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Journal of African History, 51 (2010), pp. 189–212. f Cambridge University Press 2010 doi:10.1017/S0021853710000253 189 C A M E R O O N I A N N A T I O N A L I S T S G O G L O B A L: FROM FOREST MAQUIS TO A PAN-AFRICAN A C C R A* BY MEREDITH TERRETTA Ottawa University A B S T R A C T : This article reassesses the political alternatives imagined by African nationalists in the ‘ first wave’ of Africa’s decolonization through the lens of Cameroonian nationalism. After the proscription of Cameroon’s popular nationalist movement, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), in the mid-1950s, thousands of Cameroonian nationalists went into exile, most to Accra, where they gained the support of Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African Bureau for African Affairs. The UPC’s external support fed Cameroon’s internal maquis (as UPC members called the underground resistance camps within the territories), rooted in culturally particular conceptions of freedom and sovereignty. With such deeply local and broadly international foundations, the political future that Cameroonian nationalists envisaged seemed achievable : even after the Cameroon territories’ official independence, UPC nationalists kept fighting. But, by the mid-1960s, postcolonial states prioritized territorial sovereignty over ‘African unity ’ and Ghana’s support of the UPC became unsustainable, leading to the movement’s disintegration. KEY WORDS: Cameroon, Ghana, decolonization, nationalism, Pan-Africanism. ‘T H E independence of Ghana is meaningless ’, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah declared before those gathered to celebrate an end to colonial rule at the Accra polo grounds on 6 March 1957, ‘ unless it is linked with the total liberation of Africa ’. With Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah founded the Bureau of African Affairs to aid other African colonial territories in their quest for independence. The new state’s constitution pledged to recognize the sovereignty of a United States of Africa over its own, should the occasion arise. Now, during the crucial period of decolonization, Nkrumah and his supporters believed that it was up to the Black Star to lead the way to a United States of Africa, free of European powers’ economic and political control, and non-aligned with either East or West in the age of the Cold War.1 For many territories in Africa still under colonial domination, Ghana’s initiative came not a moment too soon. From 1958 to 1966, the African * A Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellowship at the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University provided support for the research and writing of this article. I am grateful to Abdoulaye Gueye, Naomi Davidson, Eric Alina-Pisano, anonymous readers for the Journal of African History, Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali, Carina Ray, Edward Baptist, Sandra Greene, and Martin Bernal for valuable comments and suggestions. 1 On this point, see D. E. Apter, ‘ Ghana’s independence : triumph and paradox ’, Transition, 98 (2008), 6–23. 190 MEREDITH TERRETTA Affairs Centre in Accra hosted activists and exiles from Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, the Belgian Congo, Angola, Lesotho, Zambia, and Cameroon.2 For these African nationalists, Nkrumah’s foreign policy constituted the African cornerstone of a Third World solidarity birthed at the Asian–African Bandung Conference held in 1955.3 Using Cameroon’s decolonization as a case study, this article reassesses the political alternatives imagined by African nationalists on the eve of independence. Historians of the French empire have recently emphasized that African political leaders found the possibilities of postcolonial federation and citizenship in the French Union very appealing as an alternative to national independence in the era of Africa’s decolonization.4 These approaches seem to present an inter-territorial federation centered on a common metropole as the sole ‘non-national’ option for former colonial territories. Yet African nationalists who set their sights on the promise of Third World independence and hopes of a United States of Africa conceived extra-metropolitan political modalities and alliances.5 In other words, 2 Ras T. Makonnen, Pan-Africanism from Within as Recorded and Edited by Kenneth King (Nairobi, 1973), 214–15. 3 The Conference of Bandung signaled an anti-imperial shift in the global political economy and engendered the non-aligned movement and the emergence of a ‘ Third World ’. See A. Burton, A. Espiritu, and F. C. Wilkins, ‘ The fate of nationalisms in the age of Bandung ’, Radical History Review, 95 (2006), 147 ; C. J. Lee (ed.), Making a World After Empire : The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives (Athens, OH, 2010) ; J. Burbank and F. Cooper, Empires in World History : Power and Politics of Difference (Princeton, 2010), 427. 4 See, in particular, F. Cooper, ‘ Possibility and constraint : African independence in historical perspective ’, Journal of African History, 49: 2 (2008), 167–96 ; and G. Wilder, ‘ Untimely vision : Aime Cesaire, decolonization, utopia ’, Public Culture, 21: 1 (2009), ´ ´ 101–40. Elizabeth Schmidt calls this perspective into question by demonstrating that, by the time of the September 1958 referendum organized in France’s African territories over whether or not to join the French Community, France’s 1958 constitution had made the terms of confederating with France much less attractive to African states. See E. Schmidt, ‘ Anticolonial nationalism in French West Africa : what made Guinea unique ?’ African Studies Review, 52 : 2 (2009), 6. Other recent works suggest that administrations throughout French West Africa used hefty doses of coercion to push significant portions of the populations to vote in favor of inclusion in the French Community. See, for example, K. van Walraven, ‘ Decolonization by referendum : the anomaly of Niger and the fall of Sawaba, 1958–1959 ’, Journal of African History, 50 : 2 (2009), 269–92. 5 I use ‘ extra-metropolitan ’ to describe movements that deliberately bypassed inclusion in or collaboration with metropolitan political institutions and frameworks. Other historians have emphasized the ‘ extra-metropolitan ’ dimensions of anti-colonial movements in former French territories. See, for example, K. van Walraven, ‘ From Tamanrasset : the struggle of Sawaba and the Algerian connection, 1957–1966 ’, Journal of North African Studies, 10 :3–4 (2005), 507–27; M. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution : Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford, 2002) ; E. Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946–1958 (Athens, OH, 2007) which historicizes Guinea’s shift towards what I describe as an extra-metropolitan political practice. For an account of an ‘ extra-metropolitan ’ alternative available to Muslim Africans under French rule on the eve of decolonization, see G. Mann and B. Lecocq, ‘ Between empire, umma, and the Muslim Third World : the French Union and African pilgrims to Mecca, 1946–1958 ’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 27: 2 (2007), 361–83. god of peace’’ : village politics and nationalism in the maquis of Cameroun ’. pledged ´ allegiance to the sovereignty of a United States of Africa viewed territorial independence not as an obstacle but as a prerequisite to or an anticipated benefit of inclusion in a larger Pan-African framework. in the wake of Bandung. the political alternatives that Cameroonian nationalists envisaged seemed achievable. thousands of Cameroonian nationalists fled arrest and went into exile.9 With such deeply local and broadly global foundations. in discourse and practice. Indonesia. even before the French proscribed the party. 45–6. After the French and British proscriptions of the popular nationalist movement. ‘ ‘‘ God of independence.7 Those political actors who. Exiled upecistes (as UPC mem´ bers called themselves) reconstituted an explicitly extra-metropolitan political movement founded upon the possibilities symbolized by Nkrumah’s Bureau for African Affairs. Prashad. Wilder. Bandung. 89–121 . J. La naissance du maquis dans le Sud-Cameroun (1920–1960) (Paris. Journal of African History. former French subjects and evolues ´ ´ among them. 11: 1 (2009).6 For many African nationalists. The Darker Nations : A People’s History of the Third World (New York. Algerian revolutionaries also used the term maquis. ‘ At the rendezvous of decolonization : the final communique of the Asian–African Conference. cultural. 31 :1 (1991). ‘ Domaines de la nuit et autorite onirique dans les maquis du sud´ Cameroun (1955–1958) ’. 108. 46 :1 (2005). the Third World ‘ represented a coalition of new nations that possessed the autonomy to enact a novel world order committed to human rights. I probe the connections. ‘ Untimely vision’. and world peace as outlined by the Bandung communique ’. and political. and economic rupture with colonial powers both comprised the very foundation of anti-colonial nationalism and opened new routes to Pan-African federation. even after the Cameroon territories’ official independence in January 1960 (French Cameroun) and October 1961 (British Cameroons). See M. ´ Interventions. self-determination. 8 As upecistes called the underground resistance military camps – surely a reference to ´ the French resistance during the Second World War. 9 A. for the vernacularization of the UPC’s nationalist ideology in the region of the Sanaga-Maritime. Terretta. Journal of African History. In the second part of the article. Lee. locally particular political conceptions of freedom and sovereignty. 2007). As the historian Vijay Prashad insists. for an account of a similar process among Bamileke communities.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 191 alternative visions of federation existed concurrently and in competition with what Gary Wilder describes as those ‘built on the imperial history that bound metropolitan ’ and colonial populations ‘together within an interdependent entity ’. 1996). The UPC’s external support fed Cameroon’s internal maquis8 rooted in indigenous. given the movement’s objectives and international foundations. 7 6 . non-alignment. Mbembe. V. in 1955 and 1957 respectively. the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). 87. most ending up in Accra. 75–101. 18–24 April 1955 ’. Afro-Asian solidarity. See also C. I begin this history of the UPC’s place in the global politics of decolonization by demonstrating why. postcolonial citizenship in a ‘greater France’ never held much appeal for party leaders. idem. patterns of political liberation conceived in Accra established a precedent for Pan-African 10 Maquis camps were based on both sides of the Anglo-French boundary. Connelly. ‘ The Union des Populations du Cameroun and its southern connection ’. Doing so complicates Frederick Cooper’s assertion that ‘French Community and African federation failed. Accra freedom fighters represented more of a threat to state power than the embodiment of Pan-African liberation. Congolese. 168. of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache (OCAM). ‘ Possibility ’. First.10 As long as visions of Pan-Africanism shored up Africa’s anti-colonialist struggles. The Accra-centered project of African federation to which UPC nationalists were committed failed not because the French Community dissolved but because its residual alliances reemerged among member states of OCAM in 1965. this history of UPC nationalists’ Pan-Africanist trajectory takes seriously the projects of African federation that transcended metropolitan boundaries. the internal front unraveled as well. Diplomatic Revolution. and the UPC’s international credibility and visibility increased. in 1965. nationalists’ exile worked to bolster the movement within their territory’s boundaries.12 The linkages actively forged between Ghanaian. one that Cooper does not address. But there are at least two important reasons for exploring the ‘ failed’ project of continental unity through the lens of a ‘failed ’ nationalist movement. Revue Francaise d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer. and vice versa. languages. in Connelly. the history of UPC’s international dimensions illustrates the lasting effects of the political alternatives that nationalists envisioned during the ‘first wave ’ of Africa’s decolonization. between exiled Cameroonian nationalists and those in the maquis within the Cameroonian territories’ borders. as the spirit of Bandung waned. Guinean. ¸ 11 Although UPC leaders in exile did not achieve an international media campaign on the same scale as the Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA). Takougang. and political activists reveal another African federation in formation. and they failed together’. ´ ´ they utilized the same methods as the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) of Algeria ´ and the GPRA. 8–24. and other nationalists. Joined by a francophone identity and a desire to safeguard each other’s national sovereignty. closing the door on the UPC’s vision of nation. . Cameroonian. See below and J. See M. a bloc of thirteen francophone African states including Cameroon. The UPC failed to gain official power in postcolonial Cameroon and the Nkrumah regime toppled in 1966.11 The last part of the article reveals what it meant for UPC nationalism when. attempting to transform the UPC’s claims into a ‘ diplomatic revolution ’. Ghana’s support of the UPC in exile became unsustainable. Algerian. 3–13. Secondly. new postcolonial states’ territorial concerns began to take precedence over the idea of supra-national unity. ‘ Introduction. 12 Cooper. the external UPC remained linked to the internal resistance. heads of OCAM states used diplomacy to undo Nkrumah’s support for freedom fighters and the plans for a United States of Africa. 83: 310 (1996). anti-colonialists. With dwindling support for the UPC’s external front. and alliances. Although the UPC and the United States of Africa ‘failed together’. After the foundation.192 MEREDITH TERRETTA forged after the party’s ban. For many heads of newly independent African states. an active trade unionist at ´ the time. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 24 : 2 (1998). 303–20 . Panzer. generational conflict. A.15 In October 1946. 1999). but rather to emphasize its international foundations and its spread beyond French territory after its proscription. N. 14 My purpose in this article is not to recount the history of the UPC’s activities in French Cameroun. De la Jeucafra a l’UPC : L’eclosion du nationalisme camerounais (Yaounde. Revisionist histories from various disciplinary perspectives have proliferated. French Equatorial Africa. In contrast. Journal of Southern African Studies. Radical Nationalism in Cameroun : The Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion (Oxford. (unpublished MA thesis. Cameroonian demands for political and economic independence and the reunification of territories under British and French rule found voice in the nationalist party. . 35: 4 (2009).14 The party grew out of post-war Marxist study circles organized in Yaounde by French communists traveling ´ around the French territories of Africa after the Second World War. Afin que nul n’oublie : L’itineraire d’un anticolonialiste (Paris. Mozambique. beginning with Mbembe. Le sacre des indigenes evolues: Essai sur la professional´ ´ ` isation politique (l’exemple du Cameroun) (Paris. R. Journal of Southern African Studies. Memory. Onana. 15 G. D. CT. and education in Mozambican nationalism and the state. 1962–1970 ’. for example. L. although the case of the UPC demonstrates that. ‘ Les liaisons exterieures de ´ l’UPC. and B. even in this ‘ first phase ’ of Africa’s decolonization. five Cameroonian participants in the study circles went to Bamako to represent French Cameroun at the inaugural conference of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). 2008). Mathias Djoumessi. the ruler of the Bamileke chieftaincy of Foreke-Dschang . G. ‘ Geopolitical transition and state formation : the changing political geographies of Angola. Journal of Southern African Studies. ´ the role of exile in later liberation movements in eastern and southern Africa is well documented. Tchumtchoua. ‘ The historical significance of South Africa’s Third Force ’. the literature does not reflect this. H. The Maputo Connection : The ANC in the World of FRELIMO (Johannesburg. Ellis. Donnat. to this end. exiled nationalists played a crucial role in the struggle for nation. Ngando. 803–20. 1986). ` Naissance. 6–28. 2006). and the UN Trusteeships under French rule. To my knowledge only one historical study considers the UPC’s external activity : see D. 2004) . for a classic approach focused mostly on ‘ formal ’ politics. 1948–1960 ’. 1977) . ‘ The pedagogy of revolution : youth. Sidaway and D. 1995).CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 193 support of exiled freedom fighters that characterized later African liberation movements.13 THE UPC : A REVISED HISTORY In April 1948. created in French Cameroun’s port city and economic capital. S. 2009) . Cameroun and Togo. See. and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago. see R. Malkki. see V. 1977). ‘ Cultures of the African National Congress of South Africa : imprint of exile experiences ’. E.16 13 Curiously. demanded economic and political rights for Africans under French rule and. the UPC. Pouhe Pouhe. Purity and Exile : Violence. Simon. 21: 2 (2003). 261–99 . J. Suttner. For the standard political history of the UPC nationalist movement in French Cameroun from 1948 to 1956. M. 19 :1 (1993). encouraged the formation of territorial branches of the RDA throughout French Africa. La ´ ´ presence francaise au Cameroun (1916–1959): Colonialisme ou mission civilisatrice ? ´ ¸ (Marseille. Joseph. University of Yaounde. Manghezi. But see also : J. Le Vine. ´ 16 Cameroonian representatives included Ruben Um Nyobe. RDA leaders ´ from French West Africa. The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence (Westport. and Namibia ’. Douala. Ecole normale superieure. Ruben Um Nyobe and Felix Moumie. Not until October 1950 did the RDA. Yaounde. Gueye. J.194 MEREDITH TERRETTA Supported by the French Communist Party in its early years. the UPC and its affiliates – the Union Democratique ´ des Femmes Camerounaises (UDEFEC). France and the Africans. See E. who would ´ ´ later become secretary-general and president of the UPC. and links with African student groups and social movements ´ throughout Europe. ‘ Possibility ’. Enquete sur les ´ etudiants noirs en France (Paris. J. and bananas for export. and Asia. The key components of the UPC’s political platform were.-P. ´ ´ 18. Cold War. 2001) . From its inception.17 In 1947. 20 A. 18–25. the territories’ status as UN Trusteeships and the reunification of the British and French Cameroons. the Union des Syndicates Confederes ´ ´ ´ du Cameroun (USCC) – combined grassroots support with a visible presence in the international political arena maintained through annual visits to the UN General Assembly in New York. 170–1. and identity. Mbembe. Tchaptchet. Pouamoun. the movement traversed and transgressed metropolitan borders and boundaries. the movement’s membership grew to include women. 1962). 30–67. 17 As part of its initial constitution. Africa. For a biographical sketch of Ruben Um Nyobe. Affiliated with French Communists and the RDA. wage laborers. 1984). ´ 21 Joseph.000 by the 1950s. the RDA stipulated that each territory should have the right to choose whether or not to join the French Union. ‘ Felix Roland Moumie. and licensing restrictions that limited the economic autonomy of Cameroonian merchants and planters while benefiting white settlers. But UPC leaders’ purpose and vision would soon expand beyond a ‘common colonial experience’. ch.18 The ´ ´ following year. break with the French Communist Party and move towards ´ ¨ collaboration with the metropolitan French Assembly and support for the French Union. DIPES II. 1969). after all. in ´ ` Le probleme national kamerunais (Paris. 25–7. low-level administrative and Celestin Takala. the Jeunesse Democratique du ´ Cameroun (JDC). Guided by its political objectives. See Schmidt. 1925–1960 : l’itineraire d’un nationaliste in´ ´ ´ stransigeant ’ (unpublished thesis. cocoa. a Bamileke merchant based in Douala. ˆ Quand les jeunes africains creaient l’histoire (Paris. 1944–1960 : A Political History (New York. guided by the leader of the Part Democratique de la Cote d’Ivoire.19 metropolitan language. 1997). ˆ ´ Felix Houphouet-Boigny. respectively. Mortimer. . met for the first time at an RDA congress in Dakar. Les intellectuels africains en France (Paris. and the removal of price controls. Senegal. 19 See Cooper.21 Through its various branches and pyramidal organization. better working conditions. Radical Nationalism. publications in sympathetic metropolitan presses. and the labor union.20 Upecistes advocated higher wages.-M. see A. export laws. 18 Y. 5. who numbered some 17. small-scale farmers. ‘ Introduction ’. both contributed to the formation of the UPC nationalist party as a territorial branch of the RDA. the RDA’s initial stance was decidedly anti-colonial and pro-independence until 1950. the right of African farmers to cultivate cash crops such as coffee. the early anti-colonialist UPC seemed to be oriented towards francophone solidarity among post-Second World War antiimperialists. 167. Ndiaye. 2006) . N. ‘ A miscarriage of revolution : Cameroonian women and nationalism ’. Cameroons. Instead. 293–308.000 out ´ of a total electorate of just over 747. traitors. following the French administration’s classification after the delineation. and socialism and wed their appropriations of these prevalent ‘Third World ’ ideologies with local spiritual and political practices that reawakened indigenous memories of political sovereignty. just as the RDA expelled the UPC branch from its ranks. ´ 25 Terretta. Nkwi and J. Echanges. Victime du colonialisme francais (Paris. Terretta. P. Marthe Moumie. and representatives : the construction of a political repertoire in independence era Cameroun ’. 24 Centre d’Archives d’Outre-Mer. ‘ God of independence ’. antiimperialism. and several young traditional chiefs from the Bamileke region. and from the Katsina Ala river in the north to the Manengouba mountain range in the south. the vice-president. Warnier. Mbembe. 12 (2007). Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire : Contributions a une problematique de la democratie (Paris. as candidates or as voters. Le Vine. 147–256. in 1919. in elections after the implementation of universal suffrage in French Cameroun. of the Anglo-French boundary. developpement. Ernest Ouandie. membership and sympathizers had climbed to some 100. After its ban in French territory. On the involvement of Bamileke chiefs. Mbembe. 1982). for this and other political statistics from post-war French Cameroun.000. while thousands more joined the maquis (as UPC members called the underground resistance within the territories). The British followed suit in June 1957 and deported the Director’s Bureau. 1992).-P. On women’s involvement see M. Naissance. I use Bamileke region to refer to the portion of the Grassfields under French rule. including the UPC president. ´ 23 See Onana. 269. 1955. ´ Elements for a History of the Western Grassfields (Yaounde.22 By 1955. ‘ Grassfields’ refers to the region stretching west to east from the Cross river to the Mbam. Presence. human rights. entrepreneurs. 26 A. ‘ Chiefs.24 The proscription prompted the relocation of hundreds of nationalists to British territory. Marie-Irene Ngapeth-Biyong. Synthese sur l’implantation de l’UPC au Cameroun. ´ ´ . and Terretta. and seven others. Toulabor (eds. their wives. . Mbembe. See J.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 195 functionaries.-F. ‘Miscarriage ’. in J. the UDEFEC ´ secretary-general. 227–54. Abel Kingue. Marthe Moumie ´ ´ ´ and Marthe Ouandie. see Terretta.25 The ` British proscription forced the exile of hundreds more nationalists who had regrouped at Kumba and Bamenda after the French outlawed the movement. the JDC president. ‘ Memoire historique et action politique ’. nationalists pieced together an extra-metropolitan political practice comprised of Pan-Africanism. Aix-en-Provence (CAOM). 43: 2 (2010).26 As 22 Ibid. International Journal of African Historical Studies. ¸ ´ 2006). the majority of the UPC’s directors’ bureau turned away from collaboration or even dialogue with French administrators and were excluded from the project of inter-territorial federation spearheaded by the RDA. Bayart. Affaires politiques 3335/1. Felix Moumie. A.). Sacre. Soon after remarking that the UPC wielded greater political influence and attracted a greater number of followers than another other political party. ´ ` and C. et hierarchies dans le ´ ´ Bamenda pre-colonial (Cameroun) (Stuttgart. For an account of the ` UPC’s relationship with the RDA see Ngando. 61–90. Stichproben : Vienna Journal of African Studies.23 But upecistes would never have the chance to participate. 1985) . Warnier. the French administration banned the UPC and its affiliates on 13 July 1955.-P. Nkam. ‘ Binaries of nations : the ‘‘ Anglophone problem ’’ in Cameroon and the presentation of historical narratives on the internet ’ (unpublished MA thesis. youth. Several MA theses have begun to explore the histories of specific maquis. ‘ La rebellion ´ dans la subdivision de Ndikinimeki (Region du Mbam). for an ´ ´ interesting perspective on the UPC in British territory. trans.196 MEREDITH TERRETTA UPC militia based in maquis camps adopted guerilla sabotage after the December 1956 parliamentary elections. anti-colonial revolution in African colonies necessitated equal parts of social and political consciousness. DIPES II. See F. However. Yaounde. The Wretched of the Earth. and labor parties broadcast the fact that the territories of Cameroon were not colonies. 1 9 4 7 –1 9 5 7 From its inception. As the years progressed. Although upeciste leaders did not refer to ´ South Africa explicitly (as they did with Algeria and Vietnam). Ecole normale superieure.28 Henceforth the survival of the UPC depended upon exiled leaders’ ability to articulate UPC nationalism with Pan-Africanism and thus create a dual anti-colonial front : one located inside the territories and the other outside its borders. 28 UPC leaders in exile would have had occasion to cross paths with Franz Fanon in 1958 at the All African Peoples’ Conference discussed below. upon his return from trips abroad. even before the UPC’s ban.29 Yet. my intent is not to suggest that upecistes read and evoked Fanon. and violence was a necessary path to liberation from colonial rule.-C. Wouri. For the Mbam. but UN Trusteeship territories. What is certain is that there were numerous resistance camps in regions that the conventional historiography has entirely overlooked. Bamenda. laborers. 142. Oubel. nationalists began to view their fight for independence as revolutionary. This dual front – one external and PanAfrican. 130. 27 The UPC was the sole nationalist movement in francophone sub-Saharan Africa to use arms in the struggle for independence. Bamileke. there are striking parallels between the UPC’s military strategy post-1957 and that of the Umkhonto we Sizwe. T H E U P C ’S I N T E R N A T I O N A L P L A T F O R M . University of Manchester. administered jointly by the French and the British. see L. See Ellis. the other internal and cultivated by farmers. and fighters in the Sanaga-Maritime. UPC nationalism fit a Fanonian. the UPC and its affiliate women’s. and Kumba regions (the latter two in Anglophone territory) has yet to be written. revolutionary. the first in which universal suffrage applied. 1955–1969 : approche historique ’ ´ (unpublished MA thesis. Mbam. 1999) . and Pan-African model. Beginning in 1951. Fanon. R. Pilcox (New York. Nkam. Copies of his speeches circulated as tracts in local meetings.27 From 1957 on. upecistes had never espoused the project of French Cameroun’s integration into a ‘greater France’. Yet he warned against the revolutionary ‘ intellectual ’ who overlooked the contributions of a local peasantry and/or lumpen proletariat. 29 The UPC’s armed struggle began in the Sanaga-Maritime in late 1956 and spread to the Bamileke region in late 1957. Wouri. formed in 1961. For Fanon. Um Nyobe traveled annually to New York to ´ speak before the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee and. Bamenda. UPC militia groups became increasingly factionalized and it would be misleading to present the maquis as a unified front. Mungo. 2008). . The complex history of the UPC maquis in the Mungo. 2004). and intentionally modeled it on similar campaigns in Algeria and Vietnam. Mbam. Sharp. but rather to classify UPC nationalism ´ as fitting a Fanonian model. he gave accounts of his visits in public gatherings and UPC congressional meetings. ‘ Historical significance ’. 264. and Kumba regions – was of pivotal importance to the UPC nationalist ´ movement. see T. the armed wing of the ANC and South African Communist Party. 31 Elsewhere. such as ‘ONU’. Toulouse. The men and women of the UPC sent over 45.000 petitions in the year 1956 alone : see Onana. However. 30 . ´ Sylvanus Olympio. If the most notorious of these meetings were between the likes of the anti-colonialists Frantz Fanon. or ‘ Accra-ville’. ´ 32 Interview with Ignace Djoko Neguin. The French government was alarmed to witness the AEC’s swift reaction to the 13 July 1955 proscription of the UPC. which allowed them only to go from the Tudor Hotel to the United Nations building for daily meetings. ´ ‘ Miscarriage ’. ´ 33 For a history of Cameroonian students’ political mobilization in France. it also promoted the formation of Pan-African and anti-colonial networks. including representatives from Marseille. they did so under a class C visa. progressive Cameroonian students in France soon formed the Association des Etudiants Camerounais (AEC). citing New Commonwealth. for decades. At meetings such as the League for Human Rights and the American Committee on Africa. Within two days. benefiting from their access to metropolitan politicians and media.32 The nationalist narrative was perpetuated through the intersection of local and global.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 197 While the UN facilitated political mobilization within the Cameroonian Trusteeship Territories. taking place in dormitory rooms or student watering holes. 62. Quand les jeunes. apparently mid-1955. Compelled to action by fellow-students and by an awareness of the struggles back home. Clermont-Ferrand. one might only imagine the proliferation of ´ ´ such alliances among students less erudite on paper but surely as passionate. resources. the UN became essential to popular conceptions of nationalism and promoted the international alliances – across metropolitan axes.33 These discussions. Harlem was specifically off-limits. the Tunisian representative of Algerian nationalist Messali Hadj in the United States. But Janvier Onana. see Tchaptchet. Bureau de Documentation de l’AEFCameroun. the presi´ dent of the JDC. ‘Congo ’. Aime ´ Cesaire.31 UPC militia groups in the maquis had symbolic international code names for their major base camps. Mar. Baham centre. and members’ exposure to the international political realm eased upecistes’ transition to exile after the ´ party’s ban in British and French territories. Bordeaux. Student CAOM. 228.30 From the moment of the UPC’s foundation. and connections to leftist and communist organizations. from West to East – upon which nationalist leaders would rely for support after the party’s ban. Um Nyobe met the future first president of Togo. I have estimated the petitions sent by upecistes at around 6. and Lyon. 2002.000 : Terretta. traveled to the meeting of the General Assembly Fourth Committee.000 petitions to the UN from 1948 to 1960 – more than from any other UN Trusteeship territory.d. been thriving centers of anticolonial discussion among university students. Lassalle. Post-war Paris and London had. Montpellier. It was this familiarity with the international that enabled nationalists to access the UN directly through the act of petitioning. Sacre. Affaires politiques 3335/1. and Leopold Senghor. writes that upecistes sent 45. as Um Nyobe and Abel Kingue. the AEC organized a meeting that drew 75 students. 30 April 1956. n. Um Nyobe and Kingue re´ ceived visits from North African anti-colonialists such as Bouhafa. promoted a sense of urgency coupled with a realization that students could join in the anti-colonial struggle. In 1951. in economics.198 MEREDITH TERRETTA leaders spoke out against the dissolution of the UPC as ‘absolutely illegal. and Moscow and Peking in the East. and participated in international conferences and gatherings such as those arranged by non-governmental organizations such as the Women’s International Democratic Federation. which ‘ were not free ’ and ‘ should be made to shed their imperialist ties ’.38 They also expressed their wish to send a delegation to student meetings in Ghana. FEANF kept abreast of current events in Africa. Cameroonian students resolved to maintain contact with the leaders of the UPC who fled French territory after the official ban and to send new petitions to the UN protesting the ban and the forced deportation of nationalists. France d’Outre-Mer. facilitating the articulation between UPC nationalism and traditional governance. Student supporters in favor of the UPC became the most crucial leaders of the movement. a student branch of the UPC. African anti-colonialists’ transnational ties were 34 CAOM.36 ´ The Federation des Etudiants de l’Afrique Noire en France (FEANF) was ´ ´ an affiliate of the communist International Union of Students (IUS) based in Prague. Kamdem Ninyim would become one of the dozen or more openly pro-nationalist chiefs in the region. 39 Pouamoun. one young member of the AEC. Note de renseignements. as Cameroun is not a French territory. In order to enable freedom fighters to ‘carry on the struggle for their respective countries ’. and Abel Eyinga in law. 1965. ‘Felix-Roland Moumie ’. F. particularly during the years of exile after 1957. including Ivory Coast and Niger. Mr. Many of these students achieved doctoral degrees. FEANF students requested that Ghanaian passports and scholarships be granted to students abandoned by their governments for political reasons. emerged in France and declared its support for the UPC and its affiliates. and the World Congress of Partisans of Peace. Hogbe Nlend and Woungly Massaga in mathematics. ´ ´ . 53. returned to Cameroon to ´ succeed his father as traditional ruler of the chieftaincy of Baham in the Bamileke region. but a territory under UN Trusteeship’.39 In Accra. 37 Gueye. 2. Dei Anang’s summary of the letter from the Federation of African Students in France. Pierre Kamdem Ninyim. and Cairo in Africa. Students and other Africans in exile became part of a global network with hubs in Accra. such as Osende Afana. 1955. the IUS. African students and activists followed Soviet bloc and Chinese scholarship funds.34 After the AEC gathering. Intellectuels. 6 Dec. ‘ God of independence ’. Section du vingtieme ` siecle. ch. Accra (GNA). studying at Lycee Pascal in the 16th arrondissement in Paris. Conakry. including the ebb and flow of anti-colonial demonstrations and their suppression by French administrations. 24 Jul. Paris (CHAN).35 In 1954. thus adding timbre and resonance to the grassroots dimensions of UPC nationalism. 35 Centre Historique d’Archives Nationales. Affaires politiques 3335/1. London and Paris in the metropolitan sphere. those who would form its intellectual and political nucleus. SC/BAA/287 B. ` ´ 36 On this point see Terretta. Foccart papers.37 Their missive to Kwame Nkrumah in 1965 demonstrated their familiarity with Ghana’s support of revolutionaries and their recognition that this support was threatened or undermined by other African states. Section de coordination. Fonds prives 153. the ´ Union Nationale des Etudiants Kamerunais (UNEK). 38 Ghana National Archives. Eyinga deportation file. 41 He described connections forged among Africans and people of African descent. Edwards. a Caribbean-born Pan-Africanist who claimed Ethiopian descent. and the Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge. He later changed his name. See H. claiming that his father was of Ethiopian origin.d. s. By May 1955. for example.44 Ras T. the Manchester Pan-African Conference of 1945. and UDEFEC committees dotted the Mungo region along the Anglo-French boundary from Nkongsamba all the way down to Loum. collaborated closely with George Padmore in Great Britain beginning in the 1930s. Mr. Foreign Office. allowing for ‘contacts and collaborations that would have been ‘‘ unthinkable ’’ in the colonial world. Affaires poli´ tiques. beginning the Pan-African exodus that would lead them further and further from their nation’s soil. British National Archives. for all administrative and legal purposes. 40 . Eastwood. 3309/1.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 40 199 strengthened through the work of Ras T. 242. and remarked that ‘Africans were not only compelled to think out the position of their own people. Pan-African History : Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787 (London. Colonial Office. JDC. UPC nationalists used the Anglo-French frontier strategically. CAOM. so dominated by that dichotomy ’. upecistes wanted by the administration had two options to avoid im´ prisonment or assassination. 1961.42 EXILE AND BORDERS Following the French administration’s proscription of the party on 13 July 1955. the French estimated the UPC to have some 1. For the time being. but were forced by the pressures of the times into making alliances across boundaries that would have been unthinkable back home ’. They could go underground.200 members in the Mungo alone. or they could flee into British territory. becoming part of the newly formed maquis. 2003). 42 B. 41 Makonnen. 155. Both options protected nationalists from European military repression by leading them into new areas where French administrators had no control. Kew (BNA) FO 371/155344. Affaires politiques. with Kwame Nkrumah. it worked to their advantage that the territory on the British side of the Anglo-French boundary was. Makonnen. The Practice of Diaspora : Literature. 44 CAOM. apparently 1955 . when he became involved in anti-colonial and Pan-African politics.43 Even before the French proscription of the party in July 1955. Pan-Africanism. 14 Aug. and an additional 300 in British territory. to Sir Roger Stevens. a foreign land. H. and attended. Adi and M. 3335/1. Note de synthese sur les activites politiques et sociales du mois de janvier ` ´ 1955. 117–22. Translation. Makonnen was named George Thomas Nathaniel Griffith by his parents at the time of his birth in British Guiana. a hundred or so local UPC. which they claimed as part of the nation they struggled to bring into existence. MA. that Brent Hayes Edwards argues ‘broke the hold of the metropole–colony dichotomy ’. The exiles began their long journey in the British Cameroons. counting on the unwillingness of low-level European administrators to communicate across the border. Sherwood. particularly in metropolitan cities. Makonnen held a top position in Ghana’s African Affairs Committee. Propagande et action psychologique des groupements extremistes au Cameroun. 43 See. 2003). they used the boundary to escape arrest. 1955. Most of the leaders left Nkongsamba that night and headed for refuge across the border in British territory. Note de renseignements. … youth congresses. ´ took up residence in Kumba. ´ 49 Matthew Connelly uses the phrase to describe the Algerian struggle for independence. FO 371/155344. FO 371/161610. ’. Affaires Politiques. and fighting over world opinion and international law’ as the weapons of greater importance for Algerian nationalists than conventional CAOM. could be engaged as a political strategy. ´ ´ 47 BNA. 48 BNA. to Sir Roger Stevens. mountainous terrain.46 Without leaving the territory they envisioned as the nation. long after the UPC leaders had been deported. 14 Aug. 3337. 28 Apr. In April 1962. forming militia base camps in the dense. referring to the Algerian independence war.47 The situation only intensified during the first years after Cameroon’s independence.200 MEREDITH TERRETTA On 25 May 1955. Colonial Office. the entire directors’ committee. Ruben Um Nyobe. Mr Eastwood. British authorities estimated that some 1. As though following the recipe for what Matthew Connelly. 22 mai–30 mai 1955. Foreign Office.45 In so doing. Rapport de Surete. ´ ´ 46 CAOM. Diplomatic Revolution. Affaires Politiques 3347/1. with the exception of the secretary-general. following public demonstrations organized by the UPC to mark the unfurling of its national anthem. By 1961. ˆ ´ 22–29 Oct. 29 Oct. they continued organizing the movement in much the same way as they had before. See Connelly. Cameroons and the possibility of combatant forces coming in before the 1st Oct. particularly in the Mungo region. flag. press conferences. Interview with Ignace Djoko Neguin. Connelly describes ‘human rights reports. and the porous border. 1955 . remaining in daily contact with members in French territory owing to the mobility of the nationalists. 45 . establishing a pattern that would henceforth serve the resistance movement. British embassy. and ‘Joint Proclamation ’. in British territory. One only had to learn how to slip across the border unnoticed and to maintain contact between internally and externally based comrades. Yaounde. There. UPC nationalists became accustomed to a state of exile.500 maquisards from ‘all over the combined Cameroons’ were concentrated along the Anglo-French boundary. and Bamenda in Anglophone territory to prevent the ‘areas concerned from becoming a refuge for terrorists from east Cameroon’.300–1. 1962. ‘ Threat of terrorists on the border of S. Mamfe. President Ahidjo declared a state of emergency in the regions of Kumba. the French administration arrested a number of nationalists in the Mungo region. Chronologique des evenements survenus a ´ ` Nkongsamba. 1961.48 A PAN-AFRICAN ‘ DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION ’ 49 The UPC’s survival as a nationalist movement depended upon its ability to influence foreign-policy makers in Africa to support its cause. rather than serving as an obstacle to the movement’s growth. calls a ‘diplomatic revolution ’. Delegation du Haut-Commissariat. that. Yaounde to Foreign Office. exiled UPC nationalists took care to position themselves prominently in all internationally attended Pan-African conferences that took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Following the proscription of the UPC and its affiliates. or back to their villages of origin in the Bamileke region. Uganda. Guinea. Iraq. Kenya. Dir. and UDEFEC directors’ committees.54 At the Cairo meeting in 1957. Lebanon. ‘ La conference de solidarite Afro-Asiatique de Conakry ´ ´ (11–16 Avril 1960)’. the British administration banned the UPC in The Cameroons and arrested 13 members of the UPC. 6 June ´ 1960. Ghana. UPC speakers used the presence of the international journalists to their advantage. Iran. North Korea. Guinea. Guinea. Foccart papers. The UPC held seats in both the Director’s Committee and the permanent secretariat. Note d’information. 30 Sep. Indonesia. Congo. UAR. attended the Afro-Asian Solidarity ´ Organization’s (AASO) first conference. UAR. Belgian Congo. 18 from British Embassy. Soon after their arrival. India. Cameroun (UPC). 1958.51 British officials decided not to surrender them to French authorities across the Anglo-French boundary. political parties. the UPC president in exile. USSR. From the time of upecistes’ deportation until ´ 1965. upeciste leaders needed the official ´ support of other governments. Morocco. Peoples’ Republic of China. Iraq. North Vietnam. Indonesia. On 30 May 1957. and Yemen. labor unions. the movement’s proscription within the Cameroon territories pushed the UPC to greater international exposure. South-West Africa. Fonds publics 2092. Fonds prives 149. Southern Rhodesia.53 The AASO’s purpose was to ‘unify the struggle against imperialism and colonialism’ by bringing together AASO national committees. Pan-African conferences provided them with a nearly annual international forum in which to make their case. 4. BNA. Ironically. In using the international arenas available to them to sway world opinion in their favor. 53 All information on the AASO is taken from CHAN. Japan. the Sudanese president encouraged them to leave. Dr Moumie. Uganda. conference-goers Ibid. The organization’s permanent secretariat was made up of 12 members chosen by the directors’ committee : Algeria (FLN). CO 554/2367. each one representing a particular nation : Algeria. Despatch No. But in order to transform the UPC nationalist struggle into a ‘diplomatic revolution ’. Liberia. and held press conferences in the hopes of gaining support for their cause. JDC.52 Facing censorship in Sudan. USSR. Just months after his forced deportation from the British Cameroons. Moumie and other ´ UPC leaders continued on to Cairo to establish the UPC Headquarters in exile. Japan. ` ` 54 The AASO’s Director’s Committee was comprised of 27 members. UPC leaders in exile remained on equal terms with their political opponent in Cameroon. Service de documentation exterieure et ´ ´ de contre-espionage (SDECE). Somalia. Ibid. and youth and women’s organizations. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. movements for peace. whom they described as a ‘valet’ of French colonialism.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 50 201 military arms. Sudan was the only nation on the UPC’s list of desirable hosts that opened its borders to them. ‘ Soudan-Cameroun (UPC)’. China. and was elected to serve in the organization’s directors’ committee along with the representatives of Ghana. Prime Minister and eventual President Ahmadou Ahidjo. held in Cairo in December 1957. Tunisia. de l’Afrique-Levant. and Algeria – the nations whose leaders would become the most ardent political supporters of the UPC in the years to come. 52 CHAN. but instead allowed them to choose the nation to which they would be deported. India. Foccart papers. made uneasy by their radicalism and increasing visibility in the international arena. Pakistan. 51 50 . Yaounde to FO. Mongolia. Cameroun (UPC). The three of them established the Bureau for African Affairs exclusively to handle contacts with freedom fighters from dependent territories. convened in Accra to discuss ways to mutually ‘safeguard’ their political and economic independence. and at the same time. to strategize support for the liberation of the rest of Africa still under colonial rule. suggesting that the upcoming AAPC conference could ‘serve as a useful platform for dependent African territories to air views on matters affecting their destiny and future ’. Peace Without Power : Ghana’s Foreign Policy. Nkrumah scribbled a handwritten note on the records.59 and listed French Togoland. Nkrumah relied on the expertise of two Pan-African advisors of Caribbean descent. Ibid. and a UN referendum on the reunification of the British and French territories. and delegates from independent states pledged their support for Cameroon’s immediate independence. Nkrumah described the freedom fighters who had congregated in the African Affairs Centre in Accra as the ‘gem of the revolution’.58 The Conference of Independent African States was a precursor to the more important All African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC) to be held the following December. Armah. a cessation of American aid to the Cameroonian government. Liberia. I am grateful to Akosua Darkwah 58 for providing me with a copy of this publication.55 During press conferences. In fact. SC/BAA/136. 2004). perhaps most importantly. 15 Apr. to establish and maintain ties between independent states. Makonnen. Nigeria. The bureau was constituted informally from the date of Ghana’s independence. and agreed that economic sanctions and boycotts must be applied against the apartheid regime in South Africa. and the Cameroons as territories that might benefit from a conference forum. During the April meeting of heads of state. Ethiopia. On the issue of Cameroon. Libya.202 MEREDITH TERRETTA addressed the Algerian war. 27. the leaders of Ghana. 1957–1966 (Accra. Morocco. also in Accra. Ibid. From the time of Ghana’s independence. political Pan-Africanism. it was just the sort of cause Nkrumah needed at the time. and given a legal status in 1959 after Padmore’s death : see K. condemned the ‘ barbarous acts committed by Belgian colonialists against the population ’ of Congo. Tunisia. a harbor for the men and women in exile who struggled to attain independence for African territories still under foreign domination.56 At this initial AASO conference. Sudan. George Padmore of Trinidad and Ras T. 59 GNA. Moumie built alliances with Sekou ´ Toure and Kwame Nkrumah. AASO spokespersons called for a withdrawal of all French and British troops from the territories of Cameroon. and. Conference of Independent African States. and Egypt. the eight independent countries in Africa. the AASO passed a resolution painting the proscription of the UPC as ‘a war of renewed colonial conquest’. 57 55 . To shape the foundations of the Ghanaian nation-state and define its role in the quest for independence and African unity. 56 Ibid. Accra became fertile ground for the cultivation of a new.57 In April 1958. The leaders of Guinea and Ghana adopted the UPC as one of their revolutionary projects and helped to get the Cameroon case on the agenda of subsequent Pan-African forums. 1958. 58. the Franco-Cameroonian regime expressed its displeasure at Ghana’s official support of the UPC bureau in exile. and requested the intervention of the French ´ ambassador of Ghana to prevent Moumie’s participation.64 French colonial administrators shared Ahidjo’s indignation at Ghana’s position vis-a-vis Moumie and the UPC because they viewed it as an attack ` ´ on their project to integrate African territories into the French Union. 3e bureau. ‘ already the devolution of power to territorial structures was underway ’ (Burbank and Cooper. 64 CHAN. the French High Commissioner of Cameroon.61 Apparently in preparation for the AAPC.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 203 The approaching AAPC provided a sense of urgency to the completion of the African Affairs Centre. Because of ‘the imminence of the conference and lack of hotel accommodation’. Directeur des Affaires Politiques. ` ` 1958. a dormitory that would house 200 visitors. who was to institutionalize the Ghanaian government’s policy towards the freedom fighters. and the African Affairs Committee. 31 Oct. Foccart papers. and 62 nationalist organizations. The Minister of Overseas France remarked that the conference ‘constituted a dangerous tribunal for adversaries of the Franco-African community ’. 65 CHAN. Sekou Toure of Guinea. political parties. 28 African territories under foreign rule. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. And yet the AAPC convened in 1958 (and the AASO Conference held in 1957). 425). Pan-Africanism. Furthermore. the Centre had become a common meeting place for African politicians. and Nkrumah of Ghana ´ ¨ officially declared their three states to constitute the ‘nucleus of a Union of West African States’. Empires. Foccart papers.63 In the months leading up to the AAPC. symbolized the growth of a ‘ new form’ of Pan-Africanism that premised inter-territorial cooperation over territorial sovereignty. formed primarily of members of the Ghanaian government. Pan-Africanists. 58. Cameroonian Prime Minister Ahidjo told the French HighCommissioner of Cameroun that he would not send any representatives to Accra if Moumie were invited. freedom fighters. was attended by representatives from the 8 independent African states. held in Accra in December 1958. Nkrumah delegated the task to Makonnen. Direction des Affaires Politiques. 3e Bureau. by that time. 62 60 . a kitchen and cafeteria. Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 15 Jul. 61 See Makonnen. and/or trade unions.62 The conference symbolized the new age of political.60 By the time of the AAPC conference in late 1958. Fonds publics. ` ` 1958. and a staff to prepare food and wait on guests. anti-colonial Pan-Africanism. Modiba Keıta of Mali.65 On 18 July 1958. Ibid. Fonds publics. Ibid. in November 1958. The first AAPC Conference. even before Prime Minister Ahidjo had learned of the impending AAPC conference. ´ Ahidjo demanded that the French submit a strident diplomatic protest to the Ghanaian government. 63 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper write that ‘ older forms of pan-Africanism ’ had withered by the mid-1950s and that. 212–24. ` ´ Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer a M. Makonnen constructed a centre with 25 private apartments. and was extremely threatening to metropolitan powers that had yet to loosen the chains on many of their colonies. Upon learning of the AAPC conference plans in October 1958. 11 Dec. 1958. Among his colleagues were Ahmed Boumendjel. Kojo Botsio. remained ´ in Accra. Special Outre-Mer. ` ` Directeur d’Afrique-Levant. 67 CHAN. ` Cameroun. to High Commissioner. French diplomatic influence in Africa was too weak to prevent Nkrumah and other AAPC planners from upholding the UPC’s prominent position at the conference. delegations in attendance adopted a resolution on the Cameroon question. 15 Dec. and this gave him the courage to proclaim at a press conference on 12 December 1958 that the exiled UPC directors’ bureau constituted the legitimate Cameroonian government. British. where he drew on the resources of the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre. 1958. to symbolize the ‘cohesion of the ensemble francais’. Fonds publics 2092. Foccart papers. M. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Torre to Minister de la France d’OutreMer. With Moumie ´ ´ established in Conakry.68 On 13 December 1958. not one delegate from the Ahidjo government attended. a referendum on the issue of reunification. Bulletin Sud´ Sahara. Moumie was elected to a position in the ´ AAPC directors’ committee. and West-German military 66 CHAN. We must therefore require the political leaders of the other territories that have been invited to Accra. Ernest Ouandie. Rostain. 19 Dec. the representative of the FLN. It was quite another for it to continue to do so at the subsequent AAPC conferences. the AAPC passed a resolution severely criticizing the Ahidjo regime for allowing the presence of foreign armies. the UPC vice-president. As planned. to refuse … to attend the conference if they must sit in the presence of an illegal and insurrectional organization. Patrice Lumumba. Hence. Directeur des Affaires Politiques.67 At this first meeting of the AAPC. the return of those exiled and deported.69 Before the close of the AAPC.204 MEREDITH TERRETTA Torre. Djibo-Bakari. Fonds publics. Foccart papers. 18 Jul. wrote to the Minister of Overseas France that. Fonds publics. All anti-colonial organizations and African nations agreed to go before the UN to request total amnesty for members of the UPC and its affiliates. 1958. Moumie moved the UPC headquarters to Conakry in Guinea. ‘French. Pignon and Chef du 3e Bureau. It was one thing for the AAPC to recognize the UPC in exile as the legitimate government of Cameroon before the country’s independence. . in 1958. Moumie found himself in the thick of the newly ´ constituted Pan-Africanist body of the AAPC. 69 CHAN. even after Cameroon’s independence in 1960. chaired by the Kenyan Tom Mboya. Foccart papers. Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ghana. and democratic elections for the National Cameroonian Assembly with a UN-selected commission to organize and supervise all electoral proceedings. in other words. 68 CHAN. it was ¸ of the highest importance for us to make sure that Moumie cannot participate in ´ the Accra debates and to obtain permission for the veritable representatives of Cameroonian public opinion to be admitted if this conference is to be attended by representatives of French territory. if the invitation to Moumie is not revoked. and Abdoulaye Gueye. Fonds publics 2092. 1958. or Apithy. in 1961. Paris. such as Sekou Toure.66 ´ However. future prime minister of Congo. Directeur du Cabinet. In Cairo. Telegram from Directeur des Affaires Politiques. the representative of the Guinean labor union. Foccart papers. 2004 .. At the African Affairs Centre. Those housed at the centre included Patrice Lumumba from the Belgian Congo. UPC leaders sorted out those who showed intellectual promise from those who had not spent much time in school.74 By mid-1960. 1961. ‘ Jeanne ’. they would have no passports … We needed enlightened policemen on the frontiers who would know not to enforce the regulations too strictly. thousands of young nationalists set off across colonial borders on the trek to Ghana. Felix Moumie and Ernest Ouandie of Cameroon. 2002. Nkongsamba. As Makonnen reminisced : We would be rung up by the police at the frontier and told that some fellows had arrived. with Marie-Irene Ngapeth-Biyong. 2001. Congo to ´ E. The AAPC went on to condemn the agreements signed with the French government ‘eliminating national sovereignty and practically converting this territory into a French department in Africa’.71 The exiles included the sons and daughters of Bamileke chiefs or of the nascent Cameroonian bourgeoisie. 2008 . Yaounde. and BNA. Pan-Africanism. 2004.75 ´ 70 Resolutions adopted by the All African Peoples’ Conference. 1960. distributed scholarship application forms prepared by Moumie to its members.. and finally the sons of small-scale farmers and ´ ´ traders. Accra. in British Embassy. if not before. Dr Gallal. the One Kamerun (OK) party. 215. the elite cadre of late colonial intelligentsia – school teachers such as Gertrude Omog and Ernest Ouandie. FO 371/146650. 85 Brecknock Rd.72 In rare cases. 28 Oct. doctors ´ such as Felix Moumie. Beginning in 1957. many of whom had had minimal schooling. ´ ´ Holden Roberto of Angola. and the ‘bombardment of numerous regions in the Kameroun by the French artillery and the repeated executions of Kameroonese people struggling for independence ’. Boothby. and Mbiyu Koinange and Odinga of Kenya.70 THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY PAN-AFRICANISM International ideological support was perhaps not as crucial as material support for the increasing number of exiles escaping across the borders. 22 Aug. 75 Ibid. 2002. 2003. 72 Interviews with Job Njapa. Foreign Office. 71 Makonnen. the Egyptian President Nasser’s representative. The resolution called for all independent African states to support ‘the immediate and complete withdrawal of French and British military troops’. Douala. Baham. Cairo. London to ‘ Felix’ [Moumie]. Ibid. urban laborers and members of labor unions. 73 74 Ibid. Africa Department. the vice-president of the UPC. with Ignace Neguin Djoko. 1960. with Fo Marcel Ngandjong Feze. B. New Bell. . Banda and Kenneth Kaunda from southern central Africa. 1999 . elders accompanied the youths. 2005. Esq. and with ` ´ Jacqueline Kemayou. 2003 . 23–31 Mar. 1999. Most came on foot. Scholarships were obtained for those who would some day make up the national intelligentsia. Bandenkop. Leopoldville. 2003.73 The others undertook the military training that UPC leaders expected would ensure the eventual overthrow of the Franco-Cameroonian government in formation. carrying on the UPC movement under another name in the British territory of The Cameroons.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 205 bases ’. Rabaroca and Mulutsi of the PAC. 2002. 79 Interviews with Job Ngoule Njapa. 1960 in British Embassy. ´ ´ ´ 4 Sep. of lacking funds to carry out his duties. ´ Secret.. Extract from South Cameroons Intelligence Report for Dec. a permanent resident in the African ´ Affairs Centre. CO 554/2367. 77 BNA. 1960. Esq. became one of the key figures in Accra.76 and a German ambassador in Accra agreed to provide scholarships to additional students for the academic year 1960–1. 78 The scholarships increased from 1960 to 1961. Accra to Abel Kingue. B. A. Mekou did not indicate which German ambassador.206 MEREDITH TERRETTA By late 1960. While the youths destined for military training peddled ice water in the streets to earn enough to eat. Leopoldville. Interview with Job Ngoule Njapa. FO 371/146650. Africa Department. 28 Oct. Africa Department. Esq. 2003. African Affairs Centre. Yaounde. BNA. Leopoldville.79 where they would be put in contact with the UPC representatives in Accra. 1960. 30 Sep. B.81 Class cleavages prevalent in Cameroon resurfaced among the exiles during their stay in Accra. Cairo. C. Esq. a loyal leader of the UDEFEC. where Moumie was based in August and ´ September 1960. Boothby. or Cecile Teck.82 the former Bamileke chiefs Marcel Feze and Paul Kemayou ‘ never fully forgot their style of life of yesterday’ and therefore weighed on UPC finances. political refugees from Cameroon. and provided cab fares for the students to get to the airport.83 Many Cameroonian exiles. Samuel Mekou. Leopoldville. Foreign Office. Mekou found places for the youths in transit. East or West. the UPC’s youth wing. were engaged as ´ ´ couriers to slip across borders and carry funds. 1960. FO 371/155340. president of the JDC.80 Some trustworthy young men and women. Cox. Foreign Office. Esq. the British administration knew of at least four youths studying or soon to be studying on scholarship in Moscow. See also BNA. Boothby. There were 33 scholarships awarded to Cameroonian students through the UPC-OK during the single month of July 1961. and Woungly Massaga. by word of mouth. FO 371/146650. usually in the Ghana House. 1961. CO 554/2367.. Governor-General of Nigeria to the Secretary of State for the 82 Colonies. B. 1960. 19 Aug. Samuel Mekou. Ernest Ouandie. Samuel Mekou. Congo to E. 80 BNA. 3 Sep. 3 Sep. Africa Department. He complained bitterly to Abel Kingue. or Leopoldville. to Secretary of State for the Colonies. 1960 re Petition to High Commissioner (22 Feb. who oriented new arrivals and served as their liaison with the UPC Director’s Bureau. Yaounde. arms. as well as money for food and lodging. Congo to E. in British Embassy. Moumie in Leopoldville. British embassy. such as Emmanuel Fankem (also known as Fermete).78 Moumie’s father. Jacqueline Kemayou. Accra to Abel Kingue. 28 Oct. Cameroonians on the run knew. especially in the later years of the influx 76 BNA. Congo to E. Flack to R. FO 371/146650.. 81 BNA. to make their way straight to the Guinean embassy upon arrival in Accra. . B. 26 Feb. African Affairs Centre.. Mekou forwarded the names of prospective students or military trainees to the UPC leadership in Accra. ´ Commonwealth Relations Office. procured passports for them from the Guinean embassy. London.77 Other students were destined for the University of Peking. to Felix R. 28 Oct. Accra. 1960. Foreign Office. 1960) from 4 persons. and correspondence from Accra to Cameroon. Boothby. 2005. 83 BNA. CO 554/2367. 1960. 1960 in British Embassy. and then awaited transport by air to the location of their training course. In the late 1950s. . with pre-course training taking place in Conakry and Accra. 8/61. while their wives and families had to be sent home. although to do so would have placed them in severe jeopardy. and other supplies.85 In response. established a militia base in the thick forest area along the border. local OK-UPC leaders began to recruit nationalist youths suitable for military training.88 Local UPC committees and ALNK base camps in Cameroon recommended literate. and ‘ Overseas training of ALNK terrorists ’. They believed that similar courses were being taught in Egypt. ‘ Part II ’. Kumba. secretary of the African Affairs Centre in Accra. Tunisian or Moroccan youths ’. 1961. Male exiles sometimes arrived accompanied by their wives. because of its proximity to the now independent territory of Cameroun. trainees were provided with personal funds. and physically fit young men in their late teens and early twenties to the overseas training program. Sunday Telegraph.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 207 into Ghana. 8/61.90 In both China and Morocco. 23 Jul. scholarships could be obtained for men. The nominees were sent to Henri Tamo (also known as Leconstant Pengoye). military training was designed around the tactical teachings of 84 Ibid. 16 June 1961. Extract from South Cameroons Intelligence Report for Sep.89 Officers of the Chinese army trained the freedom fighters in China. the upeciste ´ Thomas Emock.86 Beginning in 1960. for Congolese or for any Algerian. if not before. who sorted through applicants and provided those selected with a written mandate that the fighter took with him or her to Accra. the organizer and inspector of ALNK troops. or by the Ghanaian government. FO 371/155341. It is more likely that many stayed and fended for themselves in Accra or moved on. These unfortunate youths were told to return to Cameroon. Annex ‘ A ’ to PERINTREP No. Housed most often at the African Affairs Centre.87 By 1961. the program was ‘ equally suitable for any of the former French territories in Central Africa. British administrators estimated that over a hundred ‘terrorists ’ trained overseas had managed to return to the ALNK in both Cameroun and The Cameroons. and the USSR. 88 BNA. See ‘ Peking training young Africans in terrorism : disruption planned ’. 85 BNA. intellectual pursuits throughout the world. British police and military personnel began to discover ‘ terrorists’ who had attended training courses in China and Morocco among the UPC’s Armee de ´ Liberation Nationale du Kamerun (ALNK) soldiers whom they arrested in ´ the southern Cameroons. FO 371/155341.84 MILITARY TRAINING While many young Cameroonian nationalists in exile followed opportunities for scholarly. clothing. Algeria. 1960. Young soldiers showing military promise were probably recruited through this base. communicated to the internal OK-UPC headquarters his intent to form a revolutionary government in The Cameroons as soon as the revolutionary army was ready. 86 Ibid. 87 BNA. 89 90 Annex ‘ A ’ to PERINTREP No. ‘ Peking training ’. CO 554/2367. In some cases. could not be funded by the UPC. Under-Secretary of State for War. intelligent. others became involved in transnational military training. Because training was conducted in French. indigenous strategies of warfare – magical technologies. 158–61. See Y.91 Trainers familiarized students with the characteristics and handling of small arms. On 3 November 1960. 2005). ´ ´ 1961. 2001).92 In Cameroon’s locally entrenched maquis. Brigade Mixte Mobile. 2003). MI.208 MEREDITH TERRETTA Mao Tse-Tung.97 92 ‘ Overseas training ’. and petrol dumps. See also Mbembe. the protection of sacred forests. Peace. Shain. houses. as Nkrumah’s more nationally oriented advisors chafed under the power and influence wielded by the PanAfricanists. ´ 94 In the 1960s. in the night of 16–17 January. 1959–1971 ’ (unpub´ ´ lished MA thesis. sabotage. hand grenades. 8/61. On local strategies of warfare.93 THE TRIUMPH OF ‘ PUPPET REGIMES ’ AND FRANCOPHONIE 94 Tensions between the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs surfaced early on. vehicles. Katangans. Annex ‘ A’ to PERINTREP No. 97 L. ´ ´ ´ Bamenda. Presidence de la Republique ´ ´ ´ federale. and guerilla warfare. railways. See. Course instructors stressed the importance of outlining a guerilla strategy based on established red zones of control from which to direct operations and in which fighters could train and congregate. factionalization is characteristic of political movements initiated or upheld in exile. Yaounde-I.95 Over time. the fighters would advance to create additional bases in the surrounding areas. ‘ Les activites de l’UPC ’. After politically educating the inhabitants of secured red zones. 1967. Of course. intimate knowledge of the terrain. these predictions began to come true. particularly fighters’ use of spiritual technology and knowledge of the landscape. Frontier of Loyalty : Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation States (Ann Arbor. ‘ Contribution a la connaissance de ` l’histoire de l’Armee de liberation nationale kamerunaise (ALNK). culturally specific. the poisoning of UPC President Moumie. The Assassination of Lumumba (London. 95 For one former cabinet member’s account. 6 Jan. Mbatchou. former prime minister of Congo. so too did the visions of Pan-African unity. or white zones. 22 Feb. 96 CHAN. for example. see S. Direction du service d’etudes et de documentation. dealt a final blow to the unity of the UPC in exile. see Armah. 1967. ordered by the French government and carried out by the ´ undercover agent Bechtel in Geneva. De Witte. 6 Mar. Foccart papers. Belgians. and Congolese collaborated in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. in ´ ´ ´ ´ Archives de la Prefecture de Nkongsamba. Fonds prives 151. and covered the use of weaponry. and trained them to use these charges to destroy bridges. As the political leaders who spearheaded the nationalist movements most invested in Nkrumah’s project of a non-aligned United States of Africa began to disappear. and explosives and detonating agents.96 Two months later. ‘ Domaines ’. Paris. and hunters’ skills – intersected with revolutionary tactics learned abroad as internationally trained troops joined ranks with ALNK fighters who had never left. upecistes described the Ahidjo government as a ‘ puppet regime ’ ´ (gouvernement fantoche) and enumerated its neo-colonial characteristics. Mungo (APN). Message du President du Comite Revolutionnaire (Ernest Ouandie). and feared that the Ghanaian government’s sympathy and aid to freedom fighters would develop into a foreign relations nightmare. 93 91 . of which Ghana was a member.100 The final blow to the UPC’s base in a Pan-African Ghana was dealt at Nouakchott. FO 371/161611. francophone Brazzaville group. 24 Sep. With the formation of the OAU. the Northern Rhodesia Independence Party. Apparently linked by their common attachment to France.. which advocated a Pan-African assembly. West and ´ Central African Department.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 209 Although the UPC had led the way in using revolutionary violence against the postcolonial state government after independence.101 OCAM ˆ demanded that the OAU have the ‘subversives ’ expelled. 1965. Following nearly a decade of intense debates between African heads of state and policy makers over the nature of African unity. 99 98 . In 1962. the exiled UPC. a francophone bloc. the OAU strove for a mutually agreed national sovereignty couched as ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of states ’ and upheld through continued cooperation with metropolitan governments. J. The organization included representatives of the Sawaba Party of Niger. inter-territorial francophone alliance. had spent time in Accra. including the newly independent Cameroon. 96–104 for an explanation of the emergence of three blocs of African states from 1960 : the conservative. which took issue with political subversion and pledged ‘ non-interference in the internal affairs of states ’. Stratton. emerged as the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). and the movement had grown out of alliances formed among the African Affairs Centre exiles. Niger. British Embassy. which became the Union Africain et Malgache in December 1960 .98 The association’s objective was to coordinate anticolonialist movements as well as struggles against ‘puppet governments ’ in ‘ most of the independent countries of Africa which are helping to keep Africans under neo-colonialism ’. the Sanwi Liberation Movement of Ivory Coast. made up of exiled revolutionaries from independent states. 1962. Peace. agreed that revolutionary nationalists outside the boundaries of their states of origin who collaborated to overthrow official governments in power represented a major threat to postcolonial African states. Yaounde to R. the United Togolese Front. Mauritania. 100 See Armah. Upper Volta and Cameroon’. and the Monrovia group. formed in Addis Ababa in 1963.99 Several of the association’s leaders. other parties protesting the apparent neo-colonialism in their governments after independence began to follow suit. BNA. 101 GNA. Foreign Office. 18 Feb. Rather than fit Nkrumah’s formula for African unity. as well as from those territories still under colonial control. Moktar Ould Daddah to Diallo Telli. on 12 February 1965. Secretary-General of OUA. members of OCAM rejected Nkrumah’s proposed African Continental Union Government in favor of an official. Writing for the group. and which pledged ‘ aid and assistance to nationalist forces ’ . political and economic committees. an Association of Freedom Fighters formed. see van Walraven. in the early 1960s. ‘ Decolonization ’. as postcolonial African leaders began to describe Ghana as a place that harbored and aided political subversives. Esq. On Sawaba. OCAM drafted a resolution to the OAU condemning Ghana for harboring ‘subversive elements which are openly planning to overthrow established governments in Cote d’Ivoire. if not all of them. the Casablanca group. and the Peoples’ Party of Bechuanaland. SC/BAA/372. Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). and High Command of Chiefs of Staff. made up of 13 French-speaking African countries. Nkrumah’s gem turned into his albatross. L’Etat au Cameroun (Paris. because they accused Ghana of encouraging ‘subversive activities directed against them’. under the command of Woungly Massaga (aka Commandant Kissamba). 104 CHAN. 119–120 . Une histoire politique du Cameroun. 454. Yaounde to ´ Mervyn Brown. Esq. 2000). was located near Alate. established in the northern regions of the Republic of Congo. West and Central African Department.210 MEREDITH TERRETTA and echoing Ahidjo’s protests to French officials in 1958. see N.104 At the summit. ‘ Conference des Chefs d’Etats ’. With their Ghanaian base now under the scrutiny of the OAU. Foreign Office. 102 J. Congo-Brazzaville to Kwame Nkrumah. Guevara. Abwa. Many of them had returned to Accra and were housed at the African Affairs Centre and in the north-western Kokomlemle suburb of Accra. The other group. 199. Massaga’s own testimony suggests that there may be more to the story. One group was stationed near Ouesso and under the command of Osende Afana. H. Ambassador of Ghana. and Cameroun’. while LeVine cites 3 December 1967 . See D. 8 Apr.102 Nkrumah complied after his cabinet members pressured him to send the freedom fighters away. these men. ´ 105 The history of the UPC’s Second Front. 1971). NY. ´ who was killed on the Cameroonian side of the Ngako river during an attempt to recruit supporters for the UPC and the ALNK.103 Even so. No published scholarly accounts exist. eight francophone states stayed away from the OAU summit. Scholars do not agree on the date of Afana’s death : Bayart has some time in March 1966. 187.. and then only on the condition that the Bureau of African Affairs supply them with return tickets. While scholars ascribe UPC exiles’ factionalization to the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1960s. the President of Mauritania presented OCAM’s resolution as an ultimatum to Diallo Telli. 106 Interviews with Woungly Massaga and Job Ngoule Njapa. Foccart papers. British Embassy. and other militia groups. Upper Volta. See also W. 1965. E.105 While in the forest. 17 and GNA. The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca.106 From late 1965 through 1968. Various pockets of fighters loyal or potentially loyal to the ALNK ranged along Cameroon’s southern border around Mouloundou. 172. 129. 2004) . It seems that. Fonds publics. African Dream : The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo (New York. as does Victor LeVine. For Ahidjo’s say in the matter. 1944–2004 (Paris. Niger. the Congolese Pierre Moulele rebels. has yet to be researched. Lomie. ´ Ngouo Woungly-Massaga alias Commandant Kissamba : ‘Cameroun. nor any subversive activity directed against any member state from outside its boundaries. the secretary-general of the OAU: Telli must ‘require Ghana to expel all subversive elements which are openly planning to overthrow established governments in Cote d’Ivoire. Cameroonian exiles were deported from Algeria. rather than a unified ‘ Second Front ’ controlled by the Chinese as the early accounts suggest. Bayart makes brief reference to it. or ˆ OCAM would not attend the upcoming OAU Summit scheduled for October in Accra. following Colonel Houari Boumedienne’s overthrow of Ben Bella. Williams. . although J. V. 2005). 128. Peace. the OAU passed a resolution stipulating that member states were not to tolerate any form of subversion on the part of political refugees. upeciste fighters benefited from further training with Che Guevara’s Cuban forces. Bayart.-F. 103 1965. A few months prior to the OAU summit of 1965. Massaga. SC/BAA/357. Armah. Woungly Massaga himself states that Afana was killed on 15 Mar 1966. 165.-F. See J. Morton. 1979). LeVine. 17 Aug. and Djoum. ma part de verite ’ ´ ´ (Paris. the upecistes were once again uprooted and set off in entirely new directions – to ´ Cabinda or the northern forests of Congo-Brazzaville to fight in the UPC’s ´ Second Front. there were at least two factions of exiled upecistes. Historians and political scientists of French Africa’s decolonization who have worked on the UPC. 108 On Ernest Ouandie’s arrest. 316 (Nov. see APN. ‘ Anticolonial nationalism ’ . 107 . Conakry. we must look beyond the metropole–colony parameters that have so often guided our research. the invading second front had a lot of ground to cover from their point of entry at Dja and Lobo before reaching the first ‘ red zone ’ several hundred miles due north-east. This means retrieving the local spiritual. Radical Nationalism . one that took While maquis camps remained in the Mbam and south-eastern Bamileke regions. Guineans. these anomalous. Mbembe. still fighting under the command of Ernest Ouandie in the ´ maquis. the shifting geopolitical terrain signaled a disintegration of the project of the United States of Africa.-A. 110 Joseph. was publicly executed by firing squad. and cultural content of nationalist movements such as the UPC. ‘radical ’ nationalist movements can no longer be seen as unique. ´ commander of the internal maquis. Schmidt. and then following the linkages nationalists created with political actors beyond their territories’ borders. Woungly Massaga traveled to Cuba. 119 . while most of his fighters made their way to Angola. By 1965. ´ ` ´ ‘ 39 ans apres: Ernest Ouandie reste immortel’. stand-alone affairs. on 15 January 1971. 1970. Lumumbistes.108 Cameroonian exiles. launched a number of unsuccessful invasions of Cameroon with the objective of joining the internal ALNK. the Parti Democratique Guineen (PDG). 2001). and Algerians who ´ had invested in it – occurred beyond the borders of a community linked to a common metropole. ‘ Possibility ’. from wherever they learned the news. ´ ´ or the Sawaba independence movement in Niger have emphasized these movements’ radicalism and/or exceptionalism.110 But when the historical perspective of decolonization is centered in Accra. Kamguia K. 2010 . In 1970. scholarship. or Brussels. Ernest Ouandie. even (or especially) when these routes do not lead to Paris. and. 22 Sep. was rounded up by Cameroonian military forces. off in multiple directions. but its failure – at least for the upecistes. de ´ Nkongsamba.109 But to truly understand the political alternatives envisioned by nationalists. rather than in Paris. La Nouvelle Expression.. Bulletin de renseignements. Nkrumaists. CONCLUSION Frederick Cooper has stressed the need for greater comprehension of the ‘political alternatives ’ imagined by political actors on the eve of independence. 15 Jan. political. whose number had dwindled to less ´ than a hundred. see E. knew the movement to be finished. or Algiers. ` ´ J. 1972). On Ouandie’s execution. in order to better understand how and why political possibilities expanded and narrowed. and assumptions. London. Secteur militaire du Littoral. ‘ Decolonization ’. Temps Modernes. their interconnectedness suggests that they were part of a different pattern. On the Postcolony (Berkeley : University of California Press. and also knew that they could not return home. M.CAMEROONIAN NATIONALISTS GO GLOBAL 211 some of them accompanied by their female companions. ‘Le Cameroun d’Ahidjo ’.107 The Congolese government’s eventual collaboration with Ahidjo to root out the upecistes sent the exiles. 109 Cooper. van Walraven. Qtr. Instead. Objet : Rapports entre ressortissants Dschang et Bangangte a Mbanga. Beti. Rabat.111 historians of the ‘first wave’ of African nationalisms. because most of the nationalist movements in French-governed territories that referenced Accra or Algiers rather than Paris failed to achieve political power in their home states. Algiers. even in this first phase of decolonization. have not often made connections between exile. Accra. revolutionary global trends. Yet from 1957 to 1965.212 MEREDITH TERRETTA shape beyond the scope of the French Community. historians have mostly overlooked the larger pattern they created. South Africa’s ANC. exiled nationalists played a role as crucial to the struggle for freedom as those who never left the contested territories that eventually became nation-states. Mozambique’s Frente de Libertacao ¸˜ de Mocambique (FRELIMO). dating from the 1950s and early 1960s. 111 See note 13 above. Cairo. the UPC established its headquarters sequentially in Khartoum. However. who found themselves on a similar Pan-African circuit. Although the role of the exiled contingents of Namibia’s South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). and the Rwandan ¸ Patriotic Front (RPF) have been well documented. . The case of the UPC demonstrates that. and liberation movements in culturally particular locales. and Brazzaville and upeciste freedom fight´ ers interacted with African nationalists and anti-colonial activists from the whole continent. Conakry.