Iran's Security Sector

GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OFARMED FORCES (DCAF) CONFERENCE PAPER IRAN’S SECURITY SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW Wilfried Buchta* [email protected] Paper presented at the Workshop on "Challenges of Security Sector Governance in the Middle East", held in Geneva 12-13 July 2004, organized by the DCAF Working Group on Security Sector Governance and Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) DCAF Conference Papers DCAF Conference Papers constitute studies designed to promote reflection and discussion on civil-military relations and issues of democratic control over defence and security sector. The publication of these documents is unedited and unreviewed. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. DCAF Conference Papers are not for quotation without permission from the author(s) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. liberal and religious orientation. the group of Shiite clerics under the leadership of the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Therefore it is vital to offer some explanatory remarks on the overall political structure of the system and its main features. Instead the paper will focus on the relationship between civilian leadership and the influential heads of the different branches of the security sector. 2 1 .3 The consolidation of its monopoly of power not only allowed the ruling elite to tolerate a limited degree of political pluralism. second edition. which was driven by a broad coalition of divergent opposition forces of leftist.C. pp. 59-195. 1994). Iran’s open and covert support for militant Islamic groups abroad. Regarding the foreign policy of Iran (which still conceives itself to be a self-professed revolutionary state). a relationship which is extremely complex and often defies explanation. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. in the first decade of the Khomeine era (1979-1989) this was 1 Wilfried Buchta is a Research Fellow at the German Orient Institute in Hamburg Wilfried Buchta: Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington D. including presidential and parliamentary elections held every four years. one of the few states in the Islamic world in which in general the security sector is submitted to the control of the civilian leadership.2 The IRI came into being as the result of the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79. the system’s fight against exiled militant opposition groups or Tehran’s policy towards Iraq prior to and after the US invasion. This paper will not deal with the issues of WMD.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Having succeeded in the overthrow of the Pahlavi-monarchy a politicised and radical wing. national. although some aspects of the security sectors´ tasks are connected to these issues.IRAN’S SECURITY SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW Wilfried Buchta1 Introduction The intention of this paper is to give an overview of the internal structure of the security sector of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). 1-78 (quoted as follows as Buchta: Who Rules Iran?) 3 See for a concise description of this period Mohsen Milani: Iran’s Islamic Revolution. pp. 2000). but also enabled it to maintain a considerable degree of political stability. From Monarchy to Islamic republic (Boulder: Westview Press. gradually ousted all competing forces from the political scene and consolidated its monopoly of power by 1983. also called “ruling jurisprudent” (vali-ye faqih). Today. whereby each camp consists of a broad spectrum of factions. 2 . A multi-centred power structure and constant factional infighting The Islamic Republic’s power structures are multi-centred and often opaque but they are key to understanding the position and role of the security sector in it. later after the “Mykonos”-trial in Berlin this transformed into a constructive dialogue. revolutionary dogmatism in foreign policy yielded gradually to the exigencies of the preservation of Iran´s national interests. Afghanistan and Tajikistan and a general ‘bringing-together’ (rapprochement) with the Arab Gulf States which made considerable progress since President Khatami convened the OIC Conference in Tehran in December 1997. aimed at normalizing relations. namely the existence of parallel structures throughout the government. its relationship with the USA and Israel. pp. albeit important areas.4 The leaders of both camps make up the civilian leadership whereby at present the decisive powers lie in the hands of 4 See Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. namely the permanent struggle for power between several rivalling ideological factions of its power-elite. is mainly dominated by pragmatic national interests and not by ideological dogma. active engagement with neighbouring states to discuss and solve the crises in Armenia. These contradictions are personified by the co-existence of a popularly elected President and a religiously appointed Supreme Leader. The tensions resulting from these dual structures are often compounded by the third feature. This power-elite can roughly be divided into a socio-political conservative camp on one side and an Islamic left-wing reformist camp on the other side. This dualism between these two pinnacles of power is linked to the second feature. 11-21. One of its three main features is the contradictions between theocratic and democratic elements that are enshrined in the new Iranian Constitution of 1979.mainly driven by revolutionary Islamic dogma. Among these initiatives were the establishment of a critical dialogue with the EU. Iran´s foreign policy with the exception of two. Under the presidency of Rafsanjani (19891997) and even more under Khatami (since 1997) Iran took several steps to moderate its confrontational foreign policy. But after the draw in the Iran-Iraq war which meant the de-facto failure of Iran´s attempts to export its revolutionary model to other countries and after Khomeini´s death in 1989. where the authority of regular political and military institutions that are grounded in the Constitution are circumscribed by revolutionary Islamic organizations which both operate inside and outside the framework of the government and Constitution. the Supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. the Supreme Leader is authorized to appoint the Head of the Judiciary. and visits. The formal office through which Khomeini’s successor. the Assembly of Experts for his life-time. to appoint and dismiss the clerical jurists in the Council of Guardians. to declare war or peace and mobilize the armed forces. Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. It is worth mentioning that among the civilian leadership it is not the President but the Supreme leader who is the focal point of loyalty for the leaders of the security sectors´ different components. appearances. and the media. who is elected by a clerical body. economics. The Constitution gives him the responsibility to act as the Commander-inChief of all the armed forces. nationwide network designed to enforcing the authority of the Supreme Leader and to extend his influence into the executive branch. and keeps him up to date on political developments in Iran. armed forces.conservatives. military affairs. p. 71. p.5. the Supreme Commander of the Regular Military and the joint staff of the armed forces. The Office of the Supreme Leader employs special advisors upon whom Khamene’i can call regarding questions relating to fields such as culture. 2nd edition (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization. In addition. and revolutionary and religious organizations. as well as in most revolutionary and religious organizations. who was elected into this office by the Assembly of Experts following Khomeini`s death on 3 June 1989. the Head of State Radio and Television. which arranges his meetings. Khamene’i has personally appointed or approved clerical ‘representatives’ (nemayandeha) in all important state ministries and institutions. Irrespective of his overwhelming constitutional competences. security services. The current Supreme Leader is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. IRGC (sepah-e pasdaran). 3 . the current Supreme 5 6 See The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 47. Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i. 1990). a kind of parliamentary upper-house which vets legislation for its compatibility with Islamic law and the Constitution and vets candidates for elected office.6 In addition. wields his power is the Office of the Supreme Leader (daftar-e maqam-e mo‛azzam-e rahbari). These “clerical commissars’ form an extended. The Supreme Leader The Iranian Constitution firmly establishes the authority and rights of the the vali-ye faqih or Supreme leader. 28.8 Since 1997. at least theoretically. 4 . in 1979 Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran´s provisional revolutionary government. only the Supreme Leader possesses competence in all general political issues. But more important than this is the fact that he also has a theological Achilles heel because his religious qualifications are not officially recognized by the most high-ranking theological authorities in Shiite Islam. The President In comparison to the Supreme Leader. and economic policies of the country—not foreign policy. is only the second most powerful official in Iran. Owing to constitutional shackles. 20 (1993)1. 82-98.Leader is not as powerful as Imam Khomeini was. the President has been the liberal cleric and outspoken reformer Mohammad Khatami. whose predecessor in the President’s office Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) now heads the powerful Expediency Council. contrary to Khomeini. however. if it is 7 From an interview by the author with Dr. The first one is to break stalemates between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians and to advise the Supreme Leader. this body has two main tasks. 4. the President. the entire executive branch is subordinate to a religious authority — the Supreme Leader—and is. 8 Mohsen Milani: The Evolution of the Iranian Presidency: From Bani Sadr to Rafsanjani. is difficult to fathom. Vol. As a consequence of this. According to the Constitution.7 They have lent him support (and still continue to do) in his endeavours to solidify his base of power but in return are strong enough to wield considerable influence on Supreme Leader whose extent. in: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (Exeter). The President` s competences focus primarily on the social. the power of the President is circumscribed. cultural. the executive organ for his directives. who did not owe his rise to the position of the revolution’s guide to anybody and whose position of power therefore was unassailable. Ebrahim Yazdi. If the Supreme Leader is unable to resolve a state problem through traditional means. S. he may only act after consulting the Expediency Council – a body that is empowered to override both the constitution and its underpinnings of sharia law. who is elected for a four year term with just one additional extension possible. despite his nominal chairmanship of the National Security Council. according to the Constitution. In addition. 2004. In the Iranian system. the President does not have control over the armed forces. which can partly be attributed to the fact that he lacks his predecessor’s unique personal charisma. Khamenei owes his election to a number of powerful individuals in the conservative camp. Tehran. the security services and the police forces. The military forces and security apparatus in Iran Composition of the security forces and their division of labour The Islamic Republic has at its disposal an entire array of military forces and revolutionary security forces besides a number of parastatal organizations. The Budget The budget of the security sector. et al: Iran`s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Technically. This Council currently consists of thirty-seven members from among the different ideological currents in the leadership elite. determines the amounts. 61. who are appointed by the Supreme Leader. 31 (quoted as follows as Byman et al: Iran´s Security Policy) 11 From an interview by the author with an anonymous source of the exiled Iranian opposition. The budget organisation in turn. the revolutionary reconstruction organization.9 Since assuming office. because in emergencies it is also in a position 9 Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. (LEF). p. p. called bonyad (foundations). which was estimated at USD 5 billion in 2001. a complete lack of transparency prevails. Hamburg 25 April. Every single institution or organisation belonging to the sectors of security and defence reports its annual needs to the planning and budget organisation which is part of the presidential executive. the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (or IRGC). whose members irrespective of their political affiliation and mutual conflicts observe the binding rule of secrecy in these matters. and the “Mobilization Army”.10 is determined by the Parliament. security affairs and the expenditures of the Supreme Leader’s office. is also part of the security forces. or Basij militia and the Law Enforcement Forces. the “Ministry of Construction Jihad”. Mohammad Khatami advocated the protection of law and the enforcement of constitutional rights and thereby initiated a reform process aimed at reforming the system from within. As for the amount of the budget allocated for national defence. 10 5 . The parliament as the institution which ratifies annually the overall budget and forwards it to the Council of Guardians for final approval does not mention the figures of these secret budgets which are only discussed in special parliamentary committees. after having checked the exactness of the needs and compared them with expenditures of the last preceding years. 2004. Among the most important defence and security forces are the regular army (artesh). Santa Monica RAND 2001. Daniel Byman.deemed such steps are necessary to preserve the interests of the Islamic state.11 1. who act as vigilantes aligned with extreme conservative members of the power-elite. The regular military (artesh) The regular military took shape in the 1920s when the first King of the Pahlavi dynasty ascended to the throne and founded the new army on the model of European armies. These vigilant groups attack and intimidate critics and dissidents and usually go unpunished because of the bias of the judiciary dominated by conservatives. pp. 13 See Michael Rubin: Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami´s Iran 14 Michael Eisenstadt: Iranian Military Power. p. In contrast to this. 1993). more than 12 See Asghar Schirazi: The Islamic Development Policy: The Agrarian Question in Iran (Boulder. 147–163. Another one is the deployment of relief forces for natural disasters like floods and earthquakes. But in several fields the limits of competences and the overlapping of tasks give rise to mutual competition and sometimes even a lack of unity of command. During and after the Iran-Iraq war. its major responsibility is to uphold security in major urban areas. Colorado. 1998). Regarding the Basij. This division of labour which has never actually formulated as the system´s official policy can be described as follows: The regular army retains its primary responsibility for the defence of Iran’s borders.13 In general every single organisation pursues a primary mission. Prior to the revolution of 1979. Capabilities and Intentions. especially by waging the war against illegal drugs (in conjunction with the Law Enforcement Forces) coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan. the IRGC keeps its major role as the defender of the system and its representatives against internal enemies while it continues simultaneously to have an albeit secondary mission of assisting the army to fend off external threats. division of labour emerged between the most important components of the defence and security sector. 40. Still another task is the active assistance of supporters of Tehran’s Islamic revolution abroad which sometimes goes hand in hand with the proactive fight against exiled militant opponents of the regime.12 Besides these officially recognized forces in Iran we also find various gangs of men known as the “Helpers of God” (ansar-e hezbollah). the IRGC has some other responsibilities too. 6 . The army grew in size considerably after the 1953 American-organized coup d`êtat against the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.14 In addition.: Lynne Reiner. One of them is safeguarding internal security in the border areas.to apply coercive means to implement Islamic order in rural areas. following the arrival of great numbers of US-military advisors. In addition to that. which nowadays is not regarded a serious threat to the ideological system. the army was essentially paralyzed during the revolution. (London: Routledge. 1988). 1988. were working for the Shah’s army.17 The younger and low-ranking officers took over the command of the army. Due to the lack of decisiveness of the Shah to order the full-scale bloody repression of the non-violent demonstrations of the opposition in 1978. p. the regular military as a professional army remains loyal to the current political leadership 15 James Bill: The Eagle and the Lion. Up to 1986. which was established with the assistance of the American CIA and the Israeli Mossad.18 These Bureaus control the conduct of officers in co-operation with the CounterIntelligence Unit. pp. and those with a background of religious and revolutionary militancy were appointed to strategic posts. 17 Nicola Schahgaldian: The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic. The army and the SAVAK. New Haven: Yale University Press. After Khomeini ascended to power. were equipped with very advanced and costly USweaponry at that time. equipped with extra-territorial rights and thereby impunity from prosecution under Iranian law. pp. 19 Yearbook Iran 89-90 (Bonn: MRB Publishing Co. As the clerical leadership of 1979 mistrusted the army as a potential counter-revolutionary force and therefore created the IRGC and the Basij as the main pillars of armed support for the new revolutionary system. 50-53.19 The history of relations between the regular army and the IRGC is characterized by mutual suspicion and rivalry.15 The air force and the navy. the formal structure of the army. 1989). 26 18 Sepehr Zabih: The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. Samii: The Role of SAVAK in the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution.20’000 American military advisors.16 were the two main pillars of power of the Pahlavi monarchy. February 1994. LTD. the regime carried out succeeding purges in the ranks of its officers. remained almost intact. PhD Thesis University of Cambridge. an estimated 17’000 officers. The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. 7 . 137-163. It took more than fifteen years of steady ‘Islamisation’ and indoctrination until the top politicians gradually overcame their mistrust of the army. although it had been built up and indoctrinated by the Shah. 6. having exposed to numerous purges in its officer corps. otherwise known as the Second Bureau of the Army. in particular. 155-157. But while most of its generals were dismissed. To the contrary. representing 45% of the entire officer corps. it placed the regular military at a disadvantage in relation to the IRGC. 16 See Abbas W. The Bureau’s offices are supervised by clerical figures and they have the task ensuring that the military conforms with the Islamic ideology as well as carrying out the Islamic indoctrination of the officers corps. the notorious secret service of the Shah. p. fell a prey to these purges. the regime created the Politico-Ideological Bureau (PIB) with branches in all sections of the army. Santa Monica RAND 1987. 22 Michael Eisenstadt: Iranian Military Power. which meanwhile put at least some of its units on the same footing as the regular army in terms of fighting power. including its own intelligence service (the Bureau of Security and Intelligence or BSI). the IRGC was put in charge of Iran`s missile forces and non-conventional programmes which still controls nowadays.. cit.21 During and after the war the IRGC underwent a permanent process of professionalization. 21 See Katzman. during the presidential elections had been a vocal supporter of Khatamis 20 See Cordesman. was created in May 1979. divided into twelve to fifteen divisions deployed in eleven security regions in Iran.22 In September 1997. According to expert estimates. As is stated in Article 150 of the 1979 constitution. 40. Thus. Khatami tried to weaken the IRGC by successfully exerting pressure on Supreme Leader Khamenei to dismiss Mohsen Rezai. irregular mass infantry forces that specialized in human waves attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. armed units. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. the IRGC initially represented a versatile tool for Khomeini and his supporters in their struggle against their former revolutionary allies—groups such as the Islamic–Marxist Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) which had begun in 1979 to build up their own autonomous. p. 89. p. 8 . the IRGC consists of about 120’000 armed men. and whose loyalty to the revolutionary regime was doubtful. “Threats and Non-Threats from Iran. Capabilities and Intentions. 232. 1998). edited by Jamal al-Suwaidi. the IRGC served as a counterweight to the regular military. by a decree from Ayatollah Khomeini. Abu Dhabi: ECSSR. the Commander of the IRGC since 1981 and a hard-line conservative. shortly after assuming the presidency. its primary function is to protect the revolution and its achievements. which initially was still dominated by monarchists.20 In the beginning.and appears neither ready nor willing to intervene in the internal power struggles of the clergy. It should be noted that since the 1980s. a lower figure than in previous years. The Warriors of Islam. Likewise. The IRGC has at its disposal numerous special units. Rezai. (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. the IRGC was mainly made up of poorly trained.” in: Iran and the Gulf : A Search for Stability. op. In 1985—in the middle of the war with Iraq—the IRGC developed its own naval and air combat forces in addition to its own ground troops. p. or IRGC. President Khatami.competitor and thereby violated the IRGCs neutrality obligation. Santa Monica RAND 2001. p.27 Besides that. 27 Daniel Byman. in an open letter to Khatami. the army is not only a much larger and better equipped organization than the IRGC. which has about 400’000 men on active duty. each possesses ground. 26 Michael Eisenstadt: *The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran> Assessment*. in Rainer Brunner et al The Twelve Shia in Modern Times. twenty-four commanders of the ground. For the text and analysis of the letter see Ö Navid Kermani: “The Fear of the Guardians. March 2001. Khatami distanced himself from the students. 5.24 Faced with this threat of a military coup. 1. the change in IRGC leadership did not result in structural changes within the IRGC since the new Commander appointed by Khamenei. 23 For the background of Rezai´s removal see Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. One of the means of the IRGC´s influence is the regular army’s formal subordination to the Ministry of Defence whose current Head. 26. 25 See al-Hayat. Vol. et al: Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. air. 1. Yahya Rahim Safavi. the IRGC wields considerable influence on the ideological indoctrination.26 Moreover. 1999. and air forces of the IRGC alluded their determination to stage a military coup in case he should does not comply with their wish to support the violent quelling of the protests. p. Leiden Brill 2001. continued the policies of his predecessor. a move which cost him much credibility among his most eager followers. July 21. Shamkhani in an act of disloyalty ran for the presidency in 2001 against his own Chief of Cabinet. Admiral Ali Shamkhani.23 Although Khatami was successful. p. Compared in terms of magnitude and armament. 24 9 . but the army’s ground formations are much bigger and heavier armed than their counter-parts in the IRGC. In July 1999. and the IRGC. at the height of the student protests it became obvious that the IRGC perceived the reform movement of Khatami as deadly threat to the systems stability. 124f. P.25 The Army and the IRGC compared Today the regular military. and naval forces. the best equipment is in general allocated to the army. sea. which has about 120’000 men. the IRGC is a more powerful institution in Iran due to its role as the guardian of the revolution and due to the fact that many senior IRGC officers have close personal and family ties to top politicians in Iran’s clerical power elite. professional development and advancement of future senior officers of the regular army. 354 364. 24 Army Officers Write a Letter to President Khatami”. At that time. in: MERIA. is affiliated to the hard-line faction of the conservative camp of Iran’s power elite. 7. No. Notwithstanding its smaller size. an IRGC officer. pp. 28 This autonomy goes back to its inception in 1979 when the IRCG obtained the right to have a Supreme Commander. By this measure.29 And although the Supreme Commander of the IRGC was theoretically subordinate. No. Supreme Leader Khamenei appointed General Ali Shahbazi in October 1998 as the Supreme Commander of the regular military. 37. In contrast to this. 4. when the threat of an outbreak of a war was imminent and the regime needed the more professionalized army. 5. Hamburg 25. whose base of power in the first years was not absolutely secure. 10 . the IRGC retained its autonomy in terms of internal command structure. However. the Head of the General Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. This put Shahbazi at least formally on an equal footing with the IRGC Commander. 1. in: MERIA. 2004. this situation altered in the aftermath of the war.31 28 Michael Eisenstadt: “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran> Assessment”. Yahya Rahim Safavi. in truth he functioned independently of Firuzabadi’s command. At the height of a political crisis with the Afghan Taliban militia. a physician and former IRGC officer. the successor of Mohsen Rezai. 1997). In his search for loyal supporters. which was created in 1988 after some battle-field set-backs in the war with Iraq resulting from mutual rivalry and lack of coordination between the two forces. March 2001. Revolution at a Crossroads: Iran’s Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. there is a coordinating body between the IRGC and the army. namely the Joint Armed Forces General Staff. p. 31 From an interview of the author with an anonymous source of the exiled Iranian opposition. It further meant a de facto strengthening of the fighting power of the regular military.30 However. really enjoys independence from the IRGC. Imam Khomeini`s death and the assumption of office of a new Supreme Leader. which devaluated all previous efforts of the regimes’ leadership to create a unity of command.In theory. a post which was filled for the majority of its existence by Mohsen Rezai (1981-1997). Since April 1995. Khamenei. Khamenei tried to win over the IRGC and approved the reestablishment of a separate IRGC Headquarters. until 1998 the regular military never had a Supreme Commander. pp. while the air force and the navy are put under the command of former IRGC officers. whose three separate combat arms were now joined under one unified command. 30 See Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. 29 David Menashri. This organ brought together the leading officers of the two armed forces and was keen on ensuring a unity of command. 146-148. Vol. the highest-ranking regular military officer had been under the command of Hasan Firuzabadi. namely the ground forces. according to reliable sources of the opposition only one of its three separate combat arms. although the LEF are formally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.S. This became obvious when it quelled the student protests in Teheran in July 1999. The Basij Militia The Basij militia is the most powerful paramilitary organization in Iran next to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG). since their officers don’t obey his orders. the Head of the LEF. it is generally assumed that the number of personnel of the LEF today amounts at about 100’000 to 120’000 men. To the contrary. oppositionists and anti-Islamic lawbreakers.32 After Khatami became President.The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) The LEF. a kind of revolutionary police. is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader who in turn appoints the higher echelons of its officers. However. 2002. It was founded by a decree of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on 26 November 1979. intervention from 32 33 International Crisis Group: Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul. p. openly confessed in a December 1999 press conference that he does not wield control over the LEF. 143. 5 August. Consequently. in which he ordered the establishment of an “Army of Twenty Million” to protect the Islamic Republic against U. the present Minister of the Interior. the city police. While the two aforementioned forces were founded by the Shah and were therefore subject to permanent suspicion of lack of allegiance towards the new order. Abdalvahed MusaviLari. the gendarmerie (country-side police) and the revolutionary committees. the reformist. The LEF play a crucial role in the maintenance of internal security. the merger proved a failure in-so-far as the desired objectives of achieving a greater degree of effectiveness in the up-keeping of law and order and the protection of the citizens by building up a new de-politicised force were not achieved.g. who are all hard-line conservatives. 8. for example by carrying out physical attacks on close aides of Khatami in 1998. within the newly established LEF. Wilfried Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. the regular Shahtrained police forces were sidelined and all influential positions in the LEF were assigned to former committees-members. 11 .33 Although exact official figures are not available. General Qalibaf. e. According to wellinformed Iranian sources. p. the later force was an offspring of the revolution and responsible for pursuing drug-dealers. came into being in 1990 as the result of a merger of three formerly separately organized forces with internal administrative autonomy. a number of high-ranking LEF commanders turned out to have been involved in acts of violation of the law. above all by the IRGC`s intelligence unit. the Basij will probably act as an extended arm of the IRGC.000 armed men. 35 12 . xx.34 The Basij recruits youthful volunteers. the Basij currently comprises approximately 90. 1987). Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. “Threats and Non-Threats from Iran.S. The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic. after military crash courses by the Revolutionary Guards and ideological indoctrination by “clerical commissars. the Basij is under the command of the IRGC. p. See Anthony Cordesman. Samii: The SAVAK. This happened for instance in cases when the leadership of regular army and the IRGC refuses to use violence against massive uprisings of local populations such as in the social unrests of Qazvin in October 1994 and Islamshahr in January 1995.” these Basijis. 1996). threw themselves into mine fields in human waves in the hope of achieving martyrdom.” in Jamal al-Suwaidi. Ideologically motivated and deeply religious. the Iranian Government often employs the Basij in conjunction with special IRGC units in cases that require the merciless suppression of unrest among the civilian population in urban areas.without and enemies from within. who holds the rank of General. which was dissolved in February 1979 after the Shah regimes’ downfall. the results of their work was 34 For information on the origins of the Basij. 232. 87–100..36 Following the SAVAK`s dissolution. which are both responsible for distributing subsidised food and other items and for monitoring the population of these areas. a member of the IRGC command council. According to U. The Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) The MOIS is the successor of the SAVAK. most “Basijis” possess only a limited education. pp. estimates.: RAND. ed.35 Besides this hardcore of trained armed fighters the Basij-Militia has about 200’000 to 300’000 unofficial collaborators and informers at their disposal who mostly work in rural areas of the large cities and are affiliated to the local Mosque network of the ruling clergy. see Nikola Schahgaldian. pp. Due to the value of the unabated revolutionary zeal of the Basij. Given the close relationship of IRGC and Basij on the level of leadership it can be assumed that in times of exigency. some of its tasks with regard to counter-espionage and disclosure of conspiracies were assumed by a number of diverse and often antagonistic Islamic revolutionary organizations. Formally. 1994. During the Iran–Iraq War. But due to the lack of professionalism of these organizations and a lack of coordination between them. 36 Abbas W. Calif. most of whom are between the ages of 11 and 17 and come from rural regions or the poorer quarters of cities. Cambridge. (Santa Monica. The current Head of the Basij is Ali-Reza Afshari. be it nationwide social unrest or be it the outbreak of violent intra-elite conflicts. p.38 According to the foundation law of the MOIS. which is led by prominent clergies who belong to the hard-line faction of the conservative camp. which at present is the largest. 174. p. in Qom. 40 Buchta: Who rules Iran?. IRGC. 166. analysis and classification of necessary information inside and outside the country and (b) disclosure of conspiracies and activities pertaining to coup d’états. 164-165 and p. pp. 13 . the Second Bureau of the regular army. it is believed to belong among the largest intelligence services in the Middle East.39 The same law stipulates that the allocated financial means of the MOIS are exempt from the public law of accountability. sabotage. Fallahiyan is believed to have turned the MOIS into an overtly repressive apparatus exercising terror and 37 On the MOIS foundation’ law and its by-laws see Wilfried Buchta: Who Rules Iran?. 41 Buchta: Who rules Iran?. 38 Al-Mujaz an Iran. passed by the Iranian Parliament in 1983. cit. op. Article 10 of that law describes the main tasks and functions of the MOIS as follows: (a) gathering.37 the MOIS has emerged as one of the most influential and powerful entities in Iran. and the incitement of popular unrest. (May 1997). espionage.41 From its inception in 1984 until 1989 the MOIS was run by Mohammad Mohammadi Raishahri. p. By stipulating that only a cleric can be at the helm of this key Ministry. 166. With its fifteen departments and 30’000 employees. which would endanger the security of the country and the system. According to well-informed insiders. the law does not lay down any system of checks and balances that would require the MOIS to be supervised by the judiciary or any other state organ. the regime obviously intended to further strengthen its grip on power. based on a foundation law passed by the parliament in 1983. 39 See Qanun-e ta`ssis-e vezarat-e ettela`at-e jomhuri-ye eslami (Foundation Law of the Islamic Republic`s Ministry of Information) in: Majmu`e-ye qavanin-e avvalin doure-ye qanungozari-ye majles-e shura-ye eslami 1359-1363 (Compilation of Laws from the First Legislative Period of Lawmaking of Parliament 1980-1984) (Tehran: Eadare-ye Koll-e qavanin. March 1984). p. (London). under whom it gained a formidable reputation of being a highly efficient apparatus that exercised repression in a strictly selective and controlled manner. 68. A separate special law stipulates that the Head of the MOIS must be a high-ranking cleric. 517-520. Also. No. procurement.often insufficient and this caused the regimes’ leadership to approve the establishment the MOIS. the MOIS changed its character after President Rafsanjani dismissed Raishahri in September 1989 and replaced him by his deputy Ali Fallahiyan. but not the only intelligence agency of Iran. 20. the MOIS is responsible for the coordination of intelligence operations among all the information agencies (LEF. the Madrase-ye Haqqani. Basij) on the one hand and the Ministry of the Interior and the General Prosecutor on the other hand.40 The top theological cadres from the MOIS all come from a single theological school. Since its inception in 1984. and trade. According to him ‘certain persons’ use these places. For Montazeri the MOIS had become an independent state in state which no organ of the state was powerful enough to call it to account. 44 Khaterat.45 Since the inauguration of President Khatami in August 1997. 31 January 2002. as Khatami no longer wanted to include him in his list of cabinet members. in addition to the unlimited budget allocated to it by the state. 507. which are not subject to any supervision of authorities belonging to parliament. 3. April 10. p. When under house-arrest (from 1997 to 2003). 1997. Ever since the ruling in the “Mykonos” terrorism trial in Berlin on 10 April 1997. there had been a German warrant out for his arrest.escaped the full control of the regime’s senior decisionmakers. 2002. Montazeri contends that the MOIS. 599f. p. p.intimidation at a much larger scale than before and expanding its autonomy to such a degree that it -at least partly. finance. under Fallahiyan the MOIS has reportedly been deeply entangled in illegal economic and commercial transactions. the MOIS reportedly killed about 80 dissidents inside Iran in addition to an unknown number of opposition figures abroad.44 That Fallahiyan even after his ousting from the MOIS was able to continue these activities was indirectly confirmed in January 2002 by a public speech of parliament speaker Mehdi Karrubi on economic corruption. but whose authenticity is doubtful. 1. Moreover. the MOIS had turned into a terrifying and impenetrable organization over which no outsider wielded full control or was informed of what was really going on in it. p. Ali Fallahiyan. the MOIS has undergone remarkable transformations beginning with Khatami’s dismissal of its Head. 14 . 2. had augmented his financial resources by diverse activities in trade and commerce. or the ministries of economy. in order to import and export goods in great quantities to unknown destinations.42 During Fallahiyan’s era as Minister (1989-1997). the customs. in which -without mentioning the MOIS by name but conspicuously alluding to it – he pointed to a parliamentary record of numerous places of shipments on Iran’s border. Interview by the author with a confidential source. no. he published his political memoirs in which he wrote that during the last years of Khomeini and in the era of Fallahiyan.46 a fact that had begun to put a strain on 42 Rafsanjani reportedly tolerated Fallahiyan’s murderous acts in order to neutralize the opposition of conservative hardliners against his moderation in foreign and economic policy. Tehran 43 Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London). 2000. 25 February.e Ayatollah Montazeri. 46 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 45 See Hayat-e Nou (Tehran). 8 June 2001.43 One of the most adamant critics of the MOIS is Ayatollah Hosein-Ali Montazeri who as Supreme Leader was Khomeinis designated successor between 1985 to 1989 and was suddenly dismissed in March 1989 by a letter ascribed to Khomeini. the reformist press reported the enigmatic serial murders of four political Iranian dissidents in Teheran. Mohammad-Reza Khatami. Khatami replaced Fallahiyan with Hojjatoleslam Qorban‘ali Dorri Najafabadi. could not hold sufficient authority within the Ministry’s bureaucratic apparatus. Najafabadi’s appointment demonstrated that despite his overwhelming victory in the election of 1997. since in most cases they were still controlled by loyal confidents of Fallahiyan. was formerly Commander of the Naval Forces of the sepah-e pasdaran (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Yunesi announced that reforms within the Intelligence Ministry were “inevitable. on 5 January 1999. the MOIS was forced on to admit in a public statement. pointed 47 Al-Mujaz ‘an Iran. who. a conservative follower of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Moreover. al-Awsat.” and he swore loyalty to the “policies of the government and the President. 1 15 . despite Fallahiyan’s dismissal the new Head. President Khatami appointed a tripartite investigating committee whose work and findings incriminated the MOIS and elicited a tough behind the scenes tug-of-war between the Heads of the conservative and the reformist camps. In November 1998. who held deviating opinions and who acted independently had committed the crimes and that the MOIS had handed them over to the law. Khatami also left the defence portfolio in the hands of the conservatives. That said. that a number of irredentist members of the Ministry. Yet. Khatami felt compelled to make a substantial compromise to his opponents in this sensitive ministry. see also al-Sharq.47 Upon taking office. p.Tehran’s relations with Bonn and thus also with the remainder of the European Union. its positive effect was at least partly offset by the emergence of new parallel intelligence organisations outside the MOIS. February 11.” Despite having the reputation of being inclined to the conservative camp. until that time had been Iran’s Supreme military judge and member of the tripartite investigating committee. among them the then deputy Speaker of Parliament and the President`s brother. ‘Ali Shamkhani. By purging the Ministry of most of Fallahiyan`s collaborators he managed to depoliticise the MOIS and to make it a useful law-abiding instrument of regular government policy. no. 90 (March 1999). an announcement which raised enormous attention inside and outside Iran. Yunesi kept his word. Dorri Najafabadi was forced to resign in early February 1999 and was replaced by Ali Yunesi. Its new leader. As a result. or IRGC). A number of prominent reformists in the Iranian Parliament. Nonetheless. Following the serial murders. 1999. Dorri Najafabadi. p. This farreaching cleaning of the MOIS can be regarded as one of the few genuine achievements of the reformist presidency of Khatami which came out of his conflicts with the conservative power structure. 20. Having been exposed to mounting criticism. former Foreign Minster (from 1981 to 1997) Ali-Akbar Velayati. 100. the officer in charge of the planning and budget organization. the Interior and Information (MOIS). 2nd edition (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization. calculate and define responses to menaces of National security. No. 24. the legislative. the most important assessment body. the structure of Iran`s decision-making is a coherent. the Chief of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. at least theoretically. 49 16 . 42. et al: Iran`s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iran Report. 50 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 1990). In addition. and two representatives of the Supreme Leader.48 Decision-Making in security affairs and the Supreme National Security Council According to the Constitution. a minister working with the subject Supreme Commanders of the army. had joined these new autonomous intelligence agencies which have expanded their activities over the course of time. Vol. the Minister of Defence. The decisions of the SNSC shall be effective after the confirmation of the Supreme Leader. p. Although the SNSC with its coherent structure seems to be the main formal forum for decision-making it would be misleading to conceive that it would be the only forum or channel by which security institutions exercise their influence. and of the IRGC. 37. 20 October 2003. with a President who is responsible for day-to day political management. 4ff. who discuss. They announced that most of the persons who had been purged from the MOIS after the serial murders of November 1998. Daniel Byman. one of these parallel organizations had three times the personnel that the MOIS has throughout the country. Vol. the judiciary. The SNSC membership is comprised of the Head of the executive. According to them. The other representative of the Supreme Leader is his Advisor on Foreign Policy.out this phenomenon in the Autumn of 2003. who controls the budget planning (by means of his organisation for planning and budget) and so. the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. the President chairs the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). p.50 By means of his representatives and loyal supporters in the SNSC. 15 September 2003. is responsible for incorporating military priorities into comprehensive strategies. 6. 6. 8ff. The existence of multiple 48 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iran Report. Santa Monica RAND 2001. No. the Supreme Leader and not the President is the dominating factor in this body. p. p. which formally coordinates decisions affecting national security.49 The Secretary-General of the SNSC and representative of the Supreme Leader is Hasan Ruhani. their recommendations for the Parliament´s committees for security and foreign affairs. Moreover. the decision-making process is in a constant back-and-forth process due to the permanent renegotiating of contentious issues. thereby preventing major changes in particular fields of policy even if it has the backing of the majority of the power-elite.52 As a consequence of the existence of multiple centres of power and the importance of informal patterns of exercising influence. One good example is the Salman Rushide fatwa. regularly 51 One of these rare examples is the elimination of Mehdi Hashemi and his group in 1986. account for the opaqueness of decision-making processes in this field. Besides that. whose members despite their often fierce mutual rivalries only very seldom go so far to eliminate particular competitors by force but try to preserve some solidarity. which in turn stabilizes the system. et al: Iran`s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era.51 Driven by the fear that their mutual conflicts escalate to a point of no return. pp. But this seemingly chaotic structure of decision-making is to a large extent offset by a cultural and procedural emphasis on consensus within Iran’s power-elite. it can be said that informal networks and mechanisms for influencing decision-making are as important or sometimes even more important than the formal system of decision-making. 17 . they have at their disposal other means for gaining access to important members of Iran’s power-elite with whom they often have strong common denominators by virtue of common family and religious ties. the system’s survival might be at stake. advisory meetings with the Supreme Leader and the President. See for this Wilfried Buchta: “Mehdi Hashemi”. RAND 2001. 52 Daniel Byman.centres of power combined with the existence of informal rules known only to insiders which enable certain security institutions to exercise their influence. 24-27. As a general rule. a revolutionary foundation close to the Supreme Leader. the 15th of Khordad. This fact implies that informal personal networks are strong while many institutions in Iran are relatively weak. forthcoming. in Encyclopaedia Iranica. That means that leaders of security organisations not only use official forums and avenues for influencing decision-makers. Since single influential group or members of the power-elite can refuse their support. they prefer instead to compromise. they can even sometimes implement measures which seemingly contradict the official foreign policy of the government and thereby create the impression that Iran´s foreign policy is inconsistent and uneven. An example for this is the internal dispute over a rapprochement towards the USA. like their participation in the SNSC. While the government refrains from implementing Imam Khomeini´s decree by sending death squads abroad. However. p.states the validity of the fatwa in public. advocate restraint in times of crisis. 2. et al: Iran`s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. that the leader of the security sectors´ components comply with the civilian leaderships´ wishes due to their relative lack of military autonomy. RAND 2001. The political ban on any step towards the resumption of diplomatic ties to both countries remain one of the strongest remnants of the revolutionary ideology and the greatest obstacle for Iran’s full integration in the international community. which a considerable part of the Iranian leadership still deem Iran’s arch-enemies. Heads of the various sections of the security sector keep to the agreed-upon objectives of the civilian leadership. although they champion their own agendas as much as they can. a pattern of behaviour which can be attributed to the fact. whose two top objectives are to safeguard the system’s survival while at the same time remaining loyal to the Islamic revolutionary ideology. Moreover. 2. especially the regular army. the security forces preferred shows of force to active confrontation. especially that of Supreme Leader Khamenei. calls upon believers to execute those found to not be following has been said in the fatwa. However. The only exceptions to this increasing moderation in Iran’s foreign policy are the policies towards the USA and Israel. p. 2. that in those times. few actors risk to carry out important operations autonomously without the tacit endorsement of the senior leadership. Civil management and control of the security apparatus Constitutional and legal framework 53 54 Daniel Byman. 18 .53 Although the details of the decision-making process of Iran are unknown to outsiders it is generally assumed. for example during the tensions with the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan in the Summer of 1998. Ibid.54 It can be assumed that the Heads of the Iranian security forces. since safeguarding the system’s survival takes precedence over anything else which requires the preservation of consensus among the power-elite on the most crucial issues. in practise real politics and national interests nearly always take precedence over Islamic ideology and this accounts for Tehran’s prudent foreign policy aimed at preserving the territorial status quo of Iran and its geographic neighbours and avoiding major military confrontations with any state which would be costly and deeply unpopular in Iran. It is surrounded by a number of neighbouring states like Pakistan. which the reformist press in the era of Khatami often levelled against illegal acts of members of the security apparatuses and which heightened the Iranian people’s awareness of their own rights. which is the raison d`être of the IRGC. During the era of Khatami. 3. However. Tajikistan. Khatami`s presidency will reach its end in August 2005. their establishment may be regarded as a first successful attempt of enforcing its authority over the security apparatuses and making them more accountable to the legislative power. Regarding the parliamentary oversight of the security apparatuses it is a matter of fact that the parliament does not wield any noticeable influence over them. whether these activities of the parliament and the reformist press have in fact established a lasting and permanent tradition of enforcing greater accountability on the security sector. Challenges to the Security Sector Iran is situated in an instable and diverse geo-strategic environment. Afghanistan. More than 80 of the most critical newspapers had put hundreds of courageous journalists and publishers on trial. and it can in all likelihood be ruled out that the conservative power-establishment will allow a promising reform minded candidate to run again for the presidential elections. However. For the reformers have not only lost in the parliamentary elections of February 2004 their second most important stronghold.Iran’s Constitution and laws only provide relatively broad instructions and rules for the control of the security apparatuses. Despite the fact that the committees work did not lead to any convictions of putative culprits by the biased conservative judiciary. which to a certain degree have often retained some autonomy in matters of internal management. in an unprecedented move the reformist parliament established several times investigation committees to examine special issues related to illegal acts committed by members of the security apparatuses. in general there is no immediate threat that these organizations might evade civilian control and become fully independent of the main political protagonists. 19 . The same is true with regard to the harsh critique. the parliament but the reformist press has been silenced to a large extent because the judiciary has closed down since April 2000. the civilian ruler reign uncontested. Due to the neutralization of the army as a potential dangerous counter-force and due to the loyalty of the IRGC leadership to the safeguarding of the system’s survival including its theocratic ideology. In addition. which will survive the era of Khatami is rather doubtful. The new ambitious role for which the IRGC strive for recently and which will be dealt with later on is an exception to this rule. Azerbaijan. and Armenia. New York. drugtrafficking or other forms. as well as increasing incidence of HIV/AIDS. With approximately 2 Million refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan. the drivers which brought about Khatami`s victory in the ballot box in 1997 are still in place. Tehran doesn’t conceive them to be an existential menace for the system’s survival. which the reform government of Khatami tried to address more seriously than any previous government. although all these mentioned issues pose sources of considerable concern for the Iranian leadership. the Iranian system faces a number of internal threats which have to do with its domestic social. Iran has one of the highest numbers of heroin and opium addicts in the world. Although the reform process is today virtually dead. after the USA succeeded in 2001 and 2003 in the military overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Kabul and the Baath-regime in Baghdad. Moreover. overcrowded prisons and an overwhelmed health system.5 million drug addicts. Iran is suffering from a nationwide growth in drug addiction.55 Instead most Iranian top politicians think that domestic threats are more serious than the external ones. The growing drug addiction among Iran’s youth is an indicator of the widespread political and social dissatisfaction of great layers of society and their desire for change. has led to an overload of court cases. Iran already plays host to some of the greatest numbers of refugees world-wide. p. Iran as a self-professed revolutionary state is since 1979 entangled in a mutual hostility with the USA which the Iranian leadership depicts as its ideological arch-enemy. Domestic Politics and National Security. economical and political problems which the security sector cannot solve by means of force. be it in the shape of refugees. IISS Adelphi Paper 342. Iran is confronted in Afghanistan and Iraq with the presence of a considerable number of troops of the USA. Iran suffers significant casualties among its security personnel and soldiers deployed along its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan due to violent clashes with heavily armed smugglers. One of them is the drug problem. which are threatened by internal instability due to low-level conflicts between ethnic or religious groups. As a result. Nevertheless. The first important factor which had driven the reform movement is the decline in the revolutionary passion that swept Iran in the early 1980s and drove the anti-Shah 55 Shahram Chubin: Whither Iran? Reform. which is interwoven with the chronic economic crisis. which may have dangerous destabilizing spill-over effects for Iran. the Middle East and beyond. 2002. with about 2. lawlessness and internal turmoil. Doubtlessly. Another attendant harm has been the increased amounts of opiates transiting Iran from Afghanistan to markets in Europe. 43f. Today. 20 . in turn. This. Although most Iranians still appear to embrace the essential achievements of the 1979 revolution. the first and foremost of which has been the economy. symbolised by the accession of Hashemi Rafsanjani to the presidency in July 1989 and even more by the elective victory of Khatami in 1997. including greater public accountability and broader political pluralism. curb inflation and improve living standards. Indicators for a new political ambition of the IRGC In retrospect to the political events which occurred since the beginning of the reform movement in 1997 one can discern indications for a new ambition of the IRGC unknown hitherto aimed at playing an independent role in Iran’s political life. Second is the issue of the strict socio-cultural restrictions that govern the lives of many Iranians. 5: Iran: The Struggle for the Revolutions` Soul. 21 . Demographics are the second major factor driving the continued impetus for change in Iran. This 56 International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. revolutionary passions to dim among much of the population. With a voting age of 16 and about 60 per cent of the electorate under 30. Finally. p. reformers have pushed for political liberalisation. Iran’s sense of revolutionary fervour began to yield to a spirit of pragmatism. including the United States. can be improved. gender relations and access to Western culture and media. in order both to ameliorate the current economic situation and to reinvigorate contacts between Iranians and their relatives abroad. 2f. Khatami`s government has focussed on four primary sets of issues. most notably in terms of women’s Islamic dress codes. After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June 1989. 2002. Iran’s younger population appears quite eager for economic and political liberalisation. Iranians expect economic reforms that will provide jobs.revolution.56 All in all these driving factors for change among the population constitute a potential for social unrest and political instability which heighten the sense of vigilance of the leaders of the security sector’s components. and less amenable to propaganda than previous generations. Iran’s youth constitute a formidable force and the driving engine behind much of the reform movement. Since 1997. A general sense of disappointment with the Islamic Government has become quite common among the large generation of Iranians who were born in the 1970s and 1980s and have recently become eligible to vote. 5 August. The third focus for many reformers has been the hope that relations with the West. p. 5. when the outcome was a landslide victory of the conservatives whose candidates won more than two thirds of the 290 seats. 58 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iran Report. he has repeatedly forbidden the IRGC from becoming involved as partisans in the power struggle between Iran’s ideological currents in public statements and written declarations. Ezatollah Zarghami. Iraq and Afghanistan. No.57 Prior to the recent parliamentary elections in February. 2004. As a matter of fact. No. Moreover. fielded a great number of former IRGC commanders and founders of the Basij as their candidates for the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history. Vol. 59 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iran Report. 9. This ban on political activities was valid in general for all armed forces since the regime’s inception. the IRGC leadership reportedly decided to transform the IRGC into one of the major independent protagonists in the political arena. the IRGC encouraged its personnel to run for parliament. 6. Hamburg 15 June 2004. in May 2004 another former IRGC Commander. p. the newly established conservative faction. The IRCG in turn is believed to have come to the conclusion that the survival of the regime is at stake because the Iranian civilian leadership elite including the Supreme Leader has grown too weak to deal with the diverse domestic and external challenges of national security properly. was appointed by the 57 Interview by the author with a well informed anonymous Iranian source from the ranks of the exiled opposition. 20 October 2003. This raised the anxiousness of many Iranians who regarded it an indication for the IRGC plan to intervene more assertively in politics in future. the so called Abad-garan-Group. March 1. whose protection is the raison d’ être of the IRGC. June 17.60 By the powerful presence of numerous former IRGC commanders in parliament this lobby may be able to intimidate critics inside and outside the legislative. a great part of the conservative establishment of power has in the course of the last few years become even more reliant on the IRGC perceiving them as the last resort which enables them both to stem the growing tide of domestic discontent and to protect the national security interests against new external threats manifested in the military presence of US troops in two neighbouring countries. Based on their self-image as the last saviours of the system.58 Indeed. 3. During Khomeini`s lifetime.59 According to one Iranian reformist newspaper the new parliament is believed to be comprised of about 90 persons having been affiliated before to the IRGC or other revolutionary organisations. 22 . 2004. 5f 60 The Economist.phenomenon is obviously linked to the increased demands of an ever growing younger populations for reforms of the political system which the IRGC leadership conceives as deadly threat to the systems survival. 7. Vol. 2004. 2004 62 23 . 64 Eurasia Insight. May 20. 61 Eurasia Insight: Iran`s Revolutionary Guards Making a Bid For Increased Power. At the same time. Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad. To them it is an indicator for the IRGC leadership’s new ambition to follow the path of their military counter-parts in Turkey and Pakistan. which is under intense international scrutiny because of its arms-making potential. the IRGC also is believed to have been involved since the 1990s in an array of financial and economic enterprises aimed at establishing itself as an economic force which is at least partly independent of the state coffers.63 What further enhanced the domestic prestige of the IRGC is the fact that they manage Iran’s nuclear programme. May 20. In both states.5 billion worth of goods are smuggled into Iran by these jetties on an annual basis. June 17.65 But given the lack of reliable data from Iran it is still too early to give a final judgement as to whether the IRGC really intends to implement a militarization of Iranian politics or not. that with the help of the conservatives who had won the communal elections in February 2003 a former IRGC Commander. which several times raised the issue of about 72 illegal jetties at Iran’s border controlled by the IRGC proved to be powerless to stop the smuggling of goods into the country carried out by these jetties. It is estimated that about USD 9. The last reformist parliament. 2004. some observers and Iranian exiled oppositional figures give a different explanation. this new development deserves to be regularly analysed. thereby occupying the important post of the administrative chief of Iran’s capital with 10 million inhabitants. 2004. the nuclear programme is a source of considerable national pride among the regime’s supporters and many of its ardent critics alike.Supreme Leader to the key post of the Head of the national television and radio. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Iran Report 63 The Economist. the military does not confine itself to being an instrument for the defence of national borders but plays a high-profile political role and often determines what the respective nations` security interests are. 20 May. has become Tehran’s mayor. 65 Eurasia Insight.62 Quite apart from its growing political influence. In any case.64 While one can argue that the new forceful advancement of former IRG commanders into prominent second rank positions of the political arena is just an ephemeral and accidental phenomenon.61 It should not go unnoticed as well. Since that time he has authored numerous works on the Shia and Iran. Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelms University in Bonn awarded him a doctorate in Islamic Studies for his dissertation entitled ‘Die iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit 1979-1996’ [ The Iranian Shia and Islamic Unity 1979-1996]. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Short biography of the author Dr. 2000).Conclusion Iran is a far cry from achieving the democratic control of its armed security forces. Wilfried Buchta has worked as a research fellow at the German Orient Institut in Hamburg/Germany since 2004. The democratic transformation of the theocratic system. Buchta has conducted extensive field research in Iran. whose most prominent and active protagonists are either silenced. from 1998-2001 he was the representative of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation in Rabat/Morocco and from 2001-2002 he held the position of the International Crisis Group Middle East Project Director in Amman/Jordan. 24 . In 1997. did not achieve any substantial progress and has in fact come to a standstill today. including ‘Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic’ (Washington D. which was translated into Arabic by the ECSS in Abu Dhabi in 2003. Since 1992. published in 1997 at the German Orient Institut in Hamburg.C. which many Iranians had aspired to at the beginning of Khatami`s reform movement in 1997. whose members in turn are determined to preserve the status quo by all means and are only willing to allow minor cosmetic changes. the prospects for an evolutionary democratic transformation of the system in the mid-term are bleak. The reason for this is quite simple. The current constitutional distribution of powers favours the conservative camp of the power-elite.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Prior to this. Given the stagnation of the reform process. imprisoned or exiled. in particular governments. and promotes international cooperation within this field.ch Website: http://www. Box 1360. military authorities. the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) encourages and supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces.ch 0 . The Centre provides its expertise and support to all interested parties. Switzerland Tel:++41 22 741 77 00.O. The Centre collects information. Fax: ++41 22 741 77 05 E-mail: [email protected] in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government. initially targeting Euro-Atlantic regions. P.dcaf. international organisations. undertakes research and engages in networking activities in order to identify problems. parliaments. CH-1211 Geneva 1. non-governmental organisations. to establish lessons learned and to propose the best practices in the field of democratic control of armed forces and civil-military relations. academic circles. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): rue de Chantepoulet 11.