How far has Sino-Japanese conflictover the East China Sea affected their bilateral relations since 2010? Name : Loo Yongquan School Name: Pioneer Junior College Subject Name: China Studies in English Higher 2 Subject Code: 9628 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Introduction This paper examines the repercussions of the East China Sea (ECS) conflict on Sino- Japanese relations since September 2010, when a Chinese trawler collided with Japanese coast guards for the first time in the ECS.1 Amidst strong historical claims over the ECS and the discovery of abundant resources, the ECS has seen a clash of interests of both Asian giants for decades. 2 The collision in the ECS was seen as a serious provocation and could have prevented either country from exploiting resources in the region. As a result, both countries switched from a laissez-faire attitude to a more bellicose policy vis-à-vis the ECS, significantly denting Sino-Japanese relations.3 Though it seems that relations have only deteriorated as a result of the conflict, some suggest otherwise citing the economic interdependence and strong cultural ties that both countries enjoyed during the ECS conflict.4 This study argues that the ECS has negatively impacted the social, economic and political aspects of the relationship– with even ostensibly robust economic ties suffering.5 This can largely be attributed to the geopolitical struggle between a rising 1 “Arrested in Disputed Seas Riles China and Japan”, The New York Times, Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, 19th September 2010, 2 Haruna Minoura, “Energy Security and Japan-China Relations: Competition or Cooperation?”, George Washington University, 2008 3 Shinju Fujihira, “The trawler trigger”, Can Japanese Democracy Cope with China’s Rise? page 39 4 Armstrong Shiro, “China-Japan economic embrace is warm enough to thaw the Politics”, East Asia Forum in the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian University Press, 27th September 2015 Jin Xi-De, “China-Japan Relations: How to Manage a Complex Relationship? China: Yunling Zhang (ed.) Making New Partnership - a Rising China and Its Neighbours”, Beijing, Social Science Press, 25th April 2015, page 45 5 Sheila A. Smith, “Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China”, Columbia University Press, 2016 Page 1 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 China and a waning Japan, which has caused a paradigm shift in the balance of power in Asia, eliciting animosities on both sides. Page 2 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Social ties Some argue that the souring of bilateral social ties has been alleviated through continuous engagement in cultural exchanges amidst tense disputes in the ECS, apparently limiting ramifications on social ties. Despite tense diplomatic relations, students have engaged in cultural exchanges with the aim to improve relations hurt by the ECS and to bring the two countries closer to each other.6 Today, more Japanese study in China and vice-versa than ever before, forging stronger trust despite the ECS dispute, according to Chinese scholar Jin Xi-De.7 Similarly, others see the rise in Japanese and Chinese bilateral tourism evinced in Annex 1 as evidence of greater social exchanges amidst diplomatic outbursts.8 This view is propounded by political science professor Lotus Yang Ruan who goes a step further than Jin, contending that increased tourism is a potent force to improve strained bilateral socio-political relations.9 6 “Culture, cost and proximity draw Chinese students to Japan”, The Japan Times, Teru Clavel, 22nd April 2015 “More Young Japanese Heading Abroad to Study”, New York Times, Miki Tanikawa, 24th March 2013 7 Jin Xi-De, “China-Japan Relations: How to Manage a Complex Relationship”, Yunling Zhang (ed.), “Making New Partnership - a Rising China and Its Neighbours”, Beijing, Social Science Press, page 45 “Tourist numbers continue to surge in Japan, with China underpinning rise”, The Japan Times, Tomoko Otake, 16th September 2015 8 Refer to Annex 1. JTB Tourism Research and Consulting co, Japan inbound tourism <http://www.tourism.jp/en/tourism-database/stats/inbound/ > 8 China travel guide, https://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/2011statistics/inbound.htm, China inbound tourism from 2009 to 2015 9 “Japan’s China-Driven Tourism Boom”, The Diplomat, Lotus Yang Ruan, June 2015 Page 3 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 However, upon closer inspection of both Jin and Ruan’s views, this paper points out two fundamental flaws that undermine the veracity of these two arguments. Firstly, they could be faulted for painting an overly simplistic view of the ECS conflict. As Sheila A. Smith and many other political scientists are quick to point out, Sino- Japanese relations are multi-dimensional; mere cultural exchanges do not fully reflect true social ties as there are many other factors, such as historical animosities, at play.10 Secondly, the views of Ruan and Jin could be overly optimistic, given the insignificant magnitude of exchanges; after all, students and tourists only represent the affluent 0.001% of Chinese, and 0.02% of Japanese.11 While examining the data on tourists and students is useful in giving us one perspective on social ties, it fails to provide a holistic picture. Therefore, to bypass this limitation and to give a more accurate, wholesome representation of social ties, this paper analyses polls by Pew research centre, reflecting views of the entire population over time shown in Annex 2.12 As evinced by the polls, the preponderance of respondents from both countries have had negative perceptions of their counterparts following the 2010 trawler incident, with clear spikes in negative perceptions following the 2010 event; an opinion which this paper staunchly upholds, especially with the improved accuracy of the more holistic approach of the polls. 10 Sheila A. Smith, “Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China”, Columbia University Press, July 2016 11 The data was calculated based on the number of Japanese/Chinese tourists divided by their total population 12 Refer to Annex 2. Pew research centre, Hostile neighbours: China vs Japan, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/09/13/hostile-neighbors-china-vs-japan>, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10b and Q10n Page 4 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 With this in mind, this paper has sought to examine the reasons why social relations suffered so drastically right after the ECS conflict. One explanation is unreconciled bitterness from World War II13 – a view put forth by professor Lionel Beehner.14 The ECS would have drawn traumatising parallels to the war, reopening psychological wounds and hatred from the war, leading to the spikes in negative perceptions.15 However, while this paper agrees with Beehner that the ECS did reinforce historical animosities, it disagrees over the extent of impact it had during the ECS. When corroborated with Annex 2, it can be seen that negative perceptions were present as early as 2006, suggesting that independent of the ECS conflict, historical differences had already significantly deteriorated social ties.16 After all, conflicts over controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have exacerbated strained relations since 1985 when then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone first paid his respects at the Yasukuni shrine.17 Therefore, it is highly improbable that historical animosities played the most significant role in the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. Instead, to better explain the sharp increase in negative perceptions after the ECS conflict, this paper argues that it is due to the political landscape at the time of occurrence of the conflict. Nationalistic tensions over the disputed territories is a result of the overarching tussle between a rising China and a faltering Japan that has 13 Michele Le, The Problem with History: China’s Collective Memory in Sino-Japanese Relations, Middletown: Wesleyan University, 2011 14 “Despite their deep economic ties, animosity between China and Japan periodically resurfaces over territorial, historical, and economic disputes”, “Strained ties between China and Japan”, Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/strained-ties- between-china-and-japan>, Lionel Beehner and Preeti Bhattacharji 15 Refer to Annex 2. Pew research centre, Hostile neighbours: China vs Japan, < http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/09/13/hostile-neighbors-china-vs-japan>, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10b and Q10n 16 Ibid. 17 “Anger as PM honours war dead”, The Guardian, Jonathan, 2001 Page 5 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 occurred at the same time- a view espoused by professor Linus Hagström.18 The changing geopolitical context has resulted in bitter feelings and fear among Japanese as they have been unable to accept their loss of status and are fearful of the rise of an unfriendly neighbour.19 An identity crisis has been sparked, and has worsened over time as China’s GDP steadily overtook Japan- shown by Figure 1. In fact, in the year 2010, when perceptions first started to worsen, China’s economy had just overtaken Japan’s. The sobering fact that Japan’s GDP has been slowing while China’s GDP has been growing exponentially, shown in Figure 1 as China’s GDP caught up with that of Japan, cemented Japanese fears of being sidestepped internationally, and with the ECS conflict arising at the same time, perhaps it was inevitable that negative perceptions exploded. Figure 1: China’s GDP as a percentage of Japan’s GDP Source: RIETI 201420 18 Linus Hagström, “The rise of The Chinese ‘other’ in Japan’s construction of identity, Is China a focal point of Chinese nationalism?”, Identity Change and Foreign Policy Japan and it’s others, Shogo Shuzuki, page 95 19 Sheila A. Smith, “Asian Affairs”, Volume 35, pages 230-256 20 The Rise of China and Transformation of Japan-China Relations: Opportunities and challenges for Japan. RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry) findings by Chi Hung KWAN Consulting Fellow, <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/14080501.html> Page 6 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 In the case of China, growth in confidence as a rising power increased its negative perception of Japan, as this caused its people to increasingly view her as a contentious enemy in its territorial disputes, as put forth by Scholar Akio Takahara.21 A stronger China – unleashed in 2010- has increased the confidence of Chinese by making them feel more powerful – enforcing the mindset that they have the ability and right to reclaim ‘their’ territories. This viewpoint can be understood when corroborated by Chinese foreign relations specialist Shannon Tiezzi’s analysis of China which explains the historical context: the Chinese used to be less confident due to Western hegemony over the past two centuries, but as China rose as a global power gradually rivalling the US, confidence has grown.22 As such, when the territorial disputes caused headlines in 2012 with the nationalisation of the islands, this change in mindset caused many Chinese citizens to take unprecedented actions such as committing widescale protests across 100 cities in China, showing their increasing willingness to make an enemy of Japan.23 21 Akio Takahara, “Change in China’s approach to international relations”, Putting the Senkaku Dispute Back into Pandora’s Box: Toward A “2013 Consensus”, Pages 77-78 22 “The China Can Say No Effect”, The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi, 7th August 2014 23 “China protests over Japanese activists' visit to disputed islands”, The Guardian, Tania Bradigan, 19th August 2012 Page 7 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Economical aspect Some also argue that economic interdependence has alleviated the impact of the ECS conflict and perhaps signalling the limited impact of the ECS conflict on economic relations. Bilateral economic ties have remained relatively unchanged in spite of the ongoing conflict in the ECS, with the China-Japan trade relationship still the second- most important economic relationship in the world in 2016, perhaps implying a limited impact on economic relations. 24 Professor Michael Yahuda thus decided to declare relations safe, even coining the situation ‘Hot economics Cold politics’, where despite political skirmishes over the ECS, economic relations remain safe as both countries would be unwilling to give up such profitable ties, especially with the economic slowdown in both countries.25 However, contrary to this conventional viewpoint, this essay rebuts Yahuda’s view because the shaking-up of economic relations resulting from ECS has revealed the sheer instability and volatility of bilateral trade showing that perhaps the economic ties are not as “safe” as previously thought. This essay agrees more with the expert Sheila A. Smith who stands at the other end of the spectrum, claiming that the ECS threw Sino-Japanese economic relations into rocky waters.26 This is because the ECS devastated current economic ties with long-lasting ramifications as well, boding badly for future economic relations. The 2010 trawler incident caused the CCP to impose a rare earth embargo to Japan, putting Japan in a severe economic position for a short 24 Trading Economics 2016, Japan imports and exports by country, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/imports-by-country> 25 Michael Yahuda, “The significance of economic interdependence”, “Sino-Japanese relations after the Cold War: Two tigers sharing a mountain”, Pages 133-135 26 Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China, Columbia University Press, July 2016 Page 8 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 while before rescinding the ban.27 Similarly, the 2012 nationalization of the islands in the ECS immediately sparked a massive boycott of Japanese businesses in China resulting in an approximate loss of 100 million USD for Japanese companies.28 This suggests that with economic ties faltering so easily, the relationship, as Sheila argues, is more unstable than previously thought. The unstable economic relationship is also seen in the long term with foreign direct investments between both countries decreasing, linked in part to the ECS conflict which has damaged business confidence.29 As a result, this has deterred investment and even caused big players such as Sony to diversify their production away from China. 30 In the long term, this has weakened their economic ties because less investments end up successful. Hence, with this in mind, this paper firmly believes that the ECS conflict has severely damaged economic ties due to the inherent instability and weakness of the previously thought “safe” economic ties. In order to explain the cause of economic ties being so hard hit, this paper once again highlights the political landscape at the time of the emergence of the ECS dispute. In conjunction with the view of Scholar Junhua Wu, this paper attributes the deterioration to the changing geopolitical context in the region.31 With increased Chinese confidence in their economic clout, the Chinese believe that it is now capable of delivering a crippling economic blow to Japan without suffering significant repercussions, therefore explaining their willingness to undermine economic relations. 27 ‘Amid tensions, China blocks vital exports to Japan, New York Times, Keith Bradsher, September 22nd 2010 28 ‘Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japan Protests’, The New York Times, Ian Johnson and Tom Shanker, September 16th 2012 29 ‘With Tensions Rising, Japanese Investment in China Plummets’, Bloomberg, Dexter Roberts, July 2014 30 “Panasonic to close China TV factory”, Japan Times, 31st January 2015 31 Junhua Wu, “Economic Integration as a Driver of the Shifting Power Balance”, “Economics of the Territorial Disputes”, Pages 71-73 Page 9 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 This was illustrated following the boat collision where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had the audacity to impose embargoes of rare earth minerals on Japan and boycotts of Japanese products. At present, China feels that Japan is unable to retaliate economically, a stand justified by China’s diminishing dependence on Japan as exemplified in Figure 2. In contrast, a declining Japan is becoming more heavily reliant on China explaining why Japan has neither engaged in retaliatory embargoes against China nor committed to wide-scale boycotts of Chinese products. Figure 2: Changing Dependence of China on Bilateral Exports and Imports Source: RIETI 201432 32 The Rise of China and Transformation of Japan-China Relations: Opportunities and challenges for Japan. RIETI findings by Chi Hung KWAN Consulting Fellow, RIETI, <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/14080501.html> Page 10 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Political aspect In the analysis of the political aspect of ties, a common viewpoint expounded by professor Akihiko Kimijima33 posits that the underlying willingness for cooperation between both countries over the ECS conflict has limited the deterioration of political ties perhaps suggesting limited impact of the ECS – which strikes us as quizzical considering the near-constant media coverage of the negative political consequences of the ECS. This argument is based on two fundamental facts: firstly that economic benefits accrued from trade are vital for governments to garner support in both countries, due to the pressure of the masses reliant on them to maintain a strong economy34, incentivizing them to cooperate; secondly, that they are constrained by external pressures to cooperate, especially with the US’s recently redoubled political pressure on both countries to resolve the conflict peacefully.35 33 “Defense Postures of the United States, China, and Japan”, Akihiko Kimijima, “From Power Politics to Common Security: The Asia Pacific’s Roadmap to Peace”, Page 58 34 “A slower slowdown”, The Economist, S.R, May 13th 2015 35 “Obama visits a troubled East Asia”, Nikkei Asian Review, April 16, 2014, Tobias Harri “Obama says US will defend Japan in island dispute with China”, Justin McCurry, The Guardian, 24th April 2014 Page 11 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Certain diplomatic actions taken to resolve the conflict seem to illustrate this need to cooperate peacefully, such as the joint statement from the leaders of both countries expressing willingness to cooperate on the side-lines of the G20 Summit in Hangzhou36 and the willingness of China to place police guards rather than People’s Liberation Army members in the East China Sea37, in an attempt to limit the possibility of war breaking out in the region. However, the problem with this view is that there appears to be a discrepancy between apparent willingness to cooperate and many of the actions actually carried out in the ECS. For instance, the unrelenting arms race that both countries have engaged in has possibly been spurred on in part by the ECS conflict, with both nationalistic leaders Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe themselves expressing the need for ‘increased spending because of territorial disputes’.38 This is in direct contradiction to their supposed willingness in ‘taking actions to limit war’. The ECS conflict has also influenced Mr. Abe into expressing his determination to alter article 9 of Japan’s constitution in order to allow Japan to build a military force.39 This paper therefore firmly argues that due to the lack of commitment to such ideals, the possibility of resolving tensions in the region peacefully was in fact hindered and on the whole, political ties may not have improved and could in fact have worsened. This paper also postulates that the worsening of political ties may have been due to expectations placed on leaders to prioritize national pride to the point of sacrificing 36 “Xi Jinping tells Japanese PM Shinzo Abe that it’s time to move forward”, South China Morning Post, Liu Zhen, 5th September 2016 37 “East China Sea: 4 China Coast Guard Vessels Enter Territorial Sea Near Disputed Islands”, The Diplomat, Ankit Panda, May 9th 2017 38 “Japan in record military spending amid Chinese tensions”, BBC, December 2016 “China to increase defence spending by '7-8%' in 2016 – official”, The Guardian, 4th March 2016 39 “Abe underscores article 9 revision”, The Japan News, JJ press, 9th May 2017 Page 12 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 cooperation. The expectations are largely due to the mounting pressures faced at home – where the incensed public vocally demanded a harsh stance on the ECS as a result of transformed perceptions due to the changing geopolitical context – as corroborated by Sheila’s viewpoint.40 To ensure popular support, leaders felt compelled by political necessity to commit to strong and harsh actions over the ECS to respond to the wants of the people. Thus, these strong-arm tactics may have led to deterioration of political relations as each country was forced to increase levels of nationalistic rhetoric which could have (and actually did) offended citizens in both countries. Their stance seems to have been justified with the continuous grip on power by both Abe and Xi because their strong stance on the ECS aligned with the wants of the people. In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan won a landslide electoral victory in 2012 which can largely be attributed to the ECS conflict making the Japanese public disillusioned with the more pacifist approach of the Democratic Party of Japan. In contrast, Abe was able to consistently garner votes because of his strong nationalist stance on the ECS conflict which most Japanese greatly approved of. Similarly, Xi received massive support41, signalling that his actions in the ECS have appealed to the masses and strengthened his support42. Hence, the changing geopolitical context of a rising China and declining Japan affecting the views of people has forced political leaders to reciprocate by maintaining an increasingly aggressive stance on the ECS discouraging diplomacy and worsening political ties. Sheila A. Smith, “Intimate Rivals Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China”, Columbia 40 University Press, 2016 41 “The world’s most popular leader”, The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi, December 2014 42 Sitthiphon Kruarattikan, “China at the Turn of the 21st century: The Role of Public Opinion in its Relations with Japan”, International Journal of China Studies, page 153, August 2015 Page 13 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Conclusion Indeed, the ECS was detrimental to Sino-Japanese relations as evidenced by its damage to all three aspects of ties examined. Though it was argued that the importance of cultural ties and economic interdependence in maintaining stable ties cannot be dismissed, many political scientists often overestimate their significance. In their optimism, they fail to take into account the sheer seriousness of the ECS conflict and thus often underrate its potential to harm ties. Even the supposedly indestructible economic ties were devastated as a result of the conflict, boding ill for the already strained socio-political ties. At the crux of the deteriorating relationship resulting from the ECS has been the changing geopolitical climate where China’s meteoric rise in recent years threatens Japan’s status quo, causing negative perceptions, which were previously already at high levels due to historical animosities, to deteriorate to unprecedented levels. The negative perceptions, amplified by the ECS conflict, even spilled over to the realm of economics with China’s actions, fuelled by increased economic confidence, serving to damage Japanese businesses. Nationalistic sentiments also forced the governments to act harshly on the ECS, compelled by political necessity to safeguard their political legitimacy. Subsequently, military spending skyrocketed due to the ECS conflict, signalling belligerent intentions on both sides, and forcing relations to enter a perilous stage where decisions are taken through visceral actions rather than sheer pragmatic means. (Word count: 2498) Page 14 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Annex section Annex 1 Overseas Residents' Visits to Japan by Region China United States Source: Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO)43 Inbound tourist from Japan to China Year Japanese tourists in China in millions 2010 3.13 2011 3.65 2012 3.51 2013 2.87 2014 2.71 Source: China National Tourism Administration44 43 JTB Tourism Research and Consulting co, Japan inbound tourism <http://www.tourism.jp/en/tourism-database/stats/inbound/ > 44 “China inbound tourism from 2009 to 2015”, China National Tourism Administration,<https://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/2011statistics/inbound.htm> Page 15 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Annex 2 Japanese views of China Chinese views of Japan Source: Pew research centre, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10b and Q10n45 45 Pew research centre, Hostile neighbours: China vs Japan, < http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/09/13/hostile-neighbors-china-vs-japan>, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10b and Q10n Page 16 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Bibliography Books 1. Jin Xi-De, “China-Japan relationship: How to manage a complex relationship, China: Making New Partnership - a Rising China and Its Neighbours” 2. Linus Hagström, “The rise of The Chinese ‘other’ in Japan’s construction of identity, Is China a focal point of Chinese nationalism?”, Identity Change and Foreign Policy Japan and its others, 3. Michael Yahuda, “The significance of economic interdependence”, “Sino- Japanese relations after the Cold War: Two tigers sharing a mountain” 4. Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China, Columbia University Press, 2016 5. Smith, China in 2010, Asian Affairs, Volume 35, No. 4, Journals/ Academic articles 1. Akio Takahara, “Change in China’s approach to international relations”, Putting the Senkaku Dispute Back into Pandora’s Box: Toward A “2013 Consensus” 2. Armstrong Shiro, “China-Japan economic embrace is warm enough to thaw the Politics”, East Asia Forum in the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian University Press, 25th April 2015 3. Akihiko Kimijima, “Defense Postures of the United States, China, and Japan”, “From Power Politics to Common Security: The Asia Pacific’s Roadmap to Peace” 4. Haruna Minoura, “Energy Security and Japan-China Relations: Competition or Cooperation?”, George Washington University, 2008 Page 17 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 5. Jin Xi-De, “China-Japan Relations: How to Manage a Complex Relationship? China: Yunling Zhang (ed.) Making New Partnership - a Rising China and Its Neighbours”, Beijing, Social Science Press 6. Junhua Wu, “Economic Integration as a Driver of the Shifting Power Balance”, Economics of the Territorial Disputes 7. Michele Le, “The Problem with History: China’s Collective Memory in Sino- Japanese Relations”, Middletown: Wesleyan University, 2011 8. Shinju Fujihira, “The trawler trigger”, Can Japanese Democracy Cope with China’s Rise? 9. Sitthiphon Kruarattikan, “China at the Turn of the 21 st century: The Role of Public Opinion in its Relations with Japan”, International Journal of China Studies, August 2015 News articles 1. “East China Sea: 4 China Coast Guard Vessels Enter Territorial Sea Near Disputed Islands”, The Diplomat, May 9 2017, Ankit Panda 2. “Arrested in Disputed Seas Riles China and Japan”, The New York Times, 19th September 2010, Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson 3. Japan’s China-Driven Tourism Boom”, The Diplomat, June 2015, Lotus Yang Ruan 4. “Culture, cost and proximity draw Chinese students to Japan”, The Japan Times, 22nd April 2015, Teru Clavel 5. “More Young Japanese Heading Abroad to Study”, New York Times, 24th March 2013, Miki Tanikawa Page 18 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 6. Tourist numbers continue to surge in Japan, with China underpinning rise”, The Japan Times, 16th September 2015, Tomoko Otake 7. “Anger as PM honours war dead”, Jonathan, The Guardian, 2001 8. Tourist numbers continue to surge in Japan, with China underpinning rise, The Japan Times, September 16 2015, Tomoko Otake 9. “Culture, cost and proximity draw Chinese students to Japan”, The Japan Times, 22nd April 2015, Teru Clavel 10. “More Young Japanese Heading Abroad to Study”, New York Times, 24th March 2013, Miki Tanikawa 11. “Japan’s China-Driven Tourism Boom”, The Diplomat, June 2015, Lotus Yang Ruan 12. “The China Can Say No Effect”, The Diplomat, 7th August 2014, Shannon Tiezzi 13. “China protests over Japanese activists' visit to disputed islands”, The Guardian, 19th August 2012, Tania Bradigan 14. “Amid tensions, China blocks vital exports to Japan”, New York Times, September 22nd 2010, Keith Bradsher 15. “Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japan Protests”, Ian Johnson and Tom Shanker, The New York Times, September 16th 2012 16. With Tensions Rising, Japanese Investment in China Plummets’, Blomberg, July 2014, Dexter Roberts 17. “A slower slowdown”, The Economist, May 13th 2015, S.R 18. “Obama visits a troubled East Asia”, Nikkei Asian Review, April 16th 2014, Tobias Harris 19. “Panasonic to close China TV factory”, Japan Times, 31st January 2015 Page 19 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 20. Xi Jinping tells Japanese PM Shinzo Abe that it’s time to move forward”, South China Morning Post, 5 September 2016, Liu Zhen 21. “Japan in record military spending amid Chinese tensions”, BBC, December 2016 22. ‘China to increase defence spending by '7-8%' in 2016 – official’, The Guardian, 4th March 2016 23. “Abe underscores article 9 revision”, The Japan News, JJ press, 9th May 2017 24. “China’s Growth Slowest in 25 Years”, BBC news, 19th January 2016 25. “Obama says US will defend Japan in island dispute with China”, The Guardian, 24th April 2014, Justin McCurry Other statistical data 1. JTB Tourism Research and Consulting co, Japan inbound tourism <http://www.tourism.jp/en/tourism-database/stats/inbound/ > 2. China travel guide, https://www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/2011statistics/inbound.htm, China inbound tourism from 2009 to 2015 3. Pew research centre, Hostile neighbours: China vs Japan, 4. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/09/13/hostile-neighbors-china-vs-japan>, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10b and Q10a 5. The Rise of China and Transformation of Japan-China Relations: Opportunities and challenges for Japan. RIETI findings by Chi Hung KWAN Consulting Fellow, RIETI, <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/14080501.html 6. The Rise of China and Transformation of Japan-China Relations: Opportunities and challenges for Japan. RIETI (Research Institute of Page 20 of 22 Name: Loo Yongquan Subject code: 9628 Centre/ Index: 3030/73 Economy, Trade and Industry) findings by Chi Hung KWAN Consulting Fellow, <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/14080501.html> 7. Trading Economics, Japan imports and exports by country, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/imports-by-country> 8. Asian review, Nikkei, 'Foreign interference' has China spending 1tn yuan on military, Joyce Ho, Nikkei staff writer, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/China-s- annual-congress/Foreign-interference-has-China-spending-1tn-yuan-on- military> Page 21 of 22
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