacity f o r principles (here practical principles. A n d since men's maxims. A s directed merely to external actions and their conformity to law they are called juridical laws. But this is not possible except by the subjection o f the m a x i m o f every action to the condition o f its qualifying as universal law. whereas objects o f outer [214] . lies within the subject's reason is called the will. Insofar as it is j o i n e d with one's consciousness o f the capacity to b r i n g about its object by one's action it is called the capacity for choice. T h a t choice which can be determined by pure reason is called f r e e choice. and is therefore o f itself (apart f r o m an acquired aptitude of reason) not p u r e but can still be d e t e r m i n e d to actions by p u r e will. not only choice but also mere wish can be included u n d e r the will. it does not have within it the matter of the law. But it is d i f f e r e n t with moral laws. and as such belong together to inner sense. Such principles must be derived f r o m a priori g r o u n d s if they are to hold as universal in the strict sense. must also be internal determining g r o u n d s of choice. its laws. and yet so trust to the universality and necessity of those laws that they have no fear o f discovering an error in experiments m a d e with them. indeed necessary. and. one must have a priori principles. since the representations o f both are still representations. So too. All appar- [215] . So Newton assumed o n the basis o f experience the principle o f the equality of action and reaction in the action o f bodies u p o n one another. and movement. he would r u n the risk o f the grossest and most pernicious errors. only experience can teach him the means by which to seek them. yet e x t e n d e d it to all material nature. yet everything that is taught a priori on this subject is either tautological or assumed without any basis. T h e y hold as laws only insofar as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to be necessary. Only experience can teach what brings us j o y . Chemists go still f u r t h e r and base their most universal laws o f the combination and separation o f substances by their own forces entirely on experience. On the Idea of and the Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals It has been shown elsewhere that f o r natural science. rest. in what he will find those joys. even b e f o r e experience. in the same way. II. B u t physics (at least w h e n it is a question o f keeping its propositions f r e e f r o m error) can accept many principles as universal on the evidence o f experience. as p u r e practical laws o f reason f o r f r e e choice generally. f o r enlarging our knowledge and so forth. For h o w e v e r plausible it may sound to say that reason. that is. A n d should anyone let himself be led astray into making something f r o m that source into a moral principle. sex. could see the means f o r achieving a lasting enjoyment of the true j o y s o f life. to p r e f i x a system o f these principles. which has to d o with objects o f outer sense.The Doctrine of Right 43 as well as o f inner sense are in time. to natural science applied to particular experiences. can tell each o f us. If the doctrine o f morals were merely the doctrine o f happiness it would be absurd to seek a priori principles f o r it. O n l y the natural drives f o r f o o d . to physics. and each only in his particular way. alt h o u g h they should not always be considered in this respect. Indeed. called a metaphysical science o f nature. w h e t h e r f r e e d o m in the external or in the internal use o f choice is considered. and (as o u r natural predispositions develop) for honor. and that it is possible. concepts and j u d g m e n t s about ourselves and o u r deeds and omissions signify nothing moral if what they contain can be learned merely f r o m experience. merely because and insofar as he is f r e e and has practical reason.44 Metaphysics of Morals [216] ently a priori reasoning about this comes d o w n to n o t h i n g but experience raised by induction to generality. to offset in advance the error o f biased scales in practical appraisal. a practical philosophy. T h e counterpart o f a metaphysics o f morals. T h i s is to say. would be moral anthro- . f o r without a priori principles how could he believe that he has a giving o f universal law within himself? B u t j u s t as there must be principles in a metaphysics o f nature for applying those highest universal principles o f a nature in general to objects o f experience. in e f f e c t . Instead it uses them (as counsels) only as a counterweight against inducements to the contrary. like the Latin mores. and only then to ensure that the weight o f a p u r e practical reason's a priori g r o u n d s will turn the scales in favor o f the authority of its precepts. which only experience could teach us. which has not nature but f r e e d o m o f choice for its object. especially if obedience is accompanied with p r u d e n c e . reason c o m m a n d s how men are to act even though no e x a m p l e o f this could be f o u n d . H e does not derive instruction in its laws f r o m observing himself and his animal nature or f r o m perceiving the ways o f the world. what h a p p e n s and how men behave (although the G e r m a n w o r d Sitten. non universalis) still so tenuous that everyone must be allowed countless exceptions in o r d e r to adapt his choice o f a way o f life to his particular inclinations and his susceptibility to satisfaction and still. and every man also has it within himself. 1 2 T h e y c o m m a n d for everyone. a generality (secundum principia generalis. t h o u g h as a rule only in an obscure way. in the end. the o t h e r m e m b e r o f the division of practical philosophy as a whole. therefore. a system o f a priori k n o w l e d g e f r o m concepts alone is called metaphysics. in o r d e r to show in it what can be inferred f r o m universal moral principles. If. and we shall o f t e n have to take as o u r object the particular nature of man. means only manners and customs). that a metaphysics of morals cannot be based u p o n anthropology but can still be applied to it. that is. Instead. But it is d i f f e r e n t with the teachings o f morality. still the authority o f its precepts as commands is not based on these considerations. which is known only by experience. will presuppose and require a metaphysics o f morals. without taking account o f his inclinations. that it will probably be m o r e to o u r advantage on the whole to obey its c o m m a n d s than to transgress them. to become p r u d e n t only f r o m his own or others' misfortunes. For although reason allows us to seek o u r advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us. on the testimony of experience. But this will in no way detract f r o m the purity of these principles or cast d o u b t on their a priori source. it is itself a duty to have such a metaphysics. and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain. a [217] metaphysics o f morals cannot dispense with principles o f application. in contrast to laws o f nature. truly a divine art w e r e w e in a position also to carry o u t fully.e. a n d with o t h e r similar teachings a n d p r e c e p t s based o n e x p e r i e n c e . i. T h i s w o u l d leave n o certain m o r a l principles. A n y t h i n g that is practical a n d possible in accord a n c e with laws o f n a t u r e (the distinctive c o n c e r n o f art) 1 3 d e p e n d s f o r its p r e c e p t s entirely u p o n the t h e o r y o f n a t u r e : O n l y w h a t is practical in a c c o r d a n c e with laws o f f r e e d o m can h a v e principles that a r e indep e n d e n t o f any t h e o r y .that is. by this w o u l d h a v e to b e u n d e r s t o o d a kind o f art that m a k e s possible a system o f f r e e d o m like a system o f n a t u r e . O n the Division of a Metaphysics of Morals* In all l a w g i v i n g ( w h e t h e r it prescribes internal or e x t e r n a l actions. Even what the highest divided concept would be. I h a v e already e x p l a i n e d m y s e l f e l s e w h e r e (in the Critique of Judgment) a n d e x p l a i n e d that practical p h i l o s o p h y can b e n o n e o t h e r t h a n m o r a l w i s d o m . s p r e a d i n g . a n d w h e t h e r it prescribes t h e m a priori by reason alone or by the choice o f *A deduction of the division of a system.The Doctrine of Right 45 p o l o g y . It w o u l d deal w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t . [218] III. a n d if the p r o f i c i e n c y o f choice in a c c o r d a n c e with laws o f f r e e d o m . the divisions of which are right . by m e a n s o f it. is also to b e called art h e r e . w h a t reason prescribes a n d to p u t the I d e a o f it into e f f e c t . that a transition from the concept divided to the members of the division takes place without a leap (divisio per saltum) in the entire series of subdivisions . f o r t h e r e is n o t h e o r y o f w h a t g o e s b e y o n d the p r o p e r t i e s o f n a t u r e . a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f m o r a l principles (in e d u c a t i o n in schools a n d in p o p u l a r instruction).is one of the most difficult conditions which the architect of a system has to fulfill. the p r e c e p t s o f w h i c h m u s t be given a priori by p u r e reason alone. A s f o r t h e h i g h e r division u n d e r w h i c h t h e division j u s t m e n t i o n e d falls. w h i c h w o u l d m i s r e p r e s e n t as unattainable w h a t has only not b e e n attained j u s t because the law has not b e e n seen a n d presented in its p u r i t y (in w h i c h its s t r e n g t h consists) o r b e c a u s e s p u r i o u s or i m p u r e incentives w e r e used f o r what is itself in c o n f o r m i t y with d u t y a n d g o o d . p h i l o s o p h y can u n d e r s t a n d by its practical part (as c o m p a r e d with its theoretical part) n o technically practical d o c t r i n e b u t only a morally practical doctrine. n a m e l y that o f p h i l o s o p h y into theoretical a n d practical philosop h y . H e n c e . f o r o n e w o u l d t h e n r u n t h e risk o f b r i n g i n g f o r t h false o r at least i n d u l g e n t m o r a l laws. a proof that it is both complete and continuous . w h i c h . b u t it must not p r e c e d e a metaphysics o f m o r a l s o r b e m i x e d with it. w o u l d d e a l only w i t h the subjective c o n d i tions in h u m a n n a t u r e that h i n d e r m e n o r h e l p t h e m in fulfilling the laws o f a metaphysics o f morals. h o w e v e r . either to g u i d e j u d g m e n t o r to discipline the m i n d in o b s e r v a n c e o f d u t y . It c a n n o t be d i s p e n s e d with. a n d wrong (autfas aut nefas). irrespective o f the incentive to it. that is. the s e c o n d e l e m e n t is this: that t h e law m a k e s d u t y the incentive. e. Teachers of ontology similarly begin with the concepts of something and nothing. l a w g i v i n g by m a k i n g t h e m . is called its legality (lawfulness). w h i c h c o n n e c t s a g r o u n d f o r d e t e r m i n i n g choice to this action subjectively with t h e r e p r e s e n t a tion o f the law. without being aware that these are already members of a division for which the concept divided is missing. calls f o r reflection. It is clear that in the latter case this incentive that is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r than the I d e a o f d u t y m u s t b e d r a w n f r o m sensibly dependent d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d s o f c h o i c e . f r o m aversions. a law.. w h i c h is internal. but that c o n f o r m i t y in w h i c h the I d e a o f d u t y arising f r o m t h e law is also the incentive to the action is called its morality. . while it also m a k e s internal actions duties. ethical lawgiving. H e n c e . itself be the d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d o f the agent's choice. w h i c h invites. w h i c h m a k e s the action a d u t y . a n d this is a m e r e l y theoretical cognition o f a possible d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f choice. B y the s e c o n d the obligation so to act is c o n n e c t e d in the subject with a g r o u n d f o r d e t e r m i n i n g c h o i c e generally. ethical l a w g i v i n g c a n n o t be e x t e r n a l (not e v e n the e x t e r n a l l a w g i v i n g o f a divine will). a n d second. w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s an action that is to b e d o n e as objectively necessary. w h i c h constrains. d o e s not e x c l u d e e x t e r n a l actions b u t applies to e v e r y t h i n g that is a d u t y in g e n e r a l . not an a l l u r e m e n t . B u t that l a w g i v i n g w h i c h d o e s n o t i n c l u d e the incentive o f d u t y in the law a n d so admits an incentive o t h e r than the I d e a o f d u t y itself is juridical. A l l l a w g i v i n g can t h e r e f o r e be distinguished with r e s p e c t to the incentive (even if it a g r e e s with a n o t h e r kind with respect to the action that it m a k e s a d u t y . a n d since it still n e e d s an incentive suited to t h e law. o f practical rules. f o r it is a l a w g i v i n g . 1 4 inclinations a n d aversions. it can c o n n e c t only e x t e r n a l incentives with it. these actions m i g h t in all cases b e external). a n d a m o n g these.46 Metaphysics of Morals a n o t h e r ) t h e r e a r e two elements: first. a l t h o u g h it d o e s take u p duties that rest o n a n o t h e r .g. n a m e l y an external. This concept can be only that of an object in general. [219] T h a t l a w g i v i n g w h i c h m a k e s an action a duty a n d also m a k e s this d u t y the incentive is ethical. B y the first the action is r e p r e s e n t e d as a d u t y . since this l a w g i v i n g d o e s not r e q u i r e that the I d e a o f this d u t y . an incentive. T h i s c o n c e p t is t h e act offree choice in general. B u t j u s t because ethical l a w g i v i n g includes within its law the internal incentive to action (the I d e a o f duty). a n d this f e a t u r e m u s t not be present in e x t e r n a l lawgiving. Duties in a c c o r d a n c e with r i g h t f u l 1 5 l a w g i v i n g can b e only e x t e r n a l duties. that is. T h e m e r e c o n f o r m i t y or n o n c o n f o r m i t y o f an action with law. incentives in its lawgiving. as duties. O n the o t h e r h a n d . what it does not have in c o m m o n with Right is only the kind o f obligation. Accordingly the giving o f the law that promises agreed to must be kept lies not in ethics but in Ius. are still assigned to ethics because their lawgiving can be only internal. Ethical lawgiving (even if the duties might be external) is that which cannot be external. were absent. ethics c o m m a n d s that I still fulfill a contract I have entered into. even t h o u g h they are external duties (obligations to external actions). juridical lawgiving is that which can also be external. T h u s . belongs to internal lawgiving alone. even t h o u g h the other party could not coerce me to d o so. For what is distinctive of ethical lawgiving is that one is to p e r f o r m actions just because they are duties and to make the principle of duty itself. the Idea o f duty by itself would be sufficient as an incentive.g. and this must not happen.The Doctrine of Right 47 It can be seen f r o m this that all duties. So while there are many directly ethical duties. but it does not follow that the lawgiving f o r them is always contained in ethics: For many o f them it is outside ethics. which connects one incentive or the other with the law.. b e l o n g to ethics. without regard f o r any other incentive. and if the lawgiving itself were not juridical so that the duty arising f r o m it was not really a duty of Right (as distinguished f r o m a duty o f virtue). Ethics has its special duties as well (e. but it takes the law (pacta sunt servanda) and the duty corresponding to it f r o m the doctrine o f Right. B u t it is still a virtuous action (a p r o o f of virtue) to d o it even w h e r e n o coercion may be applied. to the p e r f o r m a n c e o f which one can be coerced. just because they are duties. [220] [221] . namely external constraint. one and all. but it also has duties in c o m m o n with Right. All that ethics teaches is that if the incentive which juridical lawgiving connects with that duty. internal lawgiving makes the rest o f them. but the c o m m a n d to do this merely because it is a duty. T h e doctrine o f Right and the doctrine o f virtue are therefore distinguished not so m u c h by their d i f f e r e n t duties as by the d i f f e r e n c e in their lawgiving. So the obligation is assigned to ethics not because the duty is of a particular kind (a particular kind of action to which one is bound) — f o r there are external duties in ethics as well as in Right — but rather because the lawgiving in this case is an internal one and can have no external lawgiver. indirectly ethical. So it is an external duty to k e e p a promise made in a contract. It is no duty o f virtue to k e e p one's promises but a duty o f Right. the sufficient incentive f o r choice. w h e r e v e r the duty comes f r o m . then faithful p e r f o r m a n c e (in keeping with promises m a d e in a contract) would be put in the same class with actions of benevolence and the obligation to them. For if this were not the case. as already given there. For the same reason duties of benevolence. duties to oneself). For us. and of an object o f which we cannot obtain any theoretical knowledge: T h e concept o f f r e e d o m cannot hold as a constitutive but solely as a regulative and. which are called moral. which are laws of a causality of pure reason for determining choice independently of any empirical conditions (of sensibility generally) and prove a pure will in us. For those actions. in which moral concepts and laws have their source. observance or transgression of which is indeed connected with a pleasure or pain of a distinctive kind (moral feeling).e. that is. it is a concept such that no instance corresponding to it can be given in any possible experience. Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals (Philosophia practica universalis) T h e concept of freedom is a pure rational concept. which is positive (from a practical point of view). while some of them or their opposites are morally necessary. although in practical laws of reason we take no account of these feelings (since they have nothing to do with the basis of practical laws but only with the subjective effect in the mind when our choice is determined by them. indeed. By categorical imperatives certain actions are permitted or forbidden.. are based unconditional practical laws. that is. at all adding to or detracting from the validity or influence of these laws]). O n this concept of freedom. there arises the concept of a duty. moral laws are imperatives (commands or prohibitions) and indeed categorical (unconditional) imperatives. merely negative principle of speculative reason. in the j u d g m e n t of reason. whose choice is sensibly affected and so does not of itself conform to the pure will but often opposes it. which for this very reason is transcendent for theoretical philosophy. which always command only conditionally. i. A n imperative differs f r o m a practical law in that a law indeed represents an action as necessary but takes no account of whether this action already inheres by an inner necessity in the acting subject (as in a holy being) or whether . But in reason's practical use the concept of f r e e d o m proves its reality by practical principles. then. obligatory.48 Metaphysics of Morals IV. [222] T h e following concepts are common to both parts of The Metaphysics of Morals. A n imperative is a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is made necessary. As such they are distinguished f r o m technical imperatives (precepts of art). that is. morally possible or impossible. which can differ f r o m one subject to another [without objectively. Obligation is the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason. It is therefore the matter o f obligation.The Doctrine of Right g 49 it is contingent (as in man). lex vetiti). A categorical imperative. d e p e n d i n g o n whether it represents as a duty the commission or omission o f an action. because it asserts an obligation with respect to certain actions. T h a t action is permitted (licitum) which is not contrary to obligation. since there is n o law limiting one's f r e e d o m (one's authorization) with regard to it and so too no duty. [223] . B u t since obligation involves not merely practical necessity (such as a law in general asserts) but also necessitation. res merae facultatis). All other imperatives are technical and are. no special law would be required f o r it. in addition to laws that c o m m a n d and prohibit (lex praeceptiva. in o r d e r to account f o r someone's being free to d o o r not to d o something as he pleases. H e n c e an imperative is a rule the representation o f which makes necessary an action that is subjectively contingent and thus represents the subject as one that must be constrained (necessitated)' 6 to c o n f o r m with the rule. conditional. Duty is that action to which someone is bound. a categorical imperative is a law which either c o m m a n d s or prohibits. T h e g r o u n d o f the possibility o f categorical imperatives is this: that they r e f e r to no other property o f choice (by which some purpose can be ascribed to it) than simply to its freedom. H e n c e it is obvious what is meant by forbidden (illicitum). f o r w h e r e the f o r m e r is the case there is n o imperative. t h r o u g h the representation o f some end that can be attained by the action. if there are. is a morally practical law. the authorization would not always have to d o with an indifferent action (adiaphoron)-. and hence directly. which is not limited by any opposing imperative. w h e t h e r there must be permissive laws (lex permissiva). and there can be one and the same duty (as to the action) although we can be b o u n d to it in d i f f e r e n t ways. considering the action in terms o f moral laws. T h e question can be raised w h e t h e r there are such actions and. No other practical doctrine can furnish instances o f such imperatives than that which prescribes obligation (the doctrine o f morals). one and all. is called an authorization (facultas moralis). for. A n action that is neither c o m m a n d e d nor prohibited is merely permitted. lex mandati and lex prohibitiva. Such an action is called morally i n d i f f e r e n t (indifferens. but t h r o u g h the m e r e representation of this action itself (its form). and this f r e e d o m . A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly. adiaphoron. I f so. and this.. the duty itself. if it is a duty to act in accordance with one rule. B u t since duty and obligation are concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certain actions and two rules opposed to each other cannot be necessary at the same time. Obligatory laws f o r which there can be an external lawgiving are called external laws (leges externae) in general. A deed is right or wrong (rectum aut minus rectum) in general insofar as it c o n f o r m s with duty or is contrary to it (factum licitum aut illicitum). W h e n two such g r o u n d s conflict with each other. practical philosophy says. A n y object o f free choice which itself lacks f r e e d o m is t h e r e f o r e called a thing (res corporalis). two grounds o f obligation (rationes obligandi). in a rule he prescribes to himself. W h a t is right in accordance with external laws is called just (iustum). but that the stronger ground of obligation prevails (fortior obligandi ratio vincit). may be o f any kind. one or the other of which is not sufficient to put him u n d e r obligation' 7 (rationes obligandi non obligantes). can be imputed to him. not that the stronger obligation takes precedence (fortior obligatio vincit). in d o i n g it. together with the action itself. unjust (iniustum). A n unintentional transgression which can still be i m p u t e d to the agent is called a m e r e fault (culpa).e. A thing is that to which nothing can be imputed. so that one of them is not a duty. is considered in terms of the f r e e d o m of his choice. A person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him. to act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even contrary to duty. obligationum) w o u l d be a relation between them in which one would cancel the other (wholly or in part). T h o s e a m o n g them that can be recognized as obligatory a priori by reason even without exter- [224] .loo Metaphysics of Morals An action is called a deed insofar as it comes u n d e r obligatory laws and hence insofar as the subject. so a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur). However. Moral personality is t h e r e f o r e nothing other than the f r e e d o m of a rational being u n d e r moral laws (whereas psychological personality is merely the capacity for being conscious o f one's identity in d i f f e r e n t conditions o f one's existence). what is not. A conflict of duties (collisio officiorum s. From this it follows that a person is subject to n o other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone o r at least along with others). By such an action the agent is r e g a r d e d as the author o f its effect. A n intentional transgression (i. if one is previously acquainted with the law by virtue o f which an obligation rests on these. in terms of its content or origin. one accompanied by consciousness o f its being a transgression) is called a crime (dolus). A d e e d contrary to duty is called a transgression (reatus). a subject may have. O n e can t h e r e f o r e conceive o f external lawgiving that would contain only positive laws. T h e s u p r e m e principle o f the doctrine o f morals is.e. namely its freedom. A n y m a x i m that does not so qualify is contrary to morals. but then a natural law would still have to precede it. You must t h e r e f o r e first consider your actions in terms o f their subjective principles. once reason has arrived at it. A principle o f duty. one learns that just these practical (moral) laws first make known a property o f choice. which as such only a f f i r m s what obligation is. as must also its authority to c o m m a n d without a p p e a r i n g to carry any incentive with it. [225] [226] . therefore: A c t on a m a x i m that can also hold as a universal law. T h e simplicity o f this law in comparison with the great and various consequences that can be d r a w n f r o m it must seem astonishing at first. which would establish the authority o f the lawgiver (i. whereas those that d o not bind without actual external lawgiving (and so without it would not be laws) are called positive laws.The Doctrine of Right g 51 nal lawgiving are indeed external but natural laws. w h e r e reason in its theoretical use. It then seems less strange to find that these laws. hence d i f f e r e n t agents can have very d i f f e r e n t maxims with r e g a r d to the same law. But in w o n d e r i n g at a capacity o f o u r reason to determine choice by the mere Idea that a m a x i m qualifies f o r the universality of a practical law. the conformity of the m a x i m of an action with a law is the morality (moralitas) o f the action. o n the other hand. are incapable of being proved and yet apodictic. with the same Idea o f f r e e d o m or with any other of its Ideas of the supersensible. although these practical laws show incontestably that o u r choice has this property. it qualifies f o r such a giving o f universal law.. could in no way be shown theoretically to be possible. A rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective g r o u n d s is called his maxim. T h e categorical imperative. T h e conformity o f an action with the law of duty is its legality (legalitas)-. but y o u can know w h e t h e r this principle also holds objectively only in this way: T h a t w h e n y o u r reason subjects it to the test of . A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. either on a priori g r o u n d s or t h r o u g h any experience whatever. his authorization to bind others by his mere choice). conceiving yourself as also giving universal law t h r o u g h it. is a principle that reason prescribes to him absolutely and so objectively (how he ought to act). which speculative reason would never have arrived at. is: A c t u p o n a m a x i m that can also hold as a universal law. must find everything closed tight against it. like mathematical postulates. but at the same time to see a whole field of practical knowledge o p e n u p b e f o r e one. a principle which the subject himself makes his rule (how he wills to act). and which. A maxim is a subjective principle o f action. f o r the first does not maintain that the feature belongs necessarily to the concept. But we can indeed see that. since it is not directed to actions but immediately to giving laws f o r the maxims o f actions (and is. How can that capacity be d e f i n e d by [erklärt aus ] this incapacity? It would be a definition that a d d e d to the practical concept the exercise of it. A (morally practical) law is a proposition that contains a categorical imperative (a command). although experience shows that man as a sensible being has the capacity to choose in opposition to as well as in conformity with the law. t h e r e f o r e . his f r e e d o m as an intelligible being cannot be defined by this. B u t we cannot present theoretically f r e e d o m as a noumenon. O n e w h o commands (imperans) t h r o u g h a [227] . practical reason itself). f r e e d o m r e g a r d e d as the capacity of m a n merely as an intelligence. For we know f r e e d o m (as it first becomes manifest to us t h r o u g h the moral law) only as a negative property in us. In m a n the latter is a capacity f o r f r e e choice. cannot be called either f r e e o r u n f r e e . which is directed to nothing b e y o n d the law itself. even t h o u g h experience proves o f t e n e n o u g h that this h a p p e n s (though we still cannot conceive how this is possible). O n l y f r e e d o m in relation to the internal lawgiving o f reason is really a capacity. We can also see that f r e e d o m can never be located in a rational subject's b e i n g able to m a k e a choice in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason. but the second requires this. the possibility o f deviating f r o m it is an incapacity. Only choice can t h e r e f o r e be called free. namely that o f not being necessitated to act t h r o u g h any sensible determining g r o u n d s . a hybrid definition [Bastarderklärung] (definitio hybrida) that puts the concept in a false light. even t h o u g h choice as a phenomenon provides f r e q u e n t examples of this in experience. But f r e e d o m of choice cannot be d e f i n e d — as some have tried to define it — as the capacity to make a choice f o r o r against the law (libertas indifferentiae).loo Metaphysics of Morals Laws proceed f r o m the will. maxims f r o m choice. servo). we cannot therefore present f r e e d o m as a positive property. Hence the will directs with absolute necessity and is itself subject to no necessitation. since appearances cannot m a k e any supersensible object (such as f r e e choice) understandable. that is. as this is taught by experience. the will. and show how it can exercise constraint u p o n his sensible choice. For it is one thing to accept a proposition (on the basis o f experience) and another thing to make it the expository principle18 (of the concept of f r e e choice) and the universal feature f o r distinguishing it (from arbitrio bruto s. forum). at considerable self-sacrifice I rescue a complete stranger f r o m great distress. O n the other hand. but not always the author o f the law. T h e g o o d results o f a meritorious action. f o r example. Imputation (imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which someone is r e g a r d e d as the author (causa libera) o f an action. respensio) stands in no relation of Right to a deed. so m u c h the m o r e merit is to be accounted f o r a good deed. the d e g r e e to which an action can be imputed (imputabilitas) has to be assessed by the magnitude o f the obstacles that had to be overcome. which is then called a deed (factum) and stands u n d e r laws. that is. the less the natural obstacles and the greater the obstacle f r o m g r o u n d s o f duty. conduct in k e e p i n g with what is owed has n o rightful e f f e c t at all. so m u c h the m o r e is [228] . like the bad results o f a w r o n g f u l 2 0 action. T h e rightful e f f e c t of what is culpable is punishment (poena)-. finally. that o f a meritorious d e e d is reward (praemium) (assuming that the reward. like the results o f omitting a meritorious action. can be imputed to the subject (modus imputationis ponens). was the inducement to it). If the j u d g m e n t also carries with it the rightful consequences o f this deed. T h e g o o d or bad results of an action that is owed. valida)\ otherwise it is merely an imputation appraising the d e e d (imputatio diiudicatoria). if what he does is less than the law requires. as when. it is morally culpable (demeritum). H e is the author (autor) o f the obligation in accordance with the law. if what he does is just exactly what the law requires. In the latter case the law would be a positive (contingent) and chosen [willkürlich]19 law. he does what is owed (debitum). A law that binds us a priori and unconditionally by o u r own reason can also be expressed as p r o c e e d i n g f r o m the will o f a s u p r e m e lawgiver. If someone does more in the way o f duty than he can be coerced by law to do. what he does is meritorious (meritum).The Doctrine of Right g 53 law is the lawgiver (legislator). promised in the law. without his being t h o u g h t as the author o f the law. Subjectively. T h e greater the natural obstacles (of sensibility) and the less the moral obstacle (of duty). T h e (natural or moral) person that is authorized to impute with rightful force is called a judge or a court (iudex s. but this signifies only the Idea o f a moral being whose will is a law f o r everyone. cannot be i m p u t e d to the subject (modus imputationis tollens). one w h o has only rights and n o duties (hence f r o m the divine will). it is an imputation having rightful force (imputatio iudiciaria s. Charitable recompense (remuneratio s. the state o f m i n d of the subject. makes a d i f f e r e n c e in imputation. H e n c e . which has results.54 Metaphysics of Morals a transgression to be imputed (as culpable). . w h e t h e r he committed the d e e d in a state o f agitation or with cool deliberation. is said to be experienced in the law (Iurisperitus) w h e n he not only knows external laws but also knows them externally. T h e last title belongs to systematic k n o w l e d g e o f the doctrine o f natural Right (Ius naturae). what the laws in a certain place and at a certain time say or have said. §B. instead o f giving a universal solution. that is. But whether what these laws prescribed is also right. although one versed in this must supply the immutable principles f o r any giving o f positive law. If there has actually been such lawgiving. r e f e r to what the laws in some country at some time prescribe. so as to establish the basis f o r any possible giving of positive laws (although positive laws can serve as excellent guides to this). Like the w o o d e n head in Phaedrus' fable. What the Doctrine of Right Is T h e sum o f those laws f o r which an external lawgiving is possible is called the Doctrine of Right (Ius). that is. and one versed in this.[22g] Introduction to the Doctrine of Right §A. the question "what is Right?" might well embarrass the jurist if he does not want to lapse into a tautology or. Such knowle d g e can also be called legal expertise (lurisprudentia). a jurist (Iurisconsultus). and what the universal criterion is by which one could recognize right as well as w r o n g (iustum et iniustum)22 — this would remain h i d d e n f r o m him unless he leaves those empirical principles behind f o r a while and seeks the sources o f such j u d g m e n t s in reason alone. in their application to cases that come u p in experience. [230] 55 . a merely empirical doctrine o f Right is a head that may be beautiful but unfortunately it has no brain. What Is Right? Like the much-cited query "what is truth?" put to the logician. but without both together it remains mere juridical science (Iurisscientia). it is the doctrine o f positive Right. H e can indeed state what is laid d o w n as right 2 1 (quid sit iuris). of the end each has in mind with the object he wants. 23 can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other. All that is in question is the form in the relation of choice on the part of both. so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the f r e e d o m of everyone in accordance with a universal law. it cannot be required that I make it the maxim of my action. sc. has to do. as in actions of beneficence or callousness. T h u s the universal law of Right [Rechtsgesetz]. it is not asked. reason says only that f r e e d o m is limited to [231] . far less demand. whether someone who buys goods from me for his own commercial use will gain by the transaction or not. Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. but it does not at all expect. in this reciprocal relation of choice no account at all is taken of the matter of choice. But. even though I am quite indifferent to his freedom or would like in my heart to infringe upon it. is indeed a law [Gesetz]. that is. the moral concept of Right). first. but only a relation to the other's choice. it does not signify the relation o f one's choice to the mere wish (hence also to the mere need) of the other. and whether the action of one can be united with the f r e e d o m of the other in accordance with a universal law. for this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with f r e e d o m in accordance with a universal law. for example. insofar as their actions..e. It also follows f r o m this that it cannot be required that this principle of all maxims be itself in turn my maxim. instead. for anyone can be free as long as I do not impair his freedom by my external action. T h a t I make it my maxim to act rightly is a d e m a n d that ethics makes on me. insofar as it is related to an obligation corresponding to it (i. insofar as choice is r e g a r d e d merely as free. Third. as facts. whoever hinders me in it does me wrong. which lays an obligation on me. second. that I myself should limit my freedom to those conditions just for the sake of this obligation. only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another. that is.loo Metaphysics of Morals T h e concept of Right. The Universal Principle [Prinzip] of Right " A n y action is right if it can coexist with everyone's f r e e d o m in accordance with a universal law. or if on its maxim the f r e e d o m of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law." If then my action or my condition 2 4 generally can coexist with the f r e e d o m of everyone in accordance with a universal law. coercion that is o p p o s e d to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws. but if it is to remain pure. A Strict Right Can Also Be Represented as the Possibility of a Fully Reciprocal Use of Coercion That Is Consistent with Everyone's Freedom in Accordance with Universal Laws T h i s proposition says. SE. T h e r e f o r e . that Right should not be conceived as made u p o f two elements.e. if a certain use o f freed o m is itself a hindrance to f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws (i. just as Right generally has as its object only what is external in actions. 2 5 W h e n one's aim is not to teach virtue but only to set f o r t h what is right. it is right. requires only external g r o u n d s f o r determining choice.The Doctrine of Right g 57 those conditions in conformity with the Idea o f it and that it may also be actively [tätlich] limited by others. Instead one can locate the concept of Right directly in the possibility o f connecting universal reciprocal coercion with the f r e e d o m of everyone. this consciousness may not and cannot be appealed to as an incentive to determine his choice in accordance with this law. Right Is Connected with an Authorization to Use Coercion Resistance that counteracts the hindering o f an e f f e c t promotes this effect and is consistent with it. f o r only then is it p u r e and not mixed with any precepts of virtue. T h i s is indeed based on everyone's consciousness o f obligation in accordance with a law. namely that which is not mingled with anything ethical. T h a t is to say. namely an obligation in accordance with a law and an authorization of him w h o by his choice puts another u n d e r obligation to coerce him to fulfill it.. wrong). so strict Right. Now whatever is w r o n g is a hindrance to f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws. Strict Right rests instead on the principle o f its being possible to use external constraint that can coexist with the f r e e d o m of everyone in accordance with universal laws. one may not and should not represent that law o f Right as itself the incentive to action. and it says this as a postulate that is incapable o f f u r t h e r proof. H e n c e there is connected with Right by the principle o f contradiction an authorization to coerce someone w h o infringes u p o n it. that is. [232] . §D. B u t coercion is a hindrance or resistance to f r e e d o m . in effect. Only a completely external Right can therefore be called strict (Right in the narrow sense). by analogy with presenting the possibility o f bodies m o v i n g freely u n d e r the law o f the equality of action and reaction. A s o p p o s e d to o n e that is oblique. Analogously to this. one finds two cases that lay claim to a decision about rights. w h e n it is said that a creditor has a right to require his debtor to pay his debt. although n o one can be f o u n d to decide them. just as a purely formal concept of p u r e mathematics (e. that makes the presentation of that concept possible.g. is o p p o s e d to one that is curved on the one hand and to one that is oblique on the other hand. including that o f debtors. straightness is that inner property o f a line such that there is only one line between two given points. as it were. straightness is that position o f a line toward another intersecting o r touching it such that there can be only one line (the perpendicular) that does not incline m o r e to one side than to the other and that divides the space on both sides equally. which cannot refuse some r o o m for exceptions (latitudinem). Similarly. A right line (rectum). o f geometry) underlies the dynamical concept [of the equality o f action and reaction]. T h e law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the f r e e d o m o f everyone u n d e r the principle of universal f r e e d o m is. one that is straight.loo Metaphysics of Morals T h u s . In p u r e mathematics we cannot derive the properties of its objects immediately f r o m concepts but can discover t h e m only by constructing concepts. M o r e o v e r . in accordance with a universal external law. We must first separate these two cases f r o m the doctrine o f Right proper. A s opposed to one that is curved. B u t without making incursions into the province of ethics. the doctrine of Right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been determined (with mathematical exactitude). Such exactitude cannot be expected in the doctrine o f virtue. it means instead that coercion which constrains everyone to pay his debts can coexist with the f r e e d o m o f everyone. reason has taken care to furnish the understanding as far as possible with a priori intuitions f o r constructing the concept of Right. this does not mean that he can remind the debtor that his reason itself puts him u n d e r obligation to p e r f o r m this. to which we are about to proceed. the presentation o f it in p u r e intuition a priori. Right and authorization to use coercion t h e r e f o r e mean one and the same thing. [233] . the construction o f that concept. that is. and that b e l o n g as it were within the intermundia of Epicurus. it is not so m u c h the concept o f Right as rather a fully reciprocal and equal coercion b r o u g h t u n d e r a universal law and consistent with it.. so that their wavering principles will not a f f e c t the firm basic principles of the doctrine o f Right. so that he cannot buy with it what he could have bought with it when he concluded the contract. and a j u d g e cannot pronounce in accordance with indefinite conditions. By equity he can demand more f r o m the company than merely an equal share with the others. O r suppose that a domestic servant is paid his wages at the end of a year in money that has depreciated in the interval. for nothing was specified about this in the contract. his demand would be refused. It also follows f r o m this that a court of equity (in a conflict with others about their rights) involves a contradiction.The Doctrine of Right g 73 Appendix to the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right On Equivocal Rights (Ius aequivocum) A n authorization to use coercion is connected with any right in the narrow sense {ius strictum). In accordance with proper (strict) Right. T h e r e are two such true or alleged rights. equity and the right of necessity. for if one thinks of a j u d g e in this case. [234] Equity ( Aequitas) Equity (considered objectively) is in no way a basis for merely calling upon another to fulfill an ethical duty (to be benevolent and kind). however. except that he does not have the conditions that a j u d g e needs in order to determine by how much or in what way his claim could be satisfied. the second. coercion without a right. He can appeal only on grounds of equity (a mute divinity who cannot be heard). /. It can easily be seen that this equivocation really arises f r o m the fact that there are cases in which a right is in question but for which no j u d g e can be appointed to render a decision. in which there is no law by which an authorization to use coercion can be determined. Suppose that the terms on which a trading company was formed were that the partners should share equally in the profits. but that one partner nevertheless did more than the others and so lost more when the company met with reverses. T h e servant cannot appeal to his right to be compensated when he gets the same amount of money but it is of unequal value. O n e who demands something on this basis stands instead upon his right. But people also think of a right in a wider sense (ius latium). T h e first admits a right without coercion. he would have no definite particulars (data) to enable him to decide how much is due by the contract. Only where the j u d g e ' s . o f f a plank on which he had saved himself. since a threat o f an evil that is still uncertain (death by a judicial verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an evil that is certain (drowning). Yet there could be no necessity that would make what is w r o n g c o n f o r m with law. . even t h o u g h it could reject their claim by strict Right on the pretext that they u n d e r t o o k this service at their own risk. in o r d e r to save his own life. T h e motto (dictum) o f equity is. For the punishment threatened by the law could not be greater than the loss o f his own life. It is instead a matter o f violence being permitted against someone w h o has used no violence against me. II. T h e motto o f the right of necessity says: "Necessity has n o law" (necessitas non habet legem). For the issue h e r e is not that of a wrongful assailant u p o n my life w h o m I forestall by d e p r i v i n g him o f his life (ius inculpatae tutelae). there can be n o penal law that would assign the death penalty to someone in a shipwreck who. whose life is equally in danger. w h e n I am in d a n g e r of losing my own life. "the strictest Right is the greatest w r o n g " (summum ius summa iniuria). and he can dispose o f the case f o r his o w n person. for this claim belongs only to the court of conscience (forum poli) whereas every question of what is laid d o w n as right must be b r o u g h t b e f o r e civil Right (forum soli). but only subjectively. In other words. H e n c e [236] the d e e d o f saving one's life by violence is not to be j u d g e d inculpable (inculpabile) but only unpunishable (impunibile). The Right of Necessity ( I u s Necessitatis) T h i s alleged right is supposed to be an authorization to take the life of another w h o is d o i n g nothing to h a r m me. even t h o u g h it concerns a claim to a right. f o r e x a m p l e . shoves another. w h e n the crown itself bears the damages that others have incurred in its service and f o r which they petition it to i n d e m n i f y them. It is evident that were there such a right the doctrine o f Right would have to be in contradiction with itself. may a n d should he listen to equity. B u t this evil cannot be r e m e d i e d by way o f what is laid d o w n as right. as the verdict 2 6 that would be given by a court. It is clear that this assertion is not to be understood objectively. in which case a recommendation to show moderation (moderamen) belongs not to Right but only to ethics.loo [235] Metaphysics of Morals own rights are concerned. in terms of what a law prescribes. as. and by a strange confusion jurists take this subjective impunity to be objective impunity (conformity with law). A penal law of this sort could not have the e f f e c t intended. . W h a t someone by himself recognizes on g o o d g r o u n d s as right will not be c o n f i r m e d by a court. is not taken in the same sense.The Doctrine of Right g 61 O n e sees that in both appraisals o f what is right (in terms o f a right o f equity and a right o f necessity) the equivocation (aequivocatio) arises f r o m c o n f u s i n g the objective with the subjective basis o f exercising the right (before reason and b e f o r e a court). for the concept o f Right. in these two cases. and what he must j u d g e to be o f itself w r o n g is treated with indulgence by a court. Rightful honor (honestas luridica)27 consists in asserting one's worth as a man in relation to others. 2) [237] 3) So the above three classical formulas serve also as principles for dividing the system o f duties o f Right into internal duties. Do not wrong anyone (neminem laede) even if. If this last f o r m u l a were translated "Give to each what is his. to avoid d o i n g so.Division of the Doctrine of Right A. external duties. enter into a society with them in which each can k e e p what is his (suum cuique tribue). since o n e cannot give a n y o n e something he already has. a duty expressed by the saying." T h i s duty will be explained later as obligation f r o m the Right o f humanity in o u r own person (Lex iusti). T h e y are the following: 1) Be an honorable man (honeste vive)." what it says would be absurd. you should have to stop associating with others and shun all society (Lex iuridica). In o r d e r to make sense it would have to read: "Enter a condition in which what belongs to each can be secured to him against everyone else" (Lex iustitiae). " D o not make yourself a mere means f o r others but be at the same time an end f o r them. General Division of Duties of Right O n e can follow Ulpian in making this division if a sense is ascribed to his f o r m u l a s which he may not have thought distinctly in them but which can be explicated [entwickelt] f r o m them or put into them. 62 . (If you cannot help associating with others). and duties that involve the derivation of the latter f r o m the principle o f the f o r m e r by subsumption. e. at least to the extent that if he ingenuously repeats it others ridicule him as gullible. A n innate r i g h t is that w h i c h b e l o n g s to e v e r y o n e by n a t u r e . The only kind of untruth we want to call a lie.. because it can also harm someone. as (moral) capacities f o r p u t t i n g o t h e r s u n d e r obligations (i. even though merely frivolously. as a l a w f u l basis. that is. i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m b e i n g b o u n d by o t h e r s to m o r e than o n e can in t u r n b i n d t h e m . as well as b e i n g a m a n beyond reproach (iusti).The Doctrine of Right B. a n d positive (statutory) R i g h t . f o r d o i n g so). for when [238] . telling or p r o m i s i n g t h e m s o m e t h i n g . T h i s principle o f innate f r e e d o m a l r e a d y involves the f o l l o w i n g authorizations. i n s o f a r as it can coexist with the f r e e d o m o f e v e r y o t h e r in a c c o r d a n c e with a universal law. There Is Only One Innate Right Freedom ( i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m b e i n g c o n s t r a i n e d by a n o t h e r ' s choice). the false allegation that a contract has been concluded with someone. w h i c h p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e will o f a legislator. is the division into innate a n d acquired right. is the only original r i g h t b e l o n g i n g to e v e r y m a n by virtue o f his h u m a n i t y . i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any act that w o u l d establish a r i g h t . Telling an untruth intentionally. f o r w h a t is e x t e r n a l l y m i n e o r y o u r s m u s t always be a c q u i r e d . in the sense bearing upon rights. is one that directly infringes upon another's right. w h i c h are not really distinct f r o m it (as if they w e r e m e m b e r s o f the division o f s o m e h i g h e r c o n c e p t o f a right): innate equality. since b e f o r e h e p e r f o r m s any act a f f e c t i n g rights h e has d o n e n o w r o n g to a n y o n e .g. is usually called a lie (mendacium). T h e h i g h e s t division o f rights. 2 8 an a c q u i r e d r i g h t is that f o r w h i c h such an act is r e q u i r e d . a n d finally.. 2) W h a t is innately m i n e o r y o u r s can also be called w h a t is internally m i n e o r y o u r s (meum vel tuum internum). h e n c e a man's quality o f b e i n g his own master (sui iuris). And this distinction between closely related concepts is not without basis. his b e i n g a u t h o r i z e d to d o to o t h e r s a n y t h i n g that d o e s not in itself diminish w h a t is theirs. so l o n g as they d o not w a n t to accept it — such things as m e r e l y c o m m u n i cating his t h o u g h t s to t h e m . w h e t h e r w h a t h e says is true a n d sincere o r u n t r u e a n d insincere (veriloquium autfalsiloquium)-. w h i c h rests only o n a priori principles. e. made in order to deprive him of what is his (falsiloquium dolosum). Rights are d i v i d e d into natural Right. titulum. f o r it is entirely u p to t h e m w h e t h e r they w a n t to believe h i m or not. General Division of Rights 1) g 63 A s systematic doctrines. Since this h i g h e s t division consists o f two m e m b e r s v e r y u n e q u a l in content. that is. t h e r e is only one right. another always remains free to take it as he pleases. But a rumor. duties f o r w h i c h e x t e r n a l l a w g i v i n g is possible. . a l t h o u g h it m a y prescribe e x t e r n a l actions that lead to a n e n d without t h e subject m a k i n g it his e n d . o n w h o m d o e s the b u r d e n o f p r o o f ( onus probandi) fall. the c o n c e p t o f a right. t h e r e are not several rights. it c a n b e p u t in the p r o l e g o m e n a a n d the division o f the d o c t r i n e o f R i g h t c a n r e f e r only to what is e x t e r n a l l y m i n e o r yours. D u t i e s o f virtue c a n n o t b e subject to e x t e r n a l l a w g i v i n g simply b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e to d o with an e n d w h i c h (or the h a v i n g o f which) is also a d u t y . s o m e o n e w h o r e f u s e s to accept this obligation can a p p e a l methodically to his innate right to f r e e d o m (which is n o w specified in its various relations). either a b o u t a c o n t r o v e r sial fact or. B u t w h y is t h e d o c t r i n e o f m o r a l s usually called (especially by C i c e r o ) a d o c t r i n e o f duties a n d not also a d o c t r i n e o f rights. a n d so all rights as well as duties p r o c e e d ) only t h r o u g h the moral imperative. o r duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. that this is a man whose talk cannot be believed comes so close to the reproach of calling him a liar that the borderline separating what belongs to Ius from what must be assigned to ethics can only be drawn in just this way. a b o u t a controversial right. can a f t e r w a r d b e e x p l i c a t e d [ entwickelt].loo Metaphysics of Morals T h e aim in i n t r o d u c i n g such a division within the system o f natural R i g h t (so f a r as it is c o n c e r n e d with innate right) is that w h e n a d i s p u t e arises a b o u t an a c q u i r e d right a n d the question c o m e s u p . ethica). as if h e w e r e a p p e a l i n g to v a r i o u s bases f o r rights. [239] Division of the Metaphysics of Morals as a Whole A l l duties a r e e i t h e r duties of Right (officia iuris). N o e x t e r n a l l a w g i v i n g can b r i n g a b o u t s o m e o n e ' s setting an e n d f o r himself (because this is an internal act o f the mind). if this is settled. f o r w h i c h e x t e r n a l l a w g i v i n g is not possible. h e n c e internally. e v e n t h o u g h rights h a v e r e f e r e n c e to duties? T h e r e a s o n is that w e k n o w o u r o w n f r e e d o m ( f r o m w h i c h all m o r a l laws. having some basis. W i t h r e g a r d to what is innately. m i n e o r y o u r s . w h i c h is a p r o p o s i t i o n c o m m a n d i n g d u t y . 29 someone merely says what he thinks. f r o m w h i c h the capacity f o r p u t t i n g o t h e r s u n d e r obligation. that is. and so a division can also be m a d e f r o m this point o f view. and so too merely in terms o f his humanity. which is wholly supersensible. Accordingly Right and end. yield the following division: DIVISION [240] in Accordance with the Objective Relation of Law to Duty Perfect Duty Imperfect Duty [241] T h e subjects between w h o m a relation of right to duty can be thought of (whether admissibly or not) can stand related to each other in d i f f e r e n t ways. related in turn to duty in this twofold property.The Doctrine of Right 65 In the doctrine o f duties m a n can and should be represented in terms o f the property o f his capacity f o r f r e e d o m . man (homo phaenomenon). his personality indep e n d e n t o f physical attributes (homo noumenon). . as distinguished f r o m the same subject represented as a f f e c t e d by physical attributes. so that the relation h e r e is only ideal f r o m a theoretical point o f view. instead it is f r u i t f u l in r e f e r e n c e to ourselves a n d to m a x i m s o f i n t e r n a l morality. Adest For this is a relation of men to men. 0 Vacat might be r e n d e r e d "has n o members. Vacat" For these are beings lacking reason. T h e relation in terms of rights of men toward beings that have rights as well as duties. a relation to a thought-entity [ Gedankending ]. T h e reason that it is not to b e f o u n d in N u m b e r 4 is that this w o u l d b e a transcendent duty. i n a s m u c h as o u r entire immanent duty (that w h i c h can b e fulfilled) lies only in this relation that can m e r e l y be t h o u g h t o f . " 4The relation in terms of rights of men toward a being that has only rights but no duties (God). that is. [242] So only in N u m b e r 2 is t h e r e f o u n d a real relation b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d duty. T h e relation in terms of rights of men toward beings that have neither rights nor duties. a n d so f o r an internal practical p u r p o s e . slaves). 1. 3T h e relation in terms of rights of men toward beings that have only duties but no rights.loo Metaphysics of Morals DIVISION in Accordance with the Relation of the Subject Imposing Obligation to the Subject Put Under Obligation. a duty f o r w h i c h n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x t e r n a l subject i m p o s i n g the obligation can be given. that is." . b u t this c o n c e p t is not a l t o g e t h e r empty. Vacat At least in philosophy." Adest " has members. since such a being is not an object of possible experience. which can neither bind us nor by which we can be bound. Vacat For these would be men without personality (serfs. We o u r s e l v e s make t h e c o n c e p t o f this b e i n g . 2. The Doctrine of Right g 67 and so on. . it must instead be the division into natural and civil Right. once its metaphysical first principles have traced o u t completely the universal principles f o r it. For a state of nature is not o p p o s e d to a social but to a civil condition. but not civil society (which secures what is mine or yours by public laws). since there can certainly be society in a state o f nature. the f o r m e r of which is called private Right and the latter public Right. everything that involves not only the contents o f a scientific doctrine o f morals but also its architectonic f o r m . T h i s is why Right in a state o f nature is called private Right. T h e highest division o f natural Right cannot be the division (sometimes made) into natural and social Right. S o it w o u l d b e self-contradictory to say that I h a v e s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l as m y o w n if the c o n c e p t o f possession c o u l d not h a v e d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s . that is.[245] PRIVATE RIGHT MINE C O N C E R N I N G W H A T IS E X T E R N A L L Y O R Y O U R S IN G E N E R A L CHAPTER I How to Have Something External as One's Own 30 81. a n object o f c h o i c e w o u l d in itself (objectively) h a v e to belong to no one (res nullius) is c o n t r a r y to rights. a m a x i m by w h i c h . that is. T h a t is rightfully mine (meum iuris) with w h i c h I a m so c o n n e c t e d that a n o t h e r ' s use o f it w i t h o u t m y c o n s e n t w o u l d w r o n g m e . 3 3 F o r an object o f my choice is s o m e t h i n g that I h a v e t h e physical p o w e r to use. Intelligible possession (if this is possible) is possession o f an object without holding it (detentio). t h e n f r e e d o m w o u l d b e d e p r i v i n g itself o f the use o f its choice 68 . [246] §2. a n d by the f o r m e r c o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d physical possession but by the latter a merely rightful possession o f the same object. B u t s o m e t h i n g external w o u l d b e m i n e only if I m a y a s s u m e that I c o u l d be w r o n g e d by another's use o f a t h i n g 3 1 e v e n though I am not in possession of it. T h e subjective c o n d i t i o n o f any possible use is possession. B u t the e x p r e s s i o n "an object is external to me" can m e a n either that it is an object m e r e l y distinct f r o m m e (the subject) o r else that it is also to b e f o u n d in another location (positus) in space o r time. if the use o f it c o u l d not coexist with the f r e e d o m o f e v e r y o n e in a c c o r d a n c e with a universal law (would b e w r o n g ) . I f it w e r e nevertheless absolutely not within m y rightful p o w e r to m a k e use o f it. if t a k e n in t h e s e c o n d sense it w o u l d have to be called e m p i r i c a l possession. n a m e l y sensible possession a n d intelligible possession. if it w e r e to b e c o m e a law. Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights 3 " It is possible f o r m e to h a v e any e x t e r n a l object o f m y c h o i c e as m i n e . O n l y if it is t a k e n in the first sense can possession b e t h o u g h t o f as rational possession. B u t in o r d e r to think of something simply as an object o f my choice it is sufficient f o r m e to be conscious of having it within my power. For if something outside this object which is not connected with it by rights affects it. 2) another's choice to p e r f o r m a specific d e e d . [247] §3. It is t h e r e f o r e an a priori presupposition o f practical reason to r e g a r d and treat any object o f my choice as something that could objectively be mine or yours. which they would not otherwise have. W h o e v e r wants to assert that he has a thing as his own must be in possession o f an object. that is. in other words. namely to put all others u n d e r an obligation. B u t an object of my choice is that which I have the physical capacity to use as I please. that whose use lies within my power (potentia). which extends itself a priori by this postulate o f reason. since otherwise he could not be w r o n g e d 3 5 by another's use o f it without his consent. B u t since p u r e practical reason lays d o w n only formal laws as the basis f o r using choice and thus abstracts f r o m its matter. by putting usable objects b e y o n d any possibility o f being used. and it does this as practical reason. §4Exposition of the Concept of External Objects That Are Mine or Yours T h e r e can be only three external objects of my choice: 1) a (corporeal) thing external to me. it would not be able to a f f e c t himself (the subject) and do him any wrong. since this would be a contradiction of outer f r e e d o m with itself. it can contain no absolute prohibition against using such an object. even t h o u g h in the use o f things choice was formally consistent with everyone's outer f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws. T h i s must be distinguished f r o m having the same object u n d e r my control (in potestatem meam redactum). T h i s postulate can be called a permissive principle (lexpermissiva)34 o f practical reason. f r o m other properties o f the object provided only that it is an object of choice. which gives us an authorization that could not be got f r o m m e r e concepts o f Right as such. Reason wills that this hold as a principle. which presupposes not merely [such] a capacity but also an act o f choice.The Doctrine of Right g 83 with r e g a r d to an object of choice. to refrain f r o m using certain objects o f o u r choice because we have been the first to take them into o u r possession. it would annihilate them in a practical respect and make them into res nullius. but even t h o u g h I do not possess it yet. or. T h e other's promise is t h e r e f o r e included in my belongings and goods (obligatio activa). and community between myself and external objects in accordance with laws o f freedom. another person mine because I am now in charge o f them as m e m b e r s o f my household or have them within my restraining walls and in my control and possession. I cannot call a wife. So I must be able to think that I am in possession o f this object independently of being limited by temporal conditions. 3) another's status in relation to me. and so independently o f empirical possession. but only if I can assert that I am in possession o f the other's choice (to determine him to p e r f o r m it) even t h o u g h the time for his p e r f o r m i n g it is still to come. no matter where. I cannot call the performance o f something by another's choice mine if all I can say is that it came into my possession at the same time that he promised it (pactum re initum). hence merely rightfully. [248] b) c) . So I shall not call an apple mine because I have it in my h a n d (possess it physically). as long as they exist somewhere or at some time. Only if and insofar as I can assert this are they included in my belongings. in general. I shall not be able to say that the land on which I have lain d o w n is mine because I am on it. causality. T h e s e are objects o f my choice in terms of the categories o f substance. For someone w h o tried in the first case (of empirical possession) to wrest the apple f r o m my hand or to d r a g m e away f r o m my resting place would indeed w r o n g me with r e g a r d to what is internally mine (freedom). I can still assert that I am actually in some other (hence not physical) possession o f it. a) I cannot call an object in space (a corporeal thing) mine unless. a servant. and I can count it as mine not merely if (as in the first case) I already have what was promised in my possession. although they have withdrawn f r o m such constraint and I do not possess t h e m (empirically). but he would not w r o n g me with r e g a r d to what is externally mine unless I could assert that I am in possession o f the object even without holding it. I could not then call these objects (the apple and the resting place) mine. a child. but only if I can say that I possess it even t h o u g h I have put it d o w n . In the same way. but only if. even though I am not in physical possession of it.loo Metaphysics of Morals (praestatio). but only if I can assert that it still remains in my possession even though I have left the place. I can still say that I possess them merely by my will. How is it possible for something external to be mine or yours? resolves itself into the question. So. How is a synthetic a priori proposition of Right possible? . as it was in the Transcendental Analytic. [249] §6. I must be in some sort of possession of an external object if it is to be called mine. into the third question. although the object itself that I possess is not here treated. for otherwise someone who affected this object against my will would not also affect me and so would not wrong me. and Right is a pure practical rational concept of choice under laws of freedom. in consequence of §4. For the same reason it is not appropriate to speak of possessing a right to this or that object but rather of possessing it merely rightfully.The Doctrine of Right §5. in turn. Empirical possession (holding) is then only possession in appearance (possessio phaenomenon). Deduction of the Concept of Merely Rightful Possession of an External Object (possessio noumenon) T h e question. whether the object can be known through the senses or through the pure understanding alone. B u t the real definition [Sacherklärung] of this concept — that which also suffices for the deduction of it (for knowledge of the possibility of the object) — goes like this: Something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (not holding the object). intelligible possession (possessio noumenon) must be assumed to be possible if something external is to be mine or yours. but here it is concerned with the practical determination of choice in accordance with laws of freedom. as an appearance but as a thing in itself. How is merely rightful (intelligible) possession possible? and this. f o r there reason was concerned with theoretical knowledge of the nature of things and how far it could extend. g 71 Definition of the Concept of External Objects That Are Mine or Yours T h e nominal definition [Namenerklärung] of what is externally mine — that which suffices only to distinguish the object f r o m all others and arises f r o m a complete and determinate exposition of the concept — would be: T h a t outside me is externally mine which it would be a w r o n g (an infringement upon my freedom that can coexist with the f r e e d o m of everyone in accordance with a universal law) to prevent me f r o m using as I please. for a right is already an intellectual possession of an object and it would make no sense to speak of possessing a possession. instead one would say that this land is free because o f a prohibition on e v e r y o n e to make use o f it. since they are principles of reason (dictamina rationis). possession o f it in c o m m o n is required. f o r that would again be a relation to things. 3 7 [In this way. O n the other hand. namely that if I am h o l d i n g a thing (and so physically connected with it). is possible a priori. a proposition about the possibility o f possessing a thing external to myself which puts aside any conditions o f empirical possession in space and time (and hence presupposes the possibility o f possessio noumenon). so that his m a x i m is in direct contradiction with the axiom o f Right. [250] . prior to any act establishing a right. f o r example. Yet since he is in a state of nature. snatches an apple f r o m my hand) affects and diminishes what is internally mine (my f r e e d o m ) . unoccupied things would in themselves and in accordance with a law be made things that belong to no one). T h e possessor bases his act on an innate possession in common o f the surface o f the earth and on a general will c o r r e s p o n d i n g a priori to it. which permits private possession on it (otherwise. someone w h o affects it without my consent (e.g. that is. as necessary f o r the concept o f something external that is mine or yours. Reason has then the task of showing how such a proposition. f o r it says nothing m o r e than what follows f r o m empirical possession in accordance with the principle o f contradiction. But land that can be free only in this way must really be in the possession o f all those (joined together) w h o forbid or suspend one another's use o f it. which goes b e y o n d the concept of empirical possession. which w o u l d r e f u s e possession o f itself to anyone. A n a priori proposition o f Right with r e g a r d to empirical possession is analytic. and for this. Even if a piece o f land were considered or declared to be free. namely to the land.loo Metaphysics of Morals All propositions o f Right are a priori propositions. 3 6 So the proposition about empirical possession in conformity with rights does not go b e y o n d the right o f a person with regard to himself. o p e n to anyone's use. By being the first to take possession he originally acquires a definite piece of land and resists with right (iure) anyone else w h o would prevent him f r o m making private use o f it. a n d since it a f f i r m s possession o f something even without h o l d i n g it.. it is synthetic. he cannot d o so by legal proceedings [von rechtswegen] (de iure) because there does not exist any public law in this state. without being unsanctioned. goes beyond those limiting conditions. one could still not say that it is f r e e by nature or originally free. taking possession o f a separate piece o f land is an act o f private choice. which cannot take place without a contract. is to be distinguished f r o m taking possession of land with the intention o f some day acquiring it. f o r a primitive community would have to be one that was instituted and arose f r o m a contract by which everyone gave u p private possessions and. Relative to others. is an Idea that has objective (rightfully practical) reality. since (as far as one knows) it is first possession. which lays d o w n taking first possession as a rightful basis f o r acquisition on which every first possessor can rely. which is a lasting private possession of a place d e p e n dent u p o n the presence o f the subject on it. Residing on land (sedes) is to be distinguished f r o m being in possession (possessio) o f it. f o r settling o f this kind would not be original possession but would be possession derived f r o m others' consent. which is original possession in c o m m o n . Accordingly.] In an a priori theoretical principle. transformed them into a collective possession. which provides a priori the basis on which any private possession is possible. and the saying " H a p p y are those w h o are in possession" (beati possidentes). But with this practical principle the opposite p r o c e d u r e is followed and all conditions o f intuition that establish empirical possession must [252] . T h i s kind o f community must be sharply distinguished f r o m a primitive community (communio primaeva). t h o u g h certainly not o f itself sufficient f o r r e g a r d i n g it as mine.The Doctrine of Right g 73 [251] T h i s original community o f land. which is a fiction. and history would have to give us p r o o f of such a contract. I am not talking h e r e about settling as a second act to establish a right. and so something would have to be added to the concept o f possession of an object. it is consistent with the principle of outer f r e e d o m and is also implied in original possession in comm o n . T a k i n g first possession has therefore a rightful basis (titulus possessionis). B u t it is contradictory to claim that such a p r o c e d u r e is an original taking possession and that each man could and should have based his separate possession u p o n it. an a priori intuition would have to underlie the given concept (as was established in the Critique of Pure Reason)-. to interfere with the use of a piece o f land by the first occupant o f it is to w r o n g him. by uniting his possessions with those o f everyone else. Merely physical possession o f land (holding it) is already a right to a thing. which can either follow u p o n taking possession or not take place at all. because none is b o u n d to certify his possession. namely. and with it o f things u p o n it (communio fundi originaria). is a basic principle o f natural Right. and settling or m a k i n g a settlement (incolatus). " together with the exposition o f the concept o f an external object that belongs to someone. T h e r e is. is the following. in o r d e r to extend the concept o f possession beyond empirical possession and to be able to say: It is possible f o r any external object of my choice to be r e c k o n e d as rightfully mine if I have control o f it (and only insofar as I have control of it) without being in possession of it. is based on the postulate of practical reason with r e g a r d to rights: "that it is a duty o f Right to act toward others so that what is external (usable) could also become someone's. For if it is necessary to act in accordance with that principle of Right. T h e way to proceed with the concept of a right with respect to such objects. it must be applicable to objects o f experience. since no theoretical deduction can be given f o r the possibility o f the concept o f f r e e d o m on which they are based. its possibility is instead an immediate consequence o f the postulate r e f e r r e d to. it cannot be applied directly to objects of experience and to the concept o f empirical possession. no way of proving o f itself the possibility o f nonphysical possession or of having any insight into it (just because it is a rational concept for which n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g intuition can be given).loo Metaphysics of Morals be removed (disregarded). It can only be inferred f r o m the practical law o f reason (the categorical imperative). but rather the concept o f . T h e possibility of this kind o f possession. §7Application to Objects of Experience of the Principle That It Is Possible for Something External To Be Mine or Yours [253] T h e concept of merely rightful possession is not an empirical concept (dependent u p o n conditions o f space and time) and yet it has practical reality. knowle d g e o f which is d e p e n d e n t u p o n those conditions. and so the deduction o f the concept o f nonempirical possession. its intelligible condition (a merely rightful possession) must then also be possible. No one n e e d be surprised that theoretical principles about external objects that are mine or yours get lost in the intelligible and represent n o extension of knowledge. that is. as a fact o f reason. which is an empirical way o f thinking of possession. So the concept to which the concept o f a right is directly applied is not that o f holding (detentio). since that concept rests simply on that o f nonphysical possession. Since the concept o f a right is simply a rational concept. but must first be applied to the understanding's p u r e concept of possession in general. however. so that they can be external objects that are mine or yours. Now practical reason requires me. So too the expression external does not mean existing in a place other than w h e r e I am. Since this amounts to saying that I am to be in a place and also not be in it. hence only possession o f myself. insofar as I have it under my control (the understanding's concept o f possession i n d e p e n d e n t of spatial determinations). A n d anyone w h o wants to make my continuous occupation of this place by my person the condition o f my having it as mine must either assert that it is not at all possible to have something external as mine (and this conflicts with the Postulate §2) or else require that in o r d e r to have it as mine I be in two places at once." since by it an obligation is laid u p o n all others. It is not because I occupy a place on the earth with my body that this place is something external that is mine (for that concerns only my outer freedom. H e r e practical reason requires us to think of possession apart from possession o f this object o f my choice in appearance (holding it).38 in which abstraction is made f r o m all spatial and temporal conditions and the object is thought of only as under my control (in potestate meapositum esse). For here we are speaking only of an intellectual relation to an object. [254] . or that my decision and acceptance are occurring at a d i f f e r e n t time f r o m the making o f the o f f e r . to apply mine or yours to objects not in accordance with sensible conditions but in abstraction f r o m them. independently o f any relation to it in space and time. since it has to d o with a determination of choice in accordance with laws of f r e e d o m . only then is my external right involved. I shall therefore say that I possess a field even t h o u g h it is in a place quite d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h e r e I actually am. and it also requires m e to think o f possession o f them in this way. to refrain f r o m using the object. so that it is only an internal right). not a thing external to me. to think o f it not in terms o f empirical concepts but o f concepts o f the understanding. It is mine if I still possess it even t h o u g h I have left it f o r another place. since only a concept of the understanding can be subsumed u n d e r concepts of Right. U p o n this is based the validity o f such a concept o f possession (possessio noumenon). f o r such lawgiving is involved in the expression "this external object is mine.The Doctrine of Right g 75 having. those that can contain a priori conditions o f empirical concepts. which they would not otherwise have. it means only an object distinct f r o m me. as a giving of law that holds f o r everyone. he contradicts himself. by its principle of Right. So the way to have something external as what is mine consists in a merely rightful connection o f the subject's will with that object in accordance with the concept o f intelligible possession. and the object is mine because my will to use it as I please does not conflict with the law of outer f r e e d o m . "this is to be yours" and also "this is not to be yours. For my having and possession [ Habe und Besitz] in what was promised is not annulled by the promisor's saying at one time "this thing is to be yours" and then at a later time saying o f the same thing "I now will that it not be yours. as in the p r e c e d i n g cases. empirical possession (possessio phaenomenon). T h e antithesis says: It is not possible to have something external as mine unless I am in possession o f it. without any time between the two declarations o f his will. only by an unavoidable dialectic in which both thesis and antithesis make equal claims to the validity o f two conditions that are inconsistent with each other is reason forced." For in such intellectual relations it is as if the promisor had said. T h e same holds o f the concept of rightful possession o f a person.loo Metaphysics of Morals T h i s can also be applied to the case o f my having accepted a p r o m ise. In this way it can lay d o w n synthetic a priori propositions about Right. as included in the subject's belongings (his wife. the first if I understand. the p r o o f of which (as will soon be [255] . and this by an antinomy o f propositions concerning the possibility o f such a concept. Solution: B o t h propositions are true. merely by leaving out empirical conditions. child. servant). and what is externally mine or yours h e r e is based. Rightfully practical reason is f o r c e d into a critique o f itself in the concept o f something external that is mine or yours. the second if I understand by it purely intelligible possession (possessio noumenon). T h e thesis says: It is possible to have something external as mine even t h o u g h I am not in possession o f it. f o r what connects them is a relation in terms of rights. T h i s domestic community and the possession of their respective status visa-vis one another by all its m e m b e r s is not annulled by their being authorized to separate f r o m one another and go to d i f f e r e n t places. by the w o r d possession. as it is justified in d o i n g by the law of f r e e d o m . But we cannot see how intelligible possession is possible and so how it is possible f o r something external to be mine or yours. even in its practical use (having to d o with rights). With r e g a r d to this postulate it is particularly noteworthy that practical reason extends itself without intuitions and without even needing any that are a priori. to m a k e a distinction between possession as appearance and possession that is thinkable merely by the understanding. that is." which is self-contradictory. entirely o n the assumption that purely rational possession without h o l d i n g each other is possible. but must infer it f r o m the postulate of practical reason. since the universality. the subject must also be permitted to constrain e v e r y o n e else with w h o m he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's to enter along with him into a civil constitution. since that would infringe u p o n f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws. o f obligation arises f r o m a universal rule. in a Civil Condition W h e n I declare (by w o r d or deed). Corollary: I f it must be possible. 3 9 It Is Possible to Have Something External as One's Own Only in a Rightful Condition. but is already contained in the concept o f an obligation corresponding to an external right. Now a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law f o r e v e r y o n e with regard to possession that is external and t h e r e f o r e contingent. I will that something external is to be mine. the statutory laws obtaining in this condition cannot infringe u p o n natural Right (i. in terms o f rights.e.e.. in a practical respect. that can provide everyone this assurance. I thereby declare that everyone else is u n d e r obligation to refrain f r o m using that object of my choice.. hence only a collective general (common) a n d p o w e r f u l will. and with it the reciprocity. an obligation no one would have w e r e it not f o r this act of mine to establish a right. [256] In a State of Nature Something External Can Actually Be Mine or Yours but Only Provisionally W h e n people are u n d e r a civil constitution. So only in a civil condition can something external be mine or yours. That Is. in an analytic way. under an Authority Giving Laws Publicly. public) lawgiving accompanied with p o w e r is the civil condition.The Doctrine of Right g 77 shown) can afterwards be a d d u c e d . however. T h i s claim involves. I am therefore not u n d e r obligation to leave external objects belonging to others u n t o u c h e d unless everyone else provides m e assurance that he will behave in accordance with the same principle with r e g a r d to what is mine. f o r the obligation here arises f r o m a universal rule having to d o with external rightful relations. T h i s assurance does not require a special act to establish a right. So it is only a will putting everyone u n d e r obligation. acknowledging that I in turn am u n d e r obligation to every other to refrain f r o m using what is externally his. to have an external object as one's own. But the condition o f being u n d e r a general external (i. that . In summary. by which what belongs to each is only secured. f o r the will o f all others except f o r himself. then. any holding of an external object is a condition whose conformity with right is based on that postulate by a previous act of will. to furnish p r o o f that his possession is in conformity with right (for this holds only in disputes about rights). whereas possession f o u n d in an actual civil condition would be conclusive possession. and so the rightful principle " w h o e v e r acts on a m a x i m by which it becomes impossible to have an object o f my choice as mine w r o n g s me. which can be based only on a law o f a c o m m o n will. possession which t h e r e f o r e accords with the possibility o f such a condition. already presupposes what belongs to someone (to w h o m it secures it). For a civil constitution is just the rightful condition. and hence has as little lawful force in d e n y i n g him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be f o u n d only in a general will). since he is presumed to be an honest man. T h i s prerogative arises instead f r o m the capacity anyone has. which proposes to put him u n d e r obligation to give u p a certain possession. and so long as this condition does not conflict with another's earlier possession of the same object he is provisionally [257] . and in anticipation o f this holds comparatively as rightful possession. A n y guarantee.loo Metaphysics of Morals Right which can be derived f r o m a priori principles f o r a civil constitution). Consequently. this prerogative o f Right arising f r o m empirical possession does not consist in its being unnecessary f o r the possessor. is provisionally rightful possession. to have an external object of his choice as his own. whereas he at least has the advantage of being compatible with the introduction and establishment o f a civil condition. is merely unilateral. Possession in anticipation o f and preparation for the civil condition. Prior to entering such a condition. Prior to a civil constitution (or in abstraction f r o m it) external objects that are mine or yours must therefore be assumed to be possible." remains in force. by the postulate o f practical reason. In accordance with the f o r m u l a Happy is he who is in possession (beati possedentes). and with them a right to constrain everyone with w h o m we could have any dealings to enter with us into a constitution in which external objects can be secured as mine or yours. the way to have something external as one's own in a state of nature is physical possession that has in its favor the rightful presumption that it will be made into rightful possession t h r o u g h being united with the will o f all in a public lawgiving. a subject w h o is ready f o r it resists with right those w h o are not willing to submit to it and w h o want to interfere with his present possession. but not actually settled [eigentlich aber nicht ausgemacht] and determined. in accordance with the law of outer f r e e d o m . . in conformity with the postulate of reason. in preventing anyone w h o does not want to enter with him into a condition o f public lawful f r e e d o m f r o m usurping the use o f that object. a thing that would otherwise be annihilated practically. in o r d e r to put to his own use.The Doctrine of Right g 79 justified. it would always have to be thought to be acquired and derived (communio derivata). General Principle of External Acquisition I acquire something w h e n I b r i n g it about ( e f f i c i o ) that it becomes mine. it must still be distinguished f r o m a primitive community (communio primaeva). and which.[258] CHAPTER II How to Acquire Something External §10. Something external is originally mine which is mine without any act that establishes a right to it. without being derived f r o m what is another's. T h e principle o f external acquisition is as follows: T h a t is mine which I bring u n d e r my control (in accordance with the law o f outer freedom)] which. as an object of my choice. 2) Giving a sign (declaratio) o f my possession o f this object 80 . A condition o f community (communio) o f what is mine and yours can never be t h o u g h t to be original but must be acquired (by an act that establishes an external right). But that acquisition is original which is not derived f r o m what is another's. otherwise it would conflict with another's f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws. like the f o r m e r . T h i s apprehension is taking possession of an object o f choice in space and time. Nothing external is originally mine. is something that I have the capacity to use (in accordance with the postulate o f practical reason). T h e aspects (attendenda) of original acquisition are t h e r e f o r e : 1) Apprehension o f an object that belongs to no one. finally. on principles but only on history. I will to be mine (in conformity with the Idea o f a possible united will). although possession o f an external object can originally be only possession in c o m m o n . which is supposed to have been instituted in the earliest time of relations of rights a m o n g men and cannot be based. 4 0 A l t h o u g h primitive. but it can indeed be acquired originally. that is. so that the possession in which I put myself is possessio phaenomenon. Even if one thinks (problematically) o f an original community (communio mei et tui originaria). if an acquisition is first it is not therefore original. 2) [260] 3) . as the act of a general will (in Idea) giving an external law t h r o u g h which everyone is b o u n d to agree with my choice. what it requires as the condition o f empirical possession is priority in time to anyone else w h o wants to take control of the object (qui prior tempore potior iure). or another's performance (causality). the status o f that person. lege). T h e validity o f this last aspect o f acquisition. Division of the Acquisition of Something External That Is Mine or Yours 1) In terms o f the matter (the object). in the question o f what is laid d o w n as right abstraction can be m a d e f r o m the empirical conditions o f possession.The Doctrine of Right g 81 [259] and o f my act o f choice to exclude everyone else f r o m it. it is still an aspect o f the way acquisition is carried out. for if it required a bilateral choice the acquisition would be derived f r o m the contract o f two (or more) persons and so f r o m what is another's. I acquire either a corporeal thing (substance). or another person himself. is based o n this: Since all these acts have to do with a right and so proceed f r o m practical reason. that is. something external is acquired t h r o u g h the act o f a unilateral. possession (though not use) o f another person as a thing. whereas original acquisition can proceed only f r o m a unilateral will. A s original. a special m e m b e r of the division of rights. A l t h o u g h this is not. it is either a right to a thing (ius reale). It is not easy to see how an act of choice o f that kind could establish what belongs to someone. 3) Appropriation (appropriatio). or a right against a person (ius personale). the conclusion that my possession holds as possession merely by right (possessio noumenon). pacto. insofar as I get a right to m a k e arrangements about him 4 2 (deal with him). In terms o f the basis o f the acquisition in Right (titulus). that is. strictly speaking. it is only the result of a unilateral choice. on which rests the conclusion "this external object is mine. bilateral or omnilateral choice {facto. In terms o f the form (the kind of acquisition). yet it would be derived f r o m the particular wills o f each and would be omnilateral. or a right to a person akin to a right to a thing (ius realiter personale). W h e n it takes place." is correctly drawn f r o m sensible to intelligible possession. "the external object is mine." that is. so that the conclusion. 41 and only corporeal things (substances) can be acquired originally. For the acquisition o f a public rightful condition by the union o f the will o f all f o r giving universal law would be an acquisition such that n o n e could precede it. However. Original acquisition of an external object o f choice is called taking control o f it (occupatio ). and this is an absurd way of representing it. By the term Property Right (ius reale) should be understood not only a right to a thing (ius in re) but also the sum o f all the principles having to do with things being mine or yours. What Is a Right to a Thing? T h e usual exposition of a right to a thing (ius reale. that. B u t what is it that enables me to recover an external object f r o m anyone w h o is h o l d i n g it and to constrain him (per vindicationem) to put m e in possession of it again? C o u l d this external rightful relation o f my choice be a direct relation to a corporeal thing? S o m e o n e w h o thinks that his right is a direct relation to things rather than to persons w o u l d have to think (though only obscurely) that since there corresponds to a right on one side a duty on the other. because it is already u n d e r obligation to him. For this possession in c o m m o n is the only condition u n d e r which it is possible f o r me to exclude every other possessor f r o m the private use o f a thing (ius contra quemlibet huius rei possessorem) since. an external thing always remains under obligation to the first possessor even t h o u g h it has left his hands. could still be w r o n g e d by others w h o are in possession o f it and are using it. that "it is a right against every possessor of it." is a correct nominal definition. an obligation he would not otherwise have. But it is clear that a m a n . ius in re). it rejects anyone else w h o pretends to be the possessor o f it. it is inconceivable how I. Otherwise I would have to think o f a right to a thing as if the thing had an obligation to me. [261] So the real definition would have to go like this: A right to a thing is a right to the private use of a thing o f which I a m in (original or instituted) possession in c o m m o n with all others. even t h o u g h it may be permissible. unless such a possession in c o m m o n is assumed. By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain f r o m using a thing. to make this rightful relation perceptible by picturing it and expressing it in this way. f r o m which my right against every other possessor o f it is then derived. hence I can do this only t h r o u g h the united choice o f all w h o possess it in c o m m o n . always pointing m e out to w h o e v e r else wanted to take possession o f it and protecting it against any incursions by them. So he would think of my right as if it were a guardian spirit a c c o m p a n y i n g the thing. if need be.loo Metaphysics of Morals Section I On Property Right §11. w h o am not in possession o f the thing. It is t h e r e f o r e absurd to think of an obligation of a person to things or the reverse. All men are originally (i. a chosen and t h e r e f o r e an acquired lasting possession — is possession in common because the spherical surface of the earth unites all the places on its surface. without thereby infringing u p o n the f r e e d o m o f anyone else w h o is not now h o l d i n g it. is movable (at least in terms o f its matter). that is. First Acquisition of a Thing Can Be Only Acquisition of Land L a n d (understood as all habitable ground) is to be r e g a r d e d as the substance with respect to whatever is movable u p o n it. a house and so forth. for if . and the Possibility of Such Acquisition Is Based on the Original Community of Land in General T h e first proposition rests on the postulate of practical reason (§2).The Doctrine of Right g 83 w h o was all alone on the earth could really neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own. there is also no (direct) right to a thing.. a tree. they have a right to be wherever nature or chance (apart f r o m their will) has placed them. then by what is mine or yours with r e g a r d to that is understood not its substance but what adheres to it. and if a thing that cannot be m o v e d without destroying its f o r m is called immovable. T h e p r o o f o f the second proposition is as follows. and any other external object. T h i s kind of possession (possessio) — which is to be distinguished f r o m residence (sedes). so in a practical sense no one can have what is movable on a piece o f land as his own unless he is assumed to be already in rightful possession o f the land. §12. but whatever can be destroyed. whereas the existence o f the latter is to be r e g a r d e d only as inherence. as a thing. as a person. For suppose that the land belonged to no one: I could then r e m o v e every movable thing on it f r o m its place and take it f o r myself until they were all gone.e. W h a t is called a right to a thing is only that right someone has against a person w h o is in possession o f it in c o m m o n with all others (in the civil condition). Just as in a theoretical sense accidents cannot exist apart f r o m a substance. prior to any act of choice that establishes a right) in a possession of land that is in conformity with right. [262] §13. H e n c e . since there is no relation whatever o f obligation between him. Any Piece of Land Can Be Acquired Originally. which is not the thing itself. speaking strictly and literally. No insight can be had into the possibility of acquiring in this way. the concept of which is not empirical and dependent u p o n temporal conditions. rather. But the aforesaid will can justify an external acquisition only insofar as it is included in a will that is united a priori (i. For a unilateral will (and a bilateral but still particular will is also unilateral) cannot put everyone under an obligation that is in itself contingent. propria). Original possession in common is. which can never be proved. Acquisition of an external object of choice by a unilateral will is taking control of it. So original acquisition of an external object. beginning to hold (possessionis physicae) a corporeal thing in space. that is.loo Metaphysics of Morals its surface were an unbounded plane. T h e possession by all men on the earth that precedes any acts of theirs which would establish rights (that is constituted by nature itself) is an original possession in common (communio possessionis originaria). and so too possible f o r any external object to be mine or yours. In Original Acquisition. only through the union of the choice of all who can come into practical relations with one another) and that commands absolutely. men could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another. appropriation of it (appropriatio). this requires a will that is omnilateral. a practical rational concept which contains a priori the principle in accordance with which alone men can use a place on the earth in accordance with principles of Right. [263] §14.e. For only in accordance with this principle of the will is it possible for the free choice of each to accord with the f r e e d o m of all. like that of a supposed primitive possession in common (communio primaeva). its possibility is instead an immediate consequence of the postulate of practical reason. which is an act of choice. conforms with the law of everyone's outer f r e e d o m (hence a priori) is that of priority in time. that is. the Act Required to Establish a Right Is Taking Control ( occupatio) T h e only condition under which taking possession (apprehensio). But the will that a thing (and so too a specific. and therefore possible f o r there to be any right.. and community would not then be a necessary result of their existence on the earth. separate place on the earth) is to be mine. in original acquisition can be only unilateral (voluntas unilateralis s. that is united not contingently but a priori and therefore necessarily. . nor can it be demonstrated by reasons [durch Gründe dartun ]. and hence too of a specific and separate piece of land. and because of this is the only will that is lawgiving. can take place only through taking control of it (occupatio). only insofar as it is the first taking possession (prior apprehensio). but Only Provisionally A civil constitution. the possibility o f acquiring something external in whatever condition men may live together (and so also in a state o f nature) is a principle of private Right. in a State of Nature It Can Also Be Acquired. is still objectively necessary. for [265] . H e n c e original acquisition can be only provisional.The Doctrine of Right g 85 [264] §15. as far as whoever wants to appropriate it can d e f e n d it . that provisional acquisition is true acquisition. Since there is only possession in appearance to put u n d e r possession in accordance with rational concepts of Right. based on the original community o f land. by the postulate o f practical reason with regard to rights. with a view to it and to its being b r o u g h t about. Still. in accordance with which each is justified in using that coercion which is necessary if m e n are to leave the state o f nature and enter the civil condition. T h e r e f o r e something external can be originally acquired only in conformity with the Idea of a civil condition. With regard to such a constitution and its establishment there is t h e r e f o r e a real principle o f natural Right [Rechtsgesetz der Natur] to which any external acquisition is subject. that is. a title to take intellectual possession (setting aside all empirical conditions o f space and time) must correspond to this empirical title o f acquisition. but prior to its realization (for otherwise acquisition would be derived). necessary as a duty. how far does authorization to take possession o f a piece of land extend? A s far as the capacity f o r controlling it extends. Something Can Be Acquired Conclusively Only in a Civil Constitution. that is. though its realization is subjectively contingent. for." But the rational title o f acquisition can lie only in the Idea of a will o f all united a priori (necessarily to be united). which is h e r e tacitly assumed as a necessary condition (conditio sine qua non)\ f o r a unilateral will cannot put others u n d e r an obligation they would not otherwise have. T h e question arises. that is.as if the land were to say. T h e empirical title of acquisition was taking physical possession (apprehensio physica). which can alone make any acquisition conclusive. T h i s is how the dispute over w h e t h e r the sea is free or closed also has to be decided. Conclusive acquisition takes place only in the civil condition. if you cannot protect m e you cannot c o m m a n d me. B u t the condition in which the will o f all is actually united f o r giving law is the civil condition. T h i s intellectual title is the basis o f the proposition: " W h a t I bring u n d e r my control in accordance with laws o f outer f r e e d o m and will to become mine becomes mine. this land really belongs to both in c o m m o n and is not something belonging to no one (res nullius). for example. however. just because it is used by both to k e e p them apart. so that neither enjoys the right o f priority and the land remains always free. F u r t h e r m o r e . Finally. f o r which many other signs that cost less e f f o r t can be substituted. B u t with respect to a certain piece of land (lying between the two). by force if need be. However. the Hottentots. or the latter resist a people that wants to plant orchards. as in Mongolia w h e r e . and so on)? No. would still be consistent with the right of taking control. in o r d e r to acquire land is it necessary to develop it (build on it. or (which is not m u c h better). in o r d e r to establish a civil union with them and b r i n g these men (savages) into a rightful condition (as with the A m e r i c a n Indians. M o r e o v e r . they make no object of direct possession and can belong to what the subject possesses only insofar as the substance is already recognized as his. w h e n neither nature nor chance but just our own will brings us into the n e i g h b o r h o o d of a people that holds out no prospect of a civil union with it. may one party interfere with another in its act of taking possession. it can still be asked whether. developing land is n o t h i n g m o r e than an external sign o f taking possession. cultivate it. haul u p amber f r o m the ocean floor. In that case.loo Metaphysics of Morals example. since all the land belongs to the people. can anyone have a thing as his own on land no part o f which belongs to someone? Yes. w h e r e it itself can be prevented f r o m being. so that anyone can leave his pack lying on it or recover possession o f his horse if it runs away. drain it. since as long as they keep within their boundaries the way they want to live on their land is u p to their own discretion (res meraefacultatis). as far as a cannon shot can reach no one may fish. it is only by means of a contract that anyone can have a movable thing as his on land that belongs to another. and the inhabitants of New Holland). we should not be authorized to f o u n d colonies. Lastly. A g a i n . the use of it belongs to each individual. along the coast o f a territory that already belongs to a certain state. leaving it unused. and so forth? Certainly. since one party can prevent another f r o m taking possession only by being on adjacent land. absolute hindrance would be a contradiction. For since these f o r m s (of specification) are only accidents. b e l o n g i n g to no one? Not entirely. to f o u n d colonies by f r a u d u l e n t purchase o f [266] . can two neighboring peoples (or families) resist each other in a d o p t i n g a certain use o f land. as neutral territory to separate the two parties. and so forth. since it is his. W h e n first acquisition is in question. can a hunting people resist a pasturing people or a f a r m i n g people. indeed.The Doctrine of Right g 87 their land. even t h o u g h [267] . that is. original external acquisition) the hardest o f all to solve. which. §16. Exposition of the Concept of Original Acquisition of Land All men are originally in common possession of the land o f the entire earth (communio fundi originaria) and each has by nature the will to use it (lex insti). especially since nature itself (which abhors a vacuum) seems to d e m a n d it. Should we not be authorized to do this. since not all acquisition can be derived. m a k i n g use o f o u r superiority without regard f o r their first possession. provisionally. Hence it proceeds only f r o m a will in the civil condition (lex iustitiae distributivae). and great expanses o f land in other parts of the world. b e f o r e the establishment of the civil condition but with a view to it. because the choice of one is unavoidably o p p o s e d by nature to that o f another. But in the f o r m e r condition. Accordingly. So this problem cannot be a b a n d o n e d as insoluble and intrinsically impossible. Such a way o f acquiring land is t h e r e f o r e to be repudiated. of the external object that can be acquired makes this problem (of the sole. But the law that is to determine for each what land is mine or yours will be in accordance with the axiom of outer f r e e d o m only if it proceeds f r o m a will that is united originally and a priori (that presupposes no rightful act for its union). such acquisition will always remain only provisional unless this contract extends to the entire h u m a n race. it is a duty to proceed in accordance with the principle o f external acquisition. so that the end o f creation would have been frustrated? But it is easy to see t h r o u g h this veil of injustice (Jesuitism). T h e indeterminacy. which alone determines what is right. what is rightful. would have otherwise remained uninhabited by civilized people or. that is. which are now splendidly populated. Still. there is also a rightful capacity o f the will to bind everyone to recognize the act of taking possession and of appropriation as valid. But even if it is solved t h r o u g h the original contract. would do away with any use o f it if this will did not also contain the principle f o r choice by which a particular possession f o r each on the c o m m o n land could be d e t e r m i n e d (lex iuridica). with respect to quantity as well as quality. and what is laid down as right. which would sanction any means to g o o d ends. and so become owners o f their land. would have to remain f o r e v e r uninhabited. there must be some original acquisition or other o f what is external. that is. and as long as their opposition lasts. are left out or disregarded (abstracted from). cannot mean. insofar as his will c o n f o r m s with the axiom o f outer f r e e d o m . the term can m e a n merely something distinct f r o m me. as it were). with regard to the use of the thing. We have f o u n d the manner of acquisition in the empirical conditions o f taking possession (apprehensio). this favor carries with it all the effects of acquisition in conformity with right. and t h e r e f o r e of external possession subject to spatial conditions. which follows f r o m the two elements given.loo Metaphysics of Morals it is only unilateral. together with all its rightful consequences. T h e r e f o r e provisional acquisition o f land. is not yet conclusive. that is. possession is nothing other than a relation of a person to persons. this f a v o r does not extend beyond the point at which others (participants) consent to its establishment. Deduction of the Concept of Original Acquisition We have f o u n d the title of acquisition in an original community o f land. needs and gains the f a v o r [Gunst] of a principle (lex permissiva) for determining the limits o f possible rightful possession. as only leading to it. is intelligible possession o f a thing. T h e concept belonging to Right [Rechtsbegriff] o f what is externally mine or yours. in another place than w h e r e I am. f o r it is a rational concept. Now we still need to explicate [entwickeln] f r o m principles o f p u r e practical reason with r e g a r d to rights acquisition itself. the external mine or yours. since leaving the state o f nature is based upon duty. as far as the term external to me is concerned. Since this acquisition precedes a rightful condition and. is possible. with the postulate o f his capacity to use external objects o f choice. j o i n e d with the will to have the external object as one's own. so far as this is a substance. Provisional acquisition. all o f w h o m are bound. [268] §17. however. A n d [as far as the term mine is concerned] this rational concept cannot signify the concept o f empirical possession (a continual taking possession. but only that o f having an external object under my control (the connection o f the object with me insofar as this is the subjective condition o f its being possible f o r m e to use it). then. as a relation o f a person to objects that have no obligation. B u t if they are o p p o s e d to entering it (the civil condition). since only a p u r e concept of the understanding can be subsumed u n d e r a rational concept. we need to explicate intelligible possession (possessio noumenon) of an object f r o m what is contained in the concept o f it. instead. and with the lawgiving o f the will of all t h o u g h t as united a priori. Now if these sensible conditions o f possession. This. . by the will of the first person. which is a p u r e concept of the understanding. gold plating. transforming o f a piece of land can furnish no title o f acquisition to it. to secure my land against encroachment by others (e..g. T h e first working. w h e t h e r a tract o f the ocean floor can be acquired (the right to fish o f f my shore. But the o w n e r o f a shore cannot include. and w h o e v e r e x p e n d s his labor on land that was not already his has lost his pains and toil to w h o was first. if they d o not otherwise belong to another they belong to me without my n e e d i n g a particular act establishing a right in o r d e r to make them mine (not facto but lege). than the tacit prevalent deception of personifying things and o f thinking of a right to things as being a right directly against them. put things u n d e r an obligation to serve him and no one else. as if someone could. alluvium. in his right to acquire. in general. or. f o r otherwise people would probably not have passed so lightly over the question that naturally arises (already noted above). W h a t is mine or yours must instead be derived f r o m ownership o f the substance in accordance with this rule (accessorium sequitur suum principale). possession also cannot extend to them and the o p e n seas are free (mare liberum). T h i s is so clear o f itself that it is hard to assign any other cause for that opinion. and so forth). f o r they can be r e g a r d e d as accidents inhering in the substance (iure rei meae). possession o f an accident can provide n o basis for r i g h t f u l possession o f the substance. enclosing.g. or also. by the work he e x p e n d s u p o n them.. which is so old and still so widespread. a change in a riverbed adjoining my land and the resulting extension of my land. But since it is not possible to reside on the high seas themselves. W h e t h e r land that extends b e y o n d dry land can be acquired — that is. My possession extends as far as I have the mechanical ability. that is. to bring u p amber and so forth) — must be decided in accordance with the same principles. possession by mere right. mixing some stuff belonging to me with other materials. A s f o r corporeal things on land that is already mine. what is unintentionally [269] . even t h o u g h the object (the thing I possess) is a sensible object.The Doctrine of Right g 89 that is. "How is a right to a thing possible?" For a right against every possessor of a thing means only an authorization on the part o f someone's particular choice to use an object. and u p to this limit the sea is closed (mare clausum). A n y t h i n g else that is so connected with a thing o f mine that another cannot separate it f r o m what is mine without c h a n g i n g this also belongs to me (e. as far as cannon reach f r o m the shore). f r o m w h e r e I reside. insofar as this authorization can be t h o u g h t as contained in a synthetic general will and as in accord with the law of this will. A n external object that in terms of its substance belongs to someone is his property (dominium). accordingly. in which all rights in this thing inhere (as accidents of a substance) and which the o w n e r (dominus) can. My possession of another's choice. in the sense o f my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed in accordance with laws of f r e e d o m (what is externally mine or yours with respect to the causality of another). a river can be originally acquired by someone w h o is in possession of both banks. however. there can be two complete owners o f one and the same thing. they may only be possessors in c o m m o n o f what belongs to only one of them as his. without its being both mine and yours in c o m m o n . F u r t h e r m o r e . So the one w h o has full possession without use (dominus directus) only restricts the other (dominus utilis) to some continual performance without thereby limiting his use o f the thing. T h i s happens w h e n one of the so-called j o i n t owners (condomini) has only full possession without use. he can' acquire the river just as he can acquire any dry land subject to the conditions mentioned above. It is mentioned only incidentally. dispose of as he pleases (ius disponendi de re sua). So a m a n can be his own master (sui iuris) but cannot be the owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he pleases) — still less can he dispose of other men as he pleases — since he is accountable to the humanity in his own person.loo [270] Metaphysics of Morals washed up on shore. since this is not w r o n g i n g him (not a d e e d at all). it cannot be treated as a res nullius. not that o f men. as far as his possession o f the banks extends. f o r a better understanding of what was discussed a little earlier. is a right (of which I can have several against the . T h i s is not. But f r o m this it follows that an object of this sort can be only a corporeal thing (to which one has no obligation). O n the other hand. whether men o r things b e l o n g i n g to them. the p r o p e r place to discuss this point. while the other has all the use of the thing along with possession of it. which has to do with the Right o f humanity. [271] Section II On Contract Right §18. and t h o u g h a thing has been cast u p on land which belongs to someone. namely his abandoning o r renouncing what is his (per derelictionem aut renunciationem)\ f o r by such an act this would only cease to belong to one or the other. but by them alone nothing is as yet acquired. B u t this cannot take place by empirical acts of declaration. and would t h e r e f o r e be wrong). §19. T r a n s f e r o f the property o f one to another is alienation. and because o f this [272] . For an o f f e r i n g cannot be called a promise apart f r o m a preliminary j u d g m e n t that what is o f f e r e d (oblaturn) would be acceptable to the promisee. which must necessarily/o//ow> each other in time and are never simultaneous. I can still d u r i n g the interval (however short it may be) regret having promised. which is possible only t h r o u g h a comm o n will by means of which the object is always u n d e r the control o f one or the other. So too. T h i s derivation can take place only by transferring (translatio). the two others (of concluding) are promise (promissum) and acceptance (acceptatio). A right against a person can never be acquired originally and on one's own initiative (for then it would not c o n f o r m to the principle o f the consistency o f my choice with the f r e e d o m o f everyone. T h e first two (of negotiating) are offering (oblatio) and assent (approbatio) to it. contract Right. since I am still free b e f o r e he accepts. For if I have promised and the other now wants to accept. accordingly. but nothing would be acquired. and consequently only insofar as both wills are declared simultaneously. I cannot acquire a right against another t h r o u g h a d e e d o f his that is contrary to right (facto iniusto alterius)-. since as one gives u p his share in this c o m m o n u n d e r t a k i n g [ Gemeinschaft ] the object becomes the other's t h r o u g h his acceptance o f it (and so by a positive act o f choice). and this derivation. T h i s is indicated by the first two declarations. cannot take place t h r o u g h a negative act o f the other. as an act that establishes a right. Acquisition t h r o u g h another's d e e d to which I determine him in accordance with principles o f Right is. always derived f r o m what is his. A n act o f the united choice o f two persons by which anything at all that belongs to one passes to the other is a contract. in accordance with which I can be in this sort o f possession. For every contract there are two preparatory and two constitutive rightful acts of choice. by this I will still only preserve what is mine undiminished but will not acquire m o r e than what I previously had. f o r even if he has w r o n g e d me and I have a right to d e m a n d compensation f r o m him. B u t what belongs to the promisor does not pass to the promisee (as acceptant) by the separate will of either but only by the united will o f both. but there is only a single sum (system) o f principles.The Doctrine of Right g1 same person o r against others). and all the confirmations back and forth o f the declarations they have made. in which both acts required f o r establishing the right can only follow one u p o n another. T h a t I o u g h t to keep my promise is a postulate o f p u r e reason (pure as abstracting f r o m all sensible conditions of space and [273] . can consider himself as not b o u n d to his counterdeclaration after the promise. It is true that in an external relation of rights my taking possession o f another's choice (and his taking possession o f mine in turn). T h a t this is the true and the only possible deduction o f the concept of acquisition by contract is sufficiently c o n f i r m e d by the painstaking but always futile efforts of those w h o investigate rights (e. but both propositions are a priori). at the same moment. why ought I to k e e p my promise? f o r that / ought to keep it everyone readily grasps. stipula. which is a rational capacity f o r giving laws. that possession is represented t h r o u g h the will. this is the sensible condition o f taking possession. since their acts can only follow each other in time. that relation (as a rightful relation) is purely intellectual.g. H e r e both acts. T h e y still d o not succeed in this. T h e question was. Since.. is first t h o u g h t of empirically.loo Metaphysics of Morals the one w h o accepts it. as intelligible possession (possessio noumenon) in abstraction f r o m those empirical conditions. however. although they can only be successive. are represented not as following one u p o n another but (as if it were pactum re initum) as p r o c e e d i n g f r o m a single common will (this is expressed by the w o r d simultaneously). and the object (promissum) is represented. f o r his part. two of which together must be greater than the third (a synthetic proposition. by omitting empirical conditions. But it is absolutely impossible to furnish a p r o o f of this categorical imperative. promise and acceptance. just as it is impossible f o r a g e o m e t e r to prove by means of inferences based on reason alone [Vernunftschlüssel that in o r d e r to make a triangle he must take three lines (an analytic proposition). held by both persons). Moses Mendelssohn in his Jerusalem ) 43 to p r o d u c e a p r o o f of its possibility. or breaking a straw. as what is mine or yours. so that w h e n one act is the other is either not yet or is no longer. by means o f a declaration and counterdeclaration o f the choice o f each in time. T h e external formalities (solemnia) in concluding a contract (shaking hands. as acquired in accordance with a principle o f p u r e practical reason. manifest the perplexity o f the contracting parties as to how and in what way they are g o i n g to represent their declarations as existing simultaneously. Only a transcendental deduction o f the concept o f acquisition by contract can r e m o v e all these difficulties. as the basis for d e t e r m i n i n g it to a deed. and indeed a right to act u p o n his causality (his choice) to perform something f o r me. just as was the case in the p r e c e d i n g h e a d i n g f o r the doctrine o f acquisition o f external things by taking control of them. which is what constitutes any right to a thing. f o r otherwise I would acquire. and the other immediately takes it up. So the transfer does not take place in such a way that the promisor first abandons (derelinquit) his possession f o r the other's advantage. simultaneously rising and falling. By a contract I acquire something external. only a right against a person. I have become enriched [vermögender] (locupletior) by acquiring an active obligation on the f r e e d o m and the means [Vermögen] of the other. f o r a moment. that which transfers what is mine to the other is not one of the two separate wills (promittentis et acceptantis). By a contract I t h e r e f o r e acquire another's promise (not what he promised). and yet something is a d d e d to my external belongings. and this contradicts the concept of contract. just as w h e n a stone that has been thrown reaches the apex o f its parabolic path it can be r e g a r d e d as. in this condition. Because o f this continuity. T r a n s f e r is therefore an act in which an object belongs. f o r just a moment. what I acquire directly by a contract is not an external thing but rather his deed. by which that thing is b r o u g h t u n d e r my control so that I make it mine. but their united will. however. namely a right against a specific physical person. T r a n s f e r by contract o f what is mine takes place in accordance with the law of continuity (lex continui). an object as something that has no possessor (res vacua). hence would acquire it originally. [274] . T h e doctrine that it is possible to abstract f r o m those conditions without giving u p possession o f the promise is itself the deduction of the concept of acquisition by contract. a right against that moral person which is nothing other than the Idea o f the choice of all united a priori.The Doctrine of Right g 93 time in what concerns the concept of Right). or renounces ( renunciat) his right. or the reverse. to both together. however. T h i s right of mine is. possession o f the object is not interrupted f o r a m o m e n t d u r i n g this act. and so first passing f r o m its rising motion to its falling. that is. B u t what is it that I acquire? Since it is only the causality of another's choice with respect to a p e r f o r m a n c e he has promised me. §20. it is not a right to a thing. by which alone I can acquire a right against every possessor of the thing. so that some time elapses . My right is only a right against a person. namely the seller. a horse. the p e r f o r m a n c e has not yet taken place. and what I have acquired is only a right against a specific person. then this horse is not yet mine. to require o f the seller performance (praestatio) of his promise to put me in possession of the thing. But if a (definite or indefinite) time f o r delivering the thing is allowed between the conclusion and the discharge of the contract. and if what is promised is a thing. T h a t the latter is really the case is clear f r o m the following. A contract that is immediately followed by delivery (pactum re initum) excludes any interval between its being concluded and its being discharged and requires no f u r t h e r separate act by which what belongs to one is transferred to the other. to put me in possession (poscendi traditionem). prior to its being delivered. but only by delivery (traditio) o f what was promised. and becomes a right to a thing only by delivery o f the thing. f o r example. or whether a separate contract having to d o only with its being delivered must be a d d e d . and so b e f o r e the change o f possession. the question arises whether the thing already belongs to the acceptor by the contract. which is the subjective condition of its being possible for m e to use it as I please.loo Metaphysics of Morals §21. So b e f o r e the thing is delivered and received. and at the same time put it in my stable or otherwise in my physical possession. [275] In a contract by which a thing is acquired. Now if a contract does not include delivery at the same time (as pactum re initum). that is. delivers it to him. H e n c e the right that arises f r o m a contract is only a right against a person. the p e r f o r m a n c e can be discharged only by an act in which the promisor puts the promisee in possession o f the thing. If I conclude a contract about a thing that I want to acquire. it is not acquired by acceptance (acceptatio) o f the promise. so that the right acquired by m e r e acceptance is only a right against a person and becomes a right to a thing only by its being delivered. For any promise has to d o with a performance. and his right is a right to the thing. the thing has not yet passed f r o m one to the other and so has not been acquired by the promisee. and my right is a right to the thing. without making any separate arrangements with him as to w h o is to be in physical possession of the thing (holding it) b e f o r e I take possession o f it (apprehensio). But if I leave it in the seller's hands. it is then mine (vi pacti re initi). it must be a right lying b e y o n d any rights to things and any rights against persons. this instead requires a separate contract. B e f o r e this possessory act all that has been acquired t h r o u g h the contract is therefore a right against a person. and within it. by which the one w h o is alienating a thing still remains its o w n e r for a specified time (and must bear any risk that might a f f e c t it). by the favor o f which this sort o f acquisition is possible f o r us. it must be the Right o f humanity in o u r own person. . therefore takes place neither by a d e e d on one's own initiative (facto) nor by a contract (pacto) alone but by principle (1lege). for. For it is not a matter o f course that the seller will take charge. o f something f o r another's use. at his own risk. which constitutes a separate contract. namely a possessory act (actum possessorium). Only if the one w h o is acquiring the thing delays beyond this time can the seller regard him as its owner and the thing as delivered to him.The Doctrine of Right g 95 [276] between its being concluded and my taking possession o f what I am acquiring. f r o m which there follows a natural permissive principle. T h i s contract consists in my saying that I shall send f o r the thing (the horse) and the seller's a g r e e i n g to it. and the relation o f persons in the domestic condition is that o f a community o f f r e e beings w h o f o r m a society o f m e m b e r s o f a whole called a household (of persons standing in community with one another) by their a f f e c t i n g one another in accordance with the principle o f outer f r e e d o m (causality). T h a t is to say. d u r i n g this time I cannot gain possession without exercising a separate act to establish that right. since this kind o f right is neither a right to a thing nor merely a right against a person but also possession of a person. W h a t is mine or yours in terms o f this Right is what is mine or yours domestically. Acquisition o f this status. T h i s Right is that o f possession of an external object as a thing and use o f it as a person. Section III On Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things 44 §22. and the promisee can acquire an external thing only by its being delivered. §25. acquisition in accordance with this principle is of three kinds: A man acquires a wife. for which one gives itself u p to the other. do w r o n g to humanity in o u r own person. For the natural use that one sex makes of the other's sexual organs is enjoyment. Sexual union in accordance with principle is marriage (matrimonium). and unnatural use takes place either with a person of the same sex or with an animal o f a n o n h u m a n species.loo [277] Metaphysics of Morals §23. f o r otherwise marriage would be dissolved w h e n procreation ceases. f o r which it implanted the inclinations of the sexes for each other. and a family acquires servants. called unnatural (crimina carnis contra naturam) or also unmentionable vices. Even if it is supposed that their e n d is the pleasure o f using each other's sexual attributes. there are n o limitations or exceptions whatsoever that can save them f r o m being repudiated completely. T h i s is either a natural use (by which procreation o f a being o f the same kind is possible) or an unnatural use. that is. Whatever is acquired in this way is also inalienable and the right o f possessors of these objects is the most personal o f all rights. if a m a n and a w o m a n want to enjoy each other's sexual attributes they must necessarily marry. the marriage contract is not u p to their discretion but is a contract that is necessary by the principle o f humanity. but it is not requisite for h u m a n beings w h o marry to make this their e n d in o r d e r for their union to be compatible with rights. a couple acquires children. On the Right of Domestic Society Title I: Marriage Right §24. In this act a h u m a n [278] . fornicatio) or in accordance with principle. that is. the union of two persons of d i f f e r e n t sexes f o r lifelong possession o f each other's sexual attributes. venus volgivaga. Sexual union (commercium sexuale) is the reciprocal use that one h u m a n being makes o f the sexual organs and capacities o f a n o t h e r (usus membrorum et facultatum sexualium alterius). and this is necessary in accordance with p u r e reason's principles of Right. Natural sexual union takes place either in accordance with m e r e animal nature (vaga libido. T h e e n d o f begetting and bringing u p children may be an end of nature. Since such transgressions o f principle. In terms o f the object. which conflicts with the Right o f humanity in his own person. For the same reasons. A s f o r these. Accordingly. which takes advantage of the inequality of Estate of the two parties to give one o f them domination over the other. always and without question.The Doctrine of Right g7 being makes himself into a thing. either party can cancel the contract with the other as soon as it pleases without the other having g r o u n d s f o r complaining about any infringement of its rights. t h o u g h only by a separate contract. in bringing its partner back u n d e r its control. T h e same considerations also hold for a morganatic marriage. for this would be a contract to let and hire (locatio-conductio) a m e m b e r for another's use. and therefore makes herself into a mere thing). she would be surrendering herself as a thing to the other's choice. just as it is justified in retrieving a thing. f r o m concubinage [279] . T h e r e is only one condition u n d e r which this is possible: that while one person is acquired by the other as if it were a thing. since a person is an absolute unity. f o r in fact morganatic marriage is not d i f f e r e n t . A s f o r the latter. because of the inseparable unity o f members in a person. Hence it is not only admissible f o r the sexes to surrender to and accept each other for e n j o y m e n t u n d e r the condition o f marriage. the one w h o is acquired acquires the other in turn. B u t acquiring a m e m b e r o f a h u m a n being is at the same time acquiring the whole person. a contract to be a concubine (as pactum turpe) also comes to nothing. the relation o f the partners in a marriage is a relation of equality of possession. the other partner is justified. the partners are still authorized to f o r g o the use o f a part. §26. T h a t this right against a person is also akin to a right to a thing rests on the fact that if one o f the partners in a marriage has left or given itself into someone else's possession. in which. For this reason it follows that neither concubinage nor hiring a person f o r enjoyment on one occasion (pactumfornicationis) is a contract that could hold in Right. and also equality in their possession of material goods. everyone will admit that a person w h o has concluded such a contract could not rightfully be held to the fulfillment of her promise if she regrets it. equality both in their possession o f each other as persons (hence only in monogamy. in terms o f natural Right only. f o r in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality. So. but it is possible f o r them to d o so only u n d e r this condition. with regard to the f o r m e r . since in polygamy the person w h o surrenders herself gains only a part of the man w h o gets her completely. [280] Aquisition o f a wife or o f a husband therefore takes place neither facto (by intercourse) without a contract preceding it nor pacto (by a mere marriage contract without intercourse following it) but only lege.loo Metaphysics of Morals and is no true marriage. to the humanity in one's own person. children. which institutes no marriage and can also be dissolved by either of them w h o pleases. is a simulated contract. which is realized only t h r o u g h the use of their sexual attributes by each other. and it is impossible to f o r m a concept o f the production of a being e n d o w e d with f r e e d o m t h r o u g h a physi- . have by their procreation an original innate (not acquired) right to the care o f their parents until they are able to look after themselves. A marriage contract is consummated only by conjugal sexual intercourse (copula carnalis). If the question is t h e r e f o r e posed. that right cannot be forfeited t h r o u g h this accident f o r which no one is at fault. Just as there arose f r o m one's duty to oneself. B u t if incapacity appears only afterwards. §27. without any special act being required to establish this right. For the o f f s p r i n g is a person. that is. whether it is also in conflict with the equality of the partners f o r the law to say o f the husband's relation to the wife. Title II: Parental Right §28. and they have this right directly on the basis of principle (lege). either with a tacit understanding to refrain f r o m sexual intercourse or with awareness that one or both are incapable o f it. A contract made between two persons o f opposite sex. as the rightful consequence of the obligation not to e n g a g e in sexual union except t h r o u g h possession o f each other's person. that is. that is. and the right to direct that is based on this can be derived f r o m the very duty of unity and equality with respect to the end. so there follows f r o m procreation in this community a duty to preserve and care f o r its offspring. that is. he is to be y o u r master (he is the party to direct. she to obey): T h i s cannot be r e g a r d e d as conflicting with the natural equality o f a couple if this dominance is based only on the natural superiority o f the husband to the wife in his capacity to promote the c o m m o n interest of the household. a right (ius personale) o f both sexes to acquire each other as persons in the manner of things by marriage. as persons. to be u n n e c e s s a r y p o n d e r i n g that gets lost in pointless obscurity. f o r it s e e m s as if all their f u t u r e actions w o u l d h a v e to be p r e d e t e r m i n e d by that first act. nor can they even just abandon him to chance. as t h r o u g h a n a u t h o r i t a t i v e decision o f r e a s o n w i t h o u t its b e i n g able to m a k e this relation o f cause to e f f e c t c o m p r e h e n s i b l e f o r theoretical p u r p o s e s . . the temporal condition. h e will not h o l d this investigation. w h e n they r e n o u n c e their parental right to direct him as well as any claim to be compensated f o r their support and pains u p till now. since they have b r o u g h t not merely a worldly being but a citizen o f the world into a condition which cannot now be i n d i f f e r e n t to them even just according to concepts of Right. I f the p h i l o s o p h i c j u r i s t reflects o n t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f the p r o b l e m to be r e s o l v e d a n d the necessity o f solving it to satisfy principles o f R i g h t in this matter. since otherwise the fault for having neglected him would fall on the parents. §29F r o m this duty there must necessarily also arise the right o f parents to manage and develop the child. f o r which d e e d the parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his condition so far as they can. a n d it c a n d o this if it shows that the c o n t r a d i c t i o n arises only if. i n c l u d e d in t h e c h a i n o f natural necessity a n d t h e r e f o r e not f r e e . is also i n t r o d u c e d in the relation o f supersensible beings. so that in the f u t u r e he can look after himself and make his way in life. w h i c h c a n n o t be a v o i d e d in relation to sensible objects ( n a m e l y . and morally. A l l that o n e can r e q u i r e o f r e a s o n h e r e w o u l d be m e r e l y to p r o v e that t h e r e is n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n in the c o n c e p t o f a creation of free beings. T h e y have the right to do all this until the time o f his emancipation (emancipatio). all t h e way back to the first e l e m e n t s o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y in a metaphysics o f morals. since b o t h are supersensible. to develop him both pragmatically. B u t that s u c h b e i n g s (we m e n ) a r e still f r e e t h e categorical i m p e r a t i v e p r o v e s f o r m o r a l l y practical p u r p o s e s . as long as he has not yet mastered the use of his members or of his understanding: the right not only to f e e d and care f o r him but to educate him. T h e y cannot destroy their child as if he were something they had made (since a being e n d o w e d with f r e e d o m cannot be a product o f this kind) or as if he were their property. a l o n g with t h e c a t e g o r y o f causality. A f t e r they have completed his * N o c o n c e p t can be f o r m e d o f h o w it is possible f o r God to create f r e e beings. the t e m p o r a l c o n d i t i o n w o u l d h a v e to be i n t r o d u c e d h e r e too.* So f r o m a practical point of view it is a quite correct and even necessary Idea to regard the act o f procreation as one by which we have b r o u g h t a person into the world without his consent and on o u r own initiative. B u t the c o n t r a d i c t i o n vanishes if the p u r e c a t e g o r y (without a s c h e m a p u t u n d e r it) is u s e d in the c o n c e p t o f creation with a morally practical a n d t h e r e f o r e non-sensible intent. if the causal c o n c e p t is to obtain objective reality f o r theoretical p u r p o s e s . that the g r o u n d o f a n e f f e c t p r e c e d e s it).The Doctrine of Right g 99 [281] cal operation. A s f o r the supersensible. since a child still belongs to his parents as what is theirs (is still in their possession like a thing and can be b r o u g h t back even against his will into his parents' possession f r o m another's possession). so the parents are released in the same way f r o m their obligation to their children. in the doctrine o f Right. with other f r e e persons (members . merely by attaining the ability to support themselves (which happens partly as a natural c o m i n g o f age in the general course of nature. T h e domestic society that was necessary on principle is now dissolved.loo Metaphysics of Morals [282] education. W h a t they maintain is the same domestic society but it is now a society under the head of the household (societas herelis). we are referring not merely to the children's duty to return w h e n they have r u n away but to the parents' being justified in taking control o f them and i m p o u n d i n g them as things (like domestic animals that have g o n e astray). the division m a d e u p till now has not been complete. so that their right is not alienable (ius personalissimum). For w h e n we speak o f the rights of parents to children as part o f their household. [283] Both parties can now maintain what is actually the same household but with a d i f f e r e n t f o r m of obligation. a right to a person akin to a right to a thing. instead. w h o together with their parents f o r m e d a family. f o r m e d by a contract t h r o u g h which the head o f the household establishes a domestic society with the children w h o have now attained their majority or. Title III: Right of a Head of the Household §3°T h e children of a household. if the family has no children. reach their majority (maiorennes) without any contract to withdraw f r o m their f o r m e r d e p e n d e n c e . It is. From a child's personality it also follows that the right o f parents is not just a right to a thing. But this right is also not just a right against a person. and both children and parents acquire or reacquire their natural f r e e d o m . as the connection of the head of the household with servants (male or female servants o f the house). namely. there must necessarily be a d d e d to the headings rights to things and rights against persons the h e a d i n g rights to persons akin to rights to things. since a child can never be considered as the property o f his parents. Just as they are not in debt to their parents f o r their education. F r o m this it is evident that. In other words. they become their own masters (sui iuris) and acquire this right without any special act to establish it and so merely by principle (lege). the only obligation (to his parents) with which they can charge him is a m e r e duty o f virtue. partly in keeping with their particular natural qualities). namely the duty o f gratitude. without charging them with the cost of their education. and if he cannot the obligation devolves on his possessor. For the slave would have to educate his children if he could. Servants are included in what belongs to the head o f a household and. B u t children (even those o f someone w h o has become a slave t h r o u g h his crime) are at all times free. that is. and a contract by which one party would completely renounce its f r e e d o m for the other's advantage would be self-contradictory. they are his by a right that is like a right to a thing. Dogmatic Division of All Rights That Can Be Acquired by Contract §31. serving) (imperantis et subiecti domestici). can never be serfs). for if they r u n away f r o m him he can bring them back in his control by his unilateral choice.) T h e contract o f the head of a household with servants can t h e r e f o r e not be such that his use o f them would amount to using them up. null and void. since he has not yet committed a crime. as in the two preceding headings. since by it one party would cease to be a person and so would have no duty to k e e p the contract but would recognize only force. i. even b e f o r e the reasons that may have led them to r u n away and their rights have been investigated. but also f o r the servants (who. T h i s would be a society of unequals (one party being in command or being its head. what use he can make o f these members of his household. so the contract cannot be concluded f o r life but at most only f o r an unspecified time. f o r he can fetch servants back and d e m a n d them f r o m anyone in possession o f them.. [284] So we see here again. ( T h e right o f ownership with r e g a r d to someone w h o has forfeited his personality by a crime is not u n d e r consideration here.The Doctrine of Right g 101 of the household). and it is not f o r him alone to j u d g e about this. f o r it is only by a contract that he has b r o u g h t them u n d e r his control. he can never behave as if he owned them (dominus servi). and the cost o f educating him until he comes of age cannot be accounted against him as a debt that he has to pay o f f . But as far as the matter is concerned. as far as the f o r m (the way of his being in possession ) 45 is concerned. that is.e. that there is a right to persons akin to a right to things (of the head of the house over servants). the other obeying. For every man is b o r n free. accordingly. as what is externally his. A metaphysical doctrine of Right can be required to e n u m e r a t e a priori the members o f a division (divisio logica) in a complete and definite . within which one party may give the other notice. T h e acceptor. T h e r e are innumerable mixed and empirical kinds o f contract. considered objectively. and a guarantor. . A. b) Lending a thing (commodatum). only three simple and pure kinds o f contract. namely certainty o f acquisition by means o f a contract. b) Buying and selling (emtio venditio). A division in accordance with an a priori principle (in contrast with empirical divisions) can be called dogmatic. Acquisition t h r o u g h acceptance is not a part of a contract (unless the contract is a. or no acquisition but only C. as to w h e t h e r this rationally necessary result (the acquisition which ought to occur) will actually result (be the natural result) — accepting the promise still gives me n o guarantee that it will actually result. O n e r o u s contracts. which add statutory and conventional laws to the principles o f what is mine or yours in accordance with p u r e laws o f reason. I. gains nothing m o r e with r e g a r d to the object by means of the guarantor and his separate contract with the promisor. any empirical division is merely fragmentary (partitio). three persons are involved: a promisor. G o o d s f o r m o n e y . Every contract has for its purpose either A . c) Making a gift (donatio). Every contract consists in itself. A contract to alienate something (permutatio late sic dicta). Instead o f providing a system. which requires delivery) but the rightfully necessary result o f it. unilateral acquisition (a gratuitous contract) or B. but they lie beyond the sphere of the metaphysical doctrine o f Right. indeed. a) Barter (permutatio stride sic dicta). an acceptor. G o o d s f o r goods. acquisition by both parties (an onerous contract). A gratuitous contract (pactum gratuitum) is: a) Keeping goods on trust (depositum). B u t considered subjectively — that is. Since this guarantee belongs externally to the modality of a contract. and to establish thereby a true system o f them. [285] In accordance with these principles of logical (rational) division there are.loo Metaphysics of Morals way. B. which is all that should be considered here. pactum re initum. and leaves it uncertain whether there are not additional m e m b e r s that would be n e e d e d to fill out the entire sphere o f the concept divided. For this. that is. strictly speaking. o f two acts that establish a right: a promise and its acceptance. guaranteeing what belongs to someone (this contract can be gratuitous o n one side but can still be onerous on the other side). it is an additional factor serving to complete the means f o r achieving the acquisition that is the p u r p o s e of a contract. but he still gains the means of coercion f o r obtaining what is his. Loan for Consumption (mutuum). But it will be shown that the concept of money. in which division must be made in accordance with a priori principles. a payment of interest may also be a d d e d (pactum usurarium) if repayment can be made only in kind. A contract to let and hire (locatio conductio). that is. or money for money). namely goods. A s a contract of hiring this is an onerous contract (mandatum onerosum). as the greatest and most useful means men have for exchange of things. Lending a thing of mine to another for his use (locatio rei). called buying and selling (commerce). ß. abstracting f r o m the matter that is e x c h a n g e d (which could be conventional) and considering only the form. but w h e n this is d o n e in the other's name we speak o f a mandate. If someone carries on another's affairs in place of him but not also in his name. as the greatest means f o r e x c h a n g i n g thoughts. C a r r y i n g on another's affairs in his place and in his name. a . f o r example.The Doctrine of Right c) g 103 II. In this table o f all the ways of transferring (translatio) what belongs to one to another are to be f o u n d concepts of objects or instruments of transfer that [seem to be] entirely empirical and that. this is called carrying on his affairs without being commissioned to d o so (gestio negotii)'. grain f o r grain. A contract empowering an agent. granting another the use o f my powers f o r a specified price (merces). b) Assuming liability f o r another's promise (fideiussio). even in terms of their possibility. as well as the concept of a book. a) A joint giving and taking of a pledge (pignus). [286] C. . u n d e r the h e a d i n g of buying and selling. So the table of p u r e contracts need not be made impure by anything empirical mixed into it. L e n d i n g a thing on the condition of its being returned only in kind (e.. can still be resolved into p u r e intellectual relations. c) Personally vouching for a person's performance o f something (praestatio obsidis). 7. A contract o f letting of work on hire. Insofar as the contract is onerous. is the concept of money. Such. Contracts providing security (cautio).g. in contrast to all other alienable things. By this contract the worker is hired help (mercennarius). have no p r o p e r place in a metaphysical doctrine o f Right. and so too the concept of a book. T h e thing to be called m o n e y must. Still. 4 6 that is to say. F o r if it w e r e easier to p r o c u r e the s t u f f called m o n e y than goods. in general. is really only the s u m o f the industry with which m e n pay o n e a n o t h e r a n d w h i c h is r e p r e s e n t e d by the m o n e y in circulation within it. as o p p o s e d to things w h i c h are goods. a n d w o r k in place o f us. it is sufficient f o r distinguishing this kind o f object o f choice f r o m any other. insofar as it is a c q u i r e d by m e a n s o f m o n e y . a n d in turn not only raises these natural p r o d u c t s again but also helps to satisfy o u r n e e d s with the products o f art. f r o m the nominal definition o n e can see this m u c h : first. m a k i n g clothes. p r o v i d i n g the e n j o y m e n t s we seek a n d . has the greatest usefulness. B y contrast. that m o n e y represents all g o o d s . T h i s is a g o o d nominal definition [. O n this basis a preliminary real definition o f m o n e y can be given: it is the universal means by which men exchange their industriousness [or industry] 4 7 with one another. that the alienation o f m o n e y in e x c h a n g e is i n t e n d e d not as a gift but f o r reciprocal acquisition (by a pactum onerosum). A bushel o f grain has the greatest direct value as a m e a n s f o r satisfying h u m a n needs. What Is Money? [287] Money is a t h i n g that can be used only by b e i n g alienated. have cost as m u c h industry to p r o d u c e o r to obtain f r o m o t h e r m e n as the industry by w h i c h those g o o d s (natural o r artificial products) are a c q u i r e d f o r which that industry is e x c h a n g e d . It can be u s e d as f o d d e r f o r animals. a l o n g with the p r o d u c t i v e industry [Erwerbfleiss] that results in the nation's wealth. t h e r e f o r e . a m o n g all things. a n d second. H e n c e bank notes a n d promissory notes cannot be r e g a r d e d as m o n e y . industry in p r o d u c i n g g o o d s . T h u s a nation's wealth. m o r e m o n e y w o u l d t h e n c o m e into the m a r k e t than g o o d s f o r sale. since it is conceived as a universally accepted m e r e means o f c o m m e r c e (within a nation). which h a v e value in themselves a n d are related to the particular n e e d s o f o n e o r a n o t h e r in the nation. w h i c h nourish us. transport us. the value o f m o n e y is only indirect. a n d t h e r e f o r e trade in general. all the conveniences that f o r m the g o o d s o f industry [Industrie]. Yet it is still a m e a n s that.Namenerklärung] o f it (as given by A c h e n w a l l ) . the h u m a n p o p u l a t i o n is increased a n d p r e s e r v e d . w h o got the m o n e y m o r e readily. t h o u g h it tells us n o t h i n g about the possibility o f such a thing. a n d since the seller w o u l d h a v e to h a v e e x p e n d e d m o r e industry f o r his g o o d s than the b u y e r . w o u l d diminish a n d be curtailed. . O n e cannot e n j o y m o n e y itself o r m a k e i m m e d i a t e use o f it in any way.loo Metaphysics of Morals I. by b u i l d i n g houses. by m e a n s o f it. f u r t h e r m o r e . opulent ruler w h o originally used a material f o r the a d o r n m e n t and splendor o f his attendants (his court) came to levy taxes on his subjects in this material (as goods) (e. o r on the coast o f Guinea even black slaves). For the price (pretium) o f a thing is the j u d g m e n t of the public about its value (valor) in proportion to that which serves as the universal means to represent reciprocal e x c h a n g e of industry (its circulation). T h e a m o u n t of money in a nation t h e r e f o r e constitutes its wealth ( opulentia). since there is too little gold and too m u c h c o p p e r f o r them to be easily put into circulation and yet available in sufficiently small parts. in Senegal iron ingots. and in turn paid with this same material those his d e m a n d m o v e d to industry in p r o c u r i n g it. f o r they cost almost no industry to p r o d u c e and their value is based solely on the opinion that they will continue as b e f o r e to be convertible into hard cash. as is necessary for the e x c h a n g e o f [288] [289] . if the E u r o p e a n s did not increase their industry proportionately t h r o u g h being stimulated by those very materials. is apparently still greater than that e x p e n d e d on the m a n u f a c t u r e o f goods in E u r o p e . that is. but if it is eventually discovered that there is not e n o u g h hard cash f o r which they can be readily and securely e x c h a n g e d . or a kind o f beautiful seashell. In this way only (so it seems to me) could a certain merchandise have become a lawful means o f e x c h a n g e o f the industry of subjects with one another. letting those countries soon sink into poverty. especially in view of the industry vainly e x p e n d e d in searches f o r deposits that are so o f t e n unsuccessful. neither gold nor c o p p e r is r e g a r d e d as strictly money but only as merchandise. cowries. so that the luxuries they o f f e r constantly stimulate in others a desire f o r mining. w h e r e there is a great deal o f trade. silver. money. determines the price of all other things (goods). Accordingly. B u t how is it possible that what were originally only goods finally became money? T h i s would h a p p e n if a p o w e r f u l . c o p p e r . So the productive industry o f those w h o work the gold and silver mines in Peru or New Mexico. insofar as they would not otherwise be taught to others. a m o n g which even the sciences belong. in the circulation of possessions (permutatio publica). in accordance with e x c h a n g e regulations with them and a m o n g them (on a market or exchange).g. and thereby also become the wealth of the nation..The Doctrine of Right g 105 t h o u g h they can substitute f o r it temporarily. or as in the C o n g o a kind o f matting called makutes. gold. and this excess o f industry would be discontinued f r o m not being paid. this opinion suddenly collapses and makes failure of payment inevitable. In this way industry [in one country] always rivals industry [in another]. T h e intellectual concept u n d e r which the empirical concept of money falls is t h e r e f o r e the concept o f a thing that. he is the legitimate p u b l i s h e r . b u t in the n a m e o f the a u t h o r . O n e w h o speaks to the public in his o w n n a m e is called the author (autor). " M o n e y is t h e r e f o r e " ( a c c o r d i n g to A d a m Smith) "that material t h i n g the alienation o f w h i c h is the m e a n s a n d at the s a m e time t h e m e a s u r e o f the industry by w h i c h m e n a n d nations carry o n t r a d e with o n e a n o t h e r . t h r o u g h a writing. " 4 8 T h i s d e f i n i t i o n [ Erklärung ] b r i n g s the e m p i r i c a l conc e p t o f m o n e y to an intellectual c o n c e p t by l o o k i n g only to t h e form o f w h a t each party p r o v i d e s in r e t u r n f o r the o t h e r in o n e r o u s contracts (and abstracting f r o m their matter). w h e t h e r it has f e w o r m a n y pages). B u t w h e n the first two metals are not only w e i g h e d but also s t a m p e d . t h e r e b y b r i n g i n g it to the c o n c e p t o f R i g h t in the e x c h a n g e o f what is m i n e o r y o u r s g e n e r a l l y (commutatio late sic dicta). f o r e x a m p l e . operarius. It is r a t h e r a discourse to the public. o t h e r metals (even m o r e so. o r a w o r k in plaster that is a bust). o r a mass o f it. Unauthorized Publishing of Books49 Is Forbidden as a Matter of Right5" A writing is not a n i m m e d i a t e sign o f a concept (as is. h e r e . in the smallest p u r c h a s e . the printer).loo Metaphysics of Morals m e r c h a n d i s e . B u t the publisher speaks ( t h r o u g h his f o r e m a n . not in his o w n n a m e (for h e w o u l d t h e n pass himself o f f as the author). O n e w h o . a c c o r d i n g l y . so as to p r e s e n t the table a b o v e as a d o g m a t i c division a priori. nonmetallic materials) can b e f o u n d as m o n e y only in a nation w h e r e t h e r e is little trade. Silver ( m o r e o r less alloyed with c o p p e r ) is. that is. that is. they are l a w f u l m o n e y . that is. T h e s u m o f all the r e p r o d u c t i o n s o f t h e original w r i t i n g (the copies) is an edition. b u t if h e d o e s it w i t h o u t the author's permission. that is. the a u t h o r speaks publicly t h r o u g h the publisher. W h e n a p u b l i s h e r d o e s this with the author's permission. w h e t h e r it is written in h a n d o r set in type. an unauthorized publisher. discourses publicly in a n o t h e r ' s (the author's) n a m e is a publisher. h e is an illegitimate p u b l i s h e r . coinage. taken as the p r o p e r material f o r m o n e y a n d the m e a s u r e f o r r e c k o n i n g prices in the g r e a t t r a d e o f the w o r l d . p r o v i d e d with a sign indicating h o w m u c h they are to b e w o r t h . a n d so h e is entitled to d o this only w h e n the a u t h o r gives him [290] . w h i c h is a p p r o p r i a t e to the metaphysics o f R i g h t as a system. an e t c h i n g that r e p r e s e n t s a certain p e r s o n in a portrait. What Is a Book? A b o o k is a w r i t i n g (it d o e s not matter. w h i c h r e p r e sents a discourse that s o m e o n e delivers to the public by visible linguistic signs. II.The Doctrine of Right g 107 a mandate (mandatum). a right to this thing that the lessee had acquired in it (the house). T h e error consists in mistaking one o f these rights f o r the other. that is. W h y does unauthorized publishing. So unauthorized publishing of books is forbidden as a matter of Right. as included in the contract to lease). u n d e r contracts to let and hire (B. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse o f the publisher to the public. profits the legitimate publisher could and would have derived f r o m the use o f his right (furtum usus). the time being determined by custom). which strikes one even at first glance as unjust. or whether one can say that purchase breaks a lease (though notice is to be given the lessee. which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate f r o m the author to do so (praestatio operae). O n the first alternative the house actually had an encumbrance (onus) on it. Now it is true that an unauthorized publisher also speaks. on the basis of his right against a person. that o f renting to a tenant (ius incolatus). but one to which another contract had had to be a d d e d (one to which few landlords would agree). But it is still left o p e n f o r the lessee to complain. still have an appearance o f being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be r e p r o d u c e d (by someone in legitimate possession o f a copy of it). so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. T h i s can indeed take place (by entering this e n c u m b r a n c e in the land register. in the n a m e of the author. by an edition on his own initiative. T h e r e is another case. but then this would not be a mere contract to lease. a full right to a thing (property) outweighs any right against a person that cannot exist together with it. So the saying "Purchase breaks a lease" is valid. H e t h e r e f o r e commits the crime of stealing the profits f r o m the publisher w h o was appointed by the a u t h o r (who is therefore the only legitimate one).a). but he does so without having been given a mandate by the author {gerit se mandatarium absque mandata). and this is a right against a person. in which the confusion of a right against a person with a right to a thing is material f o r disputes. T h e question arises whether an owner w h o has leased his house (or land) to someone and sells it to someone else b e f o r e the lease expires is b o u n d to attach to the contract o f sale the condition that the lease is to continue. that he is to be compensated for any damages arising f r o m the breaking of the contract. [291] . A l t h o u g h this way o f acquiring is called acquisition by superannuation of claims (per praescriptionem). the claim to a g o o d reputation after death. Acquisition by Prolonged Possession51 §33I acquire another's property merely by long possession of it (usucapio). he has given it up (rem derelictam). this is not altogether correct. 2) by inheritance. since he does not contradict me. acquisition. It has now to be p r o v e d that it is possible to acquire something in this way. All three can. and carry on as if he existed u p to the time o f my possession only as a thoughtentity. since the subject acquires f r o m another w h o either does not yet exist (only the possibility that he may exist is admitted) or w h o has ceased to exist. even if there should be someone w h o was the true o w n e r and as such laid claim to it (a claimant) I may still exclude him merely by virtue of my long possession. that is. and the only reason I do not call it real is that the act o f acquiring is not empirical. but because. take e f f e c t only in a public rightful condition. I. but they are not based only on its constitution and the chosen statutes in it: they are also conceivable a priori in the state o f nature and must be conceived as prior to such statutes. in o r d e r that laws in the civil constitution may afterwards be adapted to them (sunt iuris naturae). not imaginary. so that coming into possession is merely a practical Idea o f reason. [292] . or w h e n the subject no longer exists. ignore his existence u p to now. not because I may legitimately presume that he consents to my acquiring it (per consensum praesumtum). indeed. It is nonetheless true. since exclusion of claims is to be r e g a r d e d only as a result o f acquisition: Acquisition must have come first. even if I should later learn of his reality as well as that of his claim. On Ideal Acquisition of an External Object of Choice §32. nor because I can assume that. T h e r e are three kinds o f such acquisition: 1) by prolonged possession.loo Metaphysics of Morals Episodic Section. I call acquisition ideal if it involves no causality in time and is t h e r e f o r e based on a m e r e Idea o f p u r e reason. and 3) by merit surviving death (meritum immortale). is rightly r e g a r d e d as someone w h o does not exist at all (as its possessor). T h a t a hitherto u n k n o w n possessor could always get something back (recover it) w h e n his possessory act has been interrupted (even t h r o u g h no fault o f his own) contradicts the above postulate of practical reason with regard to rights (dominia rerum incerta facere). lives in the civil condition. all he is saying is that he was once its owner. he declares himself its possessor. T h e n no acquisition at all would be conclusive (guaranteed). and indeed one that is continuously maintained and d o c u m e n t e d . w h e n another has already taken possession of it. Prescription o f an earlier possessor therefore belongs to natural Right (est iuris naturae). strictly speaking. Hence if someone does not use a thing for a long time.The Doctrine of Right g 109 S o m e o n e w h o does not exercise a continuous possessory act (actus possessorius) with r e g a r d to an external thing. and the length o f time d u r i n g which he failed to d o it (which cannot and need not be specified) is put f o r w a r d only to support the certainty o f his omission. and this immunity f r o m claims is also usually called acquisition. can guarantee that it is his. T h e presumption on which prolonged possession (usucapio) is based is therefore not merely in conformity with right (permitted. p r o l o n g e d possession is in c o n f o r m ity with right not. for acquiring a thing but f o r maintaining possession o f it without an act establishing the right. however. although it was interrupted as private possession. For he cannot complain o f being w r o n g e d as l o n g as he does nothing to justify his title of possessor. only a rightful possessory act. not that he still is and that his possession has remained uninterrupted without a continuous rightful act. and a present possessor need not prove his title of acquisition by tracing it back to the first possessor or basing it on p r o l o n g e d possession. as something that is his. iusta) as a conjecture but is also in accord with rights (praesumtio iuris et de iure) as an assumption in terms o f coercive laws (suppositio legalis). W h o e v e r fails to d o c u m e n t his possessory act has lost his claim to the present possessor. and even if later on. In the state of nature. [293] . all acquisition would be only provisional (up to the present). that is. For suppose that failure to p e r f o r m this possessory act did not result in another's being able to base a firm right (possessio irrefragabilis) on his lawful possession in g o o d faith (possessio bonae fidei) and r e g a r d himself as having acquired the thing that is in his possession. since investigation o f the past cannot reach all the way back to the first possessor and his act o f acquisition. If he is a m e m b e r o f a commonwealth. the state (representing him) can indeed preserve his possession f o r him. since this assumes two acts following each other. besides the promise. strictly speaking. As long as he lives. that upon his death his belongings are to pass to Titius. so as to acquire by his acceptance. however. T h e question of how it is possible to acquire by inheritance must accordingly be investigated apart f r o m the many ways in which it can be carried out (which are f o u n d only in a commonwealth). Now. still tacitly acquires a proprietary right to the legacy as a right to a thing: Namely. he has the exclusive right to accept it (ius in re iacente). who knows nothing of this promise. Caius. which is still lacking here. whether and how it is possible f o r belongings to pass f r o m one to the other precisely at the moment at which the subject ceases to exist. since every man would necessarily accept such a right (since he can always gain but never lose by it). Now inheritance in the state of nature cannot be conceived of without a last will (dispositio ultimae voluntatis). a transfer (translatio) in the empirical sense. acceptance (acceptatio) by the other party and a simultaneous will (voluntas simultanea)." For the testator. namely the moment at which the testator ceases to exist (articulo mortis). namely the acts by which one person first leaves his possessions and the other then comes into them.loo Metaphysics of Morals II. so that the legacy at the moment of death is called haereditas iacens. promises and in his last will declares to Titius. Caius therefore remains sole owner of his belongings. For Titius alone . and the bequest has not become altogether ownerless (res nullius) in the meantime but only vacant (res vacua). Inheritance (Acquisitio haereditatis) §34- [294] Inheritance is transfer (translatio) of the belongings and goods o f someone who is dying to a survivor by agreement of the wills of both. and so accepts tacitly. Whether this is a contract of inheritance (pactum successorium) or a unilateral disposition to the heir (testamentum) amounts to the question. Instead it is an ideal acquisition. is in this situation. Acquisition by the heir (haeredis instituti) and leaving by the testator (testatoris). this change of belongings. after Caius' death. It is therefore not. that is. Now it is true that by a unilateral will alone nothing can pass to the other person. for this there is required. Titius. Titius cannot explicitly accept. and since Titius. he can acquire the bequest by acceptance of the promise. "It is possible to acquire something through disposition to the heir. and this is not the testator's will). since Caius has promised only on the occasion of his death (otherwise the property would for a moment be c o m m o n property. takes place in one moment. for as long as Caius is alive. for a man to be able to acquire such a right. since they could get similar treatment when they die). that clings to the subject as a person. a phenomenon as strange as it is undeniable. testaments are also valid in accordance with mere natural Right (sunt iuris naturae). is to be taken as meaning that testaments are fit for and worth being introduced and sanctioned in the civil condition (if this makes its appearance some day). for in the context of his rights in relation to others. Leaving Behind a Good Reputation after One's Death (Bona fama defuncti) §35It would be absurd to think that someone who has died can still possess something after his death (and so when he no longer exists). if what he left behind were a thing. This assertion. a well-founded accusation against him is still in order (so that the principle de mortuis nihil nisi benea is incorrect). For a man to acquire by an irreproachable life and the death that ends it a (negatively) good name." [295] . whoever " " S p e a k nothing but good about the dead. HI. But a good reputation is an innate external belonging. I actually regard every person simply in terms o f his humanity. a being o f such a nature that I can and must abstract f r o m whether he ceases to be entirely at his death or whether he survives as a person.The Doctrine of Right g 111 has the right to make the choice as to whether or not he wants to make the belongings left to him his own. though an ideal one only. For only the civil condition (the general will in it) confirms possession of a legacy while it hovers between acceptance and rejection and strictly speaking belongs to no one. I say. So any attempt to stain someone's reputation by falsehood after his death is suspect. however. Accordingly. Nevertheless. a phenomenon of reason giving law a priori that extends its commands and prohibitions even beyond the limits of life. which continues to be his when he no longer exists as homo phaenomenon. unless one is quite certain of them. is. because it is at least ungenerous to spread reproaches against one who is absent and cannot defend himself. hence as homo noumenon. If anyone spreads it abroad that someone who has died committed a crime which in his lifetime would have made him dishonorable or only contemptible. for those who survive him (relatives or strangers) to be also authorized by right to d e f e n d him (for unproved charges are dangerous to them as well. f o r in a relation p u r e l y o f rights.. n o t by a criminal c o u r t b u t only by public o p i n i o n . in w h i c h c o n d i t i o n t h e y w o u l d f e e l the i n j u r y o f those w h o s l a n d e r t h e m . H e could not d o this unless h e could rightly assume that the dead m a n was w r o n g e d by it. It is t h e r e f o r e indisputable that there is a basis f o r such an ideal acquisition and for a man's right after his death against those w h o survive him.* A n apologist need not p r o v e his authorization to play the role o f apologist f o r the dead. T h e s e a r e relations in w h i c h m e n stand as intelligible beings. F o r w h a t is u n d e r discussion h e r e d o e s n o t g o b e y o n d t h e p u r e l y m o r a l a n d r i g h t f u l relations to b e f o u n d a m o n g m e n d u r i n g life as well. e v e r y t h i n g b e l o n g i n g to their existence in space a n d time). i n s o f a r as o n e logically puts aside. is still a v e n g e d with right. * B u t o n e is n o t to d r a w f r o m this any visionary conclusions a b o u t p r e s e n t i m e n t s o f a f u t u r e life o r a b o u t u n s e e n relations to d i s e m b o d i e d souls. w h i c h . E v e n a plagiarism that a w r i t e r p e r p e t r a t e s o n a d e a d p e r s o n .loo Metaphysics of Morals can p r o d u c e p r o o f that this c h a r g e is an intentional untruth and a lie can then publicly declare the one w h o spread the evil gossip a calumniator and so take away his h o n o r . such as his friends and relatives. f o r every m a n inevitably arrogates this to himself as belonging not merely to duty o f virtue (duty r e g a r d e d ethically) but to the right o f humanity as such. e v e r y t h i n g physical (i. b u t o n e d o e s n o t r e m o v e m e n f r o m this n a t u r e o f theirs a n d let t h e m b e c o m e spirits. to justify such censure. in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e r i g h t o f r e t r i b u t i o n .e. [296] . even t h o u g h no deduction o f its possibility can be given. S o m e o n e w h o . w h i c h is entirely intellectual. and the stain on the dead person need not have been prejudicial to any particular person. abstracts from. that is. even t h o u g h he is dead. a h u n d r e d y e a r s f r o m n o w . abstraction is m a d e f r o m a n y physical c o n d i t i o n s (of time). t h o u g h it d o e s not i n d e e d stain the d e a d p e r s o n ' s h o n o r b u t only steals a part o f it f r o m h i m . as h a v i n g w r o n g e d h i m (robbed the man). h o w e v e r . falsely r e p e a t s s o m e t h i n g evil a b o u t m e i n j u r e s m e r i g h t n o w . a n d w h o e v e r r o b s m e o f my h o n o r (a s l a n d e r e r ) is j u s t as p u n i s h a b l e as if h e h a d d o n e it d u r i n g m y l i f e t i m e p u n i s h a b l e . inflicts o n h i m t h e s a m e loss o f the h o n o r h e d i m i n i s h e d in a n o t h e r . and that this defense brings him satisfaction even t h o u g h he n o longer exists. b o t h o f w h i c h a r e t r u e : o n e in a c c o r d a n c e with private R i g h t . that is. h e n c e simply R i g h t that can b e k n o w n a priori by e v e r y o n e ' s r e a s o n . A n d h e r e t h e r e a r e four cases in w h i c h two d i f f e r e n t a n d o p p o s i n g j u d g m e n t s can result a n d persist side by side. natural R i g h t will i n c l u d e not only the justice that holds a m o n g p e r s o n s in their e x c h a n g e s with o n e a n o t h e r (iustitia commutativa) b u t also distributive j u s t i c e (iustitia distributiva). that r i g h t f u l principle w h i c h a c o u r t is a u t h o r i z e d a n d i n d e e d b o u n d to a d o p t f o r its o w n use (hence f o r a subjective p u r p o s e ) in o r d e r to p r o n o u n c e a n d j u d g e w h a t b e l o n g s to each as his right. 3) recovering s o m e t h i n g ( vindicatio ). I f by natural R i g h t is u n d e r s t o o d only nonstatutory R i g h t . A l l this is h e r e t h o u g h t o u t a p r i o r i only in a c c o r d a n c e with conditions o f Right.CHAPTER III On Acquisition That Is Dependent Subjectively upon the Decision of a Public Court of Justice § 3 6. b u t w h a t is r i g h t b e f o r e a c o u r t . b e c a u s e they are m a d e f r o m two d i f f e r e n t points o f view. witho u t t a k i n g a c c o u n t o f h o w such a constitution is to b e actually set u p a n d o r g a n i z e d (statutes. !'3 . the o t h e r in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e I d e a o f public Right. 2) a contract to lend a thing (commodatum). as if it w e r e also the objective principle o f w h a t is r i g h t in itself. a l t h o u g h the latter is very d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e f o r m e r . (4) taking an oath (iuramentum). So the question h e r e is not m e r e l y w h a t is right in itself. that is. h e n c e e m p i r i c a l principles. w h a t is laid d o w n as right. i n s o f a r as it can be k n o w n a p r i o r i in accord a n c e with the principle o f distributive justice h o w its decisions (sententia) w o u l d h a v e to be r e a c h e d . h o w e v e r y m a n has to j u d g e a b o u t it o n his o w n . T h e m o r a l p e r s o n that administers justice is a court (forum) a n d its administration o f j u s t i c e is a judgment (indicium). [297] It is a c o m m o n fault (vitium subreptionis) o f e x p e r t s o n R i g h t to misrepresent. b e l o n g to an actual constitution). T h e s e cases are: 1) a contract to make a gift (pactum donationis). For it is not a matter of course that the owner. that might arise f r o m its having been put into the borrower's possession. the recipient (donatorius). as it were. as can well be supposed. But it is not to be p r e s u m e d that I intend by this contract to be coerced to k e e p my promise and so also to give u p my freedom gratuitously and. w h e r e the one w h o is to receive my gift can coerce me to carry out my promise. the borrower (commodatarius) cannot presume that the thing's o w n e r (commodans) also assumes every risk (casus) of possible loss o f the thing. in accordance with public Right. or else the court in its j u d g m e n t (verdict) simply takes no account of w h e t h e r the d o n o r did or did not want to reserve his f r e e d o m to go back on his promise. and that if he did not he could be coerced to fulfill his promise. the promisor t h o u g h t that he could not be b o u n d to k e e p his promise should he regret having m a d e it b e f o r e it is time to fulfill it. that is. Yet this is what w o u l d h a p p e n in accordance with Right in the civil condition. On a Contract to Lend a Thing §3»In this contract (commodatum) by which I permit someone to use without compensation something of mine. On a Contract to Make a Gift §37In accordance with private Right. So. if the parties to the contract agree that this very same thing is to be b r o u g h t u n d e r my control again. by which what is mine passes to the recipient by his acceptance o f it ( donum ). by which I alienate without remuneration (gratis) what is mine. or o f what makes it useful. T h e court adopts this principle because otherwise its verdict on rights would be made infinitely m o r e difficult or even impossible. So even if. it would either have to be p r e s u m e d that the d o n o r consented to this coercion. the court assumes that he would have had to m a k e this reservation expressly. A. if the matter were to come b e f o r e a court. the d o n o r ( donans ). in addition to granting the b o r r o w e r the use of his thing (such . namely. this contract {donatio). the promise and the promisee's acceptance o f it.loo Metaphysics of Morals It is therefore o f n o slight importance to recognize this specific distinction and to draw attention to it. to another. a thing o f mine (or my right). which is absurd. involves a relation of myself. but takes account only o f what is certain. to throw myself away {nemo suum iactare praesumitur). [298] B. which is then perhaps permanently stained w h e n someone carelessly pours discoloring material f r o m a window. or its equivalent.The Doctrine of Right g 115 loss to himself as is inseparable f r o m parting with it). has also issued the b o r r o w e r a guarantee against any d a m a g e that could arise f r o m his having let it out o f his custody. that he has also u n d e r t a k e n to guarantee the property). that is. except. Everyone would find it absurd to say that I need d o nothing m o r e than return the coat as it is. the lender or the borrower. rather. so that a g r e e m e n t about this can only be p r e s u m e d . on which o f the two. Suppose. f o r example. B u t n o one would think it absurd if. since it would then be almost insulting him not to p r e s u m e that he would generously remit my debt in this case. or that I have only to report that the theft occurred and that it was at most a matter o f courtesy f o r m e to commiserate with the o w n e r over his loss. w h e n the lender is known to be a rich and considerate man. w h o can be presumed to have agreed to guarantee the lender's property (by the return o f it. or is stolen f r o m me w h e n I go into another house and take it o f f . I also ask its owner b e f o r e h a n d to take on himself the risk o f any mischance that might h a p p e n to it while it is in my hands. to him)? Not the lender. No one will find this s u p e r f l u o u s and ridiculous. Now if (as the nature of a contract to lend involves) nothing is stipulated in it about a possible mischance (casus) that might a f f e c t the thing. it can be decided only as it would be decided before a court. in terms o f the intrinsic character of the matter. because I am poor and unable to compensate him f o r the loss. since he could d e m a n d nothing on the basis o f his right. which always considers only what is certain in the case (which is here the possession of the thing as property). the decision as to w h o must bear the misfortune. the j u d g m e n t about this. perhaps. will go like this: T h e d a m a g e resulting f r o m mischance to a thing loaned falls on the borrower (casum sentit [299] [300] . It is. A separate contract would have to be m a d e about that. is it incumbent to attach expressly to a contract to lend the condition about assuming the risk f o r possible damage to the thing? O r . if no such condition is attached. the borrower. that having been caught in the rain I go into a house and ask to borrow a coat. So the j u d g m e n t in the state of nature. a contract to lend is an uncertain contract (pactum incertum) with r e g a r d to what is mine and what is yours by it. in requesting to use something. f o r it cannot be p r e s u m e d that he has gratuitously agreed to m o r e than the mere use o f the thing (namely. that is. because in taking on this guarantee he p e r f o r m s nothing more than is already contained in the contract. So the question can only be. Consequently. cannot be made f r o m the conditions of the contract itself. Since I cannot acquire a thing f r o m someone who is not its owner (a non domino). But in the civil condition. as a supposed find. Suppose that someone has lost a thing (res amissa) and that someone else takes it in good faith (bona fide). that is. C. when the thing is in another's possession. that it does not of itself cease to be mine apart from some act by which I give u p my right to it (derelictionis vel alienationis). rests entirely on the f o r m in accordance with which what is possessed by another is transferred to me and accepted by me. [301] . by which a right is established. H e can consider only that whoever has not attached a separate contract stipulating that he is free f r o m any damages to the thing lent must himself bear them. the verdict will come out: T h e damage falls on the lender (casum sentit dominus). and that I have a right to this thing (ius reale) and therefore a right against whoever holds it. and so before a court. since a public j u d g e cannot get involved in presumptions as to what the one party or the other may have thought. if I have only not renounced it. It must be possible for whatever can be alienated to be acquired by someone or other. On Recovery (Repossession) of Something Lost (vindicatio) §39It is clear f r o m the foregoing that something of mine that continues to exist remains mine even though I am not continuously holding it. the question arises whether I am excluded by the real owner f r o m any right to this thing and left with only a personal right against the illegitimate possessor. however. But the question now is whether this right must also be regarded by everyone else as ownership that continues of itself. This is obviously the case if acquisition is j u d g e d merely in accordance with the intrinsic grounds that justify it (in the state of nature). O r suppose that I get a thing by its being formally alienated by someone possessing it w h o represents himself as its owner although he is not. Hence the difference between the j u d g m e n t that a court must make and that which each is justified in making for himself by his private reason is a point that is by no means to be overlooked in amending j u d g m e n t s about rights. T h e legitimacy of acquisition. not merely a right against a specific person (ius personale). on the formalities of the act of exchange (commutatio) between the possessor of the thing and the one acquiring it. This verdict will indeed be given on different grounds f r o m the decree of sound reason alone.loo Metaphysics of Morals commodatarius). not in accordance with what is appropriate for a court. The Doctrine of Right g 117 I may not ask how the possessor obtained possession o f it, since this would already be an o f f e n s e (quilibet praesumitur bonus, donee etc.). Suppose, now, that it later turns out that the possessor was not the o w n e r but that someone else was. I cannot then say that the o w n e r could straightway take the thing f r o m me (as he could f r o m anyone else w h o might be holding it). For I have stolen nothing f r o m him, but have, f o r example, b o u g h t a horse o f f e r e d f o r sale in the public market in conformity with the law (titulo emti venditi). T h e title of acquisition on my part is indisputable since I (as buyer) am not b o u n d o r even authorized to search the other's (the seller's) title o f possession — this investigation would go on to infinity in an ascending series. I f the purchase is formally correct, I become not just th e putative but the true o w n e r o f the horse. B u t against this, the following a r g u m e n t arises with regard to rights. A n y acquisition f r o m one w h o is not the o w n e r o f a thing (a non domino) is null and void. I can derive n o m o r e f r o m another than what he legitimately has. Even though, in b u y i n g a stolen horse f o r sale in the market, I proceed quite correctly as far as the f o r m o f acquisition (modus acquierendi) is concerned, ray title of acquisition is still defective, since the horse did not b e l o n g to the one w h o actually sold it. I may well be its possessor in good faith (possessor bonafidei), but I am still only its putative o w n e r (dominus putativus) and the true o w n e r has a right to recover it (rem suam vindicandi). If one asks what is to be laid d o w n as right in itself (in the state of nature) in the acquisition o f external things in accordance with principles of justice in men's exchanges with one another (iustitia commutativa), then one must answer as follows. If someone intends to acquire an external thing in this way it is in fact necessary f o r him to investigate w h e t h e r the thing he wants to acquire does not already b e l o n g to someone else; that is to say, even if he has strictly observed the f o r m a l conditions f o r deriving the thing f r o m what belongs to another (has b o u g h t the horse in the market in the p r o p e r way), as long as he remains ignorant as to w h e t h e r someone else (other than the seller) is the true o w n e r o f it, the most he could have acquired is only a right against a person with regard to the thing (ius ad rem), so that if someone comes forth w h o can d o c u m e n t his previous ownership of it, nothing is left to the alleged new o w n e r but to have legitimately enjoyed the use o f it u p to this m o m e n t as its possessor in g o o d faith. Since it is largely impossible to discover w h o was absolutely first (the original owner) in the series o f putative owners deriving their right f r o m each other, no trade in external things, n o matter how well it may agree with the f o r m a l conditions o f this kind of justice (iustitia commutativa), can guarantee a secure acquisition. [302] loo Metaphysics of Morals Here again reason giving laws with regard to rights comes forth with a principle of distributive justice, of adopting as its guiding rule f o r the legitimacy of possession, not the way it would be j u d g e d in itself by the private will of each (in the state of nature), but the way it would be j u d g e d before a court in a condition brought about by the united will of all (in a civil condition). In a civil condition, conformity with the formal conditions of acquisition, which of themselves establish only a right against a person, is postulated as an adequate substitute for the material grounds (which establish derivation from what belonged to a previous alleged owner); and what is in itself a. right against a person, when brought before a court, holds as a right to a thing. A horse, f o r example, that someone puts up for sale in a public market regulated by police ordinances becomes my property if all the rules of buying and selling are strictly observed (but in such a way that the true owner retains the right to put forward a claim against the seller on the g r o u n d of his earlier, unforfeited possession of it); and what would otherwise be my right against a person is converted into a right to a thing, in accordance with which I can take (recover) it as mine wherever I find it, without having to get involved in how the seller obtained it. So it is only for the sake of a court's verdict (in favorem iustitiae distributivae) that a right to a thing is taken and treated not as it is in itself (as a right against a person) but as it can be most readily and surely judged (as a right to a thing), and yet in accordance with a pure a priori principle. O n this principle various statutory laws (ordinances) are subsequently based, the primary purpose of which is to set u p conditions under which alone a way of acquiring is to have rightful force, conditions such that a judge can assign to each what is his most readily and with least hesitation. For example, in the saying "Purchase breaks a lease," what is a right to a thing (the lease) in accordance with the nature of the contract, that is, in itself, holds as a mere right against a person; and conversely, as in the case discussed above, what is in itself only a right against a person holds as a right to a thing. In such cases the question is what principles a court in the civil condition should rely on in order to proceed most surely in its verdicts about the rights belonging to each. [3°3] D. On Acquiring Guarantees by Oath5* (Cautio iuratoria) §40. No other reason could be given that could bind men as a matter o f Right [rechtlich] to believe and acknowledge that there are gods than The Doctrine of Right g 133 that they could thereby swear an oath and be constrained to be truthful in what they say and faithful in keeping their promises by their fear o f an all-seeing, almighty power whose vengeance they would have solemnly called d o w n u p o n themselves in case their declarations were false. T h a t in requiring oaths one does not count on men's morality in these two respects but only on their blind superstition is clear f r o m this: that one does not expect any guarantee merely f r o m their solemn declarations b e f o r e a court in matters of rights, even t h o u g h everyone clearly sees the duty to be truthful in a case having to d o with what is most sacred of all a m o n g men (the Right o f men). So m e r e fairy tales are the incentive in taking oaths, as, f o r example, according to Marsden's testimony, the Rajangs, a p a g a n people o f Sumatra, swear by the bones o f their dead ancestors even t h o u g h they do not believe that there is a life after death; or as the Negroes o f Guinea take an oath on their fetish,, such as a bird's feather, calling u p o n it to break their neck, and so forth. T h e y believe that an invisible power, w h e t h e r it has understanding or not, already has by its nature this magical p o w e r that will come into play by their invocations. T h i s sort o f belief is called religion but should strictly be called superstition. It is, however, indispensable f o r the administration o f justice since, without c o u n t i n g on it, a court would not be sufficiently in a position to ascertain facts kept secret and give the right verdict. A law binding a people to take oaths is therefore obviously laid d o w n only on behalf o f the judicial authority. B u t now the question is, what basis is there f o r the obligation that someone b e f o r e a court is supposed to have, to accept another's oath as a p r o o f , valid f o r Right, of the truth of his testimony, which puts an e n d to all dispute? T h a t is to say, what binds me as a matter o f Right to believe that another (who swears an oath) has any religion, so as to make my rights d e p e n d e n t u p o n his oath? So too, can I be b o u n d to take an oath? B o t h are w r o n g in themselves. Yet with r e f e r e n c e to a court, and so in the civil condition, if one admits that there is no other means than an oath for getting at the truth in certain cases, one must assume that everyone has a religion, so that it can be used as an expedient (in casu necessitatis) f o r the purpose o f proceedings about rights before a court, which regards this spiritual coercion (tortura spiritualis) as a handy means, in k e e p i n g with men's propensity to superstition, f o r uncovering secrets and considers itself authorized to use it because o f this. But the legislative authority acts in a way that is fundamentally w r o n g in c o n f e r r i n g authorization to d o this on the judicial authority, since even in the civil condition coercion to take oaths is contrary to h u m a n f r e e d o m , which must not be lost. [304] [3°5] loo Metaphysics of Morals A n oath o f o f f i c e is usually promissory, an oath, namely, that the official earnestly resolves to fulfill his post in conformity with his duties. I f it were c h a n g e d into an assertoric oath — if, that is, the official was b o u n d , perhaps at the e n d o f a year (or more), to swear that he had faithfully fulfilled his o f f i c e d u r i n g that time — this would arouse his conscience m o r e than an oath he takes as a promise; for having taken a promissory oath, he can always make the excuse to himself later on that with the best o f intentions he did not foresee the difficulties which he experienced only later, d u r i n g the administration of his o f f i c e . Moreover, he would be m o r e concerned about being accused o f failing in his duty if an observer were g o i n g to look at the sum o f his o f f e n s e s than if they were merely censured one a f t e r the o t h e r (and the earlier ones have been forgotten). B u t a court can certainly not d e m a n d swearing to a belief (de credulitate). For in the first place it involves a self-contradiction; this thing intermediate between opinion and k n o w l e d g e is the sort o f thing that o n e can dare to bet on but certainly not to swear to. Second, a j u d g e w h o requires swearing to a belief f r o m a party in o r d e r to find out something relevant to his purpose, even if this p u r p o s e is the c o m m o n g o o d , commits a grave o f f e n s e against the conscientiousness o f the person taking the oath, partly by the thoughtlessness to which the oath misleads him and by which the j u d g e defeats his own purpose, partly by the pangs of conscience a m a n must feel, w h e n he can find a certain matter very likely today, considered f r o m a certain point o f view, but quite unlikely tomorrow, w h e n he considers it f r o m a d i f f e r e n t point o f view. A j u d g e therefore wrongs one w h o m he constrains to take such an oath. Transition from What Is Mine or Yours in a State of Nature to What Is Mine or Yours in a Rightful Condition Generally §41[306] A rightful condition is that relation o f m e n a m o n g one another that contains the conditions u n d e r which alone everyone is able to enjoy his rights, and the f o r m a l condition u n d e r which this is possible in accordance with the Idea o f a will giving laws f o r everyone is called public justice. With reference to either the possibility or the actuality or the necessity of possession of objects (the matter of choice) in accordance with laws, public justice can be divided into protective justice (iustitia tutatrix), justice in men's acquiring from one another (iustitia commutativa) The Doctrine of Right g 121 and distributive justice (iustitia distributiva). In these the law says, first, merely what conduct is intrinsically right [recht] in terms o f its f o r m (lex iusti) \ second, what [objects] are capable o f being covered externally by law, in terms o f their matter, that is, what way of being in possession is rightful [rechtlich] (lex iuridica)-, third, what is the decision o f a court in a particular case in accordance with the given law u n d e r which it falls, that is what is laid down as right [Rechtens] (lex iustitiae). Because o f this a court is itself called th e justice o f a country, and w h e t h e r such a thing exists or does not exist is the most important question that can be asked about any arrangements having to d o with rights. A condition that is not rightful, that is, a condition in which there is n o distributive justice, is called a state o f nature (status naturalis). W h a t is o p p o s e d to a state o f nature is not (as Achenwall thinks) a condition that is social and that could be called an artificial condition (status artificialis), but rather the civil condition (status civilis), that o f a society subject to distributive justice. For in the state o f nature, too, there can be societies compatible with rights (e.g., conjugal, paternal, domestic societies in general, as well as many others); but no law, "You o u g h t to enter this condition," holds a priori f o r these societies, whereas it can be said o f a rightful condition that all m e n w h o could (even involuntarily) come into relations o f rights with one another ought to enter this condition. T h e first and second o f these conditions can be called the condition o f private Right, whereas the third and last can be called the condition o f public Right. T h e latter contains no f u r t h e r or other duties o f men a m o n g themselves than can be conceived in the f o r m e r state; the matter o f private Right is the same in both. T h e laws o f the condition o f public Right, accordingly, have to do only with the rightful f o r m of men's association (constitution), in view o f which these laws must necessarily be conceived as public. T h e civil union (unio civilis) cannot itself be called a society, f o r between the commander (imperans)53 and the subject (subditus) there is no partnership. T h e y are not fellow-members: O n e is subordinated to, not coordinated with the other; and those w h o are coordinate with one another must f o r this very reason consider themselves equals since they are subject to c o m m o n laws. T h e civil union is not so m u c h a society but rather makes one. [307] §42F r o m private Right in the state of nature there proceeds the postulate of public Right: W h e n you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, 5 4 y o u o u g h t to leave the state o f nature and proceed with them loo Metaphysics of Morals into a rightful condition, that is, a condition o f distributive justice. T h e g r o u n d o f this postulate can be explicated [entwickeln] analytically f r o m the concept o f Right in external relations, in contrast with violence (violentia). No one is b o u n d to refrain f r o m encroaching o n what another possesses if the other gives him no equal assurance that he will observe the same restraint toward him. No one, therefore, need wait until he has learned by bitter experience o f the other's contrary disposition; f o r what should bind him to wait till he has s u f f e r e d a loss b e f o r e he becomes prudent, w h e n he can quite well perceive within himself the inclination o f men generally to lord it over others as their master (not to respect the superiority o f the rights o f others w h e n they feel superior to them in strength or cunning)? A n d it is not necessary to wait f o r actual hostility; one is authorized to use coercion against someone w h o already, by his nature, threatens him with coercion. (Quilibet praesumitur malus, donee securitatem dederit oppositi.) Given the intention to be and to remain in this state o f externally lawless f r e e d o m , m e n do one another no w r o n g at all w h e n they f e u d a m o n g themselves; f o r what holds f o r one holds also in turn f o r the other, as if by mutual consent (uti partes de iure suo disponunt, ita ius est). B u t in general they d o w r o n g in the highest d e g r e e * by wanting to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no o n e is assured o f what is his against violence. * T h i s distinction b e t w e e n w h a t is m e r e l y f o r m a l l y w r o n g a n d w h a t is also materially w r o n g has m a n y applications in the d o c t r i n e o f R i g h t . A n e n e m y w h o , instead o f h o n o r a b l y c a r r y i n g o u t his s u r r e n d e r a g r e e m e n t with t h e g a r r i s o n o f a b e s i e g e d fortress, mistreats t h e m as t h e y m a r c h o u t or o t h e r w i s e b r e a k s the a g r e e m e n t , c a n n o t c o m p l a i n o f b e i n g w r o n g e d if his o p p o n e n t plays t h e s a m e trick o n h i m w h e n h e can. B u t in g e n e r a l they d o w r o n g in t h e highest d e g r e e , b e c a u s e they take a w a y any validity f r o m the c o n c e p t o f R i g h t itself a n d h a n d e v e r y t h i n g o v e r to savage violence, as if by law, a n d so s u b v e r t t h e R i g h t o f m e n as such. [308] n e e d a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n u n d e r a will u n i t i n g t h e m . o r f o r a m u l t i t u d e o f p e o p l e s . So if the principle o f o u t e r f r e e d o m limited by law is l a c k i n g in any o n e o f these t h r e e possible f o r m s o f r i g h t f u l condition. so that they m a y e n j o y w h a t is laid d o w n as right. b e c a u s e they a f f e c t o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s c o n d i t i o n o f the individuals within a p e o p l e in relation to o n e a n o t h e r is called a civil c o n d i t i o n (status civilis). O n the con123 [312] . §44It is not e x p e r i e n c e f r o m w h i c h w e learn o f m e n ' s m a x i m o f violence a n d o f their m a l e v o l e n t t e n d e n c y to attack o n e a n o t h e r b e f o r e external legislation 5 ® e n d o w e d with p o w e r a p p e a r s . In relation to o t h e r peoples. a state is called simply a power (potentia) (hence the w o r d potentate). It is t h e r e f o r e not s o m e fact that m a k e s c o e r c i o n t h r o u g h public law necessary.55 Since the earth's s u r f a c e is not u n l i m i t e d b u t closed.PUBLIC RIGHT [3n] SECTION I The Right of a State §43T h e s u m o f t h e laws that n e e d to b e p r o m u l g a t e d g e n e r a l l y in o r d e r to b r i n g a b o u t a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n is public Right. H e n c e . a n d the w h o l e o f individuals in a rightf u l condition. a m u l t i t u d e o f m e n . B e c a u s e the u n i o n o f t h e m e m b e r s is ( p r e s u m e d to be) o n e they i n h e r i t e d . the f r a m e w o r k o f all t h e o t h e r s is u n a v o i d a b l y u n d e r m i n e d a n d must finally collapse. the concepts o f the R i g h t o f a state a n d o f a R i g h t o f nations lead inevitably to the I d e a o f a Right for all nations (ius gentium) o r cosmopolitan Right (ius cosmopoliticum). in relation to its o w n m e m b e r s is called a state (civitas). Public R i g h t is t h e r e f o r e a system o f laws f o r a p e o p l e . u n d e r the g e n e r a l c o n c e p t o f public R i g h t w e are led to think not only o f the R i g h t o f a state b u t also o f a Right of nations (ius gentium). h o w e v e r . B e c a u s e o f its f o r m . that. a state is called a commonwealth (respublica latius sic dicta). by w h i c h all a r e united t h r o u g h their c o m m o n interest in b e i n g in a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n . a state is also called a nation (gens). a constitution (constitutio). that is. It is true that the state o f nature need not.loo Metaphysics of Morals trary. individual men. since it is not determined by public (distributive) justice and secured by an authority putting this right into effect. peoples. T h e d i f f e r e n c e is only that the civil condition provides the conditions u n d e r which these laws are put into e f f e c t (in k e e p i n g with distributive justice). f o r a l t h o u g h each can acquire something external by taking control of it or by contract in accordance with its concepts of Right. If n o acquisition were recognized as rightful even in a provisional way prior to entering the civil condition. insofar as they . it still lies a priori in the rational Idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that b e f o r e a public lawful condition is established. So. [313] §45A state (civitas) is a union o f a multitude of m e n u n d e r laws o f Right. subject itself to a public lawful external coercion. unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting). For in terms o f their f o r m . since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not to be d e p e n d e n t u p o n another's opinion about this. But it would still be a state devoid ofjustice (status iustitia vacuus). this acquisition is still only provisional as l o n g as it does not yet have the sanction o f public law. be a state o f injustice (iniustus). there would be n o j u d g e competent to r e n d e r a verdict having rightful force. there would also be n o duties of Right with regard to them and therefore n o c o m m a n d to leave the state o f nature. that is. unless it wants to r e n o u n c e any concepts o f Right. So if external objects were not eve n provisionally mine or yours in the state of nature. and so enter into a condition in which what is to be recognized as b e l o n g i n g to it is determined by law and is allotted to it by adequate power (not its own but an external power). just because it is natural. w h e n rights are in dispute (ius controversum). insofar as the civil condition is thought of by p u r e rational concepts alone. in which each follows its own j u d g m e n t . Insofar as these are a priori necessary as laws. it o u g h t above all else to enter a civil condition. and states can never be secure against violence f r o m one another. that is to say. the civil condition itself would be impossible. the first thing it has to resolve u p o n is the principle that it must leave the state o f nature. o f dealing with one another only in terms o f the d e g r e e o f force each has. Hence each may impel the other by force to leave this state and enter into a rightful condition. in which. h o w e v e r well disposed and law-abiding m e n m i g h t be. laws concerning what is mine or yours in the state o f nature contain the same thing that they prescribe in the civil condition. the principle o f subsumption u n d e r the law. that is. and the conclusion. its f o r m is the f o r m o f a state as such. which contains the command to behave in accordance with the law. it cannot d o anyone w r o n g by its law. and so only the general united will o f the people. the attribute o f civil independence. 5 8 the executive authority in the person o f the ruler (in conformity to law). insofar as each decides the same thing f o r all and all f o r each.The Doctrine of Right g 125 follow o f themselves f r o m concepts o f external Right as such (are not statutory). Now. that o f not recognizing a m o n g the people any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as a matter o f Right in a way that he could not in turn bind the other. what is laid d o w n as right in the case at hand. the attributes o f a citizen. the minor premise. the general united will consists o f three persons (trias politica): the sovereign authority [Herrschergewalt] (sovereignty) in the person of the legislator. In terms of rights. as it o u g h t to be in accordance with p u r e principles o f Right. Every state contains three authorities within it. F r o m his i n d e p e n d e n c e follows his civil personality. that is.e. T h i s Idea serves as a n o r m (norma) f o r every actual union into a c o m m o n wealth (hence serves as a n o r m f o r its internal constitution). inseparable f r o m his essence (as a citizen). T h e m e m b e r s o f such a society w h o are united f o r giving law (societas civilis). his attribute o f not needing to be represented by another w h e r e rights are concerned. " " N o w r o n g is d o n e to s o m e o n e w h o c o n s e n t s . o f the state as Idea. civil equality. but he can never d o w r o n g in what he decides u p o n with regard to himself (for volenti nonfit iniuria). 57 that is. T h e s e are like the three propositions in a practical syllogism: the major premise. T h e legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. the attribute o f obeying no other law than that to which he has given his consent. which contains the law o f t h a t will. i. can be legislative. " [314] . §46. and third. it is always possible f o r him to d o the other w r o n g . the m e m b e r s o f a state. w h e n someone makes arrangements about another. and the judicial authority (to award to each what is his in accordance with the law) in the person o f the j u d g e (potestas legislatoria." T h e r e f o r e only the c o n c u r r i n g and united will o f all. rectoria et iudiciaria). are: lawful freedom. For since all Right is to proceed f r o m it. are called citizens of a state (cives). o f owing his existence and preservation to his own rights and powers as a m e m b e r o f the commonwealth. which contains the verdict (sentence). not to the choice o f another a m o n g the people. and so d o not possess civil independence. as c o m p a r e d with the E u r o p e a n carpenter or blacksmith w h o can put the products of his work u p as goods f o r sale to the public. to be citizens and not mere associates in the state. a m i n o r (naturaliter vel civiliter). anyone whose preservation in existence (his being f e d and protected) d e p e n d s not on his m a n a g e m e n t o f his own business but on a r r a n g e m e n t s m a d e by another (except the state). only inherence. T h i s d e p e n d e n c e u p o n the will o f others and this inequality is. all w o m e n and. w h o goes into people's houses to work on iron with his h a m m e r . T h e woodcutter I hire to work in my yard. It follows only that. T h i s quality of being independent. these are m e r e underlings [Handlanger] o f the commonwealth because they have to be u n d e r the direction o r protection o f other individuals. whatever sort of positive laws the citizens might vote for. the blacksmith in India. anvil. and so forth. the right to organize it or to cooperate f o r introducing certain laws. T h e following examples can serve to r e m o v e this difficulty: an apprentice in the service o f a merchant or artisan. that is. wants to be not just a part of the commonwealth but also a m e m b e r o f it. requires a distinction between active and passive citizens. in n o way opposed to their f r e e d o m and equality as men. B u t being fit to vote presupposes the i n d e p e n d e n c e of s o m e o n e who. as one of the people. that is. as it were. however. it is only in conformity with the conditions of f r e e d o m and equality that this people can become a state and enter into a civil constitution. All these people lack civil personality and their existence is. and bellows. these laws must still not be contrary to the natural laws o f f r e e d o m and of the equality of e v e r y o n e in the people c o r r e s p o n d i n g to this f r e e d o m . a domestic servant (as distinguished f r o m a civil servant). in general. w h o together m a k e u p a people. B u t not all persons qualify with equal right to vote within this constitution. For f r o m their capacity to d e m a n d that all others treat them in accordance with the laws o f natural f r e e d o m and equality as passive parts o f the state it does not follow that they also have the right to manage the state itself as active members o f it. namely that anyone can work his way u p f r o m this passive condition to an active one. a part of the c o m m o n wealth acting f r o m his own choice in community with others. o n the contrary. the private tutor. [315] .loo Metaphysics of Morals T h e only qualification f o r being a citizen is being fit to vote. however. as c o m p a r e d with the schoolteacher. the tenant f a r m e r as c o m p a r e d with the leasehold f a r m e r . t h o u g h the concept of a passive citizen seems to contradict the concept o f a citizen as such. first. T h e act by which a people f o r m s itself into a state is the original contract. instead. t h r o u g h the union of both each subject is apportioned his rights. but rather. coordinate with one another (potestates coordinatae) as so many moral persons. in a d e p e n d e n c e u p o n laws. T h e y comprise the relation o f a superior over all (which.people gives u p his external f r e e d o m in o r d e r to take it u p again immediately as a member o f a commonwealth. In accordance with the original contract. Third. it indeed c o m m a n d s in its capacity as a particular person. Properly speaking. everyone (omnes et singuli) within a. and since they arise necessarily f r o m the Idea o f a state as such. can be none other than the united people itself) to the multitude o f that people severally as subjects. each complements the others to complete the constitution o f a state (icomplementum ad sufficientiam). man in a state has sacrificed a part o f his innate outer f r e e d o m f o r the sake o f an end. they are also subordinate (subordinatae) to o n e another. princeps) is that (moral or natural) person to w h o m the executive authority (potestas executoria) belongs. and that the verdict of the highest judge (supremi iudicis) is irreversible (cannot be appealed). f r o m the viewpoint of laws of f r e e d o m . the relation o f a commander (imperans) to those who obey (subditus).The Doctrine of Right g 127 §47All those three authorities in a state are dignities [ Würden]. the three authorities in a state are. that is. that is. §49T h e ruler of a state {rex. that is. r e g a r d e d in their dignity. But. that is. each has its own principle. [316] §48. the original contract is only the Idea o f this act. in assisting another. in a rightful condition. lawless f r e e d o m in o r d e r to find his f r e e d o m as such undiminished. 5 9 It can be said o f these authorities. A n d o n e cannot say: A state. as essential f o r the establishment (constitution) of it. he has relinquished entirely his wild. Accordingly. that the will o f the legislator (legislatoris) with regard to what is externally mine or yours is irreproachable (irreprehensible)\ that the executive power o f the supreme ruler (summi rectoris) is irresistible. but still u n d e r the condition of the will o f a superior. so that one of them. o f a people considered as a state (universi). since this d e p e n d e n c e arises f r o m his own lawgiving will. H e is the . that is. second. cannot also u s u r p its function. they are civic dignities. in terms o f which alone we can think of the legitimacy o f a state. if either the legislative or the executive authority were to decide in a controversial case what belongs to him. designates especially f o r each act. and to r e n d e r [317] . since it w o u l d not be the people itself d o i n g this and p r o n o u n c i n g a verdict o f guilty or not guilty u p o n a fellow citizen. His directives to the people. T h e sovereign can also take the ruler's authority away f r o m him. it might d o him a w r o n g . means n o m o r e than this). B u t it cannot punish him (and the saying c o m m o n in England. indeed. and so this act is invested with n o authority to assign (allot) to a subject what is his. w h o appoints the magistrates and prescribes to the people rules in accordance with which each of them can acquire something or preserve what is his in conformity with the law (through subsumption o f a case u n d e r it). o r r e f o r m his administration. since the ruler is subject to the law and so is put u n d e r obligation t h r o u g h the law by another.loo Metaphysics of Morals agent o f the state. are ordinances or decrees (not laws). A govefnment that was also legislative would have to be called a despotic as o p p o s e d to a patriotic g o v e r n m e n t . he is called the directorate. neither the head o f state nor its ruler [Regierer] can judge. which has the sup r e m e capacity to exercise coercion in conformity with the law. but can only appoint j u d g e s as magistrates. that is. A people j u d g e s itself t h r o u g h those o f its fellow citizens w h o m it designates as its representatives f o r this by a free choice and. Since each individual a m o n g a p e o p l e is only passive in this relationship (to the authorities). So a people's head of state (legislator) cannot also be its ruler [Regent]. namely the sovereign. Finally. and it would be self-contradictory f o r him to be subject to coercion. the court has judicial authority to apply the law. u p o n someone b e l o n g i n g to the people. in accordance with laws o f their own i n d e p e n d e n c e : Each is in possession o f himself and is not d e p e n d e n t u p o n the absolute will o f another alongside him or above him. For a verdict (a sentence) is an individual act o f public justice (iustitiae distributivae) p e r f o r m e d by an administrator o f the state (a j u d g e or court) u p o n a subject. but one serving the native land (regimen civitatis et patriae). can d o n o wrong. B u t once the facts in a lawsuit have been established. In it the state (civitas) does treat its subjects as m e m b e r s o f o n e family but it also treats them as citizens o f the state. that is. f o r they are directed to decisions in particular cases and are given as subject to being changed. the s u p r e m e executive authority. but by a patriotic g o v e r n m e n t is understood not a paternalistic one (regimen paternale). f o r punishment is. that is. an act o f the executive authority. again. which is the most despotic o f all (since it treats citizens as children). R e g a r d e d as a moral person. that the king. and to the magistrates and their superior (the minister) w h o m he charges with administering the state (gubernatio). d e p o s e him. the government. B y t h e well-being o f a state is u n d e r s t o o d . executoria.a T h e r e are t h u s t h r e e distinct authorities (potestas legislatoria. instead. o r w h e t h e r p o w e r c a m e first a n d law a r r i v e d only a f t e r w a r d . that is. o r e v e n w h e t h e r they s h o u l d h a v e f o l l o w e d in ""from a king badly instructed to a king to be better instructed" 'The well-being of the commonwealth is the supreme law. to p u t h i m s e l f in a position w h e r e h e c o u l d d o w r o n g a n d so h a v e his decision a p p e a l e d ( a rege male informato ad regem melius informandum). that is. by w h i c h it f o r m s a n d p r e s e r v e s itself in a c c o r d a n c e with laws o f f r e e d o m . m a k e s it obligatory f o r us to strive a f t e r . that is. De Legibus 3. It w o u l d also b e b e n e a t h the dignity o f the h e a d o f state to play t h e j u d g e . A state's well-being consists in their b e i n g u n i t e d ( salus rei publicae suprema lex est). [318] General Remark O n the Effects with Regard to Rights That Follow from the Nature of the Civil Union A.The Doctrine of Right g 129 to e a c h w h a t is his with the h e l p o f the e x e c u t i v e authority. a subject ought not to rationalize f o r the sake o f action [werktätig vernünfteln ] a b o u t t h e o r i g i n o f this authority. 8 : "Salus populi suprema lex esto. F o r . f o r h a p p i n e s s can p e r h a p s c o m e to t h e m m o r e easily a n d as they w o u l d like it to in a state o f n a t u r e (as R o u s s e a u asserts) o r e v e n u n d e r a despotic g o v e r n m e n t . by a categorical imperative. b y m e a n s o f representatives (the j u r y ) w h o m it has delegated. it c a n n o t a n d m a y not j u d g e o t h e r w i s e than as the p r e s e n t h e a d o f state (summus imperans) wills it to.b B y the well-being o f a state must not b e u n d e r s t o o d t h e welfare o f its citizens a n d their happiness. A p e o p l e s h o u l d not inquire with any practical a i m in view into the o r i g i n o f the s u p r e m e authority to w h i c h it is subject. a l t h o u g h only indirectly. since a p e o p l e m u s t b e r e g a r d e d as already u n i t e d u n d e r a g e n e r a l legislative will in o r d e r to j u d g e with r i g h t f u l f o r c e a b o u t the s u p r e m e authority [Staatsgewalt] (summum imperium). W h e t h e r a state b e g a n w i t h an actual contract o f submission (pactumsubiectionis civilis) as a fact. as a r i g h t that can still b e called into question (ius controversum) with r e g a r d to the o b e d i e n c e h e o w e s it. H e n c e only t h e people c a n give a j u d g m e n t u p o n o n e o f its m e m b e r s . iudiciaria) by w h i c h a state ( civitas) has its a u t o n o m y . that c o n d i t i o n in w h i c h its constitution c o n f o r m s most fully to principles o f R i g h t . it is that c o n d i t i o n w h i c h reason." ." The saying seems to s t e m f r o m C i c e r o . that d e p e n d on [319] . the ruler. even if the organ o f the head o f a state. and so to limit him. wanted to resist this authority. This saying is not an assertion about the historical basis o f the civil constitution. In that case the sovereign behaves t h r o u g h its minister as also the ruler and so as a despot. 6 0 For someone w h o is to limit the authority in a state must have even more p o w e r [Macht] than he w h o m he limits. as the limiting authority (though it has.loo Metaphysics of Morals this order: For a people already subject to civil law these rationalizations are altogether pointless and. t h r o u g h its deputies. f o r example. in being represented by its deputies (in parliament). however. properly speaking. and this is self-contradictory. men w h o have a lively interest in positions f o r themselves and their families. has. exlex) in accordance with the laws of this authority. in these guardians o f its f r e e d o m and rights. having p o n d e r e d over the ultimate origin of the authority now ruling. T h e people. only legislative authority) cannot conceal the despotism. subjects may indeed o p p o s e this injustice by complaints (gravamina) but not by resistance. In that case. recruiting and so forth. and. proceeds contrary to law. moreover. and so to suspend its e f f e c t f o r a m o m e n t . flawless lawgiver. consequently he has to be able to c o m m a n d resistance publicly. with every right. A law that is so holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime even to call it in d o u b t in a practical way. threaten a state with d a n g e r . in the army. Moreover. he w o u l d be punished. even the constitution cannot contain any article that would make it possible f o r there to be some authority in a state to resist the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r [obersten Befehlshaber] in case he should violate the law of the constitution. or expelled (as an outlaw. got rid of. so that it does not come to light f r o m the measures the minister takes. Now f r o m this principle follows the proposition: T h e h e a d of a state has only rights against his subjects and no duties (that he can be coerced to fulfill). the sup r e m e c o m m a n d e r [obersten Befehlshaber] in a state is not the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r . that is. it is the one w h o can resist him. and that is what the saying "All authority is f r o m G o d " means. instead. as a legitimate c o m m a n d e r [Gebieter] w h o directs the subjects to resist. or at least as m u c h p o w e r as he has. is t h o u g h t as if it must have arisen not f r o m men but f r o m some highest. Indeed. if he goes against the law o f equality in assigning the b u r d e n s of the state in matters o f taxation. h e must also be able to protect them and to r e n d e r a j u d g m e n t having rightful force in any case that comes up. If a subject. the navy and the civil service. it instead sets f o r t h an Idea as a practical principle o f reason: the principle that the presently existing legislative authority o u g h t to be obeyed. and the illusion that allows us to think of the people. whatever its origin. besides. H e n c e a so-called m o d e r a t e constitution. T h e r e is. since a r i g h t f u l c o n d i t i o n is possible only by submission to its g e n e r a l legislative will. since everything he did. a n d w h o e v e r c o m m i t s s u c h t r e a s o n m u s t b e p u n i s h e d by n o t h i n g less than d e a t h f o r a t t e m p t i n g to destroy his fatherland (parricida). as a constitution f o r the i n n e r rights o f a state. a n d least o f all is t h e r e a right against the h e a d o f a state as an i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n (the m o n a r c h ) . Because of this the people who e x t o r t e d this f r o m h i m has at least t h e pretext of arightof necessity (casus necessitatis) in favor of its crime. a n d the c o n t r a d i c t i o n is e v i d e n t as s o o n as o n e asks w h o is to b e the j u d g e in this d i s p u t e b e t w e e n p e o p l e a n d sovereign (for. as subject. because of his previous administration.* [320] T h e dethronement of a monarch can still be t h o u g h t of as if h e had voluntarily laid aside the crown and abdicated his authority. not so m u c h to m a k e it m o r e d i f f i c u l t f o r a p o w e r f u l transgressor o f the people's rights to exercise at will his i n f l u e n c e u p o n the g o v e r n m e n t as to disguise his i n f l u e n c e u n d e r the illusion o f an o p p o s i t i o n p e r m i t t e d to the p e o p l e . the highest legislation w o u l d h a v e to contain a provision that it is not the h i g h e s t a n d that m a k e s the p e o p l e . as the source of the law. to attack his person o r e v e n his life (:monarchomachismus sub specie tyrannicidii) o n the p r e t e x t that h e has a b u s e d his authority ( tyrannis ). by o n e a n d the s a m e j u d g m e n t s o v e r e i g n o v e r h i m to w h o m it is subject. n o r i g h t to sedition (seditio). is an absurdity. the head of state. these a r e always two distinct m o r a l persons). or as if. a n d w h o are always r e a d y to play into the g o v e r n m e n t ' s h a n d s (instead o f resisting its e n c r o a c h m e n t s . without any attack on the highest person. t h e r e w o u l d h a v e to be a public law p e r m i t t i n g it to resist. still less to rebellion (rebellio). c o n s i d e r e d in terms o f rights. Of all the . in his capacity as head of state. that is. t h e r e f o r e .The Doctrine of Right g 131 the minister. can do no wrong. a n d this c a n n o t be p e r m i t t e d in time o f peace). F o r it is then a p p a r e n t that the p e o p l e wants to be the j u d g e in its o w n suit. T h e reason a p e o p l e has a duty to p u t u p with e v e n w h a t is held to be an u n b e a r a b l e abuse o f s u p r e m e authority is that its resistance to the highest legislation can n e v e r be r e g a r d e d as o t h e r than c o n t r a r y to law. must be regarded as having been done in external conformity with rights. A n y a t t e m p t w h a t s o e v e r at this is high treason (proditio eminens). a n d i n d e e d as abolishing the entire legal constitution. Instead o f b e l o n g i n g to R i g h t it is only a principle o f p r u d e n c e . a public declaration o f resistance r e q u i r e s u n a n i m i t y in a p e o p l e w h i c h has b e e n p r e p a r e d in a d v a n c e . T h i s is self-contradictory. giving it back to the people. For a p e o p l e to be a u t h o r i z e d to resist. T h e r e f o r e a p e o p l e c a n n o t o f f e r any resistance to the legislative h e a d o f a state that w o u l d b e consistent with right. and he himself. But it never has the least right to punish him. he had relinquished his authority and been reduced to the rank of a private person. so to speak) As far as we can see. only want to evade it In the first case. whose validity he still cannot deny before his own reason. as contradictory to it (hostile to it. an effect of imagination by which we put ourselves in the place of the sufferer) but moral feeling resulting from the complete overturning of all concepts of Right' It is regarded as a crime that remains forever and can never be expiated (crimen immortale. since it involves a principle that would have to make it impossible to generate again a state that has been overthrown . accordingly.loo Metaphysics of Morals atrocities involved in overthrowing a state by rebellion. he can at the same time detest his transgression and. which is not aesthetic feeling (sympathy. and that these formalities are undertaken only to give that deed the appearance of punishment. since only what happens in accordance with the mechanism of nature is capable of being explained Now the criminal can commit his misdeed either on a maxim he has taken as an objective rule (as holding universally) or only as an exception to the rule (exempting himself from it occasionally) In the latter case he only deviates from the law (though intentionally). his execution must be regarded as a complete overturning of the principles of the relation between a sovereign and his people (in which the people. which throw light on the principles of political rights themselves Any transgression of the law can and must be explained only as arising from a maxim of the criminal (to make such a crime his rule). for it is as if the state commits suicide There is. the assassination of the monarch is not itself the worst. so that violence is elevated above the most sacred rights brazenly and in accordance with principle Like a chasm that irretrievably swallows everything. makes itself his master). so that their killing him would not be an enactment of punitive justice but merely a dictate of self-preservation It is the formal execution of a monarch that strikes horror in a soul filled with the Idea of men's rights. however. inexpiabile). and it seems to be like what theologians call the sin that cannot be forgiven either in this world or the next. a formally evil (wholly pointless) crime. he rejects the authority of the law itself. which owes its existence only to the sovereign's legislation. h i s m a x i m is diametrically opposed to the law. it is impossible for a man to commit a crime of this kind. such a presumption on the people's part is still worse than murder. and yet it is not to be ignored in a system of morals (although it is only the Idea of the most extreme evil) The reason for horror at the thought of the formal execution of a monarch by his people is therefore this that while his murder is regarded as only an exception to the rule that the people makes its maxim. and so of a rightful procedure (such as murder would not be) But this disguising of the deed miscarries. a horror that one feels repeatedly as soon as and as often as one thinks of such scenes as the fate of Charles I or Louis XVI But how are we to explain this feeling. a s w e p u t it. The explanation of this phenomenon in the human mind seems to arise from the following reflections upon itself. reason for assuming that the agreement to execute the monarch actually originates not from what is supposed to be a rightful principle but from fear of the state's vengeance upon the people if it revives at some future time. for if we were to derive it from a sensible impulse. for we can still think of the people as doing it from fear that if he remained alive he could marshal his forces and inflict on them the punishment they deserve. and makes it his rule to act contrary to the law His maxim is therefore opposed to the law not by way of default o n l y (negative) b u t b y rejecting it (contrane) o r . the execution of a monarch seems to be a crime from which the people cannot be absolved. without formally renouncing obedience to the law. he would not be committing it as a free being and it could not be imputed to him But how it is possible for the subject to form such a maxim contrary to the clear prohibition of lawgiving reason absolutely cannot be explained. his right to d o so cannot be challenged since the insurrection that dispossessed him was unjust. no active resistance (by the people combining at will to coerce the g o v e r n m e n t to take a certain course o f action. and so itself p e r f o r m i n g an act o f executive authority) is permitted. as a claimant [or pretender]. Nevertheless.The Doctrine of Right g 133 [321] [322] A c h a n g e in a (defective) constitution. C a n the h e a d o f state be r e g a r d e d as the supreme proprietor 6 1 (of the land) o r must he be r e g a r d e d only as the one w h o has s u p r e m e com- . In what is called a limited constitution. can t h e r e f o r e be carried out only t h r o u g h reform by the sovereign itself. B u t do other powers have the right to b a n d together in an alliance on behalf of this deposed monarch. if these d e m a n d s were always complied with. for what he previously carried out. Moreover. which may certainly be necessary at times. but not by the people. the constitution contains a provision that the people can legally resist the executive authority and its representative (the minister) by means o f its representatives (in parliament). still less be punished. that its representatives can be bought. Indeed. to get his throne back. A d e t h r o n e d monarch (who survives the upheaval) cannot be held to account. a refusal o f the people (in parliament) to accede to every d e m a n d the g o v e r n m e n t puts forth as necessary f o r administering the state. but only negative resistance. this would be a sure sign that the people is corrupt. that is. and they cannot r e f u s e honest obedience to the authority that now has the power. provided he returns to the Estate [Stand] o f a citizen and p r e f e r s peace f o r himself and the state to the risk o f r u n n i n g away in o r d e r to e n g a g e in the adventure of trying. once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been established. merely so as not to let that crime perpetrated by the people go u n a v e n g e d and persist as a scandal f o r all states? A r e they therefore authorized and called u p o n to restore by force the old constitution in any other state w h e r e the presently existing constitution has come about by revolution? T h e s e questions belong to the Right of Nations. the lack of legitimacy with which it b e g a n and has been implemented cannot release the subjects f r o m the obligation to comply with the new order o f things as g o o d citizens. that the head o f the g o v e r n m e n t is ruling despotically t h r o u g h his minister. not the legislative. But if he prefers the latter course. [323] B. and therefore not by revolution. w h e t h e r by covertly inciting a counterrevolution or by the assistance o f other powers. and that the minister himself is betraying the people. and w h e n such a change takes place this r e f o r m can a f f e c t only the executive authority. as the supreme proprietor o f it (dominus territorii). A knightly order (whether a corporation or merely a rank of individual persons w h o enjoy special honors) or a clerical order. B u t one can also say that he possesses everything. F r o m this it follows that there can also be no corporation. All land belongs only to the people (and indeed to the people taken distributively. called the church. since he has the right o f c o m m a n d over the people. Estate. they instead belong to him as their s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r [iOberbefehlshaber] (by a right against persons). can never acquire f r o m [324] . with w h o m there is n o private ownership of land. For if he did. T h i s s u p r e m e proprietorship is. not collectively). provided it compensates those w h o are left. In accordance with concepts of Right. possessors only o f what is the property of another.loo Metaphysics of Morals mand over the people by law? Since the land is the ultimate condition that alone makes it possible to have external things as one's own. and t h e r e f o r e d e p r i v e d o f all f r e e d o m (servi). that is. the multitude of subjects. to w h o m all external things belong (divisim) (the right to assign to each what is his). except in the case o f a nomadic people u n d e r a head o f state [nomadisch-beherrschtes ]. instead o f with principles o f aggregation (which proceeds empirically f r o m the parts to the whole). also belong to him (they are his people). a n d the first right that can be acquired is to possession and use o f such things. can pass it on in accordance with certain statutes to succeeding generations f o r their exclusive use (in perpetuity). a dispute could arise between them and there would be n o j u d g e to settle it. T h e people. as o w n e r of land. or o r d e r in the state that. so that determination o f the particular property o f each is in accordance with the necessary formal principle o f division (division o f land). only an Idea o f the civil union that serves to represent in accordance with concepts of Right the necessary union of the private property of everyone within the people u n d e r a general public possessor. no estates f o r his private use (for maintaining his court). O n e can say of the lord of the land that he possesses nothing (of his own) except himself. however. so that the state would r u n the risk o f seeing all ownership of land in the hands of the g o v e r n m e n t and all subjects as serfs (gelbae adscripti). all such rights must be derived f r o m the sovereign as lord of the land. the supreme proprietor cannot have any land at all as his private property (for otherwise he would make himself a private person). f o r if he had something o f his own alongside others in the state. T h e supreme c o m m a n d e r [Oberbefehlshaber] can t h e r e f o r e have no domains. T h e state can repeal such statutes at any time. it would then be u p to his own discretion how far they should be e x t e n d e d . or better. B u t they b e l o n g to him not as if he owned them (by a right to things). and police. so that no association (of political or religious fanatics) that could a f f e c t the public well-being o f society [publicum) remains concealed. the right o f the supreme c o m m a n d e r [Oberbefehlshaber]. since the only way o f p r o c e e d i n g in accordance with principles o f Right in this matter is for taxes to be levied by those deputized by the people. stenches. that of inspection (ius inspectionis). since the reason f o r their possession hitherto lay only in the people's opinion and also had to hold as long as that lasted. But the police are not authorized to search anyone's private residence except in a case of necessity. that is. as negative taste. convenience. again. no association can r e f u s e to disclose its constitution w h e n the police d e m a n d it. or to require the p e r f o r m a n c e of services (such as providing troops for military service). and public prostitution (venus volgivaga). u p r o a r on the streets. T h o s e a f f e c t e d by such r e f o r m s cannot complain of their property being taken f r o m them. to tax private owners o f land. But as soon as this opinion lapses. and decency. T h e holdings of the c h u r c h can be similarly revoked if public opinion has ceased to want masses for souls. and import duties. Instead. even in case o f forced loans (deviating f r o m previously existing law). O n this supreme proprietorship also rests the right to administer the state's economy. as if by an appeal o f the people to the state (a rege male informato ad regem melius informandum). to require payment of taxes on land.The Doctrine of Right g 135 those privileges with which they are favored ownership in land to pass on to their successors. which it is permissible to exact by the right o f majesty in case the state is in d a n g e r of dissolution. the supposed property has to cease. O n this originally acquired ownership of land rests. is not d e a d e n e d by what o f f e n d s the moral sense. finances. and even lapses only in the j u d g m e n t o f those w h o by their merit have the strongest claim to guide j u d g m e n t . and a multitude o f clerics appointed f o r this as the means f o r saving the people f r o m eternal fire. A third right also belongs to the state for its preservation. such as begging. [325] . and in every particular case they must be warranted to d o so by a higher authority. f o r the government's business of guiding the people by laws is made easier w h e n the feeling f o r decency (sensus decori). they can acquire only use o f it u p to the present. prayers. be d o n e in such a way that the people taxes itself. as s u p r e m e proprietor (lord o f the land). however. excise taxes. T h e estates o f a knightly o r d e r can be revoked without scruple (though u n d e r the condition mentioned above) if public opinion has ceased to favor military honors as a means f o r s a f e g u a r d i n g the state against i n d i f f e r e n c e in d e f e n d i n g it. T h i s must. Police provide f o r public security. or by establishing f u n d s and using the interest f r o m them. on this obligation the state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens. which p r o d u c e m o r e poor people a n d m o r e d a n g e r to public property than there would otherwise be. which they need in o r d e r to live. f o r even if current contributions increase with the n u m b e r of the poor. or indeed m u r d e r e d because o f this. which no one w h o has to live can withdraw f r o m . insofar as he has taken over the duty o f the people. the right to impose taxes on the people f o r its own preservation. the state has a right to c h a r g e the people with the duty o f not knowingly letting t h e m die.loo Metaphysics of Morals C. which is closely akin to robbery. and f o r this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in o r d e r to maintain those members o f the society w h o are unable to maintain themselves. T o the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r [Oberbefehlshaber] there belongs indirectly. foundling homes. and which should therefore not be permitted). For reasons o f state the g o v e r n m e n t is t h e r e f o r e authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means o f sustenance to those w h o are unable to provide f o r even their most necessary natural needs. T h e wealthy have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth. or instead by assets gradually accumulated and by pious institutions generally (such as widows' homes. such as taxes to support organizations providing f o r the poor. hospitals. since they o w e their existence to an act o f submitting to its protection and care. usually called charitable or pious institutions. this a r r a n g e m e n t does not m a k e poverty a means of acquisition f o r the lazy (as is to be f e a r e d o f religious institutions) and so does not become an unjust b u r d e n i n g o f the people by government. T h i s can be d o n e either by imposing a tax on the p r o p e r t y or commerce of citizens. and church organizations. not f o r the needs of the state (for it is rich). A s f o r maintaining those children abandoned because o f poverty or shame. and the like). not merely by voluntary contributions. even t h o u g h they are an unwelcome addition to the resources o f [326] . but by legal levies — so that each generation supports its own poor. T h e general will o f the people has united itself into a society that is to maintain itself perpetually. Only the first a r r a n g e m e n t . that is. can be considered in k e e p i n g with the Right o f a state. some o f which are m a d e f o r gain (such as lotteries. by public taxation. T h e question arises w h e t h e r the care of the poor should be p r o v i d e d for by current contributions — collected not by b e g g i n g . but f o r the needs o f the people. (Since we are speaking here only o f the right o f the state against the people) it will d o this by way o f coercion. of not letting a dispute arising within a c h u r c h or a m o n g d i f f e r e n t churches e n d a n g e r civil harmony. For the s u p r e m e authority to say that a c h u r c h should have a certain belief. and so never to r e f o r m its churches. A state has only a negative right to prevent public teachers f r o m exercising an influence on the visible political c o m m o n w e a l t h that might be prejudicial to public peace. B u t no people can decide never to make f u r t h e r progress in its insight (enlightenment) r e g a r d i n g beliefs. it puts itself on a level of equality with its subjects (the monarch makes himself a priest). W h e t h e r this should be done by taxing elderly u n m a r r i e d people o f both sexes generally (by which I mean wealthy u n m a r r i e d people). (As institutions for public divine worship o n the part of the people. to whose opinion or conviction they owe their origin) churches become a true need of a state. So n o s u p r e m e authority can decide on this f o r the people. T h e s u p r e m e authority especially has no right to prohibit internal r e f o r m of churches. [327] [328] . beyond the civil power's sphere o f influence. that is. f o r in d o i n g this. they must be carefully distinguished f r o m religion. as in m e d d l i n g in the quarrels o f the schools. only to the congregation. A s f o r churches. are interferences by it that are beneath its dignity. in o r d e r to establish f o u n d l i n g homes.The Doctrine of Right g 137 the state. the need f o r a people to regard themselves as subjects o f a supreme invisible p o w e r to which they must pay h o m a g e and which can o f t e n come into very unequal conflict with the civil power. and they can straightway tell him that he understands nothing about it. B u t as f o r the expenses o f maintaining churches: For the very same reason these cannot be charged to the state but must rather be charged to the part of the people w h o profess one or another belief. which is an inner disposition lying wholly. in ways it deems advantageous to itself. or w h e t h e r it can be d o n e rightly in another way (it would be hard to find another means for preventing this) is a problem which has not yet been solved in such a way that the solution o f f e n d s against neither rights nor morality. since they are in part to blame for there being a b a n d o n e d children. since this would be opposed to the humanity in their own persons and so to the highest Right of the people. that is. to prescribe to the people or c o m m a n d beliefs and forms of divine worship (ritus) (for this must be left entirely to the teachers and directors the people itself has chosen). Its right is therefore that o f policing. So a state does have a right with r e g a r d to churches. or to say which it should have or that it must maintain it unalterably and may not r e f o r m itself. It does not have the right to legislate the internal constitutions o f churches or to organize them in accordance with its own views. for what the whole people cannot decide u p o n f o r itself the legislator also cannot decide for the people. t h o u g h free and b o u n d only by public law. once having given someone an office. the right to punish as well. T h e answer to this question comes f r o m the same principle as the reply to the preceding one: " W h a t a people (the entire mass o f [329] . 2) the distribution o f dignities. Now the question is w h e t h e r the sovereign is entitled to establish a nobility. time he could have spent in training f o r another position that would have supported him. not just those attached to an o f f i c e but also that which makes its possessors m e m b e r s o f a higher Estate even without any special services on their part. based on h o n o r alone. Hence civil officials must be able to count on lifelong support. W h a t this question comes d o w n to is not whether it would be p r u d e n t f o r the sovereign to d o this. If the head of state had this right. and this would be contrary to the intention o f the state.loo Metaphysics of Morals D. For the head of state can never make a decision about a civil official which the united will o f the people would not make. that is. a division of rank into the higher (destined to c o m m a n d ) and the lower (which. which also requires that everyone be able to rise f r o m lower to h i g h e r o f f i c e s (which would otherwise fall into the hands of sheer incompetence). offices would be filled as a rule by people w h o had not acquired the skill requisite f o r them and the mature j u d g m e n t achieved by practice. T h e rights of the supreme c o m m a n d e r [obersten Befehlshabers] o f a state also include 1) the distribution of offices. is that of the nobility. which are eminent Estates without pay. and this he can be only after he has spent sufficiently l o n g time in preparation and training. but only w h e t h e r it would be in accord with the rights o f the people f o r it to have an Estate o f persons above it who. I say. are still born rulers [ Befehlshaber ] (or at least privileged) with respect to the people. while themselves subjects. is still destined to obey the f o r m e r ) . which are salaried administrative positions. has a right to take it away as he pleases (if the official has not committed a crime). Now the people (which has to bear the costs incurred f r o m appointing an official) undoubtedly wants him to be competent for the position he is assigned to. with a view to his own or the people's advantage. the question arises w h e t h e r the sovereign. A m o n g dignities. which is distinct f r o m the civil Estate of the people and is transmitted to male descendants and by them to a wife born as a c o m m o n e r . insofar as it is an Estate intermediate between himself and the rest o f the citizens that can be inherited. t h o u g h if a w o m a n b o r n into the nobility marries a c o m m o n e r she does not pass this rank on to her husband but herself reverts to the m e r e civil rank (of the people). With regard to civil offices. no. and 3) besides these (relatively beneficent) rights. use him as he pleases (only not f o r s h a m e f u l purposes) and dispose of his powers. T h e anomaly of subjects w h o want to be more than citizens of the state." Now a hereditary nobility is a rank that precedes merit and also provides n o basis to h o p e for merit. by a contract to let and hire (locatio conductio). which is t33°] . it is impossible for the general will o f the people to assent to such a groundless prerogative. as property. and commoners has been replaced by the only natural division into sovereign and people. Now it might seem that a man could put himself u n d e r obligation to another person. w h o is accordingly not merely his master (herus) but also his owner (dominus) and can therefore alienate him as a thing. board. and t h e r e f o r e f o r the sovereign to validate it. are also hereditary. not a b o n d s m a n (servus). since he at least has the dignity of a citizen. to p e r f o r m services (in return for wages. So it has a provisional right to let these titled positions of dignity continue until even in public opinion the division into sovereign. he is made a mere tool o f another's choice (either of the state or o f another citizen). But this is only a deceptive appearance. by a contract. T h e exception is someone w h o has lost it by his own crime. or protection) that are permissible in terms of their quality but indeterminate in terms of their quantity. t h o u g h he is kept alive. which was organized almost entirely f o r war). he can also exhaust them until his subject dies o r is driven to despair (as with the Negroes on the Sugar Islands). Certainly no m a n in a state can be without any dignity. and is thus a thought-entity without any reality. W h o e v e r is another's tool (which he can become only by j u d g m e n t and Right) is a bondsman62 (servus in sensu stricto) and is the property (dominium) of another. by which he ceases to be a person. the sovereign can also not decide with r e g a r d to it.The Doctrine of Right g 139 subjects) cannot decide with regard to itself and its fellows. For if an ancestor had merit he could still not bequeath it to his descendants: T h e y must acquire it f o r themselves. because o f which. namely b o r n officials (a born professor. is by letting them lapse and not filling vacancies in these positions. Since we cannot admit that any man would throw away his f r e e d o m . perhaps) may have crept into the machinery of g o v e r n m e n t f r o m older times (feudalism. his subject will m fact have given himself away. T h e only way the state can then gradually correct this mistake it has made. since nature does not arrange things in such a way that talent and will. and that he thereby becomes just a subject (subiectus). nobility. No one can bind himself to this kind of d e p e n d e n c e . which make meritorious service to the state possible. t h o u g h not of his life and members. For if the master is authorized to use the powers of his subject as he pleases. since it is only as a person that he can make a contract. o f c o n f e r r i n g hereditary privileges contrary to right. to his master. [331] E. his subjection cannot be inherited. Even if he has become a personal subject by his crime. the latter b e f o r e a criminal court. f o r parents have an absolute natural duty to educate their children and. T h e y can be divided into crimes arising f r o m a mean character (indolis abiectae) and crimes arising f r o m a violent character (indolis violentae). for a time or indefinitely.loo Metaphysics of Morals impossible. 63 so the first (private crime) is b r o u g h t b e f o r e a civil court. that is. A transgression o f public law that makes someone w h o commits it unfit to be a citizen is called a crime simply (crimen) but is also called a public crime (crimen publicum) . and the like are public crimes. one can only withdraw f r o m his dominion. For a man can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes o f another or be put a m o n g the objects o f rights to . o r to pay rent (a tax) specified by a lease in return f o r his own use of it. because they e n d a n g e r the c o m m o n wealth and not just an individual person. because he has incurred it only by his own guilt. N o r can a bondsman's o f f s p r i n g be claimed as a b o n d s m a n because he has given rise to the expense o f being educated. Punishment by a court (poena forensis) — this is distinct f r o m natural punishment (poena naturalis). their masters take over this duty along with possession of their subjects. without thereby m a k i n g himself a serf (gelbae adscriptus). In the latter case he can make a contract. w h e n committed in such a way that the other could detect it. O n the other hand. misappropriation o f money or goods entrusted f o r commerce. It must always be inflicted u p o n him only because he has committed a crime. either as a day laborer o r as a subject living on his master's property. counterfeiting money or bills o f exchange. in case the parents are in b o n d a g e . theft and robbery. On the Right to Punish and to Grant Clemency T h e right to punish is the right a ruler has against a subject to inflict pain u p o n him because of his having committed a crime. to p e r f o r m services by w o r k i n g on his master's land in e x c h a n g e f o r the use o f it instead o f receiving wages as a day laborer. Embezzlement. by which he would forfeit his personality. S o m e o n e can therefore hire himself out only f o r work that is determined as to its kind and its amount. and f r a u d in b u y i n g and selling. in which vice punishes itself and which the legislator does not take into account — can never be inflicted merely as a means to p r o m o t e some other g o o d f o r the criminal himself or f o r civil society. T h e head o f a state can t h e r e f o r e not be punished. are private crimes. " For if justice goes. and woe to him w h o crawls t h r o u g h the windings o f e u d a e m o n i s m in o r d e r to discover something that releases the criminal f r o m punishment or even reduces its amount by the advantage it promises.it being understood. that this is applied by a court (not by y o u r private j u d g m e n t ) . all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited f o r a sentence o f p u r e and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into them. But only the law of retribution (ius talionis) . f o r justice ceases to be justice if it can be b o u g h t f o r any price whatsoever. that you inflict u p o n yourself. even t h o u g h he is o f a lower class. if you kill him. so that in this way physicians learn something new o f benefit to the commonwealth? A court would reject with contempt such a proposal f r o m a medical college. even t h o u g h he can be c o n d e m n e d to lose his civil personality. "It is better f o r one m a n to die than f o r an entire people to perish. for someone wealthy might indeed allow himself to indulge in a verbal injury on some occasion. the principle can always remain valid in terms o f its e f f e c t if account is taken of the sensibilities of the u p p e r classes. Accordingly. whatever undeserved evil you inflict u p o n another within the people.can specify definitely the quality and the quantity o f punishment. H e must previously have b e e n f o u n d punishable b e f o r e any thought can be given to drawing f r o m his punishment something o f use f o r himself or his fellow citizens. imposed for a verbal injury has no relation to the o f f e n s e . yet the outrage he has d o n e to someone's love of h o n o r can still be quite similar to the hurt d o n e to his pride if he is constrained by j u d g m e n t and Right not only to apologize publicly to the one he has insulted but also to kiss his hand. you strike yourself. for instance. T h e principle of punishment 6 4 is a categorical imperative. there is n o longer any value in men's living on the earth. should one think of the proposal to preserve the life of a criminal sentenced to death if he agrees to let d a n g e r o u s experiments be m a d e on him and is lucky e n o u g h to survive them. f o r example. Now it would indeed seem that d i f f e r e n c e s in social rank would not allow the principle o f retribution. you steal f r o m yourself.The Doctrine of Right g 141 things: His innate personality protects him f r o m this. to incline no m o r e to one side than to the other. if you steal f r o m him. But what kind and what a m o u n t of punishment is it that public justice makes its principle and measure? None other than the principle of equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of justice). in accordance with the Pharisaical saying. you insult yourself. Similarly. you kill yourself. o f course. If you insult him. What. of like for like. if you strike him. but even w h e n this is not possible in terms of the letter. someone of high standing given to violence could be c o n d e m n e d not only to apologize f o r striking an innocent citizen socially inferior to himself but also to u n d e r g o [332] . A fine. therefore. "If you steal f r o m someone. h o w e v e r wretched it may be. B u t what does it m e a n to say. and suppose that the j u d g m e n t p r o n o u n c e d by the highest court had been that each is free to make the choice between death and convict labor. which can occur only by a j u d g e imposing the death sentence in accordance with the strict law o f retribution. Iuvenal [Satires . is shown by the fact that only by this is a sentence o f death p r o n o u n c e d on every criminal in proportion to his inner wickedness (even w h e n the crime is not m u r d e r but another crime against the state that can be paid f o r only by death). and the scoundrel convict labor. he has committed m u r d e r he must die. while others on the contrary were out f o r their private interests. while the scoundrel considers it better to live in shame than not to live at all (animam praeferre pudori. although it must still be f r e e d f r o m any mistreatment that could make the humanity in the person s u f f e r i n g it into something abominable.loo [333] a Metaphysics of Morals solitary c o n f i n e m e n t involving hardship. Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its m e m b e r s (e. and this is now possible only if others provide f o r him. T h e r e is n o similarity between life. in addition to the discomfort he u n d e r g o e s .. but he still wants to live. the last m u r d e r e r remaining in prison would first have to be executed.g. and death. if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse t h r o u g h o u t the world). H e r e there is n o substitute that will satisfy justice. T h i s comes along with the nature o f the h u m a n mind. he must let it have his powers f o r any kind o f w o r k it pleases (in convict or prison labor) and is reduced to the status o f a slave f o r a certain time. namely honor. so that each has d o n e to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people f o r not having insisted u p o n this punishment. But since the state will not provide f o r him f r e e o f charge. Suppose that some (such as Balmerino 6 5 and others) w h o took part in the recent Scottish rebellion believed that by their uprising they were only p e r f o r m i n g a duty they owed the House of Stuart. the o f f e n d e r ' s vanity would be painfully a f f e c t e d . H e has nothing and can also acquire nothing. or permanently if the state sees fit. however. so that t h r o u g h his shame like would be fittingly repaid with like. f o r otherwise the people can be r e g a r d e d as collaborators in this public violation of justice. y o u steal f r o m y o u r s e l f " ? W h o e v e r steals makes the property o f e v e r y o n e else insecure and t h e r e f o r e deprives himself (by the principle o f retribution) o f security in any possible property. hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless death is judicially carried out u p o n the w r o n g d o e r . T h i s fitting o f punishment to the crime. If. I say that in this case the m a n o f h o n o r [334] would choose death. for the m a n o f h o n o r is acquainted with something that he values even m o r e highly than life. can always be exercised only in individual cases. in o r d e r to have no such criminals in it. every m u r d e r e r — anyone w h o commits m u r d e r . everyone in a people would have to have consented to lose his life in case he m u r d e r e d someone else (in the people). as clemency.The Doctrine of Right g 143 III. In opposition to this the Marchese Beccaria. No one suffers punishment because he has willed it but because he has willed a punishable action. however. for it is no punishment if what is d o n e to [335] . both would be punished quite proportionately if all alike were sentenced to death. whereas it is impossible for anyone to consent to this because no one can dispose o f his own life. everyone would l a u g h in his face if he said this. the best equalizer b e f o r e public justice is death. Moreover. Since the m a n o f h o n o r is undeniably less deserving o f punishment than the other. as the Idea of judicial authority. 6 7 m o v e d by overly compassionate feelings of an affected humanity (compassibilitas). w h e n sentence is p r o n o u n c e d o n a n u m b e r o f criminals united in a plot. to assume the role o f j u d g e (to represent him) and p r o n o u n c e a j u d g ment that decrees f o r the criminals a sentence other than capital punishment. or is an accomplice in it — must s u f f e r death. that is. the n u m b e r o f accomplices (correi) to such a deed is so great that the state. O n the other hand. 83]). 8. which still preserves the population. If. by an act of the right of majesty which. if both were sentenced to convict labor the m a n o f h o n o r would be punished too severely and the other too mildly f o r his vile action. in this case o f necessity (casus necessitatis). Accordingly. A n d so here too. has put forward his assertion that any capital punishment is w r o n g f u l because it could not be contained in the original civil contract. and if the state still does not want to dissolve. to pass over into the state o f nature. T h i s is all sophistry and juristic trickery. if it does so. this is what justice. it would be in contradiction with itself. then the sovereign must also have it in his power. could soon find itself without subjects. but it can be d o n e by an executive decree. f o r if it were. wills in accordance with universal laws that are g r o u n d e d a priori. 6 6 T h i s cannot be d o n e in accordance with public law. orders it. such as deportation. which is far worse because there is no external justice at all in it (and if it especially does not want to dull the people's feeling by the spectacle of a slaughterhouse). the legislative authority o f the state is still not authorized to inflict this kind of punishment and that. If his complaint were justified it would have to be assumed that even t h o u g h no w r o n g is done to the criminal in accordance with the law. one has never h e a r d o f anyone w h o was sentenced to death f o r m u r d e r complaining that he was dealt with too severely and therefore w r o n g e d . that is. the m a n o f h o n o r would be punished mildly in terms of his sensibilities and the scoundrel severely in terms o f his. T h e one crime is a mother's murder of her child (infanticidium maternale). and it is impossible to will to be punished. I cannot possibly be the same person who. [336] T h e r e are. In other words. in the other military honor. which subjects me. T h e chief point o f e r r o r (irpcoTOv i|ieu8os) in this sophistry consists in its c o n f u s i n g the criminal's own j u d g m e n t (which must necessarily be ascribed to his reason) that he has to forfeit his life with a resolve on the part o f his will to take his own life. which would then not even have to be called m u r d e r (homocidium dolosum). For if the authorization to punish had to be based on the o f f e n d e r ' s promise. as someone capable o f crime and so as another person (homophaenomenon).loo Metaphysics of Morals someone is what he wills. T h e feeling of h o n o r leads to both. the other is murdering a fellow soldier (commilitonicidium) in a duel. and the social contract contains n o promise to let oneself be punished and so to dispose of oneself and one's life. in one case the honor of one's sex. I cannot possibly have a voice in legislation (the legislator is holy). legislating with r e g a r d to rights. namely as a criminal. two crimes deserving o f death. it is p u r e reason in m e (homo noumenon). which is incumbent as duty on each of these two classes of people. it is not the p e o p l e (each individual in it) that dictates capital punishment but rather the court (public justice). and so another than the criminal. So it seems that in these two cases people find themselves in the state of nature. and that these acts o f killing (homocidium). which will naturally also be penal laws if there are any criminals a m o n g the people. to the penal law. and so in representing as united in one and the same person the j u d g m e n t u p o n a right [Rechtsbeurteilung] and the realization of that right [Rechtsvollziehung]. Consequently. are certainly punishable but cannot be punished with death by the s u p r e m e power. with r e g a r d to which it still remains d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r legislation is also authorized to impose the death penalty. A child that comes into the world apart f r o m marriage is b o r n outside the law (for the law is marriage) and t h e r e f o r e outside the protection o f the . is punished in accordance with the law. Legislation cannot remove the disgrace o f an illegitimate birth any m o r e than it can wipe away the stain o f suspicion o f cowardice f r o m a subordinate o f f i c e r w h o fails to respond to a humiliating affront with a f o r c e o f his own rising above fear o f death. Saying that I will to be punished if I m u r d e r someone is saying nothing m o r e than that I subject myself together with e v e r y o n e else to the laws. and indeed true honor. however. as a subject. A s a colegislator in dictating the penal law. w h e n I draw u p a penal law against myself as a criminal. together with all others in a civil union. on his willing to let himself be punished. for as one w h o is punished. it would also have to be left to him to find himself punishable and the criminal would be his own j u d g e . What. So too. T h e knot can be u n d o n e in the following way: T h e categorical imperative o f penal justice remains (unlawful killing of another must be punished by death). w h e n a j u n i o r o f f i c e r is insulted he sees himself constrained by the public opinion o f the other m e m b e r s o f his Estate to obtain satisfaction f o r himself and. as long as it remains barbarous and u n d e v e l o p e d . [337] O f all the rights of a sovereign. the right to grant clemency to a criminal {ius aggratiandi). f o r it must be exercised in such a way as to show the splendor o f his majesty although he is thereby d o i n g injustice in the highest degree. or else it must r e m o v e f r o m the crime the capital punishment appropriate to it. is the slipperiest one f o r him to exercise. so that the commonwealth can ignore its existence (since it rightly [billig] should not have come to exist in this way). the killing that occurs in this fight which takes place in public and with the consent o f both parties. stolen into the commonwealth (like contraband merchandise). and no decree can r e m o v e the mother's shame w h e n it becomes known that she gave birth without being married. is to be laid d o w n as right in both cases (coming u n d e r criminal justice)? H e r e penal justice finds itself very m u c h in a quandary. . t h o u g h reluctantly. for here failure to punish (impunitas criminis) is the greatest w r o n g against his subjects. now. as it were. T h i s right is the only one that deserves to be called the right ° f majesty. punishment o f the o f f e n d e r not by law. It has. therefore. only in case of a w r o n g d o n e to himself (crimen laesae maiestatis). So the public justice arising f r o m the state becomes an injustice f r o m the perspective o f the justice arising f r o m the people. But he cannot make use of it even then if his failure to punish could e n d a n g e r the people's security. With regard to crimes of subjects against one another it is absolutely not for him to exercise it. cannot strictly be called murder ihomocidium dolosum). is responsible f o r the discrepancy between the incentives of h o n o r in the people (subjectively) and the measures that are (objectively) suitable for its purpose. u p o n which the h o n o r o f his Estate essentially rests. either by lessening or entirely remitting punishment.The Doctrine of Right g 145 law. but the legislation itself (and consequently also the civil constitution). but by a duel. and can therefore also ignore its annihilation. Either it must declare by law that the concept o f h o n o r (which is here no illusion) counts for nothing and so punish with death. H e can make use of it. taking him b e f o r e a court. as in the state o f nature. Even if the duel should involve killing his opponent. and so be either cruel or indulgent. in which he exposes himself to death in o r d e r to p r o v e his military courage. T h e y are a p u r e Idea o f a head of state.loo Metaphysics of Morals On the Relation with Regard to Rights of a Citizen to His Native Land and to Foreign Countries §50. not his fixed belongings. which must respect the land o f the state that rules it as the mother country (regio domina). He also has the right to banish a subject to a province outside the country. entirely outside his country (in O l d G e r m a n . But this head o f state (the sovereign) is only a thought-entity (to represent the entire people) as long as there is no physical person to represent the supreme authority in the state and to make this Idea . which arise f r o m the concept of a commonwealth as such (res publica latius dicta). this amounts to making him an outlaw within his boundaries. f o r a province is not an integral part o f the realm (imperii). this is called Elend [misery]). without their having to p e r f o r m any special act to establish the right (and so are citizens by birth). A country (territorium) whose inhabitants are citizens of it simply by its constitution. T h e three authorities in a state. that is. are only the three relations o f the united will o f the people. provided that their private ownership of land is not curtailed by it. w h e r e he will not enjoy any of the rights o f a citizen. to send him out into the wide world. f o r the state could not hold him back as its property. If a f o r e i g n country f o r m s part o f a larger realm it is called a province (in the sense in which the R o m a n s used this word). §51. Since the lord o f the land then withdraws all protection f r o m him. to deport him. B u t he can take out o f it with him only his movable belongings. if he has committed a crime that makes it h a r m f u l to the state f o r his fellow citizens to associate with him. which is derived a priori f r o m reason. a secondary house68 f o r them. which has objective practical reality. a place o f residence for fellow-citizens. [338] 1) 2) 3) 4) A subject (regarded also as a citizen) has the right to emigrate. even t h o u g h his native subjects might look askance at this. H e also has the right to exile him altogether (ius exilii). that is. as he would be d o i n g if he were authorized to sell the land he previously possessed and take with him the money he got f o r it. is called their native land. A country o f which they are not citizens apart f r o m this condition is called a foreign country. T h e lord of the land has the right to e n c o u r a g e immigration and settling by foreigners (colonists). but only a possession of it. The Doctrine of Right g 147 e f f e c t i v e o n t h e p e o p l e ' s will. w h e n all the m e m b e r s o f the nation are passive a n d obey one w h o is o v e r t h e m . h o w e v e r . that the best constitution is that w h i c h is best. aristocratic. that is. a r e united in c o m m a n d o v e r all the others. that is. t h e n it unites the will o f t h e citizens to f o r m a c o m m o n w e a l t h . it unites the will o f all to f o r m a p e o p l e . the simplest f o r m is also the best. o r democratic. is not suitable f o r the c o n c e p t i n t e n d e d h e r e . o r that all t o g e t h e r h a v e c o m m a n d o v e r e a c h a n d so o v e r themselves as well. o r that several.. autocracy) is the best constitution when the monarch is good (i. so that only o n e is legislator. t h e form of a state is e i t h e r autocratic. A s f o r the consolation with w h i c h the p e o p l e is s u p p o s e d to b e c o n t e n t — that m o n a r c h y (strictly s p e a k i n g h e r e . this f o r m o f state is the most d a n g e r o u s f o r a p e o p l e . since this would take us too far afield. w h e r e a s the m o n a r c h m e r e l y r e p r e sents the sovereign. to constitute the s o v e r e i g n . ( T h e e x p r e s s i o n monarchical. that is. It says n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n that the best constitution is the o n e by w h i c h t h e administrator o f t h e state is m a d e into t h e best r u l e r . o n e c a n n o t r e a c h back to the time at w h i c h civil society b e g a n (for savages d r a w u p n o r e c o r d o f their *I shall not mention the adulterations of these forms that arise from invasion by powerful unauthorized people (oligarchy and ochlocracy). e q u a l a m o n g themselves. T h e aristocratic f o r m o f state is a l r e a d y composed o f two relations: the relation o f the nobility (as legislator) to o n e a n o t h e r . * It is true that. since it involves the f o l l o w i n g relations: First. N o w the relation o f this physical p e r s o n to the people's will can b e t h o u g h t o f in t h r e e d i f f e r e n t ways: either that one in the state has c o m m a n d o v e r all. w h e n h e not only i n t e n d s w h a t is g o o d b u t also has insight into it) — this is o n e o f those wise r e m a r k s that are tautologous. B u t the d e m o c r a t i c f o r m o f state is the most c o m p o s i t e o f all. with r e g a r d to t h e administration o f R i g h t within a state. but in that case n o n e w h o are subjects are also citizens of the state. in place o f autocratic. n a m e l y the relation o f o n e (the king) to t h e p e o p l e . W i t h r e g a r d to R i g h t itself. o v e r the c o m m o n w e a l t h . .e. f o r a monarch is o n e w h o has t h e highest authority.) It is easy to see that the autocratic f o r m o f state is t h e simplest. in view o f h o w c o n d u c i v e it is to despotism. I n o t h e r w o r d s . It is i n d e e d the most reasonable m a x i m to simplify the m e c h a n i s m o f u n i f y i n g a nation by coercive laws. or the so-called mixed constitutions. w h i c h is itself the u n i t e d will o f the citizens. has all the a u t h o r ity. [339] §52It is futile to i n q u i r e into the historical warrant [Geschichtsurkunde] o f t h e m e c h a n i s m o f g o v e r n m e n t . w h e r e a s a n autocrat. w h o rules by himself. T h e a u t o c r a t is the s o v e r e i g n . t h e n it sets this sovereign. a n d t h e n the relation o f this s o v e r e i g n to t h e p e o p l e . so long as those . or the reverse. For even if the sovereign decided to transform itself into a democracy. which served merely to b r i n g about the submission of the people. T h e transition to a better constitution is not then a metamorphosis but a palingenesis. the only f o r m that makes freedom the principle and indeed the condition f o r any exercise o f coercion. and they may therefore remain as l o n g as they are taken. It is the final end of all public Right. so as to allow to continue in existence that f o r m which is essentially required f o r a people to constitute a state. Accordingly. But it must still be possible. T h e d i f f e r e n t f o r m s of states are only the letter (littera) o f the original legislation in the civil state. that is. Only it will finally lead to what is literally a [340] [341] state. the only condition in which each can be assigned conclusively what is his. which requires a new social contract on which the previous one (now annulled) has n o effect. f o r e x a m p l e . if the existing constitution cannot well be reconciled with the Idea o f the original contract. as if it rested on the sovereign's f r e e choice [Wahl] and discretion which kind o f constitution it would subject the people to. besides. it is u n d e r obligation to c h a n g e the kind of g o v e r n m e n t gradually and continually so that it harmonizes in its effect with the only constitution that accords with right. Now this change cannot consist in a state's reorganizing itself f r o m one of the three f o r m s into another. on the other hand. T h i s is the only constitution o f a state that lasts. even if this cannot be done all at once. we can already gather f r o m the nature of uncivilized men that they were originally subjected to it by force). B u t it is punishable to undertake this inquiry with a view to possibly changing by force the constitution that now exists. For this transformation w o u l d have to take place by the people acting as a mob. But the spirit o f the original contract (anima pacti originarii) involves an obligation on the part o f the constituting authority to m a k e the kind of government suited to the Idea of the original contract. it could still d o the people a wrong. since the people itself could abhor such a constitution and find one o f the other f o r m s m o r e to its advantage. as is required by a rightful constitution o f a state in the strict sense of the word. are replaced by the original (rational) form. as. it is not c h a n g e in the civil constitution but dissolution of it. in such a way that the old (empirical) statutory forms. not by legislation. that of a p u r e republic. by old and long-standing custom (and so only subjectively). to b e l o n g necessarily to the machinery o f the constitution. but insurrection in a constitution that already exists overthrows all civil rightful relations and therefore all Right. f o r the sovereign to change it. aristocrats a g r e e i n g to submit to autocracy or deciding to m e r g e into a democracy.loo Metaphysics of Morals submission to law. the constitution in which law itself rules and d e p e n d s on no particular person. B u t as soon as a person w h o is head o f state (whether it be a king. to extricate himself f r o m the embarrassment o f large state debts. but only provisional Right within it.The Doctrine of Right g 149 other f o r m s o f state are supposed to represent literally just so many d i f f e r e n t moral persons invested with supreme authority. having attended to it. and a republic. namely to prevent it f r o m incurring new debts by extravagance or war. For in it (the people) is originally f o u n d the s u p r e m e authority f r o m which all rights of individuals as m e r e subjects (and in any event as officials of the state) must be derived. no absolutely rightful condition o f civil society can be acknowledged. he left it to the people to take this b u r d e n on itself and distribute it as it saw fit. Nor can it be said that in this case one must assume a tacit but still contractual promise of the National Assembly not to make itself the sovereign but only to administer this business of the sovereign and. A p o w e r f u l ruler in o u r time 6 9 t h e r e f o r e made a very serious error in j u d g m e n t when. in o r d e r to protect its rights in its name. not only with r e g a r d to the taxation of subjects but also with r e g a r d to the government. yet would still be binding u p o n it. he cannot control the collective will itself. to whose legislative will the belongings o f every subject became subjected. return the reins o f g o v e r n m e n t into the monarch's hands. A n y true republic is and can only be a system representing the people. W h o e v e r has it can control the people only t h r o u g h the collective will o f the people. no longer has to let the reins o f g o v e r n m e n t out of its hands and give them over again to those w h o previously held them and could again nullify all new institutions by their absolute choice. by all the citizens united and acting t h r o u g h their delegates (deputies). T h e consequence was that the monarch's sovereignty [Herrschergewalt] wholly disappeared (it was not merely suspended) and passed to the people. the democratic union) also lets itself be represented. f o r then the legislative authority naturally came into the people's hands. then the united people does not merely represent the sovereign: It is the sovereign itself." [342] . nobility. in accordance with the saying "No man can serve two masters. which is the ultimate basis o f any public contract. A contract that would impose obligation on the people to give back its authority would not be incumbent u p o n the people as the legislative power. once established. or the whole o f the population. f o r such a contract is in itself null and void. and this is a contradiction. T h e right o f s u p r e m e legislation in a commonwealth is not an alienable right but the most personal of all rights. is conside r e d as living in relation to a n o t h e r state in the c o n d i t i o n o f natural f r e e d o m a n d t h e r e f o r e in a c o n d i t i o n o f constant war. its r i g h t after war. those w h o constitute a nation c a n b e l o o k e d u p o n a n a l o g o u s l y to d e s c e n d a n t s o f the same ancestors (congeniti) e v e n t h o u g h they are not.[343] SECTION II The Right of Nations §53A s natives o f a c o u n t r y . T h e R i g h t o f states in relation to o n e a n o t h e r (which in G e r m a n is called. t h e r e f o r e . since they are b o r n o f the s a m e m o t h e r (the republic) they constitute as it w e r e o n e family (gens. as well as t o w a r d a n o t h e r state as a w h o l e . w h o m they r e g a r d as i n f e r i o r . the Right of Nations. the latter (savages). a n d partly o f their r i g h t to constrain e a c h o t h e r to leave this c o n d i t i o n o f w a r a n d so f o r m a constitution that will establish lasting p e a c e . w h o s e m e m b e r s (citizens o f the state) are o f equally h i g h birth a n d d o not m i x with those w h o m a y live n e a r t h e m in a state o f n a t u r e . that is. I n this p r o b l e m the only d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the state o f n a t u r e o f i n d i v i d u a l m e n a n d o f families (in relation to o n e a n o t h e r ) a n d that o f nations is that in the R i g h t o f N a t i o n s w e h a v e to take into consideration not only the relation o f o n e state t o w a r d a n o t h e r as a w h o l e . [344] 150 . Yet in an intellectual sense a n d f r o m the p e r s p e c tive o f rights. ins publicum civitatum) is w h a t we h a v e to c o n s i d e r u n d e r the title the R i g h t o f Nations. partly o f their r i g h t in w a r . h o w e v e r . as a m o r a l p e r s o n . T h e rights o f states consist. B u t this d i f f e r e n c e f r o m the rights o f individuals in a state o f n a t u r e m a k e s it necessary to c o n s i d e r only such f e a t u r e s as can b e readily i n f e r r e d f r o m the c o n c e p t o f a state o f n a t u r e . not quite correctly. e v e n t h o u g h they d o not constitute states but only tribes. natio). partly o f their right to go to w a r . b u t s h o u l d instead be called the R i g h t o f States. f o r their o w n p a r t c o n s i d e r themselves s u p e r i o r because o f the lawless f r e e d o m they h a v e c h o s e n . b u t also t h e relation o f individual p e r s o n s o f o n e state t o w a r d the individuals o f a n o t h e r . H e r e a state. 4) T h i s alliance must. to establish a condition m o r e closely a p p r o a c h i n g a rightful condition). in such a way that whether they shall go to war does not d e p e n d on their own j u d g m e n t but they may be sent into it by the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d o f the sovereign? It might seem that this right can be easily proved. W h e t h e r f r o m lack of f o o d or f r o m the presence o f predatory animals in the country w h e r e I live. is the deduction. Alt h o u g h n o state is w r o n g e d by another in this condition (insofar as neither wants anything better). hens [345] . perhaps. T h e r e are various natural products in a country that must still be considered artifacts (artefacta) of the state as far as the abundance o f natural products of a certain kind is concerned. not in o r d e r to m e d d l e in one another's internal dissensions but to protect against attacks f r o m without. or to put them at risk. 3) A league o f nations in accordance with the Idea o f an original social contract is necessary. to e x p e n d their goods and even their lives in it. p o w e r f u l government. it must be an alliance that can be r e n o u n c e d at any time and so must be r e n e w e d f r o m time to time.The Doctrine of Right g 151 §54T h e elements of the Right o f Nations are these: 1) States. involve no sovereign authority (as in a civil constitution). even if it is not a condition of actual war and actual attacks being constantly m a d e (hostilities). the first question that arises is: W h a t right has a state against its own subjects to use t h e m for war against other states. this condition is in itself still w r o n g in the highest d e g r e e . T h i s is a right in subsidium o f another and original right. as a mere jurist would draw it up.7° §55A s regards the original right that f r e e states in a state o f nature have to go to w a r with one another (in order. 2) T h i s n o n r i g h t f u l condition is a condition of war (of the right o f the stronger). however. but the inhabitants had been in a state of nature. considered in external relation to one another. and states neighboring u p o n one another are u n d e r obligation to leave it. since the country would not have yielded them in such abundance had there not been a state and an orderly. W h a t follows. but only an association (federation). are (like lawless savages) by nature in a n o n r i g h t f u l condition. then. namely f r o m the right to d o what one wants with what belongs to one (one's property). A n y o n e has an incontestable property in anything the substance o f which he has himself made. to avoid getting involved in a state o f actual war a m o n g the other members (foedus Amphictyonum). Now j u s t as we say that since vegetables (e.loo Metaphysics of Morals (the most useful kind of fowl). §56. also active and represents the sovereign itself. T h i s includes another state's being the first to u n d e r t a k e preparations. For they must always be r e g a r d e d as colegislating m e m b e r s of a state (not merely as means. but also as ends in themselves). sheep. wear out or destroy (kill). Only u n d e r this limiting condition can a state direct them to serve in a way full o f d a n g e r to them. and f o r this to be the case the people will have to be r e g a r d e d as having given its vote to g o to war. t h r o u g h their representatives. which can be a man's property. a product o f man. which secures the inhabitants in what they acquire and possess. In this capacity it is. w h e n it believes it has been w r o n g e d by the other state. T h e inhabitants would be very scarce since they could not take their attendants and spread out on a land that is always in d a n g e r o f being laid waste by m e n or by wild and predatory beasts. In addition to active violations [of its rights] (first aggression. has the right to lead t h e m into war as he would take them on a hunt. which can only be small. cattle. and so forth w o u l d either not exist at all or at best would be scarce unless there were a g o v e r n m e n t in this country. it seems we can also say that since most o f his subjects are his own product. In the state o f nature a m o n g states. and into battles as on a pleasure trip. especially as citizens o f a state. T h e r e would therefore not be adequate sustenance f o r such a great a b u n d a n c e of m e n as now live in a country. it simply cannot be applied to m e n . even if we attribute to these people the greatest industry (which they d o not have). or even [346] . We shall t h e r e f o r e have to derive this right f r o m the duty of the sovereign to the people (not the reverse). as regards their abundance. which is not the same as first hostility) it may be threatened.. f o r this cannot be d o n e in the state o f nature by a lawsuit (the only means by which disputes are settled in a rightful condition). as it is in the A m e r i c a n wilderness. although passive (letting itself be disposed o f ) .g. A l t h o u g h such an a r g u m e n t f o r this right (which may well be present obscurely in the monarch's mind) holds with r e g a r d to animals. the sovereign. the supreme authority in a state. which he can use. T h i s holds true o f the h u m a n population as well. not only to w a g i n g war in general but also to each particular declaration of war. namely by its own force. u p o n which is based the right of prevention (ius praeventionis). and must t h e r e f o r e give their f r e e assent. swine. the right to go to war (to e n g a g e in hostilities) is the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute its right against another state. potatoes) and domestic animals are. w h i c h w o u l d b e the m o r a l annihilation o f a state (the p e o p l e o f w h i c h w o u l d either b e c o m e m e r g e d in o n e mass with that o f the c o n q u e r o r o r r e d u c e d to servitude). In terms o f formalities. but not a way o f acquiring. Pro Milone." Cicero.The Doctrine of Right g 153 j u s t the menacing increase in a n o t h e r state's power (by its acquisition o f territory) (potentia tremenda). instead o f s e e k i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n (by p e a c e f u l m e t h o d s ) f r o m t h e o t h e r state. it is r a t h e r that the I d e a o f the R i g h t o f N a t i o n s involves only t h e c o n c e p t o f an a n t a g o n i s m in a c c o r d a n c e with principles o f o u t e r f r e e d o m by w h i c h e a c h can p r e s e r v e w h a t b e l o n g s to it. T h e r e a s o n t h e r e cannot b e a w a r o f s u b j u g a t i o n is not that this e x t r e m e m e a s u r e a state m i g h t use to achieve a c o n d i t i o n o f p e a c e w o u l d in itself contradict the right o f a state. a n d in the state o f n a t u r e an attack by the lesser p o w e r is i n d e e d legitim a t e . can any w a r be either a war of extermination (bellum internecinum) o r o f subjugation (bellum subiugatorium). then. N o r . 4. again. n a m e l y . 7 1 A c c o r d i n g l y . T h i s is a w r o n g to the lesser p o w e r m e r e l y by the condition o f the superior power. this resembles starting a w a r witho u t first r e n o u n c i n g p e a c e (without a declaration of war)-. ""In time of war the laws are silent. acceptance o f the d e c l a r a t i o n o f the o t h e r party that b o t h w a n t to seek their r i g h t in this way. §57T h e greatest d i f f i c u l t y in the R i g h t o f Nations has to d o precisely with R i g h t d u r i n g a w a r . 10. F o r p u n i s h m e n t occurs only in t h e relation o f a s u p e r i o r ( imperantis) to those subject to h i m ( subditum). a state's t a k i n g it u p o n itself to obtain satisfaction f o r an o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d against its p e o p l e by the p e o p l e o f a n o t h e r state. it is d i f f i c u l t e v e n to f o r m a c o n c e p t o f this o r to think o f law in this lawless state w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i n g o n e s e l f (inter arma silent leges). h a v e to b e the w a g i n g o f w a r in a c c o r d a n c e with principles that always leave o p e n the possibility o f l e a v i n g the state o f n a t u r e a m o n g states (in e x t e r n a l relation to o n e a n o t h e r ) a n d e n t e r i n g a r i g h t f u l condition. these i n c l u d e acts of retaliation (retorsio). A s f o r active violations that give a right to go to war. [347] .a R i g h t d u r i n g a w a r w o u l d . by w h i c h o n e state's increase o f p o w e r c o u l d t h r e a t e n others. s o m e t h i n g a n a l o g o u s to a contract m u s t b e a s s u m e d . this is also t h e basis o f the r i g h t to a balance o f power a m o n g all states that are contiguous and could act on one another. b e f o r e any d e e d o n its part. f o r if o n e wants to f i n d a r i g h t in a c o n d i t i o n o f war. a n d states d o not stand in that relation to each o t h e r . N o w a r o f i n d e p e n d e n t states against e a c h o t h e r can b e a punitive war (bellum punitivum). since it was not the c o n q u e r e d people that w a g e d the war. but not to p l u n d e r the people.loo Metaphysics of Morals A state against which war is being w a g e d is permitted to use any means o f d e f e n s e except those that would make its subjects unfit to be citizens. consists in this: T h e victor lays d o w n the conditions on which it will come to an a g r e e m e n t with the vanquished and hold negotiations f o r concluding peace. committing an o f f e n s e against the vanquished. instead. f o r if they did the war would have been a punitive war. that is. [348] In war it is permissible to exact supplies and contributions f r o m a defeated e n e m y . he lets this question d r o p and relies on his own force. A d e f e a t e d state or its subjects d o not lose their civil f r e e d o m t h r o u g h the conquest of their country. f o r it w o u l d then also make itself unfit to qualify. o r using them merely for spreading false reports — in a w o r d . §58. using t h e m o r even foreigners as assassins or poisoners ( a m o n g w h o m so-called snipers. A colony or province is a people that indeed has its o w n constitution. Rights a f t e r a war also include a right to an e x c h a n g e o f prisoners (without ransom). which is self-contradictory. so that the state would be d e g r a d e d to a colony and its subjects to b o n d a g e . Instead. since he would then be saying that he had been waging a punitive war and so. Means o f d e f e n s e that are not permitted include using its own subjects as spies. While he may well think of this a r g u m e n t he still cannot use it. so that in the peace that follows the b u r d e n imposed on the country or province can be divided proportionately. on which those w h o b e l o n g to another state are only foreigners even t h o u g h this other state has . T h e victor does not d o this f r o m any right he pretends to have because o f the w r o n g his o p p o n e n t is supposed to have d o n e him. at the time o f the peace treaty and with a view to its consequences. w h o lie in wait to ambush individuals. the state u n d e r whose rule they lived w a g e d the war through the people). since he would then have to admit that his o p p o n e n t had f o u g h t an unjust war. without regard f o r their being equal in n u m b e r . might well be classed). not to force individual persons to give u p their belongings (for that would be robbery. f o r his own part. using such u n d e r h a n d e d means as would destroy the trust requisite to establishing a lasting peace in the f u t u r e . receipts should be issued f o r everything requisitioned. rather. in accordance with the Right of Nations. its own legislation. as a person in the relation o f states (as one w h o would enjoy the same rights as others). that is. and its own land. T h e victor can therefore not propose compensation f o r the costs o f the war. T h e right o f a state after a war. still governs itself (by its own parliament. as it were. disappear f r o m the earth.The Doctrine of Right g 155 supreme executive authority over the colony or province. hereditary b o n d a g e as such is absurd since guilt f r o m someone's crime cannot be inherited. §60. instead. T h e state having that executive authority is called the mother state. any condition o f peace a m o n g nations would be impossible and. which cannot lose its original right to . 3) the right to an alliance (confederation) o f several states for their c o m m o n defense against any external or internal attacks. the right to a guarantee. [349] §59T h e right to peace is 1) the right to be at peace w h e n there is a war in the vicinity. Least of all can hereditary b o n d a g e be derived f r o m it. Since this can be assumed to be a matter of c o n c e r n to all nations whose f r e e d o m is threatened by it. if it were made a universal rule. and the d a u g h t e r state. that is. T h e r e are no limits to the rights o f a state against an unjust enemy (no limits with respect to quantity or d e g r e e . a state of nature would be perpetuated. t h o u g h ruled by it. or the right to neutrality. possibly with a viceroy presiding over it) (civitas hybrida). Still less can bondage and its legitimacy be derived f r o m a people's being o v e r c o m e in war. t h o u g h there are limits with respect to quality). T h i s was the relation A t h e n s had with respect to various islands and that Great Britain now has with r e g a r d to Ireland. But what is an unjust enemy in terms o f the concepts o f the Right o f Nations. T h e concept o f a peace treaty already contains the provision that an amnesty goes along with it. in which — as is the case in a state o f nature generally — each state is j u d g e in its own case? It is an enemy whose publicly expressed will (whether by w o r d or deed) reveals a maxim by which. that is to say. Violation of public contracts is an expression of this sort. 2) the right to be assured o f the continuance o f a peace that has been concluded. since that would be a n injustice against its people. since f o r this one would have to admit that a war could be punitive. in o r d e r to maintain what belongs to it. they are called u p o n to unite against such misconduct in o r d e r to deprive the state of its power to d o it. an injured state may not use any means whatever but may use those means that are allowable to any d e g r e e that it is able to. But they are not called u p o n to divide its territory among themselves and to make the state. but not a league f o r attacking others and a d d i n g to their own territory. Such an association of several states to preserve peace can be called a permanent congress of states. but then he would also not be my enemy. while several such corporations would again b r i n g on a state o f war. are not unachievable. o f entering into such alliances o f states. [35°] Since a state o f nature a m o n g nations. in the assembly of the States General at the H a g u e . however. so to speak. is a condition that one o u g h t to leave in o r d e r to enter a lawful condition. T h e ministers of most o f the courts o f E u r o p e and even o f the smallest republics l o d g e d with it their complaints about attacks being m a d e o n one o f them by another. after force had already been used. in their public disputes. t h o u g h it can be m a d e to adopt a new constitution that by its nature will be unfavorable to the inclinah o n f o r war. the Right of Nations survived only in books. In this way they t h o u g h t o f the whole of E u r o p e as a single c o n f e d e r a t e d state that they accepted as arbiter. this can certainly be achieved. But later. g o v e r n i n g it and so too protecting each of its m e m b e r s would finally have to become impossible. Instead. not a federation (like that o f the A m e r i c a n states) which is based on a constitution and can there- . [35 By a congress is here understood only a voluntary coalition of d i f f e r ent states that can be dissolved at any time. which serve for continual approximation to it. So perpetual peace. A just enemy would be one that I would be d o i n g w r o n g by resisting. to speak of an unjust e n e m y in a state o f nature. the political principles directed toward perpetual peace. are merely provisional. like a state o f nature a m o n g individual m e n . was relegated in the f o r m o f a deduction to the obscurity of archives. is indeed an unachievable Idea. instead o f this. S o m e t h i n g o f this kind took place (at least as regards the formalities o f the Right of Nations for the sake of k e e p i n g the peace) in the first half o f the present century. O n l y in a universal association of states (analogous to that by which a p e o p l e becomes a state) can rights c o m e to hold conclusively and a true condition of peace come about. It is redundant. and anything external that is mine or yours that states can acquire or retain by war. But if such a state m a d e u p of nations were to extend too far over vast regions. it disappeared f r o m cabinets or else. the ultimate goal o f the whole Right o f Nations. f o r a state of nature is itself a condition o f injustice. Still. which each neighboring state is at liberty to join.loo Metaphysics of Morals unite itself into a commonwealth. since continual approximation to it is a task based on duty and therefore on the Right of m e n and o f states. b e f o r e this h a p p e n s any rights o f nations. O n l y by such a congress can the I d e a o f a public Right o f Nations be realized. rather than in a barbaric way (the way o f savages). namely by war. . one to be established for deciding their disputes in a civil way. as if by a lawsuit.The Doctrine of Right 157 f o r e not be dissolved. H o w e v e r . A n d since possession o f the land. T h i s is [353] 158 . a n d t h e m o r e coastlines these nations h a v e in the vicinity o f o n e a n o t h e r (as in the M e d iterranean). it follows that all nations stand originally in a c o m m u n i t y o f land. A l t h o u g h the seas m i g h t s e e m to r e m o v e nations f r o m any c o m m u nity with o n e a n o t h e r . they are t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s o f n a t u r e most f a v o r i n g their c o m m e r c e by m e a n s o f navigation. instead they stand in a c o m m u n i t y o f possible physical interaction (commercium). to this e n d . p r o v i d e the occasion f o r evils a n d acts o f violence in o n e place o n o u r globe to b e felt all o v e r it. o n w h i c h an inhabitant o f t h e e a r t h can live. that is. in a t h o r o u g h g o i n g relation o f each to all the o t h e r s o f offering to engage in commerce with any o t h e r . T h i s rational I d e a o f a peaceful. 7 3 a n d e a c h has a r i g h t to m a k e this a t t e m p t without the o t h e r b e i n g a u t h o r i z e d to b e h a v e t o w a r d it as a n e n e m y b e c a u s e it has m a d e this attempt. to visit all r e g i o n s o f t h e earth. t h e m o r e lively their c o m m e r c e can be. t h o r o u g h g o i n g c o m m u n i t y o f all nations o n the e a r t h that can c o m e into relations a f f e c t i n g o n e a n o t h e r is not a p h i l a n t h r o p i c (ethical) p r i n c i p l e b u t a principle having to do with rights. a n d still m o r e settling there to c o n n e c t t h e m with the m o t h e r c o u n t r y . since it has to d o with the possible u n i o n o f all nations with a view to certain universal laws f o r their possible c o m m e r c e . t h o u g h not o f rightful c o m m u n i t y o f possession ( communio ) a n d so o f use o f it. or o f p r o p e r t y in it.[352] SECTION III 72 Cosmopolitan Right §6a. visiting these coasts. a globus terraqueus). c a n b e called cosmopolitan Right (ius cosmopoliticum). T h i s right. N a t u r e has enclosed t h e m all t o g e t h e r within d e t e r m i n a t e limits (by the spherical s h a p e o f t h e place they live in. Yet this possible abuse c a n n o t a n n u l t h e r i g h t o f citizens o f the w o r l d to try to establish comm u n i t y with all a n d . can b e t h o u g h t only as possession o f a p a r t o f a d e t e r m i n a t e w h o l e . e v e n if not f r i e n d l y . a n d so as possession o f that to w h i c h each o f t h e m originally has a right. a right to make a settlement on the land o f another nation (ius incolatus). become better in another part o f the world (such as New Holland). it is hoped. that w h e n constitutions are bad it is u p to the people to reshape them by f o r c e and to be unjust once and f o r all so that afterward they can establish justice all the m o r e securely and m a k e it flourish. this settlement may not take place by force but only by contract. S o m e o n e may reply that such scruples about using force in the beginning. f o r this. and indeed by a contract that does not take advantage o f the ignorance o f those inhabitants with respect to c e d i n g their lands. however: In newly discovered lands. But all these supposedly good intentions cannot wash away the stain o f injustice in the means used f o r them. even without its consent? I f the settlement is made so far f r o m w h e r e that people resides that there is no encroachment on anyone's use of his land. may a nation u n d e r t a k e to settle (accolatus) and take possession in the neighb o r h o o d of a people that has already settled in the region. the Tungusi. T h i s is true despite the fact that sufficient specious reasons to justify the use of force are available: that it is to the world's advantage. partly because these c r u d e peoples will become civilized (this is like the pretext by which even B ü s c h i n g 7 4 tries to excuse the bloody introduction o f Christianity into Germany). in o r d e r to establish a lawful condition. o r most o f the A m e r i c a n Indian nations) w h o d e p e n d f o r their sustenance on great o p e n regions. might well mean that the whole earth would still be in a lawless condition. But if these peoples are shepherds or hunters (like the Hottentots. the right to settle is not o p e n to doubt. . but this consideration can n o more annul that condition o f Right [Rechtsbedingung] than can the pretext o f revolutionaries within a state. T h e question arises. and partly because one's own country will be cleaned o f c o r r u p t men. and they or their descendants will.The Doctrine of Right g 159 not. a specific contract is required. however. Now. he can try to p r o v e that it is not. together and separately) in o r d e r to b r i n g about perpetual peace and put an e n d to the heinous w a g i n g o f war. and w h e t h e r we are not deceiving ourselves in o u r theoretical j u d g m e n t w h e n we assume that it is real. even if there is not the slightest theoretical likelihood that it can be realized. which may be either a pragmatic (merely technical e n d [Kunstzweck]) or a moral end. we must w o r k toward establishing perpetual peace a n d the kind of constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (perhaps a republicanism o f all states. problematic. f o r there can be n o obligation to d o this (to believe something). the retrog r a d e motion and stationary state o f the planets). that is. he can still ask whether he has any interest in assuming one or the other (as a hypothesis). an e n d such that the m a x i m o f a d o p t i n g it is itself a duty. neither war between you and m e in the state of nature nor war between us as states. which. although they are internally in a lawful condition. which w o u l d be a j u d g m e n t about it that is merely theoretical and. morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: There is to be no war. A n assumption is a d o p t e d f r o m a theoretical point o f view in o r d e r merely to explain a certain p h e n o m e n o n (such as. either f r o m a theoretical or f r o m a practical point o f view. What is incumbent on us as a duty is rather to act in conformity with the Idea o f that end. Now it is evident that what would be m a d e o u r duty in this case is not the assumption (suppositio) that this e n d can be realized. f o r war is not the way in which everyone should seek his rights. f o r astronomers. t h o u g h perhaps it is not. to which as their chief aim all states without exception have hitherto 160 . are still externally (in relation to o n e another) in a lawless condition. as l o n g as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either. If (as o f t e n happens) he cannot succeed in either. we must act as if it is something real. So the question is no longer w h e t h e r perpetual peace is something real or a fiction. Instead.[3541 Conclusion I f someone cannot p r o v e that a thing is. m o r e o v e r . A n assumption is a d o p t e d f r o m a practical point o f view in o r d e r to achieve a certain end. rather to be rid o f all reason and to r e g a r d ourselves as thrown by one's principles into the same mechanism o f nature as all the other species o f animals. B u t the rule f o r this constitution. that is. be derived a priori by reason f r o m the ideal of a rightful association of m e n u n d e r public laws as such. f o r the condition o f peace is the only condition in which what is mine and what is yours are secured u n d e r laws f o r a multitude of men living in proximity to one another. which arouses o u r abhorrence. still we are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting the m a x i m o f w o r k i n g incessantly toward it. so that they certainly require a metaphysics. cannot be derived f r o m the experience of those w h o have hitherto f o u n d it most to their advantage. t h o u g h carelessly. For all examples (which only illustrate but cannot prove anything) are treacherous. as a n o r m f o r others.The Doctrine of Right g 161 directed their internal arrangements. [355] . A n d even if the complete realization o f this objective always remains a pious wish. by violent overthrow of an already existing defective constitution (for there would then be an intervening m o m e n t in which any rightful condition would be annihilated). For this is o u r duty. perpetual peace. Even those w h o ridicule metaphysics admit its necessity. it can lead to continual approximation to the highest political g o o d . It can be said that establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a part o f the doctrine of Right but rather the entire final e n d o f the doctrine o f Right within the limits o f reason alone. "the best constitution is that in which power belongs not to men but to the laws." For what can be more metaphysically sublimated than this very Idea. by a leap. as can also be easily shown in actually occurring cases? T h e attempt to realize this Idea should not be m a d e by way o f revolution. it must. B u t if it is attempted and carried out by gradual r e f o r m in accordance with firm principles. and therefore u n d e r a constitution. f o r example. which even according to their own assertion has the most c o n f i r m e d objective reality. rather. and to admit that the moral law within us is itself deceptive would call f o r t h in us the wish. w h e n they say. as they o f t e n do. . 28. the capacity to be by m e a n s o f one's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s the cause o f the objects o f these representations. T o this e x p o s i t i o n h e objects "that it c o m e s to n o t h i n g as s o o n as o n e abstracts f r o m t h e external conditions o f the result o f desire. 18 Feb. is still always causality. since they still w o r k p o w e r f u l l y within the subject h i m s e l f (make h i m ill). the d e f i n i t i o n is n o t applicable to a n idealist. B u t the capacity f o r desire is s o m e t h i n g e v e n f o r a n idealist. 163 r . the text says. " I reply: B u t are t h e r e not also intense but still consciously futile l o n g i n g s (e. b u t also w i t h a p p r e c i a tion a n d "the h o p e that those first principles will b e a lasting g a i n f o r the science. h o w e v e r . e v e n w h e n h e sees the i n a d e q u a c y o f his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s f o r the e f f e c t h e envisages. .g.[352] APPENDIX Explanatory Remarks on The Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right I take the occasion f o r these r e m a r k s c h i e f l y f r o m t h e review o f this b o o k in the Göttingen Journal (No. T h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g h e r e a m o u n t s to this: that since consciousness o f one's capacity in general is (in t h e case m e n t i o n e d ) also consciousness o f one's incapacity w i t h respect to the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . W h a t is m e a n t by the capacity f o r desire? It is. 1 7 9 7 ) .." I shall use this review as a g u i d e f o r my criticism as well as f o r s o m e e l a b o r a t i o n o f this system. t h o u g h n o t o n e x t e r n a l things? A desire. W o u l d to G o d that m a n w e r e still alive!). e v e n t h o u g h the e x t e r n a l w o r l d is n o t h i n g f o r h i m . Since. M y astute critic takes e x c e p t i o n to a d e f i n i t i o n at the very b e g i n n i n g o f the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right. all that is in question h e r e is the relation o f a cause (a representation) to an e f f e c t (a feeling) in g e n e r a l . 7 5 I n this review the b o o k was e x a m i n e d with insight a n d r i g o r . the causality o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( w h e t h e r the causality is e x t e r n a l o r internal) with r e g a r d to its object m u s t u n a v o i d a b l y b e t h o u g h t in the c o n c e p t o f the capacity f o r desire. at least within t h e subject. as a striving (nisus) to b e a cause by m e a n s o f one's representations. w h i c h are devoid of any deed but not devoid of any result. might also be a f o u r f o l d division. namely that o f a right to a person akin to a right to a thing. U p to n o w jurists have admitted two c o m m o n places: that o f a right to things and that o f a right against persons. but still o f possessing them as things and dealing with t h e m as things in many relations. the Topic of principles must be complete. since no right of a thing against a person is conceivable. T h e r e can be no doubt that this is the case. they cannot b e i n d i f f e r e n t to assurance o f the completeness o f their division o f concepts o f rights. . two f u r t h e r relations might have to be a d d e d . For the sake o f the f o r m o f the system. f o r besides the two simple m e m b e r s o f the division. u n d e r which one right enters into combination with the other. For a merely logical division (which abstracts f r o m the content o f knowledge.164 The Metaphysics of Morals Logical Preparation for a Recently Proposed Concept of a Right I f philosophers versed in Right want to rise o r venture all the way to metaphysical first principles o f the doctrine of Right (without which all their juridical science7® would be merely statutory). any right is either a right to a thing o r not a right to a thing. It is t h e r e f o r e natural to ask w h e t h e r we have to add some such new concept and whether we must c o m e across it in the complete table of division. namely the metaphysical division. that o f not treating persons in a similar way to things in all respects. f r o m the object) is always a dichotomy — f o r example. namely those o f the conditions limiting a right. A f t e r w a r d one may also show that one or another concept that might be put in this place would be self-contradictory and falls f r o m this place. By the m e r e f o r m o f j o i n i n g these two concepts together into one. since otherwise that science would not b e a rational system but merely an aggregate hastily collected. T h i s possibility requires f u r t h e r investigation. T h e concept of a right to a thing akin to a right against a person drops out without f u r t h e r ado. even if it is only problematic. as members o f an a priori division: that o f a right to a thing akin to a right against a person and that of a right to a person akin to a right to a thing. that is. B u t the division in question here. two m o r e places are o p e n e d u p f o r concepts. is a concept that not only contains n o self-contradiction but also belongs necessarily (as given a priori in reason) to the concept of what is externally mine or yours. Now the question is w h e t h e r the reverse o f this relation is just as inconceivable or w h e t h e r this concept. the place that is left o p e n f o r this concept by the synthetic f o r m o f the division. the place f o r a concept (locus communis) must be indicated. [359] ." and that signifies only my physical relation (of connection) to him in a general way. a n d c o n s i d e r m y s e l f as also in intelligible possession o f it. We m u s t n o w e x a m i n e w h e t h e r this concept. to m a k e direct use o f a p e r s o n as of a t h i n g ." is a Stella mirabilis (a p h e n o m e n o n n e v e r seen b e f o r e . "* I take c a r e to say "a person ". this " n e w p h e n o m e n o n in the juristic sky. g r o w i n g into a star o f the first m a g n i t u d e but g r a d u a l l y disapp e a r i n g a g a i n . is the condition of being able to manage (manipulatio) something as a thing. I have a father. b u t possessing s o m e t h i n g is the c o n d i t i o n o f its b e i n g possible to use it. m u c h less in a n o t h e r person). e. Justification of the Concept of a Right to a Person Akin to a Right to a Thing Put b r i e f l y a n d well. relation of the possessor to an object as a thing (even though the object is also a person). TO'meum. if I say "my wife" this signifies a special.The Doctrine of Right g 165 2. but I cannot say "I have him as what is mine. f o r while it is t r u e that s o m e o n e can h a v e as his o w n a n o t h e r human being w h o by his crime has f o r f e i t e d his personality ( b e c o m e a b o n d s m a n ) ." (using the substantive)." However. b u t m e a n s w h a t is one's o w n in the sense o f u s u f r u c t (ius utendifruendi). however. to insist u p o n h o l d i n g a n object that has e s c a p e d f r o m m y control o r b e e n t o r n f r o m it. possession is called holding. B u t if I a m a u t h o r i z e d . 3Examples T o h a v e s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l as one's o w n m e a n s to possess it rightf u l l y . W h a t is one's o w n h e r e d o e s not.. b u t still w i t h o u t i n f r i n g i n g u p o n his personality. I f this c o n d i t i o n is t h o u g h t as m e r e l y physical. as a m e a n s to m y e n d . i n d e e d . p e r h a p s to r e t u r n at s o m e time) or m e r e l y a shooting star. this c o n c e p t o f a r i g h t is a sign (as a n e f f e c t is a sign o f its cause) that I c o n s i d e r m y s e l f a u t h o r i z e d to treat this object a n d to u s e it as what is mine. For I can say "this is my father.g. T h a t I a m legitimately h o l d i n g s o m e t h i n g is not o f itself s u f f i c i e n t f o r saying that the object is m i n e o r f o r m a k i n g it m i n e . Possession (physical possession). even if this must. *I do not say here "to have a person as mine" (using the adjective). be treated at the same time as a person. namely a rightful. m e a n w h a t is one's o w n in the sense o f p r o p e r t y in the p e r s o n o f a n o t h e r (for a h u m a n b e i n g c a n n o t h a v e p r o p e r t y in himself. f o r w h a t e v e r reason. this r i g h t to a t h i n g is not w h a t is in question h e r e . in another respect. the d e f i n i t i o n o f a r i g h t to a p e r s o n akin to a r i g h t to a t h i n g is this: "It is the right o f a h u m a n b e i n g to h a v e a person o t h e r t h a n h i m s e l f as his own. but "to have a person as what is mine. each is actually a consumable t h i n g (res fungibilis) with respect to the o t h e r . o r the m a n by e x h a u s tion o f his sexual capacity f r o m the w o m a n ' s f r e q u e n t d e m a n d s u p o n it. that is. this can b e d o n e only u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n o f marriage. the d i f f e r e n c e is m e r e l y in the m a n n e r o f e n j o y m e n t . b u t only f o r m a l l y so (as befits a r i g h t to a p e r s o n that is only akin to a r i g h t to a thing). so that the h e a d o f the h o u s e c a n n o t a d d t h e m to what is his (as his domestics) e x c e p t by contract. parents still h a v e a r i g h t to use t h e m as m e m b e r s o f the h o u s e h o l d subject to their direction. A m a n c a n n o t desire a w o m a n in o r d e r to enjoy h e r as a thing. acquisition o f a h u m a n b e i n g as of a thing. until they leave. it m u s t first b e c o n c l u d e d . T h i s is a d u t y o f p a r e n t s t o w a r d t h e m w h i c h follows f r o m the natural limitation o f the parents' right. n o r can a w o m a n give h e r s e l f to h i m f o r this w i t h o u t both r e n o u n c i n g their personalities (in c a r n a l o r bestial cohabitation). I n the s a m e way. as t h e condition u n d e r w h i c h such use is legitimate. W h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g is consumed by m o u t h a n d teeth. . the contract w o u l d b e c o n t r a r y to law (pactum turpe). they are very different in meaning. T h i s is. o r w h e t h e r the w o m a n is c o n s u m e d by p r e g n a n c y a n d the p e r h a p s fatal delivery resulting f r o m it. the h e a d o f a h o u s e c a n also m a k e the service o f those outside the family his * I n written G e r m a n Aeltern means Seniores a n d Eltern m e a n s Parentes. Since m a r r i a g e is a reciprocal g i v i n g o f one's v e r y p e r s o n into the possession o f the o t h e r . I n this sort o f use by each o f the sexual o r g a n s o f the o t h e r . m u s t be morally necessary. they also h a v e a r i g h t against a p e r s o n against the child. A p a r t f r o m this condition carnal e n j o y m e n t is cannibalistic in principle (even if not always in its e f f e c t ) . w h e n their d u t y to p r o v i d e f o r their c h i l d r e n c o m e s to an e n d as they r e a c h maturity. Similarly. U p until this time c h i l d r e n are i n d e e d m e m b e r s o f the h o u s e h o l d a n d b e l o n g to th e family.180 The Metaphysics of Morals B u t this e n d . A l t h o u g h the [360] two words cannot be distinguished in speech. in o r d e r to take i m m e d i a t e satisfaction in m e r e l y animal i n t e r c o u r s e with her. b u t f r o m n o w o n they b e l o n g to the service o f the family (famulatus). Finally. that is. Since they also h a v e a r i g h t to constrain it to carry o u t a n d c o m p l y with any o f their directions that are not c o n t r a r y to a possible l a w f u l f r e e d o m (ius ad rem). Parents* h a v e a r i g h t against e v e r y possessor (ius in re) o f their child w h o has b e e n r e m o v e d f r o m their control. so that n e i t h e r is d e h u m a n i z e d t h r o u g h the bodily use that o n e m a k e s o f the other. a m a n a n d a w o m a n c a n n o t b e g e t a child as their j o i n t work (res artificialis) a n d without both o f t h e m i n c u r r i n g a n obligation t o w a r d the child a n d t o w a r d e a c h o t h e r to maintain it. so that if o n e w e r e to m a k e o n e s e l f such a t h i n g by contract. a g a i n . f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the h o u s e h o l d . W h a t distinguishes such a contract f r o m letting and hiring is that the servant agrees to do whatever is permissible f o r the welfare o f the household. which was already a conditional o n e in terms of reason. 290]). instead of being commissioned f o r a specifically d e t e r m i n e d j o b . It does seem at first glance to conflict with all rights arising f r o m a contract that someone could give notice to someone leasing his house b e f o r e the period o f residence a g r e e d u p o n is u p and. a lease (locatio conductio personae). B u t if it can be p r o v e d that the lessee knew or must have known. as long as the owner does not sell the house during this time (or does not have to turn it over to his creditors if he should become bankrupt). naturally (without its n e e d i n g to be stated expressly in the contract) and t h e r e f o r e tacitly included the condition. the owner. but a giving u p o f their persons into the possession o f the head of the house. as something he can c o m m a n d by rightful proceedings (via iuris). p. then the lessor has not broken his promise. So m u c h f o r the clarification and d e f e n s e of a strange type of right which has recently been a d d e d to the doctrine of natural law. whereas someone w h o is hired f o r a specific j o b (an artisan or day laborer) does not give himself u p as part of the other's belongings and so is not a m e m b e r o f the household. break his promise to the lessee. Since he is not in the rightful possession o f another w h o puts him u n d e r obligation to p e r f o r m certain services.The Doctrine of Right g 167 own in terms o f a right to them akin to a right to a thing and acquire them as domestics (famulatus domesticus) by a contract. even if he lives in the other's house ( inquilinus ) the head o f the house cannot take possession of him as a thing (via facti)-. that the promise made to him by the lessor. p. although it has always been tacitly in use. §31. to something a certain person has to p e r f o r m f o r another (ius [362] . and the lessee's right was not encroached u p o n if he was given notice b e f o r e the lease expired. w h e n he contracted to lease it. [361] 4On Confusing a Right to a Thing With a Right Against a Person I have also b e e n censured f o r heterodoxy in natural private Right f o r the proposition that sale breaks a lease. For the right a lessee has by a contract to lease is a right against a person. (The Doctrine of Right. he must instead insist u p o n the laborer's d o i n g what he promised in terms o f a right against a person. provided he grants him the time f o r vacating it that is customary by the civil laws where they live. 129 [Ak. so it seems. Such a contract is not just a contract to let and hire (locatio conductio operae). * B u t w h a t is to b e d o n e in the *In every punishment there is something that (rightly) offends the accused's feeling of honor. n o obligation to c o n t i n u e the lease is ascribed to his heir. i n d e e d . as l o n g as b o t h parties are alive. b a n k r u p t c y ) . T h e n h e c o u l d not b e t u r n e d o u t o f his lease. respect f o r the species) simply o n g r o u n d s o f Right.e. f o r if a lessor dies.182 The Metaphysics of Morals ad rem). since it involves coercion that is unilateral only. I f h e d o e s not d o this. 5Further Discussion of the Concept of the Right to Punish T h e m e r e I d e a o f a civil constitution a m o n g men carries with it the c o n c e p t o f p u n i t i v e justice b e l o n g i n g to the s u p r e m e authority. n o r . it is not a r i g h t against every possessor o f a t h i n g (ius in re). as l o n g as they a r e e f f e c t i v e m e a s u r e s f o r e r a d i c a t i n g c r i m e (which violates the security a state gives each in his possession o f w h a t is his). A lessee c o u l d . or w h e t h e r t h e legislator m u s t also take into a c c o u n t respect f o r the h u m a n i t y in the p e r s o n o f the w r o n g d o e r (i. since this is an obligation only o n the p a r t o f a certain p e r s o n a n d ceases with his d e a t h ( t h o u g h the legal time f o r g i v i n g notice m u s t still b e t a k e n into a c c o u n t in this case). e a c h o f t h e parties was a w a r e that h e h a d m a d e a contract subject to t h e tacit c o n d i t i o n that it c o u l d be dissolved if this b e c a m e c o n v e n i e n t ( e x c e p t f o r the p e r i o d o f grace f o r vacating. as attached to the land. C e r t a i n r i g h t f u l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a bare contract to lease give f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n o f one's authorization to b r e a k a lease by sale. p e r h a p s b e c a u s e h e w a n t e d to b e f r e e to c o n c l u d e a lease o n better terms e l s e w h e r e o r b e c a u s e t h e o w n e r did not w a n t to e n c u m b e r his h o u s e with such an onus. h e c o u l d . b e f o r e the time settled u p o n h a d e x p i r e d . as d e t e r m i n e d by civil law). h a v e this r i g h t only to the lessor's h o u s e registered (entered in the l a n d registry). it m a y b e c o n c l u d e d that. not a r i g h t to a thing. N e i t h e r can the r i g h t o f a lessee. T h e only question is w h e t h e r it is a m a t t e r o f i n d i f f e r e n c e to the legislator w h a t kinds o f p u n i s h m e n t are a d o p t e d . is a lessee a u t h o r i z e d to sublet to a n y o n e w i t h o u t a n explicit a g r e e m e n t . by t h e o w n e r ' s g i v i n g notice o r e v e n by his d e a t h (his natural d e a t h o r also his civil d e a t h . n a m e l y . secure h i m s e l f in his contract to lease a n d p r o c u r e a r i g h t to a t h i n g as r e g a r d s the h o u s e . pass to his heir w i t h o u t a separate contract. I said that the ius talionis is by its f o r m always the principle f o r the right to p u n i s h since it a l o n e is the principle d e t e r m i n i n g this I d e a a priori (not d e r i v e d f r o m e x p e r i e n c e o f w h i c h m e a s u r e s w o u l d b e m o s t e f f e c t i v e f o r e r a d i c a t i n g crime). as such. so that his dignity as a [363] . as r e g a r d s the time f o r g i v i n g notice.. " [364] . since the criminal has m a d e h i m s e l f u n w o r t h y o f h u m a n society. (Yet K a n t h i m s e l f admits only provisional acquisition in the state o f n a t u r e . For the only time a criminal c a n n o t c o m p l a i n that a w r o n g is d o n e to h i m is w h e n h e brings his evil d e e d back u p o n himself. in terms of being punishable (quia peccatum est) while that for the latter is merely pragmatic (ne peccetur) and based on experience of what is most effective in eradicating crime. F o r unless o n e admits that an ideal acquisition. T h e question is w h e t h e r I can also assert that I a m t h e o w n e r e v e n if s o m e o n e s h o u l d c o m e f o r w a r d c l a i m i n g to citizen is suspended. 6. may offer no resistance. locus iusti. h o w e v e r .]." T h e crimes m e n t i o n e d are called u n n a t u r a l b e c a u s e they are p e r p e t r a t e d against h u m a n i t y itself. a c c o r d i n g to p p . 291 ff. A man of nobility or wealth who has to pay a fine feels the loss of his money less than the humiliation of having to submit to the will of an inferior. its place is not that of the conducibilis. which must be sought in ethics.The Doctrine of Right g 169 case o f crimes that c a n n o t he p u n i s h e d by a r e t u r n f o r t h e m b e c a u s e this w o u l d b e either impossible o r itself a p u n i s h a b l e c r i m e against humanity as such. be established by natural Right. a n d w h a t is d o n e to h i m in a c c o r d a n c e with p e n a l law is w h a t h e has p e r p e t r a t e d o n others. if not in terms o f its letter at least in terms o f its spirit. since the argument for the former is moral. Punitive justice (iustitia punitwa) must be distinguished from punitive prudence. f o r e x a m p l e . O n a Right from Prolonged Possession " A r i g h t based o n prolonged possession (usucapio) s h o u l d . and punitive justice has an entirely different place in the Topic of concepts of Right. is established by possession in g o o d faith. nor that of the mere honesti. T o inflict whatever p u n i s h m e n t s one chooses f o r these crimes w o u l d b e literally c o n t r a r y to the c o n c e p t of punitive justice. for he is subjected to an external duty to which he. p e r m a n e n t e x p u l s i o n f r o m civil society. n o acquisition at all w o u l d b e conclusively secured. of what is useful for a certain purpose. Per quod quis peccat. r a p e as well as p e d e r a s t y o r bestiality? T h e p u n i s h m e n t f o r r a p e a n d p e d e r a s t y is castration (like that o f a w h i t e o r black e u n u c h in a Seraglio). ° "One who commits a sin is punished through it and in the same way. for his own part. I assert that I a m the possessor o f s o m e t h i n g in good faith. that f o r bestiality. [Ak. per idem punitur et idem.)" T h i s is not t h e question h e r e . a n d b e c a u s e o f this insists o n t h e juristic necessity o f a civil constitution. only against s o m e o n e w h o c a n n o t p r o v e that h e was possessor o f the s a m e t h i n g in good faith b e f o r e m e a n d has not ceased by his will to b e its possessor. at least in this particular case. 1 3 1 f f . as it is h e r e called. T h e r e f o r e prolonged possession (usucapio). " . is a self-contradictory concept. Superannuation o f claims as a means o f conserving possession (conservatio possessionis per praecriptionem) is n o less self-contradictory.170 The Metaphysics of Morals [365] be the earlier true owner of the thing. T h i s failure to p e r f o r m any public possessory act makes him a claimant without a title. instead I acquire by principle (lege).)a Even if a claimant w h o had not previously a p p e a r e d should later c o m e forward supplied with documents he f o u n d . a negative basis. is taken to be an abandonment o f this right (derelictio). and take my stand o n my uninterrupted possession. although it is a distinct concept as far as the a r g u m e n t f o r appropriation is concerned. there would be r o o m f o r doubt. that is. conservatio est continua creatio . as in theology. and this involves a contradiction. the use o f one's right against another. (Against his claim it can be said here. that is. reg a r d e d as acquisition o f a thing by l o n g use o f it. I have n o need f o r proof. in his case again. use o f it (however long) presupposes a right in it. W h a t follows? Public immunity f r o m claims. T h i s occurs if the claimant has not (whether by his own fault or not) given any publicly valid sign o f his u n i n t e r r u p t e d possession. Far f r o m a right in a thing being based o n use o f it. not even that which is necessary to show oneself as possessor. w h o o u g h t to prove his legitimate acquisition? T h i s obligation (onusprobandi) cannot be imposed o n the possessor. For the question here is. since I d o not need to p r o d u c e p r o o f . But that any acquisition in " " C o n s e r v a t i o n is c o n t i n u o u s c r e a t i o n . [which supposed abandonment would be] a rightful act. that is. so as to acquire the object o f the earlier possessor by e x c l u d i n g it (per praescriptionem) f r o m his claim. f o r example. but w h e r e it was absolutely impossible to learn o f his existence as its possessor and o f his b e i n g in possession as its owner. by recording it in the registry or by voting as undisputed owner in civil assemblies. Finally acquiring something by prolonged possession o f it (acquirere per usucaptionem) does not d e p e n d at all o n the length of time one has possessed it. since he has b e e n in possession o f it as far back as his c o n f i r m e d history reaches. whether a still earlier claimant could appear at some f u t u r e time and base his claim on earlier possession. 7 7 T h a t is to say. the entire non-use of one's right. For it is absurd to suppose that a w r o n g becomes a right because it has continued for a l o n g time. the one w h o claims to be the earlier owner o f the thing is cut completely out o f the series of successive possessors by the interval d u r i n g which he has given no civilly valid sign of his ownership. I therefore acquire without giving p r o o f and without any act establishing my right. security in my possession by law. In accordance with principles of Right. not o f the legacy promised but o f the right to accept or r e f u s e it. f o r I have this right (to accept or refuse) immediately f r o m the o f f e r . 135 [Ak. 294]) that every m a n necessarily accepts any thing offered him w h i c h he can only gain and not lose by accepting (for there are indeed n o such things). T h a t is to say. w h e n he o f f e r s m e a piece o f f u r n i t u r e o f the house I am about to move f r o m . I f the owner of something o f f e r s it to m e gratuitously (promises that it will be mine).The Doctrine of Right g 171 a state of nature is only provisional has n o bearing o n the question of the security o f possession o f what is acquired. become richer than he was b e f o r e . something left unconditionally to my free choice [Wahl] to accept or r e f u s e is called a res iacens. rather. I alone can accept it or r e f u s e it as I please. W h e n the will is o p e n e d he sees that he had already at that moment. and I d o not get this exclusive right to m a k e the choice t h r o u g h any special rightful act of declaring that I will to have this right. I said. that everyone always in fact accepts. the right to accept the offer at the same moment. that is. without n e e d i n g to do any act to establish the right. but I cannot will to have the exclusive choice of whether it is to belong to me or not. f o r e x a m p l e . which must p r e c e d e acquisition. this transfer o f possession by one w h o is dead does not alter the possibility o f acquiring in accordance with universal principles of natural Right. I acquire it without any such act (lege). which is a [366] . is at the same m o m e n t the acceptor. since he had acquired the exclusive authorization to accept and this is already an enriching circumstance. f o r then the promisor cannot withdraw it and the promisee. without my declaring my acceptance o f it. So I can indeed declare that I will not to have the thing (because accepting it m i g h t involve me in unpleasantness with others). A l t h o u g h a civil condition is presupposed in o r d e r f o r someone w h o n o longer exists to make something belong to another. b e f o r e accepting the legacy. namely w h e n the nature o f the matter involves the absolute impossibility of the o f f e r being retracted. since if I could r e f u s e even to have this choice I would be choosing not to choose. even t h o u g h a civil constitution is the necessary basis f o r applying these principles to the case at hand. 7On Inheritance A s f o r the right o f inheritance. I did not say (p. I have the exclusive right to accept his o f f e r (ius in re iacente) so long as he does not withdraw it (and if he dies in the meantime this is impossible). this time the acuteness o f the reviewer has failed to find him the nerve o f the p r o o f o f my assertion. unavoidably and tacitly but still validly. the m o m e n t o f the testator's death. B u t if the intention of the testator's will rather than its letter is to have priority. T h o s e institutions f o r the benefit o f the poor. and of the fourth. It is said that such corporations and their right o f succession cannot be annulled. an estate that is entailed. f o r the benefit of certain members of it w h o succeed one another until they have all died out. On the Right of a State with Regard to Perpetual Foundations for Its Subjects A foundation (sanctio testamentaria beneficii perpetui) is an institution that has been voluntarily established. A. so that annulling such a constitution (corpus mysticum) would a m o u n t to depriving someone o f his belongings. circumstances can arise in time that make it advisable to nullify such a f o u n d a t i o n at least in terms o f its form. but nevertheless merely rightful (intelligible) possession of his belongings or a part o f them. A n e x a m p l e of the first kind is a hospital. Now this right to choose passes to me at the m o m e n t o f the testator's death. Consequently this possession is not interrupted f o r a m o m e n t . a church. It is called perpetual if the statute f o r maintaining it is b o u n d u p with the constitution of the state itself (for a state must be r e g a r d e d as perpetual). and the sick that have been set u p at the expense of the state (foundations a n d hospitals) can certainly not be done away with. with relatives or acquaintances. or a family and its descendants continuing in perpetuity. since it became by a bequest the property o f the heirs appointed. T h e proposition testamenta sunt iuris naturae is thus established b e y o n d any doubt. not yet his belongings and goods. or a certain Estate. an order (spiritual or secular). succession passes instead in a continuous series f r o m the dying m a n to his appointed heirs by their acceptance. than w h e n — as in the hospital at G r e e n w i c h — they are provided with splendid institutions. which I can now r e f u s e to accept to the advantage of others. [367] 8. . or a part of them united by certain special principles. So it has b e e n f o u n d that the p o o r and the sick (except f o r patients in mental hospitals) are cared f o r better and m o r e economically w h e n they are helped with certain sums o f money (proportioned to the needs of the time). and c o n f i r m e d by a state. with which they can board w h e r e they want. o f the second. o f the third. and by his testament (institutio haeredis) I acquire. invalids. T h o s e w h o are to benefit f r o m a f o u n d a t i o n are either the people generally.172 The Metaphysics of Morals contradiction. H e n c e only the first constitution is to be f o u n d . can neither be imposed u p o n a people nor taken away f r o m them by any civil authority. nor can a citizen be e x c l u d e d f r o m the service o f the state and the advantages this brings him because his religion is d i f f e r e n t f r o m that o f the court (as Great Britain has d o n e with the Irish nation). of what is theirs. as belief in the d o g m a s of a c h u r c h and in the p o w e r o f priests. and the state may pledge itself to fealty to a c h u r c h r e g a r d i n g this or that foundation. 7 9 so that these people may have the prayers. as the unbelievers o f the French republic are attempting to do? T h e question here is whether the church can b e l o n g to the state or the state b e l o n g to the church. w h o are the aristocrats of such a constitution t h o u g h it can also be monarchical (papal). and penances by which the servants o f the c h u r c h [3®9l . certain devout and believing souls establish foundations in perpetuity. indulgences. by which certain estates o f theirs are to become the property o f a c h u r c h after their death. they must submit to the sufferings of this era u n d e r the higher authority o f m e n o f this world. have given themselves by their bequests as its property. since every civil constitution is o f this world because it is an earthly authority (of men) that. [368] T h e clergy that does not propagate itself carnally (the Catholic clergy) possesses. a constitution relating to that world (hierarchicopolitica). estates and the subjects attached to them. It is evident that only the first constitution (politico-hierarchica) could subsist by itself. can be c o n f i r m e d in experience. whose kingdom is in heaven and the other world. along with its results. B u t may one assume that this relation to the laity can be directly taken f r o m the clergy by the absolute p o w e r of the secular state? Would this not a m o u n t to d e p r i v i n g someone by force o f what is his. the state is instead p r o m o t i n g this by choosing wiser means f o r preserving it.The Doctrine of Right g 173 serviced by expensive personnel. 7 ® A n d so the clergy. or indeed all o f them. which is entitled to the benefits o f this foundation. It cannot be said then that the state is depriving the people. as a special Estate. to which the laity. f o r two s u p r e m e authorities cannot without contradiction be subordinate one to the other. with the favor o f the state. T h e s e b e l o n g to a spiritual state (called a church). In o r d e r to partake o f the grace a c h u r c h promises to show believers even after their death. f o r the salvation of their souls. Even if we concede to believers. has possessions that can be bequeathed by law f r o m one generation to the next and that are adequately d o c u m e n t e d by papal bulls. Religion (in appearance). which severely limit their f r e e d o m . Even perpetual foundations for the poor. can never be r e g a r d e d as established in perpetuity. Accordingly. however. However. takes control of the property the c h u r c h has arrogated to itself. namely the land bestowed o n it t h r o u g h bequests. C. No one n e e d be surprised that it becomes m o r e and m o r e difficult f o r this idea to be carried out in all its details (e. he wants to be immortalized in it. is not at all established in perpetuity. f o r if the one w h o sets u p the f o u n d a t i o n is somewhat ambitious as well as good-natured. with full right.174 The Metaphysics of Morals appointed f o r this (clergy) promise that they will fare well in the other world. Such a f o u n d a tion.g. so that w h e n the illusion arising f r o m this opinion disappears t h r o u g h popular enlightenment. indeed the duty. that poor students must supplement by singing f o r alms an inadequate educational f u n d beneficently established).. the f e a r f u l authority o f the clergy based o n it also falls away and the state. or that if he does this he has d e p r i v e d his (noble) subjects o f what was theirs. does not change the nature of the matter itself and the right. not in the state o f nature). [37°] . it is only an accident o f the constitution. B u t it cannot be asserted that this Estate can be established in perpetuity. and educational institutions. he does not want someone else to alter it in accordance with his concepts. which has b e e n suspended f o r so long. which must go along with the circumstances o f the time and not infringe u p o n the universal Right o f men. For a c h u r c h itself is an institution built merely u p o n belief. T h e nobility of a country that is not u n d e r an aristocratic but a monarchical constitution is an institution that may be permitted f o r a certain period o f time and may even be necessary by circumstances. T h a t . supposedly instituted in perpetuity. A nobility is a temporary fraternity authorized by the state. the state can cast o f f this b u r d e n a c h u r c h has laid u p o n it w h e n it wants to. of what b e l o n g e d to them by inheritance. and that the h e a d of a state should not be authorized to annul this preeminence o f Estate entirely. therefore. B u t such a foundation. For the rank o f nobleman in a state is not only d e p e n d e n t u p o n the constitution itself. which can exist only by inherence in a state (a n o b l e m a n as such is conceivable only in a state. cannot be f o u n d e d in perpetuity and be a perpetual e n c u m brance on the land because they have a certain character specified by the f o u n d e r in accordance with his ideas. o f a state to alter any f o u n d a t i o n if it is o p p o s e d to the preservation of the state and its progress to the better. the f e u d a l tenants o f the institution that hitherto existed have the right to d e m a n d compensation as l o n g as they live. instead the state must be f r e e to adapt t h e m to the needs o f the time. since he could call it his only u n d e r the condition that this f o r m o f state continued. its f o u n d e r . O r d e r s and the privilege of bearing certain signs o f them. no philosopher has yet admitted that most paradoxical o f all paradoxical propositions: the proposition that the m e r e Idea o f sovereignty should constrain me to obey as my lord w h o e v e r has set himself u p as my lord. I at least h o p e that. "regards these metaphys[371] . Finally. w h e r e the lord of the land is determined in this way): not only can such a f o u n d a t i o n be annulled at any time with the consent of all male relatives and need not last in perpetuity — as if the right of inheritance w e r e attached to the land — and it cannot be said that letting an entailment terminate violates the f o u n d a t i o n and the will of the original lord w h o established it. D. granting the paradox here. someone w h o thereby loses his title and precedence cannot say that he is being deprived o f what is his. I cannot be convicted of heterodoxy. not to let such a federative system of its subjects. as regards the foundation of entailed estates. as he says. space does not permit him to express himself: "So far as we know. give no perpetual right of possession.The Doctrine of Right g 175 w h e n a state alters its constitution. I hope. in which someone possessed o f goods arranges his inheritance so that the next o f kin in the series o f successive heirs should always be lord o f the estate (by analogy with a state having a hereditary monarchy. w h o criticizes with moderation (and who. once the matter is considered m o r e closely. the reviewer has made the following remark about the ideas I presented u n d e r the h e a d i n g o f Public Right. despite the o f f e n s e he takes. that my astute and careful reviewer. as if they were viceroys (analogous to dynasties and satrapies). without my asking w h o has given him the right to c o m m a n d me. therefore.g. but a state also has a right and indeed a duty in this matter: as reasons f o r r e f o r m i n g itself gradually become apparent.. rather. to r e f o r m itself into a republic). revive w h e n it has once become extinct. whose existence is not even given a priori?" Now. with regard to which. but a state has the right to alter its f o r m (e. Conclusion Finally. Is there to be no d i f f e r e n c e between saying that one o u g h t to recognize sovereignty and supreme authority and saying that one o u g h t to hold a priori as his lord this or that person. to which no object given in e x p e r i e n c e can be adequate — and a perfectly rightful constitution a m o n g m e n is o f this sort — is the thing in itself. T h e Idea of a civil constitution as such. t h o u g h it is indeed given only in appearance. at least as an attempt not unworthy of a second examination. that is. B u t what seems to shock the reviewer's reason is not only this principle. which would result in a supreme will that destroys itself. For if the people should hold that it is justified in opposing force to this constitution. For otherwise. and so to cast d o u b t u p o n it with a view to resisting him should this title be f o u n d deficient. it is given as an object of experience in conformity with the Idea o f the unity o f a people as such u n d e r a p o w e r f u l supreme will. however faulty. what can be represented only by p u r e reason and must be counted a m o n g Ideas.176 The Metaphysics of Morals ical first principles o f a doctrine of Right on the whole as a gain f o r the science") will not regret having taken them u n d e r his protection against the obstinate and superficial condemnation of others. a g o o d constitu- [372] . if a subject acts o n the contrary maxim (of p r o c e e d i n g by unsanctioned choice). but also that the mere Idea o f sovereignty over a people constrains me. is sacred and irresistible. to obey without previously investigating the right that is claimed {The Doctrine of Right §49). which makes an actual d e e d [Faktum f'0 (taking control) the condition and the basis f o r a right. and to the s u p r e m e authority. which is also an absolute c o m m a n d that practical reason. A n d even if the organization of a state should be faulty by itself. If then a people united by laws u n d e r an authority exists. A n d even t h o u g h this constitution may be afflicted with great defects and gross faults and be in need eventually o f important improvements. O n the other hand. gives to every people. T h a t one w h o finds himself in possession of s u p r e m e executive a n d legislative authority over a people must be obeyed. n o subordinate authority in it may actively resist its legislative supreme authority. that there is a categorical imperative. Obey the authority who has power over you (in whatever does not conflict with inner morality) — this is the offensive proposition called in question. j u d g i n g according to concepts o f Right. it would think that it had the right to put force in place o f the supreme legislation that prescribes all rights. it is still absolutely unpermitted and punishable to resist it. Every actual d e e d (fact) is an object in appearance (to the senses). is already punishable. the defects attached to it must instead be gradually r e m o v e d by r e f o r m s the state itself carries out. a rightful constitution in the general sense o f the term exists. that obedience to him is so rightfully unconditional that even to investigate publicly the title by which he acquired his authority. as belonging to that people. and t h o u g h you can indeed reason publicly about its legislation. would not be the lawful supreme power which first determines what is to be publicly right or not. T o permit any resistance to this absolute p o w e r [Machtvollkommenheit] (resistance that would limit that supreme power) would be selfcontradictory. f o r then this s u p r e m e power (which may be resisted). fact that can begin only by [someone's] seizing supreme p o w e r [Gewalt] and so first establishing public Right. f o r the authority which already exists. in a concept o f practical reason. T h e c o m m a n d " O b e y the authority that has power over y o u " does not inquire how it came to have this p o w e r (in o r d e r perhaps to u n d e r m i n e it). is already in possession o f legislative authority. y o u cannot set yourself u p as an o p p o s i n g legislator. still n o n e must contradict it as a n o r m . Unconditional submission of the people's will (which in itself is not united and is therefore without law) to a sovereign will (uniting all by means o f one law) is a. . u n d e r which you live. T h i s principle is already present a priori in the Idea o f a civil constitution as such.The Doctrine of Right g 177 tion can come into being only by blind chance. and although no e x a m p l e in experience is adequate to be put u n d e r this concept. that is. . Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue [373- . . a n d so with a precision a n a l o g o u s to that o f m a t h e matics.* B u t in this philosophy (the doctrine of virtue) it seems directly contrary to the I d e a of it to g o all the way back to metaphysical first principles. T h e only question is w h e t h e r every practical philosophy. T h i s is w h a t is r e q u i r e d in o r d e r to say. that is. the incentive. In that case what is mine a n d what is yours m u s t be d e t e r m i n e d o n t h e scales o f j u s t i c e exactly. Since this k n o w l e d g e aims at action it n e e d n o t be s p u n o u t into the Finest t h r e a d s o f m e t a p h y s i c s . that h e is a practical philosopher [376] 181 . without regard f o r any end (the matter o f choice). N o one will doubt that the p u r e doctrine o f Right needs metaphysical first principles. a speculative subject that few know how to * S o m e o n e versed in practical philosophy is n o t t h e r e b y a practical philosopher. as a doctrine o f duties. it is primarily the i n n e r p r i n c i p l e o f the will. f o r it has to d o only with the formal condition o f a capacity f o r choice that is to be limited in external relations in accordance with laws o f f r e e d o m . n a m e l y that consciousness o f this d u t y be also the incentive to actions. a m e r e scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). For what sort o f concept can be m a d e o f the force and herculean strength n e e d e d to subdue the vice-breeding inclinations if virtue is to borrow its weapons f r o m the arsenal o f metaphysics. also needs metaphysical first principles. a metaphysics. H e r e the doctrine o f duties is. in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e that action a n d r e a c t i o n a r e equal. so as to make the concept o f duty. accordingly. unless it has to d o with a d u t y o f R i g h t . b u t this is n o t necessary w h e n it has to d o with a m e r e d u t y o f virtue. A practical p h i l o s o p h e r is o n e w h o m a k e s the final end of reason t h e p r i n c i p l e of his actions a n d j o i n s with this s u c h k n o w l e d g e as is necessary f o r it. t h o u g h purified o f anything empirical (any feeling). F o r w h a t c o u n t s in t h e latter case is n o t m e r e l y k n o w i n g what it is o n e ' s d u t y to d o (because o f t h e e n d s all m e n h a v e by their n a t u r e this is easily stated). so that it can be set forth as a genuine science (systematically) and not merely as an aggregate o f precepts sought out one by one (fragmentarily). and so too the doctrine of virtue (ethics). o f s o m e o n e w h o j o i n s with his k n o w l e d g e this principle o f w i s d o m .[379] Preface A philosophy o f any subject (a system o f rational k n o w l e d g e f r o m concepts) requires a system o f pure rational concepts i n d e p e n d e n t o f any conditions o f intuition. H e n c e . as people sometimes suppose. But his thought must go all the way back to the elements of metaphysics. if. no matter how metaphysics may disgust the supposed teachers of wisdom w h o discourse on duty as oracles or men o f genius. In that case a popular teacher can indeed be content to rely on a certain feeling that. But in fact n o moral principle is based. the law. b e f o r e they teach. m a d e it a universal law?" B u t if it were m e r e feeling that m a d e it o u r duty even to use this proposition as the touchstone. m u c h less ridiculous. lecture halls and so forth. as the touchstone f o r deciding w h e t h e r or not something is a duty o f virtue: "How could a m a x i m such as yours harmonize with itself if everyone. without which no certitude o r purity can be expected in the doctrine o f virtue. one begins with the matter the will. and hence blindly. as a philosopher. on any feeling whatsoever. is c o r r u p t e d alike in schools. is called moral. to become pupils in the classroom o f metaphysics. nor indeed any m o v i n g force. in every case. as means. since otherwise neither certitude n o r purity can be expected a n y w h e r e in the doctrine o f virtue. B u t it is not useless. that is. then there will indeed be no metaphysical first principles o f the doctrine of virtue. I f one departs f r o m this principle and begins with sensibly dependent or p u r e aesthetic or even moral feeling (with what is subjectively rather than objectively practical). B u t then the doctrine of virtue. because of the results expected f r o m it. For the kind o f incentive by which. has to go to the first g r o u n d s o f this concept o f duty. always belongs to the order of nature. instead o f with the f o r m o f the will. f o r someone. A n y such principle is really an obscurely thought metaphysics that is inherent in every m a n because of his rational predisposition. being corrupted at its source. whatever may arouse it. unless he wants to train his pupil as a philosopher.182 The Metaphysics of Morals handle? Hence all doctrine of virtue. this duty w o u l d not be dictated by reason but would be taken to be a duty only instinctively. f r o m pulpits. in lecture halls. insofar as he insists that the following lesson be taken to heart. [377] . the end. since feeling. or in popular books. also becomes ridiculous if it is d e c k e d out in scraps o f metaphysics. in o r d e r to determine duties on this basis. as a teacher will readily grant if he experiments in questioning his pupil somatically about the imperative o f duty and its application to moral appraisal o f his actions. to investigate in metaphysics the first g r o u n d s o f the doctrine o f virtue. one is led to a g o o d purpose (that of fulfilling every duty) is not a matter of indifference. those same people w h o oppose metaphysics still have an indispensable duty to go back to its principles even in the doctrine of virtue and. T h e way the teacher presents this (his technique) should not always be metaphysical nor his terms scholastic. this happiness is really his motive f o r acting virtuously. he finds himself in a state that could well be called happiness. Pleasure that must p r e c e d e one's observance o f the law in o r d e r f o r one to act in conformity with the law is sensibly d e p e n d e n t and one's conduct follows the order of nature. but he can be m o v e d to fulfill his duty only if he foresees that he will be made h a p p y by it. even t h o u g h they feel themselves compelled irresistably by it. his capacity f o r such an Idea. It happens in this way. one cannot help w o n d e r i n g how this principle could be r e d u c e d again to a doctrine of happiness. A eudaemonist's etiology involves him in a circle. Now a eudaemonist says: T h i s delight. which is the direct opposite of the moral principle. if e u d a e m o n i s m (the principle of happiness) is set u p as the basic principle instead o f eleutheronomy (the principle o f the f r e e d o m of internal lawgiving). r e d u c e d the distinction between sensibly dependent pleasure and moral pleasure to its simplest terms. and so in accordance with a sensibly dependent principle. and so o n moral grounds. but pleasure that must be preceded by the law in o r d e r to be felt is in the moral order. I think.The Doctrine of Right g 183 A f t e r it has b e e n m a d e so clear that the principle o f duty is derived f r o m p u r e reason. but on the other h a n d he can recognize that something is his duty only by whether he can count on gaining happiness by d o i n g it. the result is the euthanasia (easy death) o f all morals. t h o u g h in such a way that a certain moral happiness not based on empirical causes — a selfcontradictory absurdity 8 1 — has been thought u p as the end. B e i n g unable to explain what lies entirely beyond that sphere (freedom o f choice). People w h o are accustomed merely to explanations by natural sciences [physiologische Erklärungen ] will not get into their heads the categorical imperative f r o m which these laws proceed dictatorially. that is. he can h o p e to be happy (or inwardly blessed) only if he is conscious o f having fulfilled his duty. T h e cause o f these errors is as follows. a state o f contentment and peace of soul in which virtue is its own reward. If this distinction is not observed. he must find himself u n d e r obligation to do his duty b e f o r e he thinks that happiness will result f r o m his observance of duty and without thinking o f this. B u t since he can expect this reward o f virtue only f r o m consciousness o f having done his duty. they are stirred by [378] . For on the o n e h a n d he o u g h t to fulfill his duty without first asking what e f f e c t this will have on his happiness. T h e concept o f duty does not determine his will directly. that is to say. h o w e v e r exalting is this very prerogative of man. W h e n a t h o u g h t f u l m a n has overcome incentives to vice and is aware o f having done his o f t e n bitter duty. B u t there is also a contradiction in this reasoning. he is m o v e d to d o his duty only by means of the happiness he anticipates. In another place (the Berliner Monatsschrift)821 have. it is clear that the latter must have come first. and perhaps for a while longer. . they assail the moral concept of f r e e d o m and. w h e r e v e r possible. which makes its p o w e r so strongly felt in other fields. to band together in a general call to arms. but in the e n d they must give way. to d e f e n d the omnipotence of theoretical reason.184 Metaphysics of Morals the p r o u d claims of speculative reason. A n d so now. as it were. m a k e it suspect. [379] Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue In ancient times "ethics" signified the doctrine of morals (philosophia moralis) in general. the doctrine of virtue). f o r t h e r e is n o m a n so d e p r a v e d as n o t to f e e l a n o p p o s i t i o n to b r e a k i n g it a n d an a b h o r r e n c e o f h i m s e l f in t h e f a c e o f w h i c h h e has to constrain h i m s e l f [to b r e a k t h e law]. Later o n it seemed better to reserve the n a m e "ethics" f o r o n e part o f moral philosophy. Accordingly. and this division may stand. and even w h e n they d o obey the law. I. in German. the system o f the doctrine o f duties in general is now divided into the system o f the doctrine of Right (ius). they d o it reluctantly (in the face of opposition f r o m their inclinations). t h e r e f o r e . w h o are unholy e n o u g h that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law. T h e moral imperative makes this constraint k n o w n t h r o u g h the categorical nature o f its p r o n o u n c e ment (the unconditional ought). namely f o r the doctrine o f those duties that do not c o m e u n d e r external laws (it was thought appropriate to call this. N o w it is impossible to e x p l a i n t h e p h e n o m e n o n that at this p a r t i n g o f the ways ( w h e r e t h e b e a u t i f u l f a b l e places H e r c u l e s b e t w e e n v i r t u e a n d sensual p l e a s u r e ) m a n s h o w s 185 . does not apply to rational beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to men. which deals with duties that can be given by external laws. even t h o u g h they recognize its authority. Such constraint. Discussion of the Concept of a Doctrine of Virtue T h e very concept of duty is already the concept o f a necessitation (constraint) of f r e e choice t h r o u g h the law. as his p u r e practical r e a s o n d e t e r m i n e s him to d o . rational natural beings. and the system o f the doctrine of virtue (Ethica). T h i s constraint may be an external constraint or a self-constraint.* B u t since man is still a * Y e t if m a n l o o k s at h i m s e l f objectively ( u n d e r the aspect o f humanity in his o w n p e r s o n ) . which treats o f duties that cannot be so given. h e finds that as a moral being h e is also holy e n o u g h to b r e a k t h e i n n e r law reluctantly. which was also called the doctrine of duties. and it is in this that such constraint properly consists. fortitudo moralis). But if I a m u n d e r obligation to make my end something that lies in concepts o f practical reason. virtue {virtus. with Right. involve obstacles within man's mind to his fulfillment o f duty and (sometimes powerful) forces o p p o s i n g it. independently o f inclinations. as far as m e n are concerned. that is. T h e doctrine o f Right dealt only with the formal condition o f outer f r e e d o m (the consistency of outer f r e e d o m with itself if its maxim were made universal law). f r e e d o m u n d e r laws is a doctrine of virtue. besides the formal determining g r o u n d of choice (such as Right contains). B u t it is this self-constraint in o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s a n d its unavoidability that m a k e s k n o w n t h e i n e x p l i c a b l e p r o p erty o f freedom itself. A n end is an object o f the choice (of a rational being). Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust o p p o n e n t is fortitude (fortitudo) and. accordingly. rather than outer. but I can never be constrained by others to have an end. an e n d which. it is a duty to have. only I myself can make something my end. that is. with respect to what opposes the moral disposition within us. w h e n the concept o f duty concerns the internal determination o f his will (the incentive) the constraint that the concept o f duty contains can be only self-constraint (though the representation o f the law alone). F o r w e c a n e x p l a i n w h a t h a p p e n s only by d e r i v i n g it f r o m a c a u s e in a c c o r d a n c e with laws o f n a t u r e . Now I can indeed be constrained by others to p e r f o r m actions that are directed as means to an end. which he must j u d g e that he is capable of resisting and c o n q u e r i n g by reason not at some time in the f u t u r e but at once (the m o m e n t he thinks o f duty): H e must j u d g e that he can d o what the law tells him unconditionally that he ought to do. [381] . f o r only so can that necessitation (even if it is external) be united with the f r e e d o m o f his capacity f o r choice. and so to have. lawgiving reason can in turn check their influence only by a moral end set u p against the ends of inclination. H e n c e in this case the concept of duty will be an ethical one. t h r o u g h the representation o f which choice is determined to an action to b r i n g this object about. an end o f pure reason that it presents as an end which is also objectively^ necessary. this would be the concept o f an end that is in itself a duty. a material one as well. Impulses o f nature. a n d in so d o i n g w e w o u l d n o t be t h i n k i n g o f c h o i c e as f r e e . But ethics goes beyond this and provides a matter (an object o f f r e e choice).200 [380] The Metaphysics of Morals free (moral) being. But m o r e p r o p e n s i t y to listen to his inclinations than to t h e law. an e n d that must t h e r e f o r e be given a priori. So the part o f the general doctrine o f duties that brings inner. For since men's sensible inclinations tempt them to ends (the matter of choice) that can be contrary to duty. an end that could be set against the end arising f r o m sensible impulses. * T h e less a m a n c a n b e c o n s t r a i n e d by n a t u r a l m e a n s a n d t h e m o r e h e c a n be c o n strained m o r a l l y ( t h r o u g h t h e m e r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f duty). since self-constraint in accordance with (moral) laws belongs to the concept o f ethics alone. T h e maxim o f his action. T o have an end that I have not myself m a d e an e n d is self-contradictory. one can begin with the m a x i m o f actions in conformity with duty and seek out the end that is also a duty. so m u c h t h e m o r e f r e e h e is. at the t h o u g h t that by c a r r y i n g it o u t h e w o u l d o m i t o n e o f his duties as an o f f i c i a l o r n e g l e c t a sick f a t h e r . o n the other hand. h e p r o v e s his f r e e d o m in t h e h i g h e s t d e g r e e by b e i n g u n a b l e to resist t h e call o f d u t y . T h e doctrine of Right takes the first way. T h a t ethics contains duties that one cannot be constrained by others (through natural means [physisch])63 to fulfill follows merely f r o m its being a doctrine o f ends. no m a t t e r h o w o t h e r s m a y r e a s o n with h i m a b o u t t h e h a r m h e will d o h i m s e l f by it. Ends and [coercive] duties distinguish the two divisions o f the doctrine o f morals in general. Discussion of the Concept of an End That Is Also a Duty O n e can think o f the relation of e n d to duty in two ways: O n e can begin with the end and seek out the maxim o f actions in conformity with duty or. a m a n so firm o f p u r p o s e a n d s t r o n g o f soul that h e c a n n o t b e d i s s u a d e d f r o m a p l e a s u r e h e i n t e n d s to h a v e . f o r e x a m p l e . T h a t ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum virtutis) follows. A n o t h e r can indeed coerce m e to do something that is not my end (but only a means to another's end). W h a t e n d anyone wants to set f o r his action is left to his free choice. and yet I can have no e n d without m a k i n g it an e n d f o r myself. * B u t how is such an e n d possible? T h a t is the question now. an act o f f r e e d o m that is yet not free. I f s u c h a m a n gives u p his p l a n i m m e d i a t e l y . however. [382] II. but not to make this my end. since coercion to ends (to have them) is self-contradictory. B u t it is no contradiction to set an e n d f o r myself that is also a duty. For this reason ethics can also be d e f i n e d as the system o f the ends o f p u r e practical reason. since I constrain myself to it and this is altogether consistent with f r e e d o m . T h a t is to say. t h o u g h reluctantly. For that the concept o f a thing is possible (not self-contradictory) is not yet sufficient f o r assuming the possibility o f the thing itself (the objective reality o f the concept). f r o m the above exposition o f virtue w h e n it is connected with the kind o f obligation whose distinctive feature was just pointed out. S u p p o s e . determination to an end is the only determination of choice the very concept o f which excludes the possibility o f constraint through natural means by the choice o f another.The Doctrine of Right g 187 the doctrine o f this end would not belong to the doctrine o f Right but rather to ethics. . is yet rightly i n f e r r e d f r o m the moral categorical imperative. H e n c e in ethics the concept of duty will lead to ends and will have to establish maxims with respect to ends we ought to set ourselves. For this reason there are several duties o f virtue (and also various virtues). T h u s h u m a n morality in its highest stage can still be nothing m o r e than virtue. whereas the f o r m e r is based only on free self-constraint. f o r that would be to adopt maxims on empirical grounds. that is. O n l y an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue. it involves consciousness o f the capacity to master one's inclinations w h e n they rebel against the law. if maxims were to be a d o p t e d on the basis o f those ends (all o f which are self-seeking). Consequently. even if it be entirely p u r e (quite f r e e f r o m the influence of any incentive other than that of duty). such duties are called. [383] Setting aside the question o f what sort o f e n d is in itself a duty and how such an e n d is possible. his duty. g r o u n d i n g them in accordance with moral principles. since the latter is autonomy o f practical reason whereas the f o r m e r is also autocracy o f practical reason. It cannot begin with the ends that a m a n may set f o r himself and in accordance with t h e m prescribe the maxims he is to adopt. that is. T o every duty there corresponds a right in the sense o f an authorization to d o something {facultas moralis generatim). to every ethical obligation there corresponds the concept o f virtue. Instead. but it is not the case that to every duty there correspond rights o f another to coerce someo n e (facultas iuridica). that the f r e e d o m o f the agent could coexist with the f r e e d o m o f every other in accordance with a universal law. In its highest stage it is an ideal (to which one must con- . we have here only to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue and why it is called by this name. one could not really speak o f the concept o f duty. For finite holy beings (who could never be tempted to violate duty) there would be no doctrine o f virtue but only a doctrine of morals. and such g r o u n d s yield n o concept of duty. is d e t e r m i n e d a priori. but not all ethical duties are thereby duties o f virtue.g. t h o u g h not directly perceived. since this concept (the categorical ought) has its root in p u r e reason alone. B u t ethics takes the opposite way. Similarly. namely. object of choice) as merely with what is formal in the moral determination o f the will (e. whereas f o r the first kind of duty only one (virtuous disposition) is thought. a capacity which. that an action in conformity with duty must also be done from duty) are not duties o f virtue. specifically.188 The Metaphysics of Morals however. W h a t essentially distinguishes a duty o f virtue f r o m a duty o f Right is that external constraint to the latter kind o f duty is morally possible. which h o w e v e r holds f o r all actions.. T h o s e duties that have to d o not so much with a certain end (matter. duties of Right. the sight o f w h i c h m a k e s a m a n w h o s e soul is h e a l t h y s h u d d e r . the a b o v e question w o u l d b e t a n t a m o u n t to w h e t h e r a m a n c o u l d s h o w m o r e strength d u r i n g an attack o f sickness t h a n w h e n h e is healthy. B u t g r e a t crimes a r e p a r o x y s m s . like any o t h e r m e c h a n i s m o f technically practical reason.c h a p l a i n . w h i c h is c o m m o n l y p e r s o n i f i e d poetically by the sage. since health consists in the bala n c e o f all m a n ' s bodily forces. F o r unless this a p t i t u d e results f r o m c o n s i d e r e d . realiter oppositum)'. a n d continually p u r i f i e d principles. firm. a n d since n o o n e can h a v e an e n d with- [385] . T h i s can b e straightway d e n i e d . [384] Remark V i r t u e ( = +a) is o p p o s e d to negative lack of virtue ( m o r a l w e a k ness = o) as its logical opposite (contradictorie oppositum). For by s t r e n g t h o f soul w e m e a n s t r e n g t h o f resolution in a m a n as a b e i n g e n d o w e d with f r e e d o m . t h e r e f o r e . f o r . the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f w h i c h determines it to a n action (by w h i c h the object is b r o u g h t about). T h i s o n e can a d m i t w i t h o u t attributing m o r e strength o f soul to him. w h i c h p r o v e s n o s t r e n g t h o f soul. B u t v i r t u e is not to b e d e f i n e d [zu erklären] a n d v a l u e d m e r e l y as an aptitude a n d (as the prize-essay o f C o c h i u s . h a s its e n d . since t h e basis o f g r e a t crimes is m e r e l y t h e f o r c e o f inclinations that weaken r e a s o n . a n d it is not only u n n e c e s s a r y b u t e v e n i m p r o p e r to ask w h e t h e r g r e a t crimes m i g h t n o t r e q u i r e m o r e s t r e n g t h o f soul than d o g r e a t virtues. T h e question w o u l d t h e r e f o r e c o m e to s o m e t h i n g like this: W h e t h e r a m a n in a fit o f m a d n e s s c o u l d h a v e m o r e physical strength than w h e n h e is sane. the c o u r t . w h i l e lack o f h e a l t h is a w e a k e n i n g in the system o f these forces. E v e r y action.s t a n d i n g habit o f morally g o o d actions a c q u i r e d by practice. it is n e i t h e r a r m e d f o r all situations n o r a d e q u a t e l y s e c u r e d against the c h a n g e s that n e w t e m p t a t i o n s c o u l d bring about. III.The Doctrine of Right g 189 tinually a p p r o x i m a t e ) . 8 4 puts it) a l o n g . t h e n . h e n c e his strength i n s o f a r as h e is in c o n t r o l o f himself (in his senses) a n d so in the state o f health p r o p e r to a m a n . if by soul is m e a n t the vital principle o f m a n in the f r e e use o f his p o w e r s . a n d it is only by r e f e r e n c e to this system that absolute health can b e a p p r a i s e d . O n the Basis for Thinking of an End That Is Also a Duty A n end is an object o f f r e e choice. b u t it is o p p o s e d to vice ( = —a) as its real opposite (contrarie s. so that one's own happiness a n d the perfection of others would be m a d e ends that would be in themselves duties of the same person. T h e study o f the f o r m e r type of ends can be called the technical (subjective) doctrine o f ends. not the means (hence not conditionally). must be called the moral (objective) doctrine o f ends.. but o f objects o f f r e e choice u n d e r its laws. a categorical imperative would be impossible. which m a n ought to make his ends. B u t this distinction is s u p e r f l u o u s here. What Are the Ends That Are Also Duties? T h e y are one's own perfection and the happiness of others. as their objects. For were there n o such ends. B u t a m o n g these ends there must be some that are also (i. it is really the pragmatic doctrine of ends. For since there are f r e e actions there must also be ends to which. So it is not a question here o f ends m a n does adopt in k e e p i n g with the sensible impulses o f his nature. these actions are directed. then all ends would hold f o r practical reason only as means to other ends. and t h e r e f o r e an imperative which connects a concept of duty with that o f an e n d in general. but this end can n e v e r without selfcontradiction be r e g a r d e d as a duty. T h i s would d o away with any doctrine o f morals. containing the rules o f prudence in the choice o f one's ends. [386] . which treats of duties. to have any e n d o f action whatsoever is an act of freedom on the part o f the acting subject. anthropology) by the fact that anthropology is based on empirical principles. o f his own accord. is based on principles given a priori in p u r e practical reason. which is constraint to an end adopted reluctantly. Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. W h a t everyone already wants unavoidably. whereas the moral doctrine o f ends. it is a categorical imperative o f p u r e practical reason. For his own happiness is an end that every man has (by virtue of the impulses o f his nature). T h e study o f the latter type o f ends. Perfection and happiness cannot be interchanged here. IV. however. H e n c e it is self-contradictory to say that he is under obligation to p r o m o t e his own happiness with all his powers. since the doctrine of morals is already clearly distinguished in its concept f r o m the doctrine o f nature (in this case. by their concept) duties. does not come u n d e r the concept o f duty. But because this act that determines an e n d is a practical principle that prescribes the end itself (and so prescribes unconditionally). not an e f f e c t of nature.e. and since there can be n o action without an end.204 The Metaphysics of Morals out himself m a k i n g the object o f his choice into an end. One's Own Perfection T h e w o r d perfection is o p e n to a g o o d deal o f misinterpretation. morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this e n d his duty. qualitative (formal) perfection. as a person. so as to satisfy all the requirements o f duty. it is taken to mean the harmony o f a thing's properties with an end. and in the second. as a concept belonging to teleology. it is a contradiction f o r m e to make another's perfection my e n d and consider myself u n d e r obligation to p r o m o t e this. by which he alone is capable o f setting himself ends. Perfection in the first sense could be called quantitative (material) perfection. he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors. T h e n again. f o r otherwise it would not be a duty. not in mere gifts f o r which he must be indebted to nature. consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his o w n concepts o f duty. T h i s duty can therefore consist only in cultivating one's capacities (or natural predispositions). A n d it is not merely that technically practical reason counsels him to d o this as a means to his f u r t h e r purposes (of art). and it is self-contradictory to require that I d o (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do. the highest o f which is understanding. B u t one thing can have several qualitative perfections. V. and it is really qualitative perfection that is u n d e r discussion here. so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him. f r o m his animality (quoad actum). this perfection must be put in what can result f r o m his deeds. Clarification of These Two Concepts A. the capacity f o r concepts and so too for those concepts that have to d o with duty. W h e n it is said that it is in itself a duty f o r a m a n to m a k e his end the perfection b e l o n g i n g to man as such (properly speaking. taken together. Perfection is sometimes understood as a concept b e l o n g i n g to transcendental philosophy. 1) Man has a duty to raise himself f r o m the c r u d e state o f his nature. For the perfection o f another man. constitutes a thing.The Doctrine of Right g 191 So too. T h e quantitative perfection o f a thing can be only one (for the totality o f what belongs to a thing is one). 2) M a n has a duty to carry the cultivation o f his will u p to the purest virtuous disposition. the concept o f the totality o f the manifold which. A t the same time this duty includes the cultivation o f one's will (moral cast o f mind). m o r e and m o r e toward humanity. to h u m a n ity). in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions [387] . so that one has a duty to p r o m o t e one's own happiness and not just the happiness o f others. as it were. Since it is a feeling o f the e f f e c t that the lawgiving will within man exercises o n his capacity to act in accordance with his will. which check the influence of these. Since this is o f t e n used as a specious objection to the division of duties m a d e above (in IV). as l o n g as they have no right to d e m a n d t h e m f r o m me as what is theirs. it must be noted that the f o r m e r kind of feeling belongs only u n d e r the preceding heading. m a k e a distinction between moral happiness (which consists in satisfaction with one's person and one's own moral conduct. and so with what one does) and natural happiness (which consists in satisfaction with what nature bestows. and well-being in general. A l t h o u g h I refrain h e r e f r o m censuring a misuse o f the w o r d happiness (that already involves a contradiction). For a man w h o is said to feel happy in the mere consciousness o f his rectitude already possesses the perfection that was explained there as that end which is also a duty. and happiness is merely [388] . it is called moral feeling. Some people. and want are great temptations to violate one's duty. It is for them to decide what they count as b e l o n g i n g to their happiness. B u t time and again an alleged obligation to attend to my own (natural) happiness is set u p in competition with this end. so long as one is assured o f its lasting. health. this is not an end that is also a duty. W h e n it comes to my p r o m o t i n g happiness as an e n d that is also a duty. B. pain. It is true that moral sense is o f t e n misused in a visionary way. strength. a special sense (sensns moralis). and my natural and merely subjective e n d is thus made a duty (an objective end). satisfaction with one's state. B u t then the end is not the subject's happiness but his morality.192 The Metaphysics of Morals that c o n f o r m with duty and he obeys the law f r o m duty. It might t h e r e f o r e seem that prosperity. namely perfection. whose (permitted) end I thus make my own end as well. Adversity. The Happiness of Others Since it is unavoidable f o r h u m a n nature to wish f o r and seek happiness. but it is o p e n to m e to r e f u s e them many things that they think will make them h a p p y but that I d o not. by which one makes one's object every particular e n d that is also a duty. could also be considered ends that are duties. however. it needs to be set right. that is. as if (like Socrates' daimon) it could p r e c e d e reason or even dispense with reason's j u d g m e n t . and so with what one enjoys as a gift f r o m without). T h i s disposition is inner morally practical perfection. Yet it is a moral perfection. this must t h e r e f o r e be the happiness o f other men. establishes a law for the maxims of actions by subordinating the subjective end (that everyone has) to the objective end (that everyone ought to make his end).g. as the matter of the law). that of warding o f f poverty insofar as this is a great temptation to vice. the happiness of others) your end" has to do with the matter of choice (an object). For maxims of actions can be [adopted] at will.. and are subject only to the limiting condition of being fit for a giving of universal law. and the requirement that they so qualify is only a negative principle (not to come into conflict with a law as such). VI." already indicates this. Maxims are here regarded as subjective principles which merely qualify for a giving of universal law. Hence. A law. Ethics Does Not Give Laws for Actions (Ius Does That).The Doctrine of Right g 193 a means f o r removing obstacles to his morality — a permitted means. however. a law for the maxims of actions? Only the concept of an end that is also a duty. although for the maxim itself the mere possibility of agreeing with a giving of universal law is already sufficient. but indirectly it can well be a duty. in the latter case the law would provide a duty of Right. in the categorical imperative "So act that the maxim of your action could become a universal law. To seek prosperity for its own sake is not directly a duty. which is the formal principle of actions. the end that is also a duty can make it a law to have such a maxim. T h e formal principle of duty. since no one else has a right to require of me that I sacrifice my ends if these are not immoral. a concept that belongs exclusively to ethics. if there is an end that is also a duty. How can there be. the only condition that maxims of actions. T h e imperative "You ought to make this or that (e. Now no free action is possible unless the agent also intends an end (which is the matter of choice). O n the other hand. which lies outside the sphere of ethics. Ethics adds only that this principle is to be thought as the law of your own will and not of will in general. as means to ends. But then it is not my happiness but the preservation of my moral integrity that is my end and also my duty. [38g] . which could also be the will of others. and this distinguishes it f r o m any recommendation (where all that one requires is to know the most suitable means to an end). must contain is that of qualifying for a possible giving of universal law. but Only for Maxims of Actions T h e concept of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even if I abstract f r o m all ends. beyond this principle. takes away what is willful f r o m actions. accordingly. since it goes b e y o n d the law of duty f o r actions and makes the law itself also the incentive. his end and in so d o i n g widens his concept of duty b e y o n d the concept of what is due (officium debiti). I m p e r f e c t duties are. love o f one's neighbor in general by love o f one's parents). lack o f moral strength (defectus moralis). but only as permission to limit one m a x i m o f duty by another (e. in the first case. is not so m u c h vice (vitium) as rather m e r e want of virtue. one's weakness. that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how m u c h one is to d o by the action f o r an e n d that is also a duty. T h e same holds true of the universal ethical c o m m a n d . this is a sign that it leaves a latitude (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) the law. unless the subject should make it his principle not to comply with such duties. T h e wider the duty. so Untugend [lack o f virtue] comes f r o m zu nichts taugen [not to be fit for anything]. f o r if the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions. since another can indeed by his right require of me actions in accordance with the law. respect f o r Right. (As the w o r d Tugend [virtue] comes f r o m taugen [to be fit for]. therefore. only duties of virtue.) Every action contrary to duty is called a transgression (peccatum). A l t h o u g h there is nothing meritorious in the conformity o f one's actions with Right (in being an honest man). the m o r e imperfect is a man's obligation to action.194 [390] The Metaphysics of Morals VII. Ethical Duties Are of Wide Obligation. as duties. is meritorious. meritorious. as he." T o establish and quicken this disposition in oneself is. not actions themselves. "act in conformity with duty from duty. Fulfillment of them is merit (meritum = + a ) . in the second case. For a m a n thereby makes the Right of humanity. that is. Whereas Duties of Right Are of Narrow Obligation T h i s proposition follows f r o m the p r e c e d i n g one. by which in fact the field for the practice o f virtue is widened. that is properly called virtue (virtus). but failure to fulfill them 85 is not in itself culpability (demeritum = —a) but rather mere deficiency in moral worth ( = 0 ) . It is only the strength o f one's resolution. B u t a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to m a k e exceptions to the m a x i m o f actions. 1 . but not that the law be also my incentive to such actions. so m u c h the m o r e perfect is his virtuous action. as in the previous case. or also the Right o f men. .. brings closer to narrow duty (duties o f Right) the m a x i m o f c o m p l y i n g with wide duty (in his disposition).g. nevertheless. It is w h e n an intentional transgression has become a principle that it is properly called a vice (vitium). that is. the conformity with Right o f one's maxims o f such actions. even without r e g a r d f o r the advantage it a f f o r d s us. All that it produces is contentment with oneself. can be shown in this way. a susceptibility to being rewarded in accordance with laws o f virtue: the reward. virtue is its o w n reward. which comes f r o m p r o m o t i n g the true wellbeing o f others even w h e n they fail to recognize it as such (when they are unappreciative and ungrateful). a duty of wide obligation. in o r d e r to b r i n g wide obligation as close as possible to the concept o f narrow obligation). and so the duty. by p r o c u r i n g or p r o m o t i n g the capacity to realize all sorts o f possible ends. i. so far as this is to be f o u n d in man himself. T h a t this is a duty and so in itself an end. it could be called sweet merit. too. although in this case the merit would be greater still. is based on an unconditional (moral) imperative rather than a conditional (pragmatic) one. With respect to them (and. and that the cultivation of o u r capacities.e. VIII. usually yields no such return. there is a subjective principle o f ethical reward. that is. Exposition of Duties of Virtue as Wide Duties 1. indeed. to make ourselves worthy o f humanity by culture in general. One's Own Perfection as an End That Is Also a Duty a) Natural perfection is the cultivation o f any capacities whatever f o r f u r t h e r i n g ends set forth by reason. T h e capacity to set oneself an end — any e n d whatsoever — is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished f r o m animality). No rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should g o in cultivating one's capacities (in enlarging or correcting one's capacity f o r understanding.. that is. In other words.The Doctrine of Right g 195 B u t f o r this very reason these duties. in acquiring k n o w l e d g e or skill [Kunst- [392] . man has a duty to cultivate the c r u d e predispositions o f his nature. t h r o u g h consciousness o f this pleasure. by which the animal is first raised into man. f o r consciousness of it produces a moral enjoyment in which men are inclined by sympathy to revel. must be counted as duties o f wide obligation. of a moral pleasure that goes b e y o n d m e r e contentment with oneself (which can be merely negative) and that is celebrated in the saying that. B u t bitter merit. It is theref o r e a duty in itself. H e n c e there is also b o u n d u p with the e n d o f humanity in o u r own person the rational will. If this merit is a man's merit in relation to other men f o r p r o m o t i n g what all m e n recognize as their natural e n d (for m a k i n g their happiness his own). namely. B u t this duty is a merely ethical one. that o f seeking the basis o f obligation solely in the law and not in sensible impulse (advantage or disadvantage). that is. For a m a n cannot see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite certain. and the principle o f duty seems to prescribe with the precision and strictness of a law not only the legality but also the morality o f every action. o f the purity o f his moral intention and the sincerity o f his disposition. With r e g a r d to natural perfection. prescribes only the maxim of the action. B u t it is m o r e difficult to do good. and how many people w h o have lived l o n g and guiltless lives may not be merely fortunate in having escaped so many temptations? In the case o f any d e e d it remains h i d d e n f r o m the agent himself how m u c h p u r e moral content there has been in his disposition. the d i f f e r e n t situations in which m e n may find themselves m a k e what a man chooses as the occupation f o r which he should cultivate his talents very optional. h e r e again. the disposition. which runs as follows: "Cultivate y o u r powers o f mind and body so that they are fit to realize any ends y o u might encounter. and hence not the action itself. Benevolence can be unlimited. to strive with all one's might that the t h o u g h t o f duty f o r its o w n sake is the sufficient incentive of every action c o n f o r m i n g to duty. f o r virtue (which is the concept o f strength). T h e law does not prescribe this inner action in the h u m a n mind but only the maxim o f the action. which counsels him against the venture o f a misdeed." however uncertain you are which o f t h e m could sometime become yours. The Happiness of Others as an End That Is Also a Duty a) Natural welfare. since n o t h i n g need be d o n e with it. H e n c e this duty too — the duty o f assessing the worth o f one's actions not by their legality alone but also by their morality (one's disposition) — is o f only wide obligation. in even a single action.196 The Metaphysics of Morals fähigkeit]). accordingly. A t first sight this looks like a narrow obligation. B u t in fact the law. 2. b) T h e cultivation of morality in us. at the cost o f f o r g o i n g the satisfaction o f concupiscence and o f active injury to it in many cases. there is no law o f reason f o r actions but only a law f o r the maxims o f actions. even w h e n he has n o doubt about the legality o f the action. Very o f t e n he mistakes his own weakness. T h e n too. T h e reason that it is a duty to be beneficent is this: Since [393] .86 especially if it is to be d o n e not f r o m affection (love) f o r others but f r o m duty. Man's greatest moral perfection is to do his duty from duty (for the law to be not only the rule but also the incentive o f his actions). but also a self-constraint in accordance with a principle o f inner f r e e d o m .The Doctrine of Right g 197 o u r self-love cannot be separated f r o m o u r n e e d to be loved (helped in case o f need) by others as well. For a m a x i m o f p r o m o t i n g others' happiness at the sacrifice o f one's own happiness. to refrain f r o m what is called giving scandal. a n d it must be left to each to decide this f o r himself. What Is a Duty of Virtue? Virtue is the strength o f man's maxims in fulfilling his duty. A l t h o u g h the pain a m a n feels f r o m the pangs o f conscience has a moral source. or any other state of s u f f e r i n g . which can come into conflict with man's moral resolution. so that the obligation resting on it is only a wide one. . it is still a natural effect. But this concern f o r others' moral contentment does not admit of specific limits being assigned to it. How far it should e x t e n d depends. and it is impossible to assign specific limits to the extent o f this sacrifice. T o see to it that another does not deservedly s u f f e r this inner r e p r o a c h is not my duty but his affair. the duty has in it a latitude f o r d o i n g m o r e or less. and so t h r o u g h the mere representation o f one's duty in accordance with its formal law. and since it is m a n himself w h o puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims. but it is my duty to refrain f r o m d o i n g anything that. T h e law holds only f o r maxims. b) T h e happiness of others also includes their moral well-being (salubritas moralis). and we have a duty. in large part. we therefore make ourselves an e n d f o r others. to p r o m o t e this. and in the case o f virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations. and the only way this m a x i m can be binding is t h r o u g h its qualification as a universal law. like grief. but only a negative one. one's true needs. H e n c e this duty is only a wide one. [394] IX. and no specific limits can be assigned to what should be done. would conflict with itself if it were m a d e a universal law. considering the nature o f m e n . Strength o f any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome. on what each person's true needs are in view o f his sensibilities. not f o r specific actions. virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for then one natural inclination could strive to o v e r c o m e another). T h e happiness o f others is therefore an end that is also a duty. fear. could tempt him to d o something f o r which his conscience could afterward pain him. hence t h r o u g h o u r will to make others o u r ends as well. B u t I o u g h t to sacrifice a part of my welfare to others without h o p e o f return because this is a duty. Like anything formal. action springing f r o m such a disposition (respect for law) can be called virtuous (ethical) action. but it can be given a deduction f r o m p u r e practical reason. w h e t h e r it be self-constraint or constraint by another. B u t p u r e reason can prescribe n o ends a priori without setting them forth as also duties. T h e supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: A c t in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law f o r e v e r y o n e to have. whereas duties o f Right involve a constraint f o r which external lawgiving is also possible. involve constraint. cannot be proved. and such duties are then called duties of virtue. it is in itself his duty to make man in general his end. even t h o u g h the law lays d o w n a duty of Right. and it is not e n o u g h that he is not authorized to use either himself or others merely as means (since he could then still be indifferent to them). virtue as the will's conformity with every duty. B u t what it is virtuous to do is not necessarily a duty of virtue strictly speaking. in the relation of man to himself and others. B u t with respect to the end o f actions that is also a duty. that is. since then it would not determine maxims f o r actions either (because every maxim o f action contains an end) and so would not be practical reason. . B u t since ethical obligation to ends. In accordance with this principle m a n is an end for himself as well as f o r others. is only wide obligation — because it involves a law only for the maxims of actions. and an e n d is the matter (object) o f choice — there are many d i f f e r e n t duties. o f which there can be several. f o r p u r e practical reason is a capacity f o r ends generally. would t h e r e f o r e be a contradiction. and since obligation to the maxim of such an end is called a duty o f virtue. which are called duties of virtue (officia honestatis) just because they are subject only to f r e e selfconstraint. and for it to be i n d i f f e r e n t to ends. there are many duties o f virtue. whereas a duty o f virtue has to d o with their matter. for it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to hold the Right of m e n sacred. is merely one and the same. therefore. Since the moral capacity to constrain oneself can be called virtue. based on a firm disposition. What. not constraint by other m e n . as a categorical imperative. T h i s basic principle o f the doctrine o f virtue. W h a t it is virtuous to d o may concern only what is formal in maxims.198 The Metaphysics of Morals [395] All duties involve a concept of constraint t h r o u g h a law. can be an end is an end f o r p u r e practical reason. with an end that is thought as also a duty. c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the d i f f e r e n t ends prescribed by the law. that is. there can be several virtues. what one ought to make one's end (what is material). that is. to take no interest in them. Ethical duties involve a constraint f o r which only internal lawgiving is possible. and because they determine an end that is also a duty. Both. these are all the elements that make u p the concept o f a duty of Right. by h u m a n standards. the e n d that each has may be whatever he wills. inner f r e e d o m comes into play. these are inclinations).* Nevertheless. it is true that the [397] * M a n with all his faults Is better t h a n a host o f angels w i t h o u t will. despite the benefits it confers on men. which is limited only by the f o r m a l provision o f its compatibility with the f r e e d o m o f all. Yet in comparison with human ends. to eclipse holiness itself. and the will d e t e r m i n i n g the maxim. this is an illusion arising f r o m the fact that. T h e highest. W h e n . having n o way to measure the d e g r e e o f a strength except by the magnitude o f the obstacles it could o v e r c o m e (in us. I need not go b e y o n d the concept o f f r e e d o m to see this. But in the imperative that prescribes a duty of virtue there is a d d e d not only the concept o f selfconstraint but that o f an end. which is never tempted to break the law. an end that it makes a duty. the concept of duty is e x t e n d e d beyond outer f r e e d o m . all o f which have their obstacles to be c o n t e n d e d with. Haller 8 8 . 8 7 But the principle o f the doctrine o f virtue goes b e y o n d the concept o f outer f r e e d o m and connects with it. instead o f constraint f r o m without. the capacity f o r self-constraint not by means o f other inclinations but by p u r e practical reason (which scorns such intermediaries).The Doctrine of Right g 199 xThe Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Right Was Analytic. V i r t u e so shines as an ideal that it seems. if external constraint checks the h i n d e r i n g o f outer f r e e d o m in accordance with universal laws (and is thus a hindering o f the hindrances to freedom). That of the Doctrine of Virtue Is Synthetic [39 6 ] It is clear in accordance with the principle o f contradiction that. also its own reward. f r o m which Right abstracts altogether. T h i s principle is t h e r e f o r e synthetic. we are led to mistake the subjective conditions by which we assess the magnitude f o r the objective conditions o f the m a g n i t u d e itself. one that p u r e practical reason t h e r e f o r e has within itself. the capacity (to fulfill the law). unconditional e n d o f p u r e practical reason (which is still a duty) consists in this: that virtue be its own end and. T h i s extension b e y o n d the concept o f a duty of Right takes place t h r o u g h ends being laid down. it can coexist with ends in general. T h e supreme principle of Right is t h e r e f o r e an analytic proposition. In the moral imperative and the presupposition of f r e e d o m that is necessary f o r it are f o u n d the law. not an end that we have but one that we o u g h t to have. Its possibility is contained in the deduction (IX). in accordance with universal laws. I n a c c o r d a n c e with the principles set f o r t h above. My own end. conscience. [398] XI. which is also the incentive 2. It is also c o r r e c t to say that m a n is u n d e r obligation to [acquire] virtue (as m o r a l strength). T h e r e is n o obligation to h a v e these b e c a u s e they lie at the basis o f morality. the s c h e m a o f duties o f v i r t u e c a n b e d i a g r a m m e d in the f o l l o w i n g way: What is Material in Duties of Virtue 1. . Concepts of What Is Presupposed on the Part of Feeling [Aesthetische Vorbegriffe] by the Mind's Receptivity to Concepts of Duty as Such T h e r e are certain m o r a l e n d o w m e n t s such that a n y o n e l a c k i n g t h e m c o u l d h a v e n o d u t y to a c q u i r e t h e m .200 The Metaphysics of Morals w o r t h o f virtue itself. the promotion of which is also my duty (The happiness of others) 4T h e end. a n d t h e way to acquire it is to e n h a n c e the m o r a l incentive (the t h o u g h t o f the law). F o r while the capacity (facultas) to o v e r c o m e all o p p o s i n g sensible impulses can a n d m u s t b e simply presupposed in m a n o n a c c o u n t o f his f r e e d o m . which is also the incentive — On which the morality On which the legality of every free determination of the will is based What is Formal in Duties of Virtue [399] XII. as its o w n e n d . T h e y are moral feeling. which is also my duty (My own perfection) 3T h e law. a n d respect89 f o r o n e s e l f (self-esteem). b o t h by c o n t e m p l a t i n g the dignity o f the p u r e rational law in us (contemplatione) a n d by practicing v i r t u e (exercitio). love o f one's n e i g h b o r . yet this capacity as strength (robur) is somet h i n g h e m u s t acquire. The end of others. f a r e x c e e d s t h e w o r t h o f any u s e f u l n e s s a n d any empirical e n d s a n d a d v a n t a g e s that v i r t u e m a y still b r i n g in its w a k e . the latter. and it is by virtue o f them that he can be put u n d e r obligation. T h e state o f feeling [ästhetische Zustand] here (the way in which inner sense is affected) is either sensibly dependent or moral. it can. Moral Feeling T h i s is the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely f r o m being aware that o u r actions are consistent with or contrary to the law o f duty. Consciousness of them is not of empirical origin. there can be no duty to have moral feeling or to acquire it. f o r by the w o r d "sense" is usually understood a theoretical capacity f o r perception directed toward an object. for were he completely lacking in susceptibility to it he would be morally dead. rather. every m a n has them. which yields no knowledge. not as objective conditions o f morality. All of them are natural predispositions of the m i n d (praedispositio) f o r being affected by concepts o f duty. that which can only follow u p o n it. N o man is entirely without moral feeling. antecedent predispositions on the side o f feeling [ästhetisch]. It is inappropriate to call this feeling a moral sense. T h e f o r m e r is that feeling which precedes the representation o f the law. although people o f t e n speak [400] . B u t we n o m o r e have a special sense f o r what is (morally) g o o d and evil than f o r truth. then humanity would dissolve (by chemical laws.The Doctrine of Right g 201 as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept o f duty. taking an interest in the action or its effect. and if (to speak in medical terms) the moral vital force could n o longer excite this feeling. a. Since any consciousness o f obligation d e p e n d s u p o n moral feeling to m a k e us aware o f the constraint present in the t h o u g h t o f duty. T o have these predispositions cannot be considered a duty. whereas moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective. Obligation with r e g a r d to moral feeling can be only to cultivate it and to strengthen it t h r o u g h w o n d e r at its inscrutable source. instead every m a n (as a moral being) has it in him originally. instead. T h i s comes about by its being shown how it is set apart f r o m any sensibly d e p e n d e n t stimulus and is induced most intensely in its purity by a merely rational representation. as it were) into m e r e animality and be mixed irretrievably with the mass o f other natural beings. as the e f f e c t this has on the mind. only follow f r o m consciousness o f a moral law. Every determination of choice proceeds from the representation o f a possible action to the d e e d t h r o u g h the feeling o f pleasure or displeasure. but rather an unavoidable fact. as follows f r o m what has been said. and we have n o duty to provide ourselves with one. I would have made no practical j u d g ment at all. f o r if I could be mistaken in that. has a conscience within him originally. But if someone is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience. a susceptibility o n the part o f f r e e choice to be m o v e d by p u r e practical reason (and its law). since he would neither impute anything to himself as c o n f o r m i n g with duty nor r e p r o a c h himself with a n y t h i n g as contrary to duty. or has come. Conscience So too. I shall here pass over the various divisions of conscience and note only that. Unconscientiousness is not lack of conscience but rather the propensity to pay no heed to its j u d g m e n t . an erring conscience is an absurdity. what is m e a n t is that he pays no heed to its verdict. We have. and so it is not something incumbent u p o n one. every m a n . he could not even conceive o f the duty to have one. T h e r e f o r e . to act in accordance with conscience cannot itself be a duty. T h e duty h e r e is only to cultivate one's conscience. For if he really had no conscience. to a deed. to s h a r p e n one's attentiveness to the voice o f the inner j u d g e and to use every means to obtain a hearing f o r it (hence the duty is only indirect). T h u s it is not directed to an object but merely to the subject (to a f f e c t moral feeling by its act). For conscience is practical reason h o l d i n g man's duty b e f o r e him f o r his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes u n d e r a law. and in that case there would be neither truth nor error. I cannot be mistaken in my subjective j u d g m e n t as to w h e t h e r I have submitted it to my practical reason (here in its role as j u d g e ) f o r such a j u d g m e n t . conscience is not something that can be acquired. there would have to be yet a second conscience in o r d e r f o r o n e to become aware o f the act o f the first. then as far as guilt or innocence is concerned nothing more can be required o f him. conscience speaks involuntarily and unavoidably. rather. For while I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective j u d g m e n t as to w h e t h e r something is a duty or not. a n d this is what we call moral feeling. rather. but w h e n it comes. as a moral being.202 The Metaphysics of Morals in this fashion. So w h e n it is said that a certain man has n o conscience. for if it were. T o be u n d e r obligation to have a conscience would be tantamount to having a duty to recognize duties. It is incumbent u p o n him only to enlighten his understanding in the matter o f what is or is not duty. [401] . a duty. something merely subjective. on closer acquaintance. not a j u d g m e n t about an object that it w o u l d be a duty [402] . rather. Beneficence is a duty. So the saying " y o u o u g h t to love y o u r neighbor as y o u r s e l f " does not mean that you o u g h t immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means o f this love d o g o o d to him. But to have a duty to this (which is a pleasure j o i n e d immediately to the representation of an object's existence). d. and I cannot love because I will to. It means. is not particularly lovable. a feeling o f a special kind. again. so a duty to love is an absurdity. as conduct. w h e t h e r one loves them or not. T o do good to other men insofar as we can is a duty. is a contradiction. people even speak o f love that is also a duty f o r us w h e n it is not a question o f another's happiness but o f the complete and f r e e surrend e r of all one's ends to the ends of another (even a supernatural) being. even if this is to be self-constraint in accordance with a law. is not d o n e f r o m love. not o f willing. and y o u r beneficence will p r o d u c e love of m a n in y o u (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general). even w h e n it takes the f o r m merely o f completely avoiding m e n (separatist misanthropy). unselfish benevolence toward m e n is o f t e n (though very inappropriately) also called love. it is. B u t to hate vice in men is neither a duty nor contrary to duty. without active hostility toward them. however. that is.The Doctrine of c. he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. B u t hatred of man is always hateful. Respect Respect (reverentia) is. to have to be constrained to take pleasure in something. For benevolence always remains a duty. Love of Man Right g 203 Love is a matter o f feeling. a feeling neither a f f e c t e d by the will nor a f f e c t i n g it. W h a t is done f r o m constraint. a m e r e feeling o f aversion to vice. But benevolence (amor benevolentiae). B u t every duty is necessitation. w h o m one cannot indeed love but to w h o m one can still d o good. still less because I ought to (I cannot be constrained to love). can be subject to a law o f duty. H e n c e only the love that is delight [in another's perfection] (amor complacentiae) is direct. If someone practices it o f t e n and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention. and even if o n e had to r e m a r k sadly that o u r species. a constraint. do good to y o u r fellow man. rather. that would not detract f r o m the force o f this duty. However. even toward a misanthropist. as philosophic. what he has p r o v e d in the first case is a duty of benevolence. For such a duty. T h e distinction between virtue and vice can n e v e r be sought in the degree to which one follows certain maxims. and if someone produces two or m o r e p r o o f s f o r a duty. consoling oneself that the multitude o f reasons makes u p f o r the inadequacy o f any one o f them taken by itself. and this feeling (which is o f a special kind) is the basis of certain duties. it must rather be sought only in the specific quality o f the maxims (their relation to the . and so a duty other than the one f o r which p r o o f was required. as in mathematics. that is. Accordingly it is not correct to say that a m a n has a duty of self-esteem. r e g a r d e d as a duty. XIII. can be d r a w n only by means of rational k n o w l e d g e from concepts and not. o f certain actions that are consistent with his duty to himself. not of truthfulness. Mathematical concepts allow a n u m b e r o f proofs f o r one and the same proposition because in a priori intuition there can be several ways o f d e t e r m i n i n g the properties o f an object. Second. For any moral p r o o f . f o r he must have respect f o r the law within himself in o r d e r even to think of any duty whatsoever. only in this way can they be demonstrative. could be presented to us only t h r o u g h the respect we have f o r it. f o r this indicates trickery and insincerity. by the construction o f concepts. this is a sure sign either that he has not yet f o u n d a valid p r o o f or that he has mistaken two or m o r e d i f f e r e n t duties for one. Yet the former method is the usual device of rhetoric.204 The Metaphysics of Morals [403] to b r i n g about o r promote. f o r example. W h e n d i f f e r e n t insufficient reasons are juxtaposed. Proofs must proceed by g r o u n d and con[404] sequent in a single series to a sufficient g r o u n d . one does not compensate f o r the deficiency o f the others f o r certainty or even f o r probability. someone wants to draw a p r o o f f o r the duty of truthfulness first f r o m the harm a lie does to other m e n and then also f r o m the worthlessness of a liar and his violation of respect f o r himself. B u t it is a highly unphilosophic expedient to resort to a n u m b e r of p r o o f s f o r one and the same proposition. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in Handling a Pure Doctrine of Virtue First. all o f which lead back to the same g r o u n d . A duty to have respect would thus a m o u n t to being put u n d e r obligation to [have] duties. For any one duty only one g r o u n d o f obligation can be f o u n d . it must rather be said that the law within him unavoidably forces f r o m him respect for his own being. It cannot be said that a man has a duty o f respect toward himself. If. [3] "there is a certain measure in our affairs and finally fixed limits. while denying oneself any enjoyment from them. For who will specify for me this mean between the two extremes? What distinguishes avarice (as a vice) from thrift (as a virtue) is not that avarice carries thrift too far but that avarice has an entirely different principle (maxim). Avaritia est defectus. beyond which or short of which there is no place for right" (Horace.g.* L e t g o o d m a n a g e m e n t . [4] "happy are those who keep to the mean". 15) [quotation supplemented in view of Ak. prodigality a n d avarice: A s a virtue. " "Prodigality is excess in consuming one's means. a l t h o u g h it m a k e s the c o n f o r m i t y o r n o n c o n f o r m i t y o f c o n d u c t with d u t y d e p e n d entirely o n it. that of putting the end of economizing not in enjoyment of one's means but merely in possession of them. n o vice w h a t e v e r can b e d e f i n e d [erklärt] in terms o f going further in c a r r y i n g o u t certain aims than t h e r e is any p u r p o s e in d o i n g (e. [5] "it is a foolish wisdom. Instead. this c a n n o t serve as a d e f i n i t i o n [Erklärung]. Satires I. it c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d as arising either f r o m a g r a d u a l d i m i n u t i o n o f prodigality (by saving) o r f r o m an increase o f s p e n d i n g o n the miser's part — as if these two vices.h Since this d o e s not specify the degree.k n o w n principle (Aristotle's) that locates v i r t u e in the mean b e t w e e n two vices is false. [2] omne nimium vertitur in vitium. that seeks to be virtuous beyond the proper measure" (Horace. the w e l l . etc. o n the c o n t r a r y . I n o t h e r w o r d s . [4] medium tenuere beati. Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus)a o r o f not g o i n g as f a r as is n e e d e d in c a r r y i n g t h e m o u t (e. 137). . m o v i n g in o p p o s i t e directions. man's m o r a l capacity m u s t be estimated by the law. 105-6) [quotation supplemented in view of Kant's note to Ak. consist in the mean b e t w e e n t w o vices. w h i c h necessarily contradicts the m a x i m o f the o t h e r . equivalent to wickedness. e a c h o f t h e m has its distinctive m a x i m . 6. [5] insani sapiens nomen habeat. [2] "too much of anything becomes vice". Ethical duties m u s t not be d e t e r m i n e d in a c c o r d a n c e with the capacity to f u l f i l l the law that is ascribed to m a n . Metamorphoses II. not in *The formulas commonly used in the language of classical ethics: [1] medio tutissimus ibis. etc.The Doctrine of Right g 205 law). . F o r t h e s a m e reason.." etc. w h i c h c o m m a n d s categorically. 433]. 1. [1] "you will travel most safely in the middle of the road" (Ovid. m e t in g o o d m a n a g e m e n t .). e t c .g. In the same way. [3] est modus in rebus. Third. a n d so in a c c o r d a n c e with o u r rational k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t m e n o u g h t to b e in k e e p i n g with the I d e a o f h u m a n i t y . contain a superficial wisdom that really has no determinate principles.. 409 and 433n]. without regard for preserving them.." 4 "Avarice is deficiency. the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in an excessive enjoyment of one's means but in the bad maxim which makes the use of one's means the sole end. f o r instance. Epistles I. 220 [405] The Metaphysics of Morals a c c o r d a n c e with the e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e w e have o f men as they are. it c o m m a n d s a n d a c c o m p a n i e s its c o m m a n d with a m o r a l constraint (a constraint possible in a c c o r d a n c e with laws o f i n n e r f r e e d o m ) ." "a k i n g . or will p r e s u m a b l y b e c o m e in the f u t u r e . On Virtue in General V i r t u e signifies a m o r a l s t r e n g t h o f the will. B u t this d o e s n o t e x h a u s t the c o n c e p t . in a d e g r e e w e can assess only by the m a g n i t u d e o f the obstacles that m a n h i m s e l f f u r nishes t h r o u g h his inclinations. as courage (fortitudo moralis). V i r t u e is the o b s e r v a n c e o f the m i d d l e way b e t w e e n o p p o s i n g vices. the m o r a l s t r e n g t h o f a man's will in f u l f i l l i n g his duty. f o r s u c h strength c o u l d also b e l o n g to a holy ( s u p e r h u m a n ) being. " a n d so f o r t h . A n d while virtue (in relation to "The first edition has Meinungen. s t r e n g t h is r e q u i r e d . called wisdom in the strict sense. " "rich. a m o r a l constraint t h r o u g h his o w n l a w g i v i n g r e a s o n . the b r o o d o f dispositions o p p o s i n g the law. d r a w n f r o m w h a t m e n n o w are. rather. w h i c h issues f r o m m e r e l y e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . T h e s e t h r e e m a x i m s f o r scientific t r e a t m e n t o f a d o c t r i n e of virtue are o p p o s e d to the f o l l o w i n g ancient dicta: 1) 2) 3) T h e r e is only o n e virtue a n d o n e vice. h a v e b e c o m e ." which seems to be a simple mistake for Lastern. are the m o n s t e r s h e has to fight. a n d anthropology. a n d can s u f f e r n o loss by c h a n c e o r fate. can d o n o d a m a g e to anthroponomy. "views. is not a d u t y (for t h e n o n e w o u l d h a v e to b e p u t u n d e r obligation to [have] duties)." V i r t u e (like p r u d e n c e ) m u s t b e l e a r n e d f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . t h e r e f o r e . or possession o f it. also constitutes the greatest a n d the only t r u e h o n o r that m a n can w i n in w a r a n d is. A n y h i g h praise f o r the ideal o f h u m a n i t y in its m o r a l p e r f e c t i o n can lose n o t h i n g in practical reality f r o m e x a m p l e s to the c o n t r a r y . w h i c h is laid d o w n by a reason g i v i n g laws unconditionally. A c c o r d i n g l y this m o r a l strength. V i r t u e is. "vices. since h e is in possession o f h i m s e l f a n d the v i r t u o u s m a n c a n n o t lose his virtue." [406] . 9 0 V i r t u e itself. m o r e o v e r . i n s o f a r as this constitutes itself an authority executing the law. " " h e a l t h y . B u t b e c a u s e this constraint is to b e irresistible. T h e vices. O n l y in its possession is a m a n " f r e e . n a m e l y practical w i s d o m . in w h o m n o h i n d e r i n g impulses w o u l d i m p e d e t h e law o f its will a n d w h o w o u l d thus gladly d o e v e r y t h i n g in c o n f o r m i t y with the law. since it m a k e s the final end o f man's existence o n e a r t h its o w n e n d . But not every such facility is a free aptitude (habitus libertatis). virtue is therefore represented not as if man possesses virtue but rather as if virtue possesses man. yet in itself. is still a subjective presentation of it in which the feelings that accompany the constraining power of the moral law (e. is based on this: that the concept of freedom. etc.g. not to the law) can be said here and there to be meritorious and to deserve to be rewarded. which is common to both. On the Principle that Distinguishes the Doctrine of Virtue from the Doctrine of Right This distinction. on which the main division of the doctrine of morals as a whole also rests. and therefore not a moral . for if it is a habit (assuetudo). in order to get the better of merely sensible incitements. only the latter o f which are ethical. Considered in its complete perfection. Hence inner f r e e d o m must first be treated in a preliminary remark (discursus praeliminaris). which make moral aversion sensible) make its efficacy felt. (just as conscience was treated earlier. T h e expression that personifies both is an aesthetic device that still points to a moral sense. as the condition of all duties of virtue. f o r in the f o r m e r case it would look as if man still had a choice (for which he would need yet another virtue in order to choose virtue in preference to any other goods o f f e r e d him). and so too with regard to the contrary vices. it is not one that proceeds from freedom.The Doctrine of Right g 207 men. as the condition of all duties as such). So an aesthetic of morals.. a uniformity in action that has become a necessity through frequent repetition. that is. XIV. while not indeed part o f the metaphysics of morals. makes it necessary to divide duties into duties of outer freedom and duties of inner freedom. since it is its own end it must also be regarded as its own reward.. horror. [407] Remark On the Doctrine of Virtue in Accordance with the Principle of Inner Freedom A n aptitude (habitus) is a facility in acting and a subjective perfection of choice. T o think of several virtues (as one unavoidably does) is nothing other than to think of the various moral objects to which the will is led by the one principle o f virtue. disgust. It even has one g o o d thing about it: that this tempest quickly subsides. s u b d u i n g one's affects. T h e calm with which one gives oneself u p to it permits reflection and allows the mind to f o r m principles u p o n it and so. man's feelings and inclinations play the master over him. in a d o p t i n g a rule.222 The Metaphysics of Morals aptitude. Virtue Requires. to brood u p o n it. A passion is a sensible desire that has b e c o m e a lasting inclination (e." a n d then this aptitude is not a property o f choice but o f the will. 92 that is. and ruling oneself (imperium in semetipsum). XV. H e n c e an a f f e c t is called precipitate or rash (animus praeceps). Yet this weakness in the use o f one's understanding coupled with the strength of one's emotions is only a lack of virtue and. B u t two things are required f o r inner f r e e d o m : being one's o w n master in a given case (animus sui compos). that is. for unless reason holds the reins of g o v e r n m e n t in its own hands. as o p p o s e d to anger). and so to take u p what is evil (as something premeditated) into its maxim. H e n c e virtue cannot be defined as an aptitude f o r f r e e actions in conformity with law unless there is a d d e d "to determine oneself to act t h r o u g h the t h o u g h t o f the law. if inclination lights u p o n something contrary to the law. A f f e c t s b e l o n g to feeling insofar as. it makes this impossible or m o r e difficult. hatred. Governing Oneself Affects and passions91 are essentially d i f f e r e n t f r o m each other. which can indeed coexist with the best will. it contains a positive comm a n d to a man.. as it were. In these two states one's character (indoles) is noble (erecta).. anger) does not enter into kinship with vice so readily as does a passion. Only such an aptitude can be counted as virtue. in the First Place. [408] . governing one's passions. to get it rooted deeply. also gives it as a universal law.g. something childish and weak. a true vice. in the opposite case it is m e a n (indoles abiecta. serva). which goes beyond f o r b i d d i n g him to let himself be g o v e r n e d by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy). preceding reflection. A n d the evil is then properly evil.g. t h r o u g h the concept o f virtue. Since virtue is based on inner f r e e d o m . that one should get hold of oneself. and reason says. that is. which is a capacity f o r desire that. Accordingly a propensity to an a f f e c t (e. namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations u n d e r his (reason's) control and so to rule over himself. This misunderstanding can be prevented by giving the name "moral apathy" to that absence of affects which is to be distinguished from indifference. is a momentary. whereas an affect. it is an ideal and unattainable. is unavoidably sinking.The Doctrine of XVI. which is affected by inclinations because of which virtue can never settle down in peace and quiet with its maxims adopted once and for all but. A n affect always belongs to sensibility. if it is not rising. T h a t it always starts f r o m the beginning has a subjective basis in human nature. A n affect of this kind is called enthusiasm. supposing that both agree with me. it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish. Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details [Mikrologie ] which. while yet constant approximation to it is a duty. or rather degenerate into it. no matter by what kind of object it is aroused. would turn the government of virtue into tyranny. considered objectively. But that man can be called fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties. . as with man-traps. T h a t is the state of health in the moral life. because in cases of moral apathy feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling only because respect for the law is more powerful than all such feelings together. too virtuous. it is taken for weakness. were it admitted into the doctrine of virtue. sparkling phenomenon that leaves one exhausted. unlike technical ones. It is always in progress because. drink beer or wine. Only the apparent strength of someone feverish lets a lively sympathy even for what is good rise into an affect. and the moderation that is usually recommended even for the practice of virtue is to be interpreted as referring to it (insani sapiens nomen habeat aequus iniqui — ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. even one aroused by the thought of what is good. as if it meant lack of feeling and so subjective indifference with respect to objects of choice. T h e true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice.)\ for otherwise it is absurd to suppose that one could be too wise. Horat. Right g 209 Virtue Necessarily Presupposes Apathy (Regarded as Strength) T h e word "apathy" has fallen into disrepute. For moral maxims. [409] Remark Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning. f o r there are i n d e e d m a n y objects that it is also o u r d u t y to h a v e as ends. duty. a l t h o u g h they cannot. Third. It d o e s this by l a y i n g it d o w n 1) that duties o f v i r t u e are duties f o r w h i c h t h e r e is n o e x t e r n a l lawgiving. since t h e r e c a n b e n o direct d u t y to love.224 The Metaphysics of Morals c a n n o t be based o n habit (since this b e l o n g s to the n a t u r a l constitution o f the will's d e t e r m i n a t i o n ) . if the practice o f v i r t u e w e r e to b e c o m e a habit the subject w o u l d s u f f e r loss to that freedom in a d o p t i n g his m a x i m s w h i c h distinguishes an action d o n e f r o m duty. b u t t h e n these w o r d s are u s e d i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y . virtutis)'. so that m a n is u n d e r obligation to r e g a r d himself." it s h o u l d b e n o t e d that not e v e r y obligation of virtue (obligatio ethica) is a duty o f virtue (officium ethicum s. H e n c e t h e r e is only one obligation o f virtue. the subjective determ i n i n g g r o u n d to fulfill one's d u t y . not as n a r r o w . first." . T h e s e are usually called duties o f self-love a n d o f love f o r one's n e i g h b o r . as his e n d . with r e g a r d to the distinction b e t w e e n the m a t t e r a n d the f o r m in the principle o f d u t y (between c o n f o r m i t y with e n d s a n d c o n f o r m i t y with law). Concepts Preliminary to the Division of the Doctrine of Virtue T h i s principle o f division must. b u t only f o r the m a x i m s o f actions. contain all the conditions that serve to distinguish a part o f the d o c t r i n e o f m o r a l s in g e n e r a l f r o m the d o c t r i n e o f R i g h t a n d to d o so in t e r m s o f its specific f o r m . but instead to d o that [zu Handlungen] by w h i c h m a n m a k e s h i m s e l f a n d others his e n d . be called duties o f virtue. [410] XVII. in o t h e r w o r d s . o n the contrary. a n d o n l y such an e n d is a d u t y o f virtue. respect f o r law as such d o e s not yet establish an e n d as a d u t y . w h i c h e x t e n d s to duties o f R i g h t as well. T h e principle o f division must. p r e s e n t the d o c t r i n e o f virtue not m e r e l y as a d o c t r i n e o f duties g e n e r ally b u t also as a doctrine of ends. in terms o f w h a t is formal. H e n c e all the divisions o f ethics will h a v e to d o only with duties " T h e text reads (der Gesetzmässigkeit von der Zweckmässigkeit). 3) that (as follows in t u r n f r o m this) ethical d u t y must b e t h o u g h t as wide. b u t t h e r e is only o n e v i r t u o u s disposition. 2) that since a law m u s t yet lie at t h e basis o f e v e r y d u t y . not f o r actions. in terms o f w h a t is material. second. w h e r e a s t h e r e are many d u t i e s o f virtue. it would seem how- ever that "conformity with ends" is "the matter" and "conformity with law" the "form. b e c a u s e o f this. as well as e v e r y o t h e r m a n . this law in ethics can b e a law o f d u t y g i v e n . which deals not so m u c h with j u d g m e n t as with reason and its exercise in both the theory and the practice o f its duties. inevitably leads to questions that call u p o n j u d g m e n t to decide how a m a x i m is to be applied in particular cases. neither a science nor a part o f a science. it will be asked. accordingly. and indeed in such a way that j u d g m e n t provides another (subordinate) m a x i m (and one can always ask f o r yet another principle for applying this m a x i m to cases that may arise). and is a d d e d to ethics only by way o f scholia to the system. w h e n no such division was n e e d e d in the doctrine of Right? T h e reason is that the doctrine o f Right has to d o only with narrow duties. Ascetics is that part of the doctrine o f m e t h o d in which is taught not only the concept of virtue but also how to put [411] [412] . w h y d o I introduce a division o f ethics into a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Method. which by its nature must determine duties strictly (precisely). the method is called the catechistic m e t h o d p r o p e r . Catechizing. the m e t h o d is called that o f dialogue (Socratic method). which has no place in the doctrine o f Right. instead. Hence the doctrine o f Right. Remark But. not [presented] systematically (as dogmatics would have to be). f o r in that case it would be dogmatics. The first exercise o f it consists in questioning the pupil about what he already knows o f concepts o f duty. Casuistry is. whereas ethics has to d o with wide duties. and casuistry is not so m u c h a doctrine about how to find something as rather a practice in how to seek truth. but if it is assumed that the k n o w l e d g e is already present naturally in the pupil's reason and needs only to be d e v e l o p e d [entwickelt] f r o m it. belongs to ethics in particular. has ascetics f o r its practical counterpart. So it is woven into ethics in a fragmentary way. O n the other hand. has n o m o r e need o f general directions (a method) as to how to proceed in j u d g i n g than does p u r e mathematics. and may be called the erotetic method. B u t ethics. because o f the latitude it allows in its i m p e r f e c t duties. the Doctrine of Method o f morally practical reason. If he knows this because he has previously been told it. it certifies its method by what it does. ethics is the science o f how one is u n d e r obligation without regard f o r any possible external lawgiving. so that now it is d r a w n merely f r o m his m e m o r y . V i e w e d in terms of its formal principle. So ethics falls into a casuistry.The Doctrine of Right g 211 o f virtue. as exercise in theory. T h e s e concepts are. [413] First Division of Ethics In Accordance with the Distinction of Subjects and Their Laws. It contains: . in t h e second part. a n d with their receptivity to these ends. a n d so a r e r e q u i r e d f o r the m e t h o d i c a r r a n g e m e n t o f all the propositions f o u n d o n the basis o f the first division. these will be m a d e in a c c o r d a n c e with the d i f f e r e n t subjects to w h o m m a n is u n d e r obligation. In the first part. the o t h e r sets f o r t h in a system in terms of its form t h e objective relation o f ethical laws to duties generally. O n e sets f o r t h in terms of its matter the subjective relation b e t w e e n a b e i n g that is u n d e r obligation a n d the b e i n g that puts h i m u n d e r obligation. taken either singly o r t o g e t h e r . In a c c o r d a n c e with these principles w e shall set f o r t h t h e system in two parts: the doctrine o f the elements of ethics a n d t h e doctrine o f t h e methods of ethics. a c c o r d i n g l y . XVIII. r e q u i r e d f o r ethics only i n s o f a r as it is to b e a science. T h e division that practical reason lays o u t to establish a system o f its c o n c e p t s in an ethics (the architectonic division) c a n b e m a d e in accord a n c e with principles o f two kinds. in a c c o r d a n c e with the d i f f e r e n t ends that reason puts m e n u n d e r obligation to h a v e .212 The Metaphysics of Morals into practice a n d cultivate the capacity for as well as t h e will to virtue. the second w o u l d b e the division o f t h e concepts o f p u r e ethically practical reason that h a v e to d o with the duties o f those beings. E a c h p a r t will h a v e its divisions. The first division is that o f the beings in relation to w h o m ethical obligation c a n b e t h o u g h t . 213 B e c a u s e t h e latter division has to d o with t h e f o r m o f the science. as the g r o u n d .p l a n o f t h e w h o l e . . it m u s t p r e c e d e the first.The Doctrine of Virtue Second Division of Ethics In Accordance with Principles of a System of Pure Practical Reason. a d u t y to o n e s e l f is a self-contradictory c o n c e p t . I say "I owe it to myself. since the law by virtue o f w h i c h I r e g a r d myself as b e i n g u n d e r obligation p r o c e e d s in every case f r o m m y o w n practical reason. a n d so n o e x t e r n a l duties either. B u t if the d u t y is a d u t y to myself. F o r I can r e c o g n i z e that I a m u n d e r obligation to others only insofar as I at the s a m e time p u t myself u n d e r obligation. also an active obligation). Man Has Duties to Himself F o r s u p p o s e t h e r e w e r e n o such duties: T h e n t h e r e w o u l d b e n o duties w h a t s o e v e r . Nevertheless. The Concept of a Duty to Oneself Contains (at First Glance) a Contradiction I f the I that imposes obligation is t a k e n in the s a m e sense as the I that is put under obligation. a n d in b e i n g c o n s t r a i n e d by my o w n r e a s o n . F o r the c o n c e p t o f d u t y contains the c o n c e p t o f b e i n g passively c o n s t r a i n e d (I a m bound).[417] D O C T R I N E OF T H E E L E M E N T S OF ON DUTIES PART I TO ONESELF AS ETHICS SUCH Introduction §1. A n d the p r o p o s i t i o n that asserts a d u t y to m y s e l f (I ought to b i n d m y s e l f ) w o u l d involve b e i n g b o u n d to b i n d m y s e l f (a passive obligation that was still. §2.* *So when it is a question. a n d h e n c e a contradiction. for example "I owe it to myself to increase my fitness for social intercourse and so forth (to cultivate myself). I t h i n k o f m y s e l f as binding a n d so as actively c o n s t r a i n i n g (I. for example. so that (if b o t h a r e o n e a n d the s a m e subject) h e w o u l d n o t b e b o u n d at all to a duty h e lays u p o n himself. of vindicating my honor or of preserving myself. the same subject. O n e c a n also b r i n g this c o n t r a d i c t i o n to light by p o i n t i n g o u t that the o n e i m p o s i n g obligation (auctor obligationis) c o u l d always release the o n e p u t u n d e r obligation (subiectum obligationis) f r o m the obligation (terminus obligationis). I a m also the o n e c o n s t r a i n i n g myself." Even in what concerns duties of less importance those having to do only with what is meritorious rather than necessary in my compliance with duty .I speak in the same way. T h i s involves a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ." 214 [418] . a m imposi n g obligation). in the same sense o f the relation. u n d e r obligation to himself (to the humanity in his own person). distinct f r o m the body and capable of thinking independently of it. T h e senses cannot attain this latter aspect o f man. be the division into what is formal and what is material in duties to oneself. accordingly. it can be recognized only in morally practical relations. indeed. §4. as m a n (a m e m b e r o f one o f the animal species). to actions in the sensible world. m a n as a natural being that has reason (homo phaenomenon) can be determined by his reason. distinguish soul and body f r o m each other. and t h o u g h we may. Solution to This Apparent Antinomy W h e n m a n is conscious of a duty to himself. as a cause. so as to justify a division o f duties to the body and duties to the soul. T h e first o f these are limiting (negative) duties. is always man only. the second. not with regard to the subject that puts itself u n d e r obligation. But the same m a n t h o u g h t in terms o f his personality. u n d e r two attributes: first as a sensible being. we may not think o f them as d i f f e r e n t substances putting him u n d e r obligation. So m a n (taken in these two d i f f e r e n t senses) can acknowledge a duty to himself without falling into contradiction (because the concept of m a n is not t h o u g h t in one and the same sense). or whether life may not well be. that is. as well as the subject that binds. as a being e n d o w e d with inner freedom (homo noumenon). w h e r e the incomprehensible property o f freedom is revealed by the influence o f reason on the inner lawgiving will. is r e g a r d e d as a being that can be put u n d e r obligation and. as natural attributes o f man. he views himself. widen- [419] . it is still inconceivable that man should have a duty to a body (as a subject imposing obligation). Neither experience nor inferences o f reason give us adequate g r o u n d s f o r deciding whether m a n has a soul (in the sense o f a substance dwelling in him. that is. A n d even if the first alternative be true. even to a h u m a n body. as the subject of duty. and so far the concept o f obligation does not come into consideration. a spiritual substance). instead. that is.The Doctrine of Right g 215 §3. 1) T h e only objective division of duties to oneself will. a property o f matter. since reason in its theoretical capacity could well be an attribute of a living corporeal being). T h e subject that is b o u n d . On the Principle on Which the Division of Duties to Oneself Is Based T h e division can be made only with r e g a r d to objects o f duty. in a theoretical respect. Now. and second as an intelligible being (not merely as a being that has reason. positive duties. B o t h o f t h e m b e l o n g to virtue. that is. T h r o u g h t h e m n a t u r e aims at a) his self-preservation. t h o u g h still o n the animal level only. . avarice. perfice te ut medium)!1 2) T h e r e will b e a subjective division o f man's duties to himself. B u t man's d u t y to himself as a m o r a l b e i n g only (without t a k i n g his animality into consideration) consists in what is formal in the consistency o f the m a x i m s o f his will with the dignity o f h u m a n i t y in his p e r s o n . opulentia moralis). that is. a n d so m a k i n g h i m s e l f a p l a y t h i n g o f the m e r e inclinations a n d h e n c e a thing. that is. T h e first principle o f duty to o n e s e l f lies in the d i c t u m "live in c o n f o r mity with n a t u r e " {naturae convenienter vive). in the s a y i n g "make yourself more perfect t h a n m e r e nature has m a d e y o u " (perfice te ut finem.216 The Metaphysics of Morals ing (positive duties to o n e s e l f ) . 4 T h e vices that a r e h e r e o p p o s e d to man's d u t y to himself are murdering himself. to i n n e r f r e e d o m . a n d such excessive consumption of food and drink as w e a k e n s his capacity f o r m a k i n g p u r p o s i v e use o f his p o w e r s . " . the second. t h e r e f o r e . i n s o f a r as this can be a c q u i r e d . that is. T h e first b e l o n g to the m o r a l health {ad esse) o f m a n as object o f b o t h his o u t e r senses a n d his i n n e r sense. N e g a t i v e duties forbid m a n to act contrary to the end o f his nature a n d so have to d o m e r e l y with his m o r a l self preservation. T h e r e are impulses o f n a t u r e h a v i n g to d o with m a n ' s animality. . to t h e preservation o f his n a t u r e in its p e r f e c t i o n (as receptivity). that o f acting in a c c o r d a n c e with principles. T h e s e a d o p t principles that are directly c o n t r a r y to m a n ' s c h a r a c t e r as a m o r a l b e i n g (in terms o f its very f o r m ) ." On Kant's use of Stoic language see note g 1. a n d c) the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f his capacity to e n j o y life. a n d false humility (servility). they b e l o n g to his cultivation (active p e r f e c t i n g ) o f himself. T h e s e c o n d b e l o n g to his m o r a l prosperity {ad melius esse. b The second edition emends the preceding passage to read: "c) the preservation of the subject's capacity to use his powers purposefully and to enjoy . T h e vices contrary to this d u t y are lying. i n n e r f r e e d o m . w h i c h consists in possessing a capacity sufficient f o r all his ends. the u n n a t u r a l use o f his sexual inclination. b) the preservation o f the species. w h i c h command h i m to m a k e a certain object o f choice his e n d . but b o t h b e l o n g to it as duties o f virtue. the [420] ""Perfect yourself as an end. preserve y o u r s e l f in the p e r f e c t i o n o f y o u r nature. either as duties o f omission (sustine et abstine) o r as duties o f commission (viribus concessis utere). o n e in terms o f w h e t h e r the subject o f duty (man) views h i m s e l f both as an animal (natural) a n d a m o r a l b e i n g or only as a moral b e i n g . in a prohibition against d e p r i v i n g himself o f the prerogative o f a m o r a l b e i n g . perfect yourself as a means. c o n c e r n his perfecting o f himself. It consists. u n d e r this name. iustum sui aestimium). a cast o f mind far r e m o v e d f r o m ambition (ambitio) (which can be quite mean). that is. T h e virtue that is o p p o s e d to all these vices could be called love of honor (honestas interna. B u t it will a p p e a r prominently later on.The Doctrine of Virtue 217 innate dignity o f man. . to throw oneself away and m a k e oneself an object o f contempt. which is tantamount to saying that they m a k e it one's basic principle to have no basic principle and hence n o character. [422] Article I. m a n is still b o u n d to p r e s e r v e his life simply by virtue 218 . o r g a n i c parts. suicide ( suicidium ). w h i c h can b e t h o u g h t as either total. if I set aside all those relations.[421] PERFECT BOOK DUTIES I TO ONESELF CHAPTER I Man's Duty to Himself as an Animal Being §5T h e first. Willfully killing o n e s e l f can b e called murdering oneself (homocidium dolosum) only if it can b e p r o v e d that it is in g e n e r a l a c r i m e c o m m i t t e d either against one's o w n p e r s o n o r also. as man's a b a n d o n i n g the post assigned h i m in the w o r l d w i t h o u t h a v i n g b e e n called away f r o m it). or formal. O n Killing Oneself §6. or m e r e l y partial. mutilating oneself. T h e c o n t r a r y o f this is willful physical death o r killing o n e s e l f (autochiria). It can also b e r e g a r d e d as a violation o f one's d u t y to o t h e r h u m a n beings (the d u t y o f spouses to e a c h other. a) Killing o n e s e l f is a c r i m e ( m u r d e r ) . depriving o n e s e l f o f certain integral. o f a subject to his r u l e r or to his f e l l o w citizens. Mutilating o n e s e l f can in t u r n be either material. a n d finally e v e n as a violation o f d u t y to G o d . d u t y o f m a n to h i m s e l f as a n anim a l b e i n g is to preserve himself in his animal n a t u r e . depriving o n e s e l f ( p e r m a n e n t l y o r temporarily) o f one's capacity f o r the natural (and so indirectly f o r the moral) use o f one's p o w e r s . Since this c h a p t e r deals only with negative duties a n d so with duties o f omission. t h o u g h not the principal. against a n o t h e r (as w h e n a p r e g n a n t w o m a n takes h e r life). t h r o u g h one's killing oneself. t h e articles a b o u t duties m u s t b e d i r e c t e d against t h e vices o p p o s e d to duties to oneself. o f p a r e n t s to their c h i l d r e n . the question is w h e t h e r . m a i m i n g o n e s e l f . B u t since w h a t is in q u e s t i o n h e r e is only a violation o f d u t y to oneself. that is. M a n cannot r e n o u n c e his personality as long as he is a subject o f duty. Consequently. sacrificing oneself f o r the g o o d of all mankind. H e n c e the Stoic thought it a prerogative o f his (the sage's) personality to depart f r o m life at his discretion (as f r o m a smoke-filled room) with peace of soul.The Doctrine of Right g 219 o f his quality as a person and w h e t h e r he must a c k n o w l e d g e in this a duty (and indeed a strict duty) to himself. and so not to deprive himself of life. that is. to which man (homo phaenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted for preservation. as far as one can. or to have something cut o f f that is a part but not an o r g a n of the body. But to have a dead or diseased o r g a n amputated w h e n it e n d a n g e r s one's life. It seems absurd to say that a m a n could w r o n g h i m s e l f 9 3 (volenti non fit iniuria). or to have oneself castrated in o r d e r to get an easier livelihood as a singer. free f r o m the pressure of present or anticipated ills. disposing o f oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in one's person (homo noumenon). cannot be counted as a crime against one's own person — although cutting one's hair in o r d e r to sell it is not altogether free f r o m blame. to give away or sell a tooth to be transplanted into another's mouth. this strength o f soul not to f e a r death and to know of something that m a n can value even m o r e highly than his life. B u t there should have been in this very courage. because he could be of no m o r e use in life. and so forth — are ways of partially m u r d e r i n g oneself. a still stronger motive f o r him not to destroy himself. even t h o u g h morality is an end in itself. hence as l o n g as he lives. one's hair. [423] Casuistical Questions Is it m u r d e r i n g oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) in o r d e r to save one's country? O r is deliberate m a r t y r d o m . and it is a contradiction that he should be authorized to withdraw f r o m all obligation. freely to act as if no authorization were n e e d e d f o r this action. a being with such p o w e r f u l authority over the strongest sensible incentives. also to be considered an act o f heroism? Is it permitted to anticipate by killing oneself the unjust death sentence o f one's ruler — even if the ruler permits this (as did N e r o with Seneca)? . T o deprive oneself of an integral part or o r g a n (to maim o n e s e l f ) — for example. T o annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the existence o f morality itself f r o m the world. f o r example. by which is understood that connection of a cause with an e f f e c t in which. A m a n w h o had been bitten by a m a d d o g already felt h y d r o p h o b i a c o m i n g on. insofar as he himself brings on the disease that e n d a n g e r s his life. than is the sailor. each o f these is a natural end. Did he d o w r o n g ? A n y o n e w h o decides to be vaccinated against smallpox puts his life in danger. even t h o u g h he does it in order to preserve his life. violation of which is a defiling (not merely a debasing) of the humanity in his own person. that. permitted? Article II. On Defiling Oneself by Lust §7Just as love o f life is destined by nature to preserve the person. it is still t h o u g h t by analogy with an intelligent cause. Lust is called unnatural if a m a n is aroused to it not by a real object but by his imagining it. and so as if it p r o d u c e d m e n on purpose. without having in view the preservation o f the species.220 The Metaphysics of Morals [424] C a n a great king w h o died recently 9 4 be charged with a criminal intention f o r carrying a fast-acting poison with him. and would not thereby be acting contrary to a duty to himself. since as f a r as he knew the disease was incurable. H e explained. W h a t is now in question is w h e t h e r a person's use of his sexual capacity is subject to a limiting law of duty with regard to the person himself or w h e t h e r he is authorized to direct the use o f his sexual attributes to m e r e animal pleasure. which is to be represented [425] here as a duty o f m a n to himself. in a letter he left. so sexual love is destined by it to preserve the species. In the doctrine o f Right it was shown that m a n cannot make use of another person to get this pleasure apart f r o m a special limitation by a contract establishing the right. he is in a far m o r e d o u b t f u l situation. w h o at least does not arouse the storm to which he entrusts himself. Is smallpox inoculation. and. the virtue with r e g a r d to this sensuous impulse is called chastity. although no u n d e r s t a n d i n g is ascribed to the cause. B u t the question here is w h e t h e r man is subject to a duty to himself with r e g a r d to this enjoyment. as far as the law o f duty is concerned. by which two persons put each other u n d e r obligation. he was taking his life lest he harm others as well in his madness (the onset o f which he already felt). presumably so that if he were captured w h e n he led his troops into battle he could not be coerced to a g r e e to conditions o f ransom h a r m f u l to his state? For one can ascribe this purpose to him without having to p r e s u m e that mere pride lay behind it. so that he . T h e impetus to this pleasure is called carnal lust (or also simply lust). in other words. then. T h e vice e n g e n d e r e d t h r o u g h it is called lewdness. 62. m u r d e r i n g o n e self r e q u i r e s c o u r a g e . [426] . G. a n d i n d e e d to a n e n d e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t than that o f love o f life itself. still f u r t h e r . that is. with the t h o u g h t o f it. See A. this occasions a n d r e q u i r e s m u c h delicacy to t h r o w a veil o v e r it. i n d e e d . a n d e v e n m e r e l y u n p u r p o s i v e . a t h i n g that is c o n t r a r y to n a t u r e . Ak. m a k e s m a n n o t only an object o f e n j o y m e n t but. H e n c e o n e m a y not. Initiaphilosophiae practicaeprimae. so that w h e n e v e n the permitted bodily u n i o n o f the sexes in m a r r i a g e (a u n i o n w h i c h is in itself m e r e l y an a n i m a l u n i o n ) is to b e m e n t i o n e d in polite society. X I X . B a u m g a r t e n . that by it m a n s u r r e n d e r s his personality ( t h r o w i n g it away).The Doctrine of Right g 221 h i m s e l f creates o n e c o n t r a p u r p o s i v e l y . T h e ground of proof is. then. as f a r as its u n n a t u r a l use is c o n c e r n e d . a n d stirs u p an aversion to this t h o u g h t to such a n e x t e n t that it is c o n s i d e r e d i n d e c e n t e v e n to call this vice by its p r o p e r n a m e . It consists. at least. T h a t s u c h a n u n n a t u r a l use (and so misuse) o f one's sexual attribute is a violation o f d u t y to oneself. since h e uses himself m e r e l y as a m e a n s to satisfy an a n i m a l i m p u l s e . f o r in this way i m a g i n a t i o n b r i n g s f o r t h a d e s i r e c o n t r a r y to nature's e n d . act c o n t r a r y " Species facti is the totality of those features of a deed that belong essentially to its imputability. a loathsome object. that is.a I n t h e case o f u n n a t u r a l vice it is as if m a n in g e n e r a l felt a s h a m e d o f b e i n g capable o f t r e a t i n g his o w n p e r s o n in such a way. T h i s d o e s not o c c u r with r e g a r d to m u r d e r i n g o n e s e l f . w h i c h o n e d o e s not hesitate in t h e least to lay b e f o r e t h e world's eyes in all its h o r r o r (in a species facti). since it aims at the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the w h o l e species a n d not only o f the individual. a n d in this disposition t h e r e is still always r o o m f o r respect f o r the h u m a n i t y in one's o w n p e r s o n . Casuistical Questions N a t u r e ' s e n d in the cohabitation o f the sexes is p r o c r e a t i o n . use o f one's sexual attribute is inadmissible as b e i n g a violation o f d u t y to o n e s e l f (and i n d e e d . B u t u n n a t u r a l lust. w h i c h seems in terms o f its f o r m (the disposition it involves) to e x c e e d e v e n m u r d e r i n g oneself. in this: T h a t a m a n w h o d e f i a n t l y casts o f f life as a b u r d e n is at least not m a k i n g a f e e b l e surr e n d e r to a n i m a l i m p u l s e in t h r o w i n g h i m s e l f away. w h i c h debases h i m b e n e a t h the beasts. a violation in the h i g h e s t d e g r e e ) . B u t this d o e s not e x p l a i n the h i g h d e g r e e o f violation o f the h u m a n i t y in one's o w n p e r s o n by such a vice in its u n n a t u r a l n e s s . w h i c h is c o m p l e t e a b a n d o n m e n t o f o n e s e l f to a n i m a l inclination. B u t it is not so easy to p r o d u c e a rational p r o o f that u n n a t u r a l . occurs to e v e r y o n e i m m e d i a t e l y . a n d i n d e e d o n e c o n t r a r y to morality in its highest d e g r e e . the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the species. a n d so d e p r i v e s h i m o f all respect f o r himself. which in the collision of its d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d s makes permitted something that is in itself not permitted (indulgently. f o r then the principle by which it is to be counteracted w o u l d be one o f well-being and c o m f o r t (and so o f happiness). B u t is it permitted to e n g a g e in this practice (even within marriage) without taking this end into consideration? If. indeed. It is a unique kind o f pleasure {sui generis). as in objects that are pleasing in m e r e reflection on them (the receptivity f o r which is called taste). It is rather pleasure f r o m the enjoyment o f another person. a permissive law o f morally practical reason. and such a principle can establish only a rule of prudence. or if she feels no desire f o r intercourse. [427] Article III. A m a n w h o is d r u n k is like a m e r e animal. never a duty — at least not a direct duty. not to be treated as a h u m a n being. B u t it cannot be classed with either the love that is m e r e delight or the love o f benevolence (for both o f these. the wife is p r e g n a n t or sterile (because o f age or sickness). and the animal inclinations be allowed a latitude.222 The Metaphysics of Morals to that end. passion. and so also contrary to one's duty to oneself. deter one f r o m carnal enjoyment). f o r example. at the risk o f forsaking the law o f reason? Sexual inclination is also called "love" (in the narrowest sense o f the word) and is. On Stupefying Oneself by Excessive Use of Food or Drink §8. to its highest stage. as far as the wideness o f the obligation is concerned). Brutish excess in the use of f o o d and drink is misuse o f the means of nourishment which restricts or exhausts o u r capacity to use them intelligently. and this a r d o r has nothing in c o m m o n with moral love properly speaking. in fact. in o r d e r to prevent a still greater violation? A t what point can the limitation o f a wide obligation be ascribed to purism (a pedantry r e g a r d i n g the fulfillment o f duty. f o r one or the other o f them. It is not merely sensitive pleasure [sinnliche Lust]. is it not contrary to nature's end. to make use o f their sexual attributes — just as in unnatural lust? O r is there. Drunkenness and gluttony are the vices that c o m e u n d e r this heading. as it were). W h e n s t u f f e d with f o o d he is in a condition . in this case. instead. which therefore belongs to the capacity for desire and. t h o u g h it can enter into close union with it u n d e r the limiting conditions o f practical reason. the strongest possible sensible pleasure [ Sinnenlust] in an object. H e r e the reason f o r considering this kind o f excess a vice is not the h a r m or bodily pain (diseases) that m a n brings on himself by it. . from memory. if not e u l o g i z e . so it a p p r o a c h e s e v e n m o r e closely the e n j o y m e n t o f cattle. as C h e s t e r f i e l d says. only as medicines" follows the sentence "But who can determine . the sentence "The use of opium . b e l o w e v e n the n a t u r e o f an animal. u n l i k e d r u n k e n n e s s . they create a n e e d to use the narcotics a g a i n a n d e v e n to increase the a m o u n t . for measuring?" .The Doctrine of Right g 223 in w h i c h h e is incapacitated. Odes III. B u t w h o can d e t e r m i n e the measure f o r s o m e o n e w h o is quite r e a d y to pass into a c o n d i t i o n in w h i c h h e n o l o n g e r has clear eyes f o r measuring? M o h a m m e d a n i s m . since it only lulls t h e senses into a passive c o n d i t i o n a n d . T h e y are seductive because.11. such as o p i u m a n d o t h e r v e g e t a b l e p r o d u c t s . G l u t t o n y is e v e n l o w e r t h a n that animal e n j o y m e n t o f the senses. b u t it can also result f r o m o t h e r narcotics. T h e first o f these d e b a s e m e n t s . f o r a time. while t h e b a n q u e t ""His virtue was enkindled by unmixed wine. . p e o p l e d r e a m f o r a while that they a r e h a p p y a n d f r e e f r o m care. it e x c e e d s the n u m b e r o f the muses) allows f o r only a little c o n v e r s a t i o n (with those sitting n e x t to one). reticent. a use o f wine b o r d e r i n g o n intoxication. t h e r e is still s o m e t h i n g in it that aims at a m o r a l e n d . It is o b v i o u s that p u t t i n g o n e s e l f in such a state violates a d u t y to oneself. a n d e v e n i m a g i n e that they are strong. b u t d e j e c t i o n a n d w e a k n e s s follow a n d . f o r actions that w o u l d r e q u i r e h i m to use his p o w e r s with skill a n d deliberation. T h e y a r e t h e r e f o r e p e r m i t t e d only as medicines. 6 A l t h o u g h a b a n q u e t is a f o r m a l invitation to excess in b o t h f o o d a n d d r i n k . In the second edition. Casuistical Questions C a n o n e at least j u s t i f y . d o e s not e v e n a r o u s e i m a g i n a t i o n to a n active play o f representations. since they m a k e the user silent. w o r s t o f all. thus m a d e a v e r y b a d c h o i c e in permitting o p i u m to take its place. a n d so t h e a r r a n g e m e n t is at variance with that e n d . . since it enlivens the c o m p a n y ' s c o n v e r s a t i o n a n d in so d o i n g m a k e s t h e m s p e a k m o r e freely? O r can it e v e n b e g r a n t e d t h e m e r i t o f p r o m o t i n g w h a t H o r a c e praises in C a t o : Virtus eius incaluit mero?" T h e use o f o p i u m a n d spirits f o r e n j o y m e n t is closer to b e i n g a base act t h a n the use o f wine. a n d w i t h d r a w n by the d r e a m y e u p h o r i a they i n d u c e . ." Kant is quoting. w h i c h f o r b i d s w i n e altogether. is usually b r o u g h t a b o u t by f e r m e n t e d drinks. b [428] Horace. b e y o n d m e r e physical well-being: it b r i n g s a n u m b e r o f p e o p l e t o g e t h e r f o r a l o n g time to c o n v e r s e with o n e a n o t h e r . 21. A n d yet the v e r y n u m b e r o f guests (if. u n d e r their i n f l u e n c e . 224 Metaphysics of Morals remains a temptation to something immoral. namely intemperance. which could p e r h a p s be c u r e d by a doctor. which is a violation o f one's duty to oneself — not to mention the physical h a r m o f overindulgence. How far does one's moral authorization to accept these invitations to intemperance extend? . F o r the d i s h o n o r (being an object o f m o r a l c o n t e m p t ) that a c c o m p a n i e s a lie also a c c o m p a n i e s a liar like his s h a d o w . as it w e r e . aliud pectore inclusum gerere)." I n the d o c t r i n e o f R i g h t an intentional u n t r u t h is called a lie only if it violates a n o t h e r ' s right. humility I. The War with Catiline X . since the h a r m that c a n c o m e to o t h e r m e n f r o m l y i n g is n o t w h a t distinguishes this vice (for if it w e r e . A m a n w h o d o e s not h i m s e l f believe w h a t h e tells a n o t h e r (even if the o t h e r is a m e r e l y ideal ""To have one thing shut up in the heart and another ready on the tongue. 5. avarice. it is clear o f itself that n o intentional u n t r u t h in t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f one's t h o u g h t s can r e f u s e this h a r s h n a m e ." Sallust. but in ethics. B y a lie a m a n t h r o w s away a n d . f o r t h e n a lie. A n d so. w o u l d conflict with the p r a g m a t i c m a x i m . not the m o r a l m a x i m . w h e r e n o a u t h o r i z a t i o n is d e r i v e d f r o m harmlessness. O n Lying §9T h e greatest violation o f man's d u t y to h i m s e l f r e g a r d e d m e r e l y as a m o r a l b e i n g (the h u m a n i t y in his o w n person) is the c o n t r a r y o f truthfulness. as a m e r e e r r o r in p r u d e n c e . N e i t h e r is the h a r m that a liar b r i n g s o n himself. this h a r m is not t a k e n into a c c o u n t h e r e . annihilates his dignity as a m a n . a n d it c o u l d not b e c o n s i d e r e d a violation o f d u t y at all. B y a n e x t e r n a l lie a m a n m a k e s h i m s e l f an object o f c o n t e m p t in t h e eyes o f others.CHAPTER II Man's Duty to Himself Merely as a Moral Being T h i s d u t y is o p p o s e d to the vices o f lying. lying (aliud lingua promptum. a n d false (servility). A lie can b e an e x t e r n a l lie (mendacium externum) o r also a n internal lie. by a n internal lie h e d o e s w h a t is still w o r s e : H e m a k e s h i m s e l f c o n t e m p t i b l e in his o w n eyes a n d violates t h e dignity o f h u m a n i t y in his o w n p e r s o n . [429] 225 . the vice w o u l d consist o n l y in violating one's d u t y to others). which man perpetrates u p o n himself. as if his natural being were not b o u n d to the inner end (of communicating thoughts). has the property o f being serviceable so that another can put it to some use. as w h e n a lover's wish to find only g o o d qualities in his beloved blinds him to her obvious faults. but it seems m o r e difficult to explain how they are possible. f o r a lie requires a second person w h o m one intends to deceive. Truthfulness in one's declarations is also called honesty and. then if someone. but. he still flatters himself that he inwardly reveres His law. B u t his way o f pursuing this e n d is. t h o u g h the only incentive he feels is f e a r of punishment. [430] L y i n g (in the ethical sense o f the word). a crime of a man against his own person and a worthlessness that must make him contemptible in his own eyes. Man as a moral being (homo noumenon) cannot use himself as a natural being (homophaenomenon) as a mere means (a speaking machine). more generally. need not be harmful to others in o r d e r to be repudiated. f o r a thing. B u t communication o f one's thoughts to someone t h r o u g h words that yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness o f the speaker's capacity to communicate his thoughts. It is easy to show that man is actually guilty of many inner lies. f r o m self-love. intentional untruth as such. sincerity. . o f purity in one's professions b e f o r e one's inner j u d g e . because it is something real and given. but is b o u n d to the condition of using himself as a natural being in a g r e e m e n t with the declaration (declaratio) of his moral being and is u n d e r obligation to himself to truthfulness. takes a wish for the d e e d because he has a really g o o d e n d in mind. not a m a n himself. by its mere f o r m . having no doubt about the existence o f this f u t u r e j u d g e . that is. and is thus a renunciation by the speaker o f his personality. f o r it would then be a violation o f the rights of others. gets the name of a frailty.226 The Metaphysics of Morals person) has even less worth than if he were a m e r e thing. Insincerity is m e r e lack of conscientiousness. in o r d e r to win His favor in case H e should exist. although he really finds no such belief within himself but persuades himself that it could do no h a r m and might even be useful to profess in his thoughts to one w h o scrutinizes hearts a belief in such a j u d g e . although it is indeed contrary to man's duty to himself. It may be d o n e merely out o f frivolity or even g o o d nature. S o m e o n e also lies if. whereas to deceive oneself on purpose seems to contain a contradiction. the speaker may even intend to achieve a really g o o d end by it. if he professes belief in a f u t u r e j u d g e o f the world. truthfulness is called rectitude. f o r example. w h o is thought o f as another person w h e n conscientiousness is taken quite strictly. if the declarations are promises. Someone tells an inner lie. his inner lie. B u t such insincerity in his declarations. and such a speaker is a m e r e deceptive appearance o f a man. the results o f which his own conscience imputes to him. [431] Remark It is noteworthy that the Bible dates the first crime. which seems to be rooted in h u m a n nature itself) that the evil o f untruthfulness spreads into man's relations with other m e n as well. "How d o y o u like my work?" O n e could merely seem to give an answer. although this propensity must have been present b e f o r e the lie. must I answer f o r all the consequences it might have? For example. On Avarice §10. by j o k i n g about the impropriety o f such a question. f o r an act o f f r e e d o m cannot (like a natural effect) be d e d u c e d and explained in accordance with the natural law o f the connection o f effects with their causes. which would otherwise have been prevented by the guard sent to arrest him. T h e servant does this and. as a result. the "your obedient servant" at the e n d of a letter) be considered a lie? No one is deceived by it.. say what is expected o f one? I f I say something untrue in m o r e serious matters. and calls the author o f all evil a liar f r o m the beginning and the father o f lies. having to d o with what is mine o r yours. However. then. once the highest principle o f truthfulness has been violated. [432] By avarice in this context I d o not m e a n greedy avarice (acquiring the means to g o o d living in excess o f one's true needs). May one. not f r o m fratricide (Cain's) but f r o m the first lie (for even nature rises u p against fratricide). W h o (in accordance with ethical principles) is guilty in this case? Surely the servant.g. too. all o f which are appearances.The Doctrine of Right g 227 still deserves the strongest censure. a householder has o r d e r e d his servant to say "not at h o m e " if a certain man asks f o r him. since it is f r o m such a rotten spot (falsity. Casuistical Questions C a n an untruth f r o m mere politeness (e. the master slips away and commits a serious crime. w h o violated a duty to himself by his lie. f o r this can also be . But w h o has his wit always ready? T h e author will take the slightest hesitation in answering as an insult. reason can assign n o f u r t h e r g r o u n d f o r man's propensity to hypocrisy (esprit fourbe). t h r o u g h which evil entered the world. II. A n author asks one o f his readers. n o r . w o u l d be that t h e real d u t y o f virtue w o u l d consist in m a k i n g n o use at all o f the m e a n s to g o o d living. o r r a t h e r a vanishing. d o I m e a n miserly avarice. vice. restricting one's own e n j o y m e n t o f the m e a n s to g o o d living so n a r r o w l y as to leave one's o w n t r u e needs unsatisfied. but with the r e s e r v a t i o n o f b e i n g unwilling to use t h e m f o r oneself. and I am concerned with this kind of avarice. I f a vice is to b e distinguished f r o m a virtue. not e n j o y m e n t ) . which is called stinginess or niggardliness when it is shameful." . one ought not to do too much or too little of anything. T h e m a x i m o f miserly avarice. . rather. It is really this kind o f avarice." In fact. and so as contrary to one's duty to oneself. only two kinds of avarice. a n d at t h e s a m e time p r o v e the uselessness o f the Aristotelian principle that virtue consists in the m i d d l e way b e t w e e n t w o vices. 0 In the c e n s u r e o f this vice. the d i f f e r e n c e o n e m u s t r e c o g n i z e a n d e x p l a i n is not a d i f f e r e n c e in the degree o f p r a c t i c i n g m o r a l m a x i m s b u t r a t h e r in the objective principle o f t h e m a x i m s . that I am referring to here" the second edition has "I mean.228 The Metaphysics of Morals viewed as a m e r e violation o f one's d u t y (of b e n e f i c e n c e ) to others. w h i c h is c o n t r a r y to duty to oneself. again. What does it mean to say "I ought (to do or to refrain from some" In place of the passage "nor. o n e e x a m p l e can show clearly that it is incorrect to d e f i n e [ Erklärungen ] any virtue o r vice in t e r m s o f m e r e degree. T h e maxim o f greedy avarice (prodigality) is to get a n d maintain 4 all the m e a n s to g o o d living with the intention of [using t h e m f o r ] enjoyment. in such a way that one's e n d is o n l y possession.e. prodigality and miserliness. not as consisting in mere neglect of one's duties of love to others. but as a restricting of one's own use of the means for living well so narrowly as to leave one's true needs unsatisfied. but with no intention of [using t h e m for] enjoyment. [433] H e n c e the distinctive m a r k o f the latter vice is the p r i n c i p l e o f possessing m e a n s f o r all sorts o f ends. are in question. What does it mean "to do too much"? Answer: to do more than is good. o n the o t h e r h a n d . t h e n o n e vice w o u l d pass o v e r into the (contrarie) o p p o s i t e vice only t h r o u g h t h e virtue. miserly avarice. since it is a tautology. rather. again. in the p r e s e n t case. a n d so virtue w o u l d be simply a d i m i n i s h e d . do I mean . prodigality a n d miserli*The proposition. a n d this is directly c o n t r a r y to d u t y to o n e s e l f with r e g a r d to the e n d . is to a c q u i r e as well as maintain all the m e a n s to g o o d living. that I a m r e f e r r i n g to here. ' The second edition omits "and maintain. a n d so d e p r i v i n g o n e s e l f o f the c o m f o r t s necessary to e n j o y life. w h i c h is called stinginess o r n i g g a r d l i ness w h e n it is s h a m e f u l b u t w h i c h can still b e m e r e n e g l e c t o f one's duties o f love to others. (i. * A c c o r d i n g l y . . What does it mean "to do too little"? Answer: to do less than is good.. I m e a n . T h e result. I f I r e g a r d good management as the m e a n b e t w e e n prodigality a n d avarice a n d s u p p o s e this m e a n to b e o n e o f d e g r e e . says in effect nothing. [For a translation of these Latin quotations see the page of this translation corresponding to Ak. since the latter requirement surpasses man's powers and introduces a lack of sense (fantasy) into the principle of virtue. if taken literally. B u t miserliness is n o t j u s t mistaken t h r i f t b u t r a t h e r slavish subjection o f o n e s e l f to the g o o d s that c o n t r i b u t e to happiness. o r w h e t h e r b o t h are not m e r e i m p r u d e n c e a n d so quite b e y o n d the b o u n d s o f one's duty to oneself. and judgment can decide what is to be done only in accordance with rules of prudence (pragmatic rules). It is o p p o s e d to liberality o f m i n d (liberalitas moralis) g e n e r a l l y (not to g e n e r o s i t y . For really to be too virtuous . for both duties of virtue have a latitude in their application (latitudinem). This is an ideal which requires one to approximate to this end but not to attain it completely. who does not think fantastically of virtue in its perfection. 404n. A n d so. Casuistical Questions Selfishness (solipsismus) is the basis b o t h o f the g r e e d (insatiability in a c q u i r i n g wealth) that aims at s u m p t u o u s living a n d o f n i g g a r d l i n e s s ( p a i n f u l anxiety a b o u t waste). since one who declares his thoughts can say only what is true without telling the whole truth. by their o p p o s e d m a x i m s . since w e a r e h e r e s p e a k i n g o n l y o f d u t y to o n e s e l f . sapiens here means only a. quos citraque nequit consistere rectum — then we have made a bad choice in turning to its oracle. not in accordance with rules of morality (moral rules). sunt certi denique fines. medium tenuere beati. it m a y b e asked w h e t h e r either prodigality o r miserliness s h o u l d b e called a vice at all. w h i c h is a violation o f d u t y to o n e s e l f since o n e o u g h t to b e their master. they a r e r a t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e d specifically.] . In fact. judicious man (prudens). Now it is quite natural to ask the teacher of virtue to point out this mean to me. as to those who were nearer the fountainhead — virtus consistit in medio. commit a fault (peccatum) in putting these principles into practice. what is to be done cannot be decided after the manner of narrow duty (officium strictum). Hence. is u t t e r l y f a l s e . ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. In other words. by doing more or less than prudence prescribes. But this he cannot do. t h o u g h in the case o f prodigality this result is u n e x p e c t e d a n d in the case o f miserliness it is c h o s e n (wanting to live like a p a u p e r ) . a n d it m a y s e e m that b o t h o f t h e m — prodigality as well as miserliness — are to b e r e p u d i a t e d m e r e l y because they e n d in p o v e r t y . one who complies with the basic principles of virtue can.that is. But insofar as he adheres strictly to these basic principles he cannot practice a vice (vitium). but after the manner of wide duty (officium latum). liberal- [434] thing)"? Answer: that it is not good (that it is contrary to duty) to do more or less than is good. est modus in rebus.The Doctrine of Virtue 243 ness are not d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m each o t h e r by d e g r e e . If that is the wisdom in search of which we should go back to the ancients (Aristotle). but there is indeed a mean between candor and reticence (which are contrarie oppositis). insani sapiens nomen habeat aequus iniqui. to be too attached to one's duty .would be almost equivalent to making a circle too round or a straight line too straight. it is true. Between truthfulness and lying (which are contradictorie oppositis) there is no mean. and Horace's verse. d e p e n d i n g on whether he views himself as a sensible being (in terms o f his animal nature) or as an intelligible being (in terms of his moral predisposition). but as an e n d in himself. as o f f s p r i n g of the earth. but which he must also not forfeit. B u t what kind o f a law is it that the internal lawgiver itself does not know how to apply? O u g h t I to economize on f o o d or only in my expenditures on external things? In old age. but always with consciousness o f his sublime 135] . it is o p p o s e d to the principle o f i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m everything except the law. he should p u r s u e his end. even this gives him only an extrinsic value f o r his usefulness (pretium usus). H e n c e he can and should value himself by a low as well as by a high standard. f o r as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends. an ordinary value (pretium vulgare). his insignificance as a human animal may not infringe u p o n his consciousness o f his dignity as a rational man. he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself f r o m all other rational beings in the world. that is. o r already in youth? O r is thrift in general a virtue? III. Humanity in his person is the object of the respect which he can d e m a n d f r o m every other man. animal rationale) is a being of slight importance and shares with the rest of the animals. a price as o f a commodity in e x c h a n g e with these animals as things. that is. and is a way in which the subject d e f r a u d s himself. that is. not in a servile spirit (animo servili) as if he were seeking a favor. is exalted above any price. that is. man (homo phaenomenon. In the system o f nature. H e can measure himself with every other being o f this kind and value himself on a footing o f equality with them. and he should not disavow the moral self-esteem of such a being. which is in itself a duty. t h o u g h he still has a lower value than the universal m e d i u m of exchange. the value of which can t h e r e f o r e be called preeminent (pretium eminens). that is. not disavowing his dignity. A l t h o u g h man has. B u t m a n r e g a r d e d as a person. which is only an application o f this to a special case).230 The Metaphysics of Morals itas sumptuosa. not abjectly. as the subject o f a morally practical reason. something m o r e than they and can set himself ends. that is. Since he must regard himself not only as a person generally but also as a man. money. it gives one man a h i g h e r value than another. in his understanding. On Servility §11. that is to say. as a person w h o has duties his own reason lays u p o n him. b u t only f r o m f a i l u r e to c o m p a r e it w i t h the law. Schmeicheln. r a t h e r . a moaning breath interrupting one's speech (a sigh). t h e n . A conviction o f the greatness o f one's m o r a l w o r t h . W a i v i n g any claim to m o r a l w o r t h in o n e s e l f . b e l i e v i n g that in this way o n e will get an e v e n g r e a t e r i n n e r w o r t h . is m o r a l l y false servility {humilitas spuria). D o not accept f a v o r s y o u c o u l d d o without. B u t belittling one's o w n m o r a l w o r t h m e r e l y as a m e a n s to a c q u i r i n g the f a v o r o f a n o t h e r . Humility in comparing oneself with other men (and i n d e e d with any finite b e i n g . is called Schmiegeln [cringing] and finally. e v e n c r y i n g o u t in bodily pain. especially *Heucheln. T h i s d u t y with r e f e r e n c e to t h e dignity o f h u m a n i t y within us. T h e consciousness a n d f e e l i n g o f the insignificance o f one's m o r a l w o r t h in comparison with the law is humility (humilitas moralis). T r u e humility follows u n a v o i d a b l y f r o m o u r sincere a n d e x a c t c o m p a r i s o n o f ourselves with the m o r a l law (its holiness a n d strictness). w h i c h instills in h i m respect f o r h i m s e l f (reverentia). a n d d o not b e a parasite o r a flatterer o r (what really d i f f e r s f r o m these only in d e g r e e ) a b e g g a r . B u t f r o m o u r capacity f o r internal l a w g i v i n g a n d f r o m the (natural) m a n f e e l i n g h i m s e l f c o m p e l l e d to r e v e r e the (moral) m a n within his o w n p e r s o n . C o m p l a i n i n g a n d w h i n i n g . a n d so to ourselves. B e n o m a n ' s lackey. at the s a m e time t h e r e c o m e s exaltation a n d the h i g h e s t self-esteem. in the belief that o n e will t h e r e b y acquire a b o r r o w e d w o r t h . . B e t h r i f t y . in High German. [436] §12. C o n t r a c t n o d e b t f o r w h i c h y o u c a n n o t give f u l l security. Schmeichlen [to flatter] seems to stem f r o m Schmiegen [to bend] which. in the f o l l o w i n g examples. t r y i n g to e q u a l o r surpass o t h e r s in this respect. properly hauchten [to dissemble] seems to be derived f r o m Hauch. in terms o f w h i c h h e is a b o v e any price (pretium) a n d possesses a n inalienable dignity ( dignitas interna). c a n b e called moral arrogance (arrogantia moralis). is [a k i n d o f ] ambition (ambitio). the f e e l i n g o f his i n n e r w o r t h (valor). so that y o u will not b e c o m e destitute. A n d this self-esteem is a d u t y o f m a n to himself. e v e n a seraph) is n o d u t y . D o not let others t r e a d with i m p u n i t y o n y o u r rights. can b e r e c o g n i z e d . w h i c h is directly c o n t r a r y to one's duty to others. as a habit.The Doctrine of Right g 231 m o r a l predisposition (which is already c o n t a i n e d in the c o n c e p t o f virtue). is u n w o r t h y o f y o u . m o r e o r less. w h i c h is c o n t r a r y to one's d u t y to o n e s e l f since it d e g r a d e s one's personality. w h o e v e r it m a y b e (hypocrisy a n d flattery [Heuchelei a n d Schmeichelei]*) is false (lying) humility. a n d Sie. obeisances (compliments)." . so that it w o u l d b e c o n t r a r y to o u r d u t y (of respect) to ourselves? B o w i n g a n d s c r a p i n g b e f o r e a m a n seems in any case to be u n w o r t h y o f a m a n . )b B u t o n e w h o m a k e s h i m s e l f a w o r m c a n n o t c o m p l a i n a f t e r w a r d s if p e o p l e step o n him. 5. a p e d a n t r y in w h i c h the G e r m a n s s e e m to o u t d o any o t h e r p e o p l e in the w o r l d ( e x c e p t possibly t h e I n d i a n castes): D o e s not all this p r o v e that t h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d p r o p e n s i t y to servility in m e n ? ( Hae nugae in seria ducunt. o r Ew. Hochedelgeborenen. is c o n t r a r y to the dignity o f h u m a n i t y . that's enough!" Horace. a n d courtly p h r a s e s m a r k i n g with the u t m o s t precision e v e r y distinction in r a n k . Hochedeln. Wohledeln. thus a criminal's d e a t h m a y be e n n o b l e d (its d i s g r a c e averted) by the resoluteness with w h i c h h e dies. that it w o u l d b e advisable to cultivate humility e v e n in c o m p a r i n g o u r s e l v e s with o t h e r m e n . Ihr. Satires I. his elation of spirit (elatio animi) o r e s t e e m f o r himself. e v e n to show y o u r v e n e r a t i o n f o r h e a v e n l y objects. ' "These trifles lead to serious things. not b e f o r e a n ideal p r e s e n t e d to y o u by y o u r o w n r e a s o n . ""Stay. f o r y o u t h e n h u m b l e y o u r s e l f . Wohlgeborenen (ohe. as is i n v o k i n g t h e m in actual images. K n e e l i n g d o w n o r p r o s t r a t i n g o n e s e l f o n the g r o u n d . s o m e t h i n g a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m courtesy (which is necessary e v e n f o r those w h o respect e a c h o t h e r equally) — t h e Du. Er. iam satis est!)" as f o r m s o f a d d r e s s . so closely akin to self-conceit (arrogantia). b u t b e f o r e an idol o f y o u r o w n m a k i n g .232 The Metaphysics of Morals [437] if y o u are a w a r e o f h a v i n g d e s e r v e d it. Casuistical Questions Is not man's f e e l i n g f o r his sublime vocation. the v e r y o p p o s i t e o f true humility (humilitas moralis). 12. that is. a n d not only with the law? O r w o u l d n o t this k i n d o f self-abnegation instead s t r e n g t h e n others' verdict o n us to t h e p o i n t o f despising o u r p e r s o n . P r e f e r e n t i a l tributes o f respect in w o r d s a n d m a n n e r s e v e n to those w h o h a v e n o civil authority — r e v e r e n c e s . t h r e a t e n e d . b u t h e c a n n o t h e l p c o m i n g to h i m s e l f o r w a k i n g u p f r o m time to time.CHAPTER II [ COnt. t h e c o n n e c t i n g o f t h e r i g h t f u l result with the action ( c o n d e m n a t i o n o r acquittal). a l t h o u g h its [438] 233 . N o w this original intellectual a n d (since it is the t h o u g h t o f duty) m o r a l predisposition called conscience is peculiar in that. w h i c h p r o v i d e s a rule. B u t the internal imputation o f a deed. w h i c h . a n d . It follows h i m like his s h a d o w w h e n h e plans to escape. as a case f a l l i n g u n d e r a law (in meritum aut demeritum).] Section I On Man's Duty to Himself as His Own Innate Judge §13. E v e r y m a n has a conscience a n d finds h i m s e l f o b s e r v e d . in e x t r e m e d e p r a v i t y . b e l o n g s to the power of judgment (indicium). h e hears at o n c e its f e a r f u l voice. H e c a n i n d e e d stun h i m s e l f o r p u t himself to sleep by pleasures a n d distractions. b r i n g h i m s e l f to heed it n o l o n g e r . in g e n e r a l . A l l o f this takes place b e f o r e a tribunal (coram iudicio). is called a court (forum). j u d g e s with r i g h t f u l f o r c e w h e t h e r the action as a d e e d (an action c o m i n g u n d e r a law) has o c c u r r e d o r not. b u t s o m e t h i n g i n c o r p o r a t e d in his b e i n g . b u t h e still c a n n o t h e l p hearing it. U p o n it follows t h e conclusion o f reason (the verdict). w h i c h . k e p t in a w e (respect c o u p l e d with f e a r ) by an internal j u d g e . a n d this authority w a t c h i n g o v e r the law in h i m is n o t somet h i n g that h e h i m s e l f (voluntarily) makes. as a m o r a l p e r s o n g i v i n g e f f e c t to the law. C o n s c i o u s n e s s o f a n internal court in m a n ( " b e f o r e w h i c h his t h o u g h t s accuse o r e x c u s e o n e a n o t h e r " ) is conscience. E v e r y c o n c e p t o f d u t y involves objective constraint t h r o u g h a law (a m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e limiting o u r f r e e d o m ) a n d b e l o n g s to practical u n d e r s t a n d i n g . as the subjective principle o f i m p u t i n g a n action. a n d w h e n h e does. H e can at most. that is. T h i s o t h e r m a y b e a n actual p e r s o n o r a m e r e l y ideal p e r s o n that r e a s o n creates f o r itself.234 The Metaphysics of Morals [439] business is a business o f m a n with himself. t h r o u g h the I d e a to w h i c h his conscience u n a v o i d a b l y g u i d e s h i m . accordingly. h e m u s t be. The first is the prosecutor. h a v e to think of someone other t h a n h i m s e l f (i. the prosecutor and yet the accused as well. I n f a c t t h e latter c o n c e p t is always contained (even if only in an o b s c u r e way) in the m o r a l self-awareness o f conscience.and this specific difference is that of the faculties (higher and lower) of man that characterize him. since such a m o r a l b e i n g m u s t also h a v e all p o w e r (in h e a v e n a n d o n earth) in o r d e r to give e f f e c t to his laws (as is necessarily r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o f f i c e o f j u d g e ) . T h i s is not to say that m a n is entitled. to assume that such a S u p r e m e B e i n g actually exists outside h i m s e l f — still less that he is bound by his conscience to d o so. F o r the I d e a is not g i v e n to h i m objectively. on the one hand. if reason is not to fall into self-contradiction. since the c o u r t is set u p within m a n . When the proceedings are concluded the internal judge. F o r all d u t i e s a man's conscience will. . since t h e n t h e p r o s e c u t o r w o u l d always lose. I. conscience must be t h o u g h t o f as the subjective p r i n c i p l e o f b e i n g accountable to G o d f o r all one's d e e d s .e. itself administers the office of judge that it holds by innate authority. against whom the accused is granted a legal adviser (defence counsel). am the same man (numero idem). o t h e r t h a n m a n as such) as the j u d g e o f his actions. that is. F o r the a f f a i r h e r e is that o f t r y i n g a case (causa) b e f o r e a court. a doubled self which.* S u c h a n ideal p e r s o n (the a u t h o r i z e d j u d g e o f conscience) m u s t b e a scrutinizer o f hearts. This requires clarification. f o r conscience is the i n n e r j u d g e o f all f r e e actions. But man as the subject of the moral lawgiving which proceeds from the concept of freedom and in which he is subject to a law that he gives himself (homo noumenon) is to be regarded as another (specie diversus) from man as a sensible being endowed with reason. if conscience is not to b e in contradiction w i t h itself. o r b e t h o u g h t as. as a person having power.. N o w . on the other hand. has to stand trembling at the bar of a court that is yet entrusted to him. by * A man who accuses and judges himself in conscience must think of a dual personality in himself. we can only revere his unconditional tubeo or veto ["I command" or "I forbid"]. a p e r s o n in relation to w h o m all duties w h a t s o e v e r a r e to be r e g a r d e d as also his c o m m a n d s . a m a n c o n s t r a i n e d by his reason sees h i m s e l f c o n s t r a i n e d to carry it o n as at the b i d d i n g of another person. though only in a practical respect — for there is no theory about the causal relation of the intelligible to the sensible . as the moral results of the deed. B u t h e m u s t also impose all obligation. B u t to think o f a m a n w h o is accused by his conscience as one and the same person as the j u d g e is an a b s u r d way o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a c o u r t . a n d since such a n o m n i p o t e n t m o r a l b e i n g is called God. but which. pronounces the sentence of happiness or misery. Our reason cannot pursue further his power (as ruler of the world) in this function. T h e c o n c e p t o f religion is h e r e f o r m a n o n l y "a principle o f estimating all his duties as divine commands. b u t a l o n g with h i m c o m e s a defense counsel (advocate). by practical reason. p u t t i n g itself u n d e r obligation to act in k e e p i n g with this I d e a . H e n c e t h e blessedness f o u n d in the c o m f o r t i n g e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f one's conscience is not positive (joy) b u t m e r e l y negative (relief f r o m p r e c e d i n g anxiety)." H e n c e . as a s t r u g g l e against t h e i n f l u e n c e o f the evil principle in m a n . m e n a r e m e r e l y p o i n t e d in the direction o f t h i n k i n g o f conscientiousness (which is also called religio) as accountability to a holy B e i n g (morally l a w g i v i n g reason) distinct f r o m us yet p r e s e n t in o u r inmost being. m a n thinks o f c o n s c i e n c e as warning h i m (praemonens) b e f o r e h e m a k e s his decision. w h i c h c o n c l u d e s the case. 9 5 It s h o u l d b e n o t e d that w h e n conscience acquits a m a n it can n e v e r d e c i d e o n a reward (praemium). W h e n the d e e d has b e e n d o n e t h e prosecutor first c o m e s f o r w a r d in conscience. b e i n g m o s t s c r u p u l o u s ( scrupulositas) w h e r e t h e c o n c e p t o f d u t y ( s o m e t h i n g m o r a l in itself) is c o n c e r n e d c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d hair-splitting (a c o n c e r n with petty details). s o m e t h i n g g a i n e d that was not his b e f o r e . ascribing a wide c o n s c i e n c e to s o m e o n e a m o u n t s to calling h i m unconscientious. I n cases w h e r e c o n s c i e n c e is the sole j u d g e (casibus conscientiae). as the rule o f justice. b u t m u s t r a t h e r b e d e c i d e d with all the r i g o r o f Right. acquitting o r condemning h i m with r i g h t f u l f o r c e . a n d t h r o u g h u s i n g practical reason. a n d this a l o n e is w h a t can b e ascribed to virtue. a n d o f s u b m i t t i n g to t h e will o f this B e i n g ." 1) In a case i n v o l v i n g conscience (causa conscientiam tangens). b u t only subjectively. " "The praetor is not concerned about trifles. U p o n this follows T h e verdict o f conscience u p o n the m a n . b u t can b r i n g with it only rejoicing at h a v i n g e s c a p e d the d a n g e r o f b e i n g f o u n d punishable. but only in following out the analogy with a l a w g i v e r f o r all rational beings in t h e w o r l d . n o r can a real violation b e c o n s i d e r e d a pecadillo (peccatillium) a n d be l e f t to the advice o f a conscience that speaks at will (accordi n g to the principle minima non curat praetor).The Doctrine of Right g 235 theoretical r e a s o n ." [440] 2) 3) . a n d their dispute c a n n o t b e settled amicably (per amicabilem compositionem). Moral self-knowledge. . which makes man worthy of respect. first. (Only the descent into the hell o f self-knowledge can pave the way to godliness. (Prayer. too. that one can find a m a n w h o acts contrary to it contemptible (the m a n himself. requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to a g o o d will within him. It is only t h r o u g h the noble predisposition to the g o o d in us. dispel fanatical c o n t e m p t f o r oneself as m a n (for the whole h u m a n race). but not the humanity in him). For in the case o f man. which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) o f one's heart that are quite difficult to fathom. and sincerity in acknowledging to oneself one's inner moral worth or lack of worth are duties to oneself that follow directly f r o m this first c o m m a n d of self-knowledge. which can never be lost.) Impartiality in appraising oneself in comparison with the law. T h a t is. is the b e g i n n i n g o f all h u m a n wisdom. w h e t h e r the source o f y o u r actions is p u r e or impure. and what can be imputed to you as b e l o n g i n g originally to the substance of m a n or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to y o u r moral condition. which consists in the harmony of a being's will with its final end.) §15- [442] T h i s moral self-knowledge will. since this contradicts itself. is only a wish declared inwardly b e f o r e someone w h o knows hearts. always remain empty o f deeds . B u t such k n o w l e d g e will also counteract that egotistical selfesteem which takes mere wishes — wishes that.236 The Metaphysics of Morals [441] Section II On the First Command of All Duties to Oneself 814- T h i s c o m m a n d is "know (scrutinize. fathom) yourself " not in terms of y o u r natural perfection (your fitness or unfitness f o r all sorts o f optional or even c o m m a n d e d ends) but rather in terms o f y o u r moral perfection in relation to y o u r duty.f o r p r o o f o f a g o o d heart. h o w e v e r ardent. the ultimate wisdom. know y o u r heart — whether it is g o o d or evil. [443] . A s far as reason alone can j u d g e . or the part of nature endowed with sensation and choice (animals).g. the indescribable beauty of plants) even apart f r o m any intention to use it.. is still a disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality or at least prepares the way for it: the disposition. T h e second (superhuman) objects can be thought as spiritual beings (angels. and if he thinks he has such duties.The Doctrine of Right g 237 Episodic Section On an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts of Reflection. Taking What Is Man's Duty to Himself for a Duty to Other Beings §16. T h e first (nonhuman) objects can be mere inorganic matter (minerals). though not of itself moral. since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by that subject's will. Man can therefore have no duty to any beings other than men. God). f o r it weakens or uproots that feeling in man which. to love something (e. first. and what relation there is between them. namely. and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings. and this person must. beautiful crystal formations. H e n c e the constraining (binding) subject must . §17A propensity to wanton destruction o f what is beautiful in inanimate nature (spiritus destructionis) is opposed to man's duty to himself. be a person. since man is to strive f o r the end o f this person's will and this can h a p p e n only in a relation to each other o f two beings that exist (for a mere thought-entity cannot be the cause o f any result in terms of ends). T h i s supposed duty can be r e f e r r e d to objects other than persons or to objects that are indeed persons. it is because o f an amphiboly in his concepts of reflection. B u t f r o m all o u r experience we know o f no being other than man that would be capable o f obligation (active or passive). It must now be asked whether there is a relation o f duty between man and beings o f these two kinds. but quite imperceptible ones (who cannot be presented to the outer senses). man has dudes only to men (himself and other men). be given as an object o f experience. second. or matter organized f o r reproduction though still without sensation (plants). the duty "of recognizing all o u r duties as (instar) divine commands. are to be abhorred. Rather. to the moral law in him. it is a duty o f m a n to himself to apply this Idea. considered as a direct duty. For this Idea proceeds entirely f r o m o u r own reason and we ourselves m a k e it. f o r in that case its reality would first have to be shown (disclosed) t h r o u g h experience. the I d e a o f G o d . in this Idea. w h e n the e n d could also be achieved without these. [444] A g a i n . a given being to w h o m we would be u n d e r obligation. f o r it dulls his shared feeling o f their pain and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other men. it is always only a duty o f m a n to himself. . M a n is authorized to kill animals quickly (without pain) and to put them to work that does not strain them b e y o n d their capacities (such w o r k as m a n himself must submit to). however. whether f o r the theoretical purpose o f explaining to ourselves the purposiveness in the universe as a whole or also f o r the purpose o f serving as the incentive in o u r conduct. §18. violent and cruel treatment of animals is far m o r e intimately o p p o s e d to man's duty to himself. H e n c e we do not have b e f o r e us. it is called the duty of religion.238 The Metaphysics of Morals With regard to the animate but nonrational part o f creation. and he has a duty to refrain f r o m this." B u t this is not consciousness o f a duty to God. Even gratitude f o r the l o n g service of an old horse or d o g (just as if they were members o f the household) belongs indirectly to man's duty with regard to these animals. In this (practical) sense it can t h e r e f o r e be said that to have religion is a duty o f man to himself. which presents itself unavoidably to reason. w h e r e it is o f the greatest moral fruitfulness. f o r example. we have a duty with regard to what lies entirely b e y o n d the limits of o u r e x p e r i e n c e but whose possibility is met with in o u r Ideas. But agonizing physical experiments for the sake o f m e r e speculation. by principles. T h e y are creative to the extent that their use is not d r a w n f r o m e x p e r i e n c e but rather derived a priori f r o m principles. T h e y include m e m o r y . it is a comm a n d o f morally practical reason and a duty o f m a n to himself to cultivate his capacities (some a m o n g them m o r e than others. mind. imagination. as means to all sorts o f possible ends. and the like. as it were. and the metaphysics of nature. as the w o r d itself would suggest. but only science. f o r the advantage might (according to Rousseau's principles) turn out o n the side o f his prude natural needs. logic. taste (internal and [445] 239 . he must owe the use of his powers not merely to natural instinct but rather to the f r e e d o m by which he determines their scope. Even supposing that he could be satisfied with the innate scope o f his capacities f o r his natural needs. T h e latter two are also included in philosophy. as a being capable o f ends (of making objects his ends). and body). and because o f this experience is their guide. Instead. for. rusting away the natural predispositions and capacities that his reason can someday use. theoretical philosophy can help to p r o m o t e the end o f wisdom. insofar as m e n have d i f f e r e n t ends). that this m e a g e r scope o f his capacities is satisfactory. H o w e v e r . and to be in a pragmatic respect a m a n equal to the end o f his existence.ON B O O K II MAN'S IMPERFECT DUTIES T O HIMSELF (WITH REGARD T O HIS END) SECTION I On Man's Duty to Himself to Develop and Increase His Natural Perfection. his reason must first show him. namely theoretical philosophy. Powers of spirit are those whose exercise is possible only t h r o u g h reason. Man owes it to himself (as a rational being) not to leave idle and. for a Pragmatic Purpose §19- M a n has a duty to himself to cultivate ( cultura ) his natural powers (powers o f spirit. Powers of mind are those that are at the disposal o f understanding and the rule it uses to fulfill whatever purposes one might have. H e n c e the basis on which man should develop his capacities (for all sorts o f ends) is not r e g a r d f o r the advantages that their cultivation can provide. on which can be built learning. That Is. o f the sort to be f o u n d in mathematics. which does not then mean wisdom. cultivating the powers of the body (gymnastics in the strict sense) is looking after the basic stuff (the matter) in man. Hence the continuing a n d purposive invigoration o f the animal in man is an e n d o f m a n that is a duty to himself. [446] W h i c h o f these natural perfections should take precedence. a n d in what proportion one against the other it may be a man's duty to himself to m a k e these natural perfections his end. quite apart f r o m the need to maintain himself. f o r while it does contain a law f o r the m a x i m o f actions.. and so forth. §20. since this also belongs to the worth o f humanity in his own person. man has a duty to himself to be a useful m e m b e r o f the world.g. For. . which in itself cannot establish a duty. or a learned profession). B u t man's duty to himself r e g a r d i n g his natural perfection is only a wide and imperfect duty. are matters left f o r him to choose in accordance with his own rational reflection about what sort o f life he w o u l d like to lead and w h e t h e r he has the powers necessary f o r it (e. which furnish instruments f o r a variety o f purposes. it determines nothing about the kind and extent o f actions themselves but allows a latitude f o r f r e e choice. c o m m e r c e . without which he could not realize his ends.240 The Metaphysics of Morals external embellishment). whether it should be a trade. which he o u g h t not to d e g r a d e . Finally. with regard to the subject it is only a w i d e a n d i m p e r f e c t d u t y to himself. That Is. w h i l e this duty is i n d e e d n a r r o w a n d p e r f e c t with regard to its object (the I d e a that o n e s h o u l d m a k e it one's e n d to realize). it is true that in its I d e a (objec241 [447] . First. c o u l d j u s t as well serve vice? B u t with r e g a r d to p e r f e c t i o n as a m o r a l e n d . H e n c e . It is m a n ' s d u t y to strive f o r this p e r f e c t i o n . b u t n o t to reach it (in this life). T h e d e p t h s o f the h u m a n h e a r t are u n f a t h o m a b l e . w h e t h e r it p r o c e e d s entirely f r o m the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the law o r w h e t h e r t h e r e are not m a n y o t h e r sensible impulses c o n t r i b u t i n g to it that l o o k to one's a d v a n t a g e (or to a v o i d i n g what is detrimental) a n d that. w h e n h e feels the incentive to fulfill his duty. for a Moral Purpose Only §81. in the law b e i n g by itself a l o n e the incentive. s u c h p e r f e c t i o n consists objectively in f u l f i l l i n g all one's duties a n d in attaining c o m p l e t e l y one's m o r a l e n d with r e g a r d to oneself. T h i s d u t y to o n e s e l f is a narrow a n d p e r f e c t o n e in terms o f its quality. " I f t h e r e b e a n y virtue. H e r e the c o m m a n d is "be h o l y . this p e r f e c t i o n consists subjectively in the purity (puritas moralis) o f one's disposition to d u t y . a c c o r d i n g l y . a n d his c o m p l i a n c e with this duty can. a n d if t h e r e be any praise. n a m e l y . H e r e the c o m m a n d is "be p e r f e c t . consist only in c o n t i n u a l p r o g r e s s . W h o k n o w s himself well e n o u g h to say. " Second. a n d in actions b e i n g d o n e not only in c o n f o r m i t y with d u t y b u t also from duty. b u t it is w i d e a n d i m p e r f e c t in t e r m s o f its d e g r e e ." 9 6 §88. b e c a u s e o f th e frailty (fragilitas) o f h u m a n nature. " B u t man's striving a f t e r this e n d always r e m a i n s only a p r o g r e s s f r o m one p e r f e c tion to a n o t h e r . strive f o r it. e v e n w i t h o u t the a d m i x t u r e o f aims d e r i v e d f r o m sensibility.SECTION II On Man's Duty to Himself to Increase His Moral Perfection. in o t h e r circumstances. as h a v i n g to d o with one's entire m o r a l e n d . made u p o f several d i f f e r e n t qualities. All duties to oneself r e g a r d i n g the e n d o f humanity in o u r o w n person. such other qualities are not usually called vices). only imperfect duties. if one wanted to look f o r it (though. therefore. are. B u t a sum o f virtues such that o u r self-knowledge can never adequately tell us whether it is complete or deficient can be the basis only o f an i m p e r f e c t duty to be perfect. a n d it would probably be impossible not to find in it some lack o f virtue. . but in fact (subjectively) there is a multitude o f virtues. because o f those virtues.242 The Metaphysics of Morals tively) there is only one virtue (as moral strength o f one's maxims). we consider ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world where.DUTIES P A R T II OF V I R T U E T O [448] OTHERS CHAPTER I On Duties to Others Merely as Men Section I On The Duty of Love to Other Men Division §23. T h e chief division can be into duties to others by the p e r f o r m a n c e o f which you also put others u n d e r obligation and duties to others the observance o f which does not result in obligation on the part o f others. B u t they are basically always united by the law into one duty. it is o u r duty to behave as if o u r help is either merely what is d u e him or but a slight service o f love. and this humbles him. attraction and repulsion bind together rational beings (on 243 . of laws f o r men's external relations with one another. by analogy with the physical world. a m o n g these. but since the favor we d o implies that his well-being d e p e n d s o n o u r generosity. and can show him the respect necessary f o r every man regardless o f the fact that he would hardly be j u d g e d worthy o f love). [449] §24. and to spare him humiliation and maintain his respect f o r himself. but p e r f o r m ing the second is fulfilling a duty that is owed. only in such a way that now one duty a n d now the other is the subject's principle. So we shall acknowledge that we are u n d e r obligation to help a poor man. Love and respect are the feelings that accompany the carrying out o f these duties. with the other j o i n e d to it as accessory. In speaking o f laws of duty (not laws o f nature) and. T h e y can be considered separately (each by itself) and can also exist separately (one can love one's neighbor t h o u g h he might deserve but little respect. P e r f o r m i n g the first is meritorious (in relation to others). §25In this context. and should one o f these great moral forces fail. On the Duty of Love in Particular §a6. It is not to be understood as the m e r e feeling that comes f r o m c o m p a r i n g o u r o w n worth with another's (such as a child feels merely f r o m habit toward his parents. however. By carrying out the duty of love to someone I put another u n d e r obligation. to k e e p themselves at a distance f r o m one another. not the love that is delight in men. o r any subordinate toward his superior). love is not to be understood as feeling (ästhetisch). although it is a m e r e duty of virtue. Since the love of m a n (philanthropy) we are thinking o f h e r e is practical love. it is r e g a r d e d as narrow in comparison with a duty o f love. it must be taken as active [450] . I m a k e myself deserving f r o m him. with g a p i n g throat. as a man. and it is the latter that is considered a wide duty. T h e same holds true of the respect to be shown to others. but in a d i f f e r e n t connection). would drink u p the whole k i n g d o m o f (moral) beings like a d r o p o f water" (if I may use Haller's words. that o f the respect they owe one another. strictly speaking. love is not to be understood as delight in them (since others cannot put one u n d e r obligation to have feelings). But in observing a duty o f respect I put only myself u n d e r obligation. H e n c e . Moreover. It is rather to be understood as the maxim o f limiting our self-esteem by the dignity o f humanity in another person. which results in beneficence. It must rather be t h o u g h t as the m a x i m o f benevolence (practical love). only a negative one (of not exalting oneself above others) and is thus analogous to the duty o f Right not to encroach u p o n what belongs to anyone. a duty o f f r e e respect toward others is. "then nothingness (immorality). T h e duty o f love f o r one's n e i g h b o r can. also be expressed as the duty to make others' ends my own (provided only that these are not immoral). as pleasure in the perfection of other m e n . I k e e p myself within my own bounds so as not to detract anything f r o m the worth that the other. T h e duty of respect f o r my n e i g h b o r is contained in the m a x i m not to d e g r a d e any other m a n to a m e r e means to my ends (not to d e m a n d that another throw himself away in o r d e r to slave f o r my end). accordingly. T h e principle of mutual love admonishes m e n constantly to come closer to one another. that is. a pupil toward his teacher. is authorized to put u p o n himself. and so as respect in the practical sense (observantia aliis praestanda).244 The Metaphysics of Morals earth). But since all others with the exception of myself would not be all. in accordance with the principle o f equality. whether or not one finds them worthy of love. Someone w h o finds satisfaction in the well-being (salus) o f men considered simply as men. [451 ] §28. the principle on which every law o f duty is based. though he indeed wishes all o f them well. . Now the benevolence present in love for all men is indeed the greatest in its extent. so that the maxim would not have within it the universality of a law. It is o m i t t e d in t h e s e c o n d edition.The Doctrine of Right g 245 benevolence." the maxim o f benevolence (practical love o f man) is a duty o f all men toward one another. is called a friend of man in general (a philanthropist). B u t someone w h o avoids other men because he can find no delight in them. and his turning away f r o m men could be called anthropophobia. and when I say that I take an " In the first e d i t i o n the p h r a s e nicht der Mensch. but the smallest in its degree. so there is no obligation to it). which includes the whole species (and so myself as well) in its Idea o f humanity as such. Someone w h o is indifferent to how things go for others if only they go well for himself is selfish (solipsista). Someone for w h o m it is well only w h e n things go badly for others is called an enemy of man (a misanthropist in the practical sense). In accordance with the ethical law o f perfection "love y o u r neighbor as yourself. that is. §27. as an object o f benevolence. would be shy o f m e n (a misanthropist in terms o f his sensibility [ästhetischer ]). for w h o m it is well w h e n things go well f o r every other. T h i s does not mean that I am thereby u n d e r obligation to love myself (for this happens unavoidably. which is still necessary for imposing obligation. I want everyone else to be benevolent toward me (benevolentiam). it means instead that lawgiving reason. and so as having to d o with the maxim of actions. a relation o f f r e e actions in accordance with maxims that qualify for a giving o f universal law and so cannot be selfish (ex solipsismo prodeuntes). 0 includes me as giving universal law along with all others in the duty o f mutual benevolence. hence I ought also to be benevolent toward everyone else. ("not m a n " ) o c c u r s h e r e . and permits you to be benevolent to yourself on the condition o f your being benevolent to every other as well. For every morally practical relation to men is a relation a m o n g them represented by p u r e reason. apart f r o m any c o m m a n d . the law making benevolence a duty will include myself. in the c o m m a n d of practical reason. for it is only in this way that your maxim (of beneficence) qualifies f o r a giving of universal law. A. or depriving oneself (fanatically) of e n j o y m e n t o f the pleasures o f life by e x a g g e r a t e d discipline o f one's natural inclinations. How does this fit in with the precept "love y o u r neighbor (your fellow man) as y o u r s e l f " ? If one is closer to m e than another (in the duty o f benevolence) and I am t h e r e f o r e u n d e r obligation to greater benevolence to one than to the other but am admittedly closer to myself (even in accordance with duty) than to any other. which is. but beneficence is the m a x i m o f mak- . and C) sympathy. vary the d e g r e e greatly in accordance with the d i f f e r e n t objects o f my love (one of w h o m concerns m e m o r e closely than another). But beyond benevolence in o u r wishes f o r other men (which costs us nothing) how can it be required as a duty that this should also be practical. whereas in acting I can. practical benevolence (beneficence). since the measure o f self-love would allow f o r n o d i f f e r e n c e in degree. But it is quite obvious that what is meant h e r e is not merely benevolence in wishes. then it would seem that I cannot. that is. T h e contrary of this is d e p r i v i n g oneself (slavishly) o f what is essential to the c h e e r f u l e n j o y m e n t o f life. rather. m a k i n g the well-being and happiness of others my end. G o d f o r us all). what is meant is. without contradicting myself. without violating the universality o f the maxim. strictly speaking. and in benevolence I am closest to myself. but not to the point of e f f e m i n a c y ) belongs a m o n g duties to oneself. Division of Duties of Love T h e y are duties o f A ) beneficence. For in wishing I can be equally benevolent to everyone. say that I o u g h t to love every man as myself. only taking delight in the well-being o f every other and does not require m e to contribute to it (every man f o r himself. Yet one man is closer to me than another. B) gratitude. the interest I take is as slight as an interest can be. that everyone w h o has the means to d o so should be beneficent to those in need? Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) o f others. active. Both of these are o p p o s e d to man's duty to himself.246 The Metaphysics of Morals [452] interest in this man's well-being only out of my love f o r all m e n . I am only not indifferent with regard to him. On the Duty of Beneficence §29Providing for oneself to the extent necessary just to find satisfaction in living (taking care o f one's body. by avarice. and the duty to it consists in the subject's being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as a universal law. Instead. A rich man (one w h o has abundant means [Mitteln] for the happiness of others. or at least would be authorized to deny it. Hence the maxim o f self-interest would conflict with itself if it were made a universal law. G o d (fortune) for us all" seems to be the most natural one. which costs him no sacrifice. he must show that he is himself put u n d e r obligation by the other's acceptance or honored by it. to promote according to one's means [Vermögen] the happiness o f others in need. it is contrary to duty.The Doctrine of Right g 247 ing others' happiness one's end. then everyone would likewise deny him assistance w h e n he himself is in need. that is. should hardly even regard beneficence as a meritorious duty on his part. o f beneficence toward those in need. means in excess o f his own needs). O n the contrary. that is. rational beings with needs. united by nature in one dwelling place so that they can help one another.. without hoping f o r something in return. This virtue is greater w h e n the benefactor's means are limited and he is strong e n o u g h quietly to take on himself the hardship he spares the other. He must also carefully avoid any appearance of intending to bind the other by it. §3»T o be beneficent. [453] §31. i. that is. It is not obvious that any such law is to be f o u n d in reason. unless (as is better) he can practice his beneficence in complete secrecy. is a universal duty of men. then he is really to be considered morally rich. for if he showed that he wanted to put the other u n d e r an obligation (which always humbles the other in his own eyes). For every man w h o finds himself in need wishes to be helped by other men. T h e satisfaction he derives f r o m his beneficence. the maxim "Every man for himself. B u t if he lets his maxim o f being unwilling to assist others in turn when they are in need become public. it would not be a true benefit that he rendered him.e. . hence that the duty is merely something that he owes. even though he also puts others u n d e r obligation by it. is a way of reveling in moral feelings. Consequently the maxim of common interest. makes this a universal permissive law. that is. is every man's duty. just because they are to be considered fellow men. 248 [454] The Metaphysics of Morals Casuistical Questions How far should a man e x p e n d his means in practicing beneficence? Surely not to the extent that he himself would finally c o m e to n e e d the beneficence o f others. thinking to benefit him by f o r c i n g a gift u p o n him. counting o n his master's beneficence. which introduces an inequality o f wealth that makes others need their beneficence. without physical results. a result of certain m e n being favored t h r o u g h the injustice of the government. T h e feeling connected with this j u d g m e n t is respect f o r the benefactor (who puts one u n d e r obligation). H a v i n g the means to practice such beneficence as d e p e n d s o n the goods o f f o r t u n e is. o n which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious. On the Duty of Gratitude Gratitude consists in honoring a person because of a b e n e f i t he has rend e r e d us. really deserve to be called beneficence at all? B. I say. Even mere heartfelt benevolence on another's part. U n d e r such circumstances. for the most part. §32Gratitude is a duty. can he. I can benefit him only in accordance with his concepts o f happiness. whereas the benefactor is [455] viewed as only in a relation of love toward the recipient. deserves to be called a duty of virtue. rather. It is not a merely prudential m a x i m o f e n c o u r a g i n g the other to show m e f u r t h e r beneficence by a c k n o w l e d g i n g my obli- . and that the master's utmost concern f o r him would not really be beneficence at all? O r could the merit of such beneficence be so great as to o u t w e i g h the Right of men? I cannot do g o o d to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness (except to y o u n g children and the insane). and this is the basis f o r the distinction between active and merely affective gratitude. How m u c h worth has beneficence e x t e n d e d with a cold h a n d (by a will to be put into e f f e c t at one's death)? If someone w h o exercises over another (a serf of his estate) the greater p o w e r permitted by the law o f the land robs the other o f his f r e e d o m to make himself h a p p y in accordance with his own choices. does a rich man's help to the needy. consider himself the other's benefactor because he looks after him paternalistically in accordance with his own concepts of happiness? O r is not the injustice of depriving someone o f his f r e e d o m something so contrary to duty of Right as such that one w h o willingly consents to submit to this condition. commits the greatest rejection o f his own humanity. in particular. w h o can be r e g a r d e d as our teachers.The Doctrine of Right g 249 gation to him f o r a favor he has done (gratiarum actio est ad plus dandum invitatio). as an opportunity given one to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of man. that is. B u t even mere heartfelt benevolence. that is. namely having been the first in benevolence. if he cannot. direct constraint in accordance with a moral law. [456] . a sacred duty. A n y other duty is an ordinary duty. to combine the cordiality of a benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence (attentiveness to the smallest d e g r e e o f this disposition in one's thought o f duty). to render them to others. Gratitude is. too. even to those one cannot identify with certainty. insofar as this is possible. and so to cultivate one's love of man. and this wounds his pride). rid oneself of the obligation for it. a duty the violation of which (as a scandalous example) can destroy the moral incentive to beneficence in its very principle. f r o m all attacks. rather. for I would then be using my acknowledgment merely as a means to my f u r t h e r purposes. A grateful disposition o f this kind is called appreciativeness. as if the world were steadily declining in accordance with laws o f nature f r o m its original perfection. that it is thought i m p r o p e r not to d e f e n d the ancients. is already a basis o f obligation to gratitude. since the recipient can never win away f r o m the benefactor his priority o f merit. B u t it is a foolish mistake to attribute preeminence in talents and good will to the ancients in preference to the moderns just because o f their antiquity. But the intensity of gratitude. and to despise everything new in comparison with antiquity. by any repayment o f a kindness received. For a moral object is sacred if the obligation with regard to it cannot be discharged completely by any act in keeping with it (so that one w h o is u n d e r obligation always remains u n d e r obligation). that is. a duty. and disdain. it involves not regarding a kindness received as a b u r d e n one would gladly be rid o f (since the one so favored stands a step lower than his benefactor. it reaches not only to one's contemporaries but also to one's predecessors. if he can receive them (if he is still living) or. B u t one cannot. T h e least degree is to render equal services to the benefactor. apart f r o m any such act (of beneficence). B u t gratitude must also be considered. the degree of obligation to this virtue. accusations. is to be assessed by how useful the favor was to the one put u n d e r obligation and how unselfishly it was bestowed on him. but taking even the occasion for gratitude as a moral kindness. It is for this reason. that is. §33As far as the extent o f this gratitude is concerned. duty. It is called the duty o f humanity (humanitas) because m a n is r e g a r d e d h e r e not merely as a rational being but also as an animal e n d o w e d with reason. he rejected compassion. sickness. It was a sublime way of thinking that the Stoic ascribed to his wise m a n when he had him say. T h e second is unfree (communio sentiendi illiberalis. but rather that I might stand by him and rescue a man. then two of us s u f f e r . T h i s would also be an insulting kind o f beneficence.. In fact. B u t there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the evil in the world and so to do g o o d from compassion. etc. called pity. 9 7 since it spreads naturally a m o n g m e n living near one another. t h o u g h the evil really (in nature) affects only one. and is t h e r e f o r e called sympathetic (communio sentiendi liberalis)\ it is based on practical reason. sympathetic feeling. t h o u g h only a conditional. §35B u t while it is not in itself a duty to share the s u f f e r i n g s (as well the joys) o f others.) N a t u r e has already implanted in m a n susceptibility to these feelings. to feel j o y and sadness in c o m m o n with others (humanitas aesthetica). T h e first is free. w h e n another suffers and. and also compassion. Now humanity can be located either in the capacity and the will to share in others' feelings (humanitas practica) or merely in the susceptibility. "I wish f o r a friend. imprisonment." B u t the same wise man. " W h a t is it to me?" In other words. although I cannot help him. since it expresses the kind o f benevolence one has toward someone unworthy. servilis)\ it can be called communicable (since it is like the susceptibility to w a r m t h or contagious diseases). and to . since they are not to m a k e a display o f their worthiness to be h a p p y .250 The Metaphysics of Morals C. said to himself. given by nature itself. Sympathetic Feeling Is Generally a Duty §34- [457] Sympathetic joy a n d sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings o f pleasure or pain (which are t h e r e f o r e to be called "aesthetic" [ästhetisch]) at another's state o f j o y or sorrow (shared feeling. and this has no place in men's relations with one another. I let myself be infected by his pain (through my imagination). not that h e might help me in poverty. B u t to use this as a means to p r o m o t i n g active and rational benevolence is still a particular. T h e r e is obligation only to the first. it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate. w h e n he could not rescue his friend. r e q u i r e d by itself. a d d i n g m e a n n e s s to one's n e g l e c t o f d u t y to one's n e i g h b o r . w h e r e a s in g r a t i t u d e the o n e p u t u n d e r obligation stands a step l o w e r t h a n his b e n e f a c t o r . B u t at least a g r e a t m o r a l a d o r n m e n t . so that o n e also violates a d u t y to oneself. love t o w a r d a b e n e f a c t o r o n the p a r t o f s o m e o n e h e has p u t u n d e r obligation. love o f m a n . F o r universal l o v e o f one's n e i g h b o r can a n d m u s t b e based o n equality o f duties. ingratitude. that causes so m u c h ingratitude? s e e i n g s o m e o n e a b o v e o n e s e l f a n d f e e l i n g r e s e n t m e n t at not b e i n g able to m a k e o n e s e l f fully his e q u a l (as f a r as relations o f d u t y are c o n c e r n e d ) ? On the Vices of Hatred for Men. h o w e v e r . W h e n it b r e a k s . b u t r a t h e r respect f o r h i m . strictly s p e a k i n g . n a m e l y p r i d e . (contrarie) T h e y c o m p r i s e the l o a t h s o m e family o f envy. a n d not to s h u n sick-rooms o r debtors' prisons a n d so f o r t h in o r d e r to avoid s h a r i n g p a i n f u l f e e l i n g s o n e m a y not b e able to resist. f u l f i l l e d with the u t m o s t conscientiousness. w o u l d t h e n b e missing f r o m the w o r l d .The Doctrine of Right g 251 this e n d it is t h e r e f o r e an indirect d u t y to cultivate t h e c o m p a s s i o n a t e n a t u r a l (aesthetic [ästhetische]) f e e l i n g s in us. For this is still o n e o f t h e i m p u l s e s that n a t u r e has i m p l a n t e d in us to d o w h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f d u t y a l o n e w o u l d not accomplish. e v e n t h o u g h it d o e s not detract f r o m one's o w n . I n these vices. a c c o r d i n g l y . e v e n if n o a c c o u n t is t a k e n o f a d v a n t a g e s (of happiness). h a t r e d is n o t o p e n a n d violent b u t secret a n d veiled. L o v e o f m a n is. Is it not this. Directly Opposed to Love of Them §36. It is t h e r e f o r e a d u t y n o t to avoid t h e places w h e r e t h e p o o r w h o lack the most basic necessities are to b e f o u n d b u t r a t h e r to seek t h e m o u t . a n d b e n e v o l e n c e w e r e c o n s i d e r e d m o r a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t ? It is not so easy to see w h a t e f f e c t this w o u l d h a v e o n m a n ' s h a p p i n e s s . a) Envy (livor) is a p r o p e n s i t y to view the well-being o f o t h e r s with distress. 9 8 Casuistical Questions L45oJ W o u l d it not b e better f o r the well-being o f the w o r l d g e n e r a l l y if h u m a n morality w e r e limited to duties o f R i g h t . G r a t i t u d e is not. a n d malice. in o r d e r to p r e s e n t the w o r l d as a b e a u t i f u l m o r a l w h o l e in its f u l l p e r f e c t i o n . a n d to m a k e use o f t h e m as so m a n y m e a n s to s y m p a t h y based o n m o r a l principles a n d the f e e l i n g a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e m . put all the m o r e inner moral worth on it). indeed. the direct opposite o f sympathy. Movements o f envy are t h e r e f o r e present in h u m a n nature. of enviable h a r m o n y and happiness in a marriage or family and so forth. It is. as it were. H e n c e gratitude is freely shown to those w h o must unavoidably have p r e c e d e d us in c o n f e r r i n g benefits (to the ancestors we c o m m e m o r a t e or to o u r parents). just by scorning any such return f o r their beneficence. A c c o r d i n g l y one speaks. since this puts one u n d e r obligation to them. otherwise it is merely jealousy (invidentia). b) W h e n ingratitude toward one's benefactor extends to hatred of him it is called ingratitude proper. but w h e n it goes so far as to help b r i n g about evil or wickedness it makes hatred o f m e n visible and appears in all its . the duty o f not n e e d i n g and asking for others' beneficence. f o r we fear that by showing gratitude we take the inferior position of a d e p e n d e n t in relation to his protector. which is contrary to real self-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in one's own person). but because ingratitude stands love of man o n its head. not merely because o f the harm that such an e x a m p l e must bring on men in general by deterring them f r o m f u r t h e r beneficence (for with a g e n u i n e moral disposition they can. and yet m a n is so notorious for it that it is not t h o u g h t unlikely that one could even make an e n e m y by r e n d e r i n g a benefit. [460] c) Malice. T h i s vice is t h e r e f o r e contrary to a man's duty to himself as well as to others. at destroying others' g o o d fortune. just as if e n v y i n g someone were permitted in many cases. but otherwise mere unappreciativeness. too. in o r d e r to hide this relation o f inequality. and d e g r a d e s absence o f love into an authorization to hate the one w h o loves. but to contemporaries it is shown only sparingly and indeed the very opposite o f it is shown. W h a t makes such a vice possible is misunderstanding one's duty to oneself. B u t ingratitude is a vice that shocks humanity. namely a reluctance to see o u r own well-being overshadowed by another's because the standard we use to see how [459] weH ° f f we are is not the intrinsic worth of o u r own well-being but how it compares with that o f others. but rather p r e f e r r i n g to bear the hardships o f life oneself than to b u r d e n others with t h e m and so incur indebtedness (obligation). Yet envy is only an indirectly malevolent disposition. is likewise n o stranger to h u m a n nature. and only w h e n they break out do they constitute the abominable vice of a sullen passion that tortures oneself and aims.252 The Metaphysics of Morals forth into action (to diminish their well-being) it is called envy proper. publicly j u d g e d to be one o f the most detestable vices. at least in terms o f one's wishes. [461] . which gives e f f e c t to the law o f a supreme authority over all those subject to it. to make it one's end to harm others without any advantage to oneself. and H e alone (namely God) can say "Vengeance is mine. which is incumbent on us as a duty. the law of contrast). for then a man would be throwing away his rights and letting others trample o n them. But punishment is not an act that the injured party can undertake on his private authority. as a foil to show it in so m u c h the brighter light. is secretly to hate men. partly because a man has e n o u g h guilt o f his own to be greatly in need o f p a r d o n and partly. But to rejoice immediately in the existence o f such enormities destroying what is best in the world as a whole. because no punishment. and w h e n (as we must in ethics) we regard men as in a rightful condition but in accordance only with laws of reason (not civil laws). I will repay. Every deed that violates a man's right deserves punishment. renunciation o f rigorous means (rigorosa) for preventing the recurrence o f wrongs by other men.The Doctrine of Right g 253 hideousness as malice proper. by the laws o f imagination (namely. But this must not be confused with meek toleration o f wrongs (mitis iniuriarum patientia). a duty o f virtue not only to refrain f r o m repaying another's enmity with hatred out o f mere revenge but also not even to call u p o n the j u d g e o f the world for vengeance. may be inflicted out o f hatred. it might even seem that one has the greatest right. It is indeed natural that. which is directly opposed to one's duty in accordance with the principle o f sympathy (as expressed by Terence's honest Chremes): "I am a man. therefore. and even the obligation (as a desire for justice). and so would violate his duty to himself. whatever befalls man concerns me too. It is therefore a duty o f men to be forgiving (placabilitas). and their self-conceit in their g o o d conduct (strictly speaking. and so also to wish for them to happen. we feel o u r own well-being and even our g o o d conduct m o r e strongly when the misfortune o f others or their downfall in scandal is put next to our o w n condition. and indeed especially. but rather an act of a court distinct f r o m him. only in their good fortune in having so far escaped temptations to public vice) — both o f which an egotist accounts to his merit — that generate this malevolent j o y . It is the haughtiness o f others w h e n their welfare is uninterrupted." It is. the function o f which is to avenge a crime on the one w h o committed it (not merely to make good the harm that was done). and this is the direct opposite o f love f o r o u r neighbor. then no one is authorized to inflict punishment and to avenge the wrongs sustained by m e n except Him w h o is also the supreme moral lawgiver. no matter f r o m w h o m it comes." 9 9 T h e sweetest f o r m o f malice is the desire for revenge. Besides. such vices are still human. . without m a k i n g of him an intermediate sort o f b e i n g w h o occupies neither one place nor the other. that is. J u d g i n g something to be worthless is contempt. T h e question may remain o p e n h e r e whether Haller did not hit u p o n it better with his "an ambiguous hybird o f angel and beast. no equivalent f o r which the object evaluated (aestimii) could be e x c h a n g e d . in them one assigns m a n his place in heaven o r hell. one could call some o f these vices devilish. B u t lack o f modesty in one's claims to be respected by others is self-conceit (arrogantia). T h e first comparison (of angelic virtue and devilish vice) is an exaggeration. also fall into brutish vices — does not justify attributing to them a predisposition to these vices belonging to their species. alas. that is. a n d so too the virtues o p p o s e d to them angelic." B u t dividing something composite into two h e t e r o g e n e o u s things yields no definite concept at all.254 The Metaphysics of Morals Remark I f vice is taken in the sense o f a basic principle (a vice proper). and can lead us to n o n e in o r d e r i n g beings whose class distinctions are u n k n o w n to us. in v e h e m e n t revulsion. is inhuman w h e n r e g a r d e d objectively. of a worth that has no price. Lack of such moderation (lack of modesty) as regards one's worthiness to be loved by others is called egotism (philautia). T h e respect that I have f o r others or that another can require f r o m m e (observantia aliis praestanda) is therefore recognition o f a dignity (dignitas) in other m e n . T h e seco n d — although m e n do. is called modesty. willing restriction of one man's self-love in view of the self-love o f others. that is. But considered subjectively. A s to whether. in terms o f what e x p e r i e n c e teaches us about o u r species. both o f these concepts are only Ideas o f a m a x i m u m used as a standard f o r c o m p a r i n g > degrees o f morality. which would make h u m a n nature itself detestable. then any vice. [462] Section II On Duties of Virtue toward Other Men Arising from the Respect Due Them §37Moderation in one's d e m a n d s generally. any m o r e than the stunting o f some trees in the forest is a reason for making them a special kind o f plant. to deny them the respect owed to men in general. poor j u d g m e n t and so forth. W h a t is dangerous is no object o f contempt. and so over all things. the dignity o f humanity in every other man. Right g 255 Every man has a legitimate claim to respect f r o m his fellow men and is in turn b o u n d to respect every other. f o r they are men. Remark O n this is based a duty to respect a man even in the logical use o f his reason. even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy o f it. nevertheless. is in every case contrary to duty. that is. Hence there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other man. but the outward manifestation of this is. that is.The Doctrine of §38. by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not men and yet can be used. he is u n d e r obligation to acknowledge. Not only are such punishments more painful than loss o f possessions and life to one w h o loves honor (who claims the respect o f others. cutting o f f his nose and ears). and so neither is a vicious man. for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any m a n (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. an offense. I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a man. [463] T o be contemptuous o f others (contemnere). as men. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists. in a practical way. A t times one cannot. and if my superiority to his attacks justifies my saying that I despise him. because he shows himself in all his depravity. it is true. so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem o f others. B u t just as he cannot give himself away f o r any price (this would conflict with his duty o f self-esteem). they also make a spectator blush with shame at belonging to a species that can be treated that way. Humanity itself is a dignity. help inwardly looking down o n some in comparison with others (despicatui habere). So there can be disgraceful punishments that dishonor humanity itself (such as quartering a man. having him torn by dogs. even t h o u g h I have prepared no defense against him. Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a man. this means only that I am in no d a n g e r f r o m him. a duty not to censure his errors by calling them absurdities. as everyone must). but rather to suppose . by using such expressions. which must never break out into complete contempt and denial o f any m o r a l worth to a vicious man. B u t what not only adds nothing moral but even abolishes the worth o f what would otherwise be to the subject's g o o d is vice. an e r r o r d a n g e r o u s and destructive to virtue. by explaining to him the possibility of his having erred. §4°Respect f o r the law. B u t to take scandal at what is merely unconventional (paradoxon) but otherwise in itself g o o d is a delusion (since o n e holds what is unusual to be impermissible as well). how does one want to bring him to understand that he has erred? T h e same thing applies to the censure o f vice. but a failure in the duty o f respect infringes u p o n a man's lawful claim. an e x a m p l e of disregarding respectability that might lead others to follow it. . and this is not consistent with the Idea o f a man. one denies any understanding to a man w h o opposes one in a certain j u d g m e n t . For no one is w r o n g e d if duties of love are neglected. since such a tyranny of popular mores would be contrary to a man's duty to himself. to preserve his respect f o r his own understanding. is raised to the dignity o f a law).56 The Metaphysics of Morals [464] v that his j u d g m e n t must yet contain some truth and to seek this out. uncovering. at the same time. T o give scandal is quite contrary to duty. For if. and its manifestation in external conduct. B u t failure to fulfill the duty arising f r o m the respect owed to every m a n as such is a vice (vitium). A n o f f e n s e against respectability is called scandal. w h o as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition to the good. §41- Failure to fulfill mere duties o f love is lack of virtue (peccatum). and so. by an oversight. respectability (honestas externa). h e took f o r objective). which in its subjective aspect is called moral feeling. T h e first violation is opposed to duty as its contrary (contrarie oppositum virtutis). the deceptive illusion (the subjective g r o u n d that determined his j u d g m e n t that. For a man cannot carry his giving an e x a m p l e of the respect d u e others so far as to d e g e n e r a t e into blind imitation (in which custom. is identical with consciousness o f one's duty. T h i s is w h y showing respect f o r man as a moral being (holding his duty in highest esteem) is also a duty that others have toward him and a right to which he cannot r e n o u n c e his claim. for on this supposition he could never be improved. mos. T h i s claim is called love of honor. the inclination to be always on top) is a kind o f ambition (ambitio) in which we d e m a n d that others think little o f themselves in comparison with us. [466] . B) defamation. too. and C) ridicule. Arrogance §42. for arrogance demands f r o m others a respect it denies them. A. as it were. duties to one's fellow men arising f r o m the respect due them are expressed only negatively. that is. is merely a d e m a n d u p o n others to concern themselves with one's importance. w h o m he thinks he is entitled to treat with contempt. were his fortune suddenly to change. that is. It is. A r r o g a n c e is.The Doctrine of Right g 257 [465] For this reason. which is love of honor. that it is folly. But pride itself becomes a fault and an o f f e n s e w h e n it. a concern to yield nothing of one's h u m a n dignity in comparison with others (so that the adjective "noble" is usually a d d e d to "pride" in this sense). that an arrogant man is even a conceited ass. Arrogance (superbia and. therefore. the exact opposite o f his end (for the more an arrogant man shows that he is trying to obtain respect. a vice opposed to the respect that every man can lawfully claim. On Vices that Violate the Duties of Respect for Other Men T h e s e vices are A ) arrogance. frivolity in using means to something so related to them as not to be worth being taken as an end. It differs f r o m pride proper (animus elatus). that he shows an offensive lack o f understanding in using such means as must bring about. too. the more everyone denies it to him). this duty of virtue will be expressed only indirectly (through the prohibition o f its opposite).100 that is. that is. a solicitation on the part o f one seeking honor for followers. It is obvious that this is unjust and opposed to the respect owed to men as such. he himself would not find it hard to grovel and to waive any claim to respect f r o m others. on the part o f other men. as this word expresses it. But it might not be so readily noticed that an arrogant man is always mean in the depths o f his soul. For he would not d e m a n d that others think little of themselves in comparison with him unless he knew that. o r to dull one's m o r a l f e e l i n g by r e p e a t e d l y e x p o s i n g o n e to the sight o f such things a n d a c c u s t o m i n g o n e to it. Defamation §43- B y d e f a m a t i o n (obtrectatio) or b a c k b i t i n g I d o not m e a n slander (contumelia). a m a n i a f o r caustic m o c k e r y . It is. to m a k e their faults the i m m e d i a t e object o f one's amusem e n t . not m e r e l y by s o f t e n i n g o u r j u d g m e n t s b u t also by k e e p i n g these j u d g m e n t s to ourselves. o r at least not w o r s e than. so as finally to cast a s h a d o w o f worthlessness o v e r o u r race itself. o r s u p p o s e d faults as if they w e r e real. theref o r e .diminishes respect f o r h u m a n i t y as such. f r o m the familiarity a m o n g f r i e n d s in w h i c h o n e m a k e s f u n o f their peculiarities that only s e e m to b e faults b u t are really m a r k s o f their pluck in sometimes d e p a r t i n g f r o m the rule o f f a s h i o n (for this is not derision). T h i s is c o n t r a r y to the respect o w e d to h u m a n i t y as such. false d e f a m a t i o n to be t a k e n b e f o r e a c o u r t . f46?] Ridicule §44Wanton faultfinding a n d mockery. a m a n i a f o r s p y i n g o n t h e morals o f others ( allotrio-episcopia) is by itself already an o f f e n s i v e inquisitiveness o n the p a r t o f a n t h r o p o l o g y . to b r i n g into the o p e n s o m e t h i n g prejudicial to respect f o r others. a. o t h e r m e n . I m e a n only t h e i m m e d i a t e inclination. w h i c h everyo n e can resist with r i g h t as a violation o f the respect d u e h i m . with n o particular a i m in view.258 The Metaphysics of Morals B. a d u t y o f virtue not to take malicious p l e a s u r e in e x p o s i n g the faults o f o t h e r s so that o n e will be t h o u g h t as g o o d as. is a k i n d o f malice. a n d e v e n if w h a t is said is true . the p r o p e n s i t y to e x p o s e o t h e r s to l a u g h t e r . a n d as f a r as possible m a k e s p e o p l e skeptical a b o u t it. in o r d e r to d e p r i v e h i m o f the respect he deserves. T h e intentional spreading (propalatio) o f s o m e t h i n g that detracts f r o m a n o t h e r ' s h o n o r — e v e n if it is not a m a t t e r o f public j u s t i c e . B u t h o l d i n g u p to ridicule a person's real faults. a n d t h e p r o p e n s i t y to d o this. It is a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m banter. m a k i n g m i s a n t h r o p y (shying away f r o m m e n ) o r c o n t e m p t t h e p r e v a lent cast o f m i n d . f o r e v e r y scandal g i v e n w e a k e n s that respect. b u t r a t h e r to t h r o w the veil o f love o f m a n o v e r their faults. f o r e x a m p l e s o f respect that w e give o t h e r s c a n a r o u s e their striving to d e s e r v e it. o n w h i c h the i m p u l s e to the m o r a l l y g o o d rests. F o r this r e a s o n . t h e n n o m a t t e r h o w m u c h ridicule the a d v e r s a r y m a y h a v e u t t e r e d a n d thereby left h i m s e l f o p e n to l a u g h t e r . . o r e v e n r a n k a n d dignity. it is m o r e b e f i t t i n g the dignity o f the object a n d respect f o r h u m a n i t y either to p u t u p n o d e f e n s e against the attack o r to c o n d u c t it with dignity a n d seriousness. a n d to revere r f the law. " verehren b Hochachtung ' Achtung ä Verehren. a n d this m a k e s it a n e v e n m o r e serious violation o f one's d u t y o f r e s p e c t f o r o t h e r men. T h e only reverence^ to w h i c h I a m b o u n d by n a t u r e is r e v e r e n c e f o r law as such (revere legem). a malicious b u t i n e f f e c t u a l adversary) is h i m s e l f m a d e the l a u g h i n g stock. the second edition changes this sentence to read "To obey the law also with regard to other men. B u t this is a l r e a d y implicit in the c o n c e p t o f t h e respect w e a r e b o u n d to show o t h e r m e n . w h i c h is only a negative duty.The Doctrine of Right g 259 (spiritus causticus). " . [468] Kant may well have in mind the duty not to give scandal. to show t h e m positive h i g h esteem. I a m not b o u n d to reverea others ( r e g a r d e d m e r e l y as m e n ) that is. T h i s m u s t b e distinguished f r o m a j o c u l a r . in g e n e r a l . T h e d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f respect to b e s h o w n to o t h e r s in accord a n c e with d i f f e r e n c e s in their qualities o r c o n t i n g e n t relations d i f f e r e n c e s o f age. b u t not to r e v e r e o t h e r m e n in g e n e r a l (reverentia adversus hominem) or to p e r f o r m s o m e act o f r e v e r e n c e f o r t h e m . . since this has to d o only with its p u r e rational principles. brushi n g aside with c o n t e m p t a n insulting attack o f a n a d v e r s a r y (retorsio iocosa). by w h i c h the m o c k e r (or. However. sex. birth. Remark It will b e n o t i c e d that u n d e r the a b o v e h e a d i n g virtues w e r e not so m u c h c o m m e n d e d as r a t h e r the vices o p p o s e d to t h e m cens u r e d . w h i c h e a c h o f t h e m can r e q u i r e as the respect originally o w e d o t h e r s (observantia debita). B u t w h e n the object o f his m o c k e r y is really n o object f o r wit but o n e in w h i c h r e a s o n necessarily takes a m o r a l interest. but not to . strength o r weakness. has s o m e t h i n g o f f i e n d i s h j o y in it. is m a n ' s universal a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a l d u t y t o w a r d others. T h i s is a legitimate d e f e n s e o f the r e s p e c t o n e can r e q u i r e f r o m h i m . e v e n if derisive. w h i c h d e p e n d in p a r t o n arbitrary a r r a n g e m e n t s — c a n n o t b e set f o r t h in detail a n d classified in the metaphysical first principles o f a d o c t r i n e o f virtue. and so forth? T h e s e questions d o not yield so many d i f f e r e n t ways o f imposing ethical obligation (for there is only one way. but can only be a p p e n d e d to the system. Yet even this application belongs to the complete presentation of the system.CHAPTER II On Ethical Duties of Men toward One Another with Regard to Their Condition v §45- [469] T h e s e (duties o f virtue) d o not really call f o r a special c h a p t e r in the system of p u r e ethics. and toward the learned insofar as they use their science as m e m b e r s o f polite society or outside society. T h e y are only rules modified in accordance with d i f f e r e n c e s of the subjects to w h o m the principle o f virtue (in terms o f what is formal) is applied in cases that come u p in experience (the material). since they d o not involve principles o f obligation f o r m e n as such toward one another. by applying the p u r e principles o f duty to cases of experience. f o r e x a m p l e . 260 . toward m e n w h o are in a state of moral purity or depravity? toward the cultivated or the crude? toward m e n of learning or the ignorant. as it were. would schematize these principles. they cannot properly constitute a part o f the metaphysical first principles o f a doctrine o f virtue. just as a passage f r o m the metaphysics of nature to physics is n e e d e d — a transition having its own special rules — something similar is rightly required f r o m the metaphysics of morals: a transition that. they d o not admit of a classification that could be guaranteed to be complete. but only so many d i f f e r e n t ways o f applying it (corollaries). sex. like anything divided on an empirical basis. as specialists in their field (scholars)? toward those whose learning is pragmatic or those in w h o m it proceeds more f r o m spirit and taste? How should people be treated in accordance with their differences in rank. and present them as ready f o r morally practical use. Nevertheless. age. How should one behave. prosperity or poverty. Hence they cannot be presented as sections o f ethics and m e m b e r s o f the division o f a system (which must proceed a priori f r o m a rational concept). Hence. that o f virtue as such). health. feels his p r i d e w o u n d e d a n d m a y w a n t the i n f e r i o r ' s respect to b e p u t aside f o r the m o m e n t . hence men have a duty of f r i e n d s h i p . the principle o f respect r e q u i r e s t h e m to stay at a p r o p e r distance f r o m e a c h o t h e r . h e m a y not. but not abolished. Friendship ( c o n s i d e r e d in its p e r f e c t i o n ) is the u n i o n o f t w o p e r s o n s t h r o u g h e q u a l m u t u a l love a n d respect. its p r e s e n c e within is irretrievably lost.. T h i s limitation o n intimacy. f o r f e i t s o m e t h i n g o f the other's respect. the a d o p t i o n o f this ideal in their disposition t o w a r d e a c h o t h e r makes them deserving of happiness. It is easy to see that this is a n ideal o f e a c h participating a n d s h a r i n g sympathetically in the other's well-being t h r o u g h the morally g o o d will that unites t h e m . j u s t b e c a u s e o f this. a n d e v e n t h o u g h it d o e s not p r o d u c e the c o m p l e t e h a p p i n e s s o f life. so that it will b e d i f f i c u l t f o r both to b r i n g love a n d respect subjectively into that equal balance r e q u i r e d f o r f r i e n d s h i p ? For love can b e r e g a r d e d as attraction a n d respect as r e p u l s i o n . B u t o n c e respect is violated. a l t h o u g h striving f o r f r i e n d s h i p (as a m a x i m u m o f g o o d disposition t o w a r d each o t h e r ) is a d u t y set by reason. B u t it is readily seen that f r i e n d s h i p is only an I d e a ( t h o u g h a practically necessary o n e ) a n d unattainable in practice. h o w can h e tell w h a t relation t h e r e is in the same p e r s o n b e t w e e n the f e e l i n g f r o m o n e d u t y a n d that f r o m the o t h e r (the f e e l i n g f r o m b e n e v o l e n c e a n d that f r o m respect)? A n d h o w can he b e sure that if the love o f o n e is s t r o n g e r . a n d if the principle o f love bids f r i e n d s to d r a w closer. b e f o r e h e realizes it. 261 [470] . F o r the s u p e r i o r . b e n e v o l e n c e t o w a r d each other) is equal in the disposition o f e a c h o f the f r i e n d s ? O r . w h i c h is e x p r e s s e d in the rule that e v e n the best o f f r i e n d s s h o u l d not m a k e themselves too familiar with e a c h o t h e r . e v e n t h o u g h t h e o u t w a r d m a r k s o f it (manners) are b r o u g h t back to their f o r m e r course.g. e v e n m o r e d i f f i c u l t . contains a m a x i m that holds not only f o r the s u p e r i o r in relation to the i n f e r i o r b u t also in reverse.CONCLUSION OF T H E ELEMENTS OF ETHICS On the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect in Friendship §46. a n d n o o r d i n a r y d u t y b u t an h o n o r a b l e o n e . F o r in his relations with his n e i g h b o r h o w can a m a n ascertain w h e t h e r o n e o f the elements requisite to this d u t y (e. since he is observed and secretly criticized by him. and even the fact that his friend observes him and finds fault with h i m 1 0 1 will seem in itself offensive. ready to help at his o w n expense)! B u t still it is also a heavy b u r d e n to feel chained to another's fate and e n c u m b e r e d with his needs. o f course. T h e s e u s and Pirithous) is the hobby horse o f writers o f romances. there is n o such thing as a friend! T h e following remarks may draw attention to the difficulties in perfect friendship. each is generously concerned with sparing the other his b u r d e n and bearing it all by himself. But the latter sees in this a lack o f the respect he expected f r o m his friend and thinks that he has either already lost or is in constant d a n g e r o f losing something o f his friend's respect. A l t h o u g h it is sweet to feel in such possession o f each other as approaches fusion into one person. then he may well be able to count on equality in love. although they d o not always result in a split (for the rabble fight a n d m a k e up). friendship is something so delicate (teneritas amicitiae) that it is never for a m o m e n t safe f r o m interruptions if it is allowed to rest o n feelings. f o r h e sees himself obviously a step lower in b e i n g u n d e r obligation without being able to impose obligation in turn. and after a while it goes u p in smoke. which should not be put to the test since this is always d a n g e r o u s . even concealing it altogether f r o m his friend. and the help that each may count o n f r o m the other in case o f need must not be r e g a r d e d as the e n d and determining g r o u n d o f f r i e n d s h i p — f o r in that case one would lose the other's respect — but only as the outward manifestation o f an inner heartfelt benevolence. while yet he can always flatter himself that in case o f n e e d he could confidently count on the other's help. H e n c e friendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but must rather be a purely moral one. this is in the other's best interests and is t h e r e f o r e a duty o f love. Such people cannot part with each other. B u t in any case the love in friendship cannot be an affect. an active friend. F r o m a moral point o f view it is. Such interruptions are c o m m o n a m o n g uncultivated people. a duty f o r one o f the friends to point out the other's faults to him. But if one o f them accepts a f a v o r f r o m the other. but not in respect. How one wishes f o r a friend in n e e d (one w h o is. O n the other h a n d Aristotle says: My dear friends. f o r emotion is blind in its choice.262 The Metaphysics of Morals Friendship t h o u g h t as attainable in its purity or completeness (between Orestes and Pylades. and if this mutual sympathy a n d self-surr e n d e r are not subjected to principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and limiting mutual love by requirements o f respect. [471] . and yet they cannot be at o n e with each other since they need quarrels in o r d e r to savor the sweetness o f b e i n g united in reconciliation. o f course. but h e c a n n o t risk it: partly b e c a u s e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n . t h e g o v e r n m e n t .ästhetischen ]) is the c o m p l e t e c o n f i d e n c e o f two p e r s o n s in r e v e a l i n g their secret j u d g m e n t s a n d f e e l i n g s to each o t h e r . quite like a black swan." especially since the closest f r i e n d s h i p r e q u i r e s that a j u d i c i o u s a n d trusted f r i e n d b e also b o u n d not to s h a r e t h e secrets e n t r u s t e d t o h i m with a n y o n e else. T h i s (merely m o r a l f r i e n d s h i p ) is not j u s t an ideal b u t (like black swans) actually exists h e r e a n d t h e r e in its p e r f e c t i o n . T h e necessary c o m bination o f qualities is s e l d o m f o u n d in o n e p e r s o n (rara avis in terris. H e w o u l d like to discuss with s o m e o n e w h a t h e thinks a b o u t his associates. w i t h o u t explicit permission to d o so. can h a v e n e i t h e r the purity n o r t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s requisite f o r a precisely d e t e r m i n a n t m a x i m . as in a prison.The Doctrine of Right g 263 §47Moral friendship (as distinguished f r o m f r i e n d s h i p based o n f e e l i n g [. a n d partly because. h e c a n t h e n air his views. B u t o n the o t h e r h a n d . as r e g a r d s disclosing his faults. w h i l e p r u d e n t l y k e e p i n g back his o w n j u d g m e n t s . H e is not c o m p l e t e l y alone with his t h o u g h t s . m i g h t use this to h a r m h i m . 165. a l t h o u g h o u t o f love. shares his g e n e r a l o u t l o o k o n things — with w h o m h e n e e d not b e a n x i o u s a b o u t this d a n g e r b u t can revea! h i m s e l f with c o m p l e t e c o n f i d e n c e . nigroque simillima cygno). a m o n g w h o m h e m u s t shut h i m s e l f u p in himself. it is an ideal o f one's wishes." Juvenal. h e m m e d in a n d c a u t i o n e d by f e a r o f t h e misuse o t h e r s m a y m a k e o f his disclosing his t h o u g h t s . E v e r y m a n has his secrets a n d d a r e not c o n f i d e blindly in others. b u t enjoys a f r e e d o m h e c a n n o t h a v e with the masses. w h i c h k n o w s n o b o u n d s in its rational c o n c e p t b u t w h i c h m u s t always b e v e r y limited in e x p e r i e n c e . [472] . religion a n d so f o r t h . I f h e f i n d s s o m e o n e intelligent — s o m e o n e w h o . 6. partly b e c a u s e o f a base cast o f m i n d in most m e n to use t h e m to one's d i s a d v a n t a g e a n d partly b e c a u s e m a n y p e o p l e are indiscreet o r incapable o f j u d g i n g a n d dist i n g u i s h i n g w h a t m a y o r m a y not b e r e p e a t e d . B u t that (pragmatic) f r i e n d s h i p . a n d in cultivating the social state h e feels strongly the n e e d to reveal h i m s e l f to o t h e r s (even with n o ulterior p u r p o s e ) . m o r e o v e r . n o m a t t e r h o w reliable h e thinks h i m . w h i c h b u r d e n s itself with the e n d s o f o t h e r m e n . ""a bird that is rare on earth. M a n is a b e i n g m e a n t f o r society ( t h o u g h h e is also an unsociable one). so that h e w o u l d lose s o m e t h i n g o f t h e other's respect by p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f quite c a n d i d l y to him. as f a r as s u c h disclosures are consistent with m u t u a l respect. h e f i n d s h i m s e l f c o n s t r a i n e d to lock up in h i m s e l f a g o o d p a r t o f his j u d g m e n t s (especially those a b o u t o t h e r people). the o t h e r p e r s o n m a y conceal his o w n . Satires II. as well. serves to g u a r d against the pride that usually comes over those fortunate e n o u g h to have the means f o r beneficence. t h o u g h t and consideration f o r the equality a m o n g m e n . o f the whole race) is one w h o takes an affective [ästhetisch] interest in the well-being o f all m e n (rejoices with them) and will n e v e r disturb it without heartfelt regret. to the one he protects.e. w h o owes him gratitude.264 The Metaphysics of Morals [473] A. since the respect o w e d by each is not equal. as if all m e n w e r e brothers u n d e r one father w h o wills the happiness of all. . T a k i n g to heart the duty o f being benevolent as a friend o f m a n (a necessary h u m b l i n g o f oneself). as a benefactor. friend of man as such (i. For "a f r i e n d o f m a n " includes.. For the relation o f a protector. and hence the I d e a that in putting others u n d e r obligation by his beneficence he is himself u n d e r obligation. is indeed a relation of mutual love. Yet the expression "a friend o f m a n " is somewhat narrower in its m e a n i n g than "one w h o merely loves m a n " (a philanthropist). but not of friendship. W h i l e m a k i n g o n e s e l f a f i x e d c e n t e r o f one's principles.a g r e e a b l e ness. sociabilitas). a n d so to associate the graces with virtue. B u t if the vice is a scandal. B y all o f these.APPENDIX On the Virtues of Social Intercourse (•virtutes homileticae) §48. w i t h o u t leavi n g the w o r l d . are citizens o f the w o r l d — not exactly in o r d e r to p r o m o t e as the e n d w h a t is best f o r the w o r l d b u t only to cultivate w h a t leads indirectly to this e n d : to cultivate a disposition o f reciprocity . a n d besides. that is. B u t the q u e s t i o n arises w h e t h e r o n e m a y also k e e p c o m p a n y with those w h o a r e w i c k e d . t h e n e v e n t h o u g h the law o f the land d o e s not p u n i s h it. m u t u a l love a n d respect (affability a n d p r o p r i e t y .p r o d u c t s ( parerqa ). i n d e e d . o n e m u s t b r e a k o f f the association that existed or avoid it as m u c h as possible. in their disposition. Affability. w h i c h t h e r e f o r e b r i n g s d i s h o n o r with it. o n e o u g h t to r e g a r d this circle d r a w n a r o u n d o n e as also f o r m i n g p a r t o f an all-inclusive circle o f those w h o . 265 [474] . a n d so they still p r o m o t e a v i r t u o u s disposition by at least m a k i n g v i r t u e fashionable. T h e s e a r e . only tokens. only externals or b y . courtesy. O n e c a n n o t avoid m e e t i n g t h e m . humanitas aesthetica et decorum). since c o n t i n u e d association with such a p e r s o n d e p r i v e s v i r t u e o f its h o n o r a n d puts it u p f o r sale to a n y o n e w h o is rich e n o u g h to bribe parasites with the pleasures o f l u x u r y . T o b r i n g this a b o u t is itself a d u t y o f virtue. hospitality. i n d e e d . sociability. o u r j u d g m e n t a b o u t t h e m is not c o m petent. tolerance. a n d gentleness (in d i s a g r e e i n g w i t h o u t q u a r r e l i n g ) are. It is a d u t y t o o n e s e l f as well as to o t h e r s n o t to isolate o n e s e l f (separatistam agere) b u t to use one's m o r a l p e r f e c t i o n s in social i n t e r c o u r s e (officium commercii. yet they p r o m o t e t h e f e e l i n g f o r v i r t u e itself by a striving to b r i n g this illusion as n e a r as possible to the truth. o n e binds o t h e r s too. w h i c h give a b e a u t i f u l illusion r e s e m b l i n g v i r t u e that is also not d e c e p t i v e since e v e r y o n e k n o w s h o w it m u s t b e taken. a publicly g i v e n e x a m p l e o f c o n t e m p t f o r the strict laws o f d u t y . w h i c h a r e m e r e l y the m a n n e r s o n e is o b l i g e d t o show in social intercourse. [477] D O C T R I N E OF T H E METHODS OF E T H I C S SECTION I Teaching Ethics3 §49T h e very c o n c e p t o f virtue already implies that v i r t u e m u s t b e a c q u i r e d (that it is not innate)." Ak. this too "Die ethische Didaktik. T h a t virtue can a n d must b e taught a l r e a d y follows f r o m its not b e i n g innate. t h e Stoics [in d e n y i n g that v i r t u e can b e taught] m e a n t only that v i r t u e c a n n o t b e taught m e r e l y by c o n c e p t s o f d u t y o r by e x h o r t a t i o n s (by paraenesis). B u t t h e decision to d o this m u s t b e m a d e all at o n c e a n d c o m p l e t e l y . 413. b u t m u s t instead b e exercised a n d cultivated by e f f o r t s to c o m b a t the i n n e r e n e m y w i t h i n m a n (asceticism). F o r man's m o r a l capacity w o u l d not b e virtue w e r e it not p r o d u c e d by t h e strength o f his r e s o l u t i o n in c o n f l i c t with p o w e r f u l o p p o s i n g inclinations. B u t since o n e d o e s not a c q u i r e t h e p o w e r to p u t the rules o f v i r t u e into practice m e r e l y by b e i n g t a u g h t h o w o n e o u g h t to b e h a v e in o r d e r to c o n f o r m with the c o n c e p t o f virtue. w i t h o u t h a v i n g first tried o u t a n d e x e r c i s e d one's p o w e r s . in o r d e r to b r e a k away f r o m it g r a d u a l l y . f o r o n e c a n n o t straightway d o all that o n e wants to d o . V i r t u e is the p r o d u c t o f p u r e practical r e a s o n i n s o f a r as it gains a s c e n d a n c y o v e r s u c h inclinations with consciousness o f its s u p r e m a c y (based o n f r e e d o m ) ." although in Ak. [478] §50. were distinguished. In the "second division of ethics. 411 two methods. cathechizing and dialogue. this was called "Catechizing. a n d so c o u l d b r i n g a b o u t n o virtue (which is b a s e d o n a single principle). 266 . w o u l d itself b e i m p u r e a n d e v e n vicious. A s f o r the m e t h o d o f t e a c h i n g ( f o r e v e r y scientific d o c t r i n e m u s t b e treated methodically. o n e n e e d not a p p e a l to a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e based o n e x p e r i e n c e to see this. otherwise it w o u l d b e set f o r t h chaotically). since a disposition (animus) to s u r r e n d e r at times to vice. a d o c t r i n e o f virtue is t h e r e f o r e something that can be taught [eine Doktrin]. as the basic teaching o f duties of virtue. responds with questions o f his own about obscurities in the propositions admitted or about his doubts regarding them. guides his y o u n g pupil's course o f thought merely by presenting him with cases in which his predisposition for certain concepts will develop (the teacher is the midwife o f the pupil's thoughts). for it is only by p u r e moral principles that a transition f r o m the doctrine o f virtue to religion can be made. by his questions. in the teachings o f religion but must rather be presented separately. that it should also provide rules to direct one in searching for things. T h e formal principle of [479] .. and (as far as its f o r m is concerned) it needs only to be adapted to rules of teaching suited f o r the earliest instruction. since otherwise the professions o f religion would be impure. even the worthiest and most eminent theologians have hesitated to draw u p a catechism for teaching statutory religion (which they would personally answer for). (For logic has not yet taken sufficiently to heart the challenge issued to it. and moreover h e o f t e n makes use o f it. T h e pupil. involves no such scruple or difficulty since (as far as its content is concerned) it can be developed f r o m ordinary h u m a n reason. w h e n the teacher asks his pupils what he wants to teach them. and so provides occasions f o r the teacher himself to learn how to question skillfully. though one would have thought this the least that could be expected f r o m the vast treasury o f their learning. merely as an interpolation. or else by questions. w h o thus sees that he himself can think.e. Such a theory can be a guide even to the mathematician in his discoveries. For their own part. w h e n all those to w h o m it is directed merely listen. by which one is led to thoughts. T h e teacher. T h i s must precede a religious catechism. But a p u r e moral catechism. divided into the method o f dialogue and that o f catechism. it should not limit itself to giving rules f o r conclusive j u d g m e n t s but should also provide rules f o r preliminary j u d g m e n t s [indicia praevia]. A n d this erotetic method is. it cannot be interwoven.) For the beginning pupil the first and most essential instrument for teaching the doctrine o f virtue is a moral catechism. in turn. d e p e n d i n g on whether the teacher addresses his questions to the pupil's reason or just to his memory. according to the saying docendo discimus. i. as a self-subsistent whole. B u t it can be set forth either by lectures. For if the teacher wants to question his pupil's reason he must d o this in a dialogue in which teacher and pupil question and answer each other in turn.The Doctrine of Right g 267 must be systematic and not fragmentary if the doctrine o f virtue is to be presented as a science. F o r a m a x i m o f v i r t u e consists precisely in the subjective a u t o n o m y o f e a c h man's practical r e a s o n a n d so implies that the law itself. it is a m e c h a n i s m o f sense r a t h e r t h a n a principle o f t h o u g h t (and o n e that is easier to acquire t h a n to get rid of a f t e r w a r d ) . t h r o u g h f r e q u e n t l y r e p e a t e d gratifications o f that inclination. A s f o r the p o w e r o f e x a m p l e s * ( g o o d o r b a d ) that c a n b e h e l d u p to the p r o p e n s i t y f o r imitation o r w a r n i n g . f o r a still u n d e v e l o p e d h u m a n b e i n g . is commonly used as synonymous with Exempel [example]. [480] . but with the Idea (of h u m a n i t y ) . a German word. T o f o r m a habit is to establish a lasting inclination a p a r t f r o m any m a x i m . a n d so the t e a c h e r a l o n e d o e s t h e q u e s t i o n i n g . whereas an instance is only a particular (concretum).268 The Metaphysics of Morals s u c h instruction d o e s not. represented in accordance with concepts as contained under a universal (abstract-urn). and is a presentation of a concept merely for theory. insofar as this rule represents an action as practicable or impracticable. but the two words really do not have the same meaning. w h a t o t h e r s give us c a n establish n o m a x i m o f virtue. with m a n as h e o u g h t to be. a n d so c o m p a r i s o n with the law. §52T h e experimental (technical) m e a n s f o r cultivating v i r t u e is good e x a m ple o n t h e part o f t h e t e a c h e r (his e x e m p l a r y c o n d u c t ) a n d cautionary e x a m p l e in o t h e r s . h o w e v e r . To take something as an example and to bring forward an instance to clarify an expression are altogether different concepts. since. *Betsptel [instance]. A c c o r d i n g l y . An example is a particular case of a practical rule. not the c o n d u c t o f o t h e r m e n . a t e a c h e r will not tell his n a u g h t y p u p i l : T a k e an e x a m p l e f r o m that g o o d (orderly. w h o puts h i m in a n u n f a v o r a b l e light. diligent) b o y ! F o r this w o u l d only cause h i m to hate that b o y . So it is not c o m p a r i s o n with any o t h e r m a n w h a t s o e v e r (with m a n as h e is). A g o o d e x a m p l e ( e x e m p l a r y c o n d u c t ) s h o u l d not serve as a m o d e l b u t only as a p r o o f that it is really possible to act in c o n f o r m i t y with duty. since t h e p u p i l has n o i d e a w h a t questions to ask. m u s t serve as o u r incentive. imitation is the first d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f his will to accept m a x i m s that h e a f t e r w a r d m a k e s f o r himself. B u t t h e a n s w e r that h e methodically d r a w s f r o m the pupil's r e a s o n m u s t b e written d o w n a n d p r e s e r v e d in d e f i n i t e w o r d s that c a n n o t easily b e altered. that m u s t serve as the constant s t a n d a r d o f a teacher's instruction. a n d so b e c o m m i t t e d to t h e pupil's memory. S o t h e way o f t e a c h i n g by catechism d i f f e r s f r o m b o t h the dogmatic w a y (in w h i c h only t h e t e a c h e r speaks) a n d the way o f dialogue (in w h i c h b o t h t e a c h e r a n d p u p i l q u e s t i o n a n d a n s w e r each other). p e r m i t Socratic dialogue as the way o f t e a c h i n g f o r this p u r p o s e . y o u still w o u l d not give it w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n to a n y o n e w h o p u t o u t his h a n d f o r it. T e a c h e r : W h a t is y o u r greatest. the teacher. T e a c h e r : N o w that p r o v e s that y o u h a v e a g o o d e n o u g h heart. e n j o y m e n t o f life. W o u l d y o u really give a lazy fellow soft cushions so that h e c o u l d pass his life away in sweet idleness? O r w o u l d y o u see to it that a d r u n k a r d is n e v e r short o f wine a n d w h a t e v e r else h e n e e d s to get d r u n k ? W o u l d y o u give a swindler a c h a r m i n g air a n d m a n n e r to d u p e o t h e r p e o p l e ? A n d w o u l d y o u give a violent m a n audacity a n d s t r o n g fists so that h e c o u l d c r u s h o t h e r p e o p l e ? E a c h o f these things is a m e a n s that s o m e b o d y wishes f o r in o r d e r to be h a p p y in his o w n way. T e a c h e r : B u t d o e s n ' t it o c c u r to y o u to ask. that e v e n if y o u h a d all h a p p i n e s s in y o u r h a n d s a n d . T e a c h e r : Y o u see. desire in life? Pupil: (is silent) T e a c h e r : T h a t everything s h o u l d always g o the way y o u w o u l d like it to. in fact y o u r w h o l e . 2. by q u e s t i o n i n g . a n d s h o u l d the p u p i l not k n o w h o w to a n s w e r the question. B u t as f o r y o u r s e l f . suggests the a n s w e r to h i m . g u i d i n g his reason.The Doctrine of Remark Fragment of a Moral Right g 269 Catechism T h e t e a c h e r elicits f r o m his pupil's reason. t h e n . 5. w o u l d y o u k e e p it all f o r y o u r s e l f o r w o u l d y o u s h a r e it with y o u r f e l l o w . 3. b u t let us see w h e t h e r y o u h a v e a g o o d head to g o a l o n g with it. 4. w h a t h e wants to teach h i m . a l o n g with it. T e a c h e r : N o w the f o r c e in y o u that strives only t o w a r d h a p p i n e s s is inclination. w o u l d y o u at least h a v e n o scruples a b o u t first p r o v i d i n g y o u r s e l f with e v e r y t h i n g that y o u c o u n t in your happiness? Pupil: I w o u l d h a v e n o n e . Pupil: No. instead y o u w o u l d first try to find o u t to w h a t e x t e n t each was w o r t h y o f happiness. T e a c h e r : W h a t is such a c o n d i t i o n called? Pupil: (is silent) T e a c h e r : It is called happiness (continuous well-being. w h e t h e r y o u y o u r self are w o r t h y o f happiness? Pupil: O f c o u r s e .m e n ? Pupil: I w o u l d s h a r e it with o t h e r s a n d m a k e t h e m h a p p y a n d satisfied too. b u t that w h i c h limits y o u r inclination to the c o n d i t i o n o f [481] . T e a c h e r : N o w if it w e r e u p to y o u to dispose o f all h a p p i n e s s (possible in the world). the best will. I w o u l d not. again. c o m p l e t e satisfaction with one's condition). 1. unless some other p o w e r is a d d e d . Teacher: B u t even if we are conscious of such a g o o d a n d active will in us. L y i n g is mean and makes a m a n unworthy o f happiness.270 The Metaphysics of Morals y o u r first b e i n g worthy of happiness is y o u r reason. a wisdom so widespread and p r o f o u n d that we can explain it to ourselves only by the inexpressibly great art o f a creator of the world. H e r e is an unconditional necessitation t h r o u g h a c o m m a n d (or prohibition) of reason. Your own reason teaches you what you have to d o a n d directly c o m m a n d s you to d o it. a n d in the face of it all my inclinations must be silent. T h i s amounts to saying that y o u need not learn this rule for y o u r conduct f r o m experience or be taught it by other men. rather. in fact. a power o r d e r i n g the whole of nature and g o v e r n i n g the world with supreme wisdom? that is. 6. 7. by virtue o f which we consider ourselves worthy (or at least not unworthy) o f happiness. f o r e x a m p l e . O u r good f o r t u n e in life (our welfare in general) depends. which reason lays directly u p o n a man. Teacher: So a man's observance o f his duty is the universal and sole condition o f his worthiness to be happy. 8. For it is not always within o u r p o w e r to provide ourselves with happiness. can we base on this a sure h o p e of sharing in happiness? Pupil: No. which we can j u d g e . Suppose. that a situation arises in which you could get a great benefit f o r yourself o r y o u r friend by making u p a subtle lie that would h a r m n o one: W h a t does y o u r reason say about it? Pupil: T h a t I o u g h t not to lie. the rule and instruction in this lies in y o u r reason alone. on circumstances that are far f r o m all being in man's control. which apportions happiness in accordance with a man's merit or guilt. So o u r happiness always remains a wish that cannot become a hope. o f acting in conformity with its law? Pupil: It is called duty. and the course of nature does not of itself c o n f o r m with merit. any g r o u n d s f o r believing in God? Pupil: Yes. which I must obey. For we see in the works of nature. not o n this alone. any grounds o f its own f o r assuming the existence o f such a power. T e a c h e r : W h a t d o we call this necessity. Teacher: Has reason. and his worthiness to be h a p p y is identical with his observance of duty. no matter how great the benefits to myself and my friend might be. A n d with regard to the moral order. T e a c h e r : A s to how y o u should set about sharing in happiness and also b e c o m i n g at least not unworthy o f it. we have reason to expect a no less wise [482] . which is the highest a d o r n m e n t o f the world. and y o u r capacity to restrain and overcome y o u r inclinations by y o u r reason is the f r e e d o m o f y o u r will. The Doctrine of Right g 271 regime. such that if we d o not make ourselves unworthy of happiness. with regard for the differences in age. then there is still something that must come at the end. but quite purely on the moral principle. and rank which he gradually encounters. the very incomprehensibility in this self-knowledge must p r o d u c e an exaltation in his soul which only inspires it the more to hold its duty sacred. the concept o f duty itself vanishes and dissolves into mere pragmatic precepts. In this catechism. by violating o u r duty. the question arises of itself. For unless the dignity o f virtue is exalted above everything else in actions. merely as an instrument. by way o f summary. W h e n . and sufferings o f life — not even the threat o f death — which may befall him because he faithfully attends to his duty can rob him o f consciousness o f being their master and superior to them all. namely. that must be emphasized above all. which moves the soul inwardly and puts a man in a position in which he can look u p o n himself only with the greatest w o n d e r at the original predisposition dwelling within him. O n l y casual mention should be made o f advantages and disadvantages. sex. we can also h o p e to share in happiness. in the case of each o f them. then the question is very close to him: W h a t is it in you that can be trusted to enter into combat with all the forces o f nature within you and around you and to conquer them if they come into conflict with your moral principles? A l t h o u g h the solution to this question lies completely beyond the capacity o f speculative reason. for the taste o f those w h o are weak by nature. the impression o f which is never erased. the greatest care must be taken to base the command o f duty not on the advantages or disadvantages that follow f r o m observing it. T h e advantage o f this is not only that it is a culti- [483] . at the end o f his instruction his duties are once more. Now when this is wisely and carefully developed out o f a man's own reason. as o f a supplement which could really be dispensed with but which is serviceable. and if he takes it to heart. and when. the m o r e it is assailed. It is the shamefulness of vice. whether for the m a n it is to put u n d e r obligation or even f o r others. since man's consciousness o f his own nobility then disappears and he is f o r sale and can be b o u g h t for a price that the seductive inclinations o f f e r him. not its harmfulness (to the agent himself). recounted in their o r d e r (recapitulated). which must be carried out through all the articles o f virtue and vice. his attention is drawn to the fact that none o f the pains. In this catechistic moral instruction it would be most helpful to the pupil's moral development to raise some casuistical questions in the analysis o f every duty and to let the assembled children test their understanding by having each say how he would solve the tricky problem put to him. hardships. the pupil must always be b r o u g h t to a clear insight into the moral catechism. he will a c k n o w l e d g e duties out of f e a r and f e i g n an interest in them that is not in his heart. b r o u g h t to a science (in which he is now proficient).272 [484] Metaphysics of Morals vation of reason most suited to the capacity o f the u n d e v e l o p e d (since questions about what one's duty is can be decided far m o r e easily than speculative questions). B u t it is most important in this education not to present the moral catechism mixed with the religious one (to combine t h e m into one) or. For otherwise the religion that he a f t e r w a r d professes will be nothing but hypocrisy. and so. what is worse yet. by his o w n handling. which should be presented with the utmost diligence and thoroughness. by this sort of practice. O n the contrary. the pupil is d r a w n without noticing it to an interest in morality. a n d so is the most appropriate way to sharpen the understanding of y o u n g people in general. . Its advantage lies especially in the fact that it is natural f o r a m a n to love a subject which he has. to have it follow u p o n the religious catechism. 1. takes as its m o t t o the Stoic saying: A c c u s t o m y o u r s e l f to put up with the m i s f o r t u n e s o f life that m a y h a p p e n a n d to do without its s u p e r f l u o u s pleasures (assuesce incommodis et descuesce commoditatibus vitae). F o r w h o s h o u l d h a v e m o r e reason f o r b e i n g o f a c h e e r f u l spirit. B u t such punish" "Let this be o u r wall of bronze. the cultivation o f virtue. w h i c h f r o m superstitions f e a r or h y p o critical l o a t h i n g o f o n e s e l f g o e s to w o r k with self-torture a n d m o r t i f i cation o f the f l e s h .. a n d not e v e n f i n d i n g it a d u t y to p u t h i m s e l f in a c h e e r f u l f r a m e o f m i n d a n d m a k e it habitual. it also involves sacrificing m a n y o f the j o y s o f life. a f f o r d s an a g r e e a b l e e n j o y m e n t to life. instead. t h o u g h it is only m o r a l ." etc. the loss o f w h i c h can s o m e t i m e s m a k e one's m i n d g l o o m y a n d sullen.)a O n the o t h e r h a n d . B u t health is only a n e g a t i v e k i n d o f well-being: It c a n n o t itself be felt. m o n k i s h ascetics. spirited. T h i s is a k i n d o f regimen [Diätetik] f o r k e e p i n g a m a n healthy.SECTION II Ethical Ascetics §53T h e rules f o r practicing virtue (exercitiorum virtutis) a i m at a f r a m e o f m i n d that is b o t h valiant a n d cheerful in f u l f i l l i n g its duties (animus strenuus et hilaris). S o m e t h i n g m u s t b e a d d e d to it. is not directed to virtue b u t r a t h e r to fantastically p u r g i n g o n e s e l f o f sin by i m p o s i n g p u n i s h m e n t s o n oneself. With r e g a r d to the principle o f a v i g o r o u s . h e shirks as m u c h as possible occasions f o r practicing virtue. t h a n o n e w h o is a w a r e o f n o intentional transgression in h i m s e l f a n d is s e c u r e d against f a l l i n g into any? (hie murus aheneus esto etc. T h i s is the e v e r . a c c o r d i n g to the idea o f t h e virtuous Epicurus. a n d valiant practice o f virtue. B u t w h a t is not d o n e w i t h p l e a s u r e b u t m e r e l y as c o m p u l s o r y service has n o i n n e r w o r t h f o r o n e w h o attends to his d u t y in this way a n d such service is not loved by h i m . Horace. that is. s o m e t h i n g w h i c h . Epistles I. Horat.c h e e r f u l heart. m o r a l ascetics. F o r virtue not only has to m u s t e r all its f o r c e s to o v e r c o m e the obstacles it m u s t c o n t e n d with. 60. it wants to do penance by p u n i s h m e n t s c h o s e n a n d inflicted by oneself. Instead o f morally repenting sins (with a view to i m p r o v i n g ) . [485] 273 . consists only in combating natural impulses sufficiently to be able to master them w h e n a situation comes u p in which they threaten morality. makes virtue itself hated and drives adherents away f r o m it. but d o i n g penance. it is even a duty not to let this recollection disappear. H e n c e the training (discipline) that a m a n practices on himself can b e c o m e meritorious and e x e m p l a r y only t h r o u g h the cheerfulness that accompanies it. two very d i f f e r e n t precautionary measures. in fact. T o repent o f a past transgression w h e n one recalls it is unavoidable and. gloomy. T o repent o f something and to impose a penance on oneself (such as a fast) not f o r hygienic but f o r pious considerations are. but m u c h rather brings with it secret hatred f o r virtue's c o m m a n d . which is cheerless. morally speaking. h e n c e it makes one valiant and c h e e r f u l in the consciousness o f one's restored freed o m .274 The Metaphysics of Morals ment is a contradiction (because punishment must always be imposed by another). and sullen. Ethical gymnastics. it cannot p r o d u c e the cheerfulness that accompanies virtue. . therefore. m o r e o v e r . his o f f e r . t h e n is t h e r e n o d a n g e r o f b e i n g c a u g h t in a lie deliberately told j u s t in o r d e r to d e c e i v e H i m ? [487] 275 . at t h e s a m e time. neque ut smt. 1 0 2 In d o i n g this the A t h e n i a n j u d g e s . I do not know what to say. it m i g h t seem. that there are gods?** B u t granting this belief and admitting that religion is an integral part o f the general doctrine of duties. A l t h o u g h it w o u l d be a b s u r d to swear in e a r n e s t that t h e r e is a G o d (because o n e m u s t a l r e a d y h a v e postulated this in o r d e r to be able to take a n o a t h at all). a g r e a t a n d wise m o r a l l a w g i v e r c o m p l e t e l y f o r b a d e the t a k i n g o f oaths as s o m e t h i n g a b s u r d a n d ."* For this the Athenians d r o v e him o f f his land and f r o m the city and b u r n e d his books b e f o r e the public assembly. h o w e v e r . involves n o risk f o r h i m . the problem now is to determine the boundaries o f the science to which it belongs. habeo dicere. e v e r y o a t h that has b e e n t a k e n b o t h sincerely a n d c i r c u m s p e c t l y m a y well h a v e b e e n t a k e n in j u s t this sense. or must it be r e g a r d e d as lying entirely b e y o n d the b o u n d s o f a purely philosophic morals? T h e formal aspect o f all religion. on high authority (de par le Senat). Is it to be considered a part o f ethics (for what is in question h e r e cannot be the rights o f m e n against one another). a n d liberal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f that p r o h i b i t i o n h a v e b e e n t h o u g h t u p in o r d e r to s o f t e n it. if religion is d e f i n e d [erklärt ] as "the sum of all duties as (instar) divine commands." belongs to philosophic *"De diis. w h e t h e r h e believes in G o d o r not. a n d by s u c h an o a t h I r u n n o risk. almost b o r d e r i n g o n blasp h e m y . I f t h e r e is a G o d (the d e c e i v e r will say). as men. if t h e r e is n o G o d . B u t if there is a God. h o w e v e r . B o o k 3." * * L a t e r o n . C h a p t e r I). F o r if s o m e o n e is willing simply to swear that G o d exists. But as officials of the state and j u d g e s they p r o c e e d e d quite rightly and consistently. t h e n I h a v e hit t h e m a r k .[486] CONCLUSION Religion as the Doctrine of Duties to God Lies Beyond the Bounds of Pure Moral Philosophy Protagoras o f A b d e r a b e g a n his b o o k with the words: "As for whether there are gods or not. (Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria. t h e q u e s t i o n still r e m a i n s : w h e t h e r an o a t h w o u l d not be possible a n d valid if s o m e o n e swears only in case t h e r e is a G o d (like P r o t a g o r a s . f o r how could a man swear an oath unless it had been decreed publicly and lawfully. did him a great wrong. neque ut non sint. f r o m a political p o i n t o f view p e o p l e still m a i n t a i n that this d e v i c e is quite i n d i s p e n s a b l e as a m e a n s s e r v i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f p u b l i c j u s t i c e . t h e n n e i t h e r is t h e r e a n y o n e to call m e to a c c o u n t . d e c i d i n g n o t h i n g a b o u t it)? I n fact. conceived in that sense. not a priori. the service to be p e r f o r m e d f o r him (adpraestandum). in o r d e r to m a k e it complete. and considers only the harmony of p u r e practical reason with these (shows that there is n o conflict between them). B u t this duty with regard to God (properly speaking. and to assume it not at will but rather as something that could be set forth as given directly (or indirectly) in experience. But such a religion would still comprise no part o f a purely philosophic morals. T h e y would t h e r e f o r e also have to assume the existence of such a Being. We can indeed speak of a "Religion within the Limits [or Bounds ] of Reason A l o n e . and this does not yet make a duty o f religion into a duty to (erga) G o d . that is. namely God's (of which reason in giving universal laws is only the spokesman). T h e g r o u n d on which man is to think o f all his duties in k e e p i n g with this formal aspect o f religion (their relation to a divine will given a priori) is only subjectively logical.276 The Metaphysics of Morals morals. with regard to the Idea we ourselves m a k e o f such a Being) is a duty o f m a n to himself. and this serves to justify the author o f the present ethical work f o r not having followed the usual practice o f bringing religion. it is not objective. an obligation to p e r f o r m certain services f o r another. for the sake o f strengthening the moral incentive in o u r own lav/giving reason. since this definition expresses only the relation o f reason to the Idea of G o d which reason makes for itself. But in that case as well religion is not pure. derived from reason alone but is also based on the teachings o f history and revelation. the sum o f duties to (erga) G o d . so that they could be known by us only empirically. " 1 0 3 which is not. and would therefore belong only to revealed religion. into ethics. n o matter how well-grounded it might otherwise be. since we still abstract f r o m His existence. it is rather religion applied to a history h a n d e d d o w n to us. [488] So religion as the doctrine of duties to G o d lies entirely beyond the bounds o f purely philosophic ethics. which involve a principle of the h a r m o n y of the will of one with that o f another. that is. T h a t is to say. we cannot very well make obligation (moral constraint) intuitive f o r ourselves without thereby thinking o f another's will. and there is no place for it in an ethics that is p u r e practical philosophyConcluding Remark All moral relations o f rational beings. however. as a B e i n g existing outside o u r Idea. B u t as f o r the material aspect o f religion. not merely the Idea o f Him for practical purposes. can be . but only subjective. this would be able to contain special duties as divine c o m m a n d s that do not proceed only f r o m reason giving universal laws. but o f a violation supposed to be d o n e to G o d Himself and His right. But in the Idea o f an exercise o f justice by a B e i n g W h o is above any interference with His ends there is something that cannot well be reconciled with men's relation to G o d : namely. which limits the effects o f love. 1 0 4 still less can a claim to compensation {merces) be made by such beings. the moral relation o f men to men. For there is no place for reward (praemium. can be none other than that o f justice. B u t in the j u d g m e n t o f our own reason. to another's right. whose wills limit one another. for what is in question here is not men's violations o f each other's rights. as it were. that is. and in the case o f respect. T h e concept o f this is transcendent. remunerate gratuita) injustice toward beings w h o have only duties and no rights in relation to another. accordingly. insofar as this principle is practical. but only in His love and beneficence (benignitas) toward them. that is.e. If one o f these is a being that has only rights and no duties to the other (God) so that the other has only duties and no rights against him. quite empty for ° u r practical reason. has an immanent principle.) God's e n d with regard to the h u m a n race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought only as proceeding f r o m love. passes sentence. the concept o f a wrong that could be done to the infinite and inaccessible ruler o f the world. and the claim is that o f punitive justice. that is. on which G o d .. T o express this in h u m a n terms. T h e r e no particular j u d g i n g being that exercises it (for then this being [489] . to have something outside Himself which H e could love or by which He could also be loved. as the punishing j u d g e . Here the Idea o f divine punitive justice is personified. G o d has created rational beings f r o m the need. B u t the principle of God's will with regard to the respect (awe) due to Him. in the case o f love the basis for determining one's will can be reduced to another's end. the claim that divine justice makes u p o n us is not only as great but even greater (because the principle is a limiting one). (On the other hand. and. as the happiness of men. and compensatory justice (iustitia brabeutica) in the relation o f G o d to men is a contradiction. it lies entirely beyond the concept o f any punitive justice for which we can bring forward any instance (i. then the principle o f the moral relation between them is transcendent. the principle of God's right.The Doctrine of Right g 277 reduced to love and respect. any instance a m o n g men) and involves extravagant principles that cannot be b r o u g h t into accord with those we would use in cases o f experience and that are. then it must take place in a life after death. F o r a m a n . is j u d g e d as a supersensible o b j e c t by a s u p e r s e n s i b l e j u d g e . inevitable necessity which we cannot penetrate further. it is f r o m t h e necessity o f p u n i s h m e n t that t h e i n f e r e n c e to a f u t u r e life is d r a w n .is only his e x i s t e n c e in a p p e a r a n c e . like the fate (destiny) o f the ancient philosophical poets. indeed. All of this makes it clear that this j u d g m e n t o f condemnation is not attributed to a person administering justice (for the person could not p r o n o u n c e in this way without d o i n g others wrong). if punishment does not strike the criminal. which is always the happiness o f men. Punishment (according to Horace) 1 0 5 does not let the criminal out o f its sight as he strides proudly b e f o r e it. but rather that justice by itself. is above even Jupiter — that pronounces on rights in accordance with an iron. only his existence is r e l e v a n t h e r e . rather. but it conflicts with the material aspect o f it. c o m e first. C r i m e cannot remain u n a v e n g e d . Blood innocently shed cries out f o r vengeance. as a transcendent principle ascribed to a supersensible subject. the end). even if a completely innocent person should have to o f f e r himself to atone f o r it (in which case the s u f f e r i n g he took u p o n himself could not properly be called punishment. so as to let t h e e f f e c t o f criminal j u s t i c e u p o n it be seen. For. His life o n e a r t h — be it s h o r t o r l o n g o r e v e n e v e r l a s t i n g . it keeps limping after him until it catches him. in o r d e r to p r e s e n t that threat o f p u n i s h m e n t as c o m p l e t e l y f u l f i l l e d . punitive justice would make the end o f creation consist not in the creator's love (as one must yet think it to be) but rather in the strict observance o f His right (it would make God's right itself. B u t since the latter (justice) is only the condition limiting the f o r m e r It is n o t e v e n necessary to b r i n g the h y p o t h e s i s o f a f u t u r e life into this. m u r d e r i n g duelist f o r w h o m y o u intercede. with the formal aspect o f this principle. located in His glory. o r if it does not befall him d u r i n g his lifetime. Guilt for sins must be expiated. All o f this conforms. Now some instances of this. a wise ruler once said. which is accepted and readily believed in expressly so that the claim o f eternal justice may be settled. I will not allow blood-guilt to come u p o n my land by granting p a r d o n to an evil. c o n s i d e r e d in t e r m s o f his morality. a n d the c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e d o e s n o t n e e d to be d e t e r m i n e d m o r e closely since belief in a f u t u r e life d o e s not. p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g . instead it is justice — as if it were a substance (otherwise called eternal justice) which. n o t u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f time. in view of the eventual multitude o f criminals w h o k e e p the register of their guilt r u n n i n g on and on. determines the right o f this being. since he himself had committed no crime). . the end. o n the c o n t r a r y .278 The Metaphysics of Morals [490] would come into conflict with principles of Right). then his descendants must s u f f e r it. by which the creation of a world must have been omitted if it would have produced a result so contrary to the intention o f its author. as pure practical philosophy of internal lawgiving. This.The Doctrine of Right g 279 [491] (benevolence). only the moral relations of men to men are conceivable by us. T h e question o f what sort o f moral relation holds between G o d and man goes completely beyond the bounds o f ethics and is altogether inconceivable for us. then. which can have only love for its basis. From all this it is clear that in ethics. this seems to contradict principles o f practical reason. confirms what was maintained above: that ethics cannot extend beyond the limits o f men's duties to one another. . [492] Table of the division of ethics I. D O C T R I N E O F T H E E L E M E N T S O F E T H I C S . P A R T I. O n M a n ' s Duties to Himself. B O O K I. O n M a n ' s Perfect Duties to H i m s e l f . C h a p t e r I. O n M a n ' s Duties to H i m s e l f as a n Animal C h a p t e r II. O n M a n ' s Duties to H i m s e l f M e r e l y as a Moral S e c t i o n I. O n M a n ' s Duties to H i m s e l f as His O w n I n n a t e Judge. II. O n t h e First C o m mSection and of A l l Duties to O n e s e l f . E p i s o d i c Section. O n an A m p h i b o l y in M o r a l Concepts of Reflection with R e g a r d to D u t i e s to O n e s e l f . Being. Being. [493] Book O n M a n ' s Imperfect D u t i e s to H i m s e l f with R e g a r d to His E n d . Section I. O n the D u t y to O n e s e l f to D e v e l o p a n d I n c r e a s e One's Natural Perfection. S e c t i o n II. O n t h e D u t y to O n e s e l f to I n c r e a s e One's Moral Perfection. P A R T II. O n Ethical Duties to Others. C h a p t e r I. O n Duties to O t h e r s Merely as Men. S e c t i o n I. O n t h e Duty of Love to O t h e r M e n . S e c t i o n II. O n the Duty of Respect f o r O t h e r s . C h a p t e r II. O n D u t y to O t h e r s in A c c o r d a n c e with In Their Condition. Differences Conclusion of the Doctrine o f Elements. O n t h e Most I n t i m a t e U n i o n o f L o v e with R e s p e c t in F r i e n d s h i p . II. D O C T R I N E O F T H E M E T H O D S O F E T H I C S S e c t i o n I. T e a c h i n g Ethics. Section II. Ethical Ascetics. C o n c l u s i o n o f t h e Entire Ethics. Translator's Notes to the Text 1 On the term "Right" (Recht) see Translator's Note on the Text, page x. As for "doctrine," Kant concludes his Preface to the Critique ofJudgment by noting that this critique concludes the critical part of his enterprise and that he will now proceed to the doctrinal (doktrinell) part, i.e., to the application of the principles established in the First two critiques in a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals (Ak. V, 170). 2 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenshaft (1785), Ak. V. 3 Christian Garve (1742—1798) was professor of philosophy at Leipzig. Part I of Kant's essay "On the Common Saying: That May Be True in Theory But It Does Not Apply in Practice" (1793), Ak. VIII, which deals with the relation of theory to practice in moral philosophy in general, is a reply to some objections raised by Garve in his Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral und Literatur. Kant's reference to Garve in the present context is topical, since in his Vermischte Aufsätze (1796) Garve complains about the mischief that "various authors of the Kantian school" (though not Kant himself) have been making in popular philosophy. 4 Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794), whose discovery of the role of oxygen in combustion and influence in establishing the nomenclature of chemistry earned him the title of principal architect of the new science of chemistry. 5 On John Brown's system, see my introduction to the translation of Kant's Rektoratsrede, "On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body," in Lewis W. Beck, ed., Kant's Latin Writings (New York and Berne: Peter Lang, 1986). 6 Christian Hausen (1693-1745) was professor of mathematics at Leipzig. According to Natorp (Ak.V, 505-7), the reviewer from Tübingen was probably the same Johann Friedrich Flatt to whom Kant refers in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason. Flatt's recurrent theme, that Kant's cardinal distinctions had already been made in substance by other writers, seems to have been one that annoyed Kant. 7 See Walter Strauss, Friedrich Nicolai und die kritische Philosophie: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Aufklärung (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1927). In 1796 Nicolai, in his Beschreibung einer Reise durch Deutschland und die Schweiz im Jahre 1781, ridiculed the use to which Schiller and his followers had put Kantian terminology. Despite Kant's warning that this criticism should not be extended to critical philosophy itself, Nicolai did just that with his Leben und Meinungen 281 282 Notes to Pages 38-46 Sempronius Gundiberts (1798), which called forth Kant's Ueber die Buchmacherei: Zwei Briefe an Herrn Friedrich Nicolai (Ak. VIII, 431—8). 8 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury ( 1 6 5 1 - 1 7 1 3 ) . T h e reference is to his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Treatise II, "Sensus communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour" (170g), Section I: "Truth . . . may bear all Lights: and one of those principal Lights . . . is Ridicule itself. . . . So much, at least, is allow'd by All, who at any time appeal to this Criterion." 9 That the Doctrine of Right was written and published before the Doctrine of Virtue accounts for the title page [203] and Table of Contents [210] in the Akademie edition. 10 T h e distinction I have marked between the "capacity for desire" and "desire in the narrow sense" is that between Begehrungsvermögen and Begierde. 11 In this initial occurrence of the terms Willkür and Wille I have, when it seemed advisable, translated Willkür fully, as "the capacity for choice." I have done so again at the beginning of The Doctrine of Virtue. Hereafter, Willkür is translated simply as "choice" except when it is necessary to distinguish Willkür occurring with the indefinite article from Wahl, "a choice" or "his choice" (i.e., a choice he makes); the corresponding verb is wählen. Something is lost by this translation of Willkür in passages where Kant is discussing the relation of Willkür and Wille. What militates against consistently translating Willkür as "the capacity for choice" is not so much the wordiness this would involve; it is rather that Kant seems at times to use Willkür to signify the exercise of this capacity or external actions resulting from it. To indicate this would, however, involve distorting the German text. It should also be noted that, having drawn the distinction between Willkür and Wille, Kant does not always observe it. Nevertheless, careful attention would seem to be required here in view of Kant's assertion (Ak. 2i8n) that der Akt der freien Willkür überhaupt is the highest concept in the system of the metaphysics of morals. 12 mit den Lehren der Sittlichkeit. In Ak. 219 Kant distinguishes between the legality of an action and its Moralität (Sittlichkeit); drawing the same distinction in Ak. 225 he uses Sittlichkeit (moralitas). In the present context, however, it would seem that he continues to discuss what he has been calling Sittenlehre, i.e., the "doctrine of morals" or of duties generally. In Ak. 239 he refers to the metaphysics of morals in both its parts as Sittenlehre (Moral ). 13 Kunst. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ak.IV, 415) Kant calls such precepts those of "skill" (Geschicklichkeit). 14 von den pathologischen Bestimmungsgründen der Willkür. In order to avoid the suggestion of "diseased," pathologisch is translated throughout as "sensibly dependent." 15 rechtlich. T h e term is introduced here as, apparently, synonymous with "juridical" (juridisch). Once the concept of a right is derived, in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, rechtlich seems often to be used in the general sense of "having to do with a right or rights." I have so used it in the remainder of the Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals. T h e term becomes prominent in Private Right. See notes 28 and 32 below. 283 Notes to Pages 38-46 16 genötigt (necessitiert). Kant repeatedly gives Zwang (constraint) and Nötigung (necessitation) as synonyms. Although Nötigung is perhaps his favored term, I have often translated Nötigung by the more common English word "constraint." Kant uses Zwang (and zwingen) for both the constraint exercised upon one's capacity for choice by one's own will, through the thought of duty, and the constraint exercised by another's choice, through one's aversions. When Zwang occurs in the context of Right and without the modifier äussere (external), I have translated it as "coercion" (in keeping with III of the Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals). As the text makes clear, coercion in accordance with a universal law of outer freedom constitutes obligation. 17 zur Verpflichtung. Although Kant apparently uses both Verbindlichkeit and Verpflichtung for "obligation," the latter seems at times to have the sense of "put under obligation" and to be closely related to verbinden, which I often translate as "to bind." 18 Erklärungsprinzip. As Kant notes in the Critique of Pure Reason, A:73o; B:758, the German language has only one word, Erklärung, to express "exposition," "explication," "declaration," and "definition." Despite the strictures he places upon "definition," he adds that "we need not be so stringent in our requirements as altogether to refuse to philosophic expositions [Erklärungen] the honorable title, definition." At the conclusion of the present paragraph he gives definitio hybrida as equivalent to Bastarderklärung. See also his use of Definition and Erklärung (or definieren and erklären) in, e.g., Ak. 248—9, 260, and 286—7. In the Doctrine of Right, as well as in those passages of the Doctrine of Virtue where Kant discusses the Erklärung of the concept of virtue, I have used "define" and "definition," indicating the German in brackets. 19 willkürlich. See Ak. 224, where Kant says that in the case of positive laws the legislator binds others durch seine blosse Willkür. Because it is not always possible to translate willkürlich as "chosen," I have used a variety of words: "at will," "willful," "optional" and "voluntary" — although "voluntary" is also used for freiwillig. 20 unrechtmässig. See note 33 below. 21 was Rechtens sei. According to Ak. XXIII, 262, what is laid down as right (Rechtens, iuris est) is what is right in accordance with positive laws. 22 In Ak. 223—4 Kant used gerecht and ungerecht, iustum and iniustum, for what is right or wrong in accordance with external laws, and recht and unrecht for what is right or wrong generally. In the Doctrine of Right he uses simply recht and unrecht, although the context makes it clear that only external laws are under consideration. 23 als Fakta, perhaps "as deeds." In Ak. 227 factum was given as the parenthetical equivalent of Tat or "deed." In a number of passages it is unclear whether Tat is to be taken as "fact" or as "deed." 24 Zustand. Throughout the Doctrine of Right I have translated Zustand as "condition" except 1) where the familiar term "state of nature" is called for and 2) where it seems to require the translation "status," in Kant's discussion of rights to persons akin to rights to things. In the Doctrine of Virtue, where 284 Notes to Pages 38-46 there is no occasion for mistaking "state" for Staat, I have used "state" and "condition" interchangeably. 25 "A postulate is a practical imperative given a priori, the possibility of which cannot be explained [keiner Erklärung . . . fähiger ] (so that no proof of it can be given)." "Perpetual Peace in Philosophy," Ak. VIII, 418m Taken out of context, this seems appropriate to the present text; however, it is rather unusual for Kant to use "postulate" for a moral imperative (in this case, the imperative to promote the summum bonum) as distinguished from the propositions about freedom, God and immortality established for practical purposes by means of an imperative. T h e way in which the word "postulate" is introduced here, " und dieses sagt sie als ein Postulat," might be a reference to Ak. 225, where it was said that moral laws, like mathematical postulates, are indemonstrable and yet apodictically certain. 26 die Sentenz, perhaps "the sentence." Kant seems to draw no clear or consistent distinction between a "sentence" and a "verdict" or "decision" of a court. For further discussion of "the right of necessity," see "Theory and Practice," Ak. VIII, 300n. 27 rechtliche Ehrbarkeit. It is difficult to bring out the connection between Ehrbarkeit here and such words as Ehrliebe (honestas interna, iustum sui aestimium), Ak. 236, and Ehrlichkeit, Ak. 429. What they have in common, however, is the practical affirmation of one's dignity as a person. T h e source of this terminology may well be the Stoic "honestum." As for "the Right of humanity in our own person" mentioned in the concluding sentence of this paragraph and also in the table on Ak. 240, one would expect Kant to discuss it within the Doctrine of Virtue. However, he makes no reference to it there. It is mentioned occasionally in the Vorarbeiten, e.g., Ak. XXIII, 276 and 390. 28 rechtliche Akt. In Ak. XXIII, 262, Kant defines a rightful action (eine rechtliche Handlung, actus iuridicus) as "someone's action from which a right of his arises." (Strictly speaking, an Akt, translated as "act," is not the same as an "action," Handlung.) In the text of Private Right I have often translated rechtliche Akt as "an act establishing a right," although this needs to be modified when Kant is discussing empirical actions that are necessary but not sufficient conditions for acquiring rights; and a rightful act can also be one by which someone gives up a right (Ak. 300). Now that the concept of a right has been derived, I shall often translate rechtlich by such phrases as "in terms of rights," "with regard to rights," "about rights," "affecting rights," "bearing upon rights." See the use of rechtlich in 306. ag In the context of man's natural talents and capacities, this is translated as "to develop." However, in the context of analytic and synthetic propositions, see the Jäsche Logik (IX, 111, Anmerkung 1), where it is said that in an implicitly identical proposition (as distinguished from a tautology), a predicate which lies unentwickelt (implicite) in the concept of the subject is made clear by means of Entwickelung (explicatio). In §D (Ak. 231) Kant said that (the concept o f ) an authorization to use coercion, i.e., "a right," is connected with (the concept of) "Right" by the principle of contradiction. Compare Ak. 396, where the "supreme principle of the doctrine of Right" 285 Notes to Pages 38-46 is the proposition established in §E. In view of this, perhaps den Rechten in the paragraph above might be better translated as "Rights," i.e., Rights in the sense of 1) under heading B. in Ak. 237. 30 das Seine. This is often translated as "what is his," "an object that is his," "one's belongings," "what belongs to him." Similar expressions are used for das Meine and das Deine. 31 Sache. Although Chapter I of Private Right is concerned with objects of choice generally, Kant's language here, as in other passages (notably Ak. 255—6), indicates that he is concerned especially with rights to things. 32 Rechtliches Postulat der praktischen Vernunft. Since this postulate establishes that coercion to prevent others from doing what would not violate one's innate right to freedom can be consistent with Right, it seems appropriate to stress in the translation the cardinal function of this postulate in establishing the possibility of acquiring rights. See the use of rechtlich in Ak. 306. 33 Kant now begins to use frequently the term rechtswidrig and its opposite, rechtmässig. According to Ak. XXIII, 262, that is rechtmässig which is not contrary to Rechtsgesetzen. Letters to Kant from Ludwig Heinrich Jakob of May 10 and September 18, 1797 (Ak. XII, 160 and 196) indicate that Kant had replied to a question as to how an attack in a state of nature could be rechtmässig (§56, Ak. 346 below) when there is no determinate right (or Right) (kein bestimmtes Recht) in the state of nature. Unfortunately, we do not have Kant's letter. At times rechtmässig seems to be equivalent to recht (or gerecht); however, to mark the distinction I have then translated rechtmässig as "consistent(ly) with right," "in conformity with right," or "in accord with right." Again, Kant holds that there can be the presumption of a right, provisional possession, in a state of nature, and rechtmässig sometimes suggests the sense "compatible with rights" or "in conformity with rights," as rechtswidrig suggests "contrary to rights." In some cases, the way in which these terms are used as modifiers or the way in which the substantive Rechtmässigkeit is used would make either translation so awkward that I have used "legitimate" and "illegitimate." 34 O n permissive laws, see further "Toward Perpetual Peace," Ak. VIII, 347n and 373n. 35 lädiert. In Ak. 249 Kant gives Abbruch . . . , "would infringe upon," as a parenthetical explanation of Läsion . . . würde. I take the change from Sache to Objekt in the following sentences as indicative of the tendency mentioned in note 31 above. 36 In his essay "On an Alleged Right to Lie from Benevolence" (1797), Kant says that a metaphysics of Right requires "1) an axiom, that is, an apodictically certain proposition that follows immediately from the definition of external Right (consistency of the freedom of each with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law . . . " (Ak. VIII, 429). He goes on to add that it requires, "2) a postulate (of external public law . . . )." Compare Ak. 307. 37 It is generally agreed that the following five paragraphs, which I have enclosed in brackets, do not belong here. On the history of this discovery, see Thomas Mautner, "Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: a Note on the Text," where it is followed by (disponiren). In the case of land. work became necessary and with it a division of goods. . explicitly or tacitly. the first party's "perfect right" to something he does not need for his preservation (his right to use coercion) becomes an "imperfect right" (a right to request or petition). to private ownership of land by whoever already occupied it. pp.286 Notes to Pages 38-46 Kant-Studien 72 (1981): 356—9. in Eigentumstheorien von Grotius bis Kant (Stuttgart/ Bad Canstatt: Fromann. XXIII. although in the Doctrine of Virtue he uses the language of what is "owed" or "due" with regard to duties of respect. 3 1 . he is presumably thinking of Grotius's theory (anticipated and adopted by many others in the "natural law" tradition) that the primitive state of the human race was that of common ownership of goods. XX) to his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764). 1—2. one asserting the possibility of possessing an empirical object merely by right is ampliative. De iure belli ac pacis libri tres. 330. 1972). . since it requires the existence of a general will which. 314. verfügen is used in Ak. Gesammelte Schriften (Hildesheim: H. By this. together with a German translation of the relevant paragraphs from Grotius and selections from Kant's early theory of property found in his unpublished Bemerkungen (Ak. "occupying it" would be the appropriate translation. 255—362. II. A. or derivative concept. 279). 41 Bemächtigung. some texts in Ak. 1974). 38 In Ak. This division took place by a contract through which everyone agreed. this was a condition that could last only as long as men's needs remained simple and could be satisfied by what nature provided. as Kant points out in Ak. and the phrase über. Kant is probably referring to Mendelssohn's view that "a contract is nothing other than one party's relinquishing his right and the other party's accepting it" (p. Gerstenberg. XXIII. Verfügung is used in Ak. But as men came to want a better life. is objectively necessary but subjectively contingent. 39 Kant's assertions about the analytic or synthetic nature of the propositions put forward in the Doctrine of Right are difficult to interpret. 264 below. But Kant also uses the term in the context of rights to things generally and in the context of rights against persons akin to rights to things. There is a difference of opinion among Kant scholars as to whether the omission of these paragraphs leaves a break in the continuity of §6 and whether these paragraphs belong elsewhere in Private Right or are parts of an earlier draft inserted by mistake. such as 214—15 and 2 7 5 . provides Introductions to Grotius and Kant. . 40 Although Kant does not mention Hugo Grotius by name. Reinhard Brandt. 313 and again in Ak.4 9 and 167-79.6 . As for the postulate introduced in §2. of the category of causality. Kant of course rejects it. T h e terminology of "perfect" and "imperfect" rights seems to have originated with Grotius. 43 Moses Mendelssohn. 42 über denselben zu verfügen. 2. 325. pp. Kant points out that in the critical philosophy "having" (habere) is a predicable. suggest that whereas a proposition asserting the possibility of intelligible possession is analytic. is included in Ak. in "translating" Smith's sentence into German Kant uses Fleiss. However. But before the time of Justinian. Achenwall's text. develop in Chapter V the notion that labor determines the value of all goods. for Roman citizens. apparently in the sense of "by legal proceedings. In view of what Kant regards as his direct quotation from Adam Smith (Ak. VIII. usucapio) and "superannuation of claims" (Verjährung. prescription had come to extinguish the claimant's title instead of merely barring his action.7 1 . with Kant's comments on it." 51 T h e distinction between "long possession" (Ersitzung. one would expect him to use Arbeit. T h e language used here is similar to that of his essay "Von der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks." rather than Fleiss. the heading here suggests "the sum of principles" having to do with such possession. and there is no English term for it corresponding to "property" and "contract. by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold. however. "industriousness" or "diligence. which was earlier (in. See Ak." However. See R. He does. T h e word translated here. . IV. 250) translated as "unsanctioned. 46 Gottfried Achenwall's Ius Naturae was one of the texts Kant used for the course on Natural Right that he gave at least twelve times during his teaching career. 306. It did not confer ownership but enabled the possessor to bar a claimant's right of action against him if he could show that he had been possessor in good faith for the prescribed period of time. 1970). 250). 1930). even if the thing had originally been stolen. Ch. 77—87). p. pp.Notes to Pages 95—108 287 44 As in Sections I and II. I have sometimes used "rights" in contexts that would call for "Right. "labor." The Wealth of Nations. In Roman Law." At the beginning and at the end of Section III. The term von rechtswegen was used earlier (Ak. 289)." 48 Adam Smith says merely: "It is in this manner that money has become in all civilized nations the universal instrument of commerce. and in the context of contracts. this third member of the division of rights is an innovation on Kant's part. I. prescription by 30 years' possession gave ownership to a possessor in good faith. acquiring ownership (dominium) of a thing by usucapio was originally available only under the ius civile. accordingly. 3. and when Justinian abolished the distinction between Italian and provincial land (which had belonged to the Roman people or to the Emperor). or exchanged for one another. W. 49 Or "publishing books without having been empowered by the author. 47 Fleiss." which was published in the Berliner Monatsschrift of May 1785 (Ak. Bk. 131.g." 45 Besitzstand. Ak." To translate Büchernachdruck as "literary piracy" would seem inconsistent with the "appearance of being rightful" that Kant says it has. Roman Private Law (London: Macmillan. as "on his own initiative" is eigenmächtig. XIX. and praescriptio had to be devised as an analogous procedure for provincials or foreigners. e. (Middlesex and New York: Penguin Books. Leage." 50 von rechtswegen verboten.. praescriptio) discussed here has a long history. Throughout this passage I use "industry" in the sense of "industriousness. 1 5 9 . as here. I have used "sovereign" only when Kant specifies Souverän or. In paragraphs 43 and 44 Kant used Macht (potentia). p. the relation of "with all others" to the rest of the sentence is ambiguous: T h e phrase could modify "proceed. given the meaning of Recht specified in Ak. 316 Kant speaks of "the executive authority of the Oberbefehlshaber. 229. it is the authority that exercises coercion.e. Kant has not yet discussed the relation of the legislative. the fact was taken as conclusively proved against him. 126. " T h e decisory oath worked in the following way: Party A could put Party B on his oath as to a fact at issue that was within Party B's knowledge. as in §47. This was one of the devices of civil procedure designed to protect the judge from threats by the wealthy and the powerful. Subsequently he introduces. which was translated as "power. If Party B refused to swear. But once he distinguishes the three "powers" or "authorities" within a state. "powers" (Gewalten). without explanation." 56 Although Kant continues to use Gesetzgebung and Gesetzgeber." except for passages which might indicate that one (physical) person has both legislative and executive authority." John Henry Merryman. the fact was taken as conclusively proved in his favor. Hence "legislation" and "legislator" seem appropriate. 55 T h e English terms "municipal law" and "international law" might be used here. and E with the executive.. Otherwise I have used the more general "head of state." he is now discussing a condition in which there are positive laws. However. In Ak. 1969)." He now begins to use Gewalt (potestas). If Party B swore. When he does so in Ak. it seems preferable to continue using this term throughout das öffentliche Recht or "public Right. D. more familiarly. until "the original contract" extends to the whole human race. 58 In this initial distinction of the three authorities within a state Kant specifies that "sovereignty" (die Herrschergewalt. The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press. it is only the executive authority that has "power" in one sense. Souveränität) belongs to the legislative authority. 266). In his "General Remark" (Ak. such a variety of terms that it is not always clear which of the three authorities is under discussion. executive. i. which were translated in private Right as "lawgiving" and "lawgiver. the (Oberbefehlshaber is associated with the executive authority." and notes that ." which would decide a fact at issue in a case. 318—37) I take it that A and B have to do primarily with the legislative authority and C. 57 Or. Kant is apparently using the word simply in the sense of "a superior in general. 316." 54 Grammatically." My reasons for the above translation are 1) Kant's thesis of "original possession in common" of the earth's habitable surface by the whole human race and 2) the fact that the heading of §41 indicates that §42 is part of the transition from Private Right to the whole of Public Right. Here. and judicial authorities in a state. As Kant has said (Ak. however.288 Notes to Pages 118—25 52 Kant seems to be thinking here of "the decisory oath. Herrschergewalt. if it were kept in mind that Kant's concern is only with a priori principles. acquisition will always remain provisional. 53 Befehlshaber. I shall henceforth reserve "serf" for Gutsuntertan and "slave" for Sklave and use the more general "bondsman" for Leibeigener." Kant's phrase Gleiches mit Gleichem. as well as the context of the discussion. the "third" point here seems to concern the relation of the judicial authority to the legislative and the executive authorities. "serf. But a tacit right cannot be part of a constitution since "all the laws of a constitution must be conceived as arising out of a public will. has been translated as "like for like. here again something is apparently missing from the text." Perhaps Kant's very casual vocabulary with regard to the authorities within a state stems from his recognition of the existence and legitimacy of forms of state that fall far short of the Idea of a state (§'s 51—2). . one person has both all "authority" and all "power. not another relation parallel to coordination and subordination. technically. Kant was no ardent admirer of the British constitution. it would seem from Ak. In Ak. 61 Or "supreme owner" (Obereigentümer). 64 Strafgesetz. suggests both equality in the amount or quantity of pain inflicted and similarity or resemblance in kind or quality: repaying equally and (as far as possible) in kind. 322 that the absurdity consists in supposing that a parliament representing the people can actively resist the highest executive authority. without . I take it that his references to a "moderate" and to a "limited" (eingeschränkte) constitution are both directed at the British constitution. regarding the first kind of crime. . given in the following paragraph. 303). 270. 62 Leibeigener. for example. in which "first." In Ak. and a public crime requiring judicial punishment. see above Ak. Here too he refers to a Leibeigener as servus in sensu stricto or simply servus. contain a public provision that the people may overthrow the existing government. 324 he used grunduntertänig (glebae adscripti) — as in the present passage he uses Gutsuntertan (glebae adscriptus) — and called serfs servi. apparently. As he points out in "Theory and Practice" (Ak. the British constitution says nothing about what the people may do if the monarch violates the contract of 1688." To extricate themselves from such difficulties. Unlike many of his contemporaries. It would seem that in some cases an act may be both a tort requiring compensation from the offending party (a private crime). a criminal is said to have reduced himself to the status of a slave (Sklavenstand). VIII. T h e principle of retribution. Since the constitution could not. which he regarded as lulling the people with an illusion of freedom." In Ak.Notes to Pages 95—108 289 his Befehle are not "laws. On Eigentum (property). the leaders or "guardians" of the British people had to invent the notion that James II had voluntarily abdicated. the people must tacitly reserve the right to rebel. 333. 63 As Natorp notes." 59 Natorp suggests that a fairly extensive portion of the text may be missing here. In an autocracy. 60 Although Kant goes on to call a "moderate" (gemässigte) constitution ein Unding (an "absurdity" in the sense. of a logical impossibility)." and "third" occurred twice and the first occurrence of "third" got replaced by the second. 241 Kant classed Leibeigene and Sklaven together: They would be "men without personality. In any case." "second. self-contradiction. 2go Notes to Pages 142—63 65 Arthur Elphinstone, 6th Baron Balmerino, who took part in the attempt of 1745—6 to put Prince Charles Edward Stuart on the British throne, was captured in the defeat of the Scots forces at Culloden and subsequently beheaded. 66 Kant is apparently referring to deportation to a province as distinguished from exile. See below, Ak. 338. 67 Cesare Bonesana, Marchese Beccaria, whose influential Dei delitti e delta pene (1764) argued for a reform of the harsh penal codes of the time. Kant's interest in Beccaria may well have arisen from Beccaria's reliance on a text from Rousseau's Social Contract, which had been published in 1762: "All laws must be regarded as if they proceeded from the unanimous will of the people." x 68 Unterhauses. Some editors suggest that this is a typographical error for Untertans, in which case Kant would mean only that the mother country possesses the province as a subject. In the letter of May 10, 1797, referred to in note 33 above, the question of Unterhaus, as well as of rechtmässig, was raised. If Unterhauses is not a typographical error, Kant may mean that the citizens of the mother country are not, by birth, citizens of the province of the ruling state. See Ak. 338 and 348. A province is a "foreign country" (Ausland) as far as the "mother country" or ruling state is concerned. 69 In 1789 Louis X V I convoked the Estates General, which transformed itself into the National Assembly and then, as the Constituent Assembly, adopted a new constitution in 1791. 70 An amphictyonic league, in Greek history, was an association of neighboring states or tribes for the protection of and in the interests of a common religious center. When capitalized, the Amphictyonic League refers to the Delphic Amphictyony, formed to protect the temple of Apollo at Delphi and to direct the Pythian games. 71 In "Toward Perpetual Peace," however, Kant reaches the opposite conclusion by using his "principle of publicity," Ak. VIII, 384. 72 Part III of "Theory and Practice" (see note 3), directed against Moses Mendelssohn, is concerned with Cosmopolitan Right, as Part II, directed against Hobbes, is concerned with T h e Right of a State. 73 Kant moves between Wechselwirkung, i.e., interaction, intercourse, or "commerce" in a very general sense, and Verkehr, which he used in his discussion of contracts to signify exchange of property, "commerce" in a more specific sense. In "Toward Perpetual Peace," Ak. VIII, 368, he maintains that "the spirit of commerce" is a driving force in human nature and, since commerce and war are incompatible, one of the forces by which nature can be viewed as working toward a state of peace. 74 Anton Friedrich Büsching (1724-93) was a well-known geographer and also a theologian. 75 T h e appendix was added in the 1798 edition of The Doctrine of Right in reply to a review by Friedrich Bouterwek (reprinted in Ak. XX). As Natorp points out, Kant's quotations are not always accurate. 76 Rechtswissenschaft. See Ak. 229, where Kant seemed to say that only systematic knowledge of natural Right is a true science. When coupled with that passage, his use here of erhaben oder versteigen, which I have translated as Notes to Pages 95—108 291 "rise or venture," might be a suggestion that some philosophic jurists are out of their element in attempting to discuss the issues at hand. 77 Zueignung. In Ak. 259 Zueignung (appropriatio) was said to be the third of the Momente (attendenda) of original acquisition. As Kant pointed out (Ak. 2gi), ideal acquisition can take effect only in civil society. In the remainder of the paragraph the text seems to be corrupt. 78 welchem die Weltliche durch Vermächtnisse . . . sich als ihr Eigentum hingegeben haben. In the context of the discussion, one would have expected Kant to say that laymen have given their estates and the feudal subjects attached to them to a church. So too, at the beginning of the next paragraph when Kant raises the question of whether the church "can belong to" (als das Seine angehören kann) the state or the state to the church, the kind of right involved would seem to require a distinction between the estates of a church and a church as a body of believers (Ak. 327). 79 an diesem oder jenem Teil, oder gar ganz. Perhaps "in this or that respect, or indeed entirely." T h e remainder of the sentence is grammatically defective. Natorp suggests that the passage "so that . . . fare well in the other world" may have been written in the margin for insertion earlier in the sentence, after "believing souls." In that case, it would be the intention of these souls, not of the state, to improve their lot in the next world. 80 T h e following paragraph begins Ein jedes Faktum (Tatsache). What is in question is, first, someone's actually taking control or seizing power, and second, an actually existing constitution. The difficulties mentioned above (notes 23, 57, and 58) become acute. 81 T h e primary sense of Glück, a component of the German word for "happiness" (Glückseligkeit) is "luck" or "fortune." See also Ak. 387. 82 Natorp suggests that Kant's reference is to Part I of "Theory and Practice," which was first published in the Berliner Monatsschrift in 1793. Another possibility, suggested by Vorländer, is "On a Recently Prominent Elevated Tone in Philosophy," Ak. VIII, which appeared in that journal in 1796. 83 "Natural" is also used to translate physisch in discussions of one's natural happiness, one's natural welfare, and one's natural perfection (as distinguished in each case from its moral counterpart). 84 Leonhard Cochius's "Untersuchung über die Neigungen" was the prize essay of the Berlin Academy for 1767. 85 Literally, "transgression of them," ihre Uebertretung. In discussing duties of virtue, notably duties of love, Kant sometimes refers to "neglect" of them, e.g., Vernachlässigung (Ak. 432), Pflichtvergessenheit (Ak. 432), Verabsäumung (Ak. 464). Transgression of a duty of virtue is failure to adopt a maxim of promoting an end that is also a duty. More generally, when Uebertretung occurs with "of a duty" or "of a law," I have sometimes translated it as "violating" a duty or "breaking" a law. 86 Wohltun. In Ak. 45off. Kant discusses the difference between the duty of benevolence, Wohlwollen, and the duty of beneficence, Wohltun. Except in that passage I have often translated Wohltun and its cognates by such expressions as "to do good," "to help," "a favor." 87 I.e., the principle enunciated in §E, Ak. 232. 292 Notes to Pages 199—251 88 Here, and again in Ak. 461, Kant cites or refers to Albrecht Haller's poem "Ueberden Ursprung des Uebels," and in Ak. 449 refers to his poem "Ueber die Ewigkeit." Natorp's notes give the relevant portions of the poems. 8g Achtung. Although I have translated Achtung throughout as "respect," it should be noted that Kant gives two different Latin equivalents: reverentia in the context of one's feeling for the moral law and for oneself as the source of the law (e.g., Ak. 402), and observantia aliis praestanda in the context of duties of virtue to other men (e.g., Ak. 452). 90 einer das Gesetz ausführenden Gewalt. Kant seems to be drawing an analogy between the will and the capacity for choice on the one hand and the legislative and executive authorities in a state on the other hand. 91 Affekten and Leidenschaften. In my earlier translation of the Tugendlehre I rendered these more descriptively, Affekt as "agitation" and Leidenschaft as "obsession." However, they are so prominent in Kant's writings that I think they can be considered technical terms. On the affects and passions, and particular affects and passions, see Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak. VII, 251-82, The Conflict of the Faculties, Part III, Ak. VII, and the Rektoratsrede referred to in note 5 above. In these contexts Kant often uses the Stoic principles stated in Ak. 419, along with vim vitalem excere (Reflexion 1540, Ak. XV, 2, 965), "exercise your vital force," in discussing both duties to oneself and a regimen for preserving one's health. His term "apathy" is also of Stoic origin. 92 ein qualificiertes Böse. Qualificiert is used throughout the discussion of vices opposed to duties of love (Ak. 458—61) and is translated as "proper." As for "evil," Kant uses Böse for moral evil and Uebel for what might be called physical evil or "ills." In Ak. 460, when he uses the phrase Uebel oder Böses, I have, as occasionally elsewhere, translated the latter as "wickedness." For the most part, however, the context makes it clear which is intended and I have sometimes used "evil" (or "evils") to translate Uebel. 93 Or "commit an offense," beleidigen könne. In discussing perfect duties to oneself, as well as imperfect duties of respect to others, Kant often uses the terminology of The Doctrine of Right, as e.g., in the preceding paragraph he called killing oneself a Verbrechen, which in The Doctrine of Right was a "crime" (crimen). Given the context in which these terms were introduced, however, it does not always seem advisable to translate them precisely as they were used in speaking of rights. 94 Frederick the Great. 95 der den Beschluss macht. It both concludes the case and is the conclusion (Schluss) of the practical syllogism discussed above, Ak. 438. g6 T h e quotations in this paragraph are taken from 1 Peter 1:16, Matthew 5:48, and Philippians 4:8. 97 The words translated as "sympathetic," "communicable," and "compassion" are, respectively, teilnehmend, mitteilend, and Mitleidenschaft. 98 See also Kant's assertion, in "The End of All Things" (1784), Ak. VIII, that if one considers not only what ought to be done but whether it actually will be done, love is an indispensable supplement to the imperfection of human nature, since unless it is added one could not count on very much being done. Notes to Pages 99 Terence, The Self-Tormentor, I, 125. 95—108 293 100 T h e distinction between being "foolish" and being "a conceited ass" is, as in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak. VII, 210, that between Torheit and Narrheit. "A fool is one who sacrifices things of value to ends that have no value, for example, domestic happiness to public glamour. A man whose folly is offensive is called a conceited ass." 101 T h e context of "even the fact" would make gemeistert (finds fault with) seem a misprint for gemustert (examines). 102 Natorp suggests that the reference is probably to Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I, 23, 63. 103 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), Ak. VI. 104 It seems inappropriate to speak of a "reward" (Belohnung) as having a place in love and beneficence. Perhaps Kant is referring to a reward that "was promised in the law" (Ak. 227). 105 Odes III, 2, 3 1 - 2 . Selective Bibliography (For a more extensive bibliography of German literature on The Doctrine of Right, see the books by Bernd Ludwig and Wolfgang Kersting listed in this bibliography.) Allison, Henry E. Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 1990. Anderson, Georg. "Die 'Materie' in Kants Tugendlehre und der Formalismus der kritischen Ethik," Kant-Studien 26 (1921): 289—311. "Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten - ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule," Kant-Studien 28 (1923): 41—61. Arendt, Hannah. Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Armstrong, A. C. "Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War," Journal of Philosophy 28 (1931): 197-204Atwell, John E. Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). Auxter, Thomas. "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest Good," Journal of the History of Philosophy 16, 2 (1979): 121-34. Axinn, Sidney. "Kant, Authority, and the French Revolution," Journal of the History of Ideas 7 (1969): 273-84. Baron, Marcia. "Kantian Ethics and Supererogation, "Journal of Philosophy 84, 5 (1987): 237-61. Batscha, Zwi, ed. Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosohie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1976). Beck, Jacob Sigismund. Commentar über Kants Metaphysik der Sitten (Halle, 1798; reprint Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1970). Beck, Lewis W. "Kant's Two Conceptions of the Will in Their Political Context," in Studies in the Philosophy of Kant, pp. 215—29 (New York: Bobbs—Merrill, 1965). "Kant and the Right of Rebellion," Journal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971): 411-22. Benson, Peter. "External Freedom According to Kant," Columbia Law Review 87, 3 (1987): 559779Benton, Robert. "Political Expediency and Lying: Kant vs. Benjamin Constant," Journal of the History of Ideas 43, 1 (1982): 135—44- 295 " in Gesammelte Aufsätze. Das Privatrecht Immanuel Kants (Jena: Fromann. Reinhard. Emge. 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(to establish a 188.4 (of servants) 100-1. 80. to obligate others. 238 Achenwall. °f obligasessory. 58. 119. action: end of. 237 animality. 51. 50. contract(s). 56. 84. 161 Beccaria. 211-12. delivery. 134. . 122 (see also right(s)). 43. 191 (of persons) 95. (of promises) 9 0 . 257 derived. 89 legality and morality of. 128-9 (legact of choice islative) 57. 118. derived. 88. authorization: corresponding to any duty. autocracy: as form of a state. ideal. 104. see also love affects. 213. 80. 81. 44. 190. 85. 247. 193. 209 act of choice). 89. 200. 155 (judicial) 118. (of children) 98—100. 196. relation of. 108. 231. 44.214 ence). 102 (see also contract(s)) animals. i^eaiso right(s). virtuous. 93. 5g. inner. see also deed of a state.9 . 121 anthropology. to do what is permitted. 91.8 . 51. posbook. of a gift. 41-2. 194. original and arrogance. internal. 262 301 acceptance: of a benefit.5 . 239. (of things. 148. 186.91. 206. 56. 53. 76. 125. to require an external. authority: of moral law(s). (by prolonged possesAristotle. 76. of pracmeritorious. to take control) 84. 81. (of spouses) author: of an action (deed). sition 111-12. 216. 129 advantage. 170. (resistance to) 147—8. 42. 253. 195. 49. 45n. 257 amphiboly. 53. 258 acquisition: division of 81 (see also right(s). permitted. 189. autonomy: of practical reason. 189-90.5 . 44. 198. Balmerino. 127. to punish. 95. see also acquidefend someone's reputation. 141.201. possessory. 50. see also habit 110—11. 231. 227-30. 125. 168. 217. 142 159. act of choice: as basis for acquisition. 124 1 75-7 act: of free choice. 53. 71. 98. 127. to take possession of things. 69. 144. original. 114. 188.7 . 196. forbidden. 45. 208-9. of a legacy. antinomy. 128. 169—71. 92. 85. 56. 44. 80. to coerce. 147. 147. 106-7. ascetics. 262 sion) 108—10. 129—33. state (to bring object under control). 271. art (skill). of land) 83. 195. (by good repappearance. of a promise. 268. 46. 6 3 . 4 8 . provisional supreme in a state. 143 aesthetic of morals. only) 8 4 . 262 (see also gratitude). morally indiffertical reason. 191.9 . (to 57—8. 207—8. 214-15 apathy. (of things. 190. 87. 208. 41. 196 condition. 265. change of. matter of. 121. beneficence. 103—6. 42. 114. 44. 223 causality. see also right(s) Cochius. 140. 58. 195. 121-2. obligation contempt. ethical). 215. and ideal acquisition. 106-7. 123. use o f . 266—8. 269-72. as phenomenon. as incentive. 144-5 choice: determination of. preliminary to metaphysics of morals. (under private Right) 77. 56-7. 159 Index concepts: and capacity for desire. imperative^). (and rights) 59. 59-61. provisional and conclusive. 48—54. 176-7. 52. and natural Right. see also duty. 128. 136. object of choice. 77—8. 120. 52. 96. see method Cato. (end that is also a duty) ig8. freedom of. 37. gg—100. 57. 67. 154. 181 (see also metaphysics). 229—30. civil or rightful) conscience. and judgments about rights. property of. 233-5. 146. 52. 127. 208. 217. 84. 189. 118. 122. 100-1. 123. as civil constitution. 64. 223 children: innate right of. void. 232. 41. 10g. court of. defined. 151. 48. 161. and republican constitution) 148. 148-9. 81. 124. 86. about rights. 149. 59. 152. 193. 168. category of. 151. 110. 99 character. and executive authority. moderate. of reason. 254-6 contentment. of a representation. see also state of nature conditions: of acquisition. 44. 185-7: external. 146. 101. 59-61. (and capital punishment) 143-4. 4g. perfection of. 125. see also . 51. 70. 47. 49. 127. see also virtue. (as Idea. 64. 181. (under public Right) 114. 237. see also state community: category of. 125. 47. lawgiving. 114—16. of maxims with law. 232. 80 ble object. 52. 211. 77-8. moral. obligation of. 70. 87. 56. 114-16. 133. 197 contract(s). limited. 42. 113-18. 99-100. 186. 120—1.302 benevolence. 137. (intelligible possession) 71—2. (as Idea) 127.9 . and league of nations) 151. 77-8. 124. positive. sec oZso author Brown. 36 Büsching. (acquisition by contract) g2-3. 251. 70. 110-11. 207-8. 219—20. 153. 87. ethical. f ° r peace. household. 134-5. as distributive justice. 42. love generally. 81. obligation to. 175. 162 chance. 28m. 129. 46. in equivocal Right. of possession. and Right. 86. 201. 70. 227-8. 102. 77 (see obligation.212 catechism. 124 (see also condition. 90-5. 160-1. murdering oneself. 146. 131. 189 coercion: to ends. 106-7. 73. 49. 127 (see also state). 173-4 Cicero. 113. 47. see also right(s). 121. 127. 42. see also love book. 233. 167. 136-7. 99. see also condition. 83.90. 95. of the world. 124-5. 47. system of pure rational. 144. 108. 137. 221—2. moral education of. necessitation. 85. state's concern with. 113. ig4. 6 8 . 53. 159. form of. 176-7. 74. 120 constitution: and authorities in state. of possession. 159 command. 44. igg. civil or rightful constraint. 52 (see also casuistical questions: avarice. 204. 17®> authority to. original and primitive. authorities in. 208. 124-5. see possession conflict: between church and state. distributivejustice regarding. 216 commerce. constraint colonies. 181. 139-40. 77. distinguished from will. 140. (spiritual) 119. 86. a supersensiobject of choice church. judgments of also coercion). 121. 49. lying. and punitive justice. 276. 223-4 casuistry. with servants. as moral disposition Chesterfield. regarding an oath. for judicial decision. 253. g7. Idea of. 60. duty to realize. 125—6. see also acceptance. 101. 81. internal.^^ also definition concupiscence. 101. 137. 98. 113. 202. see acquisition. stupefying oneself by food and drink. 3i8n citizens: ofastate. 173. 148. g8. 148. 85. civil or rightful. 151. 101—3. 217. 56-8. 93. parental rights over. 133. construction of. of a spiritual state. defiling oneself by lust. (original acquisition) 88—9. 50. 47. deduction of. 51. servility. 166. 126. confusion of rights acquired by. original. 158 commonwealth. 125. division of rights acquired by. 108. 248. acquisition court: defined. objective. (as Idea. 95. 156. 147. 158. 48. of duties. marriage. 192. of personality. of virtue. to God. matter of choice in Right. of freedom of choice.4 . imperfect. 35. ethical. 6 6 . 201. 276. 4 5 Critique of Pure Reason. see also i m p u t a t i o n defamation. 49. 250. 214—15. of sympathy. 264 habit. outer. 58. 222 (see also choice. 211 (see also method). 194. 236. 66. to oneself. 238. sacred. in friendship. 52. 257.2 . 186. distinguished from vice. 186. 188. 186. 183 evil. 215. 269. 36. 44. lawless. 261-4 Garve. 227. for revenge. moral. 51. perpetual peace as. of virtue and vice. of Right. distributive crime. as God's end for men. 185—6. 261—2. hybrid. 251-2. 193. of citizen. of capacity for reason. susceptibility to be affected by duty. 207. a doctrine of virtue. see method dignities. 200. 50. 9 4 . matter of choice in ethics. 4 0 . 71. 63. (to oneself) 218-19. 212-13. delight. 127. 277—9. 163. 193. inner. 220-1 dialogue. 185. 7 3 303 negative. final. 52.3 friendship. 206.2 . virtue. 188. 2 7 5 . 127 dignity: absolute inner worth. 4 6 . 188. 82. 215. 201. 188. of method. 199. 186. 45. 2 3 0 . 65. 115—16 damages. see also obligation Curtius. 248. 273 equality. 154. 4 3 .Index and by reason. of free choice. 199. concept of. 125-6. 181. 215-16. 216. of citizens. 139—4o\ see also punishment critique. 186-7. 287. 208. use in teaching ethics. 264 (see also gratitude. 185. 52. final. of reason. heart. 53. 35. as true vice.5 . 268 Haller. 135. deduction of deed. 44. nominal and real. 83. one's own doctrine: of happiness.6 0 ethics. 101. 139 (see also personality. 191-2. 228n feeling. 64. conflict of. 182. 182. 252. 41 (see also inclination). principle in man. 253. 64. 100. ingratitude). will). 47. 235. 188. perfect. 208.7 . 42. 38. 207-8. 205. in marriage. 244. 35. 194. 243. 7 1 . 65. of humanity. and lying. 97. 240. 198. 255 (see also humanity). 49. 396. 227. of law.4 . 104-6. 152. 107. of virtue. nature's. i88. 71. 141. 56. will in man. 113—20. 222. technically and morally practical. 99n. civil). of humanity. 127. 194. 50. of money. 197-8. of philosophy. justice. as incentive. laws of. unnatural. 253.1 definition: of capacity for desire. 138 (see also nobility). 53. 3 8 . 210. 270. 199. 238. of Right. 129. 52 (see also choice). 250. 279 eudaemonism. 118 freedom: of choice. 207. 228n.3 . 66. 162. of practical reason. 186. 219 custom. 1 8 m . 50. 4 3 . 82. 115-16 deduction: of division of system. 160-1. 76 Critique of Judgment. 249. 35 God. 198. 56. 189. of externally mine. 255 (see also p e r s o n a l i t y ) end: and categorical imperative. 40. 52. 207—8. see also action. 237. 248-9.4 . of man. 181. knowledge of. 50. of citizens. 234. of right to person akin to right to thing. 198 duty: to animals. 190. 150. 187-8. 258 defiling oneself by lust. divisions of. 251-2 Epicurus. 60. 102 desire: capacity for. of right to thing. doctrine of. 56. 2 2 0 . as noumenon. 192. 241. duty envy. 183. 189. 238. 241-2. 230. 55. 45n. 130. positive and . 47. love force.7 . 47-8. 107. 60. 208 delight: inactive 41 (see also taste). see happiness. 248. 2 2 0 . 261-2. 127. innate right of. a sensible object. and passion. (latitude in) 58. 65. 48. of love and respect. rightful. 37. 63. object of metaphysics. habitual.9 gratitude. in friendship. 1 7 6 . 2 0 0 . (external and internal) 62. 240. 2 i i . 254 happiness. 199. 165. 186. see also judge. 236 examples: in Doctrine of Right. 198.64. 4 6 . 268 fault: distinguished f r o m crime. see also concepts. 218: and personality. 370. 259. 194. 198. moral relation within. 148. 125.7 . civic. (and hereditary nobility) 138 equity. 186. of citizens. 104-6. see also affects. see also love delivery. 230-1. of pure reason. innate right of. 74. 203. 4 2 . 5 9 . 52. 112. of civil constitution. 231. 190. 65. (and conditional) 49. 50. 125-6. 188-9. (in wishes) 246. public. see also metaphysics. 21 in. 49. 48. 206. 205. 202. (and laws) 42. 46-7. (cont. 273 holiness. 63n. 185. 227 incentive. 113. 55. 216. 171-2 interest. the categorical (imperative). 173 ingratitude. see servility hypocrisy.52. 153. 208. dignity of. 120. 127.3°4 Index judge. 272 intuition. 261. duty or law as. 23° humility. 176. love of. protective. 151 legislator. 168. 123. 254 (see also anthropology). 41. 216. 134. 196 (see also incentive. 272 Idea (rational concept). 84. 258 man: as end. 120. 41. duty of. 202. 196-7 (see also love.7 inclination. ground of choice. 70. penal. 260. and recommendation. 233 imputation. of original contract. 223. worth of. 64. as sexual inclination. 195. 205-6. 97. 168-g. 194. in being in rightful condition. 55. 77. as benevolence. 42. justice. 188. 51. 274. the moral (imperative). 222 (see also principle(s)) league of nations. man as moral being. 144-5. 252-3. 270 malice. 188. 198. 140-5. 48. 118. 216. 219. 278 humanity: as capacity to set ends. ideal of. 53. distinguished from decrees. 246. 113. 122. 211 justice: commutative. 203. internal. 222. duty to in one's own person. 151. 84. moral. 47. 277. 204 . 73. g8. 146. rational. 45. of friendship. 36 law: element of lawgiving. (of inner freedom) 206. 255. of others. 71. 191. 53. permissive. 168n. 77-8. of inclination and of reason.191. (external. 129. 244. 191. 203. 53. 225. 40. 157. 43. distributive. of nature. external or juridical. (of outer freedom) 69. 268. 222 lust. 189. 63 infringement (wrong): on freedom. 268. 62 Horace. form of will. of duty. 46. and habit. 124. of Right of nations. 145. igo. 227. 124. 45. 42. elements of. in casuistry. administration ofjustice. 225. 226 life. 52. 252. a priori. respect for in wrongdoer. 146—7. of original community of land. of God. 250. 238. command to be holy. of community of all nations. 144. 85-go. 193 lawgiving: capacity of reason (will). of freedom. duties of. 65. distributive judgment (imputation). 243. as delight in another. 268. 52. and personality. as beneficence. mastery of. 44. Right of. (by general will) 77. 245. 85 imperative(s): categorical. ethical or internal. 241-2. feeling of. 277-8 knowledge: anthropological. 71. moral. 46-7. 201. s e e court. of civil union. 217. 205. 59. false. empirical. God as. 37. !99> 206. (a priori basis of) 43. innate right. practical. 216. see also verdict judgment (subsumption). 182. 192. 255. 48. 192-3. 71. duty of) hatred. 233. 74. 97. 188. (of penal justice) 141. of a state. 176. 43-5. and innate right to freedom. !95. nature of. 60. 186. 5 6 . 56. 42. (duty of) 246-8. see also virtue honor.) as indirect duty only. 133-5 Lavoisier. 51. 241. 233—5. (external) 50. 276. Idea of. 83-4. 145. 37 health. 177. an incentive. see also gratitude inheritance. of sovereign. 95. of head of state. 141. 142-3. 183. 242. 223. in morality. 42-3. 42. 203. of positive Right. 46-7. 42-3. 64. 45. 251-3 Hausen. on rights. principle of Right as. 62. 73—4. 244. 71. 215 love: as beneficence. 234. 209. 72-3. 148. 251. natural and positive) 50—1. 225-7. 11^5. 53. ends of. 198. 75. i85n. 63. 251. 58. 158. 128. 220-2 lying. 128. 196. 128. 271. 231. 191. 63. theoretical. 199. 124. of others). 125. 230 happiness. 236. of humanity. 88 laws: coercive. 252. of freedom. 73—4. 236. 185. 50-1. (maxim of) 244. ig3. punitive. of will of all united. 190. end of. virtue). 266. 125. 46. 188. rightful. see also freedom. 205. 51. moral self-knowledge. philosophy land. legislative lie as violation of right. 208 independence: civil. 244-6. 176. 121. vices of. 395 (see also happiness. 62. 44. 110-11. practical reason as. 231—2. see also authorities. 120. 45-6. 117. 49. understanding's concept of. as imperfect duty. of internal morality. 119. conflict of grounds of. monarchical constitution. 191-2. 260 method: of moral proof. 52 Nero. 47. 198. subject of morally practical reason. 137. 42-3. 119 mathematics. of oneself. 68. 43. 43. 127. of teaching ethics. in moral relations. will not subject to. 245. of practicing virtue. 113. provisionally rightful. 241-2. 204. possession obligation 48. 218—20 necessitation: distinguished from necessity. 69 powers: of spirit. 66. 272. 194. 69—70 (see also right(s)).51. 190. 133. renunciation of. 128. sexual. 56. 36-8. 236 predisposition(s): to be affected by concepts of duty.77. 51. 59. court as. as burden of proof. 4 1 . see also acquisition. 56-7. 35. 209. 66. 238. of things to persons. 49. 194-5 metaphysics. 252 perfection: natural and moral. (first principles of) 2. 87. 181. to the good. 48. use person. 60. 254 monarch. 139—40. 69. 136. 125. state as. 215. and oaths. 150 personality: as being endowed with inner freedom. 133. 200—4. 68—9. 254 . human. 81. 40-1. 219. of head of state. reciprocity of in rights. (parental) 99. 233. 66. 198 ownership. 255 (see also humanity). see also citizens Phaedrus. 183 (see also feeling. teachings of. condition of use. 75. mind. 6 8 . 95 possession: antinomy regarding. 92 merit. of nature. practical. 187-8. 65.88 postulates. formal.50. a negative duty. practical. 82. taking. 52. (provisionally mine) 77—9. 76. 148. 38 nobility. 80 (see also acquisition). (division of) 35. self-imposed. 45.69—70. to vices. 191. 259. and imperfect duty. narrow. 239-40. fitness of for law. subject of imputation. 96-8. 68-9. of will. 43. see also constraint. one's own. 174 oaths. law for. 216. see Right power : as belonging to executive authority. 67. 51. 226 personality. and rights. 60—1. 194. as physical capacity to use object. in appearance. obligation necessity: case of. 196.163. 45-7. 147. 216. civil. 236. 234. 229 philosophy: critical. 198. 143. 195-6. 239 pleasure. in relations of rights. as humanity.Index marriage. see ascetics. defined. 63. transition from. 239 maxim(s). 50. 194. 118—19. 27g. 120. 182. 78. moral). 197 (see also scandal) performance. 181. natural. 207. 104-6. moral and psychological. 44 murder. 74.46. wide. 123. 194. 42.165.75. 207. 186-8. 50. 177 (see also sovereign). 78. 44. body. 13m. 77-8. habit as. 43 Nicolai. 48-9. 66. 13m. 130. moral. and ends. for right action. conscience as intellectual and moral.5 . particular. moral. of objects of choice. 36. 174 money. 214-15. 237. 153 prayer. of ends. 219 Newton. 222 Marsden. 149. of others. 64. of morals. 139. (of nations) 151. see contract(s) person: ideal. 4 4 . objective. of possession of objects. states as. ethical. 53. 230 morality: of an action. 170. 72. 58. 53-4. 71. 80. 75. 207. and Right.142-5. (catechism) 267-72. 140. 2 75 object of choice. 77. 72. 68. an end in itself. 193. 119. and categorical imperative. (practical reality of concept of) 74. 71. 211-12. see property passions.44. author of. of laws.195-6. 48. (deduction of concept of) 71-2. rational concept of. 305 85. intelligible. 42. 138-9. (contract) 93. external as mine. 76. 147. 214. 204. empirical concept of. 181.51. and authorities. 166. theoretical. for deed. 73-4. 231—2. see also right(s). conclusive. 239. right of. 193. interest in. of using objects. 108. (dialogue) 267 moderation. 126. 219. moral: authorities in state as. 50. 49. 208. 37. (property) 82—3. (marriage) 98. 230.9 Mendelssohn. 64. 70. 188 (see also virtue). dignity of. private. 127-8. (during a war) 153-4. sensibility. of authorities in a state (to administer economy. 244. 88. duties of. 48. 243 (see also self-esteem). (by usable objects) 81 (see also acquisition). 77—8. 231-2 cal. permissive. 193. (innate. for session. 158-9. 249. synthetic. 182. division of. a priori. 57. 47. 197. of citizens of a state. 255 57. 56. 261-3. of humanity. 225. 72. 64. 165. 97. (a capacity for 125-6. of doctrine of morals. 252. 52 (see also definition). see defiling oneself by lust. to be on land) Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. empirical. finances. (to go to war) 152-3. 173. 238. 76-7. 257. pure practical. 60. 277> (duties of) Rousseau. expository. 118. 102. (to tax) 135. grate) 146. 55-8. right(s). 58. 219 concept of. division into innate and religion.6 0 right(s) acquired. vices opposed to. 56. 256. 73. 100. 199. (innate.235. 65. 145. 3. reason morally and technically practical. 275 prudence. 257. 44. 258-9 self-constraint. war) 154-5. see also Right. 122. see also pos221. 203-4. (and distributivejus- preservation of oneself. 48. 216. 252. conclusive. (by kind of right. see obligation. ethical Right. 71. (to emiends) 198. self-esteem. 95. 194 revenge. empirical. (division into public and private) 121. 35. formal. 253 scandal. 215 . 172. 164-7.91. to 276 freedom) 63-4. 66. 236. and feeling. to a thing) 81. 237 189. 4on. of doctrine of Right. (by act of choice as basis) 81 (see also act of choice). 92. (to banish. 77 related. stupefying oneself by food or drink. 92. 97. i68n. (laid down as postulate) 57. 124-5. 55. (property) 82. ggn. (in state of nature and in civil condition) 8 5 . acquired. 57. 127. 53. 71-5. to a person akin to right to thing) 81. servility pride. axiom of. murdering oneself. f ° r Right. natural and positive. (virtue the product of) 266. exile) 146. 264. 63. 278 immigration) 146. 95. of duty. 4on. (to distribute civil offices) 138. 109. (by kind of right. 239 254-7.275-6 acquired. 92. 83. world. in a constitution. 172—5. 228n. 152. 169. 230. 168-9. 88. moral concept of. 138-40. of Right. 56. (to punish) 140-5. 261 principle(s) a priori and concept of original possession in common. distributive). moral and empiriservility. 216. supreme. 129. 89. 207. by kind of right to a thing propositions analytic. supreme principle of. 67-8 property. public. 51. 199. theoretical. respect for a benefactor. 86. 95. (to control foundations) 137. in wider sense. 248 . 176-7. synthetic propositions of. division of by beings 276-7. 124. 138. 63. 137. 191. (to encourage punishment. 92. constitutive and regulative. 69. 82-3. 121-2. 155. 222. 71-2. 62. 90. moral. acquisition other men. a prion for division of contracts. 216. private. 119. (vices opposed to) 257-9. (to grant clemency) 140. labor theory of.396-7 Protagoras. police) 135. 198. 121. against a person) 81. 204. of doctrine of virtue. 275 135.7 (see also justice. 256. 136. 209 metaphysics of. reciprocal in rights. vices opposed to. (to distribute dignities) 138-40. 140-5. (to require performance of services) 135. of citizens of the relation(s) of moral beings. 83. 41. (innate. postulate with regard to rights. 67. 5 9 . 68. for the law. (contract) 91. in of states with regard to war (after a friendship. 123. 143. 139. (and ideal acquisition) 109. 243-4. deport. construction of Seneca. m one's animal nature. 251. 260 ridicule. as moral being only. for oneself. 59. sensation.1 6 . postulate of public Right. 6g. 264. division of property. 199. division of. 72. in strict sense. 76. supreme. 88. (domestic society) 95. and authorization to coerce. division of. 230-1. see avarice. private. universal principle of. 84. 188. 190. 76. of children) 98. 243-4. lying.306 Index tice) 113. (by kind of right. 79. 138. natural. 72. supreme. 200. (to inspect associations) Qumtilian. 111. division of. 57. (to resist supreme author(and will) 42 ity) 129-33. 265 schema. of a state war punitive. and moral weakness. 109. 54. 231-2. 113-18 3°7 vice(s). 226. 148-9 state of nature. 271. see also virtue violence. 53. 260. 4on. 127-9 (see also authorities. 115. state). predisposition to. 60. 126. 84-5. 122. malice. ig4. 188. see Right. virtue a property of. 194. 206. 233 use of choice. 254. 212. and vice. 256. 95-7. see nght(s) will distinguised from capacity for choice. 241. private. 88. general. 101. 152. domestic. 151. 216. 189. 239 wishes. 67. 125. 222. 106 society civil. 91. forms of. 62 understanding concepts of. 135 Terence. 176-7. of hatred. 200. 239-40. see also doctrine. see also choice wisdom. defined. 124 virtue as courage. 147-9 {see also constitution). 190-5. 194. 266. 50. of disrespect. definition of. 136. 220-3 superannuation of claims. 189. 206. 273. and mean between vices. 149. 248 what is mine or yours. of things. 241. Ulpian. go verdict. 146—7. 125. and ends. 189. civil stupefying oneself by food or drink. 268. civil. 208. Adam. 215. 81. 185. 103. as thought-entity and as physical person. 194. divine. 255. 188 (see also duty). and holiness. practical. regarding one's preservation. authorities in. see also nght(s). of subjugation. 125. and merit. and injustice. 38 Smith. and obligation. form and matter of. 199. 37 . 121. 149. 215-16. 94. 188. 208. 254. 233—5. 48. 233. 208. 206. 42. 189.Index Shaftesbury. 235. 52. 210. 139. 188-90. as moral disposition. 228. 187. 165-6. 123-4. see envy. 206. 147 state. 155. 48. 121. 143. 176 transference. 161. 193. required by conditions of a court. nght(s)).6 i . of conscience. 194. 208. 236. and duties of virtue. among states. 193. 248. 53. ingratitude. 207. 228-9. 268. 163 Wolff. 42. and passion. 108. constitution of. 204—5. reason's veto of. negative. 187. as strength. defamation. judgments about acquisition in. 210-11. and capacity for desire. 56. 207-8. 45. 254. 77. 85. 42. 117. of persons. 74. 153. 50. 153. 197. 207. 197. (division of) 190-1. 41. 236. 188-g. 156 see also condition. function of. 151-2. 72. 154. 6 8 . 139-40. 270. 242. law of. as united will of citizens. and lack of virtue. of virtue voting. in itself. 67. 253 thing. 121. 265. 148. distribution of.g . 186. 265 Socrates. ideal acquisition in. see preservation of oneself. of states with regard to war wealth. 143. 216. 186. 110 transgression. and virtues of social intercourse. see also citizens. see also method sovereign. 125 (see also condition. 5 9 . (havmg) 75. 93. 124-5. 77-8. 194-5. pure. in state of nature. 67. and vice. see arrogance. 204-5. and habit. 1 g2. 18m. and inner freedom. 198. 266. 243. 88. 256. as legislative authority. 150. 139. 71. ridicule. 134. 246. 205. 191-2. 170 taste.