Hazop & Hazid Report - Cng Gas Plant - Tambak Lorok Rev b

Project Title: ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS - TAMBAK LOMBOK HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT DOCUMENT STATUS Approved : Approved : as Noted Not Approved B A REV 24 JUL 2013 28 JUN 2013 DATE REISSUED FOR REVIEW ISSUED FOR REVIEW DESCRIPTION YS YS PREPARED MTH MTH CHECKED MEF MEF APPROVED COMPANY PT. Enviromate Technology International PT Pertadaya Gas HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2 INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND STUDY OBJECTIVES SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY REPORT LAYOUT PROJECT DESCRIPTION 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 18 18 18 18 19 20 JULY 2013 2.1 OVERVIEW 2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100) 2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B) 2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B) 2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-109) 2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100) 2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82) 2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger 2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200) 2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B) 2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process 2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B) 2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300) 2.1.13 Fuel Gas 2.1.14 Instrument air 2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400) 2.1.16 Fire water system 2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001) 2.1.18 Insulation 2.1.19 Vent System 3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 3.1 HAZOP 3.1.1 Overview 3.1.2 Worksheet Definition 3.2 HAZID 3.2.1 Overview 3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS INTRODUCTION THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM GUIDE WORDS DRAWINGS REVIEWED SELECTED NODES HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB PT. Enviromate Technology International PT Pertadaya Gas HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK 5 5.1 5.2 6 7 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP REFERENCES 21 21 23 25 26 APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C APPENDIX D HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS HAZOP REVIEW WORKSHEETS HAZID REVIEW WORKSHEETS DRAWINGS HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The PT Perta Daya Gas has awarded to PT. Enviromate Technology International (PT. ETI) to conduct and construction of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facility. The plant will be located at Tambak Lorok, Central Java, Indonesia. The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems. The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air Instrument Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package and Sump system. The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase will be performed on the peak load within 4 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders. Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger. Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders. The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza Citivew Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th, and 21st June 2013. The study identified 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings. HAZOP Design It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV) It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case. It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 4 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in overpressure of the system. The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak Lorok. It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type. Maintenance and Operational Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of redundant equipment such as compressor. To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically. HAZID In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide warning sign the area to use ear plug protection. Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g. FM-200,etc) The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant. During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack. Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay out and emergency lighting. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB JULY 2013 5 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation. Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among parties to make sure the plant is operated safely. MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO The Major Hazard of this plant is : • Process Hazard : 1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks 2. Gas Compression System 3. Hot water circulation system 4. Cold Venting Non Process Hazard : 1. Control Room located in hazardous area 2. Human Error - Alarm 3. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih 4. Transportation • HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 6 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND PT. Perta Daya Gas is planning to develop CNG Plant Project. The plant will be located at Tambak Lorok, Central Java province, Indonesia. PT. Perta Daya Gas therefore commissioned an independent Chairman and Scribe for a series of safety studies to review and identify hazards and operability issues related to operation of Compressed Natural Gas Plant Project. This report details the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) review and includes a summary of the recommendations identified during the review, as well as the HAZOP/HAZID review worksheets. 1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES The objectives of the HAZOP study are to: • Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the process that could directly threaten the safety of production personnel or cause operational problems; Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems; Identify engineering and procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified problem; Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and Recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary. • • • • The objectives of the HAZID study include: • • Assess changes and consider new requirements that have emerged since the last PHA; Identification of new hazard causes or initiating factors associated with the modifications with a potential to result in major accident events (MAEs), which may give rise to serious and immediate risk to health and safety of personnel; Assessment of the consequences of these new MAEs; Determination of risk based on the likelihood and the severity of the consequences for each identified MAEs; Identification of existing safeguards that may include engineering or operational controls and measures included in the design for prevention and/or mitigation of the MAEs; Evaluation of the residual risk taking into account the existing control and mitigation measures; and Recommendation of additional safeguards or procedures, where necessary to demonstrate as Low as Reasonable Practicable (ALARP). • • • • • HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 7 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY The HAZOP/HAZID study covers these packages in detail: 1. Main Proces System: · · · · · · · V-100 : Gas Scrubber M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering D-100A/B : Gas Dryer K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement V-400 : Sump Tank 2. Utilities · · · · · · · · WHRU and Hot Water circulation Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation Open & Close Drains Venting system Instrument Air System Fuel Gas System Fire Water Ring Engine Generator 1.4 REPORT LAYOUT This HAZOP/HAZID report is structured as follows: • • • • • • • • • Section 1 gives an introduction, defining the objectives and scope of the study; Section 2 describes the process; Section 3 describes the HAZOP/HAZID methodology; Section 4 describes the HAZOP/HAZID workshops; Section 5 lists the references given in the report; Appendix A presents the summary HAZOP & HAZID recommendations; Appendix B presents the HAZOP review worksheets; Appendix C presents the HAZID review worksheets; and Appendix D presents the Drawings used, outlining the nodes. 8 JULY 2013 HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 2.1 OVERVIEW The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems. The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air Instru-ment Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package and Sump system. The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase will be performed on the peak load within 4 to 5 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders. Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger. Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders. 2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100) The gas scrubber (V-100) will be installed on incoming gas to remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility. The liquid level on the gas scrubber will be controlled by control valve LV-0101 to avoid liquid carried over to the CNG Plant. High liquid level on the scrubber will initiate the valve to open, then if liquid level has reached normal condition valve will be closed, so the valve will be as on/off mode. The gas scrubber is provided with PSV-0101A/B with set pressure of 34 barg for overpressure protection, One PSV will be on operation and another one as spare. Inlet line will be provided with SDV-0101 in order to isolate the plant in emergency condition. The initiators of SDV-0101 closing refer to Cause & effect diagram. 2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B) The metering will measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant. Total gas inlet is 19.88 MMSCFD. Gas inlet would be 19.88 MMSCFD and flows to inlet compressor and 1.1 MMSCFD flows to auxiliary fuel gas. Metering type is 2x100% custody orifice meter. Metering will be operated in continous operation. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored by flow computer. Gas inlet to metering tends to consist of high moisture. Orifice should be designed for wet gas condition. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB JULY 2013 9 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B) The outlet gas from gas scrubber (V-100) will be dried through Gas Drying Unit (D-100A/B). Unit consist of two Gas Dryer + H2S absorber, i.e D-100A/B and D-200A/B. These will be operated on parallel configuration. Maximum capacity of drying Unit is 10 MMSCFD. The range of inlet pressure is 20.6-25 barg. One bed will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Gas dryer will remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40oC and maximum 3 ppm H2S. Dew point meter and H2S meter should be installed within Dryer package unit. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time is 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby). Gas dryer pre filter (F-100) will be provided at upstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to ensure that gas goes to molecular sieve is clean and no hydrocarbon liquid carried over. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation. Gas dryer after filter (F-110) will be provided on the downstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to ensure that are there is no solid particle carried over on the gas before entering the CNG compressor. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation. Blower, electric heater, air cooler and liquid knocked out drum will be provided on the regeneration line. A portion of dried gas will be utilized as regeneration gas. The regeneration gas will be heated by an electric heater then after removing the water on the desiccants, the regent gas will be cooling downed via the air cooler then liquid will be removed on the liquid knocked out drum. After removing liquid on the knocked out drum, regent gas will be re-injected on the main gas line. The valve sequences on the dryer unit will be controlled by a microprocessor on the dryer unit package. Running and fault status on the dryer package will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring only. This system is auto mode. No interlock system to main PCS. 2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-110) The dry gas from dryer with operating pressure of 20.6-25 barg at 26.7-51.7 oCwill be transferred to the storage cylinder at pressure of 250 barg through CNG compressors (K101/102/103/104/105/106/107/108/109/110). There are 10 (ten) compressor trains with 9 (nine) compressors will be operated in parallel and 1 (one) compressor on standby mode. Each compressor will be operated with outlet capacity of 2.3 MMSCFD at inlet pressure of 24 barg. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 10 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM The compressor is reciprocating type in three stages compression, air coolers will be provided on each discharge stage to enhance the efficiency of compressor. The maximum discharge pressure and temperature from CNG compressor are 250 barg and 48OC respectively. The compressor will be supplied by vendor as a skid including electrical and instrumentation inside. Control system of CNG compressor is provided with PLC by vendor, the operating parameter will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring purpose. Shutdown system of the compressors will be managed by PLC, trigger of shutdown such as lube oil pressure low, suction pressure low, discharge pressure high, discharge temperature high and High vibration will be further developed by vendor. Compressors are driven by Gas Engine drive with fuel gas that supplied from upstream of dryer skid. 2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100) Compressed gas from CNG compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC before entering to CNG cylinders. Cooling water system is closed loop cooling system which involving CNG cooler (E-100), Cooling water circulation pump (P-200A/B) and Cooling Tower (E400). The compressed natural gas need to be cooled down to 35oC for optimizing the requirement of cylinder storage capacity. The temperature of cooling water inlet to CNG cooler (E-100) is 30oC and temperature cooling water outlet at 39oC. To avoid prolonged overpressure due to tube rupture, CNG Compressor would be shut downed by PSHH-0503 then CNG gas would be release to cooling water return line to Cooling tower (E-400). DURING DECANTING PERIOD: Cooling water to CNG Cooler will be discontinued to produce CNG stream with temperature 48oC and it will be commingled with CNG stream from compartment (Temperature 35 oC). If pressure decreases and disturbing performance of CNG compressor then CNG stream could be flowed through E-100 bypass line. Restriction orifice installed in this bypass line to giving sufficient backpressure for CNG compressor. 2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82) CNG from E-200 will be stored at CNG storage cylinders. The CNG storage cylinders are consisting of 95 compartment (base on 20 hours storage time at 18.7 MMSCFD CNG inlet). Each compartment is consisting of 8 tube cylinders. One cylinder has capacity of 2.38 m3. Three CNG compartment will be arranged in 1 (one) bank. Each bank will be provided 1 unit manual valve for incoming and outgoing CNG. Pressure relief device (PSV) protect respectives cylinders. Discharge PSV will be released to atmosphere and no additional pipe is required for PSV discharge line. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 11 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger Double pipe exchanger would be installed at downstream of PV-0501 to minimize temperature drop during CNG depressuring by PV-0501 A/B. Heating media is using Hot water in outer pipe side and CNG stream in inner pipe. Timer valve (KV) would be opened to supply hot water to outer pipe of double pipe exchanger. Restriction orifice (RO) is provided on hot water inlet to restrict capacity of hot water to exchanger. If temperature at downstream PV-0501 close with -25o C, Hot water supply could be discontinued this condition occur when pressure in compartments was dropped. 2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200) The CNG Heat exchanger is required during decanting stage, this is to reheat CNG on the downstream of pressure reducing valve. The temperature decrease due to large pressure drop in PV0501A/B, this is called Joule Thompson effect. Temperature on the downstream can be lower than the dew point of CNG such that condensation may occurs. The CNG heat exchanger (E-200) maximum duty is 4100 kW (basis 4 hours decanting time) then duty will decrease gradually as the upstream pressure is reduced during decanting process. The initial stage of decanting, the temperature of CNG will be increased from -38oC to about 30oC. The heating media for this heat exchanger is hot water system with temperature of 90oC. Hot water circulation flowrate is 140 m3/hr and the flowrate to E-200 will be controlled by (TV0502). Temperature control Valve (TV-0502) will manipulate hot water flowrate to E-200 to maintain CNG export to the pipeline at temperature of 30oC. Temperature control is using cascade with TIC-0502. 2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B) The pressure of CNG outlet to PLN will be maintained at 28 barg and temperature of 30oC. PIC0501A/B are used for controlling CNG outlet pressure. Pressure reducing system will be provided by two control valves ( PV0501A/B) with one operating and one standby. This valve is designed base on 4 hours decanting time (96 MMSCFD). 2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process The storage and decanting process will be performed by opening and closing delivery valve (KV0501A/B) downstream of CNG storage cylinders. Storage CNG will be carried out fixed maximum 20 hours per day and decanting will be performed 4 to 5 hours per day. During decanting period the CNG Cooler (E-100) will be bypassed to reduced joule thomphson effect on the downstream of PV0501A/B. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 12 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM Duration of decanting can be resetted from the control room, but changing setting time shall refer to operating pressure on the CNG storage cylinders. Over pressure on the CNG cylinders will initiate high pressure on the discharge compressor then process shutdown can be triggered. 2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B) The metering system with 2x100% with crossover will measure natural gas outlet from CNG plant. Total gas outlet is 113 MMSCFD for 4 hours. Metering is used as custody meter. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored in main PLC. For Gas composition analysis, one sampling connection is installed at the upstream of Outlet Metering (M200A/B). Gas Flow would be measured for 4 hours per day during decanting time. Totalizer would count total value base on measured gasflow. 2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300) The exhaust gas from gas engines ducting will be utilized as source of energy to increase the temperature of hot water from 63oC to 90oC. Exhaust gas from each turbine will be commingled on header before entering WHRU, and water will be heating up on the WHRU boiler. Hot water from WHRU will be stored on the hot water storage Tank at temperature of 90oC. During storage phase (20 hours), WHRU would heat water in Hot water tank (T-200) for approximately 10 hours from 30o to 90o C. The water circulating pump (P-500 A/B) with capacity of 45m3/hr is used to circulate water from T-200 through WHRU heater (E-300) and back to T-200. During decanting phase (4 hours), Hot water pump (P-300 A/B) with capacity of 140 m3/h will circulate hot water from T-200 to E-200 and back to T-200. Temperature of hot water in the Hot water tank (T-200) is controlled by manipulating damper position on each exhaust gas Turbine of CNG compressors. 2.1.13 Fuel Gas Fuel gas is supplied for two (2) units gas engine generators (1 operation & 1 stand by) thru Fuel gas strainer and for ten (10) units gas engine compressors (9 operation and 1 unit standby). The fuel gas strainer is designed based on capacity of less than 1.5 MMSCFD. Fuel Gas metering (FQI-0901) is provided to measure auxilary fuel gas consumption in CNG facility. 2.1.14 Instrument air The instrument air will be provided on CNG plant to enhace the overall reliability of the Plant. Instrument air requirement is calculated based on the number of control valves and on-off control valves plus a design margin of 20%. Three (3) Air compressors will be provided with two operating as lead and lag basis and one compressor as a standby. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 13 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM Instrument air system will be provided with a drying unit such that the dew point of instrument air is less than -40oC. 2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400) Water as cooling media will be utilized for CNG Cooler (E-100) before storage stage, The CNG from gas compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC using cooled water. Cooling water is supplied to the heat exchangers through the Cooling Tower Pump (P-200 A/B) at flowrate of 35m3/hr. After taking heat of CNG, cooling water leaves heat exchanger at temperature of 30oC is re-circulated to the Cooling Tower ( E-400) for cooling down and reused. Make-up water will be provided to compensate water losses on the Cooling Tower (E-400). 2.1.16 Fire water system Fire water will be taken from existing fire water system in front of CNG plant. Fire hydrants and monitors will be located based on equipment layout during detail engineering. 2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001) Auxiliary water for CNG plant will be taken from well in plant. Well water will be treated by Reverse osmisis (RO) technology prior to be used as make up water. Total consumption for make up water is 3.2 m3/h. The feedwater to the RO unit will be design accordingly based on input from vendor. 2.1.18 Insulation Personnel Protection Insulation (PP) shall be specified on all lines with normal operating temperatures above 70°C. This will be applied only to sections of pipe that personnel could come into contact with during normal operation. Heat Conservation Insulation (HC) shall be specified for heated systems above 65°C (e.g. hot water from WHRU). Noise Abatement Insulation (NI) shall be specified on compressor suction and discharge lines, subject to vendor confirmation. 2.1.19 Vent System Relief Gas from Pressure safety valves and Blow down system would be collected to vent header then to vent stack. Automatic drain would be provided to controlling liquid level at bottom vent stack. Flame arrester would be installed at upstream of vent stack to avoid flame due to lightning or other fire source. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 14 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM Relief gas from CNG cylinders would be free vent to atmosphere instead of to vent header line as per client and manufacture requirement. The vent stack with providing water seal at the bottom of the vent stack to prevent air ingress. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 15 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 3.1 HAZOP 3.1.1 Overview The study was carried out using the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is broken down into manageable sections and a set of standard Guide Words applied. The methodology requires exhaustive consideration of each process activity to determine if there are any potential problems in relation to safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process. The Causes and Consequences of each deviation are identified. The HAZOP team evaluates the severity of the problem and adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, recommends additional safeguards as Actions. The hazard and operability problems highlighted in the course of the review were captured in the HAZOP Review worksheets (Appendix A). 3.1.2 Worksheet Definition All concerns raised are documented in the HAZOP Review Worksheets, which include the column headers as described in Table 3.2a. Table 3.1a Column Heading No. Guide word/Deviation HAZOP Review Worksheet Description Reference Number A set of standard guide words used to analyse and determine potential problems that arise Causes or problems identified Description of the consequences of the possible impact of the cause Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment, Engineering, Operability, Safety, Financial and Regulatory Description of the safeguards in place Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place Relevant party taking responsibility for action(s) identified Possible Causes Possible Consequences Type Safeguard Recommendations/Comment Action Party The completed HAZOP review worksheets are attached in Appendix A. 3.2 HAZID 3.2.1 Overview HAZID review is used as a means to identifying potential hazards, determining the associated consequences and evaluating means of preventing the hazard or controlling the consequences. They should not be confused with a HAZOP review which looks at specific areas of the process to identify potential design/operating problems and determine ways of improving the process design to HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 16 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM prevent such incidents from occurring. A HAZID review is based on a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming activities. The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by reference to an agreed set of guidewords. During the review, each facility was considered in turn with the facility broken down according to specific areas or enclosed buildings, e.g., Main Deck. 3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions All findings during the HAZID sessions are recorded by the scribe using HAZID worksheets. These worksheets contain the column headings given in Table 3.3b. Table 3.3b HAZID Record Sheet Headings Column Heading No. Category / Guideword Event Description Consequence Prevention Control Recommendation / Comments Action Party Ranking Description Reference number Initiating event and guideword used to generate hazard scenario Description of scenario and mode of realization Description of the consequences of the hazard or possible impact and escalation of the scenario Existing measures to prevent the hazard from occurring Existing measures to control or mitigate the hazard to prevent escalation Actions generated during the review. Comments on the protective systems in place, justification of the design are also included in italics. Responsibility for addressing each action item will be assigned to the design team or to the project team Qualitative ranking of the frequency and consequence of the hazard (carried out after the review is completed to save time during the review itself) HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 17 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS 4.1 INTRODUCTION The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza Citiview Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th and 21st June 2013. 4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM The HAZOP/HAZID team comprises a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the design and operation of the facilities, led by a safety consultant from PT PROSIM The names and attendance records of the HAZOP/HAZID team members for each of the systems are tabulated in Table 4.2a. Table 4.2a HAZOP/HAZID Team Attendance June 2013 17 Margaretha T Yulia Tirtasiwi Sugiyanto Bernardo Rudolf S Suarno Cut Julia Warno Abdullah Suseno Irvan N Haidar Gigin Ginanjar Isa PT PROSIM PT PROSIM PT ETI PT ETI PT ETI PT ETI PT IKL PT IKL PT IKL PT IKL PT IKL PT IKL PT IKL Process Engineer Project Manager Engineering Manager Process Engineer Chairman Scribe Process Engineer Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö June 2013 21 Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Name Co. Role 4.3 GUIDE WORDS The full set of Guide Words used in the HAZOP/HAZID Review is listed in Table 4.3a & b. It should be noted that if not found to be applicable or not to produce any problem of concern that had not already been raised, the Guide Word was not recorded in the Worksheets for that node. Table 4.3a No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 HAZOP Guide Words Guide Word No Flow Less Flow More Flow Reverse Flow Misdirected Flow Less Level More Level JULY 2013 HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 18 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Less Pressure More Pressure Less Temperature More Temperature Contaminants Composition Corrosion / Erosion Instrumentation Relief Personnel Safety External Factors Operations Maintenance Drawing Table 4.3b Safety System Non Process Events HAZID Guide Words Guide Word Structural Failures Impact Transportation Lifting Non Process Fires Toxic Release Security Noise Health hazards No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Comments Extreme weather/subsidence/fatigue Collisions Helicopter/personnel baskets/vessels Dropped Objects Fires/escalated fires Chemical spill Pirates/fishermen High noise areas/vibration Diseases/working condition/chemicals Fires from individual process systems — Personnel escape to TR Hotlines/radio, etc Lighting during escape/ evacuation Vent/ flare/ relief, etc Produced water, etc Gas/ water injection , etc Hazardous material/ solids/ sanitary waste, etc. Loss of containment Safety Systems Ignition Ignition Sources Escape/ Refuge Communication Emergency Lighting Environmental Hazards Discharge to air Discharge to water Discharge to soil Waste disposal 4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED A basic Piping and Instrumentation (P&ID) for the process acted as a basis for discussion during the review, along with the operating procedures. The drawings used are attached in Appendix B. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 19 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 4.5 SELECTED NODES The process was initially broken down according to the step and then by each action comprising the step. Each action was considered separately with the full list of Guide Words applied. Thus each action becomes a “node”, so, for instance, each feed line into a reactor was considered as a separate node. The nodes used are presented in Table 4.5a & b while the associated worksheets are given in Appendix A (HAZOP) and Appendix B (HAZID). Table 4.5a Node N1 N2 Nodes Reviewed in HAZOP Section Drawing Number TS78-P-PID-001 TS78-P-PID-002 TS78-P-PID-003 Rev B B B B Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator Filter Regeneration System Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K109), including Blowdown Tank VE301A Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME) Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M-200A/B (DECANTING) Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-100 and E-200 Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P-500A/B and WHRU Water Treatment Plant Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-400, Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400 Fuel Gas System Instrument Air System Fire Water System Power Generation system Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100 N2R N3 N4 N5 N6 TS78-P-PID-003 TS78-P-PID-004 TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-006 TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-012 TS78-P-PID-011 B B B B B B N7 N8 N9 B B B N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 TS78-P-PID-010 TS78-P-PID-009 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-013 TS78-P-PID-014 TS78-P-PID-015 B B B B B B Table 4.5b Node N1 Node Reviewed in HAZID Section Drawing Number TS78-L-LY-001 Rev B1 CNG Plant – Tambak Lorok HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 20 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS 5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS A total of 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations were generated during the review. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings (P&ID’s). A complete list of the recommendations made by the team during the review itself is tabulated in Appendix A. A unique number is assigned to each recommendation and the node identification number is included so that it may easily be traced back to the review worksheets (Appendix B & C). Brief summary of highlighted recommendations are presented below. HAZOP Design It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV) It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case. It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System. In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in overpressure of the system. The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak Lorok. It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type. Maintenance and Operational Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of redundant equipment such as compressor. To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 21 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM HAZID In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide warning sign the area to use ear plug protection. Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g. FM-200,etc) The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant. During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack. Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay out and emergency lighting. Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation. Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among parties to make sure the plant is operated safely. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 22 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO The Major Hazard of this plant is : • Process Hazard : 1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks 2. Gas Compression System 3. Hot water circulation system 4. Cold Venting Non Process Hazard : 5. Control Room located in hazardous area 6. Human Error - Alarm 7. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih 8. Transportation • HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 23 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM The hazard management plant can be shown as follow: HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 24 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas PT. PROSIM 6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP The project, design and operation team should conduct a HAZOP/HAZID follow up session to response the HAZOP/HAZID recommendations. The response and action plan shall be back up with the relevant data and justification whether the recommendation is agreed or rejected. At the end, the team shall formulate action plans, steward all action items and ensure that the relevant changes are made to the design to address hazard and operability concerns identified as part of this HAZOP/HAZID. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB 25 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK 7 REFERENCES /1/ /2/ Process Plan Description - TS78 - P - BD - 001 Drawing List : No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 19 20 Drawing Title PID - Incoming Scrubber System PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B) PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package) PID - Storage and Decanting System PID - CNG Heat Exchanger PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B) PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit PID - Instrument Air System PID - Instrument Air Network PID - Fuel Gas System PID - Sump System PID - Cooling System PID - Water Treatment Plant PID - Fire Water System PID - Power Generator System PID - Vent Gas System General Plant Lay Out PFD – Inlet Metering and Dryer PFD – Gas Compression System PFD – CNG Storage and Pressure Reducing System PFD – Waste Heat Recovery Unit PFD – Cooling Water System PFD – Heat Material Balance UFD – Fuel Gas System UFD – Instrument air system Drawing Number TS78-P-PID-001 TS78-P-PID-002 TS78-P-PID-003 TS78-P-PID-004 TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-006 TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-009 TS78-P-PID-010 TS78-P-PID-011 TS78-P-PID-012 TS78-P-PID-013 TS78-P-PID-014 TS78-P-PID-015 TS78-L-LY-001 TS78-P-PFD-001 TS78-P-PFD-002 TS78-P-PFD-003 TS78-P-PFD-004 TS78-P-PFD-005 TS78-P-PFD-006 TS78-P-UFD-001 TS78-P-UFD-002 Rev B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B1 B B B B B B B B HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BA26 JULY 2013 PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Appendix A HAZOP/HAZID Summary Recommendation PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION NODE 1 Causes / Concerns SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure Any of manual valve at incoming line to V-100 inadvertently close PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve around the PV 0105 inadvertently close Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in the production gas Manual by pass valve at downstream line PG-10-30-053 from metering M100A/B to Compressor unit unit is inadvertenly open Manual valve upstream BDV0301 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0301 required to open Blower E-101 at regeneration unit damage/ not in operation Consequences Comments / Recommendations Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih fire or fatality facility Loss of Production Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from pipeline Rec Number CNG-HP-1 1 CNG-HP-2 1 1 Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Provide operating manual for delivery gas Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality Potential overpressurization of V-100 resulting in Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality TS78-P Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100 explosion Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion Internal corrosion of piping and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream V-100 LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line PG-10-30-053 and update PID CNG-HP-3 CNG-HP-4 1 CNG-HP-5 1 CNG-HP-6 1 CNG-HP-7 1 2 CNG-HP-8 CNG-HP-9 2 Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream fire/fatality BDV-0301 CNG-HP-10 2R No regeneration process causing wet gas going to compressor Ensure interlock system install to prevent overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101 shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown (Check with vendor) Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow Provide operating manual for operating redundant equipments, including compressors Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG compartment to be available at market or provide spare manual valve in the case of maintenance required Provide portable temperature detector to check skin temperature of CNG compartment Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically Show setting point of PV 0501A/B CNG-HP-11 2R D-200 A-B shutdown Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage CNG-HP-12 3 Switch operation between compressors Potential human error to operate manual valve and safety devices CNG-HP-13 4 One of running compressor fails Less of CNG production to operate CNG-HP-14 4 Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of cooling water Inefficiency in cooling resulting in high temperature leading to less CNG production CNG-HP-15 4 Loss of containment/piping leak Tube leak at E-100 due to corrosion SDV0601 fails close or manual valve in the metering station inadvertenly closed Gas from suction compressor going to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 Manual valve upstream BDV0505 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0505 required to open Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200 leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire CNG-HP-16 5 CNG-HP-17 5 Double counting of sales gas from Santos meter with Install additional check valve at line PG-2"-3C-027 M-100 Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream fire/fatality BDV-0505 CNG-HP-18 5 CNG-HP-19 6 Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature in the gas sales CNG-HP-20 6 Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop High temperature in the circulation water around the Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3Cdue to failure OR Strainer at waste heat recovery unit 021 to alert operator upstream P-300A/B blockage Three way valve TV-0502 to E- Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat 200 is inadvertenly close transfer and lower gas sales temperature Any manual valve at upstream E- Potential overpressure of downstream pump 300 inadvertenly close or check One or more gas engine driver Less of flue gas to E-300 resulting in lower shutdown temperature generated for water circulation Start up Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line of E-200 Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P500A/B Review requirement set point of TIA-0704 CNG-HP-21 6 7 7 CNG-HP-22 CNG-HP-23 CNG-HP-25 7 Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300 WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300 Review requirement TIA-0705 CNG-HP-26 7 Condense water from flue gas at Corrosion at E-300 leading to equipment damage E-300 CNG-HP-27 CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 2 SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT NODE 7 9 Causes / Concerns Drawing Manual valve at outlet T-100 is inadvertenly close or strainer blocked Manual valve or strainer at inlet Basin cooling water is inadvertently close Manual valve at upstream P200A/B inadvertenly close or strainer blocked Liquid control valve failure at individual equipments (V-300, Compressor K-101-109, V-100) Consequences Comments / Recommendations Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting point of all instrumentation alarm and trip Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-100 and P-600 Review design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-200 Review outlet line at venting V-400 to be sufficient for case high pressure gas introduced from upstream equipment to this vessel Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter Rec Number CNG-HP-28 CNG-HP-29 Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage 9 Potential overflow at T-600 CNG-HP-30 9 Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage CNG-HP-31 10 Build up pressure in Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization CNG-HP-32 11 3" Manual valves at Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor incoming/outgoing line Fuel shutdown Gas filter is inadvertently closed Manual valve upstream of Instrument Air Receiver V-300 inadvertently closed Manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 inadvertently closed Operation Potential overpressurization of upstream piping CNG-HP-33 12 Confirm availability of high pressure trip at internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to shut down compressor in the case of block of discharge Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG Plant Consider to provide additional flowmeter to measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has been included in the generator package. Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream GE100A Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with fusible plug CNG-HP-34 12 Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD CNG-HP-35 13 CNG-HP-36 13 Operation CNG-HP-37 14 Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment GE-100A to cooling system damage inadvertenly close Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment GE-100A to cooling system damage inadvertenly close Lighting struck during Fire at vent stack PSV/BDV release CNG-HP-38 14 CNG-HP-39 15 CNG-HP-40 CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 2 of 2 SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Appendix A SUMMARY HAZOP/HAZID PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT SUMMARY HAZID RECOMMENDATION HAZID No. 4.1.3 Hazard Description Lightning Consequences Prevention Control Grounding provided for each equipment Recommendation/ Comment Rec Number Co. S (4) C(3) Pr 4 Ri S (H16) C(H12) Type Design Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire Update EQL drawing to show CNG-HD- 1 Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be equipped CNG-HD- 2 from process area with flame arrestor and diesel engine 4.3.1 Light vehicles impact e.g. Car 4.7.1 4.8.1 Potential impact to piping/equipment leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage High noise level from Potential personnel ear compressor and gas injury engine area Toxic Material during Personnel injury MSDS provided in the handling chemical: for storage facility cooling water, corrosion inhibitor e.g. oxygen scavanger Hazardous waste disposal Personnel injury during PPE - hand gloves, handling waste disposal face shield S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) Operation / Maintenance Provide SOP to wear ear plug around noise area CNG-HD- 3 S (1) C(-) S (1) C(-) 3 S (H3) C(-) S (H3) C(-) Design Ensure portable eye wash station CNG-HD- 4 provided during chemical handling (e.g : at control room, loading area and water treatment area) Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party) Provide warning sign around hot surface equipment and pipings CNG-HD- 5 3 Design 4.8.3 S (1) C(-) 3 S (H3) C(-) Operation / Maintenance 4.9.6 4.10.1 Hot Surfaces at exhaust gas, WHRU and heat exchanger (E200) Leak from Process Equipment Potential injury due to exposure to heat personal protection insulation provided PPE CNG-HD- 6 S (2) C(-) 2 S (M4) C(-) Design Loss of Containment Release of hydrocarbon Unit SD by low resulting in potential pressure trip fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality Release of hydrocarbon NA resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality Gas detection system at process area Define philosophy of fire and gas detection system and develop fire and gas detection area at process plant Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check temperature with source from in the MCC cabinet and DCS existing IP panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher CNG-HD- 7 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) Design CNG-HD- 8 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) Operation / Maintenance 4.11.1 Battery Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release. Battery room is located in non hazardous area 4.11.2 Vent Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release in process area if stroke by lightning Heat & Smoke detector, Portable Fire Extinguisher provided at control room & MCC room Lightning protection provided at CNG compartment area Regularly to check temperature in the MCC cabinet and DCS panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher Define safe location and minimum height required for vent stack and vent location to be suitable with wind directions so that dispersed gas will not be exposed to process plan Provide emergency evacuation risk analysis to determine safe evacuation route and location of muster area Form emergency response team (ERT) and conduct emergency drill Review scenario of fire and explosion from gas plant to the area of standby personnel such as control room and provide mitigation plan (design and location of the building) to anticipate fire/explosion CNG-HD- 9 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) Operation / Maintenance CNG-HD- 10 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) Design 4.12.1 Fire on Plant area Personnel trap/ unable to evacuate leading to injury/fatality ERP - CNG-HD- 11 S (4) C(4) 3 S (H8) C(H8) Design - - CNG-HD- 12 S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4) 4 S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8) Operation / Maintenance Design 4.14.1 Control room Fire or explosion from process area impact to control room leading to potential personnel injury/fatality - Heat and Smoke detector CNG-HD- 13 2 - - Inability to monitor process area 4.15.1 Inability to contact control room within emergency - - Inability to coordinate Each operator response leading to provided with hand potential major accident held radio leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss Inability to control fire Local ESD push leading to potential button at control major accident leading to room personnel injury/fatality and asset loss Potential contamination from process fluid F&G alarm system Define safety requirement on CNG-HD- 14 control room specification to accommodate fire/explosion scenario e.g. door, wall and window specifications Consider to provide CCTV in the CNG-HD- 15 control room for monitoring purpose Define internal and external CNG-HD- 16 communication system (PABX) for connecting operator in the control room to outside parties S (4) C(4) 3 S (H8) C(H8) Design S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4) 5 S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8) Design 2 Design 4.16.1 Inability to initiate ESD - Define safety layout at CNG plant to show ESD push button, fire hydrant, etc CNG-HD- 17 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) Design 4.18.3 Blowdown of water from cooling tower, discharge RO Discharge water is Define Sampling point Define Sampling point to connected to existing to monitor discharge monitor discharge water canal (IP) water CNG-HD- 18 CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 1 HAZID Worksheet Summary PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Appendix B HAZOP Review Worksheets PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 1 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V-100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent To remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility and measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant DT: 65 deg C OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD TS78-P-PID-001 TS78-P-PID-002 B B Design DP : 34 barG Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing OP : 20.6-30.9 barG PID - Incoming Scrubber System PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B) Guide Words Parameter: Flow 1.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating L Co Pr Ri Ri Comments / Recommendations Rec. No. No Flow SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust Facility ) resulting in discharge pressure hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality Loss of Production S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih facility CNG-HP-1 Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from pipeline S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) Provide operating manual for delivery gas CNG-HP-2 1.1.2 No No Flow Any of manual valve at incoming line to V-100 inadvertently close Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust Facility ) resulting in discharge pressure hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality Loss of Production CNG-HP-3 CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 53 HAZOP Node N1 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 1.1.3 Guide Words No Deviation No Flow Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating L Co S (4) C(4) Pr 1 Ri S (M4) C(M4) Comments / Recommendations Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID TS78-P Rec. No. CNG-HP-4 PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve Potential PIH-0103 set at 31 barg as around the PV 0105 inadvertently overpressurization of V-100 high pressure alarm to close resulting in hydrocarbon alert operator release leading to fire or fatality PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG to close SDV-0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 34 barG is sized for fire case Any of manual valves at Station Inlet Potential overpresurization PIH-0103 set at 30 barg as Metering M100A/B inadvertently of upstream M-100A/B high pressure alarm to close resulting to fire or fatality alert operator PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG to close SDV-0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge Note : maximum upstream pressure from Gundih is not more than 34 barG S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 1.1.4 No No Flow 1.2.1 1.3.1 Less More Less Flow More Flow Refer to No Flow - manual valves partially closed Slugging High level at V-100 leading Slug Catcher provided at to liquid carry over to Gundih facility metering skid M-100 and downstream equipment LV-0101 will maintain level in Gas Scrubber V100 LIH-0102 as high level alarm to alert operator LIHH-0102 will close SDV0102 S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 1.4.1 1.5.1 Reverse Part of Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified 1.5.1 Part of Parameter: Level CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 2 of 53 HAZOP Node N1 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 1.6.1 Guide Words Less Deviation Less Level Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating L Co S (4) C(4) Pr 1 Ri S (M4) C(M4) Comments / Recommendations Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100 Rec. No. CNG-HP-5 Control loop malfunction causing LV- Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert 0101 to open fully V-400 leading to potential Operator vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion LILL-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0102 Sump Tank open to atmosphere Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) CNG-HP-6 CNG-HP-7 1.6.2 Less Less Level Manual valve at bypass line LV-0101 or manual drain valves inadvertently open, leak at liquid lines 1.7.1 More More Level Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert V-400 leading to potential Operator vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion LILL-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0102 Sump Tank open to atmosphere Control loop malfunction causing LV- High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level 0101 to stuck close to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment S (-) E (2) C(2) 1 S (-) E (L2) C(L2) 1.7.2 More More Level Any of manual valve upstream/downstream LV-0101 inadvertently close S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 1.7.3 More More Level SDV-0102 fails closed 1.7.4 More More Level Slugging S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 3 of 53 HAZOP Node N1 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 Initiating L Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Rec. No. as 1.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/piping leak due to corrosion Release of hydrocarbon PIL-0102 as low pressure leading to environmental alarm at incoming V-100 pollution and potential fire to alert operator PILL-0102 at incoming V100 will initiate closure of SDV 0101 Fire and Gas Detector at V100 S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 1.8.2 1.9.1 Less More Less Pressure More Pressure Refer to Misdirected Flow 1.5.1 Refer to No Flow 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4 ; Less Level 1.6.1, 1.6.2 PV-0105 stuck open Potential overpressure at Metering M100A/B and downstream equipment PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as high pressure alarm to alert operator PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG to close SDV-0101 PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as high pressure alarm to alert operator PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG to close SDV-0101 S (-) E (2) C(2) 1 S (-) E (L2) C(L2) Manual valve at by pass line PV0105 inadvertently open Potential overpressure at Metering M100A/B and downstream equipment S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Parameter: Temperature 1.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 1.11.1 More More temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping the production gas and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream V-100 CNG-HP-8 Parameter: Contamination 1.12.1 As Well Contamination As Parameter: Composition 1.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 1.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 4 of 53 HAZOP Node N1 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 1.15.1 Guide Words Other Than Deviation Instrumentation Causes / Concerns No additional significant issues of concerns identified Consequences Safeguards Initiating L Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Rec. No. Parameter: Relief 1.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 1.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Fire at plant Overpresurization of piping leading to equipment damage Fire and Gas Detector at V100 S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 1.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 1.19.1 Other Operations Than 1.20.1 Other Than Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified Single isolation valve for Maintenance of PSV-0101A/B Potential exposure of high NA pressure to personnel during maintenance of PSV0101A/B Note: Certification/testing of PSV is conducted during online operation without dismantle of PSV itself. Dismantle of PSV can only be conducted if there is a risk assessment for single valve at upstream of the PSV 1.20.2 Other Than Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Drawing 1.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 5 of 53 HAZOP Node N1 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 2 Abbreviations SOP IM Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator Filter Comment Design Intent PM Preventative Maintenance USD Unit Shutdown PSD Process Shutdown ESD Emergency Shutdown H,M,L High, Medium, Risk Co Consequence Pr Probability Ri Risk S Safety Risk C Commercial Risk One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby) To remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40 deg C and max 3 ppm H2S DT: 250 deg C OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C Drawing No. Design DP : 34 barG Conditions: Opt. OP : 20.6-30.9 barG Conditions Drawing PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD TS78-P-PID-003 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 2.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating L Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Any of manual valve at Gas Dryer package is inadvertenly close Potential PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 overpressurization of barG to alert Operator upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to initiate closure of SDV 0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 2.2.1 Less Less Flow F-100 Blockage Potential PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 overpressurization of barG to alert Operator upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to initiate closure of SDV 0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg PDI at F-100 as local indicator for operator S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 6 of 53 HAZOP Node N2 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event Safeguards AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit Initiating L Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 2.2.2 Less Less Flow D-100A/B Blockage (caking) PSH 0301A set at 32 bar at Gas Dryer D-100A/B to close SDV-0101 S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge PDSH for Local indicator at D-100A/B for operator AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit 2.2.3 Less Less Flow F-110 Blockage 2.2.4 2.3.1 Less More Less Flow More Flow see No Flow 2.1.1 For partial blockage BDV-0301 open due to failure Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage Potential PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is overpressurization of sized for block discharge upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event PDI at F-110 as local indicator for operator Potential wet gas to Gas AIH (dew point alarm) at Compression system downstream of Dryer unit resulting in equipment damage S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) Depressurization of the BDV position indication system, loss of gas to flare and alarm and loss of production S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) 2.4.1 2.5.1 2.5.2 Reverse Part of Part of Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Misdirected Flow Refer to More Flow 2.3.1 Misdirected Flow Manual valve at 1/2-in drain line inadvertently open/leak or liquid trap at F-100 and F-110 stuck open Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-100 is inadvertenly open Gas blowby to Sump Tank SOP/Maintenance of liquid leading to gas cloud and trap potential fire and explosion Potential condense liquid carry over to D-100 resulting in equipment damage SOP S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 2.5.3 Part of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 7 of 53 HAZOP Node N2 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 2.5.4 Guide Words Part of Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences SOP Safeguards Initiating L Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-110 is inadvertenly open 2.5.5 Part of Potential condense liquid carry over to compressor unit resulting in equipment damage Misdirected Flow Manual valve to regeneration unit is Ineffective regeneration inadvertenly open process in Gas Dryer D100A/B Misdirected Flow Manual by pass valve at downstream line PG-10-30-053 from metering M100A/B to Compressor unit unit is inadvertenly open Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage PSV 0301B set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge SOP S (-) C(3) 2 S (-) C(M6) LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line PG-10-30-053 and update PID CNG-HP-9 2.5.6 Part of Parameter: Level 2.6.1 Less 2.7.1 More Less Level More Level Refer to Misdirected Flow 2.5.2 Liquid trap of F-100 stuck close High level at F-100 leading SOP to open by pass to liquid carry over to Gas manual valve 1/2" Dryer D-100A/B Parameter: Pressure 2.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on D-100 due to corrosion Release of hydrocarbon leading to environmental damage and potential fire Fire and gas detection system S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 2.8.2 2.9.2 2.9.1 Less More More Less Pressure More Pressure More Pressure Refer to More Flow 2.3.1 See No Flow 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2.1, Misdirected Flow 2.5.2 Liquid trap of F-100 stuck open Low level at F-100 leading Sump tank connected to to gas blow by to Sump atmospheric Tank Manual valve upstream BDV-0301 Overpresurization of NA inadvertenly close in the event of upstream equipment ESD and BDV-0301 required to open leading to fire/fatality 2.9. More More Pressure S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream BDV0301 CNG-HP-10 Parameter: Temperature 2.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 2.11.1 More More temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Contamination 2.12.1 As Well Contamination As Parameter: Composition 2.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 8 of 53 HAZOP Node N2 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 2.14.1 Guide Words Other Than Deviation Corrosion / Erosion Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition Initiating L Co S (3) C(4) Pr 1 Ri S (M3) C(M4) Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping the production gas and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire Parameter: Instrumentation 2.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 2.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 2.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Fire Overpresurization of drier F & G leading to equipment damage S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 2.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 2.19.1 Other Operations Than 2.20.1 Other Than Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Drawing 2.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 9 of 53 HAZOP Node N2 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT 2R Node Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Regeneration System Abbreviations SOP IM Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Comment Design Intent Design Opt. Drawing PM Preventative Maintenance USD Unit Shutdown PSD Process Shutdown ESD Emergency Shutdown H,M,L High, Medium, Risk Co Consequence Pr Probability Ri Risk S Safety Risk C Commercial Risk One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 12 hours and the regeneration time 12 hours (heating, cooling and standby) To collect water from the dryer and refresh molecular sieves to be ready to absorb DP : 34 barG OP : 20.6-30.9 barG PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) DT: 250 deg C OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C Drawing No. Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD TS78-P-PID-003 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 2R.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating L Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Manual valve to regeneration system No regeneration process inadvertenly close causing wet gas going to compressor F-101 to collect any condense liquid AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit Back up dryer available S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) 2R.1.2 No No Flow Blower E-101 at regeneration unit damage/ not in operation No regeneration process causing wet gas going to compressor F-102 to collect any condense liquid S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) Ensure interlock system install to prevent overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101 shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown (Check with vendor) CNG-HP-11 2R.1.3 No No Flow F-102 blockage Potential AIH (dew point alarm) at overtemperature/overpres downstream of Dryer unit sure at gas regeneration system Back up dryer available Pump cavitation Regular Filter mainentance S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) Overpressurization of equipment upstream of F102 leading to equipment damage PSH-0301B alarm to alert Operator CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 10 of 53 HAZOP Node N2R PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 2R.2.1 Guide Words Less Deviation Less Flow Causes / Concerns F-102 partially blocked Consequences Pump cavitation Safeguards Regular Filter maintenance Initiating L Co S (-) C(3) Pr 1 Ri S (-) C(M3) Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Overpressurization of equipment upstream of F102 leading to equipment damage 2R.2. 2R.3.1 2R.4.1 Less More Reverse Less Flow More Flow Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified D-200 A-B shutdown Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage PSH-0301B alarm to alert Operator S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow CNG-HP-12 2R.5.1 Part of potential more flow at D- AIH (dew point alarm) at 100 A-B resulting potential downstream of Dryer unit offspec to compressor leading to compressor damage PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low pressure alarm to alert operator PILL 501 at SS-101 to shutdown SDV-151 Misdirected Flow Manual valve at drain line of F-102 Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to or separator after cooler leading to gas cloud and Atmospheric inadvertently open/leak potential fire and explosion Misdirected Flow Liquid trap at F-102 or at separator after cooler stuck open Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to leading to gas cloud and Atmospheric potential fire and explosion Liquid trap maintenance Less Level More Level See Misdirected flow 2R.5.2 Liquid trap of F-102 or at drain line of separator stuck close S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 2R.5. Part of S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) #N/A Part of Parameter: Level 2R.6.1 Less 2R.7. More High level at F-102 leading Manual by pass valve on to liquid carry over to Gas around liquid trap Dryer D-100A/B Second liquid trap provided on the pipe to Sump Tank AIH (dew point alarm)-0301 at downstream of F-101 S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) Parameter: Pressure 2R.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on Release of hydrocarbon regeneration system due to corrosion leading to environmental damage and potential fire See Misdirected flow 2R.5.1 F & G system S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 2R.8.2 Less Less Pressure CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 11 of 53 HAZOP Node N2R PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 2R.8.3 Guide Words Less Deviation Less Pressure Causes / Concerns Regeneration pump loss of power due to mechanical problem Consequences gas cannot circulate to regeneration system resulting in wet gas to compressor Safeguards AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit Initiating L Co S (-) C(3) Pr 1 Ri S (-) C(M3) Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 2R.9.1 More More Pressure See Now Flow 2R.1.3 Parameter: Temperature 2R.10.1 Less Less Temperature Electric heater stop due to mechanical failure In efficient heat absorbtion Maintenance to D-100 AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) 2R.11.1 More More temperature Cooler stop due to motor failure liquid cannot be condense and separated to the separator S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) Parameter: Contamination 2R.12.1 As Well Contamination As Parameter: Composition 2R.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 2R.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping the production gas and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) Parameter: Instrumentation 2R.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 2R.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 2R.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 2R.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 2R.19.1 Other Operations Than 2R.20.1 Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 2R.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 12 of 53 HAZOP Node N2R PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 3 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K110), including Blowdown Tank VE301 Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Nine (9) compressor online and One (1) stand by; reciprocating type compressor, three-stages To compress natural gas and transfer to the storage cylinder Design Capacity: 2.17 MMSCFD each compressor Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD Power : TBA KW (each compressor) Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-004 Rev: B Design Shut Off Pressure : Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing Suction Pressure : 26 barG Discharge Pressure : 250 barG PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package) Guide Words Parameter: Flow 3.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow SDV W151 fails close Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment and piping leading to loss of integrity and fire event PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D100A/B to close SDV-0101 PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit Low suction pressure to compressor leading to compressor damage and production loss PT-501 displayed in control room PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low pressure alarm to alert operator CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 13 of 53 HAZOP Node N3 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards PILL 501 at SS-101 to shutdown SDV-151 PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D100A/B to close SDV-0101 Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 3.2.1 Less Less Flow Blockage of filter FF-201 Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment and piping leading to loss of integrity and fire event PDI - S01 provided around FF 201 PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 14 of 53 HAZOP Node N3 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 4 Abbreviations SOP IM Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME) Comment Design Intent PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C CNG Storage cylinder consist of 95 compartments. 5 compartments will be arranged in 1 bank (each has 40 tubes). Operation : 19-20 hours storage time, 4-5 hours decanting time To cooling down compressed gas and storage to CNG compartment CNG Cooler DT : 65 deg C CNG Compartment DT : 70 deg C Design CNG Cooler : DP (shell) : 7 barG; (tube) : 263 barG Conditions: CNG Compartment : DP : 374 barG Opt. CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) : OP : 3 barG Conditions CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OP : 249 barG Drawing PID - Storage and Decanting System Duty CNG Cooler: 201 kW CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) 2.38 m3 each cylinder : OT : 30 deg C/ 39 deg C CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OT : 48 deg C/35 deg C Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 4.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Manual valves at inlet CNG Compartement inadvertenly close See no flow partially Less of CNG production 4.2.1 Less Less Flow Local pressure indicator provided each compartment CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 15 of 53 HAZOP Node N4 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 4.2.2 Guide Words Less Deviation Less Flow Causes / Concerns One of running compressor fails to operate Consequences Less of CNG production Safeguards Indicator of online compressor in control room Comments / Recommendations Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG compartment to be available at market or provide spare manual valve in the case of maintenance required Action Party Rec. No. CNG-HP-14 Standby compressor available Indication of pressure and flow of storage period by graph to shown loss of production 4.3.1 4.4.1 4.5.1 More Reverse Part of More Flow Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified PV-0501A/B will hold the pressure PIHH 0509 set at 33 barG will open XV-0506 and circulate gas to suction compressor Misdirected Flow KV-0503A leak or fails open (storage No adverse consequence condition) Parameter: Level 4.6.1 Less 4.7.1 More Parameter: Pressure 4.8.1 Less 4.9.1 More 4.9.2 More Less Level More Level Less Pressure More Pressure More Pressure Not relevant Not relevant Refer to Less Flow Refer to No Flow Storage time more than 20 hours Potential over pressure at overall plant PIH-S01 set 30 barG alarm to alert Operator PIHH-S01 set 32 barG to close SDVSV-101/102/103 set@ 78/165/294 barg CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 16 of 53 HAZOP Node N4 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Maximum discharge pressure of Compressor 255 barG is less than MAWP Tube storage design 373 barG Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Parameter: Temperature 4.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 4.11.1 More More Temperature Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of Inefficiency in cooling TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH cooling water resulting in high 0509 alarm will alert temperature leading to less operator CNG production Provide portable temperature detector to check skin temperature of CNG compartment CNG-HP-15 Parameter: Contamination 4.12.1 As Well Contamination As Tube leak at E-100 Gas contamination to cooling water system leading to gas release at cooling tower Gas trapped at shell side resulting in eficient heat transfer Gas detector at cooling tower fan Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically CNG-HP-16 Parameter: Composition 4.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 4.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 4.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Explosion-proof motor of cooling tower TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH 0509 alarm will alert operator No additional significant issues of concerns identified See contamination Instrument air failure Unable to supply gas to customer Nitrogen back up is provided to open KV0501 to deliver gas from CNG compartement to tambak lorok Parameter: Relief 4.16.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 17 of 53 HAZOP Node N4 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Words Parameter: Safety 4.17.1 Other Than No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Occupational Safety No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: External Factor 4.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 4.19.1 Other Operations Than 4.20.1 Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 4.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 18 of 53 HAZOP Node N4 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 5 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M200A/B (DECANTING) Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent E-200 and M-200A/B will be operated during decanting time only. Decanting Time 4-5 hours. To avoid condensation on the upstream of pressure reducing valve and to measure natural gas outlet from CNG Plant CNG Heat Exchanger DT : 120 deg C M-200A/B DT : 65 deg C CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OT- 38 deg C / 30 deg C Duty CNG Heat Exchanger 3860 kW Capacity M-200A/B: 113 MMSCFD Decanting : 113 MMSCFD Design CNG Heat Exchanger : DP (shell) : 5.5 barG; (tube) : 34 barG Conditions: M-200A/B : DP : 34 barG Opt. Conditions CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OP : 2 barG / 1.4 barG CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OP : 26.7 barG / 26 barG PID - CNG Heat Exchanger PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B) Drawing TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-006 Rev: B B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 5.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Any of manual valves on the Compressor shut off PIH 0502 set at 250psig to decanting line to E-200 inadvertenly pressure is 255 barg vs alert operator close or PV0501A/B stuck close design pressure of equipment is 263 barg - no adverse consequence identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 19 of 53 HAZOP Node N5 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards PIHH 0502 set at 255 psig to shutdown compressor Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Loss of gas to customer FT-0601A/B at M-200A/B displayed at control room FILL 0601 A/Bset at 5 MMSCFD for alarm to alert operator 5.1.2 No No Flow 5.2.1 5.3.1 Less More Less Flow More Flow SDV0601 fails close or manual valve Potential PV0501 A/B to regulate the Show setting point of PV 0501A/B in the metering station inadvertenly overpressurization of CNG pressure closed HE E-200 leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to alert operator PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to close KV 0501A Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed PV0501A/B stuck open Potential PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to overpressurization of CNG alert operator HE E-200 and downstream piping PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to close KV 0501A Double counting of sales Install additional check valve at gas from Gundih meter line PG-2"-3C-027 with M-100 Loss of gas to vent BDV position indicator and alarm in control room Loss of gas back to system instead to customer Valve position indicator and alarm in control room CNG-HP-17 5.4.2 Reverse Reverse Flow 5.5.1 Part of Gas from suction compressor going to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 Misdirected Flow BDV-0505 fails open CNG-HP-18 5.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow XV-0506 fails open Parameter: Level 5.6.1 Less Less Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 20 of 53 HAZOP Node N5 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 5.7.1 Guide Words More Deviation More Level Causes / Concerns No additional significant issues of concerns identified Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Parameter: Pressure 5.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on Decanting Line Release of hydrocarbon leading to environmental damage and potential fire F&G 5.9.1 5.9. More More More Pressure More Pressure see no flow and more flow Manual valve upstream BDV-0505 Overpresurization of inadvertenly close in the event of upstream equipment ESD and BDV-0505 required to open leading to fire/fatality NA Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream BDV-0505 CNG-HP-19 Parameter: Temperature 5.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 5.11.1 More More temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified Tube leak at E-200 Gas contamination to hot Atmospheric venting at Hot water system leading to gas Water Tank T-200 release at WHRU Parameter: Contamination 5.12.1 As Well Contamination As Parameter: Composition 5.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 5.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 5.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 5.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 5.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 21 of 53 HAZOP Node N5 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 5.18.1 Guide Words Other Than Deviation External Factors Causes / Concerns No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 5.19.1 Other Operations Than 5.20. Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 5.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 22 of 53 HAZOP Node N5 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 6 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-200 Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Circulation to E-200 will be on decanting time only To heat compressed gas from storage facility to be ready for sales gas Temperature: 120 deg C T-200 : 290 m3 P-300 : 140 m3/hr E-500 : 127 kW Power : 36.8 kW TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2 Rev: B B Design E-500 DP : 2 barG Conditions: T-200 DP : 0.17 barG Opt. Conditions Drawing Source Pressure : atm; Discharge Pump : 3.35 barG PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit PID - CNG Heat Exchanger CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C Drawing No. Guide Words Parameter: Flow 6.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C-021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature in the gas sales Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3C-021 to alert operator CNG-HP-20 TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor CNG-HP-21 6.1.2 No No Flow Manual valve on the downstream P300A/B inadvertently closed TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TAH 0706 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby hot water circulation pump P-300B leading to inefficient heat transfer Loss of hot water supply TT-0512 as low temperature leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator transfer and lower gas sales temperature S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 23 of 53 HAZOP Node N6 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit Safeguards TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TAH 0706 set at 95 deg C alarm to alert operator PSHH 0703A set at 4.5 barG to close P-300A/B TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 6.2.1 Less Less Flow Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Three way valve TV-0502 to E-200 is Loss of hot water supply inadvertenly close leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line of E-200 CNG-HP-22 TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator Three way valve TV-0502 to by pass Not adverse consequence line E-200 is inadvertenly close 6.3.1 More More Flow Hot Water Pump P-300A andB running simultaneously Excess hot water supply to TIC-0502 as high E-200 resulting in potential temperature alarm to alert overheating operator Pump running status indication at control room 6.4.1 6.5.1 Reverse Part of Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Loss of hot water supply SOP leading to inefficient heat transfer Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P300 system 500A/B S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve at T-200 to open drain inadvertently open Parameter: Level 6.6.1 Less 6.6.2 Less Less Level Less Level see misdirected flow 6.5.1 More evaporation with less make up Loss of hot water supply water leading to inefficient heat transfer Vapor Condenser E-500 provided S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 6.7.1 More More Level Make up water activated LSL 0701 to start P-600 pump for make up water Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P300 system 500A/B Potential overflow to open LSH 0701 to stop make up drain water and provide warning to operator Overflow line to Open Drain S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 24 of 53 HAZOP Node N6 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Words Parameter: Pressure 6.8.1 Less Less Pressure refer to No Flow 6.1.1 6.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow Parameter: Temperature 6.10.1 Less Less Temperature Leak at hot water system at discharge P-300A/B No. Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TAH 0706 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator 6.10.2 Less Less Temperature Fouling/Plugging at E-200 Inefficiency in heating resulting in lower gas temperature S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 6.10.3 6.11.1 Less More Less Temperature Refer to No Flow Refer to More Flow More Temperature Parameter: Contamination 6.12.1 As Well Contamination As E-200 Tube/tube sheet leak Parameter: Composition 6.13.1 Other Composition Than d 6.14.1 Other Than Corrosion / Erosion Gas introduce to hot water T-200 is venting to system leading to potential atmosphere overpressure of hot water system S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Instrumentation 6.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 6.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 6.17.1 Other Than Relief Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 6.18.1 Other External Factors Than CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 25 of 53 HAZOP Node N6 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Deviation Words Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 6.19.1 Other Operations Than 6.20.1 Other Than Maintenance No. Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Drawing 6.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 26 of 53 HAZOP Node N6 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 7 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P500A/B and WHRU Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing To recover heat from exhaust gas of compressor and heating water for heating media E-100 and E-200 Pressure: WHRU : 18 Barg Shell / Coil : 0.03 barG / 3 barG PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit Temperature: WHRU : 545 deg C Shell / Coil OT : 490 deg C / 63 to 90 deg C Drawing No. P-500 : 48 m3/hr Power : 1283 kW TS78-P-PID-007 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 7.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-500A/B blockage Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T200 TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief routed to open drain Pump running status indication at control room S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby water circulation leading to pump P-500B inefficient heat transfer CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 27 of 53 HAZOP Node N7 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 7.1.2 Guide Words No Deviation No Flow Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief Iniating L S S (-) C(2) L 1 R S (-) C(L2) Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Any manual valve at upstream E-300 Loss of water circulation inadvertenly close or check valve leading to overheating of blockage hot water circulation to T200 Potential overpressure of downstream pump 7.2.1 Less Less Flow Any manual valve on the water circulation line at WHRU system partially closed Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T200 TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P-500A/B CNG-HP-23 7.3.1 More More Flow Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B running simultaneously No additional significant issues of concerns identified Excess water circulation to Pump running status E-300/T-200 - no safety indication at control room consequence 7.4.1 7.5.1 Reverse Part of Reverse Flow Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual valve to open drain inadvertenly open Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T200 TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 7.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve to venting open Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T200 S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Parameter: Level 7.6.1 Less 7.7.1 More Less Level More Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 28 of 53 HAZOP Node N7 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Words Parameter: Pressure Refer to No Flow 6.1.1 7.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to No Flow 7.9.1 More More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 7.10.1 Less Less Temperature Refer to No Flow One or more gas engine driver shutdown No. Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Start up 7.11.1 More More Temperature Refer to No Flow, Less Flow, Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Condense water from flue gas at E300 Less of flue gas to E-300 TIA 0704 to alert operator resulting in lower temperature generated for water circulation Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300 S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Review requirement set point of TIA-0704 CNG-HP-25 Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300 CNG-HP-26 Parameter: Contamination 7.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 7.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 7.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Corrosion at E-300 leading Check with vendor the to equipment damage requirement of TIA-0705 as low temperature alarm S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M6) Review requirement TIA-0705 CNG-HP-27 Parameter: Instrumentation 7.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 7.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 7.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 7.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 7.19.1 Other Operations Than 7.20.1 Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 29 of 53 HAZOP Node N7 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 7.21.1 7.21.2 7.21.3 Guide Words Other Than Other Than Other Than Deviation Drawing Drawing Drawing Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting point of all instrumentation alarm and trip CNG-HP-28 CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 30 of 53 HAZOP Node N7 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 8 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Water Treatment Plant Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent to treat sea water and provide potable water for cooling media Temperature: 65 deg C Temperature : ambient Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-012 Rev: B Flow : 3.2 m3/hr Design Pressure : 7 barG Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing Pressure : 4 barG PID - Water Treatment Plant Guide Words Parameter: Flow 8.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Manual valve at inlet Feed Pump P701 inadvertenly close No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Low suction pressure of PSL1209 to stop P702 P702 resulting in pump damage No make up water supply Pump maintenance for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer Low suction pressure of PSL1209 to stop P702 P702 resulting in pump damage No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Low suction pressure of P702 resulting in pump damage PSL1209 to stop P702 S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) 8.1.2 No No Flow Pump P701 stop due to failure S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) 8.1.3 No No Flow MOV-1201 (valve on duty) inadvertenly close S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 31 of 53 HAZOP Node N8 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 8.1.4 Guide Words No Deviation No Flow Causes / Concerns High Pressure Pump P702 failure Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S S (-) C(1) L 2 R S (-) C(L2) Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No make up water supply Pump maintenance for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Potential overpressure of PSH 1211 to stop P702 and upstream equipment P701 Potential overfilling TK02 LS-1201 to stop Feed Pump P701 8.1.5 No No Flow Manual valve downstream P702 inadvertenly close 8.1.6 No No Flow Manual valve downstream Buffer Tank TK-02 inadvertenly close S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) 8.1.7 No No Flow LS-1201 to stop Hi press Pump PU-201 High Pressure Pump PU-201 failure No make up water supply Pump maintenance for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer Manual valve downstream PU-201 inadvertenly close No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Potential overpressure of upstream equipment Potential overpressure of upstream equipment PSH 1216 to stop PU-201 PI 1201, PI 1202 and PI 1203 to monitor differential pressure PDI 1201 to monitor differential pressure PSH 1211 to stop P702 and P701 S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) 8.2.1 Less Less Flow Filter F-1A//B blockage S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) 8.2.2 Less Less Flow Filter FX-01/02 blockage Potential overpressure of upstream equipment Potential overpressure of upstream equipment S (-) C(1) S (-) C(1) S (-) C(1) 2 S (-) C(L2) S (-) C(L2) S (-) C(L1) 8.2.3 Less Less Flow RO-A blockage 2 8.3.1 More More Flow Control valve upstream FM 1205 stuck open No additional significant issues of concerns identified Potential overflow to TK01 LS01 to stop FEED pump P701 1 8.4.1 8.5.1 8.5.2 Reverse Part of Part of Reverse Flow Misdirected Flow Manual valve for sample inadvertenly open Misdirected Flow Manual drain valve from RO-A to open ditch inadvertenly open Less Level More Level Less Pressure No additional significant issues of concerns identified see more flow see no flow Loss of make up water to environment Loss of make up water to environment SOP SOP Parameter: Level 8.6.1 Less 8.7.1 More Parameter: Pressure 8.8.1 Less CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 32 of 53 HAZOP Node N8 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words More Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 8.9.1 More Pressure see no flow and less flow Parameter: Temperature 8.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 8.11.1 More More Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Contamination 8.12.1 As Well Contamination As Parameter: Composition 8.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 8.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion No additional significant issues of concerns identified Manual valve from chemical source Low make up water inadvertenly close quality leading to scale SOP No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Instrumentation 8.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 8.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 8.17.1 Other Than No additional significant issues of concerns identified Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified Occupational Safety No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: External Factor 8.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 8.19.1 Other Operations Than 8.20.1 Other Than Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Drawing 8.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 33 of 53 HAZOP Node N8 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 9 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-100, Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing To provide cooling media for E-100 Pressure: Cooling Tower : 3.5 Barg Pressure : ATM PID - Cooling System Temperature: 65 deg C Temperature : 30 - 45 deg C Drawing No. Capacity T-100 : 54 m3 Power P-100 : 0.85 kW; P-200A/B : 5.88 kW TS78-P-PID-011 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 9.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Manual valve at inlet T-100 is inadvertenly close Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600 potential pump damage S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) 9.1.2 No No Flow Manual valve at outlet T-100 is inadvertenly close or strainer blocked Loss of make up water for Temperature alarm at cooling media and make up WHRU, E-100 and E-200 T-200 leading to ineffective heat transfer Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage Loss of make up water for cooling media and make up T-200 leading to ineffective heat transfer Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer Temperature alarm at WHRU, E-100 and E-200 S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-100 and P-600 CNG-HP-29 9.1.3 No No Flow Make up water pump P-100 broken or stop Pump running status indication at control room S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 34 of 53 HAZOP Node N9 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words No Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Pump maintenance Temperature alarm at E-100 Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 9.1.4 No Flow Manual valve or strainer at inlet Basin cooling water is inadvertently close Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Potential overflow at T-600 Floating valve at T-600 to start/stop pump P-100 9.1.5 No No Flow Cooling water pump P-200A/B broken or not in operation Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer Pump running status indication at control room S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Review design of floating valve T600 to be radar type CNG-HP-30 9.1.6 No No Flow Manual valve at upstream P-200A/B Loss of pump suction and inadvertenly close or strainer potential pump damage blocked Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer Manual valve at downstream P200A/B inadvertently close Potential overpressurization of piping at pump discharge Strainer Maintenance periodically S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-200 CNG-HP-31 9.1.7 No No Flow PSH 1108A to stop P200A/B S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 9.2.1 9.3.1 Less More Less Flow More Flow Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A and B More of water cooling running simultenaously media - no adverse consequence No additional significant issues of concerns identified Pump running status indication at control room 9.4.1 9.5.1 Reverse Part of Reverse Flow Misdirected Flow 3" manual valve at T-100/E-400 to open drain inadvertenly open Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600 potential pump damage Low level at E-400 leading Floating valve will flow to loss of pump suction and water from T-600 potential pump damage 9.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2" manual valve at E-400 to open drain inadvertenly open Parameter: Level 9.6.1 Less Less Level see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3,9.5.1 9.6.2 Less Less Level Make up water pump P-100 fails to stop Loss of water for cooling media resulting insufficent heat absorbed during heat transfer leading to CN gas offspec Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown to loss of pump suction and Pump P-100 potential pump damage S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 35 of 53 HAZOP Node N9 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences High level at Cooling Tower basin T-600 Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 9.7.1 More More Level Float valve will stop incoming flow to cooling tower Float valve at Cooling Tower basin E- Potential overflow to open SOP 400 failure drain S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Parameter: Pressure 9.8.1 Less Less Pressure Leak in water supply line to E-100 9.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3 Parameter: Temperature 9.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 9.11.1 More More Temperature Motor at E-400 fails to run Loss of water for cooling media resulting insufficent heat absorbed during heat transfer leading to CN gas offspec S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) high temperature of water supply to E-100 leading to less production TT-0503 at E-100 as high temperature alarm to alert operator S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Parameter: Contamination 9.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 9.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 9.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 9.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 9.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 9.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 9.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 9.19.1 Other Operations Than 9.20.1 Other Than Maintenance CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 36 of 53 HAZOP Node N9 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Words Parameter: Drawing 9.21.1 Other Than No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 37 of 53 HAZOP Node N9 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 10 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400 Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing To collect liquid drain from vessel (closed drain system) Pressure : 3.5 barG Tank Ops Pressure : ATM; P Pump Suc Pressure : Atm, Disch Pressure : 2 barG PID - Sump System Temperature: 45 deg C Temperature : AMB Drawing No. P-400 Capacity : 1.2 m3/hr Power P-400 : 0.3 kW TS78-P-PID-010 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 10.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow 4" manual valve at inlet V-400 inadvertenly closed No additional significant issues of concerns identified Liquid control valve failure at individual equipments (V-300, Compressor K-101-109, V-100) High level at source vessel Safeguards at source vessel S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) 10.2.1 10.3.1 Less More Less Flow More Flow Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization Loss of level at the source LT at individual equipment vessel as low level alarm to alert operator; and as low level trip to initiate USD S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) Review outlet line at venting V400 to be sufficient for case high pressure gas introduced from upstream equipment to this vessel CNG-HP-32 10.3.2 More More Flow Manual drain valves at individual equipments inadvertently open during online operation S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 38 of 53 HAZOP Node N10 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Double-valve provided at drain line of the individual equipments Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 10.4.1 10.5.1 Reverse Part of Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Level 10.6.1 Less Less Level Sump Pump P-400 fails to stop due to LT-1001 failure to function Loss of liquid level leading Pump will be stopped to Sump Pump P-400 during no signal (FC) damage due to cavitation Overfilling of Sump Tank V-400 and liquid release from vent to environment LAH 1001 as high level alarm to alert operator S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) 10.7.1 More More Level Pump stopped due to no power supply or pump damage S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) SOP - draining activity is attended by operator Standby portable pump will be provided and connected to available spare nozzle Parameter: Pressure 10.8.1 Less 10.9.1 10.9.2 More More Less Pressure More Pressure More Pressure No additional significant issues of concerns identified Refer to More flow Blockage of flame arrestor at vent line Potential overpressurization of V400 Bug screen provided Parameter: Temperature 10.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 10.11.1 More More Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Contamination 10.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 10.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 10.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 10.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 39 of 53 HAZOP Node N10 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Words Parameter: Relief 10.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 10.17.1 Other Than No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 10.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 10.19.1 Other Operations Than 10.20.1 Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 10.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 40 of 53 HAZOP Node N10 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 11 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Fuel Gas System Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing To provide fuel to compressor Pressure : 13.5 barG Pressure : 10 barG PID - Fuel Gas System Temperature: 45 deg C Temperature : 21 deg C Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-009 Rev: B Capacity : 1.5 m3 Guide Words Parameter: Flow 11.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow 3" Manual valves at incoming/outgoing line Fuel Gas filter is inadvertently closed PCV-0901A/B stuck closed Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown Less of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator Standby PCV available PDI 0901A/B to monitor differential pressure Back up fuel gas filter available PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator PT-0902 as high pressure alarm to alert operator S (-) C(4) S (-) C(4) 1 S (-) C(M4) S (-) C(M4) Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter CNG-HP-33 11.1.2 No No Flow 1 11.2.1 Less Less Flow Pump N4 stop due to failure S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 11.3.1 More More Flow PCV-0901A/B stuck open Potential overpressurization of downstream equipment S (-) C(1) 1 S (-) C(L1) 11.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 41 of 53 HAZOP Node N11 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 11.5.1 Guide Words Less Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Less Level More Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Level 11.6.1 Less 11.7.1 More Parameter: Pressure Refer to No Flow and Less Flow 11.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to More Flow 11.9.1 More More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 11.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 11.11.1 More More Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Contamination 11.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 11.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 11.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 11.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 11.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 11.17.1 Other Than Relief Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 11.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 11.19.1 Other Operations Than 11.20.1 Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 11.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 42 of 53 HAZOP Node N11 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 12 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Instrument Air System Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent To provide instrument air for instrumented system Temperature: 45 deg C Temperature : AMB - 40 deg C Drawing No. Capacity 183.63 SCFM (each) Power: 30 kW (each) TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 Rev: B B Design Pressure : 12 barG Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing Pressure : 6 - 10 barG PID - Instrument Air System PID - Instrument Air Network Guide Words Parameter: Flow 12.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Manual valve upstream of Instrument Air Receiver V-300 inadvertently closed Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD 300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation PT-0803 set at 7 barg as low pressure alarm to alert Operator NA S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Confirm availability of high pressure trip at internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to shut down compressor in the case of block of discharge S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) CNG-HP-34 12.1.2 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream of Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B inadvertently closed Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD 300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 43 of 53 HAZOP Node N12 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Guide Words Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD Safeguards PSV 0801 set at 12 barG release air to atmosphere Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation PSV 0801 set at 12 barG release air to atmosphere Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation PSV 0802 release air to atmosphere Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation PSV 0802 release air to atmosphere Auto start of standby compressor by PSLL-0803 Nitrogen back up at downstream F-310A/B Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 12.1.3 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream of Air Dryer D300A/B inadvertently closed 12.1.4 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream Air Dryer after filter F301A/B inadvertently closed Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 12.1.5 No No Flow Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Any manual valve downstream Air Loss of instrument air Dryer after filter F301A/B supply potentially leading inadvertently closed to PSD 12.1.6 No No Flow Air Compressors package trip/broken Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 12.1.7 No Flow Manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 inadvertently closed Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD 310 is provided for 5 minutes in operation Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Less of instrument air PDI 0801 to monitor supply potentially leading differential pressure to PSD Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801 resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown Spare Air Dryer Prefilter available S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 CNG-HP-35 12.2.1 Less Less Flow Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B blockage S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 44 of 53 HAZOP Node N12 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 12.2.2 Guide Words Less Deviation Less Flow Causes / Concerns Air Dryer D-200A/B blockage Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S S (-) C(2) L 1 R S (-) C(L2) Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. 12.2.3 Less Less Flow Air Dryer After Filter F301A/B blockage Less of instrument air PDI 0802A/B to monitor supply potentially leading differential pressure to PSD Wet instrument air Dew Point Meter DE 0801 resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown Spare Air Dryer available Less of instrument air PDI 0802 to monitor supply potentially leading differential pressure to PSD Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801 resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown Spare Air Dryer After filter available S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) 12.3.1 More More Flow 12.4.1 12.5.1 Reverse Part of Reverse Flow All Air Compressor running simultaneously - no adverse consequence No additional significant issues of concerns identified High pressure air blowby to sump tank V-400 Less of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD Sump Tank V-400 is open to atmosphere S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual drain valve at V-300 inadvertently close Parameter: Level 12.6.1 Less 12.7.1 More Less Level More Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified Water condensation in V-300 and lube oil entrainment from compressors Low quality of instrument SOP to monitor LG 0801 air leading to potential instrument damage and shutdown S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Parameter: Pressure 12.8.1 Less 12.9.1 More Less Pressure More Pressure see no flow, less flow, misdirected flow see no flow Parameter: Temperature 12.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 12.11.1 More More Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Contamination CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 45 of 53 HAZOP Node N12 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 12.12.1 Guide Words As Well As Deviation Contamination Causes / Concerns No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Parameter: Composition 12.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 12.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 12.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 12.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 12.17.1 Other Than Relief Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 12.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 12.19.1 Other Operations Than 12.20.1 Other Than Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 12.21.1 Other Than 12.21.2 Other Than Drawing Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 46 of 53 HAZOP Node N12 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 13 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Fire Water System Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing Fire water is supplied from existing facility to provide cooling system and extinguish fire from the process plant and building Pressure : ATM Pressure : ATM PID - Fire Water System Temperature: 45 deg C Temperature : ambient Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-013 Rev: B Guide Words Parameter: Flow 13.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Any of manual valve at fire water ring inadvertently close/stuck close Lack of fire water supply resulting in inadequate water to extinguishing fire SOP S (3) C(3) 1 S (M3) C(M3) 13.1.2 No No Flow 13.2.1 Less Less Flow Existing fire water pump inoperation Fail to supply fire water in case of fire leading to fire escalation Any of manual valve at fire water Lack of fire water supply ring partially close resulting in inadequate water to extinguishing fire No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified S (3) C(3) SOP S (3) C(3) 1 S (M3) C(M3) S (M3) C(M3) 1 13.3.1 13.4.1 13.5.1 More Reverse Part of More Flow Reverse Flow Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Level 13.6.1 Less Less Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 47 of 53 HAZOP Node N13 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 13.7.1 Guide Words More Deviation More Level Causes / Concerns No additional significant issues of concerns identified see less flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Parameter: Pressure 13.8.1 Less 13.9.1 More Less Pressure More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 13.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 13.11.1 More More Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG Plant Consider to provide additional flowmeter to measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG-HP-36 Parameter: Contamination 13.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 13.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 13.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 13.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 13.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 13.17.1 Other Than Relief Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 13.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 13.19.1 Other Operations Than 13.19.2 Other Than Other Than Operations CNG-HP-37 13.20.1 Maintenance Parameter: Drawing 13.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 48 of 53 HAZOP Node N13 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 14 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Power Generation system Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing GE-100 A is main generator and GE-100B is back up generator (emergency???) to provide power for CNG plant Pressure : Pressure : PID - Power Generator System Temperature: Temperature : Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-014 Rev: B Capacity : 600 kW Guide Words Parameter: Flow 14.1.1 No No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Power Generator unable to operate due to damage No power generated Standby Generator leading to plant shutdown provided Back up power supply from PLN available S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) 14.2.1 14.3.1 14.4.1 14.5.1 v 14.6.1 Less More Reverse Part of Less Flow More Flow Reverse Flow XV 1401 or XV 1402 or XV - 1403 inadvertenly close PV 1401 or PV-1402 stuck close Manual valve up stream GE-100A inadvertenly close No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Hydrocarbon gas release to environment Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve to drain system open Less Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified Less CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 49 of 53 HAZOP Node N14 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 14.7.1 Guide Words More Deviation More Level Causes / Concerns No additional significant issues of concerns identified Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Parameter: Pressure see less flow 14.8.1 Less Less Pressure see more flow 14.9.1 More More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 14.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 14.11.1 More More Temperature Any manual valve down stream GE- Overheating at GE-100A 100A to cooling system inadvertenly leading to equipment close damage, plant shutdown S (-) C(3) 1 S (-) C(M3) Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has been included in (LO) the generator package. Lock Open for manual valve downstream GE-100A Parameter: Contamination 14.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 14.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 14.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 14.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 14.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 14.17.1 Other Than Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG-HP-38 CNG-HP-39 Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 14.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 14.19.1 Other Operations Than 14.20.1 Other Than Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Drawing 14.21.1 Other Than Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 50 of 53 HAZOP Node N14 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node 15 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100 Abbreviations SOP IM PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk Comment Design Intent Design Conditions: Opt. Conditions Drawing Normally Flare system has no hydrocarbon gas flowing Drain and liquid outlet of Vent Stack is normally close To gather release gas from process relief valves and BDV and routing gas to safe area Pressure : 5.5 barG Pressure : ATM - 2 barG PID - Vent Gas System Temperature: 85 deg C Temperature : 10-60 deg C Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-015 Rev: B Capacity Vent Stack : 12.5 MMSCFD Guide Words Parameter: Flow 15.1.1 No 15.2.1 15.3.1 Less More No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. No Flow Less Flow More Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified PSV or BDV passing Loss of gas to atmosphere Flame arrestor installed resulting gas cloud around process area and potential fire if ignited Potential fire/explosion inside piping Water seal at bottom of vent stack to prevent air ingress to venting system S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 15.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow Air ingress to venting system S (4) C(4) 1 S (M4) C(M4) 15.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 51 of 53 HAZOP Node N15 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT Guide Words Parameter: Level 15.6.1 Less 15.7.1 More No. Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. Less Level More Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified Liquid carry over from PSV/BDV release of hydrocarbon liquid to environment Vent stack is equipped by dead leg to collect liquid and drain to Sump Tank V400 S (-) C(2) 1 S (-) C(L2) Parameter: Pressure 15.8.1 Less 15.9.1 More Less Pressure More Pressure No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Temperature 15.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 15.11.1 More More Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Lighting struck during PSV/BDV release Fire at vent stack S (4) C(3) 1 S (M4) C(M3) Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with fusible plug CNG-HP-40 Parameter: Contamination 15.12.1 As Well As Contamination Parameter: Composition 15.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 15.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 15.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than Parameter: Relief 15.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 15.17.1 Other Than Relief Occupational Safety Parameter: External Factor 15.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 15.19.1 Other Operations Than 15.20.1 Other Than Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified Parameter: Drawing CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 52 of 53 HAZOP Node N15 PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 15.21.1 15.21.2 Guide Words Other Than Other Than Deviation Drawing Drawing Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No. CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 53 of 53 HAZOP Node N15 PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheets PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Abbreviations SAA Co Consequency P Ri Rec S C H,M,L Drawing No. Probabitliy Risk Recommendation Safety Risk Commercial Risk High, Medium, Low TS78-L-LY-001 PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT Node Review date Client Project Area Comment 1 17-Jun-13 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS PLANT TAMBAK LOROK The plan is located beside Indonesia Power Company. The North side is sea side. The South side is Turbine Generator belong by IP. General Lay Out CNG Plant Drawing Rev. B1 No. 4.1.1 Category/ Guideword Natural Events Hazard Description Earthquake Consequences Potential of loss of plant integrity leading to damage and hydrocarbon release Prevention - Control Recommendation/ Comment Rec Number Action Party Co. Pr Ri 4.1.2 Natural Events Rob in process area Potential damage to process equipment 4.1.3 Natural Events Lightning Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire Plant, equipment, building and foundation design anticipated to accommodate earthquake factor (0.15G), referring to UBC-1997 and soil investigation result Plant is designed NA above Rob posistion (80 cm above average ground level vs 70 cm average rob) and in high position Grounding provided for each equipment Update EQL drawing to show Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area CNG-HD- 1 S (4) C(3) 4 S (H16) C(H12) Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Consequences Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire No major concern Damage to the equipment, loss of production Prevention Control Recommendation/ Comment Rec Number Action Party PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 4.1.4 Category/ Guideword Natural Events Hazard Description Settlement Co. Pr Ri 4.1.5 4.2.1 Natural Events External Events 4.3.1 Transportation 4.3.2 Transportation 4.4.1 Lifting Pile foundation (block design) provided to withstand settlement Land slide External corrosion Painting & Periodic maintenance coating for piping and inspection for all and equipment surface vessels and pipings Light vehicles impact Potential impact to vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be equipped with flame e.g. Car piping/equipment from process area arrestor and diesel engine leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage Heavy equipment to Potential impact to Concrete road Pipe bridge provided gas plant e.g. mobile piping/equipment to connect each crane leading to equipment across road hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage Lifting equipment Potential damage to SOP for lifting (mobile crane, forklift) pipeline and activity including failure equipment certified personnel to conduct the lifting No additional significant issues of concerns identified - S (-) C(3) 2 S (-) C(H9) CNG-HD- 2 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) S (-) C(2) 2 S (-) C(M4) 4.5.1 Non Process Fires Bush fire S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8) 4.6.1 Security Theft/sabotage Loss of production. Fence line around Security's Officer stand Potential major the plant area by 24 hrs at plant area accident leading to personnel injury/fatality 2 CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 2 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Consequences Prevention SOP for control personnel incoming to the plant Control Recommendation/ Comment Rec Number Action Party PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. Category/ Guideword Hazard Description Co. S (4) C(4) Pr 2 Ri S (H8) C(H8) 4.6.2 Security Vandalism No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified - 4.6.3 Security Wild animals (tiger, crocodile and snake) - - 4.7.1 Noise 4.8.1 Health Hazards High noise level from Potential personnel compressor and gas ear injury engine area Toxic Material during Personnel injury handling chemical: for cooling water, corrosion inhibitor e.g. oxygen scavanger - Provide SOP to wear ear plug around noise area Ensure portable eye wash station provided during chemical handling (e.g : at control room, loading area and water treatment area) CNG-HD- 3 S (1) C(-) S (1) C(-) 3 S (H3) C(-) S (H3) C(-) MSDS provided in the storage facility CNG-HD- 4 3 PPE - hand gloves, face shield SOP for chemical handling 4.8.2 Health Hazards Handling molecular sieve at dryer system Personnel exposure PPE - hand to H2S resulting in gloves, face personnel injury shield SOP for handling molecular sieve at dryer system 4.8.3 Health Hazards Personnel hygiene and Health impact to living activity operator Toilet and pantry Medical emergency are provided in provided (clinic) for control room operation personnel building JSA S (1) C(-) 3 S (H3) C(-) S (1) C(-) 3 S (H3) C(-) S (1) C(-) 4 S (M4) C(-) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 3 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Consequences Personnel injury during handling waste disposal Prevention PPE - hand gloves, face shield Control Recommendation/ Comment Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party) Rec Number CNG-HD- 5 Action Party PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 4.8.3 Category/ Guideword Health Hazards Hazard Description Hazardous waste disposal Co. S (1) C(-) Pr 3 Ri S (H3) C(-) 4.9.1 Maintenance/ construction Working at high Fall and slip location such as resulting in lightning pole, WHRU injury/fatality Maintenance access provided at WHRU SOP for working at height during maintenance and construction, including competent personnel Permit to works system S (4) C(-) 2 S (H8) C(-) 4.9.2 Maintenance/ construction Hot/cold Work Fire and potential fatality 4.9.3 Maintenance/ construction Confined Space Entry 4.9.5 Maintenance/ construction Electrical Hazards SOP for hot/cold work activity during construction, including competent personnel Potential fatality SOP for confined due to asphyxiation space entry during maintenance and construction, including Potential Proper insulation electrocution for resulting in cabling/wiring injury/fatality personal protection insulation provided permit to works system S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) permit to works system S (4) C(-) 2 S (H8) C(-) 4.9.6 Maintenance/ construction Hot Surfaces at Potential injury due exhaust gas, WHRU to exposure to heat and heat exchanger (E200) ELCB (Earth Leakage Circuit Breaker) provided for electrical equipment/devices e.g. welding machine PPE Provide warning sign around hot surface equipment and pipings S (4) C(-) 2 S (H8) C(-) CNG-HD- 6 S (2) C(-) 2 S (M4) C(-) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 4 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Consequences Release of hydrocarbon resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality Prevention Unit SD by low pressure trip Control Gas detection system at process area Recommendation/ Comment Define philosophy of fire and gas detection system and develop fire and gas detection area at process plant Rec Number CNG-HD- 7 Action Party PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 4.10.1 Category/ Guideword Loss of Containment Hazard Description Leak from Process Equipment Co. S (4) C(4) Pr 2 Ri S (H8) C(H8) - Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check temperature in the MCC with source from cabinet and DCS panel to existing IP monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher CNG-HD- 8 4.10.2 Loss of Containment Ignition Sources Diesel Leak No additional significant issues of concerns identified Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release. Battery room is located in non hazardous area Heat & Smoke detector, Portable Fire Extinguisher provided at control room & MCC room Lightning protection provided at CNG compartment area Regularly to check temperature in the MCC cabinet and DCS panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher Define safe location and minimum height required for vent stack and vent location to be suitable with wind directions so that dispersed gas will not be exposed to process plan CNG-HD- 9 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) 4.11.1 Battery 4.11.2 Ignition Sources Vent Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release in process area if stroke by lightning - CNG-HD- 10 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) 4.11.3 Ignition Sources Static electricity from external vehicle Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release. - vehicle park area away from process area S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4) 2 2 S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 5 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Consequences Prevention Control Recommendation/ Comment Provide emergency evacuation risk analysis to determine safe evacuation route and location of muster area Form emergency response team (ERT) and conduct emergency drill Rec Number CNG-HD- 11 Action Party PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 4.12.1 Category/ Guideword Escape/ Refuge Hazard Description Fire on Plant area Co. S (4) C(4) Pr 3 Ri S (H8) C(H8) Personnel trap/ ERP unable to evacuate leading to injury/fatality - - CNG-HD- 12 S (4) C(4) 4 S (H8) C(H8) 4.13.1 Emergency Lighting Personnel trap in wrong way Personnel injury/fatality - Emergency lighting for evacuation is provided in control room and evacuation route Heat and Smoke detector Review scenario of fire and explosion from gas plant to the area of standby personnel such as control room and provide mitigation plan (design and location of the building) to anticipate fire/explosion Define safety requirement on control room specification to accommodate fire/explosion scenario e.g. door, wall and window specifications CNG-HD- 13 S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4) 5 6 S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8) 4.14.1 Manned Building Control room Fire or explosion from process area impact to control room leading to potential personnel injury/fatality S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) - - CNG-HD- 14 S (4) C(4) 3 S (H8) C(H8) Inability to monitor process area Consider to provide CCTV in the control room for monitoring purpose CNG-HD- 15 S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4) 4 5 S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 6 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet Consequences Inability to coordinate response leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss Inability to control fire leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss Plant shutdown resulting loss of production Uncontrolled process upset Prevention Each operator provided with hand held radio Control F&G alarm system Recommendation/ Comment Define internal and external communication system (PABX) for connecting operator in the control room to outside parties Rec Number CNG-HD- 16 Action Party PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT No. 4.15.1 Category/ Guideword Communication Hazard Description Inability to contact control room within emergency Co. S (4) C(4) Pr 2 Ri S (H8) C(H8) 4.16.1 Shutdown Inability to initiate ESD Local ESD push button at control room - Define safety layout at CNG plant to show ESD push button, fire hydrant, etc CNG-HD- 17 S (4) C(4) 2 S (H8) C(H8) 4.16.2 Shutdown Loss of power ESD is fail safe action - UPS is provided S (-) C(4) S (-) C(4) S (-) C(-) 2 S (-) C(H8) S (-) C(H8) S (-) C(-) 4.17.1 Other Plant layout - Alternative power source from PLN for emergency equipment - 3 - 4.18.1 4.18.3 Discharge to air Discharge to water Note: venting only for emergency situation Blowdown of water from cooling tower, discharge RO No additional significant issue of concern identified Disposal of operation/ Potential construction waste e.g. environmental plant, log disturbance Potential contamination from process fluid Discharge water is connected to existing canal (IP) Define Sampling point to monitor discharge water CNG-HD- 18 4.18.4 Discharge to soil 4.18.5 Waste disposal - - Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party) CNG-HD- 5 S (-) C(-) 4 S (-) C(-) CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 7 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1 PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Appendix D Drawings Reviewed NODE 1 NODE 2 2 NODE NODE 2R NODE 3 NODE 4 NODE 6 NODE 5 NODE 5 NODE 7 NODE 6 NODE 12 NODE 12 NODE 11 NODE 10 NODE 9 NODE 8 NODE 13 NODE 14 NODE 15