RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC vs.RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011 (Rule 72 – Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules; Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court) FACTS: Respondents, who claim to be heirs (children and common law wives) of the deceased Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching/Tiong Cheng/Ching Cheng Suy filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching and his successors-in-interest. In the Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," respondents prayed for the declaration of Ramon Ching, who murdered his father Antonio, disqualified as heir and the nullity of the several transactions entered into by Ramon involving the property of Antonio. A Motion to Dismiss was filed with the RTC, alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest but the same was denied. An Amended Complaint was later filed, impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank and adding another cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. They also prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, they prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case. A motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint was filed on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since it sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity and the jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the Amended Complaint can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action. HELD: No. The Court held that although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Said civil case was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation, and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court. The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding. Page 1 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 FERNANDEZ vs. MARAVILLA G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons – Venue and Process; Rule 72 – Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules; Rule 75 of the Rules of Court) FACTS: Respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla. In the will, he was named as the universal heir and executor. The brother and sisters of the deceased, however, filed an opposition to the probate of said will. The court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another. The petitioners then filed a petition for the appointment of Eliezar Lopez, son of one of the sisters of the deceased, as special co- administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. A petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator was also filed by the petitioners, as he, accordingly, failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him. The court appointed Lopez as special co-administrator. From this order, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Lopez as special co-administrator and prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for his removal as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000 and the writs prayed for are not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction since the probate case is not on appeal before it. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent and declared null and void the appointment of Lopez as special co-administrator. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90 as per inventory of the special administrator. Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto. The appeal taken in the proceedings in the case at bar falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. Moreover, Section 2, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. Page 2 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 RUFINA LUY LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons – Venue and Process; Rules 81, 83, 84, and 87 of the Rules of Court) FACTS: Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner". Private respondents are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. Petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed a joint petition for the administration of the estate. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. The RTC granted the private respondents' twin motions. Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition, which averred that although the corporations dealt and engaged in business with the public, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y. Lim. Hence, the alleged stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of these business entities were mere dummies of the decedent and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Regional Trial Court acting on the petitioner's motion issued an order to set aside its previous order and ordered the Registry of Deeds to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens. Private respondent then filed a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, which granted its prayer. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate, with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81, 83, 84, and 87 of the Rules of Court. HELD: No. The Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court acted without jurisdiction in issuing the questioned order. Settled is the rule that a Regional Trial Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Page 3 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons – Venue and Process; Rule 78 – Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued; and Rule 79 - Opposing Issuance Of Letters Testamentary. Petition And Contest For Letters Of Administration) FACTS: This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, he contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit, out of which were born six children. The second was with an American citizen, Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. Merry Lee, however, divorced him. Subsequently, he married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. ISSUES: Whether or not venue was properly laid; and whether or not respondent has legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration. HELD: Yes, venue was properly laid. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." Residence should be viewed or understood in its popular sense – meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. The Court held that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Respondent has legal personality to file the petition despite validity or non-validity of her marriage with Felicisimo as she may be considered as a co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the property that were acquired through their joint effort during their cohabitation. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent and Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: “SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x”. An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. Page 4 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 GRIMM ROBERTS vs. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for the allowance of wills and to annul a partition. can be entertained by its Branch 38 after a probate in the Utah district court. The probate of the will is mandatory. that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate. there was already an earlier intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal. He executed two wills and a codicil. 838. L-55509 April 27. an American resident of Manila. named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. LEONIDAS G. Therefore. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court. No. Ethel later filed a motion for accounting so that the estate can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed. However. which Judge Leonidas denied for lack of merit. Allowance of Will Necessary) FACTS: Edward M. However. Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children. praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed. his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce. and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills. on April 25. Grimm. 1978. 1. the parties entered into a compromise agreement regarding the estate. or alternatively. 1978. sec. died at the age of 78 and was survived by his second wife. SY 2016-2017 . Civil Code. 1984 (Rule 75 – Production of Will. a petition for the allowance of wills and to annul a partition. that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate. The petitioners alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses. Rules of Court). The wills and codicil were later admitted to probate. approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance. approved in an intestate proceeding by a court branch. Page 5 LLB III-C. Rule 75. can be entertained by the court’s other branch. HELD: Yes. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. which were presented for probate by Maxine Grimm in Utah on March 7. the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.R. the second wife. No. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon. L-24742 October 26. Rosa Cayetano Cuenco. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. SY 2016-2017 . the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent. Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings. HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions. Page 6 LLB III-C.R. considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Lourdes. Venue and Process) FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. where she was named executrix. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon. filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament. ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition. shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. and children of the first marriage. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons. one of the children from the first marriage. CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. 1973 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. it would affect the prompt administration of justice. If this were otherwise. alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. residing in Cebu. residing in Quezon City. on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. On Venue and Jurisdiction: Under Rule 73. filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. Moreover.NEGROS G. Civil Case 6143. L-21938-39 May 29. it must be noted that testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings. proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed. between Negros and Manila. On August 28. That during the lifetime of Don Juan. No. filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain. 1970 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a CFI if it is found it that the decedent had left a last will. Higinio Uriarte. (Testate Proceeding) He also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1) as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will.R. Thus it has been held repeatedly that. Venue is waiveable and thus Manila Court has jurisdiction. Soon afterwards he also filed a petition for certiorari directly to the SC. Page 7 LLB III-C. He then filed for a petition for Mandamus to compel the Negros Court to approve his record on appeal and give due course to his appeal. it should have been the Manila Court. If the alleged last will is later disapproved or rejected. the other respondent commenced in the Manila Court for the probate of a document (SP 513896) alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite. over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons whether they died testate or intestate. Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate. Don Juan. For this reason the Negros Court dismissed his notice of appeal regarding SP 6344. between testate and intestate proceedings. He also filed an Omnibus motion to intervene on SP 513896 to annul the proceedings but this was denied by the Manila Court. and 2) petitioner had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings. in the Negros Court to be acknowledged as his natural child. paragraph (e)]. one of the respondents. CFI . The motion for reconsideration filed by Uriarte was denied. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Negros Court was the first to take cognizance of the proceedings in accordance with Rule 75 Sec 1. 1962." that is. then the intestacy proceedings will continue. Juan Uriarte Zamacona. there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings. alleging that he is the natural son of Don Juan and the sole heir. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44. petitioner had filed a petition. Venue and Process) FACTS: On November 6. 1961. it should have been filed in the Negros Court (Venue). However. he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. Rule 75 Sec 1 also provides that as regards inhabitants of a foreign country. URIARTE vs. inconsideration of public policy. petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of Don Juan Uriarte in the Negros Court.Negros court dismissed SP 6344. the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. 1961. Nevertheless. ISSUES: Which court. SY 2016-2017 . The petitioner then filed a record on appeal. and also questioned petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. the CFI of any province in which he had estate shall be the venue for the action. (Intestate Proceeding) On December. However. a non-resident alien had considerable properties. should take cognizance of the case? HELD: On the basis of hierarchy of proceedings between testate and intestate. both in Negros and Manila. HELD: The Regional Trial Court. as well as her amended petition. Instead of appealing the denial. 0100027. ISSUES: Whether the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. distributing the residue of the estate to the heir. while the probate proceedings (Spl. filed a Spl. After due publication and hearing of her petition. had. To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect. puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties. and is further. she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana. No. that she be declared sole heir of the deceased.. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation. Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel.. lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana. he died of a heart attack without having set up the foundation. 1990 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons.R. recovery of possession. would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits. petitioner Celedonia Solivio. dilatory. Jr. The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. Esteban. the spinster half-sister of his mother. in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution. Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Jr. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt. she filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana.. ascendants. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17. nephews or nieces. more than once. . Jr. Her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. ownership and damages.1981 under Reg." who died a bachelor. Jr. because she too was an heir of the deceased. expensive. 83484 February 12. and (2) the private respondent. Salustia Solivio. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings. No. she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. brothers. Unfortunately. Sr. sister of his deceased father. Thereafter. Venue and Process) FACTS: This case involves the estate of the late novelist. expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana. Page 8 LLB III-C. and terminating the proceedings. During his lifetime. even while the probate proceedings were still pending in the same court. and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting. SOLIVIO vs. Proceeding No. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court. Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in the same court. without descendants. Jr. Two weeks after his funeral. COURT OF APPEALS G. the estate be adjudicated to her. sisters. has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. and impractical.. Jr. Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban. Later. Esteban Javellana. Proc. Esteban Javellana. Jr. SY 2016-2017 . No. Four months later. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that “if no executor is named in the will.R. and there are no debts due from the estate. 597 provides that if the property left does not exceed P6. Vda. When there are no debts existing against the estate. are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration. 596 and 597 of the same Code. The general rule as provided for in Sec. there is no need for the intervention of an administrator. died leaving her spouse Pablo Utulo and her mother as forced heirs. However this is subject to 2 exceptions provided by Secs. de Garcia opposed arguing that there is no need for judicial administration and in case it should be granted by court that she be appointed administratix. or if a person dies intestate. de Garcia was appointed administratix. his heirs. DE GARCIA G. Sec. the heirs may apply to the competent court to proceed with the summary partition without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator. administration shall be granted”. 596 provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age. It is at their option if they want to enter upon the administration of the property or if they want to partition it. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid. which is always long and costly or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. One of their children Luz. His widow. 48904 September 30. Utulo commenced the judicial administration of her properties where Vda. The CFI appointed Utulo as judicial administrator hence this appeal. SY 2016-2017 . 1938 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: Juan Sanchez died intestate leaving his widow and 3 children as heirs. Rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death hence his heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the deceased. Page 9 LLB III-C. VDA. ISSUES: Whether or not there was need of judicial administration HELD: NO. Sec. UTULO vs. whether of age or not.000. No. Including Rafael Reyes. The deed of sale. COURT OF APPEALS G.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. In 1967.1991 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: During his lifetime. were allotted to Rafael Reyes. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. this Court. 255-was issued. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein. They formally partitioned the property.. 1A-14 (Exh. interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It was. DE REYES vs. On 3 December 1943. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. "5"). Accordingly. however. more or less.431 square meters. In the subdivision plan. Marcelo Reyes. the children thereafter secured tax declarations for the irrespective shares. Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavino’s children had a written partition agreement. Son of Rafael Sr. VDA. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact. It appears therein that two lots. Barcelona. SY 2016-2017 . Andal. No. however. Barcelona. did not specifically mention Lot No. Per testimony of Juan Poblete. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23. sued Gardiola. held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.R. one of Gavino's children. The application was prosecuted by his son. or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino. as shown by the torrens title over the land. Page 10 LLB III-C. et al. vs. Now. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. who was by then already deceased. son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes. Where no such rights are involved. the original certificate of title for the whole property-OCT No. indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. I-A-14. the heirs received their share of this land. located at Sangayad. et al. was valid and binding. it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other. The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.. Unfortunately. In 1941. CA reversed ISSUES: Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court? HELD: The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936. According to the vendee. "6-A"). Jr. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. the heirs of Rafael Jr. Therefore. supra. the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares. In Hernandez vs. Cavite. but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have been received by his father. In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs.’s heirs. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. could not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it. and that Rafael Jr. saying that they are the true owners of the land. 92436 July 26. more or less. supra. Rafael Reyes. Ulong-Tubig. who was the administrator of his property. although oral. Sr. an oral partition is valid. each resultant lot was earmarked. Carmona. this parcel corresponds to Lot No. one of which is Lot No. kept by Juan Poblete. he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. As stated earlier. his heirs automatically became co-own. The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes.R.. Gavino Reyes. The issuance of TCT No. Jr. it was only about thirteen and one half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question.Additionally. was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Jr. No. 1-14-A. we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes. the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G. despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property. Nemo dare potest quod non habet. since he never had any title of right to Lot No. in the estate of Gavino. it was only in or about September 1969 when. and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes. the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition. SY 2016-2017 . represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967. died. Rafael Reyes. can only acquire that which Rafael. Thus. it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. Page 11 LLB III-C. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. The rights to the succession. Sr. after the delivery of TCT No. Jr. never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Jr. And yet.. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. are transmitted horn the moment of death of the decedent. Ship and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes.. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the owner. There is one more point that should be stressed here. son of Rafael Reyes.25 But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another. as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes. 92811. 1-14-A is concerned. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes. Sr.. Sr. Rafael Reyes. era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. Jr. in so far as Lot No. Jr. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. In the case at bar. The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. Petitioners. Jr.. the lot sold by Rafael Reyes. Jr. L-10474 February 28. neither brothers. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA GR No. The said affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasisan then. then Sampilo sold it to Salacup and also registered with the same Office of the Register of Deeds. that if such cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations. Page 12 LLB III-C. Gmur. SY 2016-2017 . his wife sold the property to Sampilo. (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with. In March 1950. nephews and nieces. Leonicia de Leon has no right to execute the affidavit of self- adjudication for there are other heirs aside from her. He left parcel of lands in San Miguel. He left his heirs his wife (Leoncia de Leon) and nephews and nieces who are children of his deceased brothers and sisters. neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children. is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition. i. That Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him. nephews and nieces living at the time of his death. barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition. Felisa Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of administration. the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74. She alleged that Teodoro’s wife. Following the case of Ramirez vs. ISSUES: Whether or not the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years as prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court? HELD: No. His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying that Teodoro had no children or dependents. sisters.e. 1958 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January 1945. On July 25. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement. Pangasinan. Sampilo and Salacop alleged that the complaint states no cause of action.BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP vs. the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow. in addition.. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to participate. and. that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. 1946. regardless of their failure to participate therein. RAMON VARGAS. petitioner herein. however. JOSEPH CUA vs.R. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.. VARGAS. that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. The rule plainly states. SY 2016-2017 . 1994. however. and four others signed it. On November 15. did not sign the document. ISSUE: Whether or not heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate. a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs. The Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. GLORIA A. an Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was executed without their consent and participation. On February 4. when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published. Once more. No. 1994. the same persons signed the document and their respective shares were sold to Joseph Cua. Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. HELD: No. EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS G. Andres. and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. 156536 October 31. a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition).e. AURORA VARGAS. the procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question. Florentino. Virac. Page 13 LLB III-C. each heirs getting a share of 11square meters. Only Ester. MARITES VARGAS. Antonina and Gloria. 2006 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan. who was represented by Atty. HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS G. and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards. the respondents questioned the said Compromise Agreement for they did not give their consent and participation. Held: No. effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. Branch XI. a petition for Letters of Administration. ISSUE: Whether or not the said compromise agreement is binding to the heirs who did not consent to the Agreement. SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO vs. which approved a void Commissioner's Report. We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Jesus Yray. docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. Said agreement is not binding upon those heirs who did not give their consent to the said agreement. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. thus. what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at. Subsequently. is a void judgment for lack of due process.R. 1976. No." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother. The petitioners claimed that they were constructively notified through publication. both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Cebu. filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI). In the hearing held on January 30. 2008 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: On July 13. petitioner. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. Victor Elliot Lepiten. 1973. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos. which was not established. The trial court on even date issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16. Francisco. 1971. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference. 161220 July 30. Gloria Cuyos- Talian. Gloria Cuyos-Talian represented by Atty. Page 14 LLB III-C. Applying the case of Cua vs Vargas by analogy. SY 2016-2017 . 1972. Ramon and the heirs of Miguel. the two- year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with. The said complaint was filed on January 28. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA vs. Petitioner. while said appeal was pending.. HELD: The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by private respondents on March 11. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. When the petitioner sent her daughter. as the records confirm. represented solely by Rosalina. 11 SCRA 153 (1964). The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Thereafter. COURT OF APPEALS G. the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister.may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. THE HON. 1983. Said complaint was later amended on March 25. Miguel died intestate. i. Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa and the said petition for adoption was granted On April 29. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.R. adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. 1987. Pilar. private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of the petitioner but CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. 2001 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: On April 8. 1972. On March 11. Under the rule. but the same failed. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings for the legal adoption of herein petitioner. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs. No. to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.e. The rule covers only valid partitions. 1946. Section 4. which held that: [The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud. did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.. 118680 March 5. 1983 did not prescribe. no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed. 1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants. then. De Guzman. petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate. SY 2016-2017 . Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition. Thereafter. Carmen. Page 15 LLB III-C. It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. On November 21. the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner. Patently then. Mercedes.. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land that were divided among Jose. Loreto Jocelyn. or to such person as such surviving husband or wife. These children. – If no executor is named in the will. Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator: Sec. Luis Delgado. However. 1972. and grandnephews and grandnieces. administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife. be incompetent or unwilling. 2006 (Rule 78 – Letters Testamentary and of Administration. the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. (b) If such surviving husband or wife. During this period. HEIRS OF DELGADO vs. and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents. the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial court’s decision. they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. as the case may be. never legally adopted by the couple. requests to have appointed. Acting on the appeal. 155733 January 27. if competent and willing to serve. When and to Whom Issued) FACTS: This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. or next of kin. particularly. Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter. neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted Page 16 LLB III-C. The RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. hence. the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia. refuse the trust. or next of kin. or next of kin. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo. as the case may be. or both. The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. or if the husband or widow or next of kin. his nephews and nieces. HELD: An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. with one Amparo Sagarbarria. or fail to give a bond. SY 2016-2017 . They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3. his own flesh and blood. in the discretion of the court.and full-blood siblings. According to Guillerma. or the executor or executors are incompetent. however. Rule 78. or a person dies intestate. ISSUE: Who should be issued letters of administration. and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia. and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife for 50 years until the death of Josefa on September 8. According to petitioners. During his life with Josefa. nephews and nieces. Aside from Josefa. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son. his illegitimate child. his sisters. Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child. The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. No. all surnamed Delgado. The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. consisting of her half. The claimants to the estates of Guillermo heirs of Josefa Delgado. Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.R. they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married and supported with pieces of evidence. HEIRS OF VDA DE DAMIAN G. five other children were born to the couple. Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. With no children of their own. or the person selected by them. SY 2016-2017 .to some other person. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. a situation which obtains here. In the appointment of an administrator. in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors. the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia. (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve. if competent and willing to serve. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators. it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates. respectively. Page 17 LLB III-C. ALFREDO F. on December 29. her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children. 47572 was issued in private respondents name. 33350 was issued in his name on June 16. for one reason or another. both private respondents herein. (4) Filomena. to the exclusion of his other children. (7) Guadencio. when Rafael Marquez Sr. (11) Ricardo. Jr. Rafael Marquez. Rafael Marquez. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. ANTONIO F. No. namely: (1) Natividad. they maintain that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. HELD: YES. SY 2016-2017 . Sr. 1456 was established. private respondents were in actual possession of the land. petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not their action for reconveyance had prescribed. and (12) Antonio. From 1983 to 1991. Felicidad Marquez died intestate. 1991 for “Reconveyance and Partition with Damages” before the trial court alleging that both the “Affidavit of Adjudication” and “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents. 47572. Thirty years later or in 1982. (2) Alfredo. Forthwith. MARQUEZ. 1982. However. MARQUEZ. assert that by virtue of the fraudulent “Affidavit of Adjudication” and “Deed of Donation. MARQUEZ. Sr. Page 18 LLB III-C. In their Answer.. It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952. private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was already barred by the statute of limitations. succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. in contending that the action had not yet prescribed. Rizal. they are entitled to their respective share over the land in question. efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners’ demands. filed a complaint on May 31. Sr. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte. (6) Salvador. a constructive trust under Art. MARQUEZ. 125715 December 29. Sometime in 1945. 887 thereof. (3) Herminigildo. Under Art.” wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just share over the parcel of land. 1998 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: During their lifetime. (10) Alfredo. 33350 as well as the house constructed thereon to three of his children. EXEQUIEL F. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children. and RAFAEL F. when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572. (2) Aurea. and (3) Belen. TCT No.R. TCT No. (8) Rafael. more particularly described in TCT No. Consequently. In 1952. wherein they constructed their conjugal home. AUREA M. executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication” vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No.. now joined by Rafael Jr. 47572 they immediately demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael Marquez. As a result of the donation. (5) Exequel. JR. executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” covering the land described in TCT No. Thus. vs.. Sr. SALVADOR F. misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive. a constructive trust was created.. Thereafter. as such. COURT OF APPEALS. In view of the private respondents' indifference. Jr. and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name. CABEZAS. MARQUEZ G. petitioners herein. the spouses Rafael Marquez. since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud. in 1982. (9) Belen. and her spouse. Petitioners. Now. MARQUEZ. RICARDO F.. 1983 Rafael Marquez. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. Unfortunately. namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.. Thus. Page 19 LLB III-C.In this regard. 1991. the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. which was on June 16. thus: Art. 736. 33350 was issued. Finally. Prescinding therefrom. SY 2016-2017 . Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them. 1982. it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action. or approximately nine (9) years later. validly donate portion to the respondents? Obviously. as trustee of his wife’s share. we cannot grant their plea for moral damages and attorney’s fees since they have not satisfactorily shown that they have suffered “mental anguish” as provided in Art. nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him. Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine inasmuch as it necessitates the production of evidence not before it. considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31. as expressly provided in the Civil Code..2219 and Art. he cannot. can Rafael Marquez Sr. For the purpose of this case. while we rule in favor of petitioners. Moreover.2290 of the Civil Code. it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property. 1995 Order denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.10 Hence. this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again. She insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of the proceedings. NO. Such factual finding. Hence. Dr. NITTSCHER VS NITTSCHER GR. Metro Manila. Metro Manila at the time of his death. However. Respondent maintains that the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the will. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the probate proceedings. Metro Manila. Where estate of deceased persons settled. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City. On September 26. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines. but her motion was denied for lack of merit. the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. HELD: Section 1. … (Emphasis supplied. and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in her husband’s will actually belong to her. neither did he leave real properties in the country. Nogales. and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. Page 20 LLB III-C. however. 1996. counters that Dr. Nogales. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death. Nittscher. Dr. 1990. or letters of administration granted. Nittscher is a resident of the Philippines. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas. Atty. his will shall be proved. 1994. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Dr. which then covered Las Piñas. 160530 20 NOV 2007 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. On May 9. Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. herein petitioner Cynthia V. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous. which we find supported by evidence on record. Respondent Atty. ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. and his estate settled. Rogelio P. applying the aforequoted rule. Venue and Process) FACTS: On January 31. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. SY 2016-2017 . the court in its September 29. the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Dr.Petitioner moved for reconsideration. whether a citizen or an alien. Atty. Nittscher’s surviving spouse. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. should no longer be disturbed. in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death. Nittscher died. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty.) In this case. moved for the dismissal of the said petition. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping. Nittscher did reside and own real properties in Las Piñas. HELD: No. 1982 (Rule 76 . Then. Quezon City for the probate of the holographic will of Clemencia. thus. single. L–57848 June 19. The motion was granted. intestacy should ensue. Maninang. died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at the age of 81. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad Maninang was denied for lack of merit. SY 2016-2017 . Soledad filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. Normally. She left a holographic will. instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. these may be impugned as being vicious or null. Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the Court of First Instance–Branch IV. and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. Page 21 LLB III-C. claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir. The Supreme Court held that the court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case proper. the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it. the probate of a Will is mandatory. Generally. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.Allowance or Disallowance of Will) FACTS: Clemencia Aseneta. notwithstanding its authentication. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and void because he. The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected. Soledad averred that the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to the examination of and the resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. herein private respondent Bernardo Aseneta. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. being the only compulsory heir. After she died. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. the court appointed Bernardo as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust. In her opposition. because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world. with whose family she has lived continuously for a period of 30 years. which provides that all her property sall be inherited by Dra. the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. In the same order. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions. was preterited. MANINANG vs. effort. if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will. HELD: The case is for the probate of a will.Allowance or Disallowance of Will) FACTS: Rosario Nuguid. The court’s area of inquiry is limited – to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased. shall annul the institution of heir. The due execution thereof. Remedios. by the court. Surviving her were her legitimate parents. one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole. These are practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence. and six (6) brothers and sisters. are the questions solely to be presented. 1966 (Rule 76 . and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed. 1962. single. whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may rule on the validity of the will. a resident of Quezon City. NUGUID vs. After all. L–23445 June 23. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar. and to be acted upon. the testatrix’s testamentary capacity. nothing will be gained. However. On the contrary. this litigation will be protracted. plus added anxiety. And for aught that appears in the record. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. died on December 30. Remedios. NUGUID GR No. Result: waste of time. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. without descendants. the legality of any devise or legacy therein. namely: Alfredo. all surnamed Nuguid. Conrado. Lourdes and Alberto. the institution is void. SY 2016-2017 . universal heir of all her properties. Page 22 LLB III-C. probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. expense. in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will. some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line. there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. Said court at this stage of the proceedings – is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. legitimate or illegitimate. Federico. Article 854 provides that preterition of one. they could use. Page 30 of 112 they could use. Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently. the present Petition for Review has been filed. 2008 (Rule 76 . The phrase “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament. it having the following characteristics: (1. comply with the formalities of a will.) That before the death of the transferor. After his death.) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter. but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor. Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido. CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa. encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. The Deed provided that such will become effective upon the death of the Donor. Crispin was the owner of six lots at Capiz. HELD: The Court held that the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) was one of mortis causa. Thereafter. and (3. subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. the statement “anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive. whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots to Zenaido Aluad. she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property inter vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. it had to. the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. since it was not probated. ALUAD GR No. The phrase in the earlier quoted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the Donor” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land.Allowance or Disallowance of Will) FACTS: Petitioner’s mother Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. The donation being then mortis causa. said phrase could only have referred to the donor. For the deed of donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor. the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. ALUAD vs. hence. no right to the two lots was transferred to Maria. ad nutum. Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. 176943 October 17. With respect to the conveyed lot. not inter vivos and as such.) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. or what amounts to the same thing. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation inter vivos and if such deed is valid. that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. SY 2016-2017 . (2. the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido Page 23 LLB III-C. but did not. however. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. If so. Provided. as it was witnessed by only two. Further. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. RALLA vs. UNTALAN G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989 (Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will) FACTS: This petition seeks to nullify the Order of respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan, excluding from the probate proceedings 63 parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes, denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the same Order of Judge Untalan. On January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in CFI of Albay docketed as SP No. 564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro. In the same year, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; docketed as Civil Case No. 2023. In the course of the hearing of the probate case (SP No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo for its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. The motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo 149 parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro who was deprived of his successional rights over the said properties. The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by SC (in G.R. No. L-26253). On November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to partition the 63 parcel of land forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, which were amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved by Judge Grageda. On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding. Eleven years later, On February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for the probate of Rosendo's will in SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP 564. On August 3, 1979, the order of November 3, 1966, was set aside. On June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of 63 Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition In Civil Case No. 2023." 5 In his Order of July 16,1981, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order, to wit: The Project of Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three (63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied by respondent Judge Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 1 1 06 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for reconsideration was filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition for the probate of the Will, and before said Will was probated, is a NULL considering that such was already decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs. Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated. HELD: The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will of Rosendo Ralla. Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties. Page 24 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 FERNANDEZ/REYES V. DIMAGIBA G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662 October 12, 1967 (Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will; Rule 75 – Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary; Rule 109 – Appeals in Special Proceedings ) FACTS: Intestate heirs of late Benedicta delos Reyes petitioned for review of the decision of CA affirming the decision of CFI Bulacan, whereas in special proceeding of said court in admitting to probate the last will and testament of the deceased. The respondent Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to CFI petition for the probate of alleged will of the Benedicta, wherein in the said will it instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The CFI found that the will was genuine, hence was properly executed, but with deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation. Petitioners filed petition for reconsideration insisting that the issues on estoppel and revocation be resolved. Where the court overruled that the claim for estoppel in asking for probate of the will be reserved unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at opportune time. The appellate court held that admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of opportune appeal and same was appealable in the issue of implied revocation. ISSUES: Whether or not the decree of CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal. Whether or not the order of the court of origin overruling the estoppel invoked by the petitioners is final. Whether or not the 1930 will of late Benedicta delos Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favour of the proponent. HELD: The first issue regarding the allowing of probate of will, the court said it shall be considered interlocutory, due to it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitely settle questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, whether valid and enforceable. As such, the probate order is final and appealable and it so recognized by express provisions sec 1 Rule 109, that any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled. The last issue of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites: Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase. Page 25 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 SPOUSES AJERO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994 (Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will) FACTS: The holographic will of Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982, was submitted for probate in the RTC of Quezon City. In the will, the following were named as devisees: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. Petitioners filed for allowance of decedent's holographic will, alleging that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate, finding that the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the submitted will. On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals which found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit. ISSUE: Whether the admission for probate of the holographic will in question is valid since probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. HELD: Yes, the admission of the said holographic will is valid. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that a will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. Page 26 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. DECISION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs. SO ORDERED. Page 27 LLB III-C, SY 2016-2017 or other known heirs. The petition specified the names and addresses of the petitioners as legatees and devisees. This order was published in “Nueva Era” a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated. Rule 76 is mandatory and the omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion. 77047 May 28. In this case. if such place of residence be known. legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence.Allowance or Disallowance of Will) FACTS: Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate and allowance of the last will and testament of Monserrat RInfantey G-Pola. Joaquin was then allowed to present evidence ex-parte and was appointed executor. Page 28 LLB III-C. HELD: Yes. This was denied. The probate court then issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no notices were sent to them as required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition.R. 1988 (Rule 76 . No. GALING G. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. there is no question that the places of residence of the petitioners are known to the probate court. SY 2016-2017 . DE ARANZ v. ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement under Section 4. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator. filed an Opposition to the Petition. as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court. the then RTC Executive Judge. FRANCISCO C. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator. 166520 March 14. Herein Petitioners. Lim (Romualdo). Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Romualdo D. claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased. THE HON. HELD: No. TAN vs. filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order. the RTC Judge consequently issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death. SY 2016-2017 . who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan. be appointed as the special administrator.R. NO. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity. The appeal is devoid of merit. Page 29 LLB III-C. which was opposed by Petitioners. which was denied by respondent Judge Gedorio. Private respondents. 2008 (Rule 78 – Letters Testamentary and of Administration. GEDORIO. JR. and not of a special administrator. The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6. The preference under Section 6. and is not appealable. claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan. For Vilma’s failure to comply the court’s directives in her capacity as de facto administratrix. this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. However. When and to Whom Issued) FACTS: Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died leaving no will. G. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner’s plea to be given primacy in the administration of their father’s estate. Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman. in the case at bar. insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation. as a general rule. for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world. GERONA vs. respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased. who died on August 9. They demanded from respondents their share in said properties. May 29. that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife and that petitioners' action has already prescribed. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof. that the latter. from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child. Teodora de la Cruz. L-19060. ordering the respondents to reconvey to them their aforementioned share. 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife. on June 25. 1964 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: Petitioners herein. Page 30 LLB III-C. 1948. that after the death of his first wife. The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra. of Marcelo de Guzman. HELD: Petitioners' contention is untenable. who begot him several children. to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon. Although. the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action. his forced heirs’ respondents succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land. No.R. That Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11. to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name. DE GUZMAN G. by first marriage. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner contention is tenable. also. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases.judicial settlement. Such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos. SY 2016-2017 . 1948. alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each. when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. 1945 and on May 6. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place. an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe. the action therefore may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased. Although they well knew that petitioners were. issued in the name of said deceased. BARREDO vs. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period.) The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification. Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.(as well as the payment of P20. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDnough. said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause. COURT OF APPEALS G. because under Section 2. 1946. SY 2016-2017 . the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20. The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants. This ground insufficient. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title. Here. of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim. due to the availability. HELD: No. The original lease. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims. Page 31 LLB III-C. L-17863 November 28.000. the probate court’s discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. and knowledge by the petitioners. a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring February 23. Aquino.00 made by the Japanese military authorities. A tardy claim may be allowed. petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. On 22 October 1947. and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. (Paulin vs. ISSUES: Whether or not the tardy claim will be allowed. at the discretion of the court. the extension of its term. petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. L-11267. The claim was opposed by the administrator. 1958) However.R. In the case at bar. 1962 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estate) FACTS: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945.000. March 20. No. and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. The lower court allowed it after hearing. was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough. upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time. Villanueva the sum of P10. is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property. VDA. Villanueva. this court laid down the following doctrine: The purpose of the law. and that the same claim appears in the present complaint. Villanueva be confirmed by the court. and the costs. filed his claim with the committee on September 22. however questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva. Ricardo Sikat. as administrator of the estate of Mariano P. "means an ordinary suit in a court of justice. as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. de Villanueva. against Quiteria Vda. according to section 1 of Act No. these proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila through the application of Enrique Kare. with legal interest from July 15. In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil. The said committee on claims and appraisal.R. Page 32 LLB III-C. according to the same section. composed of Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas. is any other remedy provided by law. and upon appeal the Supreme Court decided that said Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said intestate proceedings. Villanueva. SIKAT vs. in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented. The plaintiff. be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10. No. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court of First Instance of Albay incompetent to take cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro Villanueva. de Villanueva. The very reference in section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their death clearly means ordinary actions and not special proceedings. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva.. ISSUES: Whether at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right. and the defendant as judicial administratrix. Villanueva's estate to collect the credit against him has already prescribed. or the redress or prevention of a wrong". administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva. Villanueva. the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof. DE VILLANUEVA G. Manarang. 1932 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estate) FACTS: Ricardo Sikat filed a complaint. which. Villanueva upon the ground that when Pedro Villanueva died he owed the estate of Mariano P. 573). praying that the decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano P. and set up a special defense of prescription. and she prayed for judgment absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest and costs. 1925. filing their report with the court accordingly. 1919 until fully paid. Villanueva. Enrique Kare. instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the estate of Mariano P. After the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed Quiteria Vda.192.192. According to this definition. citing section 49 of the aforecited Act No. the proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding.92. as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva. as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. admitted the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. 1919. SY 2016-2017 . is the ruling spirit of our probate law. which. HELD: The court decided the question in the affirmative. and a counterclaim for P15. In answer to the complaint. cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. L-35925 November 10. 190.92. 190.536.69 which she alleges the estate of Mariano P. and Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas as commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal. This provision of law speaks of an "action". with legal interest from June 15. to the persons entitled to receive it. The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid. until after three years had elapsed. which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P. to June 18. Villanueva to have prescribed. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same proceedings in the competent court. as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate. was guilty of laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the place where the decedent had died. and the fact that the administration of Mariano P. and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. the estate of Mariano P. SY 2016-2017 . to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribe. 1921. To hold otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense. and applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy.1925. Page 33 LLB III-C. we declare the claim of Mariano P. and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been appointed to fix the time for filing claims. Villanueva's claim against it. Villanueva's estate.It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that direction. from October 21. Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates. that is. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death. the Court of First Instance of Manila. the right of the plaintiff. on December 19. the notice has been published in the Morning Times. WHEREFORE. the widow Mauricia G. Villanueva. Teodulo R. appellant contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings. upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable. for letters of Administration (Sp. within which to present claims against the estate. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times. in the Manila Daily Bulletin. deceased. DE VILLANUEVA vs. that Sec. Proc. The administrator. The period fixed in the notice lapsed or about 1 year and 8 months late. The name of Atty. 1954. March 4. alleging. was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings. on November 14. among others. 1949. even after the period limited has elapsed. the employees did not come to know of the proceedings. the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence. the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed. for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan. No. 1961 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estate) FACTS: For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband. Creditor of Pascual Villanueva. suggested and all the parties agreed. HELD: The claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court. allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed. there was no period to extend. respectfully presents its claim against the estate of the said deceased. The defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the administration proceedings. other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under administration opposed the appointment the widow. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties. Ricaforte. Moreover. Rule 87 of the Rules. The petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof was published on February 25. not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City. ISSUES: Whether or not the question is already barred. It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims against the estate. Pascual Villanueva. which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice. Atty. Page 34 LLB III-C. No. The appellant PNB. PNB G. more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the claim presented by the administrator. Agusan. This notwithstanding. 1950. At the hearing. SY 2016-2017 .R. After the taking the required oath. L-18403 September 30. and 11. the same had elapsed. on November 5. respectively. 67). but such extension should be granted under special circumstances. 2. petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for one thing. 1958. consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the administrator of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). a newspaper very limited circulation. filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank". opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. he died and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. plus the amount of P35. of the Penal Code. L-24098 November 18. the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate. Balbina Bongato and his children and the parties have reserved to present in Court evidence on facts not agreed to herein by the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and said decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27. No Cost. Mauricio Polinar was convicted of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala. Judgment reversed and set aside. Art. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108. still. No. now claimant herein. that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs. BELAMALA vs. a complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed againts Mauricio Polinar. On June 18.000. 1956. 774). Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries.R. et al. Hence. Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife. Page 35 LLB III-C. Act No. since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. 1967 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estate) FACTS: On May 24. ISSUES: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.80 as indemnity the amount of P1. 1956. the amount of P990. Assuming that for lack of express reservation. in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin. Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action.00 as moral damages.00. the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. 1954. entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. POLINAR G. HELD: The Supreme Court see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished. Mauricio appealed and while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals. 1958 wherein said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27. SY 2016-2017 . because the latter acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code. Bohol. in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. As pointed out by the Court below. Page 36 LLB III-C. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. JDS posted a performance bond which executed. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose D. Jr. 147561 June 22. HELD: No. G.. or the nature of the obligation. SICI filed its answer and interposed the defense that the money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Republic-Asahi sought to recover the amount expended to complete the project using another contractor. Pasig City. Inc (SICI). ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the party extinguishes the liability of a solidary obligor. Santos. Due to allege slow pace of construction. jointly and severally with Stronghold Insurance Co. 1989. the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS). the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. 2006 (Rule 87 – Actions by and against Executors and Administrators) FACTS: On May 24. but it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE vs. Through the filing of the complaint.. the stipulations of the parties.Asahi was to pay JDS. as a general rule. for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in Republic- Asahi’s compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs. Santos. Republic. Jr. SICI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.R. SY 2016-2017 . REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORP. Hence. No. Republic-Asahi extra judicially rescinded the contract without prejudice for recovery of damages from JDS and its sureties. except when the transmission is prevented by the law. Death is not a defence that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. GABRIEL vs. Provided further. The three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal. the serving officer shall state the reason therefore in the return. deposit fee." The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the delivery of a copy of the tribunal’s decision. the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions. service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative. 1997 when it was received through registered mail. awards or orders by the counsel of record. Provided. or he has no office. In the present case. Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of Procedure states that: "service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel. or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. For the purpose of computing the period of appeal.R. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1. then by leaving the copy. SY 2016-2017 . That in cases of decision and final awards. 1997. The LA dismissed the appeal. and garage fees. The Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter to have been validly made on May 28. That where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative. BILON G. On April 18. or his office is not known. ISSUES: Whether the appeal was filed on time. Angel Brazil and Ernesto Pagaygay were jeepney drivers of jeepneys owned by Melencio Gabriel. petitioner died before a copy of the labor arbiter’s decision was served upon Page 37 LLB III-C. On April 30. 1997.00 to cover police protection. No. As correctly pointed out by petitioner’s wife. 2007 (Rule 87 – Actions by and against Executors and Administrators) FACTS: Nelson Bilon. Section 4.00.03M. The copy was re-sent via registered mail on May 28. If no person is found in his office. if known. 146989 February 7. they were not given any jeepney to drive. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but it ruled that the separation pay should not be awarded but rather. 1995. It ruled that there was no employee-employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4. the employees should be reinstated. Service of Notices and Resolutions. 1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for appeal. 1997. The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice. Eventually. his name. Later. resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail. 1997. They are paying P400/day for their boundary. copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel. stating legibly in his return. when the drivers reported to work. the drivers were required to pay an additional P50. HELD: YES. – Notices or summons and copies of orders. 1997. service of a copy of the decision could not have been validly effected on April 18. between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening. Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: SEC. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. 4. it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation was made on April 18. Gabriel died on April 4. with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. at the party’s or counsel’s residence. resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof. If no service was effected. 1997 and that the appeal on June 5. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5. car wash. however. and the names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case. Section 6. The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50. Apparently. they were dismissed. order. 1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed. The decision was only served on April 18. The preceding considered. SY 2016-2017 . Thus. Page 38 LLB III-C. respondent Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the pendency of the case. Thus.him. 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same. 1997 after receipt of a copy of the decision via registered mail on May 28. when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them. 1997 while Mr. the above provisions do not apply. Hence. they were not in a position to receive them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the party’s residence is not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still living and is not just available to receive the decision. without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime. As aptly stated by the NLRC: In the case at bar. Gabriel passed away on April 4. the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent. 1997. the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5. A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17. His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents. wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors. Edmund and Florence. hence. that is. there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43. on February 5. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void. executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC. leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981. On August 20. 1980. two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. 2005 (Rule 88 – Payment of the Debts of the Estate) FACTS: On May 31. Accordingly. 149926 February 23. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. On April 9. In testate succession. Consequently. Efraim and his son. 1980. Summonses were issued against both. Ariola. a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. 1988. b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid.156. 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it. testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On December 13. Efraim and his son. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. Edmund. In view thereof. Aside from such promissory note. the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S.745. respondent Florence S. 1985. Efraim died. as one of the heirs. trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. 1981. the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement. Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola. corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement. with accessories. the joint agreement is invalid. but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Again. the surviving heirs. it was null and void. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128. since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads: The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held thatthe petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court. the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. 1988. Sometime in February 1981. On December 7. ISSUES: Whether or not the joint agreement was valid. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.R. and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased. Page 39 LLB III-C. Edmund. executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22. but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. SY 2016-2017 . Edmund.00.00.000. the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. among others. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court. During the pendency of the testate proceedings. was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid. UNION BANK vs. executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC.96 due on May 31. because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world. 1980. this time in the amount of P123. they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13. 1981. Thus. Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund. the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez. No. 1981. HELD: No. SANTIBAÑEZ G. wherein the FCCC as the assignor. Page 40 LLB III-C. In the present case. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed. inter alia. left a holographic will which contained. SY 2016-2017 . real or personal. which I own and may be discovered later after my demise. the provision which reads as follows: (e) All other properties. The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect. We rule in the negative.The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. the deceased. of course. This. the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. Efraim Santibañez. shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence. my children. 157912 December 13. Page 41 LLB III-C. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy. all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims. but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed.250. HELD: No. but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. SY 2016-2017 . Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.000. In compliance therewith. No. Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. they would be barred subject to certain exceptions. after granting letters of testamentary or of administration.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties of Alice an another 275. Alan Joseph Sheker filed contingent money claim in the amount of 206. ISSUES: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void. SHEKER G. In the case at bar.R. 2007 (Rule 88 – Payment of the Debts of the Estate) FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. SHEKER vs.00 as reimbursements for the expenses he incurred. The trial court issued order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate and as a motion. the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filling of the petition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will. otherwise. the Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. Under the Section 1 and 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. its office is not to initiate new litigation. A motion is not an independent right of remedy. when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory. if the same may also be predicted as one source of obligation other than delict. Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. that death supervenes before final judgment. HELD: Yes. BAYOTAS G. 1991. which was held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and therefore civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. ipso facto extinguishes the former. cover ‘both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case.R. thus.’ The Rules of Court state that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final ‘after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served. Bayotas died. the decision to be rendered must. ‘there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists. however.’ The accused died before final judgment was rendered. or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. ‘In addition. 1994 (Rule 88 – Payment of the Debts of the Estate) FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June19. the Solicitor-General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. provided. of course. it required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. This comment was opposed by the counsel of accused-appellant. where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility. In his comment. Moreover. the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved. he is absolved of both his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on delict or the crime committed. As in this case. he cited in support and invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. PEOPLE vs. the extinction of the latter by death. No. arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties. of necessity. SY 2016-2017 . While the appeal was pending. Page 42 LLB III-C. Corollarily. the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused. ISSUES: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. Castillo. 102007 September 2. and ’for the simple reason that ‘there is no party defendant. 44 with petitioner Alfredo Hilado. as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. 10. in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. including the status of the assets of the estate. to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed. disputing the personality of the petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. On 27 February 2004. or fraudulently conveyed. CA G. br. while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. the present petition. Benedicto died intestate on May 15 2000. praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised. (3) Sec. At the time of his death there were two (2) pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. On January 2. On August 2. 2002. Still.R. 2009 (Rule 83 – Inventory and Appraisal. Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator. HILADO vs. Private respondent opposed. he was survived by his wife. 2000. 1. 95-9137 was then pending with RTC Bacolod City. Petitioners are allowed to be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings. even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory. After all. embezzled. HELD: Yes. Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty. the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant. SY 2016-2017 . ISSUES: Whether or not the administrator is required to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment. A petition then for certiorari was filed with the CA. or to sell. according to the appellate court. it argued that petitioners had the right to intervene in the latter being the defendant in the civil case they lodged with Bacolod RTC. the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her husband. Yes. such as the right. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. private respondent Juliata Campos Benidicto and his only daughter. 164108 May 8. Page 43 LLB III-C. (2) Sec. even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings. No. as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. petitioners filed with Manila RTC a Manifestation/ motion Ex Abudanti lautela. Nonetheless. but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates. First civil case No. Rule 87. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate. Rule 87 – Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators) FACTS: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Hence. On September 24. Provision for Support of Family. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment. Manila RTC issued an order denying the Manifestation/Motion on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. 2001. and. and whether or not petitioners are allowed to furnish with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. under Section 6. Hence this petition. 5.R. Rule 87 – Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators) FACTS: Respondent. may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the deceased Isabelo Nacar. Page 44 LLB III-C. NACAR vs. Actually only four carabaos where attached because 3 carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceeding the burial of the late Isabelo Nicar. Rules of Court). being one arising from a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents may file an ordinary action in court for the recovery of money against the administrator or executor of the estate of Isabelo Nacar. the same shall have to be dismissed. HELD: No. Rule 86. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not filed therein within the period prescribed. He further alleged that Nicanor Nacar is about to remove and dispose the property (seven carabaos) with intent to deprived him. and the claim prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings. as follows: "No action upon claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator. Even if settlement proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar. NISTAL G.…. This is expressly provided for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The filing of an ordinary action to recover money claim is not allowed in any court. The petitioner filed a motion to dismisss the case but it was denied by the Court." The claim of private respondents. the same shall be deemed "barred forever. SY 2016-2017 . considering that Mr. Even if this action were commenced during the lifetime of Isabelo Nacar. 1982 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estate. No. Idelfonso Japitana filed the complaint in civil case No. the suit to recover the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate. 65 and entitled “ Claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar with preliminary attachment” to recover an outstanding debt of the late Nacar due to respondent. Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach the seven cattles in the possession of petitioner Nacar." (Sec. L-33006 December 8. Jupitana had given security according to the rules of Court. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim”. this petition. Luz J.Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim Special Administrator. as auditors and the Order dated April 3. George S. The court ordered the accounting firm of Messrs. Respondents ‘motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. which is hereby fixed at 1. and the court shall appoint a special administrator. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration. HELD: No. the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator’s commission – effectively. in the adjustment of such claim. Hence. 159130 August 22. 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba. Lilia prayed that her mother’s holographic will be disallowed and that shall be appointed as the intestate administratix. 2008 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estate) FACTS: Ruby J. a claim by the special administrator against the estate – is the lower court’s last word on the matter and one that is appealable. Henson at the RTC of Manila. he shall give notice thereof. a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother. Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari. Prohibition. have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims.Cruz. 1999. BRIONES vs. No. to the court. the action of the court on a claim against the estate “is appealable as in ordinary cases. A Petition for Certiorari. It provides that: “if the executor or administrator has claim against the estate he represent. who shall. She alleged that Ruby under stated the value of their late mother’s estate and acted with unconscionable bad faith” in the management thereof. sec. The trial court granted the motion and designated petitioner Atty. SY 2016-2017 . in writing. deceased daughter and also a respondent in the petition opposed Ruby’s Petition. The trial court. 8 of Rule 86 in special proceedings states for the “claim of executor or administrator against an estate’. Also.8% of the value of the estate. 2002 which reiterated the appointment. Henson filed on February 23. Romeo & Co. however. took his oath of office. The petition assailed the Order dated March 12. Briones’ commission. by the express terms of the Rules. ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in assailing the commission of executor. under Section 13 of the same Rule. Atty. Lilia subsequently praying that the Prudential bank and Trust Company. Briones accepted the appointment. HENSON-CRUZ G.Romeo & Co. Alba. They subsequently filed their record on appeal. and started the administration of the estate. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Lilia Henson. denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of forum shopping. and Mandamus was filed by the respondents to CA. Page 45 LLB III-C. and suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission.” Hence. the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the Order insofar as it directed the payment of Atty.R. SY 2016-2017 . After 10 years. Sr. the trial court rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanog the lawful owners of the subject land. which is an action involving real property. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. upon proper notice. sps. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. At the trial. No. and Valeria Saligumba. adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land. Hence. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment. In the complaint. and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. . Palanog alleged that they have been in actual. ISSUE: Whether or not an action for quieting of title. Page 46 LLB III-C. the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased. open. (spouses Saligumbas).Petitioners thus question the decision as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by counsel of record. It appeared that Eliseo Saligumba. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1. before the RTC. Death of Party. this petition.Palanogs appeared. Sps. being a void judgment. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners. without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs”.R. 143365 December 4. is extinguished upon death of the party. 2008 (Rule 87 – Actions by and against Executors and Administrators) FACTS: Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants. No motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed. PALANOG G. Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the procedure. or within such time as may be granted. Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the said decision. Sr. may be recovered as costs. SALIGUMBA vs. and Valeria Saligumba died.After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished. After a lapse of more than two years. She further requested that the heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants. if defrayed by the opposing party. Spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. HELD: No. the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court. thus: “Section 17. Therefore. never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba. only the counsel for sps. And when a party dies in an action that survives. within a period of thirty (30) days.Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba. the court shall order. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them to appear. Sr. Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed. NLRC levied a Fuso Truck bearing License Plate No. who bought the same from the Spouses Te. that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein. In the case before Us. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16. had long testified on the complaint on March 13. sold at public auction. submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint. Meanwhile. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. through her lawyer. 2009 (Rule 87 – Actions by and against Executors and Administrators) FACTS: On February 14. argues that respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact. and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue. Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution to satisfy the judgment award in favor of Sereno. deTe. and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on March 11. SARSABA vs.R. and 3. Section 1. actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property. Faustino Castañeda. In fact. 1998 for and on her behalf and. However. Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it was levied on execution and. LBR-514 which sold at public action . In such cases. 2. SY 2016-2017 . died on April 12. 175910 July 30. Neither had he shown any proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or anyone who succeeded her. 2005. Br. It appeared that the respondent. Davao del Sur. DE TE G. 46 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Sereno appaearing as the highest bidder. Corollarily. as amended. a complaint for recovery of motor vehicle. actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon. represented by her attorney-in-fact Faustino Castaeda. de Te. petitioner Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants. that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te. Respondent alleged. Respondent. Teodoro Gasing/ Truck Operator . a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative. he had actively participated in the proceedings. The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows: 1. 1986 by one Jesus Matias. accordingly. but a requirement of due process. 2005. It is only when there is a denial of due process. or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the case. it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. actions to enforce liens thereon. the registered owner of the truck. Fe Vda. respondent Fe Vda. Page 47 LLB III-C. 1995. Lavares and the NLRC of Davao City. as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction. No. a decision was rendered by NLRC in the case of Patricio Sereno vs. Sereno. among others. ISSUE: What is the legal effect of death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case? HELD: When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished. as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir. damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendent elite against petitioner. On October 17. Petitioner Sarsaba alleges that that there was no showing that the heirs have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te. filed with the RTC . Digos. later on. the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. 18. Page 48 LLB III-C. is an action that survives and is not extinguished by the death of a party. The deceased litigants are themselves protected as they continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of their estate. will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party.such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate the proceedings that have long taken place before the RTC. SY 2016-2017 . De Te has been extinguished due to the death of the principal. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client. Despite the special power of attorney given to Castaneda by Fe Vda. such that no substitution is effected. the case at hand is an action for the recovery of a personal property. a motor vehicle. The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. claiming that half of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. 80 Phil. among others.. whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives. L-18148 February 28. herein petitioners. Francisco Reyes. namely. to include the properties mentioned in the deed of donation between the instituted heirs and the legal heirs of the deceased spouses. the court disapproved the said partitions and directed the executor to file another. herein respondents. 73 Phil. matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding. 232). which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage. executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI. it was averred. upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties. and Jose Isidoro. Venue and Process) FACTS: Eusebio Capili. namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO. except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property. herein executor-petitioner of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili. the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action. HON. SY 2016-2017 . In the same order. citing Article 133 of the Civil Code. Page 49 LLB III-C. it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property. HELD: The matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. Armando Capili and Arturo Bernardo. 229. disposing of his properties in favor of his heirs. and that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation. In the memorandum of the petitioner. 561). No. it was also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased. where both parties submitted their evidences and memorandum respectively. DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO. respondents had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation. While his widow died the following year. Eusebio’s testamentary heirs. by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. including. By petition. the widow. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES G. and when so submitted. However. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void. there being no attestation clause. among others. among others. Deogracias Bernardo. with the exception of Hermogena Reyes. and for want of compliance with the required formalities of a will pursuant to Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code. adjudicating the estate of the Testator Eusebio Capili among the petitioners. a property whose ownership is in question.R. ET AL. because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership. The probate court sets the two projects of partition for hearing. On June 12. so. in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. married to Hermogena Reyes. 1959. In a line of decisions. of course. Few days later the said respondents filed an opposition to the executor-petitioner’s project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition instead. that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership. vs. and that with the consent of the parties. the executor-petitioner filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the disposition in the will. and the instituted heirs. petitioners filed their petition for review by certiorari. she was substituted by the deceased widow’s collateral relatives and intestate heirs. now represented because of her death. said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Amparo. question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings. died testate on July 27. The motion for new trial by the said executor was denied and the appellate court affirmed the ordered appealed from. his widow Hermogena Reyes. 1958 whose will was probated in the same year. Pascual. it held as a general rule. ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court has the power to adjudicate in the testate proceedings. 1963 (Rule 73 – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Marcelino Doronio and his wife. The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners’ predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents’ predecessor. 44481 in the names of the petitioners predecessor. the owners of the adjacent property are the Najorda’s. Based on OCT No. a registered parcel of land in the name of the said donor spouses. where the petitioner heirs claimed that they are the owners of the entire property in view of the donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors. 1950 is Void. 352. they disputed on the ownership. the property described in the said deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO G. the owner is Fortunato Doronio. ISSUES: Whether or not the Donation Propter Nuptias made in a private instrument was valid. but it was dismissed on the ground that the decision had already become final as it was not appealed. 2007 (Rule 90 . respondent heirs filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner heirs before the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs. on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis xxxxx Both parties were occupants of the said property. SY 2016-2017 . in part as… xxxxx A piece of residential landxxxx. It concluded. and that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes. 352 and the deed of donation. a private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by the late spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of their son. While the respondent heirs argued that only half of the property was actually donated. that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 1919. Branch 45. The said donation was never notarized and the property is described. However. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different. are being represented by their heirs as petitioners. 169454 December 27. unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. However. HELD: Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property Made in a Private Instrument Before the New Civil Code Took Effect on August 30. on the east by Fortunato Doronio. Whether or not an action for reconveyance is the proper remedy with respect to issues on impairment of legitime. while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio (also among the several children of the donor spouses). the Page 50 LLB III-C. the appellate court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the lower court. in this case. that a title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse. in view of the disparity in the OCT and the said deed. who. also both deceased. among others. which has significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. hence. it based its conclusion on the disparity of the technical descriptions of the property under OCT No. among others. and contended. Respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration with the said RTC. the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino. Fortunato Doronio. Accordingly. On appeal. which was granted and subsequently led to the cancellation of OCT No. HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO vs. Determined to remain in their possessed property. Thereafter petitioner heirs filed a petition for registration of the mentioned deed of donation with the RTC.Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: On April 24. open and notorious possession or by prescription. No. 44481 in the names of the petitioners predecessors.R. whereas in the deed of donation. 352. 352 and issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Under the Old Civil Code. partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property. SY 2016-2017 . 352. donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners’ predecessors. therefore. Not in Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages. Page 51 LLB III-C. is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent.Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919. be restored to its original owners under OCT No. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument. in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in the same Code. Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding. Logically. In the instant case. the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. then. must appear in a public document. The title to the subject property should. Hence. in order to be valid. the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action. It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument. A probate court. petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. 44481 in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. 1950. On the other hand. R. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Rule 80. Timbol. supervises and controls all acts of administration. and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition. 6). The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration. should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered. Sec. and ruled the said contract of lease is in all forms illegal. 5). Sec. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease. and that he is in possession under express authority of the court. No. leaving her only heir-son Florante C. upon motion of the parties. 14). proposing that the agricultural lands of the decedent be leased to him in order for the rentals be used for the maintenance of the appellee and the payment of land taxes and other dues. he modified the area from 30 hectares to 41. 1961 (Rule 80 – Special Administrator. Jose Cano. Sec. JOSE CANO G. a project of partition was approved. Rule 89 – Sales. among others. L-15445 April 29. among which. L-8152. mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90. who was a minor at that time. (Tambunting vs. 2). 1951." and under article 1491. ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract. designating the minor-appellee as the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the decedent. SY 2016-2017 . 13). On January 14. Rule 91 – Escheats) FACTS: Mercedes Cano died intestate in August. orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89. under a valid contract. filed a petition on April 13. approved the reduction of the said rental of the same lands and the conversion of 30 hectares thereof into a subdivision. grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id. Then on April 2. but in its general jurisdiction. so may it order its revocation. hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87. was obtained with the court's approval. No. 1956 the court. 1). TIMBOL vs. its orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal. if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator. The above decision is the subject of the appeal. are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein. When the appellee was appointed administrator in place of appellant. San Jose. cited the provisions under article 1646 of the Civil Code that the persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491. also subject to the approval of the court.9233 hectares for the projected subdivision.R. upon motion of the said administrator. 1957. and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent. HELD: The appellant’s arguments are without merit. The petition was acted upon by the presiding Judge with favor. contended. Page 52 LLB III-C. 1945. brother of the deceased. in the instant proceedings. See. See. herein appellant Administrator. but not because the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the administrator.) Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect. FLORANTE C. Mortgages. The court granted the motions of the appellee. See. that the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings. Rule 90 – Distribution and Partition of the Estate. or the reduction of the subject of the lease. herein appellee.. cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract. executors and administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under administration. and as such trustee. G. and averred that the Probate Court. It has been held that the court acts as a trustee. he presented a motion. except in its general jurisdiction. Of course. Rule 87 – Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators. not dissipated. authorizes sale. directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91. The appellant objected the motion. 1960. 89 Phil. 1972 (Rule 90 – Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: Jacinta Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez. Further on contended that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased.. 137). In an order dated March 5. on the ground of lesion. 1953. Cano. Nevertheless.). In Testate Proceedings No. she also filed a petition dated July 20. while the rest of the properties including the 28 other parcels of land were allotted to the respondent. 1964. 83 Phil. 3368 and 3441. 460-461). that respondent be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots nos. 1961. 1956. the spouses legally adopted Juanita Lopez-Guilas. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Daluz. April 24. 1960 the respondent and petitioner executed a project partition where the later inherited the paraphernal lots of the deceased Jacinta Lopez which include Lots Nos. Cano. Respondent opposed to the said petition. Agustines. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ G. L-26695 January 31.R. Roman Catholic vs. Ortuzar. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. SY 2016-2017 .. Bonilla. provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed. 1964. is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings. On April 28. Jingco vs. supra. perpetration and fraud. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with. Austria vs. Timbol vs. HELD: The position of petitioner should be sustained. and that petitioner is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate. when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15. 1082. respondent herein. and declared her as legal heir. Cano. April 29. 89 Phil. which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. In 1953. L-15445. L-14710. 3368 and 3441. 18. 1960 and the approval of the project of partition submitted by the parties subsequent thereto in April 23. and not through an independent action. and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same") ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction of the probate court under administration already ceased by virtue of its approval on the project of partition on the estate which was submitted by the heirs. 1936. 741-742. for the heir who has not received his share. 730. March 29. Tecson. L-5107. 455. 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court citing A. Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. Page 53 LLB III-C. The better practice. In March 19. the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs. 92 Phil. Petitioner in her reply contended that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs. however. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla. On April 10. L-100808. No. Siguiong vs.. 1961. supra.. herein petitioner. claimed that the testate proceedings have already been closed and terminated by virtue of the order dated December 15. because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share. in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. petitioner filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition. April 29. praying. where the lower court approved the said partition. Sept. They had no children.). determines the termination of the probate proceedings (citing the case of Timbol vs. among others. and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings. Tecson. the aforementioned WILL was admitted to probate and the respondent was appointed executor without bond by the Court of First Instance. 1960. where it was ruled that "the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the taxes. 1959 in Testate Proceedings No 1426. 107 Phil. 1426. has been had. Deogracias. section 4 of the above-mentioned rule provides that. within the prescriptive period. defendants contend good faith in purchasing the parcel of land. and not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share. If as is probably the case defendants relied on the court order adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista the entire estate in the distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. The SC. and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. this appeal. the property in litigation was acquired as homestead patent. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. 73 Phil.R. MARI vs BONILLA G. No partition. "If it shall appear at anything within two year after the settlement and distribution of an estate . a TCT was issued to the latter and they assumed possession of the lands. HELD: NO. They begot two children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista. 563) held that: "A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. She then sold the subject property to the defendants-spouses." Page 54 LLB III-C." Far from shielding defendants against loss the adjudication and the rule under which it was made gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. That was a summary settlement made on the faith and strength of the distributes self-serving affidavit. Broad perspectives of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition. When Casimiro Evangelista died intestate. No. judicial or extrajudicial. such co-heir may still. L–852 March 19.. ISSUE: Whether or not defendants’ innocence in the purchase of land is binding in relation to the summary settlement on the faith and strength of the self-serving affidavit executed by co-owner Deogracias Evangelista. In action to recover parcel of land. judicial or extrajudicial. a registered owner of a homestead. alleged to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista and executed a declaration of heirship. in the case of Lajom v. Hence. .1949 (Rule 74 – Summary Settlement of Estate) FACTS: Plaintiff Leonida Mari was married to Casimiro Evangelista. SY 2016-2017 . Viola. After the sale. could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. One of their children. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership. which is the property in litigation. . their innocence avails them less as against the true owners of the land. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive. bring an action for reinvindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for purpose of satisfying such participation. In fact. Makati City. and Sec. Revised Rules of Court). nor distributed to Silverio-Dee. which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to stay in the property. SILVERIO JR. Silverio. SY 2016-2017 . 2004. the said property may still be sold to pay the taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate. as the administrator of the estate. From the Order. 2 Rule 84. Revised Rules of Court is made. penalties. the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes. she filed MR of the order which was denied in an order dated December 12. 2005. Sr. Jr. the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (Sec. as the new administrator. 1 Rule 90. Revised Rules of Court). JR. In fact. 2009 (Rule 84 – General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators. supra. After her death. Moreover. Notably. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located Forbes Park. the alleged authority given by SILVERIO.. Page 55 LLB III-C. Instead of filing an appeal. vs. 3 Rule 84. which the RTC granted in its order. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in annulling the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate HELD: Yes. for Nelia S. 178933 September 16. 2006. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property dated May 4. The respondent Silverio-Dee’s occupancy of the Intestate property located at Forbes Park will prevent the sale authorized by the order to secure funds for the payment of taxes due. During the pendency of the case. Jr.R No. as the administrator. Rule 90 . while appointing Silverio Jr.. On May 2005. such order also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio.Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. In the same order. CA annulled the the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19. is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court. Upon appeal. her surviving spouse. 2007. the RTC issued an Omnibus Order directing Nelia to vacate the premises of the property located at Makati. Silverio. filed MR which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31. SR. since no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations mentioned in Rule 90. COURT OF APPEALS G. Silverio Jr. interests and other charges due thereon.( Sec. Such property cannot be occupied or appropriated by. filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. filed a petition to remove Silverio Sr. assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO. Sr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio. " Seventeen days thereafter. born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. 1964. 1970 (Rule 90 . the minors Dahlia and Roy.Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: Saturnina M. The remedy was therefore invoked on time. the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be. for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of. Vda. there are two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent. Ortuzar. would be. which should be an independent action against the individual distributees. HELD: 1. and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed. instead of an independent action the effect of which. YES. Uriarte.R No. In an order dated March 30. LOPEZ G. filed a motion to reopen the proceeding. et al. as in the instant case. filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. to wit: (1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open. if successful. ISSUES: 1. both surnamed Lopez. 2. In the case of Uriarte vs. 89 Phil. and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy. Bachar. Whether or not such motion was the proper remedy. 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes. as far as practicable. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. or on April 16. L-23915 September 28. Even then. represented by their mother. VDA." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. the deceased Emilio Lopez. Bachar. Whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late 2. 730: The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. NO. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them.de Lopez.DE LOPEZ vs. judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period.. Also in Ramos vs. Page 56 LLB III-C. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees. applicable in Special Proceedings. SY 2016-2017 . Lolita B. Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions. COURT OF APPEALS G. 94005 April 6. her rights. even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. a writ of execution was issued by the latter. SY 2016-2017 . interests. right. In January 1987. Rule 90 . she contends that not being a party to the case. in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims. that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share. The order to partition was affirmed in toto by the CA in July 1982 then remanded to the lower court and two years later. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property. ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case. the daughter of the spouses. Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. it becomes immutable and unalterable. ownership and participation is concerned. It may no longer be modified in any respect. said share not having been brought within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Page 57 LLB III-C. NUÑAL VS.R No. In her motion. She further invokes Sec12. 1993 (Rule 86 – Claims against Estates. Such order was assailed by the petitioner before the CA contending that Mary was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in the case for partition and accounting of the property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory? ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to quash is a proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final and executory judgment of partition HELD: NO. In this case. and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of land. the lower court issued an order directing the inclusion f Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property. the remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. the CFI rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property of the late spouses Lyon. Mary Lyon-Martin. In July 1984. filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. When a final judgment becomes executor.Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: In December 1974. No. The plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the civil case and prayed that the intestate proceedings not be closed until said civil case has been terminated. ISSUES: 1. 1951 (Rule 90 . DINGLASAN vs. ANG CHIA G. instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administatrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. 1948. The counsel for defendants objected on the basis that there was a pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong.R. (b) stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the intestate proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. Whether or not the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by petitioners-appellees HELD: 1. the trial court: (a)issued an order denying the petition for a co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5. SY 2016-2017 . Thereafter. NO. CFI Capiz issued in the intestate estate proceedings an order holding in abeyance the approval of ther petition for an extrajudicial partition the closing of said proceedings until after final termination of civil case of the same court. Page 58 LLB III-C. Whether or not the lower court erred in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed claim of petitioners-appellees and in ordering the administatrix to file a bond of P5. On August 1948. They also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. An order requiring the filing of a new bond by the administatrix is interlocutory in nature and is solely addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 2. As to the bond. and (c) took cognizance of the pendency of the civil case. L-3342 April 18. The administatrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond. A probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of ordinary case because to hold otherwise would render some provisions in the Rules of Court nugatory. On July 1949. NO. her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz. The plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administatrix be increased. against Ang Chia. this appeal. who is the widow Ang Chia.000. the administatrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motions made by plaintiffs. The petitioners objected.Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: Dinglasan filed a case in the CFI of Capiz on February 16. Hence. The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of the civil case is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over the said case.000 2. the lower court did not err in view of the fact that the appellants did not appeal from the court’s order of August 4. It merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot be branded as having acted in excess of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion and they filed an amended complaint seeking inclusion as party-defendant of the administatrix of the estate. suit would be brought for its recovery. the inheritance tax accrued as of the date of death of the decedent. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest. the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the decedent’s death.Distribution and Partition of the Estate) FACTS: Thomas Hanley died. Page 59 LLB III-C. upon the death of the decedent. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees’ commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax. the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax. The CFI dismissed Lorenzo’s complaint and Posadas’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed to this court. 1937 (Rule 90 . No. 3. ISSUES: 1. under the will. The will was admitted to probate. A trustee is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. Plaintiff went to court. leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal properties. were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two executors named in the will were appointed trustee. During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee. LORENZO vs. In this case. in determining the net value of the estate subject to tax HELD: 1.R. regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value. 2. G. The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same. and such tax should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to Moore as trustee. POSADAS JR. Whether or not the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s death. Posadas overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the said amount. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. made effective by his death. But from this it does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject to tax. L-43082 June 18. notifying Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded. Whether or not it is proper to deduct the compensation due to trustees. If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if. together with the penalties for deliquency in payment. When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied? 2. and the CFI of Zamboanga appointed a trustee to administer the real properties which. or on its value ten years later 3. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent. succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly. SY 2016-2017 . Lahaba died.000 paid already). After the receipt of the said amount. He said he had only P2. Page 60 LLB III-C. The amount of P30.500 in his possession belonging to his principal. a balance of P20. 1905. Pending the receipt of said authority. the vendee executed a mortgage on said lands in favour of Lahaba for P25. 6. SY 2016-2017 . may acquire the trust estate by prescription provided there is repudiation of the trust and this fact is known to the cestui que trust. Fernandez appointed Jose Moreno Lahaba as attorney in fact or agent for Salinas. On April 24.000. the trustee must prove that there was a direct repudiation of the trust and that the cestui que trust or beneficiary had knowledge thereof. The repudiation must be clear. In 1900. The Lower court acted correctly in taking jurisdiction of the case. but not as to the amount of P30. of he and his heirs failed and refused to account. L-33626 March 2.500 constitutes res judicata as to that amount only. and the action has prescribed. 3. A trustee. 1931 (Rule 98 – Trustees) FACTS: Francisco Callejon Salinas.000 after deducting the expenses incurred by Lahaba for the survey and registration of said lands and for attorney’s fees and taxes. No.R. Mere failure of the trustee to respond to repeated inquiries addressed to him by the cestui que trust is not enough. TUAZON G. Among the issues include: the court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter. on instalment. There was no open. Prescription in order to be available as a defense. a trust estate is exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations. open and unequivocal. 5. SALINAS vs. the Spanish Consul in the Philippines. He had not. the heirs of Salinas requested the Spanish Consul to make further inquiries about the other properties. which he was ready to deliver upon the production of written authority from the heirs for the consul to receive the same. however. made inquiries from Lahaba about the properties administered by him. Judgment affirmed. rendered any report of his administration in spite inquiries made by the heirs of his principal from July 1911 up to time of his death in 1920. The trial court concluded that the heirs are entitled to recover the said sum of P30. Both parties appealed. with express authority to delegate his powers as such attorney or to appoint his successors. Among the properties administered were the 2 parcels of land in question. On the contrary. 1. The said amount was entered in the inventory of his estate as conjugal property and passed to the heirs of Lahaba. it is not an indebtedness but represents the price of trust property administered by him.000 was still unpaid.000 claimed in this action.000 to secure the unpaid balance of the price (P5. 2. None of the alleged errors was committed by the lower court. clear and unequivocal repudiation of the trust by Lahaba.000 which the heirs of Salinas were seeking to recover is not a claim against the estate of Lahaba. there was concealment and misappropriation on the part of Lahaba of the property entrusted to his administration and care. the claims constitute res judicata. at the request of the heirs of Salinas. 4. The payment of the heirs of Salinas in the amount of P2. When Lahaba died. Five days after the sale. however. a former resident of the Philippines died in Spain on May 31. the death of the principal. The consul presented a claim for P2. Lahaba administered the properties and rendered accounts until 1911. 1911 (no record when he left the Philippines). As a general rule. Salinas appointed Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez as his attorney in fact to administer his properties in the Philippines. ISSUE: Was the lower court correct in deciding in favour of the heirs of Salinas? HELD: Yes. Neither was there any knowledge on the part of Salinas and his heirs of any such repudiation.500 to the intestate proceedings of Lahaba which was allowed and paid and delivered to the heirs of Salinas. It was discovered that Lahaba had sold in the name of Salinas the 2 parcels of land to Thomas Luis for P30. Sometime before the death of Lahaba. Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT. independently of the particular intention of the parties. with the Deed of Absolute Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee. respondent-spouses asserting that petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta property sold in 1943 by Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company. O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS G. trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. SY 2016-2017 . Manila. It appears that on 31 May 1943. On 22 June 1960. 58010 March 31. the latter who is the former's older sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought the property from their conjugal funds. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. finding no trust relation between the parties. or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity. private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Page 61 LLB III-C. both coming into being by operation of law. are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent. Petitioners and respondents appealed. Hence. this case. Sta. They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila... Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts. respondent-spouses told her that these were misplaced or lost. she filed a petition for issuance of a new title. that when she asked for the return of the documents evidencing her ownership. that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the corresponding title with respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping. They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually bought the property with her own money. On 17 May 1960. the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company. the trial court dismissed the complaint together with the counterclaim.R. By definition. While petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping. 1993 (Rule 98 – Trustees) FACTS: The case at bar involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. Cruz. Ltd. Ltd. that in view of the loss. HELD: Yes. and. EMILIA O'LACO and HUGO LUNA vs. or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. and on 18 August 1944 the then Court of First Instance of Manila granted her petition. ISSUE: Whether a resulting trust was intended by the parties in the acquisition of the property. No. by some writing or deed. On 20 September 1976. and that the legal title thereto was merely placed in her name. respondent-spouses sued petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to recover the purchase price of the land before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. without being express. sold a parcel of land. the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court and ruled in favor of the respondents. On 9 April 1981. or will.. situated at Oroquieta St. Implied trusts are those which. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties. strongly suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in trust for respondent- spouses. However. Once the resulting trust is repudiated. absent any machination or fraud. there can be no persuasive rationalization for the possession of these documents of ownership by respondent-spouses for seventeen (17) years after the Oroquieta property was purchased in 1943 than that of precluding its possible sale. As differentiated from constructive trusts. implied trusts may be established by oral evidence. where the settled rule is that prescription may supervene. This continued possession of the documents. in resulting trust. Page 62 LLB III-C. the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. alienation or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco. together with other corroborating evidence spread on record. SY 2016-2017 . Indeed.Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein which cannot be proved by parol evidence. in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence. however. it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription. It cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof. J. and the trustor and appellant on the other. L-16185-86 May 31.R. thus it is basically sound and wise as it is should be applicable to trustees. Nos.R. all surnamed Perez Y Tuason. and does not necessarily apply to trustees. Perez. in view of the nature of the relations between the trustor and the trustee. PEREZ (judicial guardian-appellant) G. Antonio Araneta(1) may be allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm. Besides. governed by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. had rendered various services. as counsel for the appellee. Both questions were decided by the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. that. No. Angela and Antonio. Francisco T. Atty. Araneta&Araneta. of which he is a member. All questioned transactions were affirmed by the lower court to be valid. for services rendered to him. considering that the appellee was merely defending himself in the proceedings that required the services of counsel. SY 2016-2017 . (When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him) HELD: No. Page 63 LLB III-C. However. on the one hand. while the duties of executors or administrators are fixed and/or limited by law. Though it is true that some functions of the former bear a close analogy with those of the latter.R. L-16185 is whether or not the trustee. that the will creating the trust and designating the appellee as trustee explicitly grants him the right to collect for his services such reasonable fees. ISSUE: Whether or not the payment of services to Araneta&Araneta is in violation of Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Section 7 of Rule 86 refers only to "executors or administrators" of the estate of deceased persons. Hence. and that it may have been more costly for the trust estate to engage the services of a law firm other than that of Araneta&Araneta. the duties of a trustee is usually. the duties of trustees may cover a much wider range than those of executors or administrators of the estate of deceased persons. It even authorized the payment of P5. if established by contract. through its assistant. ARANETA (trustee-appellee) vs.00 for the services thus rendered by Araneta&Araneta. No.It appears that the law firm Araneta&Araneta. The issue in G. (2) whether the purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the appellee for the benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial approval. in several judicial proceedings. there can be little doubt but that the trustor would have sanctioned the payment of the attorney's fees involved in this incident. in his aforementioned capacity as such trustee. Papa. 1962 (Rule 98 – Trustees) FACTS: These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno. that in each case the stand taken by the appellee was upheld by the court. L-16186 concerns the question. In the case at bar. whereas G.500. this appeal by Antonio M. Mariano and Luis. is alive in China or in Hongkong. 1962. occupied a part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals. TAN vs. which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court found that Pizarro's testimonies "ring with untruthfulness. In 1923. Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court. and (3) a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Pizarro. According to the petitioner. to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favor.R. informed the Solicitor General about the property. Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court. in effect. Pizarro tried to prove it through: (1) supposed pictures of the missing heir (2) an Extrajudicial Settlement and Adjudication of Dominga's Estate allegedly executed by Vicenta in Hongkong. through the Solicitor General. The City of Davao filed a petition with the CFI. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir or person by law entitled to inherit her estate. 1964. Dominga's adoptive parent. they are replete with inconsistencies" and the witnesses who corroborated him were "unworthy of belief”. or in connection with. Another nephew of Cornelia. ISSUE: Whether or not the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition. Segundo Reyes. 1988 (Rule 91 – Escheats) FACTS: The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted Dominga Garcia. when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court. neither she. the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident of. Cornelia Pizarro died. Dominga Garcia and her family migrated to China. represented by the Solicitor- General. NO HELD: With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines. SY 2016-2017 . The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are. proceedings to settle her estate. Page 64 LLB III-C. Trial court rendered judgment declaring that the land escheated and assigned to the City of Davao. the CA correctly ruled that the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12. Her nephew. Since her departure for China with her family. No. Although the escheat proceedings were still pending then. the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition because to do so would work injustice to the City of Davao. nor her husband. YES Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring Vicenta Tan presumed dead. nor any of their children has returned to the Philippines to claim the lot. L-44347 September 29. Vicenta Tan. may commence escheat proceedings. did not take effect until January 1. Tan Seng with whom she had three children: Vicenta. may file the escheat petition under Section 1. Indeed. CITY OF DAVAO G. an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of such absentee. Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not authorized to declare that a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in Red China is not a sufficient ground to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings. Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman. Pizarro alleges that Dominga's daughter. Ramon Pizarro. while a petition instituted for the sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead cannot be entertained if that were the only question or matter involved in the case. the same should be escheated. Dominga Garcia died intestate and left in the Philippines a parcel of land in Davao. SY 2016-2017 . and decreed the escheat of said funds to the municipality of Guinga. DIVINO vs. 1936 (Rule 91 – Escheats) FACTS: Tan Kui Sing began the intestate proceeding for the deceased Tan Chay. because the court without jurisdiction cannot grant him the relief. No.44658 January 24.000 deposited with the Philippine Foreign Trading and Company. 314 her claims.000. stating in the petition that the deceased was a party in civil case no. HELD: Without the publication. The judgment of which was appealed to this Court. filed a motion to set aside the decree escheating the PhP5. This is without prejudice to petitioner’s right. in the same capacity as guardian. to present in the special proceeding No. no notice was published. that his only estate is PhP5.R. to declare the minors the only heirs of Tan Chay. 1147 of the same CFI. The motion was based on the allegation under oath that the minors were the only legitimate nephews an niece left by the deceased and that the latter had not been survived by another. and to adjudicate to them the share. declared that Tan Chay had died intestate. On the setting for trial. Davao. The petitioner. in her capacity as administratix. The money should be given to the legal heirs. in any case. Page 65 LLB III-C. while his properties are yet unknown. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs can recover the amount of PhP5. HILARIO G.000. The court appointed Ang Liong as special administrator. the court cannot have acquired jurisdiction and the petitioner cannot resort to the remedy granted by section 752. that the decree of reversion was already irrevocable. that he left no legal heirs. L. and asking that. the minors could avail themselves of the procedure under section 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the court called the petition for hearing and after the presentation of evidence. On August 1935. a special administrator be appointed to duly represent said deceased in appeal. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits. Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue. Likewise named defendants therein were the individual depositors and/or creditors Summonses were accordingly issued to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors requiring them to file severally their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the first publication of the summons with notice that should they fail to file their answers. an English newspaper. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. otherwise known as the Unclaimed Balance Law. or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more. Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue. under Section 2. plaintiff would take judgment against them by default. petitioner interposed the instant appeal on pure questions of law among others: a.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62. If the bank were not a real party in interest. SY 2016-2017 . 1988 (Rule 91 – Escheats) FACTS: Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. or on July 25. Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat proceedings principally because said section refers to personal actions. or who have not been heard from. b. No. the Treasurer of the Philippines caused the same to be published in the February 25. and the"El Debate". 1968. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA G.91. likewise. Besides. governs escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Its motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order having been denied in the second assailed order. Page 66 LLB III-C. the motion to dismiss was granted in the first assailed Order. Thereafter. Whether or not Section 2(b). or in the names of such depositors or creditors known to be dead. private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of improper venue. Private respondent bank being a real party in interest. March 3 and March 10. b. private respondent bank is a real party in interest as its presence in the action is necessary for a complete determination and settlement of the questions involved therein. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. On October 5. Opposed by the petitioner. Yes. Whether or not Pres. is located. b. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 73707 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. the legislature would not have provided for its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings. 73707 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. likewise. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines in January of 1968 separate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all deposits and credits held by them in favor. L-30381 August 30. only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of P126. 1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald". 3936. No. a Spanish newspaper.1968. it may and can file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Whether or not Section 2(b). some 31 banks including herein private respondent Pres. governs escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Manila. ISSUES: a. HELD: a. In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent Bank. Upon receipt of these sworn statements.R. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. including herein private respondent. the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks. both of general circulation in the Philippines. With the increase and proceeds thereof. The court held that cashier’s checks and demand drafts fall under the act but upon MFR changed its view and excluded drafts. Telegraphic Transfer payment orders should be escheated to REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. L-16106 December 30. Among this bank was the first national city bank of New York who argued that some of its credit didn’t fall with the purview of the ACT. Shall be deposited with the insular treasurer to the credit of the PHIL. REPUBLIC vs. In fact . Page 67 LLB III-C. ISSUE: Whether or not demand drafts create a creditor-debtor relationship between drawee and payee. 3936 which provides that “UNCLAIMED BALANCES” (Which includes credits or deposit of money security and other evidence of indebtedness of any kind plus interest) in favor of persons not heard for 10 years or more. Hence the drafts never became “CREDITS” under the Act. Drafts must however be distinguished from cashiers checks which simply a bill of exchange drawn by the bank on itself.R.I. 1961 (Rule 91 – Escheats) FACTS: Republic filed a complaint for escheat of certain unclaimed bank deposit balances against several banks under Act. Government. HELD: No. Since it is admitted in this case that the drafts in question were never presented either for acceptance or payment . The law requires presentment within reasonable time or else the drawer is discharged from liability. No.L does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee who is not liable on the instrument until he accepts. a demand draft is not the same category as a cashier’s check which should fall under the act. Appellee Bank never became a debtor of the payees. SY 2016-2017 . In Banking terminology. The term Bank draft is used in interchangeably with a bill of under the N. Disposition of TELEGRAPHIC CHECK decision modified. PNB G. It is equivalent to a certified check and its deposit passes to the credit of the holder who then becomes a depositor of that amount. No. claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda. 1938 (Rule 91 – Escheats) FACTS: The Municipality of San Pedro. From the moment it was confiscated. claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose. Pursuant to Sec 1 of Rule 91. Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively. the municipality where the property is situated. The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may legally claim it (2nd requirement lacking). Laguna objected to the appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoint. HELD: YES. Given this fact. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for escheats should be dismissed. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has his last residence or in case he should have no residence in the country. it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law. Page 68 LLB III-C. Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. In this case. also intervened in the case. the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition. L-45460 February 25. were confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. Colegio de San Jose. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof. it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically. SY 2016-2017 . which are jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are: 1. and 4. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will. Carlos Young. Municipal Council of San Pedro. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE G. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO. LAGUNA vs. 2. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro. assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property.R. 3. it is evident that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them. Petitioner in this case is not the sole and exclusive interested party. temporal property of the Father of the Society of Jesus. ROMMEL. 675-84-C against Nelly S. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. 1984. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was found incompetent since 1980. Herein. 1984. namely. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. the proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of Nave with the Regional Trial Court.R.M. Bar by previous judgement means that the judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of parties. T-3317 (27604). Subsequently. all surnamed PABALE G. a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and Nave involving said parcel of land. Hence. While a bar by virtue of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. SY 2016-2017 . ROILER and AMANDA. Thus. Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent. LOLITA R. 1) bar by previous judgment. docketed as SP No. HELD: No. representing S. the first judgement can be conclusive only as to those matters actually controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved. Jr. Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. all contracts that she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void. the complaint was amended to include the Pabale siblings as party defendants. a Decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings. 1988. and to pay attorney’s fees. 146-86-C with Atty. and cause of action. the trial court denied Nave’s Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to Fernando’s amended complaint. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated February 20. 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba. 1984. Fernando Realty Corporation on February 6. even if there is identity of parties.. subject-matter. Fernando prayed that after trial on the merits. Fernando. In an Order dated April 24. Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon. ELMER. Hence. de Guzman. the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata. Branch 36 of Calamba. No. Laguna covered by TCT No. The Pabale siblings intervened. However. 2008 (Rule 93 – Appointment of Guardians) FACTS: This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. 151243 April 30. ALAMAYRI vs. Laguna. litigation expenses and damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata. On June 22. Nave be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor. ERWIN. [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. Nave [Nave]. docketed as Civil Case No. owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba. the Pabale siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property. this petition. and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. The decision on the former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings. Fernando alleged that on January 3. Page 69 LLB III-C. but no identity of causes of action. 2005 (Rule 99 – Adoption and Custody of Minors) FACTS: Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie. and that he is now a widower and qualified to her adopting parent. Hence. ISSUE: May an illegitimate child. in re: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA GR 148311 March 31. it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind. Page 70 LLB III-C. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. and that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle andsurname. including the right to bear surname of her father and her mother. upon adoption by her natural father. his surname. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption. use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? RULING: YES. Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. her mother’ssurname. and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig. SY 2016-2017 . HELD: No. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos. and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Act No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers. thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian. filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos. Rep. the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.who went to Italy. as claimed by petitioner. 2006 (Rule 99 – Adoption and Custody of Minors) FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother. 8552 was already in effect. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs.R. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. petitioner’s brother (deceased). 164948 June 27. of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam. re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children . NO. she should. Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. REPUBLIC G. a citizen of the United States of America (USA). SY 2016-2017 . Page 71 LLB III-C. that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them. USA. If. and Amelia Ramos. When she filed her petition with the trial court. CABUAY GR 160792 August 25. which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. If. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. ALEJANO vs. It is not a writ of error. 2005 (Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment. SY 2016-2017 . then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. however. ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus? HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. Page 72 LLB III-C. the detention is proven lawful. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. the court orders the release of the person. The SC issued a resolution. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal. Neither can it substitute for an appeal. Hence. petitioners Honorato Galvez. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with the present petition for certiorari and mandamus. 1993. When the arraignment was suspended. Bulacan. Before arraignment. 114046 October 24. and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate information with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide. GALVEZ vs CA G. an order to arrest herein petitioners was issued. a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. Bulacan. the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention. Page 73 LLB III-C. No. having recommended for the crime of Murder. However. Private complainants filed before the Supreme Court change of venue purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and witnesses and prevent the miscarriage of justice. The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters. No bail. habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. 1994 (Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: On November 12. Four new information were later filed in the trial Court of Malolos. prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals. respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to Withdraw Information in said cases and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. Before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal cases. SY 2016-2017 . HELD: Yes. but not the record. R. petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the new information for lack of merit which was subsequently denied. its judgment. or from 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months. Eligido Iturralde and Alfredo Valencia. On December 8. petitioner was a minor. The Solicitor General has not filed any brief. Martin. is not the proper remedy.. and sentenced to serve an imprisonment of from 12 years and 1 day to 18 years. SY 2016-2017 . The trial court denied his petition. the petition for habeas corpus. No. and as such he was entitled to a penalty next lower than the one prescribed for the crime committed. He alleged in his petition that the penalty imposed is excessive and not in accordance with law. etc. 114046 October 24. HELD: It is already a settled rule that when a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the accused.. et al.R. SOTTO vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS G. 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. de Talavera v. the Court of Appeals certified the case to us for determination. Cruz v. for the crime of robbery. Respondent. 11 months and 21 days. he should already be ordered released from custody and control of the Respondent Director of Prisons or his representative. by the CFI of Zamboanga. but not granting that the sentence is not in accordance with law. Supt. 30. (Cuenca v. 67 Phil.. Petitioner appealed. 75 Phil. 1994 (Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: Together with Rocindo Brillantes. alleged in his special defense that admitting. petitioner Eduardo Sotto was convicted upon a plea of guilty. as the proper penalty imposable. and that having served sentence for a period of 4 years. 1958. Dee. order or decree is valid and is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. to wit. In a recent case. Superintendent.. 16 years old. for this cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error. 11). order or decree was erroneous (Vda. for the offense charged in the information should be that of Article 302 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code: that at the time of conviction. 538. he filed his petition for habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case. and this holds true even if the judgment. arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. etc. 1961) Page 74 LLB III-C. answering. L-17400. Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights. A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free choice. Marital rights including covertures and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra- ordinary writ of habeas corpus. SY 2016-2017 . Page 75 LLB III-C. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. BILDNER GR No. 2000 (Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition. HELD: No. ISSUE: Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling. ILUSORIO vs. 139789 May 12. as the best and only sufficient defence of personal freedom. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment. Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife. It is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. COURT OF APPEALS G. the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law. in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. but on the court’s view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another.Facing arrest. as in the case of adults. allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her. Hence. Carmen and Vicente Ty. The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom. No. was brought to the Sir John Clinic. Petitioner then filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the Writ. HELD: No. Page 76 LLB III-C. the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. 1989. Rule 102. Dra. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in anulling the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued by the lower court. Despite alleged payments by installments. these cases are decided. the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. In short. the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person. was discharged from the clinic in April.R. However. Therefore. Sombong. Petitioner testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years and her pleas to claim the child allegedly fell on deaf ears.” In the second part of the same provision. the owners of the clinic. because an infant is presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. private respondents filed an appeal from the decision to the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. however. 1996 (Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. SY 2016-2017 . we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. for treatment. In passing on the writ in a child custody case. The SC ruled that: Fundamentally. Quite significantly. Dr Ty admitted that petitioner’s child. leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require.” Thus. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1. The agents of the NBI went to said address and there found a female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. JOHANNA SOMBONG vs. Ty disclosed the possible address where the child may be found. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian. of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill and Arabella could not be then discharged. Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic. When she was just a baby. the evidence disclosed that the child had been living with respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988. When a criminal complaint against the spouses Ty was filed. Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. in the consideration of the facts. spouses Dr. the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just. although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary. but should. and was turned over to someone who was properly identified to be the child’s guardian. She alleged that sometime when Arabella was then only six months old. not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention. 111876 January 31. the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. One day. Thus. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children. respondent was a Filipino.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. When he went to Basilan. SY 2016-2017 . it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only in cases within their jurisdiction. since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines. After 3 years. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. No. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan.R. As explained by the Solicitor General: That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle. RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. HELD: CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON G. it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: Petitioner was an American. 2004 (Rule 99 – Adoption and Custody of Minors. the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.) ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions. injustice. he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest. Page 77 LLB III-C. Literal interpretation would render it meaningless. and contradiction. Further. leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON vs. From the foregoing. One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. They were married and had one daughter. lead to absurdity. there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. 154598 August 16. R. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxx xxx xxx The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court. HELD: Yes. that under the Family Code. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. 2007 (Rule 99 – Adoption and Custody of Minors. Court of Appeals. SY 2016-2017 . FRANCISCA MADRIÑAN G. 03-03-04-SC (April 22. respondent was entitled to custody of the minors. 159374 July 12. Page 78 LLB III-C. Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married. Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s care. and after a bitter quarrel. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. or with any of its members and. FELIPE MADRIÑAN vs. Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369. 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that: Section 20. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. if so granted.M. petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently. No. family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling. the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture. Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition. the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention. at past noon. their agents. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007. While the aforementioned case was pending. No. they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition. Aggrieved.R. the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. to Admit Supporting Affidavits. the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition. Where powerful military officers are implicated. Forthwith. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1. Page 79 LLB III-C. 180906 October 7. On 23 August 2007. or persons acting in their stead. the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. MANALO G. the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). On 26 December 2007. ISSUES: Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be invoked. and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. 2008 (Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus) FACTS: On 14 February 2006. SY 2016-2017 . representatives. On 25 October 2007. confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved. Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). Injunction. and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. ANSWER: It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements. and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody. the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves. and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. No. ” Article 3 of the UDHR provides. xxx Third. but essentially an individual international human right. As the degree of physical injury increases. physical disabilities. strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. xxx Second. organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families. the “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. Section 2. Article III. it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom from threat. liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. In the context of the writ of amparo. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule. the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Thus. First. in criminal law.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle.2. a cause of action. Notably. the danger to life itself escalates. In other words. Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. “freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life. in the amparo context. and painful physical intrusion.” In its “whereas” clauses. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. Protection includes conducting effective investigations. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II. as a general rule. Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III.” Viewed in this light. It may constitute dismemberment. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear. viz: Everyone has the right to life. and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. the right to security of person is “freedom from fear. the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life. threat is a stimulus. the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security. SY 2016-2017 . Fear is a state of mind. liberty and security of person. one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination. Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked –While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9. a reaction. Page 80 LLB III-C. Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that. liberty or security is the actionable wrong. The Court has reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private respondent’s change of name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally justifiable cause for allowing such change. The petitioner’s mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband therefrom and it was again approved. Legal constraints lead the court to reject private respondent’s desire to use her step. confusion arose as to her parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio s surname causing much embarrassment on her part. she contends that in such situations. was still considered a minor. Vicencio left their conjugal property in Meycauayan Bulacan and never returned nor gave support to his family. 1987. the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted private respondent Cynthia’s petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. 1998 (Rule 108 . the private respondent although already 18 years old when the Appellate Court rendered its decision. as it may trigger deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. SY 2016-2017 . in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname. Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her husband. 1971 to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Lebres. Page 81 LLB III-C. On June 29. On January 10. The court also contends that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage. ISSUE: Whether or not the Appellate Court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision of the trial court to allow the change in private respondent’s surname to that of her stepfather’s surname.father’s surname and no assurance exists that the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person. The Office of the Solicitor General having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses. 1986. it was Ernesto Yu who had taken Vicencio’s place. and Hon. more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if private respondent is to use his stepfather’s surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. 1976. leabres filed a petition with the juvenile and domestic relations court for the dissolution of her conjugal partnership with Vicencio. 1989. and such petition was granted. evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real father. The same was affirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28. REPUBLIC vs CA G. that of her stepfather. manifested opposition over the petition. On the other hand. failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name. after a marital disagreement. 1927. Corona Ibay-Somera decided in favour of the petitioner’s mother on April 26. HELD: Yes. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related activities.R NO. On August 31.Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) FACTS: The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19. It is Page 101 of 112 also noteworthy that as a result of Republic Act 6809. and that in his absence. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to consider adoption. Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. And the result of these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the petitioner’s mother and Ernesto Yu on April 15. 1984. 88202 December 14. contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents. HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. Those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely misspelled. etc. duly served on the Solicitor General. Page 82 LLB III-C. and not changes or corrections involving civil status. the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng. it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. Respondent Leonor Valencia. a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu. occupation of parents. and notice thereof. and changing also the status of the mother from “married” to “single” the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial. filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents. 3043-R. 1986 (Rule 108 – Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) FACTS: Respondent Leonor Valencia.. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance. once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No. SY 2016-2017 . or citizenship which are substantial and controversial. involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors. L-32181 March 5. It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. ISSUE: Whether or not the proper suit or appropriate action was filed by the respondent. their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if (1) the proper court suit is filed. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. That respondents have complied with these requirements.R. REPUBLIC vs. for and in behalf of her minor children filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. However. which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted. but one involving nationality or citizenship. nationality. The Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. and (2) evidence is submitted either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same. VALENCIA G. The local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from “Chinese” to “Filipino” and their status from “Legitimate” to “Illegitimate”. the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate. Affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. Erlinda Reynoso Reyes prayed for the declaration of absence of her husband Roberto L. There are properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court. invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. law only require that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage. His wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her. When he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the court. When to declare for absence: 1. Reyes who have been absent in their house since April 1962 due to a misunderstanding over personal matters. The spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property. 2. that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Court of First Instance dismissed the case. Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. it is necessary to judicially declare spouse an absentee only when 1. ALEJANDRO G. The spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property or 3. it was right for the Trial Court to dismiss the case. Erlinda claimed that they acquired no proprerties or debts during their marriage. HELD: No. The provision is concerned with the interest or property of the absentee. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. 2.R. 1986 (Rule 107 – Absentees) FACTS: In October 1969. ISSUE: Whether or not Roberto Reyes must be judicially declared absent. He left no will or debts. Since then she doesn’t know his whereabouts. Wife is asking the Court that the administration of property in the marriage be transferred to her. Page 83 LLB III-C. REYES vs. No. L-32026 January 16. Her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband. 3. For civil marriage. that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living. Otherwise. SY 2016-2017 . since there were no properties to speak of. In this case. HELD: No. A clerical error is one which visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. 1998.R. BENEMERITO G. leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings. SY 2016-2017 . A change of the father’s name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito appearing therein from September 01. 2004 (Rule 108 – Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) FACTS: Respondent Petronio L Benemerito. Edna V. Benemerito. The proceeding there contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical. REPUBLIC vs. The date of the marriage Joven Lee’s parents. 146963 March 15. in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. an error made by a clerk or transcriber is a mistake in copying or writing or harmless changes such as a correction of a name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. spelling typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings. Nueva Ecija. in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Joven Lee Benemerito. on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Guimba. Sicat and Petronio L. The entries sought to be corrected includes: 1. filed a verified petition before the RTC of Nueva Ecija asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son. Page 84 LLB III-C. states the procedure by which an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The obvious effect of the enactment of RA 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register. No. 1989 to January 25. ISSUE: Whether or not the entries sought to be corrected are innocuous. On the other hand. and 2. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Whether Marivel or respondent’s parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceedings is necessary. as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned “married” status of Carlito and his sibling’s parents and the latter’s citizenship from “Filipino” to “Chinese”. 2002. petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature. SY 2016-2017 . 2007 (Rule 109 – Appeals in Special Proceedings) FACTS: Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. HELD: No. Page 85 LLB III-C. It may not be amiss to mention.R. the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non- inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding. they could be only granted through and adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties such as Marivel and respondent’s parents should have been notified or impleaded. REPUBLIC vs. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial courts judgment void. No. In the present petition. 170340 June 29. Marivel. KHO G. faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implied minor’s mother. that during the hearing on January 31. The court held that the publication of the order of hearing cured the failure to implead an indispensable party. unverified and not notarized petitions granted by the Court. No. there are petitions where the date of filing were simultaneous or ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision and were found to have either no court action or no further action for a considerable length of time. PANIQUI. they contended that these petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved innocuous errors that may be subject of administrative corrections under R.A. ISSUES: 1. Whether the summary procedure prescribed in R. almost all of them have no hearings conducted that it will be improbable if not possible that the court orders be published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the Rules of Court. 2. The local civil registrar has primary. 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before the courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution of said petitions. applications to take board examinations and petitions to travel abroad.A. Moreover. there is nothing in R. 2. Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an Explanation. No. Moreover. 9048 allows corrections of entries without hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted.) No. Matter No.A.A.A. The procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. SY 2016-2017 . HELD: 1. with R. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceedings before the local civil registrar. Since R. jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname. then presided by Judge Cesar M. The trial court resolved these petitions with dispatch to accommodate the petitioners’ need to have their civil registry documents immediately corrected to conform with their passport applications. Since R. it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for the correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. No. There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. No. 9048 which authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. As to the petitions that were resolved on the same date as the date of filing or date of hearing. not exclusive. Further.A. Page 86 LLB III-C. 2007 (Rule 103 – Change of Name. Yes. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied with. they explained that almost all of these petitions may be covered by Republic Act (R. 9048 prescribing the procedure that the petitioner and local civil registrar should follow. 9048 should be adopted in cases filed before the courts.A. RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. During the course of the audit it was observed by the Audit Team that almost all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod as ex- officio notary public. Branch 67. Tarlac. Whether trial courts still have jurisdiction over petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name and nickname in the civil registry. As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and publication. 06-7-414-RTC October 19. the trial court considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions for correction of entries filed before it. 9048. BR. No. No. No. Rule 108 – Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) FACTS: This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui. TARLAC Adm. Judge Sotero was more lenient in such instances since in his view no substantial prejudice would ensue. 67. The promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. There are even unsigned. The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned. 2007 (Rule 103 – Change of Name. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. the sex of a person is determined at birth. 1962. Under the Civil Register Law. a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely. In this case. if not attended by error. 2002. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. he failed to show. Thus. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. He underwent psychological examination. 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. From then on. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth. that is. the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth. No. petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. that is. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila on April 4. he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. hormone treatment and breast augmentation. is immutable. assuming it could be legally done. "anatomically male but feels. Thailand. Page 87 LLB III-C. 174689 October 22." ISSUE: Whether sex reassignment a valid ground for the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate. any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest." and his sex from "male" to "female. More importantly. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. His sex was registered as "male. SY 2016-2017 . HELD: No. or even allege. Also. a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Branch 8. visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative. Rule 108 – Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) FACTS: On November 26.R. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27. In addition. Before a person can legally change his given name. under RA 9048. petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. The petitioner impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. that provided under RA 9048. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion. respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). the Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion. 2008 (Rule 103 – Change of Name. she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. she alleged that she was born on January 13. she has become a male person. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. like respondent. to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can change her sex and name in the birth certificate based upon her condition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. Biologically. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons. Laguna. The Court views that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual. 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up. Branch 33 of Siniloan. SY 2016-2017 .R. Rule 108 – Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) FACTS: Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion. As a result. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender. In her petition. the Court finds merit in respondent’s change of name. CAGANDAHAN G. is fixed. Page 88 LLB III-C. 166676 September 12. she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. like respondent. The respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. No. HELD: Yes. However. JENNIFER B. having reached the age of majority. As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male. nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Thus. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the rule. HELD: No. 2002. and Consuelo M. RENE B. 12022. 2010 (Rule 109 – Appeals in Special Proceedings) FACTS: Jaime Robles. but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22. a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. No. Macario J. denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by the Rules of Court. On 12 October 1999. The RTC. the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding. the said order appointed Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property. On April 16. in an order dated 22 November 1999. prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. Rodriguez and Settlement of their Estates. Accordingly. the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. In special proceedings. however. the 13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. hence. SY 2016-2017 . Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Delfin Rodriguez. 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not Robles has timely made an appeal before the RTC. It. 2000. On 13 August 1999. ROBLES G. Robles then appealed the August 13. Antonio Rodriguez. Rodriguez. In a Resolution dated February 14. 1999 for Robles' failure to file a record on appeal. 182645 December 15.R. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal. the decision or order becomes final. the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13. It was. In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez. therefore. After hearing on Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator. JAIME M. the Court referred the petition to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with the Court and that no special and important reason was cited for the Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance. PASCUAL vs. an error for the Court of Appeals to entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles' appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality. it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. In the case under consideration. in his opposition. such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate. the RTC dismissed the oppositions of Robles for his failure to substantiate his claim of heirship to the late Hermogenes. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal being perfected. Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal. Page 89 LLB III-C. re- affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the opposition of Robles. On 27 April 1999.