Image, Issues, and Machinery: Presidential Campaigns in Post-1986 Philippines

114Image, issues, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines Julio C. Teehankee Abstract This paper will explore the political terrain leading to the 2010 presidential election. It seeks to understand the nature of presidential campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines. Utilizing survey data, it will trace trends that reflect continuity and change in Filipino voting behavior. Moreover, it will apply the analytical tools of political marketing, such as market segmentation and candidate positioning, in identifying the key elements that contributed to a successful presidential campaign in the three most recent electoral cycles. The paper notes that electoral campaigns in the post-authoritarian period have been waged with competing narratives of reformism, populism and clientelism. The tradition of Filipino-style reformist politics has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption and good governance campaigns. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money politics have manifested themselves in the machine-based campaigns that have eroded the gains of reformism. The failure of reform politics to address the problem of poverty, coupled by the ascendancy of the mass media, has fueled the image-based populist campaigns. Ultimately, the rise of media and public opinion polling as influential conduits between national candidates and the electorate underscores the need to find the right mix and astute use of image, issues and machinery. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 115 Three presidential elections have been held in the Philippines since the restoration of democratic rule in 1986. The elections of 1992 and 1998 have demonstrated the efficacy of a smooth and legitimate transition of power while the experience of 2004 exposed the corroding effects of a stolen election. The 2010 presidential election offers an institutional mechanism for addressing the crisis of legitimation triggered by the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. While the familiar elements of 1992, 1998, and 2004 are evident in the upcoming 2010 campaign, new factors are coming into play. Consequently, the outcome of the 2010 presidential election is crucial for political change since the “effects a president has on the benefits enjoyed by the citizenry go far beyond policies: a president provides moral and social cues to the country . . . elections integrate the country and provide the common symbols which inform public discourse” (Popkin, 1991: 3). Ultimately, how a presidential candidate wages a campaign, gives some cue to how a president will govern after victory. And in most instances, “an effective president is one who has projected an effective image of himself [or herself].” (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004: 5) This paper is an exposition on the nature of presidential campaigns in the post-Marcos political period. It seeks to provide a historical review of Filipino voting behavior since 1992 and analyze the trends that reflect continuity and change in Philippine presidential elections. The paper will identify the key elements that contributed to a successful presidential campaign in the three most recent presidential electoral cycles. Moreover, it also aims to provide a brief backgrounder for the coming 2010 presidential election. Presidential campaigns in the Philippines Despite the growth in the literature on Philippine electoral studies through the years, only a handful of works have focused specifically on a scholarly analysis of Filipino voting behavior in presidential elections. Thus far, only three significant studies have been written 116 on this area in the past 40 years: Hirofumi Ando’s statistical study of voting patterns in pre-martial law presidential elections published in 1969; Carl Lande’s geographical and statistical analysis of the 1992 presidential election published in 1996; and more recently, Yuko Kasuya’s groundbreaking work, published in 2009, on the unstable effects of single-term presidential elections on the post-authoritarian Filipino party system.1 This paper would like to contribute to the scant study of Filipino voting behavior by providing a review of presidential campaigns in the post-authoritarian period from the perspective of political marketing. It will draw extensively from data culled by Lande’s 1996 study; the comprehensive survey data compiled by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) since 1992, and Pulse Asia since 2004. The marketing of the president Political marketing offers a more pragmatic framework for thinking about electoral campaigns that “contrasts with the explanatory and scientific intent of the traditional academic approach to analyzing political campaigns” (Mauser, 1983: 2). The application of marketing principles in politics allow for the use of standard marketing tools and strategies, such as polling research, market segmentation, targeting, positioning, strategy development and implementation. From this perspective, “the voter can be analyzed as a consumer in the political marketplace using the same models and theories in marketing that are used to study consumers in the commercial marketplace. And both are 1 Ando’s study analyzed the pattern of Filipino voting in presidential and senatorial elections from 1946 to 1965. He utilized three main independent variables in explaining partisan voting: party identification, linguistic affiliation and socio-economic status. Ando identified linguistic affiliation as having the best explanatory power of the three. Lande, on the other hand, investigated the first presidential election in the post-Marcos era. Using statistical techniques, he correlated the result of the 1992 election with 37 demographic variables of the Philippine census. Similar to Ando’s finding, Lande demonstrated that ethno-linguistic division was a highly significant influence on voting behavior at the dawn of the post-authoritarian era. More recently, Kasuya argued that presidential elections in the post-authoritarian period are characterized by an observed instability of inter-party competition. She identified two factors that have contributed to this instability: 1) the increased number of candidates; and 2) the frequent appearance and disappearance of new parties. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 117 dealing in competitive marketplaces and, as such, need to rely on similar approaches to winning (but each may have several distinct options)” (Newman, 1994: 11). In political marketing terms, there are two crucial factors in winning votes in an election (see Figure 1). The first is the “push factor” or the organization that will deliver the votes to a particular candidate. The other is the “pull factor” or the characteristics that will attract voters to a candidate. The former is geared towards command votes, while the latter is aimed at attracting market votes. In applying these basic marketing principles to political campaigns, the exchange process centers on a candidate who offers political leadership in exchange for a vote from the citizen. The product in politics is the campaign platform, and marketing would require that research and polling be done to help shape the platform of the candidate. More than the platform itself, the image, or impression, is what the candidate leaves in the mind of the voter. An image is created by the use of visual impressions that are communicated by the candidate’s physical presence, media appearances and experiences and record as a political leader. (Newman, 1994: 10) Candidate Pull Factor Push Factor Figure 1: Pull and Push Factors in Elections The increased use of political marketing techniques coincides with the increasing dominance of media, particularly television, and the growing influence of political consultants in electoral campaigns around the world. There is a growing trend towards the 118 “hybridization” of campaign practices in media-centered democracies, or “a combination of modern media-centered campaign practices with traditional organization-based mobilization strategies, relying on networks of supporters and activists” (Plasser & Plasser, 2002: 349). This trend in global political campaigning is also evident in Philippine electoral politics, which continues to operate according to its own unique traditional dynamics despite the growing influence of mediadriven campaigns (see Figure 2.) Command votes, bailiwicks and machineries In Philippine elections, command votes are blocs of votes that are gathered and delivered through traditional networks such as political machines and bailiwicks, usually negotiated through leaders and gatekeepers.2 Bailiwicks (baluarte) refer to the candidate’s natural sphere of influence, commonly determined by his or her ethno-linguistic, regional or provincial attachments. The ethno-linguistic vote, as demonstrated in the past two presidential elections, is the most secure source of votes for a national candidate. Hence, a national candidate must immediately factor it in his or her electoral calculations. 2 The standard approach to analyzing Filipino electoral and party politics has been to view power relations within the context of the patron-client factional (pcf) framework. The pcf framework highlights the interpersonal, specifically the familial and patron-client, nature of Philippine politics in a rural society (Lande, 1965; Kerkvliet, 1995). Another study has concluded that elite-dominated factions and their bifurcated inter-familial rivalries have been replaced by local political machines geared towards multi-factionalism and characterized by the alliance of factions into temporary blocs. This trend was further reinforced by the breakdown of the two-party system and the emergence of a multi-party system (Kimura, 1992). The onslaught of economic transformation and increased social mobilization has largely depersonalized patron-client relations in the rural areas. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between leader and followers has become contractual in nature. The potency of the kinship system as an instrument of patronage has diminished and has been replaced with the emergence of machine politics (Kawanaka, 2002). Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 119 Electorate Comm and Votes Command Votes Mach ine Party Market Votes Bail iwick Money Popularity Issue Gov ernment Image Figure 2: Classification of Votes Political machines are specialized organizations set up for the purpose of mobilizing and influencing voter outcome through the dispensation of social, economic or material benefits. These benefits are essentially patronage in the form of jobs, services, favors and money distributed to voters and supporters. There are essentially three types of political machines in the Philippines – money-based (organized largely through the use of money), party-based (organized around local and national political leaders and gatekeepers), and government-based (organized primarily through access to government personnel and resources). These three are oftentimes structured on top of each other. Market votes, image and issues Market votes are votes that have to be identified, targeted and attracted from various segments of the electorate. Similar to the market, the dominant brand is the most popular one. Hence, market votes are translated into political support by way of popularity that is gauged and reflected in regular public opinion surveys. There are essentially two factors that will draw or repel market votes to a candidate – image and issues. Image is the general perception by the 120 electorate of a particular candidate (whether positive or negative). On the other hand, issues are the major concerns of the electorate that they hope the candidates will address when elected into public office. Candidates usually attempt to address these concerns through their campaign message and platform. Again, similar to market competition, candidates have to distinguish themselves from others by projecting an ideal image and articulating the proper issue or issues in the hope of gaining popularity in the surveys. Competition among candidates to capture large chunks of the market vote is usually waged through the mass media – both print and broadcast. Moreover, “politics is no longer just addition. In the age of mass media, politics is image-making. Amplified by television and advertising, a politician’s image in the public’s collective mind is greater than the sum of his actual attributes, assets and accomplishment” (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004: 5). Candidate images are “cognitive representations and, to a considerable extent, people’s image of things [that] rules the way they behave, regardless of how close to reality their images are” (Laylo & Dayag-Laylo, 1999: 3). The Institute for Political and Economic Reforms (IPER) conducted two “psychographic” studies that profiled the voting behavior of the Filipino electorate in 1995 and 2003. In 1995, the top four factors for voters choice were: 1) popularity, 2) endorsement of traditional network and organization, 3) characteristics that can be of benefit to the voter, and 4) party program. By 2003, the ranking of the factors had significantly changed into: 1) the benefit factor, 2) political machinery, 3) popularity, and 4) endorsement of traditional network and organization (cited in Co et al., 2005). The decision to mobilize either command or market votes relies largely on a myriad of factors that include political opportunity, personal attributes and/or resources available to individual candidates or political parties. The identification of image, issues and machinery in this paper refers to the predominant electoral strategy waged by a presidential campaign. Of course, these categories are not absolute Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 121 and may actually overlap into mixed strategies in actual presidential campaigns. Ascendancy of media Given the physical, financial and logistical impossibility of personally facing the electorate in a national campaign, media has emerged as the most efficient and cost-effective way of communicating with the public. Broadcast media (radio and television) has emerged as the primary source of news and information for the public. Broadcast media, with an audience reach in the millions, has supplanted print media, which is circulated in the hundreds of thousands. However, while broadcast media has the most audience reach, it tends to have less substance since everything is reduced into a two- or threesentence sound byte. On the other hand, print media offers much space for elaborate explanations (Carandang, 2004). Within broadcast media, television has replaced radio as the source of information for the masses. This trend has been manifested since the late 1980s when television sets were sold by the hundreds of thousands. Programming and language shifted from English to Tagalog to reach the mass audience. By 1995, some 57 percent of households nationwide had TV sets. This figure has risen to 85 percent, as of 2001 (Coronel, 2003). In 2001, a 13-year old law banning political advertising was lifted, thus opening the floodgates of media-related expenditures for political campaigns. The 2004 elections “marked the first time that presidential candidates spent more than half of their total campaign expenses on advertising” (Gloria et al., 2004: 30) (see Table 1). 122 Table 1: Commercial and Political Ads from January to May 2004 (in million pesos) TV Nonpolitical Ads Political Ads 2,216.25 1,405.67 Radio 2,016.55 530.07 Print 598.17 53.66 Total 4,830.97 1,989.40 Source: Gloria et al., 2004 The media has eroded the vote-delivery potential of the political machinery. Traditionally, a well-oiled machinery was relied upon to deliver 75 percent of a candidate’s vote. The other 25 percent was delivered by provincial sorties, posters and propaganda materials. Presently, this equation has been altered with media accounting for approximately more than 50 percent of a candidate’s votes. Hence, the communications group composed of image strategists, pollsters, advertising specialists and media relations experts have become an integral and important component of any presidential campaign (Gloria et al., 2004). The advantage of the incumbent is reflected by the budget that is made available for media advertisement. In 2004, government spent a total of P6.1 billion on advertisements for a period of five months prior to the elections (see Table 2). Table 2: Government Ads in 2004 (January to May) Government Ads Social Concern Ads Political Ads Source: Gloria et al., 2004 P1.4 billion P2.8 billion P1.9 billion Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 123 The 1992 presidential election The 1992 election was the first democratic election for the presidency since 1969. It was also the first to be held after the 1986 transition from authoritarianism to democracy. There were seven contenders: Fidel Ramos, Miriam Defensor Santiago, Eduardo Cojuangco, Ramon Mitra, Imelda Marcos, Jovito Salonga and Salvador Laurel. Of these seven, only four were considered serious contenders. Former Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos won with 23.6 percent of the national vote (see Table 3). Former Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago placed second with 19.7 percent, close Marcos associate Eduardo Cojuangco placed third with 18.2 percent, and House Speaker Ramon Mitra placed fourth with 15 percent of the presidential vote. Table 3: Results of 1992 Election Candidate Fidel V. Ramos Miriam Defensor Santiago Eduardo Cojuangco Ramon Mitra Imelda Romualdez Marcos Jovito Salonga Salvador H. Laurel Party Lakas NUCD People’s Reform Party Nationalist People’s Coalition Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino Kilusang Bagong Lipunan Liberal Party Nacionalista Party Votes 5,342,521 4,468,173 4,116,376 3,316,661 2,338,294 2,302,124 770,046 % 23.6 19.7 18.2 14.6 10.3 10.2 3.4 Source: Commission on Elections, 1992 124 Reformism and issue-based campaigns Ramos consistently topped the Social Weather Stations (SWS) surveys from July 1991 to early February 1992 (see Table 4). His closest rival, Miriam Defensor Santiago, only caught up with him in April 1992, but her lead was not statistically significant. Ramos’ support was evenly distributed by age, class, education and location (Mangahas, 1994). He also capitalized on his role in the 1986 “People Power” revolution and his staunch defense of the Aquino administration from seven coup attempts. Consistent with this image, he encapsulated his campaign message into the slogan – “people’s empowerment”. Table 4: SWS National Surveys: July 1991 – April 1992 July 1991 1 2 3-4 Ramos Salonga Estrada & Santiago 5 Laurel 6-7 Mitra & Pimentel 8 Cojuangco November 1991 1 2-3 4 5 6 7-8 Ramos Estrada & Santiago Salonga Mitra Laurel Fernan & Cojuangco February 1992 1 2 3-4 5 6 7 8 Ramos Santiago Mitra & Estrada Cojuangco Marcos Salonga Laurel April 1992 1-2 Santiago & Ramos 3 Cojuangco 4-6 Mitra & Salonga 7 Laurel Undecided 17% Undecided 26% Note: SWS utilized several survey techniques, hence only the rankings can be compared. Source: Posadas & Sandoval, 1992 Santiago waged a single-issue campaign against corruption and captured the support of the youth through her unusual image. She also won the support of the middle class, educated and urban voters (Mangahas, 1994). Her image was the antithesis of Cory Aquino’s. While Cory was pensive, dignified and passive, Miriam was shrill, acerbic and aggressive. This image, however, was used by her opponents to portray her as unstable and possibly disturbed. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 125 Notwithstanding his national prominence as House Speaker, Mitra did not rate well in the SWS surveys. He ranked between 6th to 7th in July 1991, 5th place in November 1991, between 3rd and 4th in February 1992, and between 4th and 6th in April 1992. Ironically, his main power base – the speakership of the lower house – was also his greatest liability. The position reinforced his image as a “traditional politician” or “trapo”. The public had an adverse perception of the House of Representatives because of a number of scandals that involved its members. The Speaker himself was implicated in the misuse of the House printing facilities to support his presidential campaign (Lande, 1996). Businessman Eduardo Cojuangco languished at the tail end of the surveys but managed to rise from 8th place in July 1991 to between 7th and 8th place in November 1991, to 5th place in February 1992, and finally landing oin 3rd place in April 1992. While his image handlers highlighted his alleged business acumen, he was hounded by his close association with the ousted dictator and his role in the controversial coconut levy imposed on coconut farmers by the Marcos administration. With such an image, his over-all negatives outweighed his positives. Rise of the machines Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. had the most organized party machinery – the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). On the eve of the 1992 elections, the LDP boasted that it had the support of 150 out of 200 congressmen, 50 out of 73 governors, 35 out of 60 city mayors, 1,100 out of 1,532 municipal mayors and 70 percent of barangay officials (De Castro, 1992). In addition, Mitra was publicly endorsed by the influential Roman Catholic Archbishop, Jaime Cardinal Sin. On the other hand, Eduardo Cojuangco attempted to replicate the national pyramidical political machinery of Ferdinand Marcos by designating a loyal deputy (postes) in every geographical region. In addition, he utilized his vast financial resources to set up his 126 party machinery. However, he was outspent by Ramos at the tail end of the campaign. Some of the postes, particularly in Northwestern, Northeastern and Central Luzon, were effective in delivering the bulk of Cojuangco’s votes (Lande, 1996). Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) Bishop Eraño Manalo endorsed his candidacy.3 Except for his home province of Tarlac, Cojuangco did not benefit much from Tagalog-speaking provinces. He, however, drew much support from the Ilocano-speaking provinces, given his close association with former President Marcos. His combined support from Ilocano and Tagalog provinces was greater, on the average, than the support he received in provinces dominated by other language groups (Lande, 1996) (see Appendix 1). Unlike the other presidential candidates, Mitra did not have a large linguistic-regional base of his own; he got his strongest support from the thinly-populated island and frontier provinces (Siquijor, Camiguin, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Romblon) that resemble his native Palawan, and the thinly-populated highlands (Cordillera region) where he grew up (Lande, 1996). He got additional votes from the populous Cebuanospeaking Central Visayan provinces, the home of his vice-presidential running-mate former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan. This advantage, however, was limited because of the equally strong support given by the region to Ramos’ vice presidentvice-presidential running-mate, Cebu Governor Lito Osmeña (Lande, 1996). Ramos, a non-politician, entered and lost the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) primaries to Mitra. He then organized his own political party, the Lakas NUCD, and won the endorsement of President Aquino. This endorsement translated to access to government resources through the extra-legal pre-election release of between P600 million to P1.5 billion National Aid to Local Government Units (NALGU) funds to localities whose leaders campaigned for Ramos (Lande, 1996). In addition, the LDP charged that portions of an estimated P100 million 3 The Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ) is a Christian sect founded by former Seventh Day Adventist member Felix Manalo in 1914. The sect grew in numbers and became very influential in local and national politics as a result of its practice of block voting. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 127 fund for the Rebel Returnee Program were distributed to local officials supportive of the Ramos campaign (Balgos, 1998). Ramos, a protestant and only the second non-Catholic to seek the presidency, secured the endorsement of two tightly-knit religious organizations – the El Shaddai of Brother Mike Velarde and Jesus is Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva. In terms of regional strength, he got the bulk of his support from the country’s most heavily populated regions: Central Luzon and the Cebuano-speaking areas of the Visayas and Mindanao. In addition, he was exceptionally strong in two provinces with very large populations, Pangasinan and Cebu (Lande, 1996) (see Appendix 1). Santiago did not have a political machinery to support her candidacy. Her People’s Reform Party had no congressional or local candidates and it had only a partial senatorial slate, which included five retired generals. It was only in the latter part of the campaign that she was able to convince Ramon Magsaysay Jr. to be her vicepresidential running-mate. What she lacked in traditional political machinery, she made up for with a non-traditional campaign powered largely by unpaid volunteers, made up of students and civic leaders (Lande, 1996). Santiago won in two of the country’s most densely populated regions: the National Capital Region and its surrounding semiurban provinces, and Western Visayas, particularly vote-rich Negros Occidental and Iloilo (Lande, 1996). While she topped most media and campus surveys, the SWS surveys from July 1991 to early February 1992 had her running second to Ramos. By April 1992, she was able to overtake Ramos, but her lead was not statistically significant (Mangahas, 1994). Keys to success In 1992, Ramos consistently topped the surveys, articulated the proper issue (people’s empowerment) consistent with his image as one of the EDSA heroes, and had government resources at his 128 disposal to by-pass the traditional party machinery. The phenomenal performance of Santiago revealed the potential of cultivating the right image and articulating hot-button issues in attracting the market votes. However, her campaign suffered from a lack of machinery to protect her votes. The tight competition between Ramos and Santiago served to highlight the important role of ethno-linguistic bailiwicks in a close election. Nearly ten percent of Ramos’s total tally came from his native Pangasinan, while the bulk of Santiago’s votes came from the Ilonggospeaking provinces. Hence, in a close election, the margin could be swung according to regional and linguistic bases (Coronel, 2003) (see Appendix 1). An issue-focused campaign without the corresponding positive image and credible machinery can also prove to be disastrous. Jovito Salonga articulated nationalist and progressive issues and was favored by a segment of the educated middle class but he suffered from an image problem due to his age. Both Mitra and Cojuangco relied on their respective machineries to deliver command votes: Mitra’s machine was largely party-based, while Cojuangco’s was money-based. The two, however, suffered from extremely negative images: Cojuangco as the Marcos crony, and Mitra the trapo. Command Votes Party Mo ney Gover nment Cojuangco Mitra Ramos Im age Market otes Market V Votes Santiago Issue s Salonga Figure 3: 1992 Candidate Positioning Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 129 The 1998 presidential election The second presidential election saw an unprecedented number of presidential candidates in Philippine political history (see Table 5). The eleven candidates who competed for the presidency included: Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr., Vice-President Joseph Estrada, Senator Raul Roco, former Cebu Governor Lito Osmeña, Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim, Defense Secretary Renato de Villa, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Santiago Dumlao and Manuel Morato. Out of this number, there was one frontrunner and three serious challengers. Table 5: Results of 1998 Election Presidential Candidate Joseph E. Estrada Jose C. de Venecia Jr. Raul S. Roco Emilio R. Osmeña Alfredo S. Lim Renato S. de Villa Miriam Defensor Santiago Juan Ponce Enrile Santiago F. Dumlao Manuel L. Morato Party LAMMP Lakas NUCDUMDP Aksyon Demokratiko PROMDI LP Reporma-LM PRP Independent KPP Partido ng Bansang Marangal Votes 10,722,295 4,268,483 3,720,212 3,347,631 2,344,362 1,308,352 797,206 343,139 32,212 18,644 % 39.9 15.9 13.8 12.4 8.7 4.9 3.0 1.3 0.1 0.1 Source: Commission on Elections, 1998 Vice-President Joseph Estrada won the presidency with 39.9 percent of the vote. House Speaker Jose de Venecia placed second 130 with 15.9 percent ; Senator Raul Roco was on third place with 13.8 percent ; and Emilio “Lito” Osmeña placed fourth with 11 percent of the national vote. Populist onslaught Estrada’s popularity was formidable; his support from the masa was solid. His popularity compensated for the relative handicap of his LAMMP coalition vis-à-vis the administration Lakas party. Estrada dominated the SWS surveys throughout the campaign period. From January to May 1998, he did not relinquish the top position in the opinion polls (see Table 6). Although rejected by a small but significant ABC or middle-to-upper classes, Estrada nevertheless won as a result of mass support from the D and E classes – the so-called masa vote. The 1998 election was the first time that the masa came out solidly behind a single candidate. Estrada captured 38 percent of the class D and 48 percent of the class E votes (Mangahas, 1998). The Estrada campaign will be remembered for one of the most successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential campaigns – Erap para sa mahirap (Erap for the poor). The slogan did not only capture the core message and issue of the Estrada campaign, it was also in synch with his image as an idol of the masses. He won the endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and SWS exit polls indicated that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for him. Estada was also endorsed by El Shaddai; however, only 39 percent of its members actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 4). Estrada was subjected to a barrage of negative attacks revolving around his character and competence. His opponents raised the issue of morality, particularly regarding his mistresses, his drinking sprees and gambling habit. His lack of advanced education was also used to cast doubt on his competence. While these allegations had some basis in fact, his popularity did not wane. His media strategists even used the “Erap jokes” that were circulating to further endear him to the masses. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 131 Table 6: SWS National Surveys: January 1998-May 1998 Sep 96 Estrada De Venecia Roco Osmeña Lim De Villa Arroyo Enrile Santiago Marcos Dumlao Morato Undecided 19 1 3 1 14 18 0 Dec 96 17 2 6 0.5 17 14 1 Apr 97 23 5 5 3 22 13 3 Sep 97 19 3 9 3 4 19 13 14 Jan 98 28 11 10 17 14 7 9 4 Feb 98 28 12 9 13 14 6 0.9 5 2 0.1 0.6 10 Mar 98 28 14 11 9 14 5 2 7 2 0.4 0.9 7 Apr 98 30 12 10 13 13 5 2 4 2 0.3 0.2 9 May 98 33 15 11 11 10 6 3 2 0.3 0.3 0.2 9 Source: Mangahas, 1998 De Venecia struggled to catch up with Estrada’s popularity but he only placed fourth in January and February; tied for second place with Alfredo Lim in March; fell to third place in April, and regained second place in May. On the eve of the elections, he was behind Estrada by 18 percentage points, or roughly 4.5 million votes. Like Mitra in 1992, de Venecia suffered from a negative trapo image reinforced by his role as House Speaker. Roco was popular among women voters and the youth, but he was eventually outdone by Estrada, even among these sectors. Hence, socioeconomic class, age and gender did not matter much in the 1998 132 elections (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 5). Brilliant and articulate, Roco initially projected himself as an incarnation of Ninoy Aquino. He was adept at discussing and debating policy issues, but was oftentimes perceived as flowery in delivery and too esoteric for the layperson. In terms of popularity, as reflected in the SWS surveys, Osmeña consistently placed a far second to Estrada in the early part of the campaign period. He fared well in the surveys with strong name recognition – his family has been active in local and national politics since the American colonial period. His grandfather, Sergio Sr., had been a president of the Republic; his uncle, Sergio Jr., had been a senator and a presidential candidate; his estranged brother, Sonny, was a long-time senator; his cousin, Sergio III, was also a senator; and another cousin, Tomas, was mayor of Cebu. On top of his strong regional backing and wide name recognition, Osmeña ran a single-issue campaign that resonated with the electorate. His advocacy of greater decentralization for local government units was a popular issue in the Visayas and Mindanao where the electorate have strong animosity against the dominant centralism of “Imperial Manila” (see Appendix 2). Splintering the reformist votes Estrada’s machinery was provided largely by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), which coalesced with the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), and his own party Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP). The coalition Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) served to supplement his popularity with the electorate. Estrada’s bailiwick was concentrated in the Tagalog-speaking provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan. Regionally, he was strong in Regions 1 and 2 (Ilocos and Cagayan Valley), Region 3 (Central Luzon), Region 4 (Southern Tagalog), Region 8 (Eastern Visayas), Regions 9 and 12 (Western and Central Mindanao), Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) and Region 11 (Southern Mindanao) (Laquian, 1998). In spite of the fact that he came from San Juan, a small municipality in Metro Manila, Estrada Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 133 enjoyed wide margins throughout the country. He even encroached on the regional bailiwicks of his rivals (Coronel, 2003). De Venecia had the advantage of money and machinery built around the administration party, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, whose membership included majority of the congressmen, governors, mayors and local officials in the country. He also won the endorsement of President Ramos after a grueling competition with Defense Secretary Renato de Villa in the Lakas primaries. Soon after, he was endorsed by the Jesus is Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva and the Jesus Miracle Crusade of Brother Wilde Almeda (see Appendix 3). The main base of support for de Venecia was his home province – vote-rich Pangasinan. He was also particularly strong in Northern Luzon (see Appendix 2). Roco placed third despite a lack of money and machinery. Like Santiago in 1992, he ran an alternative grassroots campaign anchored on the miniscule party he founded – Aksyon Demokratiko. Aside from an unknown vice-presidential candidate, Inday Santiago, his party did not field a national or local slate of candidates. Roco’s votes came primarily from his bailiwick – the Bicol Region. He also performed strongly in the National Capital Region (see Appendix 2). Roco dominated the votes among the ABC classes but fared poorly among the D and E (see Appendix 4). Osmeña ran for president under his own provincial-based party – the Probinsya Muna Development Initiative (PROMDI). He got the most number of votes in Cebu, where he had served as governor. He also did well in the nearby Cebuano-speaking areas in the Visayas and Mindanao where he repeated his strong performance in 1992 as a vice-presidential candidate. His campaign reflected the continued potency of ethno-linguistic ties as the most dependable source of command votes in a national election. Keys to success In 1998, Estrada’s popularity as an actor was reinforced by his core message (Erap para sa Mahirap), his single-issue campaign, 134 which was consistent with his image, and his machinery that was largely provided by the LDP and NPC. He managed to secure his frontrunner position throughout the campaign, which projected invincibility and resulted in a bandwagon effect. De Venecia had the advantage of having a well-financed party machinery in the form of the monolithic administration party Lakas NUCD-UMDP, and the endorsement of President Ramos which translated into access to government resources. However, like Mitra in 1992, he was very unpopular and suffered from a negative trapo image. Command Votes Gover nment Mo ney De Venecia Party Estrada Im age Market Votes Market V otes Issues Osme ña De Villa Lim Roco Figure 4: 1998 Candidate Positioning Roco ran a strong alternative grassroots campaign and captured a portion of the market votes, particularly among the middle class, youth and women. But as in the “Miriam phenomenon” in 1992, his lack of machinery weighed down his chances of winning the election. Osmeña’s campaign revealed the continuing potency of ethno-linguistic ties as the most dependable source of command votes in a national election. This was also evident in the strong support from regional bailiwicks received by de Venecia from Pangasinan and Roco from Bicol. However, Estrada’s encroachment in his rivals’ bailiwicks revealed that “class Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 135 loyalties could overcome regional and linguistic ones” (Coronel, 2003: 10). The 2004 presidential election In 2004, after a tumultuous three-and-a-half years of completing the unfinished term of ousted President Joseph Estrada, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo sought her own electoral mandate. Notwithstanding her earlier promise not to seek election, she was determined to win a full six-year term. Her candidacy served as a referendum on her administration’s achievements and failures. There were six candidates for the 2004 presidential elections, namely President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, film legend Fernando Poe Jr., former Education Secretary Raul Roco, Senator Panfilo Lacson, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Eddie Gil. Of the six candidates, two were serious frontrunners, three were spoilers, and one was a nuisance candidate. The incumbent won by a margin of 3.4 percent of the total votes cast or an equivalent of 1,123,576 votes (see Table 7). Table 7: Results of the 2004 Presidential Election Candidate Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Fernando Poe Jr. Panfilo Lacson Raul Roco Eduardo Villanueva Total Source: Commission on Elections, 2004 K4 KNP Independent Alyansa ng Pag-asa Bangon Party Votes 12,905,808 11,782,232 3,510,762 2,082,762 1,988,218 32,269,782 % 39.9 36.5 10.9 6.4 6.2 100 Power of the incumbent The last time that an incumbent president was re-elected in the Philippines was in 1969 when Ferdinand Marcos defeated Sergio 136 Osmeña Jr. It would also be the last democratically-held presidential election in the Third Philippine Republic. Marcos’s attempt to force an electoral mandate in the 1986 snap presidential election unleashed the first “people power” uprising. The 2004 election was only the third time in Philippine political history that a former vice-president who completed an unfinished term of a predecessor, sought a full mandate as president. The first time was the controversial victory of Elpidio Quirino in the 1949 presidential election that nearly resulted in an uprising by disgruntled followers of defeated candidate Jose P. Laurel Sr. In 1953, Quirino’s blatant attempt at re-election was thwarted by a “reformist-populist” candidate, Ramon Magsaysay (Hedman & Sidel, 2000). Since she assumed office after EDSA 2, President Arroyo has suffered from an image problem that did not disappear after several image makeovers. Consequently, she campaigned against herself “on issues like the vows she broke, the promises she has yet to fulfill, her flip-flops that need more explaining, and her husband that many say has been her heaviest political baggage” (Paez, 2004: 26). The President relied on three parallel machineries to carry her to victory. The first was the government bureaucracy, an advantage of incumbency. The second was her party machinery composed of the ruling Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), in coalition with the Liberal Party, a faction of the Nationalist People’s Coalition and the miniscule People’s Reform Party. The third was a network of parallel support groups organized under the control of the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, the president’s brother Diosdado Macapagal Jr., and the seasoned political operator – Ronaldo Puno. Lakas stalwarts and strategists had learned the lessons of the failed 1998 bid of Speaker de Venecia. Despite the advantage of governmentbased and party-based machineries, great efforts were made to organize parallel campaign organizations, in case the party machinery failed again. In addition, the President was a hardworking and driven campaigner. She was a veteran of three grueling national elections: Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 137 two for the senate and one for vice president. She got the highest number of votes on her second run for the senate in 1995, and when she won the vice presidency in 1998. Aside from Pampanga, she also counted Bacolod, Negros Occidental (her husband’s province) and Iligan, Lanao del Norte (her mother’s province) as her bailiwicks. In successive SWS surveys, she consistently scored high in the Visayas, where she outranked Fernando Poe Jr. She eventually consolidated her ethno-linguistic base (i.e. Cebuano and Ilonggo) in the Visayas and Mindanao to counter Poe’s dominance in Luzon (see Appendix 6). In terms of presidential preference, Arroyo consistently trailed behind other candidates. Before her October 2003 announcement that she would seek election, she consistently trailed behind Senators Noli de Castro and Raul Roco, except in June of the same year when she placed first with 20 percentage points in the SWS survey. Her numbers did not pick up after her October announcement. It was only in January 2004 that she overtook Roco with 27 percentage points, and placed second to Fernando Poe Jr. She benefited largely from the decision of survey frontrunner Noli de Castro to withdraw and become her vice-presidential candidate. By February 2004, she had become competitive, rising two percentage points and narrowing her margin with Poe in the SWS survey (see Table 8). 138 Table 8: SWS National Surveys: August 2003 – May 2004 Dec May - Jun 02 Jun 03 03 Arroyo Poe Roco Lacson De Castro Villanueva Gil Others Undecided 13 21 24 6 19 12 6 15 16 19 12 22 10 5 20 15 19 11 18 15 3 Aug 03 16 12 18 11 20 15 4 Sep 03 17 14 20 10 28 8 4 Nov 03 17 25 18 10 24 6 Jan 04 26.5 Jan - Feb 04 28.7 Feb 04 31.8 30.5 17.9 11.4 1.8 0.03 6.6 Mar 04 32.9 Mar 04 31.4 Apr 04 35.3 30.8 8.4 10.6 4.0 0.05 10.9 May 04 37 30 6 11 4 0.3 12 36.3 37.5 19.2 11.5 1.0 0.1 5.4 17.4 8.4 1.7 0.2 6.1 34.9 32.0 13.1 11.5 2.4 0.5 4.6 15.0 11.2 2.8 7.6 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004 She managed a statistical tie with Poe in the Pulse Asia and SWS surveys in that period of time. Compared with Poe, Arroyo gradually consolidated her hold on the ABC class and made inroads in the D class (see Table 9 and Appendix 8). Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 139 Table 9: Pulse Asia Voter Preference by Socioeconomic Class, in Percent Candidate/ Sector Arroyo, G.M. ABC D E Poe, F. Jr. ABC D E Lacson, P. ABC D E Roco, R ABC D E Villanueva, E. ABC D E Undecided/ None/NR ABC D E Nov ‘03 (1,200) 21 27 32 15 27 32 17 12 10 41 32 24 Jan ‘04 (1,800) 28 36 30 25 33 43 14 8 8 25 20 16 Feb ‘04 (1,800) 33 33 29 23 30 39 14 11 10 17 17 13 Mar ‘04 (4,800) 32 34 32 22 27 41 13 11 6 19 13 10 Apr ‘04 (1,800) 33 39 35 18 28 41 19 12 7 12 7 5 - 4 1 1 2 1 2 4 4 3 7 6 2 6 2 2 5 3 3 11 8 7 6 12 8 1 7 8 Source: Gloria et al., 2004 Populism falters After 282 movies and 48 years as the undisputed box-office king of Philippine cinema, Fernando Poe Jr. (popularly known as FPJ) performed the greatest role of his life by running for the presidency and following in the footsteps of his best friend, Joseph Estrada. His candidacy was borne out of the efforts of several sectoral and 140 volunteer groups that urged him to run. His main political vehicle was the hastily-formed coalition – the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) – composed of the LDP, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), and the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP). FPJ’s electoral strength was both regional and class-based. In Luzon, FPJ relied on his home province of Pangasinan as his major bailiwick. He was also particularly strong in Mindanao where he had a strong following among the Muslim communities. His campaign hoped to capture the class D and E votes that delivered the presidency to Estrada in 1998. FPJ’s survey numbers surged initially despite his late declaration to run for the presidency. However, a series of negative news stories about him, including a disqualification case filed at the Supreme Court, succeeded in halting his upward momentum. Moreover, FPJ’s refusal to articulate his platform or participate in debates fatally impaired his candidacy. His public appearances were limited to smiling, waving and saluting to the crowd, and his speeches were limited to oneliners, which were often taken from his movies. Despite the huge number of fans who attended his campaign sorties, the failure of FPJ to mount an insurmountable lead in the presidential surveys prevented most local politicians from endorsing his candidacy and discouraged political financiers from infusing funds into his campaign. In the end, he lost his hold on his core demographic base – the class D and E votes. Ironically, he captured the youth vote, but majority of the older voters supported Arroyo (see Appendix 9). His campaign was also saddled by internal bickering among the parties and organizations within the opposition coalition. His failure to unite with recalcitrant opposition candidate Panfilo Lacson further weakened the political opposition, weighed down his campaign message of “national unity” and resulted in the withdrawal of support of the influential Iglesia ni Cristo. In the end, the opposition failed to provide the political vehicle for the charismatic Poe. Unlike President Estrada’s Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) coalition in 1998, which managed to assemble the requisite Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 141 political machinery to convert popularity into votes and have them counted, the KNP, Poe’s coalition in 2004, fielded only 26 candidates out of 211 seats (12 percent) for the House of Representatives and eight candidates for 76 (10 percent) provincial governor seats (Doronila, 2004). Keys to Success Despite serious charges raised by the opposition regarding the conduct and outcome of the 2004 presidential election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo managed to claim a new mandate and was proclaimed victorious by Congress. On March 29, 2005, the Supreme Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), dismissed the election protest filed by defeated opposition candidate Fernando Poe Jr. “on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant” (Clapano, 2005). Poe had died from a stroke on December 14, 2004, with the resolution of his election protest still pending. The PET dismissed the request of his widow, Susan Roces, to substitute for her deceased husband since the rules allowed only the registered candidates who obtained the second and third highest votes for the presidency to file an election protest. The victory of President Arroyo and her running mate, Senator Noli de Castro, was the first time a presidential and vice-presidential ticket was not split in the three elections since 1992. The immensely popular former television newscaster and senator, Noli de Castro, defeated equally popular fellow newscaster and senator, Loren Legarda. De Castro, whose name was earlier floated as a presidential contender, contributed much to the victory of Arroyo in terms of vote transferability, as the administration’s internal survey indicated that an estimated 70 percent of those who would vote for de Castro would also vote for Arroyo. The inclusion of de Castro in the president’s ticket also allowed Arroyo to communicate with the poor, who 142 comprised the bulk of the electorate and the natural constituency of Poe (Bergonia, 2004; Gloria et al., 2004). Command Votes Party Government Money Issues Market Votes Image Poe Lacson Roco Villanueva Figure 5: 2004 Candidate Positioning Arroyo Arroyo’s victory was also the first time in Philippine history that a presidential candidate won the election by winning the southern islands of Visayas and Mindanao but losing in the traditional locus of political power – the northern island of Luzon. Despite the fact that Luzon was Arroyo’s natural bailiwick, majority of its voters indicated their preference for Poe in successive surveys conducted by SWS and Pulse Asia prior to the election. Given her political weakness in Luzon, she relied on the political clans and bosses in the Visayas and Mindanao to deliver the votes for her (De Castro, 2004). The administration also succeeded in getting the support of seven out of ten governors in voterich provinces (Go, 2004). The President’s candidacy was reinforced by the religious command votes that were delivered by the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai (see Appendix 7). According to estimates, each religious group can deliver between two to four million votes. In 1998, Erap Estrada got the endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai. The 1998 SWS exit polls indicated that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 143 Estrada. The El Shaddai also endorsed Estrada, but only 39 percent of its members actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998). The 2010 Presidential Election The allegation of massive fraud committed by the administration during the 2004 election was reinforced in June 2005 with the sudden and mysterious release of wire-tapped conversations between Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano and various personalities led by President Arroyo. The taped conversations, which allegedly took place from May 17 to June 18, 2004, exposed the cabal of political operators who tampered with votes upon orders of Garcillano. While the President admitted to being one of the voices in the taped conversations, she denied any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, she profusely apologized for the impropriety of her “lapse in judgment”. The 2010 presidential election will serve as a referendum on the nine-year rule of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It will also be an opportunity to repair the political institutions damaged by the legitimation crisis that emerged from the 2004 election. Contested elections have the effect of weakening legitimacy since they diminish the belief in democratic procedures as a source of political authority. Given the impending end of Arroyo’s term of office, and her failure to extend it by constitutional revision, several political personalities have projected themselves to be her possible successor in the next round of presidential elections. Air and ground war Fresh from getting the highest number of votes in the 2007 senatorial elections, Loren Legarda topped the first survey on possible presidential candidates for 2010 conducted that year. Succeeding surveys showed Vice-President de Castro as the most preferred choice to succeed President Arroyo. Between September 2007 and June 2009, however, preparations for the 2010 electoral campaign 144 shifted to the mobilization of party-based local machineries (“ground war”) and the early saturation of radio and television with expensive political advertisements (“air war”). Two potential candidates strongly competed in this regard: Senators Manuel “Mar” Roxas II and Manuel “Manny” Villar Jr. The former is the grandson of the late president and Liberal Party (LP) founder Manuel Roxas; while the latter is the steward of the resurgent Nacionalista Party (NP). Aside from leading the two oldest parties in the Philippines, both are among the richest legislators in Congress. Roxas is a scion of the Araneta clan – owners of the Araneta Commercial Center in Cubao; while Villar is a self-made billionaire who made his money developing mass housing projects (Lopez, 2007). According to Nielsen Media Research, in the first three months of 2009, three possible candidates had already spent a total of P230 million in televised “advocacy ads”. The three are Roxas (P140 million), Villar (P80 million), and Legarda (P10 million). The cost of air time at peak viewing hours on the two major television networks (GMA 7 and ABS-CBN 2) can be as much as P475,000 per 30 seconds. (Sisante et al., 2009). By the second quarter of 2009, Villar had overtaken Roxas in ad placements. According to Nielsen, Villar logged a total of 603 minutes or 10.5 hours of television advertisements in the first half of 2009 accounting for 45 percent of the total 1,345 minutes of infomercials during the period. He was followed by Roxas with 444 minutes of airtime; Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay with 166 minutes, Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro with 70 minutes, evangelist Eddie Villanueva with 33 minutes and Sen. Panfilo Lacson with 30 minutes (Daily Tribune, 2009). The barrage of television advertisements pushed Villar’s survey ranking. In May, he reached a statistical tie with de Castro, the consistent survey leader , and by June 2009, had taken the lead in the SWS survey. Even as he competed tightly with Villar in media spending, Roxas failed to obtain the same push in his survey rankings. On the other hand, Legarda’s survey numbers plummeted after her political advertisements stopped airing on the major television networks. VicePresident de Castro managed to compete in media exposure through Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 145 his government-sponsored infomercials promoting housing loans. However, his later actions indicated his disinterest in either pursuing the presidency or running for re-election as vice-president. His noncommitment paved the way for the selection of the relatively unknown Gilbert Teodoro as the standard bearer of the recently merged LakasCMD and Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi) (see Table 10). Table 10: SWS National Surveys: September 2007 – June 2009 Sep 07 Aquino De Castro Villar Estrada Legarda Roxas Escudero Lacson Villanueva Binay Fernando Teodoro Others Don’t Know None 25 18 5 44 9 13 18 0.5 0.3 0.2 15.6 12 6 Dec 07 30 27 9 23 20 15 13 0.4 1 1 14.7 12 5 Mar 08 35 17 14 30 16 19 12 0.04 0.4 1 9.3 11 5 Jun 08 31 25 11 26 13 14 16 0.1 0.2 1 8.2 15 8 Sep 08 29 28 13 26 13 16 17 0.2 0.3 1 10.5 9 9 Dec 08 31 27 11 28 10 19 14 0.4 2 2 0.1 4.74 7 12 Feb 09 27 26 13 25 15 23 14 0.04 1 1 0.2 8 13 7 May 09 21 29 13 14 18 15 12 0.7 2 1 0.2 10.1 20 9 Jun 09 19 33 25 15 20 20 7 0.8 4 1 0.8 5.7 18 - Sep 09 60 8 37 18 5 12 15 2 1 2 1 4 0.5 6 4 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2009 146 Revival of reformism At the outset, it became apparent that the 2010 electoral battle was going to be waged in terms of an expensive media war and a pitched battle for the mobilization of local political machineries. However, the massive outpouring of national grief over the death of former President and democracy icon Corazon C. Aquino on August 1, 2009 reawakened a sense of collective nostalgia for the democratic struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. Similar to the events of 1983 after Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. was assassinated, thousands representing a cross-section of Philippine society – from street vendors to middleaged professionals and their children – literally lined up in the streets of Manila to pay their last respects to the former president. The tremendous national grief, coupled with deep frustration over the scandal-ridden Arroyo administration, rekindled the flames of reformist aspirations. Suddenly, national attention shifted to Aquino’s son, Senator Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, as the bearer of the reformist struggle. In a repeat of his mother’s path to the presidency, several individuals and private organizations launched a signature drive urging the young Aquino to consider running for president under the Liberal Party in 2010. Recognizing the signs of the times, Mar Roxas graciously withdrew his presidential candidacy in favor of Aquino. His act – similar to the withdrawal of Salvador “Doy” Laurel in favor of Cory Aquino – further reinforced the historical parallelisms with the 1986 campaign for the snap presidential election. A special SWS survey covering the voterich Lingayen-Lucena corridor was commissioned in September 2009 to test the potentials of a Noynoy candidacy. The poll was taken a day after Roxas’ withdrawal but weeks before Aquino’s declaration that he would seek the presidency (see Table 11). Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 147 Table 11: SWS Survey on Presidential Preferences for 2010 Election: Lingayen-Lucena Corridor (September 2009) Total Benigno Simeon Aquino III Manuel Villar Jr. Joseph Estrada Francis Escudero Noli De Castro Don’t Know None 50 14 13 12 7 2 1 NCR 50 14 15 14 5 1 1 Pangasinan 48 22 5 10 14 0 1 Region III 49 15 14 9 8 1 1 Region IV-A 51 12 13 12 6 3 2 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2009 According to Mahar Mangahas (2009: 15), the Lingayen-Lucena corridor “extending from Metro Manila to the north into Central Luzon and up to Pangasinan, and to the south into Southern Tagalog provinces on Luzon island, is where presidential races have traditionally been won, with the notable exception of the 2004 election”. In the LingayanLucena corridor, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of the national vote. the special survey had Noynoy scoring a phenomenal 50 percent over his closest rivals. The question of whether the “Noynoy phenomenon” was limited to Manila and Luzon was answered by the result of the 3rd Quarter regular SWS survey (see Table 9) taken from September 18 to 21, 2009, in which Aquino was named by an astounding 60 percent of respondents as their choice for president. Despite his being off the political radar in the nine polls since 2007, Noynoy’s ranking took off from virtually zero to 60 percent (Mangahas, 2009).4 Aquino’s 4 Since 2007, the SWS utilized the “best three” method in tracking the viable candidates for its regular quarterly national surveys. Respondents are asked to name up to three names (plural, as in sinu-sino). The objective is not to approximate actual election day voting but to identify and track the potentially viable candidates (Mangahas 2009). 148 frontrunner status was further reinforced by the result of the Pulse Asia survey conducted from October 22 to 30, 2009, where he scored 44 percent nationwide, a 25 percent margin over second placer Manny Villar (see Table 12). Table 12: Pulse Asia First Choice Presidential Preference for 2010 Election (October 22-30, 2009) Location RP Aquino, Benigno “Noynoy” III Villar, Manuel Jr. Escudero, Francis Estrada, Joseph De Castro, Noli Teodoro, Gilbert Fernando, Bayani Villanueva, Eduardo Others None/Refused/Undecided 44 19 13 11 4 2 1 1 1 3 NCR 47 11 17 11 2 4 1 0 0 3 Bal Luz 41 19 16 9 5 1 1 2 1 4 Vis 53 24 9 3 5 1 0 0 1 4 Min 41 19 9 21 4 1 1 1 0 2 ABC 51 13 12 5 1 4 1 1 1 2 Class D 44 20 15 9 4 2 1 1 0 4 E 44 18 10 17 6 1 1 1 1 2 Source: Pulse Asia, 2009 Keys to Success Some political analysts and opinion columnists have described the surge in the surveys of Noynoy Aquino as a “game changer”. With the rise in his numbers in the surveys, it is apparent that the core reformist issues such as transparency, accountability and good governance have gained ground as the central issues of the 2010 election. As political analyst Amando Doronila (2009) observed, “the survey results reflect the deep and broad resonance of the issue of clean and honest governance Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 149 that highlights Aquino’s campaign theme. The groundswell of support for Aquino following the death of his mother, President Cory Aquino, flows from the public service record of his mother and his father, the martyred former Sen. Benigno Aquino, whose honesty and transparency appear to have been accepted by the Filipino public”. The entry of Aquino has definitely shifted the momentum of the campaign from the initial focus on “ground” and “air” wars, to a revival of the issue-based, middle-class-backed reformist crusade reminiscent of the campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon Aquino in 1986. Both reformist campaigns faced critical elections that “provided unique opportunities for transformist mobilization to ease, if not resolve the deep-rooted ‘system contradictions’ which had crystallized into full blown political crises” (Hedman & Sidel, 2000: 20). In the same light, the imperatives of addressing the legitimation crisis of the Arroyo administration have galvanized reform-oriented individuals and civil society organizations around the candidacy of Noynoy Aquino. In effect, the aspirations for “change” and “hope” and a rejection of “politics as usual” are fuelling the groundswell of support for Aquino across class, age and region. The main challenge for the Aquino campaign is to sustain this support into vote-generating and vote-protecting machineries that will assure him of victory in 2010. As of this writing, there are four serious contenders for the presidency: Aquino, Villar, Estrada and Teodoro. This number is expected to narrow down by the start of the official campaign period on February 9, 2010. Each candidate is capitalizing on his perceived strengths in positioning against the others (see Figure 6). In terms of market votes, Aquino’s closest competitor is Erap Estrada. The former president, the most media-savvy among the potential candidates, still attracts a core of solid supporters, but his numbers have dwindled from his phenomenal rankings in 1998. No doubt, his image has been greatly affected by his ouster from the presidency, his conviction for plunder, and more recently, his alleged complicity in a celebrated 150 murder that happened during his controversial administration. He also faces the possibility of disqualification, given the constitutional provision on term limits that bans the president from seeking any reelection. In terms of command votes, Manny Villar has mobilized his vast fortune to finance the revitalization of the moribund Nacionalista Party. Since 2001, the billionaire legislator has been rebuilding the NP to serve as his vehicle for the presidency. Using the network he has built as former House Speaker and Senate President, Villar has either directly raided other parties or quietly secured the support of local and national politicians. He has invested large amounts in political advertising, which has translated into positive survey ratings. Despite efforts by his critics to implicate him in corruption scandals and portray him as a trapo, he is among the best-prepared candidates to take the reins of the presidency, given his professional and political experience. With his “rags-to-riches” story, he offers a compelling narrative to the Filipino electorate that can rival the masa appeal of Erap. Equally prepared to succeed the presidency is Defense Secretary Gilbert “Gibo” Teodoro. A bar topnotcher, three-term congressman, and known protégé of his uncle Danding Cojuangco, Teodoro shifted allegiance from the NPC to Lakas-CMD to contest the presidential nomination of the ruling coalition. He won the nomination almost by default, after frontrunner Noli de Castro refused to participate in the primaries. However, Teodoro is a virtual unknown with survey rankings hovering between 0.8 to 4 percent in the SWS surveys. He is also saddled with the unenviable task of defending the largely unpopular Arroyo administration. Adding to his troubles is his less-than-impressive performance as Chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) during the two recent typhoons that hit Manila and Northern Luzon which caused massive floods and losses to lives and property. What Teodoro lacks in terms of popularity, he hopes to make up for in terms of the almost monolithic machinery of the ruling coalition. The merged administration parties – Lakas-Kampi-CMD – claim the support Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 151 of about 70 percent of governors, congressmen and mayors across the country (Burgonio & Salaverra, 2009). Out of 219 congressional seats, Lakas-Kampi-CMD have 146 representatives, or about 66.7 percent representation. In the gubernatorial race, they have 58 candidates out of 80 slots, or 72.5 percent of the total available posts. For the city and municipal mayoral positions, they have 85 out of 120, and 1,112 out of 1,507 positions, respectively (Joven, 2009). Command Votes Government Teodoro Money Party Issues Market Votes Image Aquino Estrada Villar Figure 6: 2010 Candidate Positioning Competing narratives of reformism, clientelism and populism Thus far, electoral campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines have been waged with competing narratives of reformism, populism and clientelism. Thompson (2009), in his contribution to this volume, argues that these three are but forms of “elite politics”. The tradition of Filipino-style reformist politics, which can be traced to the presidential campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon Aquino in 1986, has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption and good governance campaigns of Miriam Defensor Santiago in 1992 and Raul Roco in 1998 and 2004. The same reformist aspirations have been rekindled to fuel the surging campaign of Noynoy Aquino. However, the failure of reform politics to address the problem of poverty, coupled with the ascendancy of mass media, fueled the image-based populist campaigns of Joseph Estrada in 1998 and 152 Fernando Poe Jr. in 2004. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money politics manifested itself in the machine-based campaigns of Ramon Mitra in 1992 and Jose de Venecia in 1998. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s successful revitalization of clientelism in 2004 managed to undercut the threat of a populist restoration (Thompson 2009). But in so doing, she also triggered a legitimation crisis that nearly toppled her administration and damaged fundamental institutions. The last three elections in the post-1986 period “were not a severance from the past but a continuation – with some surprising twists” (Coronel, 2003: 11). A formidable political machinery is not enough to guarantee success in presidential elections, as experienced by Mitra and de Venecia. The experiences of Santiago and Roco demonstrate that image and issues are also not enough to win presidential elections; a candidate needs the corresponding political machinery to get and protect his votes. Successful presidential campaigns are characterized by the right mix and astute use of popularity and machinery. It has been observed that the Filipino electorate has shifted from “feudal” to “mass” politics. The successive electoral exercises since 1992 have pointed to the rising inadequacies of relying on strong provincial bailiwicks in winning national office. The so-called “command votes” must now be supplemented by “market votes”. Like the mass market, the electorate must be segmented and targeted. Thus, national candidates (e.g., presidents and senators) must be packaged to target defined niches in a highly segmented electorate (Magno, 1992). Ultimately, media and public opinion polling have emerged as a primary and most influential conduit between national candidates and the electorate. These trends will continue to shape and define electoral campaigns in the Philippines. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 153 References Ando, H. (1969). A study of voting patterns in the Philippine presidential and senatorial elections, 1946-1965. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 567-586. Balgos, C. (1998, January-June). Show me the money. I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, pp. 25-31. Bergonia, T. (2004, July 28). GMA election strategy: Blending governance, magic, Noli. Philippine Daily Inquirer, pp. 1, 4. Burgonio, T. J. & Salaverra, L. (2009). Lakas-Kampi downplays poll result. Inquirer. net. Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/ view/20090827-222211/Lakas-Kampi-downplays-poll-results Carandang, R. (2004). Media, political parties and elections. Unpublished paper. Clapano, J. R. (2005). Supreme Court junks FPJ, Susan poll protest. Retrieved from http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/hl/hl101953.htm. Co, E. A. et al. (2005). Philippine democracy assessment: Free and fair role of political parties. Pasig: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Coronel, S. (2003, October-December). Who wants to be president? I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, pp. 8-11. Daily Tribune (2009, September 2). Villar logs 10.5 hours of infomercials in 6 months. Retrieved from http://www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/20090902hed3.html. De Castro, I. (1992). Money and moguls: Oiling the campaign machinery. In L. Kalaw-Tirol & S. Coronel (Eds.), 1992 & beyond: Forces and issues in Philippine elections. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs. De Castro, I. (2004, June 7). Gloria’s classic win. Newsbreak, 4(11), p. 19. Doronila, A. (2004). The importance of having a party machine. Inquirer.net. Retrieved from http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/apr/text/opi_amdoronila-1-p.htm. Doronila, A. (2009). Transparency now a defining issue in the campaign. Inquirer. net. Retrieved from http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/ view/20090916-225404/Transparency-now-a-defining-issue-in-campaign. Gloria, G. M., Tabunda, A. M. L. & Fonbuena, C. S. (2004). Spin & sell: How political ads shaped the 2004 elections. Makati City: Foundation for Communication Initiatives. Go, M. (2004, January). All bases covered, Newsbreak, 4(1), pp. 19-20. Hedman, E. & Sidel, J. T. (2000). Philippine politics and society in the twentieth century: Colonial legacies, post-colonial trajectories. London: Routledge. 154 Joven, B. (2009). Lakas-Kampi merger, a win-win situation – party members. Philstar. com. Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=472837. Kasuya, Y. (2009). Presidential bandwagon: Parties and party systems in the Philippines. Manila: Anvil. Kawanaka, T. (2002). Power in a Philippine city. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization. Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (1995). Toward a more comprehensive analysis of Philippine politics: Beyond the patron-client factional framework. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 26(2), 401-419. Kimura, M. (1992). 1997). Elections and politics: Philippine style (A case in Lipa). Manila: De La Salle University Press. Lande, C. H. (1965). Leaders, factions and parties: The structure of Philippine politics. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies. Lande, C. H.. (1996). Post-Marcos politics: A geographical and statistical analysis of the 1992 presidential election. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Laylo, P. Jr. & Dayag-Laylo, C. (1999). The 1998 Philippine presidential elections: Candidate images, media portrayals, and vote intentions. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations. Lopez, A. S. (2007). 2010: The presidential race is on: Arroyo’s successor will again be a minority president. BizNews Asia, 5(23), 4-12. Magno, A. R. (1992). From feudal to mass politics. The Manila Chronicle, p. 9 Mangahas, M. (1994). The Philippine social climate: From the SWS surveys. Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc. Mangahas, M. (1998). SWS surveys on the 1998 national elections. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations. Mangahas, M. (2009, October 17). Climate change in the 2010 election race. Philippine Daily Inquirer, p.15. Mauser, G. A. (1983). Political marketing: An approach to campaign strategy. New York: Praeger. Newman, B. (1994). The marketing of the president: Political marketing as campaign strategy. London: Sage Publications. Paez, C. (2004, January). The tireless campaigner. Newsbreak, 4(1), pp. 26-28. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. (2004, May). The presidency as image. I: The Investigative Reporting Magazine, pp. 5-11. Popkin, S. L. (1991). The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 155 Posadas, C. L. & Sandoval, G. A. (1992, June 12). How did SWS fare in predicting the May 11, 1992 election results? Social Weather Bulletin. Plasser, F. & Plasser, G. (2002). Global political campaigning: A worldwide analysis of campaign professionals and their practices. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. Pulse Asia, Inc. (2009, October 29). Ulat ng Bayan: Media release on Filipinos’ preference for May 2010 election. Social Weather Stations. (1998). A report on the SWS 1998 national exit polls. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations. Social Weather Stations. (2004). ABS-CBN/SWS day of election survey: May 10, 2004. Quezon City: Social Weather Stations. Social Weather Stations. (2008a). Fourth quarter 2007 Social Weather survey: De Castro, Villar, Legarda and Roxas are the people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/. Social Weather Stations. (2008b). Second quarter 2008 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Loren Legarda, and Manny Villar are the people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/. Social Weather Stations. (2008c). Third quarter 2008 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Manny Villar, and Loren Legarda are people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/. Social Weather Stations. (2009a). Fourth quarter 2008 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Loren Legarda and Manny Villar are still the top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/. Social Weather Stations. (2009b). First quarter 2009 Social Weather survey: Noli De Castro, Manny Villar, Loren Legarda, and now Chiz Escudero are the people’s top recommendees for 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/ Social Weather Stations. (2009c). SWS surveys on 2010 commissioned in behalf of Senator Manuel Villar, Jr. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/ Social Weather Stations. (2009d). SWS April 16-May 6, 2009 survey: Villar, De Castro and Roxas are the “best leaders to succeed GMA in 2010”. Retrieved from http:// www.sws.org.ph/ Social Weather Stations. (2009e). Second quarter 2009 Social Weather survey: Villar tops the “best leaders to succeed PGMA in 2010”; Estrada, Escudero, and Roxas gain while de Castro drops. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/ Social Weather Stations. (2009f). SWS confirms survey for Sergio Osmeña III in Metro Manila, Region III, Region IV-A and Pangasinan. Retrieved from http://www.sws. org.ph/. 156 Social Weather Stations. (2009g). Third quarter 2009 Social Weather survey: Noynoy Aquino and Manny Villar top the people’s “three best leaders to succeed PGMA in 2010”. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/. Sisante, J., Marueñas, M., & Severino, H. (2009). Months before campaign, politicians test the power of ‘advocacy ads.’ Eleksyon 2010. Retrieved from http://blogs.gmanews. tv/eleksyon2010/2009/07/months-before-campaign-politicians-test-the-power-ofadvocacy-ads/. Teehankee, J. C. (2002). Electoral politics in the Philippines. In A. Croissant, G. Bruns & M. John (Eds.)., Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia (pp. 149-202). Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Teehankee, J. C. (2006a). Electoral campaigning in the Philippines. In C. Schaferrer (Ed.), Election campaigning in East and Southeast Asia: Globalization of political marketing (pp. 79-101). Aldershot: Ashgate. Teehankee, J. C. (2006b). Consolidation or crisis of clientelistic democracy? The 2004 synchronized elections in the Philippines. In A. Croissant & B. Martin (Eds.), Between consolidation and crisis: Elections and democracy in five nations in Southeast Asia (pp. 215-276). Berlin: Lit Verlag. Teehankee, J. C. (2009). Citizen-party linkages: Failure to connect? In M. Herberg, (Ed.), Reforming the Philippine party system: Ideas and initiatives, debates and dynamics (pp. 23-44). Pasig: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Thompson, M. (2009). After populism: Winning the “war” for bourgeois democracy in the Philippines. Paper presented at the conference “Designing Governance for Civil Society,” sponsored by the Keio University, Center of Governance for Civil Society (CDCS), Japan, November 22-23, 2009. Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 157 Appendix 1: 1992 Presidential Candidates and Census Variables: Percentage of Variance in Votes Accounted for by Census Variables F. Ramos M. Santiago E. Cojuangco R. Mitra I. Marcos J. Salonga S. Laurel Language Cebuano Tagalog Ilocano Hiligaynon Bicolano Samar-Leyte Pangasinan Major Language Protestant Aglipayan Iglesia ni Cristo Muslim Other Religion Rice Corn Sugar Tobacco Perm. Crops College Grade School No School Radio 4.97 -1.20 -0.01 1.17 0.00 -3.20 14.19 0.91 -4.49 -1.46 -4.33 1.15 -0.52 -3.15 0.01 2.24 -0.24 0.97 8.09 -0.15 -0.02 -2.02 0.63 -0.01 Religion 5.06 -0.90 0.12 0.62 -0.99 0.61 0.39 0.00 0.14 0.62 -1.74 -0.15 1.46 0.00 -0.27 Crops -3.73 -5.13 -3.25 -0.29 -0.31 -0.46 -1.38 0.00 0.00 1.72 0.12 -0.02 1.02 0.54 2.99 -0.92 -1.58 -0.68 0.41 0.90 0.01 -0.55 -0.52 Information -2.15 -0.28 -0.74 0.00 -2.77 0.98 0.00 4.78 -0.02 1.04 4.44 0.01 0.02 2.50 0.33 -5.10 10.82 0.72 4.89 0.34 -0.75 0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.86 0.14 -0.39 -0.99 -0.41 -0.34 0.12 -0.75 -0.63 -1.42 0.07 0.75 2.95 17.14 -1.03 8.42 0.06 -2.19 0.00 0.42 1.61 -2.41 1.66 -4.79 -3.52 -3.06 0.44 -1.58 -0.31 0.36 -0.01 -9.43 0.94 -0.60 -3.75 0.01 0.45 0.43 -1.97 -1.91 0.16 -0.07 -0.15 -0.85 3.84 2.29 8.51 4.62 0.01 9.72 -2.76 -2.21 2.54 0.51 1.18 0.44 0.45 10.44 -0.48 1.34 -0.32 20.06 1.21 -0.43 0.03 0.38 -1.05 -0.03 Source: Landé 1996 158 Appendix 2: Presidential Votes by Language Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls Total RP (100%) Tagalog Cebuano (25%) 31.1% 15.4 3.6 38.8 6.6 2.2 0.4 0.1 1.7 0.1 0.1 Ilonggo Ilocano Bicol Kapampangan (2%) 44.7% 12.1 22.2 0.0 19.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 Pangsinense (2%) 7.9% 90.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Chavacano (1%) 52.4% 5.3 5.3 8.3 26.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other Luzon (2%) 38.9% 26.8 15.7 0.0 3.4 1.2 0.0 12.7 0.3 0.9 0.0 Other Visayan (4%) 37.3% 11.1 4.9 15.3 8.8 1.8 19.2 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.0 Other Mindanao (5%) 52.7% 27.4 1.9 8.7 3.8 2.1 0.4 0.8 1.5 0.8 0.0 Waray (3%) 6.1% 14.3 0.6 6.3 11.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 (34%) 41.7% 10.8 19.1 1.5 13.8 10.6 1.8 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 (8%) 43.6% 12.5 3.0 9.0 9.1 2.3 19.2 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 (8%) 49.6% 24.7 5.4 0.4 4.1 1.0 0.6 11.0 .1 0.2 0.0 (5%) 9.9% 7.2 80.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 Estrada De Venecia Roco Osmeña Lim De Villa Santiago Enrile Marcos Dumlao Morato 38.8% 16.2 13.4 12.1 9.1 4.7 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.04 Source: Social Weather Stations, 1998 Appendix 3: Presidential Votes by Religion Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls Total RP (100%) Estrada De Venecia Roco Osmeña Lim De Villa Santiago Enrile Marcos Dumlao Morato 38.8% 16.2 13.4 12.1 9.1 4.7 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.04 Catholic (82%) 37.0% 14.9 14.7 12.5 9.8 5.2 3.2 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 Iglesia ni Cristo (3%) 81.4% 6.4 3.4 2.1 3.3 1.7 0.0 3.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 A g l i payan (2%) 34.7% 27.6 5.1 9.3 8.2 0.0 8.5 1.6 2.9 0.2 0.0 Other Christian (6%) 29.0% 26.4 11.0 16.1 7.0 3.6 2.9 0.0 1.8 0.4 0.0 Muslim Other El Shaddai (3%) 39.2% 11.0 20.9 4.6 11.4 10.6 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Charismatic Group Jesus is Lord (1%) 51.9% 23.4 10.0 6.5 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Jesus Miracle Crusade (0.3%) 43.2% 13.1 0.0 38.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other Groups (8%) 33.0% 15.6 14.2 13.3 14.6 4.7 3.0 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.0 (4%) 63.2% 24.7 2.3 1.9 3.7 2.4 0.0 2.2 0.5 0.6 0.0 (3%) 34.7% 23.2 11.7 11.5 8.2 3.4 2.8 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 Source: Social Weather Stations, 1998 Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 159 Appendix 4: Presidential Votes by Socio-Economic Class and Educational Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls Total RP ABC (100%) Estrada De Venecia Roco Osmeña Lim De Villa Santiago Enrile Marcos Dumlao Morato 38.8% 16.2 13.4 12.1 9.1 4.7 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.04 (9%) 23.0% 12.3 26.1 5.7 20.1 9.6 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 D (21%) 38.2% 1.3 13.2 12.4 8.8 4.7 3.7 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.0 Socio-Economic Class E (20%) 47.6% 17.7 8.5 13.7 5.6 2.5 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.4 0.0 Elementary Graduate (35%) 44.6% 17.0 8.9 14.0 6.1 3.5 2.9 1.7 1.1 0.3 0.0 Educational Attainment High School Graduate (41%) 41.6% 16.4 12.0 11.1 7.9 5.3 3.2 1.4 1.0 0.1 0.0 Some College (10%) 30.8% 14.8 21.0 10.4 12.5 6.7 2.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.0 College Graduate (13%) 21.4% 14.9 24.1 11.8 18.2 4.3 3.0 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 Source: Social Weather Stations, 1998 Appendix 5: Presidential Votes by Gender and Age Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls Total RP (100%) Estrada De Venecia Roco Osmeña Lim De Villa Santiago Enrile Marcos Dumlao Morato 38.8% 16.2 13.4 12.1 9.1 4.7 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.04 Gender Male (46%) 40 16 13 12 8 5 3 1 0.7 0.3 0.05 Female (54%) 38 16 14 12 10 5 3 2 1 0.1 0.03 18-24 (16%) 39 16 17 11 10 5 2 1 0.7 0.3 0.2 25-34 (29%) 40 17 14 12 9 4 2 2 0.6 0.04 0.1 Age 35-44 (25%) 39 16 12 13 8 6 3 1 1 0.2 0 45+ (30%) 38 16 12 13 10 4 4 1 1 0.3 0 Source: Social Weather Stations, 1998 160 Appendix 6: Presidential Votes by Language Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls Total RP (100%) Arroyo Poe Lacson Roco Villanueva No Answer 41% 32 9 5 5 8 Tagalog (34%) 25% 38 15 6 8 8 Cebuana (25%) 61% 24 5 2 3 5 Ilocano (8%) 32% 36 11 2 5 14 Ilonggo (8%) 54% 22 6 4 5 9 Bicol (4%) 25% 20 4 3 3 10 Others (19%) 47% 35 4 3 3 7 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004 Appendix 7: Presidential Votes by Religion Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls Total RP (100%) Arroyo Poe Lacson Roco Villanueva No Answer 41% 32 9 5 5 8 Catholic Iglesia Other Muslim Others ni Christian Cristo (80%) 41 32 10 6 3 8 (3%) 74 10 1 0 0 15 (6%) 29 30 8 3 25 6 (4%) 47 44 3 3 0 3 (7%) 41 29 9 3 10 7 None Couples for Christ (4%) 54 22 7 6 1 10 Charismatic Group El Shaddai (1.3%) 23 53 16 4 2 3 Jesus is Lord (0.7%) 24 23 0 3 44 5 (0.7%) 34 33 10 8 4 10 Jesus Miracle Crusade (0.1) 13 63 0 0 0 24 Other Groups (5%) 46 22 8 7 9 7 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004 Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines 161 Appendix 8: Presidential Votes by Socio-Economic Class and Educational Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls Total RP Socio-Economic Class Educational Attainment ABC (100%) D E None Elementary Graduate (20%) 47 33 6 2 2 11 Elementary Grduate (19%) 41 39 5 4 2 8 High School (33%) 39 36 9 5 5 6 Some College (16%) 38 25 16 8 8 6 College Graduate (11%) 42 16 12 9 11 9 Arroyo Poe Lacson Roco Villanueva No Answer 41% 32 9 5 5 8 42 20 11 7 12 8 40 32 10 5 5 8 43 35 7 5 3 8 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004 Appendix 9: Presidential Votes by Gender and Age Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations 2004 Exit Polls Total RP (100%) Male (45%) Gender Age Female (55%) 18-24 (14%) 25-34 (25%) 35-44 (25%) 45-54 (17%) 55 & up (19%) Arroyo Poe Lacson Roco Villanueva No Answer 41% 32 9 5 5 8 41 30 11 5 5 8 41 33 8 5 5 8 33 38 11 8 5 4 38 33 10 6 6 6 44 30 8 5 6 7 44 31 8 3 3 10 45 28 7 5 3 12 Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004