Swedish Defence Materiel Administration0 To our Foreign Reader 1 Introduction 2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 3 Methodology Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual 4 Weapons 5 Ammunition 6 Definitions 7 References Stock name: H VAS-E Stock number: M7762-000242 Approved: FMV:Inspectorate Edition: 2000 Central storage: Armed Forces book and form store 8 Checklists 4 Foreword This Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual supersedes previous editions of the Ammunition Safety Manual (FMV Amsäkhandbok 1990). The Ammunition Safety Manual contained a chapter on ammunition safety methods. As such methodology is a core feature and shall be applied to all safety work concerning materiel and systems this chapter has been excluded from the current manual as it was found to be more appropriate to incorporate a methodology chapter in the Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual (H SystSäkE). Both manuals are co-ordinated and are designed to be used together. This Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual should thus be used as a complement to the System Safety Manual. Comments on the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual will be gratefully received and should be submitted to FMV: Inspectorate, SE-115 88 Stockholm, Sweden. 5 Content 0 To our Foreign Reader ........................................................................... 15 0.1 Purpose of this chapter ................................................................... 15 0.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement ....................................... 15 0.3 About the manual ........................................................................... 15 1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 17 1.1 General ............................................................................................. 17 1.2 Instructions for use ......................................................................... 20 1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety .................................................. 21 1.3.1 General .................................................................................. 21 1.3.2 Concepts ................................................................................ 23 1.4 Objectives for safety activities ....................................................... 25 1.4.1 General .................................................................................. 25 1.4.2 Peacetime and wartime .......................................................... 25 1.4.3 Integration of safety work with other activities ..................... 25 1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV .................... 25 1.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities ........................................................................................ 26 1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers ... 26 2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ................. 27 2.1 General ............................................................................................. 27 2.2 Safety activity requirements .......................................................... 28 2.3 Requirements common to all materiel .......................................... 32 2.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ....................................................................................... 34 3 Methodology ............................................................................................. 35 3.1 General ............................................................................................. 35 3.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO ........................ 35 3.2.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 35 3.2.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 36 3.2.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 36 3.2.4 Activity description ............................................................... 36 3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ..... 37 3.3.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 37 3.3.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 37 3.3.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 37 3.3.4 Activity description ............................................................... 38 3.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) ............................................................................... 39 3.4.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 39 3.4.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 39 7 ..............5.....................3 Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices ...............8....................... 40 3............................................... 40 3........9............. 46 3.....................6.. 44 3............... 41 3.5.....3 Time frame .........................................4 Activity description ............ 48 Safety testing ..4........................6................................................3 Time frame ........................................9.......................7..................8 3........................4.....1........................ 52 3...............6.....................6 3......4. 43 3....................9. 50 Test directives for safety surveillance .......................... 54 3..6.....................................................................................2 Advisory Group for Explosives ..................................7....... 54 3..........7.......6........1 Purpose ................................................. 50 3.......................6...............9 3..............3 Purpose of the requirements .......... 53 3........................................3 Time frame .......................1................. 42 Obtaining advice from advisory groups .......... 41 3............................6...5...............4 Activity description .......... 43 3.............................. 53 Proposed Handling..........................3...............1 Background ..............7....................1 Purpose ........2 Responsibility ...............................1 Purpose ........ 57 4.........4...........2 Responsibility ............................................................. 57 8 .............. 53 3.............1................................................. 52 3.................................. 57 4.......................1........ 52 3...........4............... 50 3....................................9...4.................................. 43 3....................................................1 Purpose ..............................................................4 Activity description .............4..........4.... 54 3.........2 Subdivision of materiel publications ........................... 53 3....1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems ............................................. 57 4..................................5 3.............................2 Responsibility .....................6.2 Responsibility ..............1.... 40 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ...............1 Purpose .............................................4 Activity description .......8.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility...................................... and checklists for reviews ......2 Structure of chapter ............... Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) .. 54 3................ 43 3................................ 50 3................................................................1...............................................1 Manufacturer’s internal safety requirements ..............3 Time frame ......... 41 3.......3 Time frame ........ 41 3..........5........... 44 3................................................ 55 4 Weapons .................4 Activity description ....................... 50 3........................................ 45 3............................8..........4...............7 3....1 Purpose ...........................3 Time frame .......................2 Responsibility ............................................. 57 4......................................................................................................8.....9.....9........1 General ...................................4 Activity description .......4. ........2.........3............................................2................................................................4............. 78 4........2. 71 4........................15......................1..........2 Installation aspects ...................................1 Danger area ...................................................2...3..... 67 4.................12...........11 Pressure ...............................2.....7 Barrels and sub-calibre barrels .............3 Toxic substances .... 60 4........................................15........................ 72 4..............1.........2.............................2.............. 62 4................................................... 84 4...15 Transport ................................ 76 4....1 General ......................................................6 Backflash ..........2. 70 4.....2 4.............. 70 4..1 General .................................................................2....2.....9 Backblast ..2 Breech mechanisms ................2 General requirements ... 76 4..........................................................2 Requirements .... flame guards and recoil amplifiers ........1.....................................1. 73 4......2...................3...........1....12............................ 68 4......2..............1........3 4.......1 General .......4 Additional requirements .5 Water and moisture resistance .2............2.......3...............1........................ 75 4...2.................. 81 4.............................................2.3. 79 4............ 72 4............1 Launchers ....2........2............. 81 4.......................7 Fire .............. 75 4...2............. 81 4...............................10 Vibration dose ...............2. 71 4......................... 74 4............................... 79 4..8 Fume extractors .2.......... 64 4......... 67 4..............3 Recoil forces ...2..2..........2......... 61 4............. 70 4..12...4 Electrical and magnetic fields .............................. 76 System requirements .....................2..... 82 4.2.........2................. 78 4....2 Hydraulics and pneumatics .................................14 Stability – mechanical .....................1..............2... 60 4........2.............................. 58 Common requirements .2.........2 Safety of friendly forces .....2...................15.... 69 4....... 69 4...........................9 Muzzle brakes...............................12.........1................ 70 4.3.............2........1....2.....................................2.........12......1 Springs (gas or mechanical) ..........15.8 Blast pressure ....12 Forces ...3........2............1 Weapon installation .2 Recoil systems ......4 Breech ring ..........2............ 60 4..1 Requirements of International Law .....................3.......3......6 Extreme climatic conditions .. 66 4.......2...1..2 Requirements ..2.................................... 77 4................13 Lasers .... 74 4...........2..........2.............. 84 9 ....3............2..................3.................................................12.1............ 77 4...................2.....4 Risks and system safety ......................2....................... 77 4.....2............1 Requirements to prevent fall-back ..............................................................3.................................3 Firing mechanisms .....................5 Obturation .... .........................................3................................3............................................3...........................4 Aiming and firing limitations ......................................2 Requirements of International Law .........3 Fire-fighting equipment ...2 Materiel environment ..1....3....11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters ...3................5........2 Requirements ......1...2 Warheads . 85 4.............................. 97 4....................4........................3...2..1...........1.................3.......................2 Requirements ...............3...1.................. 96 4...3................................................5 Other weapon systems .1... 114 5.....................1 System accuracy ...............1 Minelayers for landmines .3...................... 95 4............................... 96 4....7........1.......... 86 4.........4 4................1.................................1........... 113 5........... 118 5............. 118 5...........2 Warheads containing high explosive (HE) .3 Requirements ....3.3...3...............5.. 88 4.4 Hatches and doors .......................................................2..... 87 4.....................................3 Launch tubes for torpedoes . 97 4............................................1..... 116 5............... 89 4................................................3 Firing .......... 94 4...................... 118 5.......... 113 5.........................1....... 93 4.3......2 Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges .......... 120 5......2....... 100 4.....2........1 Joint ammunition requirements .7................2............... 97 4........2...........3 Weapon platforms .................5.......... 91 4..................7............3... 90 4.............................................. 96 4......3.......................5................................................................. 85 4.............1 Description ...... 90 4................. 119 5.5 Sighting and laying systems .......2 Lifting devices ............................. 114 5..1 Pressure vessels .2.................................. 100 4... 122 10 ..................................................... 102 5 Ammunition ..................3... 91 4................................3..............1......................................................................... 100 4..........1.6 Guidance systems .3................3 Recoilless weapon and rocket systems .3...10 Muzzle flash ...3.............1.............7 Miscellaneous requirements ............1..3...2.........1 General .....2.....2................13 Recoil buffers ........2....3 Materiel specific requirements .. 87 4.....5.12 Ramming ...................1........................................3..........3....1 General .1 General ... 100 Requirement checklist for weapons .3..3.......2..........4 Checklist for joint ammunition requirements .......2...... 96 4...........................................1 General .............................3....1..5.. 86 4. 113 5...2 Sight tests and adjustments .1............2 Pylons and dispensers ....5...........................4 Composite and compound barrels .....5.....1....3.......3................. 96 4..............5... ............................1.....2...1 General ...........2........... 122 5...................................5 HE warheads for large underwater ammunition ......3............3 Materiel environment .3..2 HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles ...............1.3.....1 General .................3...........4 5..3.1 Safety aspects .......2.......1 Requirements .........2........4........................ 145 5.. 145 5.......................................... 132 5.....................1 General ..................3 Pyrotechnic warheads ..........................2......2 Safety aspects ..............................1 Introduction .........4 Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs .........3..... 124 5...6.....2...................................3....................5 Requirement checklist for warheads ......6 Propulsion devices for torpedoes ..............2.................4................3......3......4 Joint requirements .......... 140 5... 150 5.. 132 5............. 126 5.......... 152 5.......3.................... 134 5.......1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition ....4......4 Other warheads ........ 130 5.........3.......................... 150 5...............3.1 General .......2..............2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators ...........1 Description of function .2................3......... ........3....................2 Requirements ...... 130 5.......................3......3 5.......................................3..... 138 5............... 129 5...........................3............3.......3 Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets.............. 127 5......... 149 5. 157 11 . 125 5.....2 Requirements ........................2.............1...................3....3.... 139 5.......2...........5 Other pyrotechnic warheads ........3...................................... 154 5...............4 HE warheads for landmines .. 151 5.........................3 Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition .........2..................4 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices .2... torpedoes.......................3 HE warheads for bombs ...... 139 5..........................2..... 152 5........3....3.......2.......3....................2 Requirements ........... etc.............................................................. 144 5. 142 5.5......3...3.......2..... 138 5...............................3...................... 153 5.....3.3 Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators .......3....................................1 General ........3.. 135 5...1....................1.2.4 Jet engines ...........................3........3..........................2..1 General .........6 HE warheads for other ammunition .... 134 5....2. unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs).5 Ram rocket engines ...................3.........................3.. 136 Propulsion systems ....3.................................. 142 5........ guided missiles.2......5...............2. 141 5....1............... 145 5......................................... 154 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges .......2........2................ 146 5... 157 5.........2 Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition ...........3.......... .....1....4..4.4.10 Propulsion devices ............1 Mechanical stress ..... 167 5............5...4........ 178 5............1 Fuzing systems where unique.............1..................... 162 5.........1 Fuzing systems for explosives etc.......4..................... 177 Requirements for systems with interrupters ....2........ .2...4.4.......3..4 Hand-grenades .1...2.4...... 169 5...2 Demolition devices (such as plastic explosives.............4......1......4. Bangalore torpedoes and linear charges) .......................4.... 179 Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions ...... recovery and disposal .......4................. 167 5....4....5........1 Electrical subsystems ............4......4 Other fuzing systems .3 The arming process ....4......... 163 5....4.....................1..........................4...4....1..8 Multi-purpose ammunition ..4................... 182 Requirement checklist for fuzing systems .............................2.... 157 5..........................1........................ 168 5. 168 5.5 5........... demolition sticks.....4..........4...4......................1....2...... 170 5...............4........3 5.......5 Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters ... 169 5...... 168 5.4....6 Self-destruction .................... 167 5.4..5....3 Technical solutions ..............4.. 180 5...................2 Materiel environment .....................7 Submunitions .........1........ application specific..4.2........... deactivation....2 5........4....3 Signal and spotting agents ...................... 170 5..6 Testing ........................................ 181 5.........1.............................4 Propulsion devices ...4...2 Physical and chemical stress ...........4...................4....4.............. 164 5.....4 5...........4..5 Application specific requirements ..................4.....4......................1......1 Design requirements ...........7 Neutralisation.... 180 5.3 Initiation devices and demolition charges ................... 169 General requirements ..5................ 164 5..4............ 176 5..4....4 Arming safety features including semiconductor switches .....2.... 180 5..1............1.....5.1 Common requirements .....4..... 168 5.......................3.................2.......1....2........ 167 5...4.... 174 5.....8 Requirements of International Law ....4....1..6 12 5...2 Testing interrupters ...........................2 Signal and spotting agents ...1........ 178 Requirements for systems without interrupters ........4.....2 Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs) . 178 5.4......... 174 5.... 162 5... environmental factors are not available ................4..............................................1.......1 General .........................4............. 173 5...... 177 5.......................... 172 5......4....3.4.....................9 Tandem systems ............ 182 .....2................................. ...............2.................... 239 7..................................6...................1 System specific specifications ............................................................... 242 Index ...................5. 226 7.............................................. 237 7..................................................................................................................1 Checklist example 1 .......................... 237 7..........1 Documents governing safety ....................3...............6 Combined testing ...........6...........2 Key to abbreviations .4 Requirements .......................................................................4 Textbooks ... 193 6.................1 General ....................5 Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings ...............3..................5................................................ 238 7....... 238 7.........................2 Checklist example 2 .............................................................. 223 7.........6..5............... 190 5....................................................... 237 7.......... 218 7 References ................................................2 Environmental factors .................... 190 5.....2 Electrical environmental stress ............2..1 Terminology ........... 235 7.................................................... 193 6.................. 189 5.....3 Chemical testing ....3 Chemical environmental stress ......................4 Climatic environmental stress .....5.......................................................................... 225 7...............2........6.....................5..............1 Mechanical environmental stress ........................3............................................ 189 5.....................................2 Environment specific specifications . 190 5............................................. 239 7.....................6.....................5 Fire and explosion testing ............7 Accident investigations .................................5 Packaging for ammunition ....... 189 5............. 237 7....5.......5 Documents relating to the environment ......6..... 233 7.................2 Standards relating to design and testing ...................................6.................................1 Mechanical testing ................... 190 5.......2 Climatic testing .. 239 8 Checklists .............................3 Design principles and experience .... 188 5....6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition ...................... 241 8........ 192 6 Definitions ..........................4 Electrical and electromagnetic testing ..3 Consequences of environmental stress .................................................5....5............. 238 7......................... 188 5.... 190 5...............2.........6............. 243 13 ....................................5.........2..............3.5...........5..........2........................................3.. 241 8......5 Other environmental stress .................. 230 7................................................ . 0 0.1 TO OUR FOREIGN READER 1 Purpose of this chapter The purpose of this chapter is to inform our Foreign Reader on some facts about the role-play in Sweden concerning Weapons and Ammunition procurement. 0. which could be compared with a specification in a business agreement. testing and inspection of equipment. based on EU directives. To define the task. This chapter is added to the English edition only and does not exist in the Swedish edition. financial objective (TTFO). nor has it basically any resources for design (but quite a lot for testing). everything is financed through the assignments. producing technical specifications). After contracting a supplier.3 About the manual During the late sixties and early seventies.g. FMV does neither manufacture nor sell anything. a number of ammunition related accidents occurred in Sweden. FMV contracts the industry. financial and time aspects. mostly in competition and strictly obeying the public procurement act. FMV has no funding of its own. an Ammunition Safety Manual was issued. An assignment is formulated as an agreement between the HQ and FMV in each case. technical. defining the scope of work and reached after a dialogue regarding technical. negotiating contracts. The purpose of the manual was to pre- 1. 15 . FMV monitors and controls the safety work performed by the supplier. HQ issues a tactical. The responsibility for the defence procurement extends to the technical processing (e.To our Foreign Reader 0 0 0. But as a governmental authority.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) is a separate agency for procurement of materiel for the Armed Forces on assignment from the Head Quarters (HQ). purchasing. As a result of the investigation of the accidents. Reflecting the obvious advantages of the ammunition safety methodology Sweden had until then. This manual hence includes requirements and experiences from both ammunition and weapons. A couple of years ago we had reports on some failing artillery pieces. 16 . some mandatory and some desired. Many of the requirements were of the prohibiting type. 0 The manual was based on a record of experience gained over the years.0 To our Foreign Reader scribe a procedure that would ensure an acceptable level of safety throughout the life of the ammunition and to lay down basic safety requirements for ammunition. the natural question was ‘Why only ammunition?’. We also carried out safety investigations on some older artillery systems. It contained a list of technical requirements. We were also aware of the growing complexity of modern systems and also the impact from the use of software. The manual has been updated regularly and also been issued in English versions. acquisition. It can even be difficult to categorize certain types of defence materiel as either weapons or ammunition. to state appropriate activities for providing weapons and ammunition with the required level of safety throughout their service life. manufacture. This has now been extended to include a weapons section. 1 This manual states both the requirements for operations in the form of activities that are necessary primarily during development/acquisition of weapons and ammunition. FMV.Introduction 1 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION General The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual (H VAS-E) is a record of the experience accumulated over the years relating to weapons and ammunition safety. H VAS-E. This is a natural progression as the boundary between weapons and ammunition is becoming increasingly fuzzy. to constitute a guide and checklist for personnel in the Armed Forces. use and disposal. particularly during the development stages of projects. shall also be applied. a manual was compiled of experience accumulated from the ammunition sector. As a result of a proposal in the final report dated 1970-09-28 from the Ammunition Safety Working Group (ASWG) with representatives from the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). to state basic requirements concerning weapons and ammunition. 1996 English edition (H SystSäkE) M7740-784851. If there is any doubt use both Chapter 4 and 5. If the defence materiel system contains weapons and/or ammunition this manual. The System Safety Manual shall always be applied. This manual complements the Swedish Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual. 17 . the Defence Research Establishment (FOA) and the Swedish defence companies concerned. The purpose of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is: • • • • to complement the System Safety Manual in respect of weapons and ammunition. and the materiel specific requirements for weapons and ammunition. FOA and the defence industry in matters concerning weapons and ammunition safety during development. if a weapon contains safety critical software the Software Safety Manual shall be applied in addition to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual. and experience accumulated from. and experience accumulated from. The requirement specification in the order/ contract shall state which requirements. 1 The System Safety Manual states how system safety activities can be appropriately conducted and contains certain materiel specific requirements. For example. These manuals are used as a complement to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual when formulating technical requirements and requirements for operational undertakings. the development of vehicles as well as regulations governing road worthiness. 18 . shall apply for specific weapons and/or specific ammunition. The Vehicle Safety Manual (H FordonSäk) states the design principles for. The Software Safety Manual (H ProgSäk) states directives relating to the programming of safety critical software. The REQDOC Technical Specification Manual (H Kravdok) states how requirements shall be formulated in the work undertaking (VÅ) and technical (materiel related) requirements in a technical specification (TS). the development of submarines. and the type of requirement (mandatory or desired).1 illustrates schematically how the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual interrelates with other documents etc. The Submarine Safety Manual (H UbåtSäk) states the design principles for. that govern and affect weapons and ammunition safety activities.1 Introduction Safety requirements in this manual are subdivided into mandatory (SHALL) and desired (SHOULD) requirements. Figure 1. Weapons and ammunition safety activities are governed within FMV by FMV Service Regulations (TjF-FMV 1997:12.1 The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual relative to other documents. When a defence materiel system is to be acquired the contract stipulates that a System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) shall be established. The SSPP then governs other safety-related activities.Introduction 1 H VAS Requirements Documentation Manual Software Safety Manual System Safety Manual Vehicles Safety Manual Submarine Safety Manual 1 Figure 1. These state that the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual shall be applied during the acquisition of weapons and ammunition. Safety work in a defence industry is often governed by internal company documents that relate to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual. The System Safety Manual and the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual provide support concerning which activities and overall requirements should/shall apply. Chapters 2 and 3. These documents often specify the entire materiel development process with safety work as an integral part. 19 . Refer also to the System Safety Manual. updated via TjF-FMV 1999:46). This approach is also supported inter alia in ISO 9000-1:1994 and AQAP 110. ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ specifies weapon and ammunition related safety activities as well as the common materiel requirements for the project. 3. Chapter 5. ‘Ammunition’ specifies materiel specific requirements for ammunition. Chapter 4. Chapter 1. Propulsion systems.1 Introduction 1. Other chapters (1. 6. Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges and Packaging for ammunition. ‘Weapons’ and Chapter 5. In such cases both Chapter 4. Chapter 7. In all the chapters where safety requirements are specified (chapters 2. Chapter 8. 1 20 . Chapter 2. Chapter 6. ‘Definitions’ defines certain materiel specific terminology and lists a key to the abbreviations and acronyms used in the manual. ‘Introduction’ describes the background. For some defence materiel systems it may be difficult to determine the boundary between weapons and ammunition. ‘Weapons’ specifies materiel specific requirements for weapons of which the main parts are Common requirements and System requirements.2 Instructions for use This manual comprises both descriptive and requirement based chapters as described below. 4 and 5) checklists are provided that can be used to check that each requirement is observed. ‘Checklists’ contains examples of how checklists of requirements can be formulated for inter alia issuing reports to FMV advisory groups. ‘Methodology’ describes how the activities specified in Chapter 2 can be managed. preconditions and objective of the manual. 7 and 8) are of a descriptive nature. ‘Ammunition’ must be applied. With regard to ammunition the specific subsystem requirements also apply that are specified under the respective headings Warheads. ‘References’ lists references to literature relating to defence materiel. Chapter 3. In addition. Accidents with weapons and ammunition. determines transport codes. however. weapons and ammunition often constitute a potential major hazard even to the user. which includes storage. 21 .3.1 Weapons and ammunition safety General 1 All activities with technical systems involve risk. handling. The Armed Forces stipulate requirements in the TTFO for the achievement of a tolerable level of risk. the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables examines and approves all explosives. the materiel must be acceptable safe to handle throughout its life. Consequently. and Transport of Dangerous Goods Act.3 1. 1. The Armed Forces. the requirements governing safety shall be stringent. refer directly to the System Safety Manual. Consequently. FMV. The purpose of the weapons and ammunition in the Armed Forces is to inflict the maximum possible damage on the enemy in wartime. As accidents with weapons and ammunition often have serious consequences for personnel.Introduction 1 The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is based on – and is a complement to – the System Safety Manual. materiel and the environment. which means a real ‘acceptable level of safety’. When designing weapons and ammunition it shall always be assured that they have a tolerable level of risk throughout their service life. The requirements specified for performance and reliability can be mutually exclusive to requirements stipulated for safety since complex safety devices can entail a lower level of reliability and operational availability. use. and the defence industry are enjoined to conduct active safety work through legislation such as the Work Environment Act. Complete freedom from risk is thus an unattainable ‘ideal condition’ which is why the goal of risk reducing activities and measures in general can only be to reduce the risks to a so-called tolerable risk level. and establishes storage codes in consultation with FMV. It can mainly be read and applied independently but certain sections in the text. maintenance and disposal. moreover. Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act. transport. also tend to erode confidence in military materiel in general. The National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI) examines and approves all explosive goods developed and manufactured by the industry for military or civil use. The Armed Forces ensure that training materiel and training plans. The user complies with the instructions given during training and with safety regulations when handling the weapon and ammunition. FMV formulates the requirements of the Armed Forces into technical requirements with the aid of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual and other applicable specifications. storage. safety regulations. transport. production. Military units provide users with sufficient training and ensure that conditions during usage are such that weapons and ammunition do not cause accidents or ill-health. and ensures that safety activities stated in the SSPP are performed in a satisfactory manner and that documentation for Armed Forces’ activities are produced. while the general activities are described in the System Safety Manual. These specific weapon and ammunition activities are described in Chapter 2. The supplier ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirements stated in requirement specifications and that the activities agreed in the SSPP are properly performed. FMV ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirements specified in the RFP or equivalent as well as those specified in this manual. maintenance and disposal.1 Introduction The following prerequisites are necessary to meet the requirements pertaining to a tolerable level of risk: • Relevant materiel specific safety requirements and requirements for safety activities are formulated by the Armed Forces in the form of Tactical Technical Financial Objectives (TTFO) or equivalent. 22 . Section 2. use. • 1 • • • • • • It is essential that all parties involved are aware of their responsibility for ensuring that weapons and ammunition are acceptably safe to handle throughout their service life.2. All the safety requirements are specified by FMV in the Request for Proposal (RFP). In the weapon and ammunition sectors the system safety activities consist of a number of risk reducing activities that are to be performed during development. The Armed Forces assign to FMV the task of disposal of weapons and ammunition. and restrictions on the use of the materiel are available so that military units can use the materiel in a safe manner. 23 .2 Concepts The term ‘accident’ is used in the Work Environment Act. but if no person is injured and no materiel/property or the environment is damaged by the detonation the event is not designated as an accident but as an incident. A hazardous event shall result in someone being injured or something being damaged for it to be deemed an accident. Examples of such stated conditions (preconditions) for materiel safety are: • • • that the safety of devices for handling weapons and ammunition are satisfactory. that the specified environmental severities are not exceeded. (Example: If a shell detonates at an undesired point in time it is a hazardous event.3.) 1 Accident & Hazardous Event Person injured or object damaged Figure 1.Introduction 1 1. that users have undergone the specified training.2 The ‘accident’ concept Weapons and ammunition safety is the property of materiel to be handled under specified conditions without a hazardous event occurring or parts incorporated in the materiel being affected in such a way that a hazardous event may occur during subsequent handling. that instructions for use have been complied with. Weapons and ammunition safety is only one of many safety concepts. self-propelled artillery guns and missile launchers for example.e.3 System safety exemplified by a naval vessel system Seaworthiness in this example is directly affected by weapons and ammunition safety insofar as defects and deficiencies in these could impact on seaworthiness.1 Introduction • • that the materiel is used and operated in the intended manner. transport. maintenance and disposal. resistance to environmental conditions.g. use. storage. In such a case seaworthiness. 1 System safety Ammunition safety Weapons safety Seaworthiness Figure 1. ammunition safety. and activities for the protection of the environment. e. For example. that safety inspections and status checks are performed as required.g. vibration) resulting in hazard detonation. System safety may also encompass further concepts such as software safety. An explanation of how this safety concept can be related to other safety concepts is given below. or if ammunition stored in the ammunition hold was unable to withstand environmental stresses (e. Handling refers to handling during all phases throughout the life of the product. 24 . helicopters. The concepts below may constitute parts within a major system such as a naval vessel. aircraft. and weapons safety are constituent parts of the wider system safety concept for the vessel. i. if it was possible to fire a gun onboard a vessel towards the deck resulting in holes in the hull. Equivalent concepts apply to vehicles. requirements specified in the Armed Forces’ TTFO are met.2 Peacetime and wartime It is of decisive importance for combat morale that the user has full confidence from the safety aspect in the materiel that is used. 1. Safety requirements for newly developed weapons and newly developed ammunition should specify that the materiel can be used with the same restrictions in peacetime and in wartime alike.4. FMV or manufacturer level.3 Integration of safety work with other activities Safety cannot be managed independently but only in combination with the other activities involved during the life of the materiel. responsible for integration of the weapon or ammunition into existing materiel or system.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV Responsibility for weapons and ammunition safety devolves upon the function at FMV which is: • • responsible for acquisition or modification of the weapon or ammunition in question. safety regulations and marking. 1.4 1.Introduction 1 1. 1 • • 1.1 Objectives for safety activities General Weapons and ammunition safety activities shall be performed to an extent that: • applicable legislation and requirements governing the materiel are complied with and provide adequate safety against ill-health and accidents during handling and that the materiel is provided with instructions for use.4. Neither can responsibility for safety be removed from the line organization at the Armed Forces. system safety will not be degraded by the use of new technology or new system solutions. 25 .4. 26 .6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities This manual does not govern delegations and responsibility for weapon and ammunition safety activities within the Defence Research Establishment or other supporting authorities. 1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers The application of this manual by manufacturers shall be governed by the provisions stipulated in the relevant order contract. Advice obtained does not alter the line organization responsibility stipulated above. 1.1 Introduction After completion of weapons and ammunition safety work or system safety work a Safety Statement (SS) shall be issued as specified in the Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual. 1 Regulations governing ammunition safety activities within FMV are disclosed in TjF-FMV 1997:12. updated 1999-12-27 via TjF-FMV 1996:46. Advice concerning weapons and ammunition safety can be obtained from the Inspectorate advisory groups (and such advice shall be procured in cases where explosive goods require transport and storage classification). here refers to purchase of off-the-shelf goods. It is necessary to carry out a selection of these activities in order to achieve the required level of safety. renovation or disposal. Within the framework of a large-scale type P2 acquisition the adaptation of subsystems may be necessary. Project type P2. see the System Safety Manual. P3: Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems. here refers to an investigation of the status of materiel in existence within the Armed Forces with the objective of creating the basis for a decision regarding the most appropriate measures to be taken with the system. 27 .1 This chapter specifies the safety activities and materiel requirements that are specific to weapons and ammunition. 2 These project types are henceforth referred to as P1.2 specifies safety activity requirements and Section 2. only weapon and ammunition specific materiel requirements are stated in this manual while the overall requirements are stated in the System Safety Manual.Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2 2 SAFETY ACTIVITIES AND REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL MATERIEL General 2. modification. It is appropriate that this integration be carried out by incorporating the specific activities in the System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) of the materiel system. Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems. For example.g. • • Activities that are specific to weapons and ammunition shall be integrated with overall materiel system activities. Requirements and activities are subdivided into three different project types according to whether they deal with: • • • P1: Development. Such an adaptation is carried out as a P1 project type.3 the requirements common to all materiel. Development. here refers both to development of new weapon and ammunition systems and to modification or renovation of existing systems. Some of the weapon and ammunition specific activities form a natural basis for the overall activities. Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems. P2 and P3: • Project type P1. Section 2. Project type P3. e. P2: Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems. Such hazards can be limited through restriction on use.1. In some cases such documentation can be obtained via the authorities of a country with whom a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been established. It may. be necessary to take into consideration procedures in use in the country in which development is taking place. Pertinent documentation must be available to form a basis for making a decision on acquisition.2 Safety activity requirements The principles for weapon and ammunition safety activities are illustrated in Figure 2. and consequently the manual is applicable in its entirety even for international use. However. Certain hazards may remain after manufacture such as blast pressure. When a development project is assigned to a foreign manufacturer the safety activities shall be performed in the same way as they would be during development by a Swedish manufacturer.2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel While drafting this manual consideration was given to the procedures and standards that are in use internationally. When purchasing fully developed materiel from abroad it shall always be ensured that information/documentation is obtained to enable an evaluation of safety to be performed. and fragments from detonation. weapons and ammunition often contain hazards that are essential for their objectives to be achieved. During design and manufacture most risks are limited by the design measures taken and by good production control. It is for reasons such as this that it is impossible to create completely safe systems. 28 . however. With regard to their nature and purpose. 2 2. Prior to each decision on an acquisition a thorough evaluation of the safety of the product shall be performed. and by providing users with training in the handling and operation of systems etc. thermal radiation during firing. the risks pertaining to a weapon and ammunition system during its various phases can partially be eliminated or limited. The substance of the activities – often denoted in this manual by abbreviations – are explained in more detail in the System Safety Manual. equipment. The objective of these activities is to obtain an acceptable level of safety for personnel.2 shows the safety activities that can be performed during the various phases in the life of the system for the various types of project (P1. P2 or P3). This is stipulated in the SSPP for the materiel system. 29 . Abbreviations are derived from English language expressions.Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2 Materiel system Possible hazards Defence industries activities FMV activities Armed Force activities 2 Figure 2. The activities selected and the interflow between them varies depending on the specific project.1 System safety activities Figure 2. property and the surrounding environment. P2 and P3 programs. Requirements for the safety activities to be performed for the various programs (P1. each mandatory (SHALL) requirement is written in bold type on a dark yellow background and each desired (SHOULD) requirement is written in normal typeface on a light yellow background. and the arrows indicate the intended direction of the information flow. In the activity flows below the circles with ‘A’ indicate who bears the main responsibility for performance of the activity.2 Safety activities during the various phases Figures 2. P2 and P3) are incorporated into the overall SSPP or equivalent for the materiel system. P2 and P3) are incorporated into the overall SSPP or equivalent for the materiel system. Cases where the text does not have a requirement number shall not be interpreted as strict requirements but as a general guideline and explanation. while an empty circle denotes participation in the activity or that a document/activity moves.5 illustrate the information flow between the Armed Forces.2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel Phase Activity Studies Study/ Development Planning and procurement Verification/ Testing Operation Manufacture Transport/ Storage Use/Consumption Maintenance Disposal Disposal Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to SRP Supplement to PHL Advising Group Check (Advisory Group) Safety Testing Directives for safety inspection Directives for PHST 2 Figure 2. Furthermore.3.4 and 2. 2. FMV. and the manufacturer involved in the P1. The words ‘shall’ and ‘should’ are used in the running text as explanations. Each requirement is assigned a unique number to facilitate references. Requirements for the safety activities to be performed in the various programs (P1. 30 . 1.5 Example of activity flow for P3: Review of Existing Materiel How.22002 31 . ‘Methodology’. 1.2.4 Example of activity flow for P2: Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Materiel Activity Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to PHL Safety Testing FM FMV A A A A Figure 2. and by whom the activities stated below shall be performed in each program (P1. Most activities conclude with a clearly identifiable documentation. when.3 Example of activity flow forP1: Development Activity Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to SRP Advising Group Check (Advisory Group) Directives for safety inspection Directives for PHST FM FMV Industry 2 A A A A A A Figure 2. P2 and P3) is described in Chapter 3.3. Supplement to safety requirements in the RFP shall be performed as specified in Section 3.22001 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO (Tactical Technical Financial Objectives) shall be performed as specified in Section 3.Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2 Activity Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to SRP Supplement to PHL Advising Group Check (Advisory Group) Safety Testing Directives for safety inspection Directives for PHST FM FMV Industry A A A A A A A A Figure 2. 22006 Supplement to supplier’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) performed as specified in Section 3. For explosive goods advice shall be obtained from FMV’s Advisory Group for Explosives.6. Refer also to Section 3.3 and 5. analyses and tests.4.2.8. 5.22005 1. Further requirements are stated in the System Safety Manual. 1. Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) performed as specified in Section 3.1.7. Chapter 2. 32 . Section 2. Proposed Handling.3 Requirements common to all materiel Requirements that apply to all weapons and ammunition have been collated in this section to avoid the need for repetition in Chapter 4 and 5. As the failure probability values to be verified are very low it is not sufficient to use only testing – instead.5. During the development phases safety requirements are verified by means of audits. 5. Refer also to Section 3.22003 1. Refer also to Section 3.22009 2.6.2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 1. Test directives for safety inspections (part of the In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition) shall be produced by FMV in conjunction with ammunition development. 1. These requirements shall be incorporated into requirement specifications together with other applicable weapon and ammunition requirements.2.22008 2 1. Advice from FMV’s Advisory Groups should be obtained as per the instructions issued by the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety. Safety testing shall be performed by the manufacturer as part of safety verification.3.2. Thus it is forbidden to design weapons with non-discriminatory effect that cause unnecessary suffering or excessive injury.2. Refer also to Section 3. It is the aim of weapons and ammunition development to create a design that satisfies safety requirements.4. Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) should be established as specified in Section 3.9.22004 1.23001 Weapons shall not be designed so that they violate the applicable Rules of International Law.1. several methods of verification must be used in parallel.22007 1.8. Comment: Refer also to requirements in Section 4.1. 1.23006 1. This applies to materials that are in direct contact with each other or that can be affected via an interchange of gasses. Explosives incorporated in the materiel shall be approved by the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI). see Section 3. Compatibility testing often tests all organic materials with the explosives incorporated and with other safety critical components.23003 1. SÄI determines transport and storage codes in consultation with FMV and establishes UN codes. Comment: Incompatible materials are to be avoided even if their reaction products are harmless.23002 Each project concerning new acquisition or modification of weaponry or conventional weapons mainly for use against personnel shall be reported to the Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Projects. Testing of ‘chemical life’ should be performed as specified in FSD 0223.23007 33 .6. The product shall retain its safety properties for at least as long as its specified service life. Materials incorporated shall be compatible so that the product remains safe during its lifetime.23005 1.Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2 1. Comment: Approval is based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables statute book (SÄIFS 1986:2). Comment: Appraisals of the scope of qualification are performed by the Advisory Group for Explosives.23004 2 1. Explosives incorporated in the materiel shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214. type Content Comment 2 Activities 1. Reqmt.23004 SHALL Explosives qualified 1.22003 1. Table 2:1 Checklist of requirements for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel Reqmt.22002 1.23006 SHALL Service life 1.22001 1.22006 1.22004 1.23002 SHALL Scrutiny by Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Projects 1.23001 SHALL Non-discriminatory effect 1.2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2.22005 1.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups.23007 SHOULD Chemical life a) Becomes mandatory (SHALL) requirement if specified in the SSPP. no.22009 SHALL SHALL a) a) Requirements in TTFO Requirements in RFP Requirements in SRP PHL Advisory Group for Explosives Advice Safety testing Safety inspections PHST SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHOULD Requirements common to all materiel 1.22008 1.23005 SHALL Compatibility 1. ‘Checklists’. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8.23003 SHALL Explosives approved by SÄI 1.22007 1. 34 . 1 METHODOLOGY General The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide for the implementation of the activities described in Chapter 2. FMV participates in a dialogue with the Armed Forces to generate proposals for supplementary requirements concerning system safety aspects for weapons and ammunition for a specific materiel system. but if other methods are used they must be described.1 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO Purpose The Armed Forces are responsible for ensuring that all requirements stipulated for the weapon system are disclosed in the TTFO. preferably in the System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) as specified in the System Safety Manual. Each section in this chapter embraces the following areas: Purpose: Gives a brief description of what the activity intends to achieve for each project type: P1. The activities do not have to be carried out in the manner stated in this chapter. P2 and P3.2 3. To state in which phase during the life of the system that the activity shall be started or carried out. 3 Responsibility: Time frame: Description of activity: 3. Describes the way in which the activity can most suitably be carried out.Methodology 3 3 3. 35 . To these are appended selected requirements from the System Safety Manual. Determines which authority – FMV or the manufacturer – bears prime responsibility for ensuring that the activity is carried out.2. It is appropriate to produce the draft SSPP at the same time as the draft requirement specification. The safety requirements are used by FMV as the basis for the formulation of requirements in the Request for Proposal (RFP) to the manufacturer. This leads to a new TTFO process. Technical and Financial Objectives).2 Responsibility P1: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO. etc. study phase. or operative capability and tactical guidelines. 3. In the DTTFO and PTTFO the requirements are divided into mandatory (SHALL) requirements and desired (SHOULD) requirements. operative focus. 3 P3: In conjunction with review of existing materiel. Technical and Financial Objectives).4 Activity description The safety requirements are specified in the DTTFO (Draft version of Tactical.2. P2: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO. permitted safety distances when firing. PTTFO (Preliminary Tactical.3 Time frame P1: At project start.2. Technical and Financial Objectives). Restrictions concerning firing conditions such as rate of fire. Requirements for weapons and ammunition safety may comprise inter alia the following: • • Maximum restrictions during use such as the maximum size of the danger area in peacetime and wartime. 3. P2: When acquisition is necessary. 36 .3 Methodology 3. and finally in the TTFO (Tactical. Changes in the general operative conditions.2. permitted charges for artillery. may create the need for revisions to established requirements. P3: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO. Methodology 3 • • Maximum restrictions concerning storage such as compatibility groups for ammunition.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) Purpose 3.3 Time frame P1: During RFP for each phase. 3 3. Chapter 3. FMV also formulates the safety requirements necessary for FMV’s own work such as for review of existing materiel.3. 37 .2. They must comprise all phases of use throughout the life of the system.3. Responsibility 3. P3: Before review of existing materiel. Insensitive munition (IM) requirements. 3. Safety requirements can be stated qualitatively or quantitatively. More information is available in the System Safety Manual. Section 3.3. Regarding policy and testing refer to FSD 0060. P2: During RFP. P2: FMV. P3: FMV.2 P1: FMV.1 To formulate the specific safety requirements that shall apply during the RFP process on the basis of the weapon and ammunition related requirements in the TTFO. Proposals from the manufacturer regarding the activities that should be included in the system safety program shall be stated in the SSPP for the materiel system. These shall be stated in the RFP. Environmental design and test requirements for extreme environments shall be formulated as per the applicable military or other standards. In addition to the materiel specific safety requirements further safety activities shall be stipulated. however.4 Activity description Safety requirements for the materiel are stated in the requirement specification to be included in the RFP. laser class as per IEC 60825-1. ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’. Danger areas for ammunition. see the System Safety Manual. preferably as specified in the System Safety Manual. with reference to the concrete requirements specified in Chapter 2. so-called eyesafe lasers). There must. be a balance between live ammunition with catastrophic consequences in the case of a hazardous event. and less complex training ammunition. e. Prohibited materials and combinations of materials. Examples of safety requirements: • • • • • Safety margins for structural strength such as compressive strength for launchers. ‘Ammunition’. Criteria for qualification when insensitive munition is required. 3 The Armed Forces’ safety requirements for a complete system may need to be broken down to subsystem level. at which the various manufacturers/suppliers of subsystems must share responsibility for the overall safety requirements. 38 .g. Approved classes of laser (e.3. The format for the requirement specification is specified in the REQDOC Technical Specification Manual and in the REQDOC Statement of Work Undertakings Manual.g. Chapters 2 and 3. Section 2.2. ‘Weapons’ and Chapter 5. Chapter 4. Safety requirements stated in the TTFO are given a more ‘industry-friendly’ wording.3 Methodology 3. and from other manuals such as the Software Safety Manual and the Vehicle Safety Manual. Chapter 2 Safety activities and materiel requirements. Activities .Performance req H VAS .4. For the purchase of off-the-shelf goods this means the specification requirements that apply to the purchase of the goods.Performance req Software Safety Manual Vehicle Safety Manual 3 Figure 3. P2: The manufacturer.Activities .Performance req System Safety Manual . 39 .Methodology 3 SSPP .4.1 To formulate weapon and ammunition safety requirements in a requirement specification that shall apply to the materiel and whose fulfilment shall be verified.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) Purpose 3.Activities Requirement Specification .2 Responsibility P1: The manufacturer. 3.1 Allocation of requirements 3. Refer also to the System Safety Manual.4. artillery primer. fuze.3 Methodology 3. platform.4.4.7 ‘Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP)’. This involves two things: • Allocation of safety requirements stipulated at overall level (complete weapon systems) to weapon and ammunition safety requirements at subsystem level (barrel. environmental design and test specification or equivalent. Chapter 3.16 ‘Safety Verification (SV)’. This is often a process that is internal to the manufacturer since the manufacturer has overall responsibility for the safety of the complete system. and so that it is easy to understand how the requirement is to be verified. Each requirement shall be described in such a way that it is possible to follow up the requirement. Chapter 3. ammunition. 3. 40 .1 Manufacturer’s internal safety requirements System requirements for a development project must be allocated to subsystems and components before the actual design work starts.3 Time frame P1: During the tender stage and product definition phase.4. The operating environment is specified in the RFP. and the planned verification is stated in the verification specification. P2: During the tender stage.). The safety requirements in the overall requirement specification shall preferably be reformulated into more concrete requirements to facilitate the task of the administrator in incorporating them into subsystem specifications. Section 3. Refer also to the System Safety Manual. Section 3. 3 This activity also includes reformulating environmental design and test prerequisites into specified environmental design and test requirements. cast charge.4 Activity description The supplier shall respond to the requirements in the RFP in a way that enables FMV to evaluate the planned system safety program and compare the tenders received from the various suppliers. 3. etc. Methodology 3 • A re-formulation of an overall requirement to more concrete characteristics for the subsystems. Example: System requirement: copper azide must not be formed. Subsystem requirement for fuze: copper alloy and lead azide igniter must not be used simultaneously. 3.5 3.5.1 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) Purpose A Preliminary Hazard List shall be compiled early in the operation (and be continuously updated) to identify hazards and their potential hazardous events. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Section 3.8. This section states certain hazards based on experience that can result in hazardous events. 3.5.2 Responsibility 3 P1: The manufacturer. P3: FMV. 3.5.3 Time frame P1: At Product Definition Phase. P3: Prior to start of review of existing materiel. 41 3 Methodology 3.5.4 Activity description To identify hazards one should analyze equivalent materiel, accident and incident reports, previous experience and the checklist below. This can never be complete, however, but must be supplemented over time. Table 3:1 HAZARD Example of hazards FAULT MODE CONSEQUENCE Aiming system High barrel pressure Firing system Moving parts Laser transmitter High explosives in warheads 3 Chemical substances in illuminating, smoke and incendiary ammunition High explosives in explosive trains Primary explosives Propellants (propellant charges for tube-launched ammunition, solid or liquid Excessive pressure resultrocket fuel, powder ing in rupture of combuscharges for actuator cartion chamber tridges) Escape of gas rearwards from gun Impact or fragments outside danger area Barrel rupture or fragmen- Blast injuries tation Inadvertent firing Impact or fragments outside danger area Inadvertent movement Personnel injured by crushing Crushing Inadvertent transmission Eye injuries to personnel Premature burst: in depot Blast, fragmentation or holstore, during transport, dur- low-charge effect ing handling or loading, in Open fire the bore or in trajectory Premature initiation/effect Blast or fragmentation effect Open fire Emission of corrosive agents or toxic gases Premature initiation Initiation of warhead Blast or fragmentation effect Open fire Premature initiation Initiation of warhead Open fire Premature initiation Open fire, shatter effect Blast and fragmentation effect when chamber ruptures Incorrect direction of fire Facial injuries to gunner Excessive forward or rear- Gunner injured ward recoil in recoilless weapons 42 Methodology 3 Table 3:1 HAZARD Example of hazards FAULT MODE CONSEQUENCE Projectiles, rockets or missiles at launch, release or in flight High electric voltage High electric current Hydraulic pressure Rotating parts Vibration Electromagnetic radiation Body ruptures, guidance failure, or fins etc. detach in flight Flash-over Short-circuit Leakage Parts detach Inherent resonance Inadvertent radiation Shatter or fragmentation effect Electric shock Fire in cables Injuries caused by release of pressure Impact injuries Internal injuries to driver Injuries to internal organs 3.6 3.6.1 Obtaining advice from advisory groups Purpose 3 To obtain advice from advisory groups with technical expertise and experience in the weapons and ammunition sectors. The objective of advisory operations is to provide advice and recommendations to project managers, line managers and administrators within FMV, based on the technical expertise and experience of the relevant advisory group. 3.6.2 P1: FMV. P2: FMV. Responsibility 3.6.3 Time frame P1: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with the SSPP or equivalent. P2: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with the SSPP or equivalent. 43 3 Methodology 3.6.4 Activity description The preliminary number of reviews in which the participation of the manufacturer is required shall be specified in the SSPP and in the contractual undertaking. The aim is to obtain advice relating to the project from the advisory groups as early as possible. The Advisory Group for System Safety can state which other advisory groups ought to review the project. More reviews than those originally planned may be needed. Separate reviews may be necessary prior to special tests. The current advisory groups are listed below: • • • Advisory Group for Fuzing systems (Rg T) Advisory Group for Explosives (Rg Expl) Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D) Advisory Group for System Safety (Rg SystSäk) Advisory Group for Environmental Engineering (Rg M). 3 • • The advisory groups written in italics are described in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4. In practical terms advice is given in the form of responses to concrete questions submitted in respect of a specific project. It shall be possible to use the responses as a basis for the project or line organization decisions in the project. This advice also includes the safety principles (norms for ensuring ammunition safety) that the project or line organization intends to use as a basis for its work with concrete objects, plans, regulations, etc. When requesting advice the checklist issued by the relevant advisory group shall be adhered to. 3.6.4.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility, and checklists for reviews Section 3.6.4.1.1 through 3.6.4.1.3 state the tasks for each advisory group and the data required for review by each advisory group. 44 Methodology 3 If it is unclear as to which groups should review a project the question can be submitted to the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety. 3.6.4.1.1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems 3.6.4.1.1.1 Tasks • To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of fuzing systems The advisory group operates in the following areas: – fuzing systems for warheads, – fuzing systems for propulsion devices, – design and production methods for fuzing systems for propulsion devices, – compatibility. Advice may inter alia concern: – action to be taken with existing fuzing systems and fuzing systems undergoing development, – project specifications and technical documentation. To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for fuzing systems (for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extent possible, or on assignment, to participate in the above. To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience acquired concerning fuzing systems to FMV departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies. • 3 • 3.6.4.1.1.2 Procedure Section 5.4 in the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the basis for advisory group assessments. Scope of report: • Brief general information about the object: – field of application, – weapon platform, – weapon (or equivalent), – ammunition, – danger areas. Description of the object or functional description: – drawings or diagrams, – wiring diagram / block diagram / printed circuit board assembly layout, • 45 Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. heat treatment). – treatment (e. Advice may inter alia concern: – action to be taken with existing explosives and explosives undergoing development. 0212.1 Tasks • To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of explosives. arming conditions. – environmental analyses.3 Methodology – – – – – – – • model or hardware. – testing of explosive. 0213 and 0214). – compatibility. ‘Checklists’.1. Copies of the relevant documentation shall be submitted.2. function of fuzing system. Statement disclosing the quality plan for the object. – tests (as specified in FSD 0112. The advisory group operates in the following areas: – selection of explosive.4. – project specifications and technical documentation.1. Statement disclosing materials and components: – type. explosive trains or transmitters including characteristics.4.6. – production methods for the explosive. Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than three weeks prior to review of the object. initiation conditions. surface treatment. Statement disclosing requirement verification for Section 5. Statement disclosing safety verifications performed: – safety analyses. – compatibility. – classification of explosive (UN code and Transport and Storage codes). Advisory Group for Explosives • • 3 • • • 3.4 performed in accordance with Chapter 8.2 3. 46 . safety devices. safety critical software.6.g. – composition. Methodology 3 • To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for explosives (for reviews.) and. • 3. verification. design.2. – weapon (or equivalent).1. or on assignment. not so-called brand names.e. – weapon platform. i. Weights and compositions shall be disclosed and adequate denominations shall be used. pyrotechnic compositions. diagrams and possible model). To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience acquired concerning explosives to FMV departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies. – electrical screening. to the extent possible. testing. – data on all explosives. 3 • 47 . Scope of report: • Brief general information about the object: – field of application. assessments. – fuzing system with safety devices and arming conditions (advice from submission to the Advisory Group for Fuzes. – compatibility analyses performed concerning the compatibility of the various components incorporated with the explosives or pyrotechnic compositions. as well as the compatibility of the various explosives and pyrotechnic compositions with each other and with the surrounding fabrication material. validation. etc. and other active substances incorporated in the object. including an account of the risk for copper azide formation resulting from the presence of materials with copper content and lead azide). analyses. When presenting a submission to the Advisory Group for Explosives concerning the recommendation of Transport and Storage codes and UN code the special aspects that are of importance to transport and storage shall be elucidated. – function.2 Procedure The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual and FSD 0214 shall constitute the basis for advisory group assessments.6.4. – anti-humidity protection. Description of the object concerning: – design (drawings. to participate in the above. If new explosives are used they shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214. ) and. – compatibility.1. – location of the object in the packaging. or on assignment. small arms bullet attack (FSD 0117). validation. – structural strength. • • 48 . propulsion devices and warheads. – total quantities of explosives etc. launchers and warheads or suchlike that are undergoing development. provided no comparison can be made with a similar object that has undergone such testing.4.1 Tasks • To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of launchers. design. verification. To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for launchers. Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices • 3 3.3 3.6. – total weight. testing.. – anti-humidity protection. such as: fragment impact (FSD 0121). Testing of ammunition: – mandatory testing must always be performed as specified in FSD 0060 and shall be disclosed. assessments. – project specifications and technical documentation. cook-off (FSD 0166). – design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices.1.6. – wear in launchers. etc.4.3. – materials. to the extent possible. – all informative testing performed that can provide information concerning the sensitivity of the ammunition shall be disclosed. bump (FSD 0113). analyses.3 Methodology • Packaging: – design. Advice can inter alia relate to: – action to be taken concerning existing weapons. shock (FSD 0114). The advisory group shall be able to operate in the following areas: – launchers and propulsion devices. to participate in the above. propulsion devices and warheads (for reviews. – weapon platform. – design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices. A detailed review of the launchers or propulsion devices and warheads: – Launchers or propulsion devices. propulsion devices and warheads to FMV departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies. Statement disclosing safety analyses performed. • 3 • • • • • • • 49 . – materials.3. Statement disclosing verification of requirements for Section 5.1. Statement disclosing safety testing. ‘Checklists’.6. Review of proposals for technical requirement specifications.3 performed in accordance with Chapter 8.2 Procedure Members present in the advisory group may vary according to which of the group’s sectors of expertise is relevant to the advice sought. Scope of report: • Brief general information about the object: – field of application. – wear in launchers. 3. Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than three weeks prior to review of the object.2 and 5.Methodology 3 • To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience acquired concerning launchers. – weapon (or equivalent). Copies of relevant documentation shall be submitted. design type testing and other safety testing performed (as specified in FSD 0060). Review of the quality plan for the object. The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the basis for advisory group assessments. – compatibility. – structural strength.4. Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. 1 Safety testing Purpose In combination with the safety analysis to constitute a verification of the safety requirements for the product. so-called FMEA testing. P3: FMV.4 Activity description Safety testing is a comprehensive and extensive activity. It is a method of generating input data for the safety analyses that are used to verify other safety requirements.3 Time frame 3 P1: During verification. P3: During review of existing materiel. 3.7.7. Example: Testing to find out what happens with an incorrectly fitted spring in a fuzing system when that system falls from a truck platform. inspection.7 3. • 50 .2. The purpose of safety testing embraces three areas: • It is one of several methods for verifying that safety requirements are met (analysis.3 Methodology 3. 3. see Figure 3. Example: 3-metre drop test to demonstrate resistance to an environmental condition. are others).7. 3.2 Responsibility P1: The manufacturer. etc.7. Since all ammunition contains explosive in some form. If ammunition incorporates an electric igniter. 3 51 . Verification Testing: • 5 m drop • arming FMEA-testing Testing of defective units Qualification Classification: • 12 m drop • fuel fire test distance Analysis Inspection FSD 0060 FSD 0213 Figure 3. as well as testing in accordance with UN regulations for the classification of explosive goods. FSD 0112 and FSD 0212 shall be applied. and a section on the testing of insensitive munitions (IM). FSD 0060 contains a section that defines extreme environments. Example: Fuel fire test and 12-metre drop test to provide data for classification of ammunition according to UN and Transport and Storage coding by the Advisory Group for Explosives / SÄI. FSD 0214 shall also be applied. If ammunition incorporates a fuzing system. FSD 0213 shall also be applied.2 Example of scope of safety testing Safety testing as specified in FSD 0060 shall always be performed.Methodology 3 • It is a method for providing the authorities with decision data for qualification/classification. how high and low temperature sequences shall be dimensioned. Safety surveillance constitutes part of the overall in-service surveillance of ammunition.1 Explosives Figure 3.8. Responsibility 52 .8.3 Methodology Environmental resistance Env Engineering Manual Separate testing -FSD -FSD Sequential testing UNAbnormal environment classification IMHot sequential testing Cold sequential FSD 0060 FSD 0213 Fuze systems FSD 0212 EED in systems FSD 0214 FSD 0112 EED’s 3 3. This is the documentation that enables surveillance of ammunition in depot storage to obtain data to decide whether the ammunition is still safe to use. P2: FMV. 3.3 Safety testing for qualification Test directives for safety surveillance Purpose To produce test directives for safety surveillance.8 3.2 P1: FMV. 3. method of implementation.8. safety approved or newly developed ammunition.4 Activity description The basis for test directives should contain the following parts: • • • • • • • description of the product. applicable documents (references). For further information refer to the FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition. allocation of undertakings between FMV and possible suppliers.9.1 To provide a basis for the handling and storage regulations that contribute to reducing the remaining risks of the weapon system to a tolerable level. 3 The method for safety inspection is based on the concept that assessment is a comparison between the characteristics of ageing ammunition and the equivalent characteristics of newly manufactured.8.Methodology 3 3.9 Proposed Handling. product requirements. P2: When acquisition is necessary. 53 . Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) Purpose 3. 3.3 Time frame P1: During the development phase. The need for comparative data for newly developed ammunition thus places an equivalent requirement on development operations to generate ‘zero values’ by such means as so-called shelf life testing. criteria for assessment of results. formulation of the results in the documentation. 9.9. P2: FMV and the Armed Forces.9.4. The handling and storage regulations produced by FMV in collaboration with the Armed Forces during development subsequently constitute the basis for the item headed ‘Restrictions’ in the FMV Safety Statement (SS). and is regulated under Chapter 6 ‘Co-ordination with other authorities etc.3 Time frame P1: During the development phase.3 Methodology 3. 3. 54 .4 3.’. 3.9. P2: When acquisition is necessary.2 Responsibility P1: FMV and the Armed Forces.1 Activity description Background 3 A basis for handling and storage regulations shall be produced at an early stage in the materiel development process. An integral part of development – together with representatives from the Armed Forces – shall be to develop a product that meets the requirements stipulated by the Armed Forces concerning handling in peacetime and wartime. The restrictions in Section 4 of the Safety Statement are issued by the Armed Forces and FMV in accordance with the regulations stated in the Manual Governing Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids (H PubL). Materiel manuals .Technical orders (some) . It illustrates the co-ordination between publications from Armed Forces headquarters and materiel publications from FMV regarding content and denomination. 1996.4.Manuals . 3 55 .2 Subdivision of materiel publications The following table is reproduced from the Manual for Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids.Materiel instructions .Technical orders .Technical orders (some) . = compulsory or advisory Solely information / elucidation .Methodology 3 3. Table 3:2 Publications overview Content Armed Forces HQ publications Materiel publications from FMV Solely directives = compulsory Diverse directives. where it is published as Table 6:1.Regulations .9.Regulations .Manuals .Materiel manuals . guidelines. etc.Instructions .Materiel charts The work of producing and allocating information between the various publications should always be co-ordinated between FMV and the Armed Forces.Materiel charts . . 3 Purpose of the requirements Where safety to personnel. identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered during development of ammunition. guidance systems and miscellaneous. The system requirements part is subdivided as follows: launchers. the purpose throughout of the requirements formulated is to ensure: • safe handling during transport and deployment. fuzing systems and packagings are not discussed in this chapter but are dealt with in Chapter 5. make proposals for the specification of such interfaces between weapons and ammunition. Ammunition specific requirements concerning warheads.1 4. One part deals with common requirements that apply independent of the type of weapon. and the second part – called system requirements – also includes a number of other requirements.2 Structure of chapter 4 This chapter is subdivided into two main parts.1. 4. propulsion devices. the interfaces must be given careful consideration. property and the environment is concerned. safety also encompasses the interaction between weapons and ammunition. sighting and laying systems. hatches and doors.Weapons 4 4 4. weapon platforms.1. 4. pylons and dispensers. 57 . or a completely new weapon system is developed or acquired. ‘Ammunition’.1.1 WEAPONS General Purpose In addition to pure ammunition safety and the safety of weapons and launchers. If any of these constituent parts is modified or developed further. The purpose of this chapter is to: • • • identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered and verified when developing and acquiring a weapon system. a gun may be part of a battery with other guns that have different fire missions and thus different natures of ammunition that should preferably not require different safety instructions concerning use. repair and maintenance.4 Risks and system safety 4 Besides freedom from malfunction in the weapon and ammunition. • • • 4. For example. It is therefore crucial that ammunition is developed with due consideration given to all the applicable applications. and the various advanced guidance systems used in guided weapons – increasingly comprehensive safety programs and documentation will be needed. aircraft and naval vessels. exercises.4 Weapons • safety inside and around the weapon during loading or taking onboard.1. unloading of the weapon. One type of launcher and one nature of ammunition can also be intended for different weapon platforms such as vehicles. terminal guidance. safety is also dependent on the interface between them and the interfaces between the system and the environment and the application (use) for which it is intended. safety during disposal. safety during training. 58 . and that the characteristics that are decisive for safety in a specific application are documented. while the unit is loaded and during firing or weapon release. safety outside the specified danger area. As more specialized functions are incorporated in ammunition – such as proximity fuzes. There may also be requirements for several natures of ammunition to be usable in the same launcher without any necessity for changes such as barrel replacement. 1 Overview of weapon phases and risk factors Fragmentation Sabots/driving band function Base bleed container Mussle brake Muzzle flash Examples of hazards factors Mechanical ammunition handling Loading Unloading Flare-back (propellant combustion) Abnormal handling Sound pressure Pressure Recoil Max impulse (gun strength) Wear Cook-off Sub-calibre barrel Hazardous initiation Backblast Dynamic interaction ”Rocket flare” Trajectory instability Fragmentation Fuze setting Aiming and firing limitation Weapons 4 59 4 .Hazard overview Arming range(delay) Safety distance(times) Transport and loading safety Safe separation distance Mask safety In-flight safety rain safety resistance to electromagnetic bush safety Bore and muzzle safety Exempel på riskfaktorer Figure 4. 2. Weapons that may cause extensive. long-term.2. ‘References’. shall not be fabricated.42005 1. the weapon platform.42002 Booby traps that look like civilian utility goods. This condition shall also apply during transport in all operational environments. severe damage to the natural environment shall not be fabricated. For references refer to Chapter 7.42001 1. 4. Weapons that have deliberately been made toxic in order to harm people shall not be fabricated. Laser weapons mainly for use against people (anti-personnel laser weapons) shall not be fabricated.1 shows which risks may need to be evaluated for various types of weapons and in which phase damage/injury may arise. 60 . The figure does not claim to be exhaustive for all applications. Weapons that are difficult to aim at a specific target shall not be fabricated. 1. For information concerning requirements that are common to all materiel refer to Chapter 2. 4.42004 1.2 Common requirements Requirements that are independent of weapon type or are similar for several types of weapons are discussed below.4 Weapons Figure 4. or are marked with internationally recognized safety emblems. Comment: This requirement applies mainly to carpet bombs. shall not be fabricated. Incendiary weapons that have a non-discriminatory effect. and is mounted on.42003 1. ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’. 4 1.1 Requirements of International Law The weapons related requirements specified below are stated for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the requirements of International Law.42006 4. or are mainly intended for anti-personnel use.2 General requirements The handling of an uncocked weapon unit shall be tolerably safe both when the unit is separated from. Arming of the ammunition should occur at a safe distance from the weapon platform. etc. arising from movement of the weapon for example. Figure 4. Guided ammunition. The size of danger areas is affected inter alia by the characteristics of the ammunition. backblast and blast pressure must be taken into consideration. may deviate considerably from its intended flight path. 4 61 .2.Weapons 4 During an exercise a loaded weapon shall be safe for the personnel operating it and for its surroundings. Firing with sub-calibre anti-armour projectiles may result in a projectile flying several kilometres. if a malfunction occurs. The danger area near the weapon. It shall not be possible for the weapon to be inadvertently fired during a simulated attack and thereby cause damage to the weapon platform or its surroundings including simulated targets (which may be living or artificial targets). toxic gases. In certain cases the shell (missile) shall self-destruct.1 Danger area When firing or testing involves explosive materiel the danger area must be calculated and closed off to prevent damage to property and injury to personnel.2 shows an example of the danger areas around a weapon and in the firing zone. During combat the weapon shall be tolerably safe for personnel operating it. Even damage/injury caused by fragmentation. but also sufficiently early to enable effect in target at short ranges. 4. must also be considered.2. Consideration must be given to the type of trials to be performed. and without risk to the general public as a result of inadequate safety instructions concerning malfunctions when firing. toxic substances.2. and firing procedures shall be performed.2. e. and the methods for stowage of ammunition and other 62 . blast pressure. fragmentation.g.4 Weapons Danger area boundary Firing zone 4 Figure 4.42007 On the basis of analysis and testing an assessment of the danger area for all current combinations of weapons. ammunition. Comment: Refer also to the relevant hazard factor. Safety of friendly forces 4. The proficiency required to operate the weapon.2 Example of danger areas 1.2 Before a Safety Release is issued the weapon system must be evaluated to ensure that it can be operated without risk of injury to personnel or damage to materiel. the risk of a major failure or accident owing to human error can be minimized by good ergonomic design and appropriate training. eye protectors (e. The emergency stop for laying and firing should operate in such a way that the energy source is disconnected. if the application so demands. Comment: Cf. 1.42014 1.42009 1.42008 There shall be an emergency stop for laying and firing when the ordinary stop function is not sufficient to prevent injury or damage to property.42018 63 .42016 1. Comment: Such equipment may comprise personal protective clothing such as gloves. Monitors/VDUs shall be adapted to enable them to be read with existing illumination.42011 1.42010 1. even outdoors in direct sunlight or in darkness. In weapon systems where several operators can fire the weapon it shall be possible for each operator to disarm the weapon independently. The emergency stop for laying and firing should be located as close to the energy source as possible. etc.Weapons 4 equipment. It shall be possible to unload a propelling charge that has not functioned.42013 1. It should be possible to manually override automatic functions. In general terms. standard SS-EN 418 also. It shall be possible to mount and remove equipment at the incline angles specified for the weapon platform.42017 1.6 ‘Extreme climatic conditions’. Comment: When testing the weapon it should be possible for an observer to operate the emergency stop manually. missile launch tubes. helmet. anti-laser goggles) and NBC protective clothing.42015 4 1. It shall be possible for a member of the crew to wear specified equipment while at his operator station.42012 1. For safety in extreme climates refer to Section 4. Symbols/texts on switches and other controls shall be legible and unambiguous in accordance with applicable standards.2. It shall be possible to remove empty cartridge cases. 1.g. constitute a vital part of the requirements. protective mask. These toxic substances include inter alia metals. nausea. The safe separation distance shall be determined for all relevant ammunition in the most unfavourable firing conditions.42022 4. heating and air conditioning system should be incorporated if applicable. Carbon monoxide binds with the haemoglobin and thereby reduces the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood. Locking devices shall be incorporated to secure heavy hatches and doors in open position (see also requirements under the heading ‘Weapon platforms’). The rate at which carbon monoxide is eliminated from the blood declines exponentially and relatively slowly. ammonia. Propelling charge cases may emit toxic substances even after firing. requirement 1.3 Toxic substances Substances produced by propelling charges during firing are classified as toxic when their concentration in the air exceeds certain levels. nose and throat irritation. 4 Carbon monoxide (CO) commonly occurs and is dangerous since it is odourless and colourless.4 Weapons 1. Normally. Exposure to ammonia primarily affects the respiratory tract and the eyes. fragmentation and toxic substances. blurred vision. The half-life time of carbon monoxide in the blood can be as high as 4 hours for a healthy person in an environment free from contaminants. carbon monoxide and oxides of nitrogen.2.42021 1. Any protective features on the weapon shall be taken into consideration. and can cause death.42019 1. oxygen from the lungs is transported through the body by the haemoglobin in the blood. Ammonia (NH3) is generated by the combustion of ammunition propellants.42020 Where necessary footholds shall be fitted with appropriate anti-slip surfaces.51024. Comment: Refer also to other hazard factors and hazards such as blast pressure. The bonding capability of carbon monoxide to the blood can be 300 times greater than that of oxygen. giddiness. 64 . 1. cf. Typical symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning are headache. Carbon monoxide is removed solely through the lungs. extreme lethargy and unconsciousness. A ventilation. At concentrations of 50–100 ppm most people experience a moderate degree of eye. is usually less efficient with low charges).05 mg per cubic metre of air as a mean average over an 8hour exposure. The lead is vaporised as the charge burns. (The fume extractor. leakage in the breech mechanism. can affect or degenerate personnel capability. the internal ballistics. Lead (Pb) can be absorbed into the body from inhaling finely divided particles. 65 4 . wind velocity and direction. the efficiency of the fume extractor if fitted. Short exposures to 5 ppm may cause coughing and shortness of breath. the chemical composition of the propellant. Exposure to concentrations of 50–100 ppm may cause death or chronic respiratory problems. overpressure in the crew compartment. The predominant components are nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Combustion gases containing lead either escape via the barrel or enter the crew compartment. and also occur when small calibre ammunition hits the target. even in small concentrations.Weapons 4 Nitrogen oxides are also generated during firing. At concentrations below 50 ppm the conversion of nitrogen oxide to nitrogen dioxide is slow.g. Nitric oxide has been reported to cause unconsciousness in laboratory animals exposed to concentrations greater than 2 500 ppm. Neither shall toxic gases be ignored in the case of towed or other materiel. Nitric oxide itself has no irritant properties but is frequently oxidised in air to form nitrogen dioxide. The permissible exposure limit to lead has been set at 0. the volume of the cartridge case. A number of factors affect the level of concentration of toxic substances at the crew stations. and causes irritation of the eyes. the efficiency of the ventilation system such as the NBC ventilation system. Despite ventilation systems. nature and weight of the propelling charge. toxic gases and particles can be a major threat to personnel working in the enclosed confines of a combat vehicle for example. if fitted. such as: • • • • • • • • • • • • the rate of fire. materials used in the ammunition (e. beryllium alloys). Nitrogen dioxide is more dangerous than nitrogen oxide. which of the weapons is fired. Propelling charges and small calibre ammunition contain certain quantities of lead. Toxic substances. whether firing takes place with hatches open or closed. skin and respiratory tract. 42023 1. particularly if electromagnetic screening is inadequate. high-power microwave radiation (HPM). especially radio and radar transmitters. 1.2. inadvertent firing may occur. 66 . 4. Angle sensors.42024 The concentration of toxic substances shall be less than the permissible values stated in AFS 1996:2. and to radiated interference generated by external sources. Electrical switching operations may cause transient interference in the weapon system.4 Electrical and magnetic fields 4 An electrical firing circuit may be subjected to radiated or conducted electrical interference generated by the weapon system in which it is incorporated. Special measures may need to be taken to protect the weapon system against electrostatic discharge (ESD). Onboard radio transmitters and other electrical equipment may constitute an internal source of interference. Communication with the ammunition is also a sensitive function. conditions for arming. However. Ozone depleting substances as specified in the Montreal protocol must not be used. The parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer shall be mindful of their obligation under that convention to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against activities that may affect the ozone layer. ‘Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupational Safety and Health’. such a concept may be just as susceptible as an electrical firing circuit and consequently needs to be analysed and tested. and probably do not need to be tested in this respect. External interference may emanate from airborne or groundbased radar and radio transmitters operating in the vicinity.42023 shall be verified in the most unfavourable firing conditions and in field conditions.4 Weapons Comment: Limit values are specified in AFS 1996:2. Requirement 1. If the interference level exceeds the specified test level. and against the electromagnetic pulse that arises in conjunction with lightning (LEMP) or when a nuclear charge detonates (NEMP). Fuzing systems employing percussion caps and a striker actuated by a heavy-duty solenoid are less likely to be adversely affected. if the solenoid is controlled by any form of electronics or sensitive relays. and control of status are other functions that can be affected and lead to a hazardous event. Firing and fuzing systems containing electric igniters may be particularly susceptible to such interference. the following requirements shall be met: 1. humidity and ice. The weapon system should be tested while subjected to water spraying and during fording through water.2.5 Water and moisture resistance Water and moisture affect mechanical.42027 The susceptibility of electrical circuits to interference shall be analysed with regard to safety. snow.42029 The weapon system should not incorporate undrainable channels.42026 1. To ensure that the crew can fulfil their duties in extreme high and low temperatures in field conditions. dust.3.42031 67 . for example. is often necessary. optical and electrical functions. It is also necessary to verify that the crew can operate the weapon system at these temperatures. 4. The levels of electrical and magnetic fields to which the crew and equipment are subjected shall be determined. 4. for example. rain. 4 1. Drainage of electrical and optical boxes. Tests must be conducted in the field where extreme temperatures combined with the terrain provide adverse conditions including combinations of sand.42030 The weapon should be designed so that personal protective clothing and other equipment worn by operators does not affect their operation of the weapon.Weapons 4 1. Changes in temperature during storage can cause condensation on surfaces with a subsequent risk of moisture damage and corrosion. The system should be equipped with facilities that provide a good work environment even in extreme temperature conditions. 1.3 ‘Firing mechanisms’.6 Extreme climatic conditions The safety of the overall system with all its functions shall be verified at the extremes of temperature stated in the specification for the system. Refer also to Section 4.2. It is not sufficient solely to test the system at extreme temperatures. The susceptibility of safety critical electrical circuits to electrical interference shall be determined.1. mud.42028 1.42025 1.2. Fire-resistant materiel must thus resist such a temperature for a certain prescribed time without inadvertent initiation of propelling charges or warheads. The requirements shall ensure the safety of the crew during fire in the weapon or ammunition. – the occurrence of toxic or corrosive gases during fire.3 ‘Fire-fighting equipment’. 68 . and variations in other circumstances at the time of fire.42032 In the event of fire in a weapon platform or in materiel (ammunition or other materiel) stowed in a confined space the crew should be protected by specific material design measures and/or escape routes.3. 1. and during fire in the crew compartments and ammunition stowage compartment. Fire tests can be subdivided and defined as follows: • • • The purpose of material tests is to determine the properties of materials when exposed to fire. Because of the various types of materiel. and in some cases the materiel shall still be usable after the specified fire exposure time. Any fire of major scale generates temperatures in excess of 800ºC. – hazards in an explosive atmosphere. – the risk for explosion or ignition during fire.7 Fire All constituent parts of a weapon system and natures of ammunition may be subjected to fire owing to accidents or combat action.2. range of applications. ‘Ammunition’. The purpose of safety tests is to determine the characteristics of the weapon and ammunition when exposed to fire or an explosive atmosphere from the point of view of the crew and materiel safety. Even with fires at lower temperatures. For this reason it is essential that the materiel is resistant to fire to a certain degree. System tests often consist of operational tests in which the weapon system or ammunition are subjected to a fire scenario determined by the authorities. Additional requirements concerning the resistance of ammunition to fire are stated in Chapter 5. it is difficult to standardize a comprehensive fire test. The following characteristics are pertinent: – resistance to fire with retained function.7.4 Weapons 4. Testing can be performed as specified in FSD 0165. 4 For information concerning fire-fighting refer to Section 4. large quantities of toxic gases can be formed. 9 Backblast The backblast is a rearwards directed jet of (hot) propellant gas that exits a recoil weapon via the muzzle brake and from a recoilless weapon via the rear opening during firing. Any protective devices and the location of the crew relative to the launcher shall be stated in the Safety Restrictions. 69 1. 1.42033 The blast pressure level shall be determined for the personnel concerned.43038 .42035 4 1.42036 4. such as close to the muzzle of a highenergy weapon.42034 1. Very high pressure.43037 shall be verified by calculation and testing. 1.2. Blast pressure levels should also be measured around the vehicle/materiel to enable an assessment of the hazard to troops operating in the immediate vicinity of the materiel. 1.2. can be immediately fatal. Backblast can contain fragments and particles from the ground. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. Requirement 1. The blast pressure pattern inside and outside the troop transport compartment can be complex and necessitates trials under field conditions. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. When verifying blast pressure characteristics. Comment: Recoilless systems shall be designed so that there is no harmful interference between the blast pressure in the muzzle and venturi. Bow-wave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account. The number of impulse blasts (rounds fired) to which the crew may be exposed during a given period of time shall be determined and stated in the Safety Restrictions for the system. Bowwave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account.8 Blast pressure The impact pressure of the air set in motion by an explosion – called blast pressure – that arises when a gun is fired can impair hearing and also injure other organs in the body.Weapons 4 4.43037 The backblast (propellant gases) from the muzzle brake or equivalent shall not have such high particle and energy content that it can cause injury to personnel or damage to materiel outside the specified danger area. the test methods and criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 should be used. The effect of the terrain (the surroundings) shall also be taken into account. 11 Pressure 4 When projectiles are fired the launcher and projectile are subjected to an internal ballistic gas pressure. From these results the number of rounds that may be fired before the VDV level is reached is calculated for various angles of elevation and traverse.2. If this pressure in any section of the barrel exceeds the structural strength of the structure. which is why the projectile must also withstand the internal ballistic pressure.2.12 4. If the internal ballistic gas pressure exceeds the structural strength of the projectile there is a risk of barrel rupture.42040 When determining dimensions and design of the barrel.2. VDV is calculated from data obtained from trials.2.12. By establishing a vibration dose value (VDV) a limit can be set for each individual crew member.g.10 Vibration dose During firing each individual crew member is subjected to a dose of vibration. The value gives a general indication of the associated discomfort and risk of injury.1 Forces General This section contains general guidelines for ‘forces’ in the form of springs. 4. can also withstand the loads involved. such as the breech block and mechanism.42039 Crew members shall not be exposed to a harmful vibration dose. 1. VDV is a measurement of the total vibration to which a crew member may be exposed during a specific period of time. there is a risk that the barrel may rupture and cause serious injury. Comment: A common requirement for exposure to body vibration is stated in ISO 2631. During the design phase it must also be ensured that other components than the barrel that are subjected to pressure. 70 . 4. 1. breech mechanism and other parts exposed to pressure. ISO 5349 and SEN 580110.4 Weapons 4. hydraulic pressure or similar that in the event of a failure/malfunction can be released and cause injury (e. the pressure definitions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 or equivalent standard shall be applied. from impact and/or crushing by moving parts). etc. contains stored energy.2. When personnel must be present inside a danger area. can be cocked.2.12. the personnel entering the danger area shall ensure that the designated safety devices are engaged. drive springs for the ramming motion of the loading tray. since failure modes in these design elements can have critical consequences. maintenance and disposal. 4.).2. This should be taken into account during service. such attachment elements shall be integrated into the safety analysis. for example.42042 Spring forces that alone. or in combination with other hazards. 1.42041 1.12. brake parts (like parking brakes. can result in death or serious injury. Springs in a breech mechanism shall be given particular consideration during the safety analysis. drive springs in ammunition magazines. It is important that the analysis gives special consideration to the status of springs incorporated with regard to stored energy in the event that firing is interrupted.Weapons 4 In many cases it is impossible to determine whether a spring.1 Springs (gas or mechanical) Many constructions contain spring forces such as: • • • • • drive springs in loading trays. can result in an accident shall be analysed.2 Requirements 4. The energy stored constitutes a hazard which. During recoil in a recoil system. for unloading or cocking the breech block before the first round for example. etc. when inadvertently released. Spring forces that can cause an accident shall either be provided with double locking devices or anti-handling devices that prevent inadvertent release of the spring forces. hydraulic system. 4 71 . operating springs in breech mechanisms. balance springs. When the attachment elements of a spring may constitute a more frequent hazard than the spring itself. 42044 1. Instead.42048 Accumulated pressure shall be monitored and equipped with a device for pressure equalization if inadvertent actuation of any consumer in the system can lead to injury during operation.42044 shall not be modified between inspection intervals for preventive maintenance such that safety is degraded.42045 1.2.12. Monitoring as specified in requirement 1. in the event of malfunction. Fastening elements shall be analysed with regard to failure modes and shall be characterised together with the spring. Hydraulic hoses and hydraulic components should be located outside crew compartments in confined spaces. The term ‘recoilless system’ is a qualified truth – there is no absolutely recoilless system. Springs and their attachment elements that can cause a serious injury in the event of a malfunction should have a duplicate (redundancy) function or have a fail-safe function.2. 72 . unloading and/or maintenance.42049 1.42048 should be duplicated (instrument and control lamp) or have a fail-safe function.12.42051 4. the recoil is generally so small that it does not entail any potential risk for accidents. Hydraulic fluid should be prevented from penetrating into crew compartments. 4 1.4 Weapons 1. motors. can result in hazardous events. etc. 1.2.2. The characteristics as specified in requirements 1.3 Recoil forces Recoil forces exist both in recoilless and recoil systems.42043 Any spring that constitutes a component in a locking device which. hoses. 1. or accumulated hydraulic pressure after operation.42047 4.42043 and 1.42050 1. Hydraulic pressure can also constitute a hazard via its consumers (hydraulic cylinders.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics Hydraulic pressure (and even pneumatic pressure) during operation. Springs and their attachment elements that can affect safety shall be located in a protected position in such a way that inadvertent contact by personnel or the environment around the system does not degrade their safety.42046 1. can cause injury shall be analysed with regard to failure modes and shall be characterized.). Comment: The actions of the gun crew in all situations (emergency firing.4 Additional requirements Some examples of parts in a weapon system that can cause serious injuries are: • • • loading trays during ramming.42052 The danger area around the recoil system shall be determined and stated in the Safety Restrictions. Personnel shall be protected against the ejection of empty cartridge cases. the recoil can be experienced differently by different gunners even though the recoil is of equal magnitude (i. the same energy).2.12. Comment: This requirement can be satisfied by the provision of guards or by preventing the presence of personnel inside the danger area.42057 73 .Weapons 4 Recoilless systems exist inter alia as manportable anti-armour weapons (such as the Carl-Gustaf system) or as anti-armour guns of various types.42053 1. If it is conceivable that overpressure can arise in the recoil buffer and recuperator and constitute a hazard. Rotating and other moving parts shall be located so as to minimise the risk of injury.2. The recoil forces in a recoilless system shall be established by calculation and testing. 4 1.42054 4.42056 1.42055 1. etc. unloading.) shall be taken into account.e. In manportable recoilless systems the recoil could result in excessive recoil forces on the gunner’s shoulder and/or cause the sight to hit his eye. they shall be equipped with a device for relieving the pressure before disassembly. In recoilless systems the recoil is neutralised by the gas flow through the open rear end of the barrel which is equipped with a nozzle/venturi. It shall not be possible for loading devices to be controlled by anyone other than the person performing the loading. axles/shafts and other rotating parts. The recoil forces can be influenced by variations in the geometry of the nozzle/venturi. In cases where a recoilless system is fired from the shoulder. empty cartridge cases that are ejected. 1. 1. 1.4 Weapons 4. It is particularly dangerous if binoculars or optical sighting devices etc. power density and the frequency of repetition.2. Lasers are subdivided into a number of classes according to type and output power. Sights. Regulations governing classification are stated in IEC 60825-1. A laser beam directed at the skin can cause burns and is also considered to be able to cause small blood clots. prism windows etc. 1. Comment: This requirement can be satisfied by linking the laser to the barrel or equivalent. The overall publication applying to the use of lasers is the Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations of the Board for Occupational Safety and Health (AFS). 74 . Lasers can even cause injuries at long distances from the laser source depending on the type of laser. It should not be possible to look into the laser outlet optic when used in the normal way.42058 It should not be possible to activate lasers of range-finder type in an arbitrary direction.42062 1.42059 4 1. should either have built-in laser protection filters or be designed in a way that allows the operator to wear anti-laser goggles. the weight and the location of the centre of mass of the weapon system.2.14 Stability – mechanical The stability of a weapon system during firing is affected by the following main factors: • • • trunnion forces and height above the trunnion. are being used.13 Lasers Laser beams can cause burns and total or partial blindness. Lasers shall be equipped with warning signs.42063 4. the angle of elevation.42060 1. Lasers should be equipped with safety covers and locking devices.42061 1. Lasers should be equipped with safety circuits for use in training mode. Occupational activities involving the use of a laser are subject to employer liability in accordance with current legislation and regulations. 15 4.Weapons 4 • • • • the longitudinal axis of the weapon system relative to the direction of fire. the vehicle is used in a new environment involving more severe environmental stresses for the ammunition. In addition. The safety of the crew shall also be analysed. In the case of a combat vehicle that uses separated ammunition that is rammed into the barrel. ammunition stowage arrangements are altered. The risk of projectile fall-back should be evaluated through transport resistance testing. vehicle motion may cause a projectile to fall back against the propelling charge.42064 Motion of the chassis. The weapon or weapon platform shall retain ammunition and stowed materiel in their designated places during operational use.42065 1.2. damage may be caused to the barrel when the gun is fired.42066 4. platform. Although simulation methods have been improved the need for practical trials remains. 1. eye-piece or launcher shall be so minimal that no danger to personnel nor damage to ammunition or materiel occurs.15. 1. transport resistance testing should be performed whenever: • • • • new ammunition is introduced into an existing weapon system. the incline and type of surface that the system stands on. the vehicle is equipped with newly modified tyres. 4 75 . and then subsequently to test fire the ammunition to verify its function. Stability during firing shall be verified. If this should happen. tracks or suspension system.2. Open (or closed) doors or hatches shall remain secured.1 Transport General Despite comprehensive testing in simulated environments it has long been recognized that it is necessary to transport ammunition stowed in combat vehicles and self-propelled guns for long distances in a manner specified by regulations. controls. whether or not spades are fitted to restrain motion during firing. the effectiveness of brakes and suspension. 15.2 Installation aspects 1. requirements to ensure that the projectile does not fall back from rammed position shall be stated.2.4 Weapons 4.42067 During driving in terrain in accordance with specified conditions the ammunition should not fall back from the rammed position. 1. 4 76 .42069 The method for stowing ammunition in racks and bins in various stowage locations shall be dimensioned so that the ammunition after transport and redeployment does not constitute a hazard to the crew.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back If the weapon is designed to fire separated ammunition (separate propelling charges) and is required to be kept loaded during transport mode.2.15.e.2. Comment: Gas leakage around the ammunition can damage both the ammunition and the barrel.42068 4. 1. Comment: This requirement should be verified by testing with a barrel that has 50% or less of its service life remaining in respect of wear.2 Requirements 4. in fall-back position).2.2.15. The system should withstand rounds being fired with ammunition that is not rammed in a correct manner (i. 3.1 Weapon installation During development it is necessary to verify the structural strength and integrity of the weapon installation.1 System requirements Launchers 4 Figure 4. strain gauges are fitted at critical locations to measure the stresses and inner ballistic 77 . In the case of testing an initial functional inspection shall be performed without firing.3 Examples of launchers 4. Next.3.1.3 4.Weapons 4 4. Verification can be by means of calculation and/or testing. Most modern weapons of large calibre have hydro-pneumatic or hydro-mechanical mechanisms to assimilate recoil forces and to return the system to initial position. Many weapon systems have a muzzle brake fitted to the barrel to reduce the force of recoil.2.3.2 4. Comment: The minimum requirement is that the ‘danger’ zone must be marked out. or bugs in software for example.43002 1.43003 4 4.4 Weapons pressures during firing. a better interface is obtained.1. Rifled guns also generate a torque acting on the gun when spin is imparted to the projectile. recoil systems are characterised inter alia by high internal ballistic gas pressures and high combustion temperatures. The often high rate of fire rapidly results in a high temperature on the inside of the barrel. do not affect safety in any crucial way. Incorrect firing data must not occur during temporary malfunctions in the weapon system computers. For any given design of weapon and type of ammunition. the fatigue limits for the installation are estimated through calculations and firings or laboratory trials. etc. Often several natures of ammunition shall be fired in one and the same gun system.1 Besides the movement of recoil. 1. Automatic handling of ammunition and automatic ramming are common. Comment: By differentiating in the design between electronics designed to control safety functions and electronics designed for other functions. Clearance between the elevating mass and other parts at maximum recoil within the entire laying range in traverse and elevation shall be sufficient to prevent damage to the system.43001 Launchers controlled by electronics shall have such an interface with safety functions that malfunctions. or guidance systems. Finally. electrical or hydraulic systems. Recoil systems General 1. A number of rounds are then fired to produce the stresses and internal ballistic pressures.1.3. Preparation systems and guidance systems must not render the weapon dangerous in the event of any malfunction. the forces acting on the elevating mass vary according to angle 78 .). Safety devices should be fitted to prevent crew members from inserting limbs into spaces containing moving system parts (range of movement of the recoil system. that could enable a hazard firing. 2 Breech mechanisms There are several types of breech mechanism such as screw type with sectored threads. When the breech mechanism is operated automatically the firing mechanism shall automatically become inactive before the breech mechanism is released from its locked position. 4.43010 4. The firing mechanism is also the means by which the firing of the weapon is controlled. Consequently.2. Firing mechanisms 1.2.3. There are several types of firing mechanism: 79 .43004 It shall be possible to operate the breech mechanism from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system to prevent injury to crew members by crushing.3. during trials the recoil system shall be fired at the extremes of temperature and pressure that are expected in the field and at maximum laying angles.1. Large calibre weapons that have semi-automatic breech mechanisms can utilize the recoil energy to open the breech on run-out. Under certain conditions the recoil energy becomes so reduced that it is insufficient to open the breech. It should not be possible to assemble any component of the breech assembly in an incorrect manner that could cause injury/damage. The worst situation with the recoil system often occurs when firing the lowest propelling charge (or when firing the ammunition that produces the lowest trunnion force) at the lowest firing temperature. and is therefore of crucial importance for the interface between the crew and the weapon. It shall not be possible to fire the weapon if the breech mechanism is not fully closed.43005 1. a wedge-shaped transverse block or back-piece. 1.43009 1.1. Semi-automatic systems must be tested by firing under various combinations of these conditions. This is either an integral part of the cartridge case or a separate cartridge.Weapons 4 of elevation.43008 4 1. It shall be possible to indicate or observe the status of the breech mechanism.43007 1. the temperature of the propellant. When the breech mechanism is fully closed it shall be locked in the closed position.3 The firing mechanism initiates the propelling charge via a cannon primer or cartridge. and the temperature of the recoil system.43006 1. The breech mechanism shall not open as a result of vibration caused by firing or motion/transport. The weapon shall be fired by an active operation from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system If an electromechanical device is used it shall be protected from the effects of radiated or conducted interference that could cause inadvertent initiation. Laser. The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1. In this type the primer is located in the artillery primer.43018 1. lever or similar is employed it shall be provided with protection against inadvertent operation such as by a trigger guard. If a firing mechanism is employed to release a firing pin it shall be designed to withstand vibration and shocks.43014 1. or from moderate external sources of interference (radio. In this type a metal firing pin strikes the primer of the cannon primer or cartridge causing it to produce a flash which ignites the propelling charge. radar.) without resulting in hazard initiation.43011 1. • • 1. Electrical firing systems shall be resistant to radiated or conducted interference generated by other electrical installations on the weapon.43021 80 .43017 1.43016 1. There should be at least two mechanical safety devices (which do not constitute any part of the firing linkage) that directly actuate the striker or the capability of the striker to fire. either manually or by a mechanical or electrical device. The firing mechanism shall be resistant to shock from other weapons mounted in the vicinity. The firing pin is actuated by the release of a spring mechanism.43020 shall be located outside the zone of operation of the recoil system. There shall be a separate manually operated safety interrupter that can break the electrical firing circuit. This type uses a laser whose output power is dimensioned to initiate the propelling charge. The electroexplosive device (EED) in the artillery primer contains a priming composition. The electrical connector of the firing mechanism should not come into contact with the base connector of the artillery primer until the breech block/screw is closed and locked.43020 1.43015 4 1. Electric.43019 1. etc. pedal. It shall be possible to safe the firing mechanism from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system. If a firing button.43012 1.4 Weapons • Percussion.43013 1. Backflash 4 Backflash sometimes occurs in recoil systems when the breech is opened after firing. 81 .5 For a given load profile the life of the breech ring shall be established by calculation and material testing. 1. It occurs when combustion has not been completed when the breech is opened.43024 4. Backflash is not always detected during development trials of the propelling charge since the breech is not always opened immediately after firing in such trials.1. In the same way as the barrel etc.2.6 Obturation shall be designed to ensure that the crew is not exposed to either hot gases or harmful concentrations of toxic fumes.43022 The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1. 1. The safety analysis of the breech ring shall be based on calculation and testing. Obturation The breech mechanism shall prevent leakage of propellant gases. The efficiency of the fume extractor. and A for automatic fire.1. The resultant flash can cause burns to crew members and constitutes a hazard for propellant charges and equipment inside the turret of a combat vehicle.43023 4.2.3. If the problem is serious. Breech ring 4. Leakage of hot propellant gases could severely burn members of the crew. Firing into a head wind also tends to exacerbate backflash. The choice of obturation system is dependent on design requirements such as rate of fire and the size of ammunition.3.1. The same requirement should apply to any future initiation system such as laser ignition or an equivalent system. From the safety aspect the obturation system must function with all types of relevant charges over the entire temperature range. Special trials should be performed to determine whether backflash might be a problem. O for armed. It should be noted that initiation systems employing an igniter also necessitate a gas-tight solution. if fitted.Weapons 4 1. the breech ring can become fatigued.3. Backflash may occur when the breech block/screw is opened during run-out. can be another contributing factor. especially in confined spaces. Safety Restrictions may have to be placed on the use of certain charges or the fume extractor may need to be modified. or when combustible propellant gases are released and ignited by the supply of oxygen. for example.4 The breech ring is one of the parts in a firing system that is subjected to very high stresses.2.43020 shall be marked with actual position/mode such as S for unarmed. A minor leakage could cause a rise in the concentration of toxic fumes. 1. wear reducing material (such as titanium dioxide). In a worn barrel the projectile may accelerate ‘unguided’ until it engages with the rifling.43027 4.3. Comment: A worn barrel can normally be defined as a barrel that has less than 25% of its total wear life remaining. As wear increases the hot gases may begin to erode material from the driving band of the projectile.2. 1.7. Wear reduces the efficiency of obturation since it allows hot gases to pass the projectile. theoretical calculations may be employed. Eventually a level of wear is reached that results in insufficient spin being imparted to the projectile.43025 4.43028 1. metal fatigue rather than wear can be the determining factor when calculating the service life of a barrel as fatigue failure may occur before wear life has expired. both in the bore and in trajectory.3. The resultant load may then cause the driving band to be damaged while in the barrel.7 Backflash that can cause injury shall not occur during automatic fire into a maximum head wind.1.4 Weapons 1.43029 Fatigue.2. 82 .7. Requirement 1. On the basis of this data the safe limit for fatigue failure can subsequently be established. and non-metallic obturating material has decreased the rate of barrel wear and has thus extended barrel life considerably. The resultant instability of the projectile then constitutes a hazard. and the inherent risk of barrel rupture. Consequently.3. Barrels and sub-calibre barrels 4.43026 shall be verified by testing. This leakage of hot gases can accelerate barrel wear.43026 The barrel shall not constitute any enhanced hazard (such as by imparting extra stress on ammunition or incorrect trajectory) when the ammunition in question is fired in either a new or worn barrel. shall not occur during firing within the established barrel life. Requirement 1.1 Barrel wear Barrel wear is primarily caused by hot propellant gases eroding the inside of the barrel.2. 1.43028 shall be verified. Normally barrel wear is defined as the increase in bore diameter at a specific point in the barrel (usually at the commencement of rifling). 4 1.2 Fatigue In most modern weapon systems the use of surface coated barrels. To establish the fatigue life it is necessary to perform theoretical calculations.1. sabots.7. jackets. or in the event of a new commencement of rifling in the barrel or a new muzzle brake. or snow in the barrel. obturators.3. 83 . Testing and calculations are necessary to establish at which temperature cookoff occurs.7.Weapons 4 4.4 Cook-off Where barrel cooling systems are not employed. as well as how many rounds and which rate of fire are necessary to attain this temperature. 1. 1. Spontaneous initiation of ammunition (cook-off) can occur in a hot barrel when.43033 shall be performed. sand. Comment: Testing may be performed by filling the barrel with various quantities of sand and gravel to determine the ruggedness of the weapon. the barrel may rupture. testing shall be performed to determine the occurrence of fragmentation. The muzzle brake should prevent rearward ricochets of driving bands.43032 1. Practical trials to simulate barrel rupture as per requirement 1. etc..2.43030 Attachment of external parts on the outside of the barrel or subcalibre barrel shall be in a way that precludes detachment during firing. can also cause fragmentation during firing. sabots. etc. melted explosive may be subject to hazard initiation caused by the acceleration stresses generated during firing.3. firing is interrupted while a round is rammed. for example. jackets etc.2. Usually it is the propelling charge that is initiated. sand or gravel in the barrel.3 Fragmentation Under extreme conditions. The barrel shall not rupture when firing the highest charge with a specified amount of snow.43031 1. but initiation of the warhead can also occur. a forgotten barrel telescope.1. sabots. It is also conceivable that a projectile detaches from the cartridge case during ramming thus enabling propellant to come into direct contact with the hot surface of the barrel and result in ignition. During modification in the design or new development of ammunition or weapons relating to driving bands. obturators.43034 4 4. a sustained high rate of fire will make the barrel extremely hot. obturators. To ensure the safety of the crew the requirements below shall be satisfied.43033 1.1. Ammunition driving bands. When a warhead heated in this way is ‘fired’. for example when there is soil. flame guards and recoil amplifiers Weapon systems are provided with muzzle brakes to reduce recoil forces. high velocity particles and high pressure.3. and/or the permitted duration for fire.2.2. thereby extracting residual gases out through the muzzle. The muzzle brake is subjected to powerful forces by the high gas velocity. and must be dimensioned to withstand such stresses. Comment: Refer also to requirements 1.4 Example of a fume extractor 1. 4 Figure 4. It is pressure fed by the propellant gases produced during firing and vents them forwards in the barrel. Fume extractors 1. To determine the risk of cook-off the temperature and heat flux etc. The fume extractor also helps to prevent the occurrence of backflash.43035 Cook-off shall not occur during the maximum specified fire engagement in combination with interrupted fire with rammed ammunition.1. the permitted number of rounds per salvo.1. The fume extractor shall be so dimensioned that it is not subjected to fatigue and inherent risk of rupture during firing.43036 4. for a hot barrel shall be established. Muzzle brakes.8 A fume extractor is a cylinder attached around the mid-section of the barrel.52011 and 1.4 Weapons 1. The fume extractor is subjected to a certain load during firing.9 The fume extractor shall be fitted to the barrel in a way that prevents detachment during firing.53019. 84 .43037 1.3.43038 4. Comment: The Safety Restrictions shall state the permitted rate of fire. muzzle flash may also damage sight equipment (e.10 Muzzle flash Muzzle flash can occur when the projectile passes the muzzle and unburnt propellant gases are combusted. By using a sub-calibre barrel the weapon system can largely be used in the same way as with a standard barrel and effective training is thus achieved.43043 4.3. flame guard or recoil amplifier shall be dimensioned so that it does not rupture during firing.43040 shall be verified by firing tests using the highest charge. Any muzzle brake. 4 1. Figure 4.1. be necessary to increase recoil forces because of functional requirements. 4.g. 1.43039 1. 85 .1.43040 1.43042 When fitting external equipment onto the weapon or weapon platform consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle flash. 1. A flame guard is employed to reduce the signature from the weapon when firing.7 above shall apply. flame guard or recoil amplifier fitted to detach during firing.1. Besides danger to the crew.3. Crew stations shall be located such that the crew are not subjected to muzzle flash.2.2.5 Example of a muzzle brake 1.43044 Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.Weapons 4 In some cases it may. however.43039 and 1. Requirements 1. This can be achieved by mounting an expansion nozzle (venturi) on the muzzle.3.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters A sub-calibre barrel/adapter is often used in large calibre barrels to enable lowcost ammunition to be used. primarily for exercise purposes.43041 It shall not be possible for any muzzle brake. image amplifier). Muzzle flash can also occur when the driving band or sabot does not obturate properly against the internal surface of the barrel. 43052 1.3. The system contains substantial forces which is why care must be taken during maintenance and repair. 1.43050 1. electronics. Recoil forces are usually accumulated in a pressure chamber for gas/fluid or by springs. 1.3.43046 1.43047 It shall not be possible for a correctly fitted sub-calibre barrel or sub-calibre adapter to detach during firing. such as with a high rate of fire. Leakage of recoil buffer fluid and gas should be minimized. or rocket motors may be particularly vulnerable in this respect. Before and after firing the following requirements shall be satisfied: 1.43054 86 The system shall be designed so that the static pressure of the recoil buffer is retained. The physical ramming environment for the weapon in question shall be verified by testing.4 Weapons 1. for example.12 Ramming Ammunition can be rammed in the barrel in a number of different ways. Ammunition containing submunitions. the high explosive or fuzing system in the projectile may be damaged. other acceleration and spin stresses may arise. .43047 shall be verified by test firing using the actual propelling charges and natures of ammunition. a sub-calibre barrel is longer than a standard barrel. A sub-calibre barrel/adapter shall not produce higher stresses on the ammunition than a standard barrel.43049 4. Maximum recoil stresses shall be verified. It shall be possible to inspect a sub-calibre barrel/adapter for cracks and other defects.2.43048 1.13 Recoil buffers Recoil buffers are employed to create forces to enable the cyclical function of the recoil system.2. Comment: If. When a high ramming velocity is used. It must be determined whether the ammunition is dimensioned for such stresses. which shall be performed at the extreme temperatures specified.43045 1.43045 and 1.43053 1.1. 4 4. A system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently fitted in an exercise weapon or in a special exercise cartridge that is loaded like normal ammunition.1. Requirements 1.43051 The rammer shall be provided with safety devices that prevent physical contact by the crew during the ramming operation. disposable weapons (for firing once only). In rocket systems the projectile is equipped with a rocket motor in which propellant combustion takes place.1. The force of recoil can be influenced by the geometry of the nozzle and the design of the recoil rocket. Recoilless weapon and rocket systems General Minimal recoil systems and rocket systems are characterised by relatively little recoil and gas flow rearwards. The mass of gas escaping to the rear can be replaced by solid or liquid substances. which results in a lower blast pressure around the weapon. which is usually much lower than in recoil systems.3. disposable barrel or launch tube. The pressure in the launch tube is determined by the static pressure of the escaping gases. weapons for limited repeated use. In recoilless systems the recoil is neutralised by the escape of gas through the open rear end of the launch tube which has a nozzle or recoil rocket.Weapons 4 1. Different types of ammunition can be used in the same weapon system.3. can be guided while in flight and this affects the danger area.43055 4.3 4. Some systems. known as countermass. among other things.3.1. such as missiles. Ammunition handling is often performed manually.1 Forced recoil equipment shall withstand recoil forces with a safety margin. Such systems usually have muzzle velocities below sonic speed and relatively short ranges. 4 87 . Recoilless weapons and rocket systems employ various solutions for ammunition handling: • • • • weapons for repeated use. fixed launch and aiming unit with replaceable. These systems often have large danger areas rearwards compared with recoil weapons. 43057 1.3 Hazards around the weapon 1.1. For recoilless systems there is the rocket-assisted projectile (RAP) which maintains or increases velocity in flight by means of a rocket motor.43062 The necessity for using a specific firing stance when firing a weapon shall be documented in the Safety Restrictions. 4 1.2 Requirements 4.2.5 Muzzle flash 1.1.3. Requirement 1.43063 shall be verified by testing.2.3.4 Weapons There are variations to both these systems.43064 4.1 Firing mechanism 1.3. and for rocket systems a gas generator located in the launch tube provides the initial acceleration for the rocket in the launcher.43063 Outside the danger area for materiel and friendly forces the backblast shall not have a high enough energy content to cause injury.43059 Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.2 Recoil 1. 4. 88 .2.3.3.1.2.43058 1.1.2.3. fin-stabilized rounds with wide-span fins cannot be fired from the prone position.1. 4.43060 The direction of recoil for recoilless launch tubes and rocket systems should be to the rear in the event of any resultant recoil.3. and during firing muzzle flash and backblast present hazards.2.43056 1.3.3.1.43065 When fitting external equipment onto the weapon consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle flash. It shall be possible to deactivate the system to prevent hazard initiation during loading/unloading and during transport of the system. The firing mechanism shall have a transport safety device.3.43061 4. Comment: For example.3.3.1. The firing system shall have a safety device for the operating and system ready-to-fire phases. 1. Recoil forces shall be established by testing.3.3 above shall apply. Safety Restrictions governing operation must be formulated on the basis of the documentation specified above.4 Backblast 1. 4. Comment: Energy and particle content shall be determined. During loading there is a risk of inadvertent firing. 43067 4.Weapons 4 1. In the design and fastening of external parts onto non-metallic barrels.3.3. Composite and compound barrels 4.43069 4.3. 1.4 Materials in the form of non-metallic composites. Comment: For requirements concerning pressure refer to STANAG 4110 or equivalent. The weapon should not produce such a muzzle flash that personal protective equipment is required by personnel. Such properties shall be taken into account in the design and calculations for weapon systems. are used to an increasing extent in weapon applications.6 Pressure 1.1. consideration shall be given to dimensioning with regard to expected material properties when these change over time.43070 A recoilless system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently fitted in an exercise weapon. consideration should be given to the influence of fixtures that are permanently attached by winding for example.1.2.43068 shall be verified by theoretical calculations and testing. 1. These materials have different properties compared with metallic materials.1. The risk for barrel rupture shall be established for the specified operational profile. so that elongation properties are not negatively affected.2.43072 89 . plastics. Elongation and expansion in barrels and rocket/missile launch tubes can be significant factors.43071 In the design of non-metallic and compound barrels. etc.7 Sub-calibre barrel 1. or in a special exercise cartridge that is loaded like normal ammunition. 1.3. compounds (mixtures of metal and composite).43068 There shall be a safety margin for structural strength and fatigue.43066 Muzzle flash shall be limited so that personnel are not subjected to higher levels of thermal radiation than the prescribed personal protective equipment can withstand.3. 4 1. Requirement 1. 43075 1.43073 shall emit both a light and sound signal when a mine becomes jammed in the minelayer.43076 90 . designed for the type of ground in question prepares space beneath the surface in which the mines are laid. Refer also to the requirements stated in Section 5.6 Example of a minelayer 1. A minelayer that mechanically arms the mine shall enable access to a mine that becomes jammed without the necessity for the use of any tools. It shall be possible to decouple a minelayer that mechanically arms the mine from the towing vehicle to enable personnel and the towing vehicle to be moved outside the danger area of the mine within the duration of the safety delay including a safety margin. A monitoring system as specified in requirement 1.4 Weapons 4. 4 Figure 4. for example.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges’. which means that hundreds of mines can be laid every hour by each minelayer. A plough-like device. Usually the mines are fed into the minelayer from the towing truck so that only a small number of mines are in the minelayer at any one time.43073 1.5 4.3. Comment: If the above safety delay is 5+1 minutes it should be possible to de- 1. The alarm shall be reset manually.3.43074 If the minelayer arms the mine via a mechanical device it shall be equipped with an automatic monitoring system.1 Other weapon systems Minelayers for landmines In some cases landmines can be laid mechanically.5.1.1. The mines can either be launched by rails over the side of the vessel from where they fall freely into the water.3. combat-ready torpedoes are stowed in the launch tubes and/or in stowage (standby mode) close to the launch tubes. 91 .43079 The minelayer shall not arm the mine before the mine leaves the minelaying device. Naval mines are often heavy (several hundred kilograms) and thus require special lifting devices during handling. 1.2 Naval mines are normally laid from a vessel under way (within a certain speed range).3 Torpedoes are used as armament (weapon system) on submarines. In a submarine.43078 1.5. with a certain distance between each depth charge to cover a specific area. Onboard surface vessels the torpedoes are normally stowed only in the launch tubes.1. or by a minelaying device specially designed for one or more types of mine.e.43077 The minelayer should be designed so as to minimise the risk of a mine becoming jammed during laying. Torpedoes are loaded into the launch tubes at the naval base. Depth charges can be dropped from a launcher (from a vessel or helicopter) to form a ‘carpet’.1. 1. i.3. Comment: The configuration of the mine should also be taken into account.5. The fuzing system is generally separate from the mine and is installed before laying. Comment: The configuration of the mine shall also be taken into account. surface vessels and helicopters.Weapons 4 couple the minelayer from the towing vehicle and to move the personnel (with vehicle) outside the mine’s danger area within 2 minutes. Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges 4. The minelayer shall be designed so that the mine cannot become jammed during launch. Launch tubes for torpedoes 4 4. 1 800 kg) and require lifting tackle to facilitate handling. Launch tubes shall be so designed that the torpedo cannot become jammed on its way out of the tube or in the forepeak of submarines. It can also be reused as a combat torpedo after being refitted with a warhead. Electric energy stored in rechargeable or thermal batteries and an electric motor for propulsion. • Torpedoes are heavy (250 .430821 1) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank. Currently Swedish torpedoes use high-test peroxide as oxidation agent and alcohol or paraffin is used as fuel.43081 Launch tubes shall be equipped with sensors that indicate that the torpedo has left the tube. After a practice run the torpedo is recovered and reused for other practice runs. 1. arming and ignition unit (SAI) is normally stored separate from the torpedo. Start of the torpedo motor in a water-filled launch tube whereby the torpedo ‘swims’ out of the launch tube under its own power (swim-out). The warhead is armed when the barrier lock in the SAI is cancelled.4 Weapons In peacetime torpedoes are used as exercise torpedoes with the warhead replaced by a special exercise head. 92 .43080 1. Two types of system are currently used to launch torpedoes from a submarine: • • Compressed air that actuates a piston located aft of the torpedo that forces both the torpedo and the water out of the launch tube (push-out). 1. This overpressure is generated either by combustion of a propelling charge or by compressed air. and the SAI is also provided with a transport safety device. Comment: The configuration of the torpedo shall also be taken into account. There are two types of energy platforms for propulsion of torpedoes: • Thermal system for generating propulsion gas for a thermal motor. 4 Torpedo launch from a surface vessel is performed by an overpressure in the launch tube aft of the torpedo. The safety. The SAI is installed in the torpedo when the latter is loaded into the launch tube. missiles and torpedoes. 4 Figure 4.3. 1.Weapons 4 1.2 Pylons and dispensers Pylons and dispensers are attachment elements for weapon systems such as bombs. The functions that are built into the pylon or ammunition vary according to the application. bomblets (multiple weapons). rockets.7 Example of a weapon launcher 1.43086 93 . Comment: This enables deactivation if the aircraft lands at a different site from the ammunition preparation site. 1. A pylon/dispenser as specified in requirement 1. A specific function requirement in the following requirements does not mean that the function must be built into the weapon itself.43085 A pylon/dispenser shall enable a transport safety device in the form of an indicator or equivalent to be clearly visible while the ammunition is in transport safety mode. Comment: The test system shall normally be separate from the launch system.43085 should enable the transport safety device to be carried adjacent to the ammunition.43084 4.43083 It shall not be possible for the testing of a launcher to cause hazard initiation. For torpedoes incorporating hydrogen peroxide the launch tubes when in standby mode shall be equipped with a draining system connected to the hydrogen peroxide system of the torpedo. 3 Weapon platforms This section will be transferred when separate manuals for different platforms have been compiled. 4. which means that requirements vary according to the type of platform in question. usually has only a driver (in some cases also a ‘passenger’) in the cab. naval vessels. vehicles. although in some cases supplementary requirements may be necessary. For instance. 94 .) for a weapon system.43087 Pylons/dispensers shall enable separation of the weapon system or ammunition in such a way that there is no collision with weapon platforms. Generally. or at the articulation pivot point). 4 An articulated truck. etc.3. when used in a military application may need additional requirements to be stipulated depending on the particular military application. each type of platform shall comply with applicable legislation and regulations. a vehicle that is mainly designed for civil use (such as a construction vehicle). which could lead to an (inadvertent) movement of the steering wheel resulting in injuries from crushing. in front of or behind the platform. When such a vehicle is modified for military use four to five persons may be transported in the cab. for example.4 Weapons 1. which could entail a risk of injury by crushing around the platform (in the vicinity of the wheels. This means that several persons may be entering the cab (from different directions) while the driver is seated at his station. Comment: This includes incorrect manoeuvring of the ammunition. several persons are often in the vicinity of the platform while the driver is still at his station. Furthermore. There are numerous types of platform (aircraft. 43088 The weapon platform for the system shall satisfy applicable traffic regulations for civil and military use.3. Blast pressure during firing shall be acceptable for crew mounted in the platform. opening. Specific safety requirements concerning manoeuvrability. etc. 1.Weapons 4 4 Figure 4.8 Examples of weapon platforms 1.4 Hatches and doors Hatches and doors shall meet certain specific requirements. Comment: When verifying blast pressure characteristics the test methods and criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 can be used. Comment: Dispensation may be given. must be met. locking. They shall be sufficiently stable to withstand shockwaves close to a detonation and subsequently be openable. 95 .43089 4. 43091 1. Locks on hatches and doors should be manoeuvrable by crew wearing regulation personal protective equipment at all extreme temperatures.3.43090 1.2 1.43092 The locking mechanism shall be dimensioned to withstand the stresses arising during operational use. 4.3.4 Weapons 1. Sight tests and adjustments The setting of the sight should not change owing to transport etc.2.5 4.3. Such an event can be caused by a fault in the sighting system. or a fault in the laying and firing function caused by human error. 4.2.3. The possibility of user error makes it essential to stipulate requirements to ensure that the system is designed according to sound ergonomic principles and that it is easy to operate. both when the system stands on a level surface and when it is on a maximum incline during operation.5.1 Sighting and laying systems General It is obvious that a serious accident may occur if the weapon is fired in the wrong direction.43094 4. Controls must be conveniently located for the crew and facilitate the performance of their tasks. The locking mechanism should be accessible and manoeuvrable from both inside and outside. Comment: This is not a general requirement. Generally it can be stated that serious accidents can be minimized by good ergonomic design combined with carefully prepared appropriate training. or a combination of these. A stabilised weapon shall retain the direction laid until a new direction is specified/commanded.43093 Requirements System accuracy The relationship between the axis of bore.5. 4 1. Scales and displays must be unambiguous and legible in all conceivable situations.43095 96 . for example.1 1.3.5. It does not apply. to turret guns.2 4. and the optical axis in the sight and the values presented on displays/instruments shall coincide.5. Weapons 4 4.3.5.2.3 Firing To ensure that the sighting and laying system can withstand the stresses that occur during firing, the following requirement shall be met: 1.43096 When firing with natures of ammunition and charges designed for the weapon the sighting and laying systems shall retain specified settings and attain specified performance. Aiming and firing limitations There shall be devices to prevent the armament being aimed or fired in prohibited zones. Comment: In maintenance mode aiming in a prohibited zone is permitted. 4.3.5.2.4 1.43097 4.3.6 Guidance systems For a guided weapon/ammunition the flight path is determined after separation from the weapon platform by the following criteria: the condition of the weapon platform at separation, the characteristics of the propelling charge/motor, the pre-determined firing data, and the design and characteristics of the guidance system. The level of complexity of a guidance system can vary. It generally incorporates guidance controls, servomotors, and some type of processor to generate guidance signals which can emanate from the weapon platform as well as from the missile itself. Signals from the weapon platform can be transmitted via a link such as electromagnetic waves of suitable frequency such as radar, thermal or light, or electrically/optically by wire during part or all of the flight path. Guided weapons/ammunition often employ search and fire control devices that register target data via active sensors based on active target acquisition (e.g. radar, laser) with potentially harmful effects. Furthermore, there is often a turntable or mobile platform and, for example, even a ground installation that also involve hazards. Search and fire control devices are dealt with in Section 4.2.4, 4.2.13 and 4.3.5 of this manual. Guidance systems contain sensors, guidance electronics/software, guidance controls, and possibly additional functions such as communication links, guidance beams or indication equipment (e.g. radar beacon or tracer). All this equipment requires power – electric, pneumatic, hydraulic, for example – in addition to the power normally required for an unguided system. 4 97 4 Weapons Self-destruction and control of the warhead function may be incorporated. Elementary examples of this are arming when there is a specific remaining flight time to target, or proximity fuze delay, based on approach velocity. Subsystems in weapons/ammunition affect guidance in one way or another. For example, if the propulsion motor stops/expires the guidance performance is changed dramatically, and the same applies to the energy supply. A true guidance system incorporates an automatic guidance function with associated rudder system, sensor unit and target seeker. These units, together with computers and geometry, form a closed guidance system that must be precisely dimensioned for optimal functioning and performance. An attack can be subdivided into several stages depending on the general design and functional method of the weapon. Search often precedes an attack. Thereafter comes the approach flight (or equivalent) – possibly involving variations in altitude and/or changes of course. Target search and the locking of the target seeker onto the target may occur fairly early in an attack or rather late (terminal guidance) in the case of certain weapons. A successful result in the latter case is entirely dependent on the preceding guidance to the target zone. Prior to launch and separation of the weapon from the weapon platform, all subsystems are prepared with initial values while essential functional checks are performed simultaneously so that the separation conditions are satisfied. The separation sequence may involve constraints on guidance signals and rudder deflection to prevent any risk of the projectile colliding with the weapon platform, or any risk of the projectile acquiring excessive angular acceleration with regard to the equipment and subsystems incorporated. Different guidance methods can be applied during the various stages of the flight path such as control of attitude, proportional navigation with lead bias, inertial navigation and SemiActive Command by Line Of Sight (SACLOS), depending on the design and performance requirements for the weapon. The purpose of the requirements is to ensure: • • • • safe handling during transport and deployment, safety in and around the fire unit during loading, unloading, loaded fire unit and launch, safety outside the designated danger areas, safety during training, loading exercises, and operation of the fire unit. Sources of radiation (e.g. laser) directed at the fire unit from the guided weapon/ammunition should be so designed that they do not require any danger zones at the fire unit. 4 1.43098 98 Weapons 4 1.43099 Sources of radiation for guidance that can have a dangerous effect shall be indicated to the operator when radiation transmission is in progress. During exercises the indication specified in requirement 1.43099 should also be visible to anyone anywhere in the vicinity. It shall not be possible for guidance signals to the weapon/ammunition to initiate motor or warhead igniters. The guided weapon/ammunition should incorporate a function which, in the event of a target miss or if a malfunction is detected, definitively precludes effect in the target by disarming the weapon. This can be achieved, for example, by self-neutralisation, self-destruction or disarming. There should be a system for function monitoring and failure detection for the guidance system. This may result in self-neutralisation or disarming of the weapon, etc. The guidance system shall be designed and documented in a way that enables a safety analysis to be performed. The safety analysis shall be performed or audited by an instance that is independent of the designer. Comment: Another department or special safety function within the same department may be considered as an independent party. All materials incorporated shall be selected and combined in such a way that effects detrimental to safety do not arise during the life of the guidance system, for example as a result of corrosion, ageing, chemical change or short-circuiting. Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and after launch, should conform to standardized communication protocols. Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and after launch, shall be subject to function monitoring. Comment: Function monitoring can, for example, be by means of parity checking or a ‘watch-dog’ function. 1.43100 1.43101 1.43102 1.43103 1.43104 1.43105 1.43106 4 1.43107 1.43108 99 4 Weapons 4.3.7 4.3.7.1 Miscellaneous requirements Pressure vessels There are a number of types of pressure vessel for numerous applications. Structural strength calculations and hydrostatic testing shall always be carried out to provide the basis for type approval. 1.43109 4.3.7.2 Pressure vessels shall be type approved in accordance with the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health directives. Lifting devices Lifting devices are used to lift parts of, or complete, systems during production or in the field. An assurance of compliance with the regulations governing lifting devices shall be submitted in writing by the manufacturer. This means that applicable standards have been adhered to, structural strength calculations have been performed, hazard analyses have been performed, an instruction book has been compiled, test certificates have been issued, material certificates are available, and that the lifting device has been CE marked. 1.43110 1.43111 Lifting devices shall be CE marked. The danger area for a lifting device shall be established and taken into consideration when formulating Safety Restrictions. Comment: The danger area is greater than the area immediately beneath a hanging load, for example. Fire-fighting equipment 4 4.3.7.3 Fire, especially in ammunition stowed in confined spaces, can become catastrophic in a very short time. Even fire in other materiel can quickly lead to major health hazards to the crew, especially in a combat vehicle. It is therefore vital that a fire can be extinguished as quickly as possible before the crew is injured by the fire itself, or by toxic substances released during certain types of fire. Fire-fighting equipment comes in the form of fixed equipment and hand-carried extinguishers. Fixed fire-fighting equipment can usually be activated automatically as well as manually. 100 Weapons 4 Fixed sensors that react to smoke and/or temperature, for example, are in general use. The primary purpose of the requirements is to ensure the safety of the crew, and secondarily to preserve weaponry. 1.43112 1.43113 Fire-fighting systems in crew compartments shall not contain halon. Fire-fighting systems for engine, crew, and ammunition compartments shall be automatically activated, but also be possible to activate manually. Confined spaces that have automatic fire-fighting systems shall be equipped with an evacuation fan to enable rapid ventilation after a fire is extinguished. In addition to automatic fire-fighting systems, manual fire extinguishers shall be within the reach of the armament crew. This also applies onboard combat vehicles where all compartments shall have a fire extinguisher. The equipment shall have sufficient capacity for the most severe fire possible in a defined application. Confined spaces that are not crew compartments should have automatic fire alarm systems. A single failure in fixed fire-fighting equipment should not result in non-function. Fixed fire-fighting equipment shall have duplicate containers containing fire-fighting materials. If a rubber hose or equivalent is employed in fixed fire-fighting equipment, its function shall not be exposed to any hazard before or during the actual fire-fighting. If the actuating device in fixed fire-fighting equipment comprises any form of accumulated pressure there should be duplicate pressure vessels. The type of fire extinguisher (powder, water, foam, etc.) should be selected so as to preclude any other danger arising during the firefighting. 1.43114 1.43115 1.43116 1.43117 1.43118 1.43119 1.43120 4 1.43121 1.43122 101 42005 SHALL Weapons difficult to aim 1.42017 1.42020 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL 102 .42006 SHALL Severe damage to environment General requirements 1.42009 SHOULD Danger area Emergency stop Energy stop & energy source disconnection Emergency stop close to energy source Unload propelling charge Empty cartridge cases & expended launch tubes Manual override of automatic functions Mount & remove equipment Specified equipment Monitors/VDUs Symbols/texts Disarm the weapon independently Footholds & anti-slip surfaces Locking devices on hatches & doors 4 1.42004 SHALL Incendiary weapons 1.42014 1.4 Weapons 4.42013 1.4 Requirement checklist for weapons The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups. no.42018 1.42002 SHALL Laser weapons 1. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8.42012 1. Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons Reqmt.42010 1.42008 SHOULD 1.42001 SHALL Booby traps 1.42007 SHALL 1.42019 1. Reqmt.42015 1.42011 1. type Content Comment Requirements of International Law 1.42016 1. ‘Checklists’.42003 SHALL Toxic weapons 1. 42037 Vibration dose 4 Blast pressure 1.42033 Number of rounds fired Protection & location of crew Backblast Verification of requirement 1.42028 SHOULD Drainability 1.42027 SHALL Electrical & magnetic fields Water and moisture resistance 1.42024 SHALL Electrical and magnetic fields 1.42037 SHALL 1.42025 SHALL Susceptibility of electrical circuits 1. type Content Comment 1. Reqmt.42023 SHALL 1.42036 SHALL SHALL Backblast 1.42023 Toxic substances 1.42032 SHOULD Crew protection Blast pressure level Verification of requirement 1.42022 SHOULD SHALL Ventilation.42021 1.42030 SHOULD Protective clothing & equipment 1.42029 SHOULD Water spraying & fording Extreme climatic conditions 1.42033 SHALL 1.42039 SHALL 103 . no.42026 SHALL Safety critical electrical circuits 1.42038 SHALL Vibration dose 1.42034 SHOULD 1.Weapons 4 Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.42031 SHOULD Good work environment Fire 1. continued Reqmt. heating & air conditioning system Safe separation distance Concentration of toxic substances Verification of requirement 1.42035 1. 42054 1.42042 1.42060 SHALL Determining dimensions relative to pressure Spring forces & hazards Spring forces & double locking devices Springs & analysis Fastening elements Fastening elements. overpressure Recoil forces Rotating & moving parts Loading devices Cartridge case ejection Activation of lasers Safety circuits Safety covers & locking devices Laser outlet optic Warning signs Laser protection filters & goggles Activation of lasers Safety circuits Safety covers & locking devices SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD 4 104 .42051 1.42044 1.42049 1.42045 1.42043 1.42062 1. characteristics Springs to be located in a protected position Springs duplicated Accumulated pressure Monitoring duplicated Location of hydraulic hoses Hydraulic fluid Danger area Recoil buffer.42050 1.42059 1.42052 1.42055 1.4 Weapons Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.42040 Forces 1.42047 1. type Content Comment Pressure 1.42058 1.42053 1.42057 Lasers 1.42041 1. no.42058 1. recuperator.42059 1.42056 1. continued Reqmt.42060 1. Reqmt.42061 1.42046 1.42063 1.42048 1. 42066 SHALL Transport 1.42064 SHALL 1.43005 1.42065 SHALL 1. Reqmt.42063 SHOULD SHALL SHOULD Laser outlet optic Warning signs Laser protection filters & goggles Chassis or platform motion Open (or closed) doors or hatches Retention of ammunition etc. no.Weapons 4 Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.42069 SHALL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS Launchers Weapon installation 1. type Content Comment 1.42068 SHOULD 1.43010 SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL 4 Operation of breech mechanism Locking Breech mechanism: vibration resistance Incorrect assembly Firing mechanism inactive Indication of breech mechanism status Firing with breech mechanism not fully closed 105 .42062 1.43003 SHOULD Safety devices for moving system parts Recoil systems Breech mechanisms 1. continued Reqmt.42067 SHOULD 1.43009 1.43004 SHALL 1. Fall-back Firing in fall-back position Method for stowage Stability – mechanical 1.43006 1.42061 1.43002 SHALL Clearance 1.43008 1.43001 SHALL Interface with safety functions 1.43007 1. 43020 1. obturators 1.43028 SHALL Fatigue & barrel rupture 1.43028 1. sabots.43021 1.43026 SHALL Firing with new or worn barrel 1.43032 SHALL Testing for fragmentation 106 .43012 SHALL 1.43011 SHALL 1.43017 1. shock resistant Radiated or conducted interference Electrical connector.43014 1.4 Weapons Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons. no.43025 SHALL Barrels and sub-calibre barrels 1. Reqmt.43022 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL Firing mechanism.43013 SHALL 1.43031 SHOULD Driving bands. safing Firing by active operation Protection for electromechanical device Firing button guard etc.43016 1.43024 SHALL Backflash 1.43015 1. continued Reqmt. Firing mechanism to withstand vibration & shocks Firing mechanism.43019 1.43018 1. safing Mechanical safety devices Manually operated safety interrupter Location of safety interrupter Safety interrupter marking Breech ring life Obturation Automatic fire into maximum head wind 4 Breech ring 1.43023 SHALL Obturation 1.43027 SHALL Verification of requirement 1.43026 1. type Content Comment Firing mechanisms 1.43029 SHALL Verification & calculation of requirement 1.43030 SHALL Attachment of external parts 1. 3. 1.43047 1. 1. 1.43049 SHOULD Permanently fitted sub-calibre barrel Ramming 1. flame guards and recoil amplifiers 1.43033 1. type Content Comment 1.Weapons 4 Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.43037 SHALL 1.43042 SHALL 1. Reqmt.43039 SHALL Attachment of muzzle brake etc.43048 SHALL Verification of requirements 1. sand or gravel in barrel Barrel rupture trials Cook-off at maximum fire engagement Determination of temperature & heat flux Attachment of fume extractor Dimensioning of fume extractor Fume extractors 1.43038 SHALL Muzzle brakes.43040 Muzzle flash 1.43036 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL Snow.43046 SHALL Inspection of sub-calibre barrel etc.43039 & 1.43044 SHALL Applicable requirements as stated in Section 4.43050 SHALL 1.43041 SHALL Verification of requirements 1. no.7 1.43045 SHALL Fitting of sub-calibre barrel etc.43035 1.1.43043 SHALL External equipment & effect of muzzle flash Crew stations – muzzle flash 4 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters 1.43034 1.43040 SHALL Dimensioning of muzzle brake etc.2. continued Reqmt.43045 & 1.43051 SHALL Rammer Ramming environment 107 . 1.43047 SHALL Stresses on ammunition 1. 43054 1.43053 1. energy content 1.2.43062 SHALL Firing stance 1.43061 SHALL Recoil forces.43067 1.43059 SHALL Deactivation.1.3 1.43069 SHALL Verification of requirement 1. transport safety 1.43058 SHALL Firing system. testing 1. Reqmt.43052 SHALL 1.43066 SHALL Limitation of muzzle flash 1.43068 1.43067 SHOULD Personal protective equipment 1. loading/ unloading 1.43071 SHALL Material properties 1.43055 SHOULD SHALL SHALL Static pressure of recoil buffer Leakage of recoil buffer fluid & gas Maximum recoil stresses Forced recoil equipment 4 Recoilless weapon and rocket systems 1. safety device 1.43057 SHALL Firing mechanism. type Content Comment Recoil buffers 1.3. no. continued Reqmt.43056 SHALL Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.43068 SHALL Structural strength for pressure 1.43064 SHALL Verification of requirement 1.43070 SHOULD Permanently fitted sub-calibre barrel 1.43060 SHALL Direction of recoil 1.4 Weapons Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.43063 SHALL Backblast.43072 SHOULD Fixtures permanently attached by winding 108 .43065 SHALL External equipment & effect of muzzle flash 1. 43073 SHALL Arming the mine 1.43084 SHALL SHALL Testing Draining system Transport safety device indicator Transport safety device to be carried No collision of ammunition with weapon platform Weapon platform Blast pressure Locking mechanism Locking mechanism accessibility Manoeuvrable when wearing personal protective equipment Pylons and dispensers 1.43092 SHOULD 109 .43091 SHOULD 1.Weapons 4 Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.43083 1.43090 SHALL 1. type Content Comment Other weapon systems Minelayers for landmines 1.43082 1.43089 SHALL Hatches and doors 1.43079 SHALL Mine cannot become jammed Launch tubes for torpedoes 1.43080 SHALL Sensors 1.43081 SHALL Torpedo cannot become jammed a) 1.43076 SHALL Decoupling minelayer 1. no.43087 SHOULD SHALL 4 Weapon platforms 1.43088 SHALL 1.43086 1.43085 SHALL 1.43075 SHALL Mechanical arming 1. continued Reqmt.43074 SHALL Monitoring system 1.43077 SHOULD Risk of mine becoming jammed Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges 1. Reqmt.43078 SHALL Arming 1. 43101 1. type approval Lifting devices 1.43099 1.43100 1. 1.43102 1.43113 SHALL Automatic activation 1.43114 SHALL Evacuation fan 110 . continued Reqmt.43109 SHALL Pressure vessels.43093 SHALL Axis of bore & optical axis 1. type Content Comment Sighting and laying systems 1.43103 1. no.43098 SHOULD 1.43110 SHALL 1.43094 SHALL Direction laid 1.43095 SHOULD No change of setting during transport 1.43112 SHALL Halon systems 1.43104 1.43108 SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL Sources of radiation & danger zones Sources of radiation & indication Indication during exercises Guidance signals to warhead system Design of self-destruction Function monitoring Safety analysis Auditing by independent instance Materials incorporated Data transfer Function monitoring of data transfer 4 Miscellaneous requirements Pressure vessels 1.4 Weapons Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons.43107 1.43105 1.43097 SHALL Firing in prohibited zones Guidance systems 1.43106 1.43096 SHALL Firing & retention of settings etc.43111 SHALL CE marking of lifting devices Danger area for lifting devices Fire-fighting equipment 1. Reqmt. type Content Comment 1.43116 1.43118 1.43120 1. Reqmt.43117 1. no.43122 SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD Manual fire extinguishers Capacity of equipment Confined spaces Single failures Duplicate containers Rubber hoses Actuating device Type of fire extinguisher a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.43121 1.43115 1. 4 111 . continued Reqmt.43119 1.Weapons 4 Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons. . 1 5. is a constituent part of the materiel system. Where a weapon part such as a barrel. 5 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges’. Certain materiel specific requirements that are not naturally related to any of the other sections in this chapter are thus stated in this section. 5.3. after which the materiel specific requirements for the various parts of the ammunition shall apply as stated in the respective subsystem section: 5. This chapter specifies the requirements that are unique for ammunition and its constituent parts: warheads.3 ‘Propulsion systems’. refer to Chapter 4 ‘Weapons’. With regard to guidance systems for ammunition that affect the ammunition after it has left the launcher. 5. These requirements together with the other applicable weapon and ammunition safety requirements shall be incorporated in the requirement specifications. For all ammunition the activity and materiel related requirements stated in Chapter 2. pylon.2 ‘Warheads’.5 ‘Packaging for ammunition’. and 5. Packagings can also be included in the ammunition concept as they have a unique marking to denote the characteristic of the ammunition therein. produce smoke.1 Joint ammunition requirements General This section specifies the requirements that are applicable for complete ammunition. Ammunition also comprises practice materiel for the above purposes. illuminate the battlefield. propulsion units. Chapter 4. ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ shall always be taken into consideration. or achieve electromagnetic jamming. 113 . dispenser.1 shall apply. Thereafter the requirements specified in Section 5.1. ‘Weapons’ also applies. fuzing systems and packagings.Ammunition 5 5 AMMUNITION The term ammunition denotes materiel that is designed to achieve damage in the widest sense (often through explosion). Section 4. etc. 1. 1. Bullets shall not be easily expanded or flattened in the human body. etc.2 Requirements of International Law These requirements. thermal radiation. fragmentation. Bullets shall be fully jacketed and shall not incorporate any notches (cf. must always be met and can thus never be disregarded through any other agreement. This is particularly important when the projectile and propelling charge are separate and an interspace can arise with certain charges.51004 5.5 Ammunition 5. Comment: Danger areas for lasers.1.51005 Analysis and testing shall be performed to provide data for assessment of the danger area for all combinations of launchers and ammunition. Mines shall not be designed to be of similar appearance to civil utility goods.3 Materiel specific requirements When developing ammunition it is necessary. Comment: Refer to the definition of a worn barrel. 1. Refer also to Section 4. Comment: The above applies for ammunition where ramming is desirable.2. analyses and testing. neither may they be marked with internationally recognised safety emblems.51006 shall be tested using a worn barrel.2.51003 1. to achieve a design that satisfies the safety requirements in the requirement specifications. The requirements stated herein are largely based on experience accumulated over the years. During the development phases the safety requirements are verified through audits.51002 High explosive shells designed primarily for anti-personnel purposes shall have a minimum weight of 400 grams. amongst other needs.51007 114 .51001 1.1. 1. 5 1.15.51006 1. The function stated in requirement 1. dumdum bullets). originating from international agreements. blast pressure. The projectile and propelling charge should be designed so that the projectile remains in rammed position with the gun at maximum elevation without any special devices for this being needed on the gun. Ammunition 5 1.51008 Ammunition should be designed so that unloading can be performed in a safe manner by the weapon crew. Comment: This also applies to unloading after an ammunition misfire. Verification of requirement 1.51008 shall include testing to determine the forces that can be permitted for the unloading tool in question. Comment: Testing also includes the force required to achieve unloading. Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading as a reverse process of loading. Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading to be performed with the aid of tools if the ammunition becomes jammed either during ramming or in the barrel. To establish the risk of cook-off for the ammunition, the temperature/heat flux etc. for a barrel at its maximum operating temperature and for the shell shall be determined. Driving bands/sabots/obturators/casings etc. should be dimensioned and designed so that no fragments are formed that can impact with the muzzle brake (if such is fitted) and ricochet rearwards. When modifying or newly developing ammunition, driving bands/ sabots/obturators/casings etc. shall be tested regarding the occurrence of fragments. Driving bands, casings or equivalent shall be designed so that they do not inadvertently disintegrate outside the barrel when firing with the maximum stress level. Sabots shall be designed to ensure safe separation. Comment: Consideration shall be given to the hazards of sabot fragments and to any change in projectile trajectory. The projectile shall be designed to achieve external ballistic stability in all permitted types of firing provided that the barrel has not reached its maximum permitted wear so that the specified danger area is still valid. Comment: Worn barrels, driving bands, fins, tail units, etc. can affect external ballistics. 1.51009 1.51010 1.51011 1.51012 1.51013 1.51014 1.51015 1.51016 5 1.51017 115 5 Ammunition 1.51018 Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualified by the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI). Comment: Approval shall be based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Code of Statutes, edition 1986:2 (SÄIFS 1986:2). Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214. Comment: Assessments concerning the scope of qualification shall be made by the advisory group for explosives, see Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’, Section 3.6 and 3.8. The ammunition should be resistant to extreme environments such as accidents or the effect of enemy weapons so that the ammunition does not increase the vulnerability of the system to which it is integral. Comment: The above shall be based on the resistance of the ammunition and the protection level of the materiel system. Cf. FSD 0060. Mines shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079. Torpedoes shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in launch tubes. Cf. requirement 1.43081. Underwater mines/depth charges shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079. The safe separation distance/time shall be determined for the severest case of operational use. Refer also to requirements 1.42022, 1.52022, 1.53007 and 1.54013. The design and the materials used in the ammunition shall be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, including pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable deformation. Comment: When dimensioning and designing ammunition the pressure definitions and procedures specified in STANAG 4110 shall be applied. 1.51019 1.51020 1.51021 1.51022 1.51023 1.51024 5 1.51025 5.1.4 Checklist for joint ammunition requirements The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’. 116 Ammunition 5 Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements Reqmt. no. Reqmt. type Content Comment Requirements of International Law 1.51001 SHALL Minimum weight of HE shells 1.51002 SHALL Mines shall not be similar to utility goods 1.51003 SHALL Bullets shall not be easily expanded 1.51004 SHALL Bullets shall be fully jacketed Materiel specific requirements 1.51005 SHALL Analysis and testing for danger area 1.51006 SHOULD Projectile in rammed position 1.51007 SHALL Testing for requirement 1.51006 in worn barrel 1.51008 SHOULD Unloading safely 1.51009 1.510010 1.51011 1.51012 1.51013 1.51014 1.51015 1.51016 1.51017 1.51018 1.51019 1.51020 1.51021 SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL Verification of unloading tool forces Unloading via loading route Unloading using tools Exposure to high temperature Fragments from driving bands, sabots, casings, etc. Testing newly developed driving bands, etc. Driving bands etc. shall withstand maximum stress Safe separation of sabot External ballistic stability Explosives approved by SÄI Qualification of explosives Resistance to extreme environments Mines not become jammed 5 117 5 Ammunition Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements, continued Reqmt. no. Reqmt. type Content Comment 1.51022 1.51023 1.51024 1.51025 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL Torpedoes not become jammed Underwater mines not become jammed Safe separation distance Casing to withstand all stresses 5.2 5.2.1 Warheads General This section is a summary of the joint requirements for warheads. For each type of warhead there are additional object specific requirements that apply which are stated in the relevant subsections of this chapter. 5.2.1.1 Description 5 The term warhead refers to that component of the ammunition which, at a predetermined time or place (e.g. impact in target, actuation in immediate proximity of target, etc.) is intended to provide effect by, for example, pressure, fragmentation, or incendiary, or any combination of these, or any other effect of tactical importance to the user. In certain circumstances effect is achieved after entry or penetration of armour or other protection element, for example. A warhead that is not loaded with explosive is exemplified by an anti-armour projectile which penetrates armour by means of high kinetic energy. Furthermore, there are pyrotechnic warheads (illuminating, incendiary, smoke). Most combat warheads have practice counterparts which – on impact – provide some kind of visual signal, such as a flash or smoke, to indicate point of impact and which have a lower explosive effect. There is also practice ammunition whose warheads contain little or no explosive (such as inert ammunition that has no explosive content at all). Several countries are developing more insensitive ammunition designated IM (Insensitive Munition). Technically, the lower sensitivity is achieved by using plastic as a binding agent and nitramine-based products for the energy producing substance (PBX = plastic bonded high explosive). 118 Ammunition 5 For multiple warheads, each submunition is treated as an individual warhead. In the case of guided and trajectory correctable warheads the warheads are dealt with as described in this chapter, while the guidance and trajectory correction motors are dealt with in Section 5.3 with consideration given to the actual launch environment. When initiating such motors, the same requirements are specified as for fuzing systems for propulsion devices, see Section 5.4, if it is not proven that hazard initiation does not incur injury to personnel nor damage to property or the environment. 5.2.1.2 Materiel environment Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the mechanical effects of the environment: • • • leakage can occur in joints, cracks can occur in warhead casings, explosive dust or similar can be created and be moved to a more shock sensitive position, e.g. threaded joints and gaps where there may be a risk of initiation due to vibration or shock (e.g. during firing). Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the physical and chemical effects of the environment: • high explosives can be heated to a temperature at which they become plastically deformed or melt. This can lead to cavities, or the high explosive migrating into threaded joints, between separating surfaces, or into cracks where it can be compressed and thus involve a risk of initiation, air may be pumped in and out through leaks in the warhead casing which can lead to accumulations of water. The high explosive or equivalent may be affected and gaseous products may form, for example in the case of high explosives with an aluminium content, brittle fractures can occur in the casing, especially at extremely low temperatures, a significant difference between the coefficients of expansion of the charge and the casing can occur which may result in the formation of cracks or cavities at low temperature, or high internal overpressure can result at high temperature, reactions between incompatible materials can change the properties of explosives. • 5 • • • 119 The internal surface of the casing shall be smooth and clean.52002 Requirements NBC warheads (nuclear charges. Comment: Testing shall be performed in accordance with FSD 0060. in which a fuel is sprayed into the air and detonates owing to the oxygen in the air and where the main purpose is anti-personnel. without exceeding acceptable deformation. 1.5 Ammunition 5. shall not be fabricated. Comment: The warhead shall be protected against moisture until filled with explosive.52004 1.52007 5 1.52006 1.52008 and 1.52009 1. ‘Weapons’. chemical weapons) shall not be fabricated. overlaps.2. ultrasonic testing or other methods. refer to Chapter 4. Separation charges and guidance or trajectory correction motors shall be treated as propulsion devices. Comment: The parts in the warhead can be examined prior to testing by using X-ray.52001 1.52010 120 .52003 1. Concerning pressure in the barrel. including pressure in the barrel.52009 shall be verified by testing. Comment: Examples of detailed requirements that can be stipulated: safety margin for deformation.52008 1. Warhead casings whose main effect is fragmentation shall be fabricated from material that can be easily detected by X-ray.1. FAE (Fuel-Air Explosives) warheads. biological weapons.3 1. The design and composition of the HE charge and the pyrotechnic charge shall be such that they can withstand all stresses arising without any risk of a hazardous event occurring.52005 1. When tempered steel is used in the casing the material and heat treatment chosen shall be such that hydrogen embrittlement or other dangerous corrosion does not occur. The warhead shall be designed to preclude the presence of high explosive or pyrotechnic composition in threads and joints in such a quantity as to create a risk of hazard initiation when screwing components on or off or during launch or release. pores or incorrect heat treatment that can lead to hazardous events. freedom from cracks. radiography. Multiple weapons and guided weapons shall be treated as having several warheads and propulsion devices. Requirements 1. The design and the materials used in the body of the warhead shall be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising. 52020 5 1. The warhead in its application should not detonate in the event of fire.52015 should be verified by testing.51024. The environmental aspects of manufacture. The design of the warhead should facilitate upgrading.52017 1. clearance of duds. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060. The melting point of the high explosive should be higher than the temperature reached by the ammunition in a barrel heated to its maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in question. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060. Requirement 1. Comment: The danger areas for blast pressure and fragmentation shall be determined.52022 121 . The possible destruction of any duds (unexploded ammunition) should be taken into account during the design of the warhead.52013 1. The blast pressure from a detonating warhead should be determined. and disposal should be taken into account.43035 and 1.52019 1. in-service surveillance and disposal.Ammunition 5 1. clearance of duds.53019. use. Toxicity arising from manufacture.52014 1. Refer also to requirement 1. Requirement 1.52015 1. The warhead in its application should not detonate from bullet attack from small arms ammunition.52013 should be verified by testing. use. and disposal should be taken into account.52021 1. recovery of target materiel. The safe separation distance shall be determined for all warheads. 1. Comment: Refer also to requirements 1.52012 1.52016 1.52011 The warhead shall not be susceptible to cook-off in the event of a misfire or interruption in firing when the barrel is at its maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in question.52018 1. recovery of target materiel. ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ shall apply. The quantity of high explosive is reduced to such an extent that no injury to the gun crew nor damage to the gun shall occur in the event of premature detonation in the barrel. the practice shells shall be treated in the same way as HE shells from the safety aspect. mortars.1 Example of an HE shell containing a booster and fuze 122 .5 Ammunition 5. common instructions as stated in Chapter 2. On burst the spotting charge produces a flash and smoke to facilitate observation of the impact point. spin. The design is dimensioned to withstand high pressure and high acceleration and. and recoilless launch tube weapons are dealt with herein. howitzers. HE shells primarily consist of a shell body filled with high explosive which may be compressed or cast.2.2 5. HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition for cannons.1 Warheads containing high explosive (HE) HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition This section contains object specific instructions for warheads for tube-launched ammunition. where relevant. Practice shells with a reduced charge are similar to HE shells but have a greatly reduced charge or spotting charge.2. In addition.2. If this condition cannot be met in the design. Fuze 5 Booster Auxiliary booster Auxiliary booster casing Auxiliary booster charge HE Shell Auxiliary booster Main charge Shell body Driving band Pipe disc Figure 5. or by the use of bisectable shell bodies. Material defects can have a critical effect if leakage occurs allowing hot propellant gases to enter and ignite the HE charge. cavities or cracks do not occur and that the required adhesion is achieved. which in turn may cause a hazardous event. a copper alloy. 1. Shell bodies may exhibit leaks in the base (so-called pipes).52027 1.52024 shall be verified by X-ray inspection. In the case of rocket assisted projectiles it is important to consider the effects of thermal conductivity and erosion on the wall separating the rocket engine from the high explosive charge.52024 1. and often spin in the barrel. The sensitivity of the warhead in question is significantly dependent on the quality of the high explosive. an HE charge in a shell may be initiated if it remains in the rammed position in a hot barrel (so-called cook-off). Pressed shell bodies shall be free from explosive composition dust. and cracks (especially close to the base) may cause settling of the high explosive during firing. which in turn can lead to premature ignition by adiabatic compression (detonation in the barrel). which is why the base is usually fitted with a metal base plate or other sealing device. Defects in the material or in the manufacture of the driving band may lead to disintegration in the barrel. Pressed shell bodies shall meet stipulated requirements concerning freedom from cracks and other defects. cavities.Ammunition 5 A characteristic of tube-launched ammunition is that the projectile is subjected to high pressure. A coarse inner surface in the shell body may increase the risk of a hazardous event owing to increased friction. its freedom from foreign particles and its application.52028 . When filling a shell body with high explosive it shall be ensured that unacceptable pipes. If firing is interrupted. as well as aerodynamic heating while in flight.52023 If it is conceivable that the material from which the shell body is fabricated may contain pipes a base plate or equivalent shall be employed and shall be attached in a satisfactory manner. The driving band – usually made of copper. plastic or sintered iron – can be a safety critical item. sawing in half the shell bodies. Pipes. Any separations in the shell body shall be satisfactorily sealed to prevent the ingress of high explosive into joints.52026 1.52025 1. This means that the safety of the design must be examined carefully with regard to material load etc. Requirement 1. high temperature and acceleration. 123 5 1. or because of material defects.g. (e.5 Ammunition 1. are not subjected to such an accel- 124 .2 This section covers HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles. the HE charge in the shell shall be well filled against the base of the shell.2. Such warheads consist mainly of a casing (sleeve.52030 1.52031 When installing an auxiliary booster it shall be ensured that no cavity occurs that could cause hazard initiation.2. Most rocket and missile warheads. Figure 5. Designs differ to achieve optimum effect in the intended target. the safety review must take into account inter alia the likelihood of initiation of the explosive by heat from the burning propellant or by the direct ingress of propellant gases owing to their erosive effect. HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles 5. in the HE charge and warhead casing are the same as for tube-launched ammunition as specified in Section 5.2 Rocket with warhead 5 A characteristic feature of rocket and missile warheads is that they are usually located adjacent to a rocket engine.2. The casing is also dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. to avoid any possibility of settling of the high explosive that could cause premature initiation. such as those employing impulse rocket engines.2. In shells equipped with an end screw or base fuze. are subjected to high acceleration when all the propellant has burnt out in the launch tube. Consequently. They have a reduced HE charge.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’.52029 1. There are also practice warheads that produce smoke on impact without employing any high explosive (or fuze). Most rockets and guided missiles have practice warheads for training purposes. an ampoule of titanium tetrachloride which is crushed on impact). In this type of ammunition the requirements concerning absence of pipes etc. The HE charge may be cast or compressed. nose cone) and an HE charge. It shall be ensured that any uncontrolled base bleed combustion cannot lead to deflagration/detonation of the warhead via gas flow or gas erosion when firing base bleed ammunition. Some projectiles. however. combined with a spotting agent that produces smoke and/or a flash when they burst. It is important that the quantity of high explosive in practice warheads is reduced to a small enough quantity to ensure that hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury. For this item the requirements specified in Section 5. For bombs that contain devices to guide the bomb to the target or to correct the final phase of the trajectory.2. 5 125 .2 ‘HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles’ apply. This may be cast or compressed. The casing may also contain the bomb fuzing system.2. If this is not feasible. The casing is sometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The HE charge in the warhead should be protected from heat-generating components.52032 1.2. which is why the same stringent safety requirements do not need to be applied in respect of the casing. the applicable parts of Section 5. A feature of warheads in HE bombs is that they usually contain large quantities of high explosive which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage. 1. and are dropped from aircraft to subsequently follow a ballistic trajectory. or consist of liquid high explosive.2. and the freedom from pipes and cracks of the HE charge. Bomb warheads mainly consist of a casing and an HE charge. the practice warhead in question shall be considered to be an HE warhead from the safety aspect. In the case of practice bombs containing explosive spotting charges it is vital that the quantity of explosive contained is small enough so that any hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage.Ammunition 5 eration.2.2. The bomb casing is equipped with a suspension device and fins. HE warheads for bombs This section addresses HE warheads for bombs which herein refer mainly to those that are equipped with fins or equivalent.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges’ apply. The casing is also dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use.52033 5.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ and 5. surface texture. and is usually completely filled with high explosive.3 The warhead casing should not consist of separate parts within the zone adjacent to the rocket engine in order to avoid gas leakage. Airborne ammunition can be subjected to aerodynamic heating of the warhead during normal flight or during the approach phase. either homogeneous or surface-reinforced. Landmine warheads mainly consist of a casing and HE charge. minor earth tremors or equivalent. there shall be sufficient sealing to ensure that ingress of moisture or leakage of explosive does not occur. etc.2. the design shall take into account the possible risk of hazard initiation – caused by the weather. 1. The casing is sometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. Environmental stress factors such as vibration and aerodynamic heating occur in high speed flight. The casing is usually completely filled by the HE charge. The casing also has to be dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. 5 126 . road works – even after a long period of deployment. the relevant parts of previous sections of this chapter apply. The joint requirements stated in Section 5. homogeneity. radio/light signals. In the case of landmines designed for possible deployment in peacetime.2. HE warheads for landmines 1.52035 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges’ apply.52034 If the casing consists of separate parts. The casing may also contain the mine fuzing system.2.2. In some cases the warhead has no casing. For warheads that are ejected or transported to the target zone by some kind of carrier.1 ‘HE warheads for tubelaunched ammunition’ also apply. but the HE charge is then reinforced with fiberglass. which may be cast or compressed. Where separate charges are used the intervening space shall be filled with an appropriate filler material. which herein mainly denotes those that are laid manually and those laid by a mechanical minelayer. of the explosive charge. for which the requirements stated in Section 5.5 Ammunition Bombs are usually not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated regarding the structural strength. The text below addresses HE warheads for landmines.4 This section contains materiel specific requirements for landmine warheads. 52036 1. refer to Section 5. such as anti-submarine shells.5 If the casing consists of separate parts there shall be sealing to prevent the ingress of moisture. which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage. It is vital that practice landmines containing an explosive spotting charge contain a quantity of explosive that is small enough so that any hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury during normal use.2. For small underwater weapons. The text below addresses HE warheads for underwater use in such weapons as underwater mines.2.2.2.52037 5.3 Example of a landmine warhead In terms of safety.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply. depth charges and torpedoes. 5 127 .2. the joint requirements stated in Section 5. Underwater mines that are intended for deployment in peacetime should be designed to take into account the possible risk for hazard initiation – owing to gas formation in the warhead or collision with a vessel or submarine – even after a long period of deployment. 1. depth charges and torpedoes. warheads for HE landmines are usually characterised by containing relatively large quantities of high explosive.2. In addition. HE warheads for large underwater ammunition This section contains object specific requirements for warheads used in underwater mines. etc.Ammunition 5 Figure 5. homogeneity. Landmines are normally not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated concerning their structural strength. The metal casing shall be protected against corrosion.6 ‘HE warheads for other ammunition’. and torpedoes is that they usually contain extremely large quantities of high explosive which is why an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury or damage. depth charges. and its freedom from cavities and cracks. and torpedoes are designed to provide overpressure effect and consist mainly of an explosive charge. depth charges. These warheads are subjected to lower rates of acceleration than tube-launched ammunition which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated concerning the structural strength of the high explosive. The high explosive may contain aluminium powder and ammonium perchlorate to increase the pressure effect. 128 . In certain cases ventilation must be enabled. The casing is dimensioned for the calculated stresses during handling and the actual launch stresses.5 Example of a torpedo 5 A characteristic feature of HE warheads for underwater mines. the casing and a location for the fuzing system.5 Ammunition Warheads for underwater mines. but great importance must also be attached to corrosion resistance and being proof against the ingress of water/moisture. both in salt water and in a salt water atmosphere. Figure 5.4 Example of an underwater mine Figure 5. there is enhanced risk when there are through-cracks in large charges contained in elastic casings or in casings with low structural strength. This generally means that stringent requirements must be stipulated concerning water-tightness since ingress of moisture may cause gas to form. its adhesion. However. the former being thrown by hand and the latter being deployed by means of a rocket.2.2. pull-string with percussion cap. Ammunition denoted by the title to this section is normally used statically with the exception of hand-grenades and rocket-projected line charges. any intervening space shall be filled with an appropriate filler material.52041 5. such as during in-service surveillance of ammunition. the joint specifications stated in Section 5. it is vital that the quantity of any explosive used shall be small enough so that a hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage to materiel. This section addresses HE ammunition that is not readily categorised as having HE warheads designed for tube-launched ammunition. rapid or PETN fuze. for example. Metal casings shall be protected against corrosion internally and externally.6 This section states materiel specific requirements for natures of ammunition containing HE charges other than those dealt with elsewhere in this chapter. rockets. bombs. Instead.g.2.52040 1. If the pedagogical nature of the training does not enable total exclusion of high explosive. or electrically).Ammunition 5 High explosive should be avoided in practice warheads.g. safety fuze with detonator or delay detonator) or remotely controlled (e.2. Fuzes shall form a seal with the casing or have a sealed seat/location.52039 1. Where separate charges are used. landmines. 1. underwater mines or torpedoes.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply. 5 129 . In addition. guided missiles.52038 If there is a risk of overpressure in the warhead it shall be possible to remove plugs or other seals without risk of injury to personnel. HE warheads for other ammunition 1. Initiation is either delayed (e. other types of indication should be employed such as buoys or pyrotechnic spotting charges for smoke or light signals. 5.1 General This section addresses warheads whose main effect derives from pyrotechnic charges. PETN fuzes. Incendiary warheads containing a charge of high explosive incendiary composition shall be considered as HE warheads from the safety aspect.2.3 Pyrotechnic warheads The section headed ‘General’ is a compilation of general requirements. Safety during use is mainly based on directives.2. and instructions for use.g. 5 5. cylindrical or prismatic hollow-charges.g. Figure 5. each type of warhead also has object specific requirements that are disclosed in other sections of this chapter. In addition.52042 Ammunition and packaging should be such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and joint loading in accordance with the ‘UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods’ can be permitted. The same applies to warheads with comparable effect achieved by agents other than pyrotechnic (e. and demolition charges in the form of Bangalore torpedoes and linear/hose charges. as tracers or as components in priming devices) are addressed in the relevant subsection. regulations.6 Example of a hand-grenade 1. and that if a hazardous event occurs can deflagrate or detonate to cause incendiary.5 Ammunition Examples of such ammunition are hand grenades. mine clearing ammunition. instantaneous smoke by ejection of substances that are themselves not explosives). A characteristic feature of such HE ammunition is that it often incorporates high explosive in containers of elementary design or without a casing.1 ‘HE warheads for tubelaunched ammunition’ also apply. the general requirements stated in Section 5.2. fragmentation and pressure effects. Other warheads incorporating pyrotechnics (e. Moreover. 130 .3.2. Even cracks in compressed pellets can entail a risk of friction initiation or violent burning sequence if subjected to environmental stress. granulated to a particular shape. especially if composition dust is present or can occur. such pressure may arise that rapid deflagration. A characteristic feature of most types of pyrotechnic ammunition is that it often contains flammable pyrotechnic composition which. spotting agents and practice ammunition simulating real weapon effect. Generally. signal ammunition. smoke compositions contain inert zinc which shall not involve a risk of spontaneous combustion. emits hot combustion products that can cause fire. There is a risk of friction ignition if such composition dust migrates to.e. warheads for tube-launched ammunition.g. Pyrotechnic compositions that are hygroscopic may change their properties as a result of moisture ingress. there is no risk of inadvertent ignition. i. incendiary ammunition. Pyrotechnic compositions can be sensitive to shock. the warhead casing is resistant and sealed. e. for smoke compositions containing zinc). Where appropriate. Smoke ammunition is TS classified with a ‘3’ as the second digit. Escaping gas (such as hydrogen) can form an explosive mixture with air. 131 5 . occurs in which case the casing can burst with subsequent fragmentation effect. smoke ammunition for degrading enemy visibility. Ingress of moisture can also entail a risk of spontaneous combustion (e. utilising light and/or smoke.Ammunition 5 Pyrotechnic charges contain pyrotechnic compositions that can be in powder form. or compressed (with or without a binding agent) to form pellets.g. Gas may form and create such an increase in pressure that the casing can burst. shock or vibration. threads or joint surfaces where it may initiate when the fuze is screwed on or off or when subjected to equivalent stress such as bump. Pyrotechnic warheads can be incorporated in: • • • • • illuminating ammunition used for illuminating the battlefield. They are usually encased in moisture-proof containers. or even detonation. It is vital that pyrotechnic charges are adequately confined to prevent risks of this type. when ignited. Depending on the confinement. rockets and bombs. Some parts of inadequately mixed compositions may be more sensitive to percussion than normal. or during manufacture becomes present in. 2. smoke or incendiary effect (or a combination thereof) used in guns (including signal pistols). In addition. smoke screen.52043 Requirements Pyrotechnic ammunition should be designed and the compositions selected such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and the ‘UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods’ can be permitted.2. and if necessary by destructive testing.52044 1. Compressed pellets shall meet the prescribed structural strength. Insulation adhesion shall meet the prescribed value. the applicable parts of the joint requirements stated in Section 5.3. This section addresses pyrotechnic warheads for illuminating. spin and spin acceleration for the weapon specified. or by signal effect. 5.52051 5.52047 1.52045 1. Care must also be taken to ensure compatibility between the various compositions and the other components in a pyrotechnic warhead. Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition 1. in most cases there are one or more parachutes. Effect is achieved in the form of illumination. Requirement 1.52049 1.5 Ammunition Pyrotechnic compositions or their combustion products can be toxic.52050 1. where appropriate. especially smoke compositions. The charge shall meet the prescribed moisture content.2. The charge casing shall be sealed. Additionally.3.52048 shall be verified by testing. The charge shall meet the prescribed purity from foreign particles. The pyrotechnic composition used should have good storage stability.52048 1.3 5 This section contains object specific requirements for pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition. Such warheads mainly consist of a shell body (cargo shell) which is dimensioned to withstand the high pressure and subsequent high acceleration and. together with a pyrotechnic charge (or charges). Insulation shall be free from cracks and cavities. spin brakes and support segments.2. 132 .52046 1.2 1.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply. setting the target on fire. The stability of the compositions used when subjected to various environmental conditions shall also be assured. Unsatisfactory sealing of the base or material defects that may allow the ingress of hot propellant gas can cause a hazardous event if the charge is ignited in the barrel. because if the charge disintegrates during acceleration. Furthermore. Comment: If necessary the charge may need to be dried before final assembly. and against composition dust.52053 The base of the shell shall be completely sealed against hot propellant gases. 5 133 . moisture etc.7 Example of a shell for smoke and illuminating effect A characteristic feature of pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition is that the propelling charge subjects them to high pressure and high temperature during the bore phase.52052 1. At final assembly the charge shall have the correct moisture content. the structural strength of the charge and the charge casing is vital from the safety aspect. In most cases the shell body is provided with an expellable base. which is expelled together with the pyrotechnic charge at a pre-determined point in the trajectory. friction initiation and an uncontrollable burning sequence may occur. 1. or if there is loose composition dust present.Ammunition 5 Smoke shell Illuminating shell Fuze with igniting device Separation charge in bag or cartridge Smoke charges with igniting charge Illuminating charge with igniting charge Spin brake Spin brake Shell body Driving band Support sleeve Parachute with central and shroud lines Base plate Figure 5. 52044 SHALL 1.52029 SHALL Auxiliary booster.52022 SHALL Safe separation distance HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition 1. filler material HE warheads for other ammunition 1.52023 SHALL Base plate against pipes 1.52030 SHALL HE charge well filled 1.52043 SHOULD 1.52038 SHALL Plugs for overpressure 1.52031 SHALL Uncontrolled base bleed combustion HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles 1.52028 SHALL Separations sealed 1.52032 SHOULD Mono-casing 1.52034 SHALL Casing in separate parts 1.52036 SHALL Casing in separate parts 1. filler material HE warheads for landmines 1. no cavity 1.52039 SHALL Fuzes sealed 1.52041 SHALL Separate charges. no.52035 SHALL Separate charges.52037 SHALL Corrosion protection for casing HE warheads for large underwater ammunition 1.52033 SHOULD HE charge protected HE warheads for bombs 1. Reqmt. type Content Comment 1.52024 SHALL Unacceptable pipes 1.52042 SHOULD Co-storage Pyrotechnic warheads 1.52026 SHALL Explosive composition dust 1.52025 SHALL X-ray inspection 1.Ammunition 5 Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads.52040 SHALL Corrosion protection for casing 1.52045 SHALL Co-storage Moisture content of charge Purity of charge 5 137 . continued Reqmt.52027 SHALL Freedom from cracks 1. 5 Ammunition Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads.3 5 a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank 5.2. no.52051 SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL Storage stability of pyrotechnic composition Structural strength of compressed pellets Insulation adhesion Verification of requirement 1.52052 SHALL Base of shell sealed 1.52058 SHALL Requirements as per Section 5.52049 1. continued Reqmt.52047 1. type Content Comment 1. the materiel specific requirements stated in the relevant subsection for the various types of propulsion system also apply.52053 SHALL Moisture content of charge a) 1. 138 .52055 a) Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs 1.52056 SHALL Dividing wall sealed 1.52048 1.52046 1.52050 1.1 Propulsion systems General This section specifies the joint requirements for propulsion devices.52048 Insulation free from cracks Charge casing sealed Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition 1.3. Reqmt.52057 SHALL Moisture content of charge Other pyrotechnic warheads The applicable parts of the requirements specified for pyrotechnic warheads apply to other pyrotechnic warheads Other warheads 1. In addition.3 5.52054 1. base-bleed initiators. reproducible ignition of the propulsion agent.1. i. percussion cap. and rocket engine initiators are examples of such priming devices.g. Propellants. The term propulsion devices herein denotes charges in gun systems that impart the correct muzzle velocity to projectiles.. Artillery primers. On the other hand. Gas generators are designed to produce gas flow under pressure and are used for various purposes in ammunition. i. such as to pressurise fuel and oxidiser tanks in liquid fuel rocket engines etc. Propulsion agents are used in propulsion devices and gas generators. Gun systems use propellants only. heat generation per unit weight is low. Airbreathing engines use low-oxidiser propellants (in ram rocket engines and turbo-rocket engines). electric primer) to ensure rapid.e.3.2 Safety aspects 5 From a safety point of view it should be noted that propulsion agents can be inflammable. The rate of combustion usually increases with pressure. The priming device usually contains a pyrotechnic booster charge adjacent to the initiator (e. SFRJ – Solid Fuel RamJet). confinement ratio. highly reactive. or as devices in projectiles for reducing air resistance – socalled base-bleed units.1. and liquid fuels (ordinary ramjet and turbojet engines).3. Gas generators use propellants or liquid propulsion agents. and includes reaction motors of various types that provide propulsion in the launch or trajectory phase – such as in a rocket assisted projectile – or in both phases. like other types of explosives. are characterised by a very rapid generation of energy irrespective of their surroundings. If the rise in pressure is 139 . air or water (torpedo propulsion). Rocket engines use propellant as well as single. Ignition of propulsion agents is achieved by using various types of priming devices containing an initiator that is initiated mechanically or electrically. solid fuels without oxidizer (ramjets. as power sources for subsystems in guided missiles and torpedoes. toxic and explosive. for example only about 10% of the heat generated by burning the corresponding quantity of petrol (gasoline) in air. but can also be taken from the medium through which the projectile travels. double or triple base liquid propulsion agents.Ammunition 5 5.e. or by some other type of energy supply. 5.1 Description of function The purpose of propulsion devices in ammunition is to impart sufficient impulse to the warhead to transport the ammunition to the target. though in the future this may possibly be combined with electricity. 5. for example. in unfavourable cases for example. Inadvertent initiation can occur through friction. The designation LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) is also used. discharge of static electricity.5 Ammunition uncontrolled there is a risk of a hazardous event.3 Materiel environment The following are examples of the consequences of mechanical stress from the environment: • Cracks.1. When using a case bonded charge a permanent deformation may be induced because of differences in the coefficients of expansion between the casing and the charge.3. may occur in propelling charges causing the pressure during combustion to be higher than that for which the ammunition casing is designed. This ammunition is known as IM (insensitive munition). result in blockage of the exhaust nozzle in rocket engines or base bleed units by charge particles that have debonded. and/or by confining the propulsion agent in such a way that sensitivity is reduced. shock.e. the propulsion agent is made less sensitive by the use of plastic as a binding agent while the energy-producing agent is a nitramine. This can – in some cases after a long duration – result in cracks in the charge (relaxation until fracture) or cause debonding between the charge and its insulation. Another example is degraded stability which. This applies particularly to unbonded charges and can. or by inadvertent actuation of the priming device (by impact. Reactions in the propulsion agent. The risks are enhanced when the casing is subjected to pressure at ignition. formation of propellant dust. heat or electric fields). Several countries are developing ammunition that is less sensitive to fire and bullet attack. Technically. heating to ignition temperature. Additionally. A further example involves changes in internal bal- 5 • • 140 . propulsion agents can be susceptible to deterioration through ageing so that the ignition temperature becomes lower or the agent becomes unstable. An example of this is a decay in the rheological properties which can lead to the formation of cracks in the propulsion agent when used at low temperature. can lead to self-ignition of the propulsion agent. The following are examples of the consequences of physical and chemical stress from the environment: • If stored at high temperature and/or in high humidity there is a risk that the rate of burn of the propelling charge may be affected so that an excessive pressure arises. or between the agent and other materials. in severe cases. debonding. ageing). damage to propellant insulation or other defects that considerably increase the burning surface. can change the properties of the agent itself (i. Risks can also arise owing to variations in temperature (temperature cycles). . . . 53002 1. which can cause the combustion process to differ from what is intended. These materials may comprise internal protective paint.23007. The safe separation distance/time shall be established for all propulsion systems during the most unfavourable operating conditions. whereby the propulsion agent can be expelled into the reaction chamber and/or the surroundings. particularly at high or low temperatures.51024.Ammunition 5 listic properties. Furthermore. When using hardened steel the material and heat treatment chosen shall be such that no hydrogen brittleness nor detrimental corrosion occurs.23005. Joint requirements The design of.53005 1. wear protectants. quality. causing the material to embrittle and rupture. for example. shall be compatible. such as the igniter cup. 1. Peacekeeper). The propulsion force process and pressure–time curves shall be reproducible within the stated requirement specification. and materials in. This applies particularly in a dry.53001 1. cold atmosphere.53007 141 . Propellant motors with non-electrically conducting casings. All have occurred in systems containing large charges (Pershing. combustion catalysts.53003 5 1. and size to ensure that the required safety margin for permissible maximum pressure in all specified environments is not exceeded. Refer also to requirements 1. The electric field from the charge can be intensified in the propellant and create a flash-over between the metallic grains thus causing hazard initiation. Refer also to requirement 1.1. Adjacent materials.53006 1. and materials in the propelling charge. etc.53004 1.3.4 1. Electrical charging of the motor casing can occur during use. a propelling charge casing shall be selected so as to ensure that the casing resists all specified loads without exceeding the permissible deformation or stress. A number of accidents caused by ESD (electrostatic discharge) have occurred in the USA. insulation materials. The propelling charge shall be of a type. • Liquid fuel propulsion agents with a higher thermal cubic expansion rate than the surrounding fuel tank casing can. can be subject to hazard initiation caused by electrostatic discharge. rupture the casing or the integral bursting discs. the propulsion agent can affect other materials. when overheated. and propellants containing metallic powders such as aluminium. sealing agents. The propelling charge should be designed to minimise fragments propelled rearwards from the base plate or nozzle plug.23006 and 1. • 5. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060.53013 should be performed.53008 1. clearance of duds and disposal.53015. Nitrocellulose-based propellants are normally used as propulsion agents in tubelaunched ammunition. The propulsion device in its tactical application should not detonate when subjected to the specified bullet attack.53009 1. The design should facilitate disassembly (e. The propulsion agent casing shall withstand handling throughout its service life.53016 5 5.g. its components and its combustion products are of minimal toxicity and have as little environmental impact as possible. and the temperature.53011 Metal additives. 1.53012 1. The composition of the propulsion agent should be such that the agent.5 Ammunition 1.2 5.53010 1. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060. method of ignition. This applies to manufacture. The pressure process is dependent on these factors as well as on the type of propellant and the 142 . if any.53015 1. use. The propulsion agent casing shall be sealed as required. inservice surveillance and disposal). Bullet attack testing of the propulsion device as specified in requirement 1. the joint requirements specified in Section 5. The following factors must be taken into account when dimensioning a propelling charge: the size of the combustion chamber. driving band force. A fuel fire test should be performed as specified in requirement 1.1 Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition General This section contains materiel specific requirements for propulsion agents in the form of solid propellant for tube-launched ammunition.53013 1. mass of the projectile. dynamic strength of the barrel (elasticity). shall not be able to block the exhaust nozzle.3. length of the barrel. The propulsion device in its tactical application should not detonate if subjected to fire. In addition.1 also apply.2.3.53014 1. for upgrading. The high pressure in the ejection mechanism requires steel with very good mechanical and chemical properties. Cannon primers are used as priming devices in howitzers and other gun systems that use bag charges. and is integral to the propelling charge to a greater or lesser extent. This enables simultaneous initiation of the entire propelling charge. ETC (electro-thermal-chemical launching) is being studied and developed for possible introduction into future weapon systems. This technology provides the prerequisites for increased range and higher reproducibility in the weapon. since the aim is to achieve low dispersion of velocity and to minimise the flame. to facilitate simultaneous loading of the shell and propelling charge. Propellant is normally encased either in fabric (i. Combustible cartridge cases are also available. Propellant dimensions are usually such that the propellant has burnt out before the projectile travels through the muzzle of the barrel. Small arms and automatic weapons. Liquid fuel propellant may be introduced into future weapon systems. Oscillations during combustion can affect the electronics in the ammunition. The combustible case burns together with the propellant. The propulsion agent for small arms ammunition is ignited by a percussion cap or equivalent. use unitary ammunition with a single propelling charge in a metal cartridge case. The cannon primer is inserted into the breech mechanism of the weapon. The artillery primer can be short or can extend through a large section of the loading chamber. bag charge). for example. such as for howitzers and mortars. Propellants in liquid fuel propellant ammunition employ other suitable mixtures of explosives rather than nitro-cellulose and nitro-glycerine. made of metal or plastic. or in a cartridge case or separate case to form a propelling charge of designated type and dimensions. Bag charges can then be used in combination with separate charge cases. Priming devices normally consist of an artillery primer (electrically or mechanically actuated). 143 5 . to enable a lower sensitivity resulting from a higher ignition temperature for the composition.e. and usually screwed into the base of the cartridge case. Bag charges (modular charges) often have a booster charge of black powder or finely granulated porous propellant attached. for example.Ammunition 5 size and shape of the burn surface. consisting mainly of nitro-cellulose. Bag charges are used where an incremental/modular charge system is required. 3. Some propellants. small particle size. The rapid discharge of large quantities of stored energy in the capacitor bank of the weapon increases risks in the form of high electric and magnetic fields and currents. high porosity. or if an incorrect or defective projectile is used. high nitro-glycerine content and large charge quantities.1. Figure 5.9 Examples of propelling charges 5 5. can be made to detonate. accidents can occur if the incorrect charge (incorrect type of propellant. Considerably higher combustion temperatures and pressures will be achieved.1 Safety aspects A characteristic feature of propelling charges is that they combust without any supply of air.2. In addition to the hazard initiation stated in Section 5. under certain circumstances. Factors that tend to increase their proneness to detonation are severe confinement. and that their rate of combustion depends inter alia upon the pressure. incorrect dimension or quantity) is used.3. 144 . which in turn is dependent on the confinement conditions of the propellant.2.1.5 Ammunition More stringent requirements will thereby be prescribed for heat resistance and structural strength in the combustion chamber and barrel. 53017 Requirements Within the permitted temperature range the propelling charge shall produce a pressure (MOP) that is lower than the permitted maximum value for the barrel and shell. General 5.53021 1. the impact surface shall be countersunk so that the risk for inadvertent initiation during use is minimal. torpedoes.10). guided missiles.53019 1.53022 5. etc. When using percussion caps in artillery primers etc. Refer also to requirement 1.2 1.Ammunition 5 5.2. and can be subdivided into the following three groups: • • • reaction engines (see Figure 5.3. 1. propulsion devices for torpedoes. The cartridge case shall seal against the chamber seat so that there is no gas leakage.1 5 This section contains materiel specific requirements for propulsion devices and gas generators used in rockets. The propelling charge shall be resistant to cook-off in the event of a misfire or an interruption in firing when the barrel is at maximum temperature for the operational profile in question. 145 . For recoil barrels the combustion of the propelling charge should be designed not to cause backflash. gas generators. A common factor of these devices is that they all contain propulsion agents that constitute hazard factors (fire. guided missiles.53020 1. explosion or toxic hazards).3. The propelling charge should be designed such that the propellant is burnt out before the projectile exits the muzzle.3 Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets.. etc.53018 1.43035.3. These devices are incorporated in various types of propulsion systems. unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs).1.3. torpedoes. Comment: In the dimensioning and design of the ammunition the pressure definitions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 shall be applied. UAVs. 5 Because the rate of combustion is dependent on the temperature of the propellant. a singel component propulsion agent Ram rocket engines Turbojet engines Air taken in from the atmosphere is compressed by a turbine driven compressor Ram rocket engines Air inducated from the atmosphere is compressed by the ram effect Figure 5.3. In certain cases. hot gases are formed that vent out through the exhaust nozzle(s).2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators use propellant confined in a casing (sleeve) incorporating one or more jets (nozzles) and the necessary priming devices.5 Ammunition Reaction engines Rocket engines Contain oxidants and fuel Jet rocket engines Contain a gas generator that generates gaseous fuel that is combusted by air taken in form the atmosphere Jet engines Use fuel (solid or liquid) that is combusted by air taken in form the atmosphere Propellant rocket engines Contain solid propellant Hybrid rocket engines Contain a solid and a liquid propulsion agent Liquid fuel rocket engines Contain liquid oxidant and liquid fuel. 146 . In a propellant gas generator the pressure is regulated by releasing the gas flow that is not consumed for the designed purpose through one or more valves.10 Subdivision of reaction engines 5. As the propellant burns.3. the pressure is usually higher in a hot engine than in a cold one. 12. 5 Figure 5.13. see Figure 5. see Figure 5. All-round combustion 147 . case bonded by casting propellant directly into the engine casing which is provided with an internal layer of cementing and insulating material.12 Unbonded tubular propellant.11 Example of a propellant gas generator The charge(s) in a propellant rocket engine is/are usually designed according to one of two main principles: • • unbonded in the engine casing in the form of tubes or rods.Ammunition 5 Exhaust jets Filter Insulation Casing Booster charges Main charge Electric priming device Figure 5. for example. Sections of the inner walls of the engine casing that are subjected to hot combustion gases during combustion are usually protected by insulation. 53023 Propulsion devices should be designed such that the pressure vessel does not burst or detonate as a result of the impact of shrapnel from fragment-forming ammunition (or equivalent). or because of corrosion or defects in the internal heat insulation. Propulsion devices should be designed such that fuel fire does not cause uncontrolled flight. but it can be reignited if it comes into contact with hot surfaces.13 Case bonded charge.53025 1. High pressure can also result from the unstable combustion of propellant owing to high frequency pressure oscillations in the engine. may create such high pressure levels that the casing ruptures.5 Ammunition Propellant charge Liner Insulation Figure 5. 5 Usually the propellant is extinguished if the casing ruptures.53024 1. 1. Propulsion devices should be designed such that if the pressure vessel bursts a minimum number of dangerous fragments are formed. 1. Propulsion devices containing propellant with metallic powder shall be analysed with regard to risks in the event of electrostatic charging. Rupture or leakage at normal operating pressure can also occur owing to degradation in the strength of the casing material. Combustion in the propellant channel The malfunction of a propellant rocket engine or propellant gas generator as a result of enlargement of the surface.53026 148 . Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060. such as by cracks in the propelling charge(s) and/or debonding between the charge and its insulation. 53005. factory-sealed type with double base propulsion agent (spontaneously reacting fuel and oxidiser) including propellant gas generator Propulsion agents are often highly reactive and toxic. 1.53029 . 149 5 1. Over-pressure valve 8. Exhaust nozzle Figure 5.53028 1. Propulsion agents can be of mono. exhaust nozzle.53024 and 1. Piston 5. Liquid fuel rocket engines usually contain propellant gas generators with relevant priming devices. The tank system shall be designed such that direct contact between propulsion agents cannot occur inadvertently. Gas generator 6. Oxidant tank 4. Tanks for propulsion agents shall have adequate space for the expansion of the liquids.53016. The main parts of the system are: • • • • tank system. reaction chamber (combustion usually occurs spontaneously). Combustion chamber 9.53023. fire in the event of contact between propulsion agent that has leaked out and combustible or catalytic substances. spontaneous or delayed reaction in the event of contact between propulsion agents. 1.14 Example of a liquid fuel rocket engine of off-the-shelf. 1.53027 1.3 Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators are based on propulsion agents usually in hermetically sealed containers (tanks). Requirements 1. Fuel pipe 2.3. Fuel tank 3. Priming agent 7. 1. The following hazardous events can occur: • • • poisoning or injury to skin upon contact with propulsion agent that has leaked out during the liquid or gaseous phase.53015. 1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 1. feed system.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections.3.or multi-component type where each component is stored in a separate tank.Ammunition 5 5. an integrated booster).4.15 Example of a turbojet engine 150 . Turbojet engines are normally started after the weapon is released or launched.3.1.1.4.3. Missiles that have liquid fuel engines are usually kept in storage with their fuel tanks full. The rocket engine nozzle located in the ramjet engine exhaust nozzle is discarded after burnout. Liquid fuel Priming agent Figure 5.1 Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the engine to start. Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the pressure vessel to burst.4 5. This is generally achieved by using a propelling charge in the combustion chamber of the ramjet engine (i.5 Ammunition 1. 5.3.1 Turbojet engines Vehicles powered by turbojet engines can be air or ground launched (or launched from ships). The rocket engine exhaust nozzle can be eliminated in certain cases by designing the propelling charge in a specific way (a so-called nozzleless booster).3. 5. but ramjet engines can also use a solid fuel charge located in the combustion chamber of the engine.2 Ramjet engines 5 Vehicles powered by ramjet engines are normally accelerated to approximately twice the speed of sound to achieve satisfactory ramjet engine function. In the latter case one or more booster rocket engines are used that are discarded after burnout.3.e. and either the front end of the combustion chamber is opened or special sealing elements are ejected to enable air to enter for the ramjet engine to start.3.53030 1.3. Jet engines General Turbojet and ramjet engines usually use liquid fuel.4.3.53031 5. rocket engine exhaust nozzles. and separate burnt-out booster rocket engines are discarded after launch.53032 Requirements Requirements 1.3.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections for integrated boosters.53013. The fuel for the ramjet phase is a solid fuel propellant.16 SFRJ – Solid Fuel RamJet engine A special safety aspect concerning turbojet engines is that the liquid propulsion agent can cause fuel fire through leakage or inadvertent fuel feed.Ammunition 5 Air intake with centre cone Diffuser Combustion chamber Propellant charge Afterburner chamber Exhaust nozzle Figure 5. The safety requirements are therefore less stringent than requirements stated for booster rockets and propulsion devices in gun barrels.3. This velocity can be achieved with the aid of a booster rocket or by firing from a gun.53015.4. From the safety aspect an integrated ramjet engine is characterised – apart from the risk of fuel fire – by the same hazards as those inherent in propellant rocket engines owing to the propelling charge located in the combustion chamber.53034 151 . The number of components containing pyrotechnic or explosive compositions should be minimised.53033 1. The quantity and size of discarded parts (debris) at the start of ramjet function should be minimised.53016. 1. For an SFRJ to function it is necessary for it to reach a high velocity. Other hazards that must also be taken into account with both types of engine are those that arise when engine parts such as intake and exhaust covers. generally with no or very low oxidiser content.53023 and 1. 1. 1. 5 1.2 1. 5. 3. and an afterburner chamber where the fuel is burnt after mixing with air from the atmosphere. At transition (i.e. A ram rocket engine usually has a propellant rocket charge located in the afterburner to achieve the required flight velocity in the same way as an integrated ramjet engine.5. and a propellant rocket nozzle aft that is discarded when the propellant has burnt out.e.5 Ammunition 5. The gas generator is started by its own igniter and begins to produce gas in the afterburner chamber where it mixes with incoming air to be subsequently ignited by the afterburner igniter.3. thus contributing in a minor way to the mass flow and thereby to the thrust.1 Ram rocket engines General A ram rocket engine consists of a gas generator in which a gaseous fuel is generated. The solid fuel (i. end of propellant phase) the airway is opened while simultaneously the seal closing the air intake is also opened. propellant with a large excess of fuel) in the gas generator can be ignited and be already burning during the rocket engine phase.3. The gaseous fuel is generated through combustion or pyrolysis of a solid propulsion agent. It has a similar system of sealing elements in the front end near the air intake.3. However. 5 152 . it is more usual to have the airway between the gas generator and afterburner chamber closed during this phase.5 5. At the same time an appropriate quantity of water is injected so that the propellant gas for the engine consists of dry highpressure steam mixed with combustion products.53015.53034 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections.3. Propulsion devices for torpedoes 5 5.Ammunition 5 Booster phase Solid fuel Propellant Propellant igniter Transition phase Priming agent Ram rocket phase Priming agent Figure 5.53013. 1.3.17 Ram rocket engine phases From the safety aspect. 153 . 1.6 Propulsion devices for torpedoes are based on piston engines that are driven by high-pressure steam from a steam generator. Battery-driven electric motors are also used.53035 Requirements 1. 1. 1. usually carbon dioxide.53023. A propellant gas generator can be used to start the engine.53033 and 1. 1. 1.53005. 1. The steam generator is in principle a combustion chamber in which fuel and an oxidiser react while heat is generated. ram rocket engines are equivalent to propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators. as well as ramjet engines (see relevant subsections).53025.53016. as well as nitrogen in the case of air propulsion. 53038 5.53005. The instability and powerful oxidising effect of hydrogen peroxide constitutes the most significant hazard factor in systems where HP is used as propulsion agent. 1.53024. 1. 5.4 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices 5 The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups.53036 Requirements Requirements 1.53016. 1. The hazard factors that apply to propulsion devices with the propulsion agent combinations of ethyl alcohol/air and paraffin (kerosene)/air are the same as those that apply to liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators (see above in this section). Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8. 1. Propulsion agents are stored in separate tanks. and paraffin (kerosene) and high test peroxide (HTP).1 1. 1. 154 .5 Ammunition The following combinations of fuel and oxidiser are used: ethyl alcohol and air. ethyl alcohol and hydrogen peroxide (HP). Compressed air is used as an oxidiser as well as for pressurising the other propulsion agent tanks. HP tanks shall be provided with adequate load relieving and draining devices.3.53023.3.53015. paraffin (kerosene) and air.53029 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections. HP shall be provided with a stabilizer. HP that accidentally leaks out and comes into contact with combustible or catalysing substances can cause spontaneous combustion. 1.3. ‘Checklists’.6.53037 1.53028 and 1. 53004 SHALL Permissible maximum pressure of propelling charge 1. type Content Comment Propulsion devices and gas generators in ammunition 1. 1.53015 SHOULD Propulsion device resistant to fire 1. Reqmt.53024 SHOULD Fragments from pressure vessel burst 5 155 .53011 SHOULD Toxicity of propulsion agent 1.Ammunition 5 Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices Reqmt.53019 SHALL Cook-off 1.53022 SHOULD Propelling charge burnt out Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets etc.53009 SHALL Propulsion agent casing sealed 1.53017 SHALL MOP of propelling charge 1.53001 SHALL Deformation of casing 1. no.53018 SHOULD Backflash 1.53007 SHALL Safe separation distance 1. handling throughout service life 1.53020 SHALL Cartridge case sealed 1.53021 SHALL Percussion caps countersunk 1.53006 SHOULD Fragments propelled rearwards 1.53010 SHALL Propulsion agent casing.53003 SHALL Heat treatment 1.53016 SHOULD Fuel fire test for propulsion devices Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition 1.53013 SHOULD Bullet attack of propulsion device 1.53023 SHOULD Pressure vessel burst caused by shrapnel 1.53005 SHALL Reproducibility of propulsion force process 1.53012 SHOULD Disassembly 1.53008 SHALL Locking of exhaust nozzle 1.53002 SHALL Compatibility 1.53014 SHOULD Bullet attack test 1. 53015. 1. type Content Comment 1. 1. space for expansion 1.53031 SHALL Pressure vessel not to burst by leakage of propulsion agents Jet engines 1. Reqmt.53033 and 1.53023.53025 1. 1.53016.53016.53028 and 1.53027 SHALL Requirements 1.53005.53029 apply 1. 1.53005. continued Reqmt. 1.53034 apply 1.53013.53015.53025 apply 1.53034 SHOULD SHOULD 5 Ram rocket engines 1. 1. no. 1.53023 and 1.53037 SHALL Stabiliser for HP 1.53035 SHALL Propulsion devices for torpedoes 1.53024.53016. 1.53032 SHALL Requirements 1.53030 SHALL Motor not started by leakage of propulsion agents 1.53025. 1. 1. 1. 1.53033 1.53015.53024 and 1.5 Ammunition Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices.53036 SHALL Requirements 1. 1. 1.53025 apply Discarded parts to be minimised Explosive compositions to be minimised Requirements 1.53023. 1. 1. 1.53028 SHALL Direct contact between propulsion agents 1.53015. 1.53005.53029 SHALL Propulsion agent tanks.53013.53023.53026 SHALL SHALL Uncontrolled flight Electrostatic charging Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators 1.53016.53038 SHALL Draining devices for HP tanks 156 . 5 shall as far as possible be met. the design and location of which are dependent on the method of initiation. even by fuzing systems with non-conforming functions (e.1 5. It is necessary for all the safety devices to be armed to enable the warhead to be initiated. The requirements specified in Section 5.4.6.4. The integral safety system of a fuze may contain one or more mutually independent safety devices.1 The following sections apply to all fuzing systems that are designed to initiate warheads or propelling charges. Warheads and propulsion devices must be initiated by a fuzing system if they are to function as intended.Ammunition 5 5. The principal element of a fuzing system consists of one or more transmission safety devices. The fuzing system therefore has its own safety system whose task is to prevent hazard initiation throughout all phases in the life of the ammunition with the necessary degree of safety. 5 157 .4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges Introduction General 5. It thus follows that the safety of the fuzing system is a decisive factor in the safety of the entire weapon system.4. fuzing systems that do not use environmental forces for arming) in Section 5.1. a large number of safety devices can degrade the reliability of the fuzing system with regard to its intended function. On the other hand. Each safety device is subject to one or more arming conditions. the greater is the degree of safety against hazard initiation at that stage.2 through 5. each of which must be satisfied for the safety device to arm.g.4. The more safety devices that prevent initiation or transmission in an explosive train at any given stage.4. The transmission safety device can be electrical (circuit breaker) or optical.5 Ammunition There are two groups of transmission safety devices (see Figure 5.19): 1. The explosive train is initiated by an initiator when the initiator receives the signal to initiate. Transmission safety devices for systems with an out-of-line explosive train (safety device). 2. Sensor(-s) Signal processor Initiator Interrupter Booster Explosive train Initiator Transmission safety device Safety features Interrupter Arming conditions 5 Booster Warhead charge Figure 5.18 and 5. for example. Transmission safety devices for systems with an in-line explosive train.18 A fuzing system with out-of-line explosive train 158 . The explosive components in the explosive train are separated by a mechanical interrupter. There is no mechanical interrupter between the explosive components of the explosive train. for example. an explosive or a priming composition. such as when environmental conditions dependent on use are lacking. Of these the primary explosive is most easily initiated. there are exceptions such as EFI systems. Moreover. However.19 A fuzing system with in-line explosive train When all requirements for the arming process cannot be met. 5 159 . the safety level can be accepted in certain cases by enabling the fuzing system – or an essential part thereof – to be assembled/installed immediately before use. and therefore demands the most stringent requirements for the safety system. that can cause hazard initiation) than mechanical initiators. The most sensitive part of the initiator can be a primary explosive. The use of electric SAI units has become increasingly common in pace with the use of electronics for sensors and signal processing. it is often difficult to predict the presence and extent of electric energy. These initiators are generally more sensitive to initiation (by radiated interference.Ammunition 5 Sensor(-s) Signal processor Initiator Booster Circuit breaker Transmission Circuit breaker safety device Safety features Arming conditions Explosive train Initiator Booster Warhead charge Figure 5. Together these two factors shall enable a tolerable safety level. very carefully considered technical solutions and. secondly. 5 160 . As many as possible of the safety features shall be designed into the technical solution. be related to the consequences of a hazardous event. Requirements governing the need for safety devices in a fuzing system must.5 Ammunition Total safety when using a fuzing system is based on two factors – firstly. and shall rely on operating instructions no more than is necessary. A thorough consideration of this interrelationship is vital to system safety. to a large extent. instructions on how to use the system. Hazard overview Arming range(delay) Figure 5.20 Safety concepts Safety distance(times) In-flight safety rain safety resistance to electromagnetic bush safety Transport and loading safety Bore and muzzle safety Mask safety Safe separation distance Exempel på riskfaktorer Ammunition 5 161 5 . Defects discovered at this stage can often be remedied by relatively elementary actions. loading and firing. Batteries and electrolytic capacitors can be damaged causing leakage of electrolyte that may cause spontaneous ignition of explosives or make them more sensitive. Extraneous circuits can also be created by the ingress of foreign bodies. New designs and materials may entail new hazard factors. Cracks in micro-electronic circuits can result in failure effects that are difficult to evaluate. The risk of complex short-circuits on printed circuit boards and in connectors. for example.2. Mechanical parts of fuzing systems can be damaged or broken so that initiation occurs during transportation.1. Examples of defects and events that can result from environmental stress and that can adversely affect safety are listed in the subsections below.4.1 Mechanical stress Examples of the effects of mechanical stress: • • • • • • Leakage.2 Materiel environment Certain typical defects can be detected by subjecting the fuzing system to special testing during development. 5. Localized heating caused by friction between moving parts. 5 • • • 162 . Such testing shall simulate the predicted environment to which the fuze will be exposed during its life.1. Additional information may lead to the discovery of further hazard factors. During transportation. or prematurely during loading or firing. should be particularly considered. warheads are subjected to acceleration levels that can disable safety features temporarily or permanently. Cracks in materials Pulverization of explosives that can subsequently migrate to a position where initiation can occur through shock or vibration.5 Ammunition 5.4. Electric power cuts or short-circuits can occur through damage to leads or connections. The list should not be considered as comprehensive. Materials containing moisture may swell or shrink when the moisture content changes. and sometimes may also react with them to form more sensitive compounds (such as copper azide).2. Electrostatic discharge can. Air can be pumped in and out through leaks whereby water vapour enters the fuzing system.Ammunition 5 5. This can result in explosives fastening in screw threads or cavities where they may later be actuated leading to hazard initiation. for example. and dimensions of the materials from which the fuze is fabricated are affected by temperature so that damage from shocks and vibrations at low temperature. The structural strength. can cause initiation. Most explosives are adversely affected by water and become either more sensitive or more inert. Gaseous products can be formed from the reaction that can cause damage to constituent parts.2 Physical and chemical stress Examples of the effects of physical and chemical stress: • Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they melt or flow plastically.1. possibly caused by some environmental factor. in unfavourable cases (in inappropriate designs). is more likely to occur. such as discharge of static electricity.4. Where there are great differences between the coefficients of linear expansion of explosives and their encasing material. Condensation and coating on electrical components and leads can result in extraneous lead-over current and changed electrical characteristics. An inadvertent flow of energy to electric or laser initiators. can result in electronic components being damaged in such a way that safety is affected. Gases or fluids (desirable or undesirable) in the construction can cause corrosion or other physical changes to constituent materials in the fuzing system. Corrosion can occur where there is galvanic contact between different metals. Extreme variations in pressure can occur that can damage confined parts and thereby affect their function. directly or indirectly initiate the initiator in the fuzing system. elasticity. Reactions between incompatible materials. leaks and ruptures can be caused in the casing or cracks may be formed in the explosive. • • • • • • 5 • • • • • 163 . An inadvertent supply of electric energy. Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they are initiated (cook-off). When selecting components all the environmental factors to which the system can be subjected shall be taken into account. The risks are greatest when the potential difference is equalized in conjunction with a connection – mechanical or electrical – to the weapon platform or test equipment.1. – Circuit insulating relays and connectors that are insensitive to HF energy shall be located as close as possible to protected elements to preclude use of long cables that assimilate energy. Storage containers can give considerable protection against electromagnetic energy. Technical solutions Electrical subsystems • 5. When connecting and disconnecting electrical equipment. EMP (electromagnetic pulse) and HPM (high power microwaves). and any break in voltage results in the relay returning to unarmed mode.5 Ammunition • An electric potential difference can occur between the ammunition and nearby objects or earth/ground.4.3. – Shield connections shall be of low resistance and shall be fully sheathed at all connection points. – HF shielding of openings where there are controls and connectors.4.1. Protection can be achieved in the following ways: – Metallic shielding of sensitive components.4.1 5.3.1 General Consideration shall be given to the following factors inter alia when designing fuzing systems to achieve protection against inadvertent function: • Selection of components: The relay for the armed and unarmed modes shall be selected such that an electric current maintains the relay in armed mode. Electromagnetic energy: The design must provide the best possible protection from electromagnetic influences including lightning.1. – ‘Filtration’.1. The design shall ensure that the electrostatic discharge can occur via a resistor or in some other way. • • 5 164 . high transient currents can occur inadvertently such as when disconnecting the power source after testing. Static electricity: Any uncontrolled discharge of static electricity can cause hazard initiation of the fuzing system.3 5. Mechanical initiators for thermal batteries shall be selected such that they do not activate the batteries in the event of a defect. Current developments involve the replacement of mechanical and electromagnetic designs with electronic circuits. Connectors and cables: Connectors and cables shall be designed and located to achieve maximum protection against short-circuiting resulting from ingress of moisture and foreign matter. Often any defect in the electronics will affect not only function but also safety.4. and that the probability of an unauthorized signal reaching the arming object is made sufficiently low. Connectors shall be designed such that they cannot be assembled incorrectly nor be incorrectly identified. The application of electronics in fuzing systems is. however.g. low weight. 5. Each design shall ensure that earth/ground currents are restricted to a safe level during operation.1.4. Consequently. but if the interrupting function as such is controlled by electronics the system should be considered as an electronic fuzing system from the safety aspect. far from self-evident.3 Subsystems with wave-borne signals 5 If an arming system uses a signal transmitted via a carrier wave the system will be open to all signals – intentional and inadvertent – that reach its input port. loading and testing. It must thus be ensured that only the correct signal can result in arming. for example.1.1.Ammunition 5 • Earth/ground currents: The design shall not incorporate earth/ground loops. there are excellent reasons for exercising great caution. on this standard of safety. lead connections can have insulating combs between connection points. • 5.3. In fuzing systems with an out-of-line explosive train transmission in the explosive train is certainly prevented. 165 .1. This trend is driven by the major advantages afforded by electronics such as high performance. by: • Using a sufficient number of combinations and a sufficiently narrow bandwidth. great flexibility and low price. or even improve. This can be achieved. e.3. When developing new products the aim must be to maintain.2 Electronics Experience has shown that our present fuzing systems are very safe. Software can be a good aid for enhancing test efficiency but should be avoided as a circuit safety feature in fuzing systems.5 Ammunition • • • • • • • Limiting the strength of the signal in range and dispersion to that which is necessary for the specific application. For a system without an interrupter in the explosive train. testing. Instead. development. ‘Manufacturing defects’ can also arise during coding. 5. Varying the signal when repeating commands to the same object.1.3. Changing the signal before the next operating occasion.4. Instead. Ensuring the code cannot be deciphered despite wide knowledge of the safety system.1.1. for example. Those used for the design of electronics are not directly applicable. optical fibre.4. Conventional safety analysis studies the consequences when various components malfunction or are missing. Being able to vary codes or data for signal configuration when deploying the object. Incorporating a time-dependent parameter in the signal in cases where arming will take place at a later occasion after deployment. Unfortunately. the risk is that the system does not behave as intended in all respects. It is also possible to transmit laser energy directly to the detonator without any optical fibre. and a detonator (primer). This is achieved by systematic procedure throughout design. configuration management and documentation. Selecting codes so that only a limited number of objects can be armed by the same code. safety must be designed into the application.4 Programmable subsystems 5 The increasing use of software in safety critical applications creates a need for rules and guidelines concerning the development of such systems. the laser must be prevented from releasing initiation energy to the detonator before the safe separation distance has been reached. Component defects do not usually occur in software after the system has been developed. 5.3.1. This can be prevented by: 166 .5 Laser fuzing systems A laser fuzing system in its most elementary form consists of a laser. it is not possible to prove subsequently that an existing software program is free from bugs in all respects. The behavior of the system in various failure modes can be predicted. Bangalore torpedoes and linear charges) Demolition devices are initiated by fuzing systems consisting of. or by blocking the laser cavity. 167 . even though sensitivity requirements are not met for such fuzing systems.1 Other fuzing systems Fuzing systems for explosives etc. 5.4. The initiator usually consists of a primer or detonator that is initiated by electrical or mechanical energy.4. 5.4.1. Safety features to prevent the electronics from activating the laser. hand-grenades.4. PETN fuze.Ammunition 5 • Separating the laser from the detonator by a barrier introduced into the part of the beam.4. the standard requirements for an interrupter apply. It is vital that fault-free materiel and only the prescribed initiation device are used to prevent hazard initiation. the requirements in this section should also be applied.4.2 Demolition devices (such as plastic explosives.4 5. For newly developed ammunition. or percussion primer with wire actuation. non-electric fuze. The requirements for the barrier/blocking then become the same as for an interrupter. signal and spotting agents. or solely a detonator with electrical or mechanical initiation.3 Signal and spotting agents 5 Signal and spotting agents are ignited by igniting devices such as a primer in combination with a safety fuze. in the event of hazard initiation in air. Signal rounds for underwater use can have explosives which. • For laser systems with an interrupter in the explosive train.1. Fuzing systems with an in-line explosive train have been traditionally accepted for use in demolition devices. For this reason they should have a safety system to which the requirements in this section are applied to the greatest possible extent. for example.4.1. a safety fuze. explosive cutters and acoustic explosive sweeps.1. however. Safety is mainly based on the observance of regulations governing use. 5. and minesweeping ammunition such as mine counter-blasting charges. can cause great damage. demolition sticks. 5. Submunitions can have special functions and characteristics for which it is important to observe the following: • That the safety features are disabled in the proper sequence.4.6 Self-destruction 5 If the fuzing system contains an integrated self-destruction or anti-handling device etc.1. having on many occasions caused injury during practice throwing. The fuzing system is armed by the release of a lever on throwing. The most common type of hand-grenade has a fuzing system containing a priming device (i.5 Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters are initiated by a fuzing system consisting of a mechanically initiated detonator. In addition to a transport safety device they incorporate a safety device that requires them to be submerged in water (water pressure).1. for example. the second safety feature is disabled when the submunition is ejected.4. The hand-grenade fuze is stored separately and is installed only when the grenade is to be used. The detonators are fired by an electric initiation device with the charges located in special launch tubes. for example.1. 5. this function shall have the same degree of safety against hazard initiation as the remainder of the system.e. however. For newly developed hand-grenades. For an airborne pod system it could.5 Ammunition 5.4.1. That the safety features are disabled as late as possible with regard to available environmental requirements. be inappropriate to disable the first safety feature when the pod is • 168 .4 Hand-grenades There are different kinds of hand-grenades such as smoke or HE grenades of which the latter are the most dangerous.. the requirements in this section should be applied to the greatest possible extent. This can be crucial.4. An acoustic explosive sweep consists of detonator clusters and TNT bodies that are initiated by electric detonators. 5. for a submunition in an artillery shell in which the first safety feature is disabled when the shell is fired.4. hand-grenade fuze).4.4.7 Submunitions Fuzing systems in submunitions are subject to the same basic requirements as other fuzing systems.4. 8 Multi-purpose ammunition is a special type of tube-launched ammunition that exists mainly in the 12.7 . it is desirable that the requirements stated in this section be applied.4. A characteristic feature of this type of ammunition is that it lacks a conventional fuzing system. FMEA testing should be performed with regard to the conceivable malfunctions that can cause safety hazards. The explosive in the warhead is initiated solely by the transfer of energy that occurs when the shell hits the target. be used as an ‘extra’ safety condition and as a prerequisite for disabling the other safety features. should be used as conditions for disabling. and even in some cases can activate the fuzing system for the warhead. Multi-purpose ammunition 5.Ammunition 5 released from the aircraft since the aircraft is often close to the pod for a long time after separation. the separation of submunitions from the pod and the drag force from the parachute etc.4.4. however. Safety against inadvertent initiation can thus only be regulated to a certain extent by applicable requirements in this section.4.4. A safety margin can be achieved by increasing the level of severity during testing contra the operational environment. • For submunitions containing high explosive it is often important to incorporate a self-destruction facility owing to the risk of difficulty in detecting unexploded ammunition. safety must be verified by testing dedicated to the operational environment of the object. and that the propulsion device itself in the event of a hazard initiation can cause great damage. The warheads can have separate or common fuzing systems. 169 5 . 5. 5.40 mm calibre range. and that the explosive reaction consists rather of deflagration instead of detonation.1. however. Instead. For newly designed fuzing systems for propulsion devices.4. Instead. Separation from the aircraft may. tandem systems).1.10 Propulsion devices Existing fuzing systems for propulsion devices often lack a transmission safety device despite the fact that the fuzing system contains explosives that are not approved for use after interrupters. In addition.1.e.9 Tandem systems The requirements stated in this section shall apply to the initiation of each warhead in systems containing several warheads (i. 1.5 Ammunition 5. No sensitive explosive is permitted after that interrupter. 1.2 5. Single failures that can lead to inadvertent arming or initiation of explosives after the interrupter or circuit safety device within the safe separation distance/time shall not occur. The safety analysis shall be performed by at least one independent party. a fail-safe function or by an interrupter between the energy source and the initiator so that activation of the sensor does not lead to initiation. The interrupter in an explosive train should.54005 5 1. before arming. For some applications the requirement for redundancy to prevent inadvertent arming can be resolved by. Comment: In some cases the special system safety function in the same company that designed the system can be considered to be an independent party. segregate the sensitive explosive (out-of-line) from the explosive train.4. Explosives approved for use after the interrupter or for use in systems without an interrupter shall be qualified for such use as specified in FSD 0214. Comment: Refer also to requirements1. for example. Explosive trains containing sensitive explosives (not approved for use after an interrupter as specified in FSD 0214) shall have at least one mechanical interrupter. Consequences to the system of single failures shall be verified by theoretical analysis and/or FMEA testing throughout the environmental/applicational range.54007 1.54113.2.1 1.54002 General requirements Common requirements Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable safety analysis to be performed. The safety level of the fuzing system should be specified numerically as a probability and should be verified by analysis.54006 1.4. Comment: This requirement does not apply to the failure mode ‘self-initiation of explosive’.54114 and 1.54008 170 . The probability of inadvertent initiation of an explosive after the interrupter or circuit safety device shall not be higher than the probability against inadvertent arming.54001 1.54115.54004 1.54003 1. electrostatic or laser – to be able to inadvertently initiate the initiator in a fuzing system.54013 5 1.54012 1. e. 1. The safe separation distance is so great that there is no risk to friendly forces in the event of a burst when that distance has been reached. 1. or insufficient chemical stability resulting in the formation of copper azide for example.Ammunition 5 Comment: A failure must thus not lead to initiation unless all the steps normally required for arming have been completed.54009 Fuzing systems shall be designed and documented in such a manner as to facilitate an effective production control and quality inspection.g. No evasive action is assumed. mechanical fatigue. Comment: This requirement can lead to a degradation of any deactivation or self-destruction function.54010 1.54015 1. 2. mutual interference. The safe separation distance is shorter than in item 1 above owing to tactical reasons. Evasive action or taking cover is assumed. 1. All explosives shall be confined and/or be fixed so that they remain intact when subjected to specified environmental severities.42022 and 1.54011 1.54016 171 . Comment: Three different cases can be distinguished: 1. It shall not be possible for external environmental stress – such as electromagnetic. The safe separation distance/time shall always be established with regard to warhead effect and intended tactical use. Fuzing systems should be designed such that incorrect assembly of safety critical parts is not possible.51024. The safe separation time enables friendly forces to exit the danger area. 3. Refer also to requirements 1.54014 Fuzing systems should be designed so that a failure in the system results in a fail-safe state. Fuzing systems should not be capable of accumulating sufficient energy to initiate the warhead within the safe separation distance/ time. as a result of corrosion. All constituent materials shall be selected and combined such that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing system. The composition and integration of the booster should be such that it does not detonate or deflagrate before the main charge is subjected to heating (e. The shielding of ignition cables should be connected to the casing of the connector around the complete circumference of the cable. Fuzing systems should be equipped with indication for vital safety devices/functions such as arming.54028 172 . The connection pins in a connector should not be used to connect shields.54024 1. functions for a reliable test shall be built into the fuzing system from the beginning. Fuzing systems should be designed to enable maintenance.54021 1. destruction and destruction of duds. Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs) Connector pins in external connectors connected by an EED should be semi-enclosed.54025 1.54027 1.2. Well proven components should be used. by fire).54017 It shall not be possible to install an armed SAI/SAU in the ammunition if signals to the target sensor can be expected to occur during transport and storage. disposal.54026 1. The switch that finally connects an EED to the electric supply should be located as close to the initiator as possible. Comment: This is particularly important with the casing of an EED to obtain good high frequency protection. The sleeve of an external connector should make contact and provide electromagnetic shielding before the pins engage. in-service surveillance. upgrading. or because the SAI/SAU was not deactivated after final testing. Comment: Arming may have occurred without being detected as a result of incorrect assembly during manufacture or maintenance.4. or during firing before the safe separation distance has been reached. to be carried out safely.5 Ammunition 1.54022 1.g.2 5 1.54023 5.54019 1. Integrated circuits should be avoided in safety critical applications. The lead/leads between the switch and the EED shall be shielded from external electromagnetic fields and be protected against static electricity. If there is a requirement for system testing after manufacture (AUR testing). 1.54018 1.54020 1. Comment: This requirement applies to all phases including manufacture. 54033 1. Fuzing systems containing EEDs shall be system tested in accordance with FSD 0212 or equivalent. or cracks in PCBs or substrates.54032 1.54030 1.54034 5. An EED shall have documented electrical characteristics as specified in FSD 0112 or equivalent. If a fuzing system requires human intervention to start the arming process. for example.Ammunition 5 1. If the current supply ceases before arming is completed the fuzing system shall be neutralized or deactivated. oxidised connector surfaces. there shall be a device that provides unambiguous indication of whether the system is unarmed.54035 1.54036 1.54037 The capacitance across the switch should be kept sufficiently low to prevent initiation by electrostatic discharge. on PC assemblies and in integrated circuits.3 1. Twin conductors should be twined. 1. Arming shall not be enabled as a result of plausible short-circuits such as short-circuits between adjacent leads in harnesses.54040 1.2.4. Arming shall not occur until the safe separation distance/time has been reached at the earliest.54039 1. The arming process The arming process should be as elementary as possible. The arming process should be functionally and physically separated from other processes in the system.54029 1.54043 1. Fuzing systems in which arming is performed by connecting the circuit to earth/ground (single conductor system) should be avoided.54042 1. In a system where the arming process is controlled by electrical safety features. at least two of them shall be in the form of an interrupter from the current supply. If one pole is earthed/grounded to an EED the earthing/grounding should take the shortest route to a shield surrounding the igniter.54038 1. When two electric signals are used for arming at least one of them shall be dependent on a continuous current supply. in connectors. soldering defects.54044 173 . Ignition cables shall not be located in the same shield as other conductors.54031 1. Arming shall not be enabled as a result of a plausible power cut caused by.54041 5 1. 54050 If a system with only two safety features is used. Comment: The closings are best actuated by different signal levels. If a signal outside the ammunition is used for arming.5 Ammunition 1. A system containing only semiconductors shall not be able to arm as a result of static failures in the safety features (failure mode either closed or open). 1.54047 1.4.54045 In systems with wave-borne signals the probability of unauthorized arming/actuation shall be sufficiently low with regard to the field of application. Comment: The safety features can be: – mechanical safety features in an interrupter. 1. at least three independent ‘closings’ shall be required at system blocking level for arming.54048 1. – relays. which can mean that at least one of the safety features requires a dynamic signal.4 1.4. For systems with only semiconductors as safety features. both shall be mechanical. Arming safety features including semiconductor switches Hazard arming shall be prevented by at least two mutually independent safety features. There shall be at least one mechanical safety feature before the point of launch/deployment.5 1. the fuzing system shall verify the signal before arming takes place.2. The safety analysis of system solutions containing only semiconductors as safety features should be performed by at least two independent parties.2. – semiconductor switches.54046 5. Comment: The dynamic signal must be of such a nature that it cannot reasonably occur inadvertently.54052 5. – mechanically operated electric switches. Application specific requirements Fuzing systems should be designed so that safety is not dependent upon operating procedures.54053 174 .54051 5 1.54049 1. – drag (via a turbine or parachute for example). – angular acceleration.54054 Arming shall only be enabled during use. there shall be at least one manual operation (such as removal of a safety pin) required for arming prior to loading/deployment. or two dependent conditions.54058 175 . – launch/deployment device.54056 If only one realistic environmental condition is available. Sensing of these devices (such as a barrel) is not considered to be a particularly good method but can be accepted. provided that reasonable such conditions are available. transport and other relevant environmental conditions. environmental conditions are satisfied. – arming wires. – hydrodynamic and hydrostatic pressure. A manual operation or safety pin shall also block the function produced by the only available environmental condition During mechanical deployment of ammunition (such as when laying mines with a minelayer) the arming shall take place at the earliest when the mine leaves the laying device. Comment: The lower limit for arming shall exceed by a good margin the maximum stress level experienced during operation. – back pressure. – dynamic pressure. Arming shall only be enabled if two mutually independent.54057 1. All of them shall be considered before the most suitable is selected: – acceleration. Comment: When safety relies entirely on one environmental condition after the manual operation has been performed.Ammunition 5 1. a major effort must be made to verify practically and theoretically that this condition cannot occur inadvertently after the manual operation. such as if a shell is dropped during loading.54055 1. – spin. 5 1. Comment: Examples are stated below of environmental factors that can be used to activate arming and/or as sources for arming energy. 1. application specific. Testing is designed to verify requirement 1. Comment: The concept of ‘inherent safety’ is used for torpedoes. 1.54063 5 1. Testing shall be performed in the environment (within the operating range of the fuzing system) that is considered to be the most unfavourable from the safety aspect. impact with the ground.5 Ammunition 5.4. dimensions. Comment: Safety limit in this case denotes the stress level which exceeds by an acceptable margin the most severe level reached during transport.54054. 1.23006 and 1. Refer also to requirements 1. Refer also to the comment after requirement 1.23007.23005. Testing shall be performed to demonstrate whether the design used for confinement of the explosives meets the stipulated requirements.54065 176 . they shall be neutralised prior to testing. Testing shall be performed to establish the distance or time from launch or equivalent at which the transmission safety device arms. compacting pressure and other properties shall be selected within their respective tolerance range such that the probability for failures is considered to be greatest.54062 1. or collision with obstacles.54061 1. Safety critical functions should be monitored during testing and be inspected after testing.2. ramming or the firing/launch process.54060 1.54064 1. Testing shall be performed at a safety limit at which arming is not permitted.54059 Testing Constituent components and subsystems that are vital to the safety of the fuzing system shall undergo separate safety qualification (type testing). The choice of materials in a fuzing system shall – if it is considered necessary – be verified by testing that demonstrates with acceptable probability that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing system. Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not initiate within the safe separation distance/time owing to passage through mask.6 1. Comment: For this testing. operation. Fuzing systems shall undergo complete safety qualification as specified in FSD 0213 or equivalent.54056. contact with the seabed. somersault. If there are other safety devices in the explosive train. Deactivation should remove all initiation energy.4.54075 5 1. The leakage resistance of ignition capacitors.54076 5.54072 1. Neutralisation. or for earthing/ grounding in twin conductor systems.8 1.2. If it is intended to enable clearance or disposal or recycling the fuzing system shall be designed for subsequent safe handling.7 1.54077 1.54074 1.54066 Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not initiate in flight or after deployment after the arming process is completed as a result of the environmental stress stipulated in the requirement specification for the object.54068 1. Deactivation should not require special tools. 1. At least one of these circuits shall be physically located as close to the capacitor as possible. Requirements of International Law Landmines shall have a self-destruction.54071 1. The fuzing system should be designed such that deactivation/neutralisation is not prevented by a malfunction in any part of the fuzing system that is not used for deactivation/neutralisation. Deactivation shall provide at least the same level of safety as when the system was initially in unarmed mode.2. recovery and disposal Ignition capacitors shall be equipped with duplicate discharge circuits.54073 1. Comment: This requirement applies in the first instance to ammunition for which there is a continuous (undivided) danger area.4. the same safety requirements shall apply as for a normal fuzing system. deactivation. shall have as low earth/ ground resistance as the system permits.54069 1.54070 1.54078 177 . Fuzing systems incorporating a deactivating function shall contain a device that indicates in an unambiguous way whether the system is deactivated. Drift mines shall have a fuzing system that ensures that the mine is harmless one hour after deployment at the latest. neutralisation or deactivation facility that renders the mine harmless after a certain time.54067 5. Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable the required functional testing to be performed safely. If the fuzing system contains an integrated anti-handling or anticlearance device or a booby trap charge. This facility can be automatically or remotely controlled.Ammunition 5 1. 5 Ammunition 1.54088 178 .4. not via any linkage or similar device. Safety features in an interrupter should lock directly into the interrupter. environmental factors are available. Torpedoes shall be neutralised if they do not hit the target. The function of each safety feature shall be tested individually. 5.54085 1. 1. at least one of the safety features shall lock the interrupter during the arming phase until the ammunition has left the launcher/release device. Stored energy shall not be used for both disabling safety features and removing interrupters. the environmental specification) when only one safety feature is installed. In systems where unique.4. Each of the safety features shall individually retain the interrupter in unarmed mode.54082 1. Confinement of the explosive train shall be designed such that hazard initiation of the explosive train before the interrupter while the interrupter is in unarmed mode does not provide ejection of fragments that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment.3 5. Testing interrupters Testing shall be performed to establish that an interrupter remains locked in unarmed mode with sufficient margin when subjected to the most severe load (cf. pyrotechnical or electrical – for removing the interrupter in an explosive train. Comment: Energy for removing an interrupter can best be provided by some unique environmental factor after launch/release.3.4.54080 Anchored mines shall be neutralised as soon as the mine has slipped its mooring. Fuzing systems should not contain stored energy – such as mechanical. application specific.1 1.2 1.54086 5 1.54087 5.54084 1.54083 1.3.54081 Requirements for systems with interrupters Design requirements The interrupter shall prevent the booster charge in the fuzing system from initiating in the event of a hazard initiation in the explosive train before the interrupter.54079 1. 54090 Testing shall be performed to determine at which point transmission is achieved when the interrupter is gradually moved from unarmed to armed position. Comment: For interrupters with an instantaneous arming motion. Comment: This is analogous to the conventional case with one interrupter that moves slowly and enables transmission in the explosive train at 5 1. Comment: Usually only high power systems (such as EFI) are used in systems containing only circuit fuzes. 5.4 1.54093 179 . The term ‘critical’ denotes the value when transmission in some form takes place. The voltage in an ignition capacitor or equivalent shall be below the lower ignition voltage (maximum-no-fire) until the safe separation distance/time is reached.Ammunition 5 1. testing can be performed in fewer positions (at least one) between unarmed and armed position.54089 Testing shall be performed to establish that explosives located after the interrupter are not initiated by the detonator while the safety device is in unarmed mode.54091 Requirements for systems without interrupters A fuzing system with an in-line explosive train shall be initiated only by a signal that is unique and which cannot be emulated by any undesired internal or external signal.4. of gas passages through or around the interrupter. deformation or fragmentation shall not entail a risk of injury. Charging of an ignition capacitor or equivalent should only be started after the safe separation distance/time has been reached. Between unarmed position and the boundary limit for transmission. – the critical charge quantity and compacting pressure of a detonator located before the interrupter. Testing can be supplemented by calculations. – the critical play and dimensions etc.54092 1. 1. Dimensions shall be chosen within each tolerance range so as to facilitate transmission. any ejection of fragments. Comment: The following shall be taken into consideration: – the critical thickness of a mechanical barrier. 54097 1.2 1. Comment: These manual operations should be sequential. Full arming is achieved when the voltage of the ignition capacitor reaches the minimum-all-fire level of the electric igniter. signal and spotting agents owing to a mistake. operating instructions shall accompany the packaging or the ammunition. At least two different and almost simultaneous manual operations shall be required for arming to take place.1 1. or when the fuzing system or initiator is installed and arming or priming is performed in accordance with the specified operating instructions. 1. at least one of the safety features shall be disabled by an environmental factor after the ammunition has left the launcher.5 Ammunition some point before final position. a specific sequence is required. clumsiness or carelessness shall be taken into account.54096 1.5.54100 5. Signal and spotting agents The risk of incorrect connection of fuzing systems to explosives.54099 1. This applies until the point in time when the ammunition is issued. Fuzing systems should be set/installed as late as is permissible by the requirements of the tactical application. environmental factors are available.54102 180 .4.54098 5 1. In cases where safety is based on operation.54094 In systems where unique. environmental factors are not available Fuzing systems shall be designed such that the packaged ammunition and fuzing systems remain safe during storage. Fuzing systems shall be equipped with a device which – after arming – provides sufficient safety time for the operator to leave the danger zone. 1.5 5.54101 1. Incorrect installation of a fuzing system should not be possible. 5. Electric ignition energy shall not be enabled in the firing circuit until after the specified arming delay or safe separation time has elapsed.4. application specific. handling and use.54095 Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions Fuzing systems where unique. i. transport.e.4. application specific.5. The initiation device is armed when the interrupter is removed from the explosive train.54109 5 1. When the application permits. An intentional manual operation. can be used. shall be necessary before initiation of the warhead can take place. it should be equipped with a conductor tester and an indicator to show that it can deliver sufficient ignition energy.54106 1.5. such as removing a safety pin. Time fuzes should incorporate an interrupter that arms after the fuze is set and after personnel have taken cover.54104 5. Comment: Consequently. 1.54110 1.3 1. Comment: The safety pin shall be designed so that it is not inadvertently removed during normal handling of the ammunition. If requirement 1.54107 1.54108 cannot be met.54105 1. To minimise the risk of inadvertent initiation.4. Initiation devices should be designed so that the risk of ignition failure is minimised.Ammunition 5 1. initiation devices shall be designed so that at least two manual operations are required to enable firing. Ignition leads shall be long enough to enable connection of the initiation device without it being necessary for personnel to be inside the danger area of the warhead. Initiation devices and demolition charges Fuzing systems for demolition charges shall be designed to enable them to be disassembled safely after connection so that they can be re-used if so stipulated.54111 181 . for example.54103 The fuzing system and components for the fuzing system shall be designed such that assembly of the priming device can be performed as the final operation in the readiness procedure. fuzing systems for demolition charges should incorporate an interrupter that is remotely controlled from the initiation device.54108 1. Comment: Where application specific environmental factors are available (such as hydrostatic pressure for underwater time fuzes) they shall be used. the initiation device shall incorporate a time function that provides a delay in arming of sufficient duration to enable the operator to leave the danger area or take cover. For other time fuzes manual time-delayed arming. The fuzing system shall be designed so that normal firing takes place within the specified timeframe (i.54115 1. Comment: The output on the initiation device can also be short-circuited up to the moment of firing (e.54119 5.6 Requirement checklist for fuzing systems The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups. socalled hangfire. is prevented).e.4. The fuzing system should be easily accessible for replacement.g. or in an igniter in a system without an interrupter. 182 . It should be possible to install the fuzing system into a propulsion device as late as possible before operation. 5.54116 1. Comment: This requirement also applies if the propelling charge itself can cause major damage. Electric igniters in propulsion devices that do not contain a transmission safety device shall be as insensitive as possible.54113 1.5. It should be possible to check easily whether the fuzing system is installed in a propulsion device. by one or more electromechanical interrupters). The explosive in an igniter composition after an interrupter.54112 There shall be at least one mechanical/galvanic interrupter in the firing circuits of initiation devices. abnormal delay. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8.4 1.4.54117 1.5 Ammunition 1.54114 1. should not be more sensitive than the explosive in the propelling charge. ‘Checklists’. Propulsion devices There shall be a transmission safety device in the explosive train of propulsion devices if hazard initiation of the propelling charge leads to activation of the fuzing system in the warhead. Comment: The aim shall be that an electric igniter can be subjected to a current intensity of 1 A and an output of 1 W for a minimum duration of 5 minutes.54118 5 1. 54015 1.54016 1.54008 1.54018 1.54019 1.54007 1.54010 1.54005 1. type Content Comment General requirements 1.54021 1. Reqmt.54011 1.Ammunition 5 Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems Reqmt.54023 SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD Fuzing system design Safety analysis Specification of safety level Single failures.54009 1.54004 SHALL 1.54001 SHALL 1.54017 1.54012 1. safety analysis Mechanical interrupter in explosive trains Interrupter in an explosive train Qualification of explosives Probability of inadvertent initiation Quality inspection of fuzing systems Selection of constituent materials Confinement and/or fixing No initiation by environmental stress Safe separation distance Fuzing system design Accumulated energy in fuzing systems Incorrect assembly of fuzing systems Assembly of SAI/SAU Indication in fuzing systems Integral test in fuzing systems Upgrading Booster design Integrated circuits Proven components 5 183 . no.54022 1.54014 1.54006 1.54002 SHALL 1.54003 SHOULD 1.54020 1.54013 1. 54048 SHALL Mechanical safety features 1.54047 SHALL Hazard arming 1.5 Ammunition Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems.54035 SHOULD 1. no.54050 SHALL Independent ‘closings’ 184 .54028 1.54034 SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL Connector pins semienclosed Shielding of connector sleeve Shielding of ignition cables Location of switch Shielding of leads Capacitance across switch Twin conductors twined Earthing/grounding Location of ignition cables Documented characteristics of EEDs System testing Elementary arming process Separated arming process Unarmed indication Point in time for arming Electric signals for arming Neutralisation/deactivation Interrupter for current supply Arming by earthing/grounding Arming by short-circuiting Arming by power cut Probability of unauthorized arming Verification of arming signal Arming process 1.54037 SHALL 1.54040 SHALL 1.54045 1.54036 SHOULD 1.54029 1. continued Reqmt.54025 1.54027 1.54041 SHALL 5 1.54046 SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL Arming safety features including semi-conductor switches 1.54032 1.54026 1.54033 1.54039 SHALL 1.54049 SHALL Mechanical safety feature 1.54031 1. type Content Comment EEDs 1.54024 1.54038 SHALL 1.54042 1.54043 1.54030 1.54044 1. Reqmt. 54073 SHOULD No special tools for deactivation 185 .54057 SHALL Manual operation.54064 1.54051 1.54059 1.54054 SHALL Arming 1.54060 1. block 1.54053 SHOULD Safety 1.54056 SHALL Manual operation 1.54070 SHALL Anti-handling or anti-clearance device 1. recovery and disposal 1.54052 SHALL SHOULD Arming by semiconductors only Safety analysis Application specific requirements 1.Ammunition 5 Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems.54061 1.54063 1.54062 1. continued Reqmt.54069 SHALL Low leakage resistance of capacitors 1.54055 SHALL Arming. no. environmental conditions 1.54058 SHALL Point in time for arming Testing 1.54066 1.54065 1.54067 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL Type testing of components Complete safety qualification Testing at safety limit Verification of choice of materials Testing for confinement Testing for distance/time Testing for safe separation distance/time Testing for environmental stress Design to enable functional testing 5 Neutralisation. type Content Comment 1.54068 SHALL Discharge of ignition capacitors 1. deactivation.54071 SHALL Indication of deactivation 1. Reqmt.54072 SHALL Safety level of deactivation 1. 54081 SHALL Interrupters.54086 SHALL Stored energy for interrupter or safety feature 1.54079 SHALL Neutralisation of anchored mines 1. continued Reqmt.54078 SHALL Fuzing system for drift mines 1.54087 SHALL Ejection of fragments 5 Testing interrupters 1. type Content Comment 1. basic requirement 1. Reqmt.54080 SHALL Neutralisation of torpedoes Requirements for systems with interrupters Design requirements 1.54075 1.54090 SHALL Test of locking Initiation in unarmed mode Interrupter transmission status Requirements for systems without interrupters 1.54085 SHOULD Stored energy for interrupter 1.54076 SHOULD SHOULD SHALL Deactivation to remove initiation energy Design and deactivation Clearance or disposal.54077 SHALL Self-destruction/neutralisation of landmines 1.54074 1. Requirements of International Law 1. etc.54094 SHALL Safety feature disabled by environmental factor after launch 186 .54083 SHOULD No linkage in safety features 1.54091 SHALL Initiation 1.54093 SHALL Maximum-no-fire 1.54089 SHALL 1.54082 SHALL Individual safety features 1.54092 SHOULD Charging and ignition capacitor 1.54084 SHALL Safety feature before separation 1. no.54088 SHALL 1.5 Ammunition Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems. continued Reqmt.54119 SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL Transmission safety device Electric igniters to be insensitive Sensitivity of explosive in igniter composition Point in time for installation of fuzing system Check of installation Fuzing system accessible for replacement Abnormal delay 5 187 .54111 SHALL Manual operations for initiation devices 1.54099 SHALL Ignition energy 1. Reqmt.Ammunition 5 Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems. no.54115 1.54100 SHALL Safety time Signal and spotting agents 1.54096 SHOULD Setting/installing fuzing system 1.54098 SHALL Manual operations 1. application specific.54107 SHOULD Interrupter in time fuzes 1.54105 SHALL Fuzing system design 1. environmental factors are not available 1.54104 SHALL Intentional manual operation Initiation devices and demolition charges 1.54117 1.54114 SHOULD 1.54112 SHALL Mechanical interrupter Propulsion devices 1.54109 SHALL Time function 1. type Content Comment Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions Fuzing systems where unique.54116 1.54097 SHOULD Incorrect installation 1.54110 SHOULD Initiation device design 1.54108 SHALL Length of ignition leads 1.54118 1.54101 SHALL Incorrect connection 1.54106 SHOULD Remotely controlled interrupter 1.54113 SHALL 1.54095 SHALL Fuzing system design 1.54103 SHALL Assembly of priming device 1.54102 SHALL Operating instructions 1. It is essential that packages be clearly marked to enable rapid and safe identification (even under stressful conditions) to prevent dangerous mix-ups during handling. There are various types of packaging for once-only (i. and resistance to various environments etc. In the case of IM and LSM the packaging can contribute to reducing the sensitivity of the packaged ammunition. 5 188 .). There are two distinct environmental concepts for packaged goods: the external environment where environmental factors affect the goods from the outside. and protection against electrical interference etc. The required safety level can be achieved by choosing the packaging design and materials to enable the critical environmental factors in the internal environment to be constrained to a low level of severity. and the internal environment (sometimes called the micro-environment) which denotes the environmental factors present inside the packaging.5.1 Packaging for ammunition General To ensure that the safety characteristics of ammunition are maintained during handling and storage it is essential that ammunition be protected by appropriately designed packaging whose task is: • • to protect its contents against the adverse effects of the relevant environmental factors. Comprehensive data must be prepared for the study of environmental factors. to protect the surrounding environment.5 5. disposable) or repeated use. are included herein. Components like shock absorbers. barriers (against humidity.5 Ammunition 5. It is important to consider the question of packaging at the earliest possible stage during development of ammunition to enable the specified safety level to be achieved in the most appropriate way. etc. gases. Packagings consist of a collective part that surrounds one or more units as protection against prevalent environmental stresses.e. properties of materials. In some cases the packaging is designed to have a secondary function such as a launcher or other type of launch device. insects.5. climatic and biological environmental factors. Initiation of initiators containing impact-sensitive pyrotechnic compositions can occur through inadvertent impacts. Mechanical environmental factors comprise.2 Environmental factors The risks of damage to packaged ammunition are determined by mechanical. thermal shock. can cause damage or hazardous events. If the packaging is damaged it may result in unpredictable impact on the environment. debonding.g.5. and high power pulsed microwave radiation. damage to surface treatment. Biological environmental factors such as other life forms (such as rodents. or electromagnetic pulse in conjunction with a nuclear weapon engagement. thunderstorms or hovering helicopters).g. dynamic stresses from shock or vibration. Climatic environmental factors such as extreme high or low temperatures. fungi and bacteria) can cause damage or hazardous events.3 5. explosive dust. 5.1 Consequences of environmental stress Mechanical environmental stress 5 Examples of the consequences of mechanical stress: • • Leaks in joints can occur through fatigue. Cracks. relative humidity. The risks may exist during all phases of the life of the ammunition. shock or other mechanical stress. changes in barometric pressure. Chemical environmental factors such as the effect of gases. etc. rain.3. or stresses caused by static load (such as when stacking). from radio or radar transmitters). static electricity (e. fluids or particles in the external or internal environment can cause damage or hazardous events. for example. for example. electromagnetic radiation (e.5.Ammunition 5 5. indications of ruptures or other degradation of material strength can occur as a result of mechanical stress or fatigue. hail. chemical. electrical. vapours. • 189 . Electrical environmental factors comprise. Climatic environmental stress 5. Other environmental stress • • 5. 5.g. These environments are stated in the environmental specification.3. Chemical environmental stress 5. the packaging shall withstand the testing specified in the UN recommendations for the explosive goods in question.2 Electrical environmental stress Examples of the consequences of electrical environmental stress: • Electric igniters can be initiated inadvertently if the electrical and electromagnetic environment is more severe than the test level.5. The packaging shall protect the ammunition against the environments to which it is predicted that the system will be subjected throughout its life.5.55002 190 .4 1.5.4 Examples of the consequences of climatic environmental stress: • Variations in temperature during storage can cause condensation on the surfaces of materials with high thermal capacity incurring a risk of moisture damage and corrosion.3. either by direct contact or through any gases or fluids generated. This also applies in the case of electrostatic discharge.5 5 Example of the consequences of other environmental stress: • Explosives can be initiated by inadvertent heating (e.55001 Requirements Provided no special reason for non-compliance exists.5.3.3.3 Examples of the consequences of chemical environmental stress: • Corrosion can occur through the effect of incompatible substances in combination with moisture.5 Ammunition 5. Variations in temperature of high amplitude can cause such high stresses in materials or joints that ruptures occur. 1. in the event of a fire).5. for example. Air can be pumped in or out through leaks in packaging enabling moisture to be transported into the internal environment where it causes damage to the ammunition such as corrosion. be caused by corrosion. Comment: Such effects can. When selecting materials for packagings.55007 1. consideration shall be given to the applicable regulations for recycling.55006 1. Packagings should be designed to prevent mass detonation.g. Comment: In the event of a fire a propulsion device. for example. the packaging must not create an environment that the ammunition cannot withstand.55005 1. for example.55010 1. The design of. 1. packagings shall be selected to prevent detrimental effects from handling and storage environments. and materials for. Packagings and their contents shall be TS classified in accordance with IFTEX. incompatibility or instability.55012 191 . Packagings and their contents shall be classified in accordance with UN coding. RID. can give a ‘gun effect’ if the packaging is in the form of a metallic tube. 1. Furthermore. Re-usable packagings shall be checked to ensure that they are equivalent to new ones from the safety aspect. Packagings should be designed such that the consequences of a hazard initiation of the constituent explosive is limited.55011 1. Comment: This requirement can be achieved by adequate separation between the units.Ammunition 5 Comment: Requirements governing the protective properties of the packaging can be related to the inherent resistance of the ammunition.55008 1. Further. there are certain constraints regarding materials in international regulations (e. IMDG code and the UN Recommendation for the Packaging of Dangerous Goods).55004 1. Packagings and their ammunition shall be provided with distinct and durable marking in accordance with applicable regulations governing transport and storage to enable rapid and safe identification of the contents.55003 Constituent materials in the packaging shall be selected and combined so that effects detrimental to safety do not occur. The prescribed material recycling symbols shall be marked on constituent components.55009 5 1. ADR. ‘Checklists’.55010 SHALL 1.55011 SHALL 1. Reqmt.55004 SHOULD 1.55003 SHALL 1.55007 SHALL 1.5. no.55006 SHALL 1.55002 SHALL 1. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8.55001 SHALL 1.5 Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups. type Content Comment General requirements 1.55009 SHALL 1. Table 5:5 Checklist of requirements for ammunition packagings Reqmt.55005 SHOULD 1.55008 SHALL 1.5 Ammunition 5.55012 SHALL UN recommendations Protection of ammunition Constituent materials Mass detonation Hazard initiation Storage environment TS coding UN coding Marking Re-usable Selection of materials for recycling Material recycling symbols 5 192 . 6 193 . and certain types of signalling. Accident An undesired event. The term also comprises packaging for ammunition and manufactured parts for ammunition.1 Terminology Ablation Evaporation of surface material by the action of (hot) gases (flowing over it). Aiming and firing limitation Aiming and firing limitation is a system integrated into the weapon to prevent aiming in certain sectors (so as not to collide with nearby obstacles for example). Comment: Ablation is a method for protecting objects against aerodynamic heating (e. and to prevent firing in other specific sectors (to prevent hitting weapon platforms or friendly forces for example). Ammunition Materiel designed for inflicting damage. blasting. 6. producing smoke or illumination.g. Acquisition program for off-the-shelf (OTS) materiel This program relating to system safety shall be applied when acquiring OTS materiel systems. as well as exercise materiel used to replace the above during training. that causes unacceptable injury or damage to property or the environment. or series of events. rate of combustion and mechanical strength).Definitions 6 6 DEFINITIONS This section lists the nomenclature and abbreviations used in this manual. mine clearance. mining. space vehicles on re-entry into the atmosphere). Ageing The ageing of materials involves a continuous change through time of properties (chemical and physical such as sensitivity. The materiel may contain explosives or other chemicals. The auxiliary booster consists of compressed high explosive designed to ensure initiation of the main charge. Comment: In cases where the priming device is fixed by means of compressing it is often incorrectly referred to as a cannon primer. Auxiliary booster A booster affixed to a main charge (e. in the rear plane of which there is a seat for the artillery primer. used. AUR (All Up Round) testing Testing of a complete weapon or ammunition while in storage. Comment: In a system with an out-of-line explosive train arming occurs when the interrupter has been removed and an initiation can result in fuzing system function. Arming range/distance/time The range (distance/time) from the launcher (or release device) until the point (in time) where/when the fuzing system is armed.g. In an in-line system arming occurs when the minimum level for ignition energy has been reached and only the initiation signal remains for initiation to take place. install (a fuze) To assemble/install individually manufactured ammunition components containing explosive. 194 . casting or screw attachment). including assembly/installation of fuzes in ammunition. Arm To remove safety constraints in safety device(s) to enable initiation to take place. Arming device Refer also to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’. 6 Assemble. kept in depot storage.6 Definitions Ammunition safety Ammunition safety is the property of ammunition that enables the ammunition – under specified conditions – to be transported. by cementing. An artillery primer is usually threaded and is used to ignite a propulsion agent confined in a cartridge case or separate case. Artillery primer An igniting device of the same design and function as a cannon primer. and disposed of without a hazardous event taking place. and without constituent parts in the ammunition being affected in such a way that a hazardous event occurs. The blast may contain fragments and particles swept up from the ground. Blast pressure Air shock waves created around the weapon as a result of firing. The shock waves normally emanate from the muzzle in recoil systems. and in recoilless systems from the aft end of the launcher as well as the muzzle. in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the HE charge. 6 Comment: The booster is normally also used as a connector device for combinations of certain fuzes and shells. 195 . escape from the muzzle brake of recoil weapons and from the aft opening (venturi) of recoilless weapons. The barrel fatigue life is calculated using mechanical rupture methods based on crack propagation data for the material of the barrel. Booster (1) A launch rocket engine. Black powder Refer to the entry for ‘Propellant’. Refer also to the entries for ‘Booster (2)’ and ‘Booster charge or booster’. usually comprised of compressed explosive. Base bleed An auxiliary device in a shell consisting of propellant in a combustion chamber. and an established safety factor for barrel life shall be applied. 2. The calculation shall be made for a pressure level corresponding to an upper operational temperature for the ammunition. A charge. Booster (2) 1. The propellant gases flow out into the wake behind the shell. Comment: Severe blast pressure may cause impairment of hearing. Extreme levels may even cause fatal injury (collapse of the lungs. Barrel fatigue life This is the number of rounds a barrel can be fired with an acceptable risk of fatigue rupture. High levels may cause injury to the larynx. An amplifying charge in a fuze usually comprised of compressed explosive. etc.Definitions 6 Backblast The rearward blast of (hot) propulsion gases which.). enhancing the pressure and thereby reducing drag. when a weapon is fired. A cannon primer is mainly used in guns where the propulsion agent is not confined in a cartridge case. usually made of metal or plastic. Bore safety The property that enables ammunition and its constituent parts to withstand the environment during the bore phase of firing with the required level of safety. thereby initiating a priming composition or primary explosive. Burst The explosion phenomenon of a detonating warhead and its corresponding practice ammunition. Bullet attack safety The capability of the ammunition to withstand bullet attack without initiating/ igniting. Cartridge case A case. 6 196 . Comment: Cartridge cases are used in: – fixed rounds (permanently attached to the projectile) – semi-fixed rounds (attached to the projectile. The booster charge may also be referred to in various contexts as booster.6 Definitions Booster charge or booster A link in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the priming device. such as in certain howitzers. incorporating an igniting device and containing propellant. Booster motor or booster A motor that accelerates a vehicle in the launch phase. bridge wire igniter An electric initiator in which the initiation current passes through a wire or thin layer of metal that becomes heated. A cannon primer is inserted (fed into) the breech mechanism. so as to be separable) – separated rounds (separated from the projectile but united before loading). Bridge primer. such as by a bayonet coupling. the entry for ‘Separate case’. Cannon primer An igniting device in the form of a cartridge containing an initiator such as a percussion primer and booster charge. auxiliary booster or auxiliary charge. Cf. Compatibility A property of materials used in a product which means that they do not affect one another chemically when subjected to the specified environmental conditions. Combustion catalyst An additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to increase the rate of combustion. Combustion chamber The space in which propulsion agents burn. Deactivate To return an armed fuzing system to unarmed mode. Cook-off Inadvertent initiation of an explosive as a result of abnormal heating. Control system. Composite propellant Refer to the entry for ‘Propellant’. for example. Comment: Cook-off can occur. after a misfire in a hot barrel. Certain combinations of metals may cause galvanic corrosion that may involve a safety hazard.Definitions 6 Case bonded charge Refer to the entry for ‘Rocket propellant charge’. 197 6 . for example. Comment: TNT. Danger area The area around a proving/firing site inside which there is a risk of injury. Polycarbonate resin is embrittled by double-base propellant. Circuit interrupter Refer to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’. Lead azide forms highly sensitive copper azide on contact with copper. is affected by polyamides but not by olefin plastics. in some cases after mixing. guidance system Functions and related subsystems that can change the path of a guided missile. torpedo or other guided ammunition. No special action is normally required before the fuzing system can be used again. Delay A device that provides the desired delay in a fuzing system. defective. sustained by a chemical reaction in the shock wave zone. even in small quantities. electrically. or to render harmless components of ammunition that can/will no longer be used (e. In the event of incorrect operation or malfunctions of various types. Design criteria and test plan The part of an item specification that contains requirements specifying resistance to environmental conditions and the environmental factor list for testing.. Deflagration Deflagration is characterised by a combustion wave. Comment: During normal use of propellants in rockets. that propagates at supersonic velocity. The delay may be achieved pyrotechnically. demilitarization Disassembly of ammunition for an in-service surveillance inspection. sustained by the generation of heat in the decomposition zone. that spreads through the explosive or explosive mixture at subsonic velocity.). etc. This may even progress to detonation. such as a blockage in the exhaust nozzle of a rocket engine or excessive charge density in guns. Comment: Detonation gives maximum blast effect in explosives. can transmit a sufficiently powerful shock wave impulse to initiate a detonation process. the combustion rate may increase uncontrollably so that the combustion chamber ruptures. for example. Desired (SHOULD) requirements Refer to the entry for ‘Requirements’. barrels. 6 Detonation Detonation is characterised by a shock wave. Destruction Refer to entry for ‘Deactivation of ammunition. 198 . the combustion rate (deflagration rate) – which is dependent on the pressure – is much lower than sonic velocity (in the magnitude of cm/s at l0 MPa). mechanically or chemically.6 Definitions Deactivation of ammunition. etc.g. demilitarization’. and is normally started by a primary explosive which. exceeded the established service life. gas generators. Definitions 6 Detonator An initiator that is initiated by a stab, percussion, friction, flame or break sensitive primary explosive designed to initiate the detonation in an explosive. Dud High explosive ammunition that has not burst despite expected function. Dynamic analysis Verification of test of the flow in a computer program to discover how the program behaves in different situations. The following items inter alia are of particular interest: • • • • • • determination of which segments of the program are executed most frequently, time studies for certain operations, tracing of variable values, inspection of invariant conditions, code that is not executed, inspection to verify that the test comprises all elements of the program. Dynamic interaction The interaction between projectile and barrel during the launch process. Comment: Incorrect interaction can cause damage to the bore and/or greater dispersion and/or ammunition malfunction (e.g. failure to initiate). EBW (exploding bridge wire) igniter An electric initiator without priming composition or primary explosive. Initiation is achieved by an exploding wire in contact with a low-density explosive, usually PETN. Comment: The wire is made to ‘explode’ by a very high power input (MW). EED (electro-explosive device) A priming device that is initiated electrically. Electric igniters, electric primers, electric artillery primers, electric detonators, electric blasting caps and electric priming detonators are examples of EEDs. 6 199 6 Definitions EFI (exploding foil initiator) igniter An electric initiator without a priming composition or primary explosive. Initiation is achieved by an exploding metal foil accelerating a plastic disc against the high density explosive. Comment: The metal foil is made to ‘explode’ by very high power input (MW). The term ‘Slapper’ is also used for EFIs. Electric primer An electrically initiated igniting device containing an initiator and booster, all confined in a casing. Electric detonator An initiator that is electrically initiated and which contains primary explosive for a detonating explosive train. Electro-explosive cartridge Refer to the entry for ‘Electric detonator’. Electric gap detonator An electric initiator that is very fast and easily initiated. There are three main types of gap detonator: • • • Electrically conducting composition, consisting of primary explosive and graphite or metallic powder. Graphite bridge, in contact with primary explosive. Spark gap, adjacent to primary explosive. Thus there is no hot wire, and the initiating function in all three types is based on energy concentration in hot spots. 6 Electric igniter, EED An initiator that is initiated electrically. Electric primer An initiator that is initiated electrically and which contains priming composition for a deflagrating explosive train. Electric primer-detonator An electric initiator used for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes and explosive cutters. Cf. the entry for ‘Electric detonator’. 200 Definitions 6 EMP (electromagnetic pulse) An electromagnetic pulse that can arise, for example, when a nuclear charge detonates. Environment The cumulative effect of all the natural and induced environmental factors to which an item is subjected at a specific moment. Environmental factor A factor or group of factors that alone affects certain failure mechanisms and can thus usually be isolated when testing. Environmental severity The value of the physical and chemical magnitudes that is characterised by the environment or an environmental factor. Erosion The removal of material from a surface by the action of another medium flowing over the surface. Exhaust nozzle That part of a reaction engine through which the combustion gases of the propulsion agent escape at high velocity. An exhaust nozzle consists of an inlet, a constricting section, and in most cases an expansion section. The thermal energy released is converted into kinetic energy in the exhaust nozzle. Explosive Explosives are defined in the Law Governing Inflammable and Explosive Goods as solid or liquid substances or mixtures thereof that can undergo a rapid chemical reaction whereby energy is released in the form of pressure-volume work or heat. Explosive plunger An explosive charge used in explosive cutters. Explosive train A combination of various elements (explosives, channels, etc.) designed to initiate a charge. The explosive train may contain conditional interrupters or barrier locks (safety devices). Extreme environment Environmental factors of such a severity that arise in conjunction with accidents or enemy attack (e.g. fire, bullet attack). 201 6 6 Definitions FAE (fuel air explosives) A warhead based on fuel that is dispersed in the air in an appropriate ratio prior to initiation. Flame safety device An interrupter in an explosive train that prevents the transmission of ignition to a deflagrating main charge. Cf. the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’. Fuel The propulsion agent that is combusted (oxidated) to generate energy. Full form gauging An inspection method for the loadability of ammunition. Fuze A fuze is a type of initiation system in which the sensors, safety system, initiator and booster are integrated into the same assembly unit – generally for artillery ammunition. Comment: Fuzes are classified according to: – mode of initiation, e.g. impact, time or proximity, – location, e.g. in nose, mid-section or base, – sensitivity, e.g. sensitive or supersensitive, – time of action, e.g. instantaneous or delay, – safety devices in fuze categories, – connection dimensions in fuzing systems. Fuzing system A generic term for a device designed to initiate charges in ammunition at a specific time or location. 6 Comment: A fuzing system also contains a safety system that shall prevent inadvertent initiation that can cause injury or damage to equipment or serious malfunctions. A fuzing system consists of (a) sensor(s), a safety system (often referred to as an SAD/SAU) and a priming device. The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks controlled by arming conditions. There are two different principles for the design of a fuzing system: – an out-of-line explosive train in which the SAD/SAU contains a mechanical interrupter which, in unarmed mode, prevents transmission in the explosive train, 202 Definitions 6 – an in-line explosive train containing no interrupter. In this case the safety and arming functions are allocated to the electric circuits preceding the explosive train. The explosive train contains no primary explosive. In out-of-line systems the interrupter often incorporates a detonator or primer which, when in unarmed mode, is geometrically located in such a way that its detonation or deflagration cannot be transmitted to subsequent charges. This arrangement is the reason for the term ‘out-of-line’. The interrupter may consist of a rotor, slide or equivalent. Fuzing systems are often named according to the method of functioning of their sensor(s), such as impact or proximity sensing, or delay systems. Gas generator A device for producing a gas flow under pressure by combustion of a propulsion agent. Comment: There are two types of gas generator: propellant and liquid gas. Guided missile An unmanned object that is launched, projected or dropped/released, and which is designed to move in a flight path totally or partially above the surface of the earth guided by external signals or by integrated devices. Gun PMP (permissible individual maximum pressure) The pressure which, for reasons of safety, must not be exceeded at any point in the weapon by more than 13 rounds in every 10,000 statistically. Handling In the Law Governing Inflammable and Explosive Goods handling denotes all handling from manufacture to final use and destruction. This comprises inter alia storage, transport, handling, use and disposal/demilitarization. Hazard Something that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment. Hazardous event An event that occurs by accident, i.e. unintentionally, and which may result in an accident/mishap or damage/injury. 6 203 This is achieved by using a lower sensitivity propellant and explosive. Independent safety device A safety device is independent if its status is not affected by the status of any other safety device in the system. Impulse (rocket) motor A motor of very short burning duration used to provide guidance impulses etc. It consists of an initiator and a booster charge. Comment: An igniting device in its most elementary form may consist of only the initiator (e. 6 IM (insensitive munition) Ammunition with a lower sensitivity than current ‘normal’ ammunition. Hypergolic propulsion agent combination A combination of propulsion agents (fuel–oxidizer) that react spontaneously with one another. Comment: To start a detonation in a high explosive usually requires initiation with high energy and shock wave effect provided by. Igniferous burst The explosion phenomenon of a deflagrating warhead. 204 . the entry for ‘Burst’. Igniting device A device whose purpose is to ignite deflagrating explosive charges.6 Definitions Hazard initiation Inadvertent initiation of a propelling charge or warhead.g. Cf. High explosive (HE) An explosive whose decomposition normally occurs through detonation. a primary explosive. Hybrid rocket engine Refer to the entry for ‘Rocket engine’. HPM (high power microwaves) High-energy pulsed microwave radiation. or by enclosing the propulsion agent in such a way that its sensitivity is reduced. a primer in small arms ammunition). Ignite To make an explosive deflagrate. for example. Inherent safety The safety property of a torpedo and its constituent parts that enables it to make contact with the seabed. that receives initiation signal(s) and subsequently initiates an explosive train In-line explosive train An explosive train whitout interrupter. target sensor or equivalent to enhance hit probability. It comprises an initiator (mechanical or electric) and a booster. Initiating device A device designed to initiate detonating explosive charges. i. 205 6 . Integrated fuzing system (or initiator) A fuzing system that is built into the ammunition in such a way that it is not possible to remove it completely or partially. or to somersault. if one element in the explosive train is initiated then the booster in the fuzing system will also be initiated. or collide with objects in the water. In-service surveillance inspection An activity designed to establish whether the status of ammunition has changed so as to jeopardise safety during storage.e.Definitions 6 In-flight safety The property of ammunition and parts thereof not to detonate or burst in flight from the point at which the fuzing system is armed until the point at which it is designated to function. target seeker. Initiator A device. operation or other handling. without detonation of the main charge within the safe separation distance. It may consist of a rotor. slide or similar device. Interrupter A mechanical component that effects a designated interruption in an explosive train. Intelligent ammunition Ammunition with built-in logics. Initiate To ignite or initiate an explosive. such as a primer or detonator. transport. Initiate To cause an explosive to detonate. Mission profile A part of the operational profile that defines conditions to which an item can be subjected when used in a specific way. be a complete guided missile. which in turn is defined in the form of flight velocities. Launch phase The period from when the ammunition has irrevocably started to move in the launcher until it has left the launcher. such as an airborne missile suspended from an aircraft and carried on a mission. for example. An item may. Liner A binding layer between the propelling charge and the cartridge case. Monopropellant A propulsion agent that decomposes in a reaction chamber to form propellant gas.6 Definitions Item or specimen Any piece of defence materiel or software being dealt with at a specific moment. Mask safety The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enable firing through vegetation (mask) close to the weapon without a burst or igniferous burst resulting. the entry for ‘Test item or test specimen’. usually consisting of the same material as the fuel polymer in the propellant. the entry for ‘Operational profile’. LSM (less sensitive munition) Ammunition for which action has been taken to reduce sensitivity to extreme environments such as fire.LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) Propellant with low sensitivity properties. Cf. an electronic component or a computer program. Loading safety The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables the ammunition to be loaded into a weapon with the required level of safety. Main charge The largest charge in a high explosive warhead or propulsion device. Cf. 6 206 . altitudes and durations. Decomposition can be by catalysis or be started by the application of heat. Muzzle safety The property of the ammunition and its constituent parts that enables it to pass through a fixed obstacle close to the muzzle of the weapon with the required level of safety. PBX (plastic-bonded explosive) Plastic-bonded explosive. and which purely statistically must not be exceeded by more than 13 cases out of 10.000. Out-of-line (interrupted) explosive train The explosive train that contains an interrupter that in unarmed position prevents transmission in the explosive train. 6 207 . Pressure in the chamber may thus increase locally to such an extent that deformation occurs. Neutralization Prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated. Operational profile The part of the life cycle comprising use of the product. Multiple warhead A warhead which in turn consists of several warheads. Barrels Pressure oscillations that can occur in long chambers not completely filled by the propelling charge. such as in terms of propellant temperature. for example by discharging ignition capacitors or by interrupters returning to unarmed state. Obturator A sealing element attached to the projectile used to achieve a satisfactory seal during the launch phase. Pendulum pressure Pressure perturbation in barrels and rocket engines. Oxidizer A propulsion agent that oxidizes fuel while generating energy. The operational profile is defined in terms of various methods of application and their respective durations.Definitions 6 MOP (maximum operating pressure) The pressure that a specific charge provides under the most extreme conditions. Priming device A device containing an initiator (mechanical or electrical) and a booster whose purpose is to initiate or ignite an explosive charge. torpedoes and explosive cutters. flame. The pressure oscillations may be of such an amplitude that the engine ruptures. for example in the form of heat (friction. Primer An initiator consisting of a case (capsule) containing a stab. together with other factors. Polymer A chemical compound formed by the interlinking of small units to large molecules. contribute to this. hot wire). percussion. the entry for ‘Detonator’. The geometry of the engine and the charge. percussion. percussion. polybutadiene rubber and styrene-butadiene rubber). flame or other heat sensitive priming composition designed to initiate deflagration in an explosive train. Premature burst A burst that occurs inadvertently in the trajectory before the designated point or time. A primary explosive detonates even in very small quantities when there is little or no confinement. underwater mines.6 Definitions Rocket engines Pressure oscillations that can occur in propellant-driven as well as liquid fuel rocket engines as a result of resonance between acoustic perturbation and pressure-dependent combustion. and is used to initiate detonation in high explosives (such as TNT). Priming composition A pyrotechnic composition that is initiated by heat (friction. Polymers can be subdivided into plastics (such as polyethylene. Primary explosive An explosive that decomposes through detonation and which requires little initiation energy. 6 Priming detonator An initiator for depth charges. PVC and phenolic plastics) and elastomers or rubber materials (such as natural rubber. spark. Cf. flame or hot wire). In its most elementary form a priming device may comprise only an initiator (such as a primer as an igniting device in small arms ammunition). 208 . 209 . Applied to ammunition A warhead without an integral propelling force. Composite propellant consisting of a finely distributed oxidiser. are sometimes used. and nitramine propellant with a binding agent of plastic. The most common types of propellant are: • Nitro-cellulose based propellant such as single-base propellant. fired from tube-launched weapons. can also be denoted as a pyrotechnic composition. double-base propellant containing nitro-cellulose gelatinized with nitro-glycerine. triple-base propellant containing nitro-cellulose. Composite propellant usually contains softeners and combustion catalysts. Energy enhancing additives. however. • • • 6 Propulsion device The part of the ammunition that provides the necessary impulse to transport the warhead from its launcher to the target. the main constituent of which is nitro-cellulose. Comment: The term projectile is also used as a generic name for all types of warheads in tube-launched ammunition. such as metallic powder. The mixture can be cast into the desired shape. Propellant An explosive in solid form that normally decomposes by deflagration.Definitions 6 Projectile General A body projected (launched) by an external force and which subsequently continues in motion under its own inertia. and which does not contain explosive with the exception of illuminating compositions in tracers and incendiary substances in small incendiary compositions (spotting charges). An example of such a propellant is black powder which. Anew type of propellant known as LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) where reduced sensitivity is achieved by using a binding agent consisting of a polymer and where the energizer is a nitramine (such as RDX or HNX). nitro-glycerine and a nitro compound such as nitroguanadine. usually ammonium perchlorate dispersed in a fuel binding agent – usually a polymer such as polybutadiene. Mechanically mixed propellants in which the various components in finegrained powder form are granulated or compressed to the desired shape and size. thereby increasing range. molecules. Pyrotechnic compositions are usually used for: • • functions in explosive trains in the form of ignition. Recoil Recoil is the phenomenon that occurs when a weapon reacts to the effect of the propellant gases and acceleration of the projectile. smoke. used in mortar ammunition and rifle grenades for example. Pyrotechnic composition An explosive that consists of a mixture of fuel and oxidiser. The components can react with each other in the form of deflagration involving heat generation. Reaction motor or jet engine A motor in which the thrust is generated by the momentum of an escaping working medium (combustion gases. air.). initiation effect in warheads in the form of light.6 Definitions Propulsion agent A substance that functions as a fuel or oxidiser or both. Propulsion cartridge A cartridge containing a propelling charge and igniting device. or be separated as in liquid-fuel rocket engines and air-breathing engines. which normally are not themselves explosives. force and energy. usually gaseous. reaction products. and which contains the energy necessary for propulsion. There are different ways of measuring recoil such as impulse. Propulsion agents can be in solid. RAP (rocket assisted projectile) A shell with a (propellant) rocket engine that provides thrust in flight. etc. Pyrolysis The decomposition of solid or liquid substances caused by the effect of heat into smaller. fire. usually in solid form. liquid or gas form. noise. They can be mixed with each other like propellants. delay. Reaction chamber A chamber into which propulsion agents are injected and made to react in order to generate propelling gas. 6 210 . The propulsion agents are liquid – mono-propellant or bi-propellant – in the latter case an oxidiser and fuel. The propulsion agents consist of a solid and a liquid propulsion agent. Hybrid rocket engines. There are three types of rocket engines: • • Propellant rocket engines. Rocket An unmanned. Rheological properties The deformation properties of a material subjected to external forces. or issued as a requirement document when placing an order. In viscoelastic materials the properties are time-dependent. Requirements Mandatory requirements (often expressed by SHALL in tables) are requirements that are of decisive significance to the achievement of the necessary safety level in a system.Definitions 6 Relaxation to rupture The delayed forming of cracks in a deformed material. Liquid fuel rocket engines. The propulsion agent is a solid propellant. Requirement specification A specification issued by the purchaser to provide a basis for tendering prior to a procurement. Rocket engine A type of reaction engine that carries its own fuel and oxidiser. Tri-propellant may also be used. Risk A combination of frequency or probability and the consequence of a specified hazardous event or accident. Desired requirements (often expressed by SHOULD in tables) are requirements that are important to system safety and shall thus be satisfied whenever possible. Resistance to environmental conditions The capability of an item to withstand a specific severity for a specific duration. 6 • 211 . unguided self-propelled object incorporating a warhead and rocket engine(s). and is thus independent of the surrounding atmosphere for combustion. An unbonded charge is free from the rocket casing but is supported against it or against special support. Safety analysis A generic term describing the parts of the safety program that involve a systematic analysis of hazardous events and their causes. A case bonded charge is wholly or partially bonded to the rocket casing by means of an intermediate layer (liner). The propellant charge is determined inter alia by the type of propellant. The charge may also be bonded to an internal support tube. Safety device A part or combination of parts designed to prevent inadvertent initiation of the main charge in ammunition. as well as the qualitative or quantitative evaluation of the safety level achieved. Reasonable evasive action by the weapon platform is assumed. and the method of fixing it inside the rocket casing. Safe separation distance The minimum distance between the launcher (or drop/release device) and the ammunition beyond which a burst is judged to give an acceptable level of safety for personnel and equipment located at the launcher or drop/release device. Safety assessment of existing materiel A system safety program that shall be applied during overhaul of existing defence materiel systems in storage that have not been examined previously with regard to modern system safety requirements.6 Definitions Rocket engine igniter The igniting device for a rocket engine. Rocket propellant charge A solid propulsion agent charge for propellant rocket engines. 6 212 . SAU (safety and arming unit) A device that arms a fuzing system at the correct time. and which also prevents inadvertent initiation of the explosive train. Safety device Refer to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’. charge geometry. SAD (safety and arming device). Safety feature A device that locks a transmission safety device. Sealing ring Refer to the entry for ‘Obturator’. Safety system The generic term used to denote the combination of all the safety devices in a fuzing system. A mechanical component that locks the interrupter in unarmed or armed mode or a component/function that breaks an electric circuit. mortars. Service life The period during which the ammunition can be transported and stored in the prescribed packaging under the stipulated storage conditions (temperature and relative humidity) without changes occurring that can result in hazardous events or an unacceptable degradation of performance. Comment: Each individual safety device has its safety distance. flare launchers. 213 . 6 Secondary charge Refer to the entry for ‘Booster charge or booster’. The following types of weapon are considered to belong to this category: • • • • machine gun or cannon for covering fire.Definitions 6 Safety distance The distance from the launcher (drop/release device) to the point in the trajectory or flight path at which a safety device is cancelled. arming and ignition) unit An SAD/SAU with ignition function. Secondary armament This term refers to additional weaponry that can be mounted on a combat vehicle to provide secondary or supporting functions. parallel machine gun for use together with the main armament. The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks that are controlled by arming conditions. SAI (safety. Separate case A case. brass) with an igniting device and containing a propelling charge. Similar to operational conditions The realization of hardware. the entry for ‘Cartridge case’. normally made of metal (e. Comment: A separate case requires two operations when loading the weapon. reliability. impact or proximity mode) or time. Cf. Squib An initiator that is initiated electrically and which comprises electricity supply leads with a heating hot wire between them surrounded by priming composition. being as close to the final design or system environment as possible with regard to function and behavior. and safety of a product after simulated depot storage. the power unit of the series design shall be used. It is kept separate from the projectile during transport and loading. Shelf life testing Testing to verify the performance. Sensor The part of a fuzing system that senses the target and emits initiation signal(s) to the initiator when function is expected. submunitions or equivalent. smoke or illuminating composition.g.g. 6 214 . software (in co-ordinating functional parts outside the tested software) or environment in the system. for example. SHALL requirement Refer to entry for ‘Requirements’. or was not initiated within the designated time after arming. Example: If the requirement is that the software shall be verified using an electricity supply similar to that used in operational conditions.6 Definitions Self-destruction Automatic initiation of an HE charge in ammunition that has missed the target. Shell A projectile with a cavity filled with explosive. Set a fuze The act of setting the fuze to the desired initiation mode (e. usually under controlled relative humidity conditions. Sustainer. the entries for ‘Neutralisation’ and ‘Deactivate’.Definitions 6 ST fuze A shock-tube fuze consists of a plastic tube coated on the inside with a thin layer of high explosive or filled with a combustible gas mixture. naval vessels. It denotes storage in ammunition depots or at readying sites located adjacent to bases. and used either for aligning the standard barrel or for practice firing. Sterilization The prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated by permanently damaging some part of the safety system (Cf. sustainer motor A motor designed to provide thrust in flight. The initiation impulse is transmitted through the tube as a shock wave. 6 215 . usually without any kind of controlled environment. Stability The property that enables a material not to change in the environment in which it exists. Terminally corrected projectile A shell that is corrected in the final path of its trajectory by intermittent lateral forces triggered by guidance signals.) Storage. Stabilizer An additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to keep decomposition at a low level and thereby safeguard storage capability. or deployment areas. logistical The long-term storage of items in depots. Also known as sub-calibre adapter. Storage. Sub-calibre barrel A small calibre barrel inserted inside the standard barrel. tactical The storage of an item for a limited period of time under field conditions. Transport safety The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables transport. naval vessels. logistical Transport of items to and between storage depots.6 Definitions Terminally guided projectile A shell that is guided in the final part of its trajectory by continuous lateral forces controlled by guidance signals. The synonyms for this concept are detonator safety device. that is to be tested. arming device. Test item or test specimen An object. for example. such as a component or subsystem. A switch in the electric circuit(s) of a fuzing system including associate safety components. fly in a specific direction. The concept includes short transport of items within and between these sites. Also known as a circuit breaker (in-line explosive train). Unbonded charge Refer to the entry for ‘Rocket propellant charge’. Test An investigation to determine one or more properties of an item/specimen. deployment areas. Unguided weapon A weapon whose flight path is determined at launch. 6 216 . operation and storage with the required level of safety. Transport. and from storage depots to and from maintenance workshops. tactical Transport of items in field conditions from depot storage to bases. • Transport. etc. and flame safety device (out-of-line explosive train). Transmission safety device • This denotes an interrupter in an explosive train including associate safety components. Terminal guidance device A device that by its influence makes a projectile. Warhead The part of ammunition which at a predetermined time or place provides the intended effect by means of pressure. Wear (in barrel) The mechanical. As a rule. or any combination of these effects. dispersion. Worn barrel A worn barrel has less than 25% of its total barrel life left. Cf.Definitions 6 Validation This is a method of verifying that requirements are correct. fragmentation. or incendiary effect. There are two wear effects: barrel wear through the mechanical effect of the round. the entry for ‘Base bleed’. and wear at commencement of the rifling. often made of cardboard. 6 217 . or any constituent parts of the weapon being affected in such a way that a hazardous event could occur. the commencement of rifling is most exposed to wear. Wad A flat or cupped unit.e. Wake The area immediately behind a projectile in motion. launching. that is inserted into the cartridge case to secure the propelling charge in position and to reduce the risk of cookoff. other forms may be smoke or illuminating effects or sensor jamming. and chemical influences on the internal surface of the barrel. thermal. that the product functions as intended in its operational environment. i. Weapon safety Weapon safety is the property of the weapon that enables the weapon under specified conditions to be transported. maintained and demilitarized without any hazardous event occurring. Comment: A worn barrel is a prerequisite for some compatibility tests. fast flowing propellant gases. The wear life is usually established with reference to decreased muzzle velocity. kept in depot storage. used. dropping or deploying ammunition. and erosion of the barrel caused by the mechanical and chemical influences of hot. Weapon A device for firing. Compare EC mark of conformity Draft version of TTFO Electro-Explosive Device Exploding Foil Initiator ElectroMagnetic Pulse ElectroStatic Discharge Fuel-Air Explosives Swedish Armed Forces Fault Modes and Effects Analysis Swedish Defence Materiel Administration Swedish Defence Research Establishment Swedish Defence Standard High frequency Headquarters Hydrogen peroxide ASWG BVKF Cf.2 AFS Key to abbreviations Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations of the Swedish Board for Occupational Safety and Health Ammunition Safety Working Group Swedish Armed Forces’ joint regulations for the prevention of fire and explosion hazards.6 Definitions 6. CE DTTFO EED EFI EMP ESD FAE FM FMEA FMV 6 FOA FSD HF HQ HP 218 . chemical health hazards from flammable goods etc. water contamination. Definitions 6 HPM HTP IEC IFTEX High power microwaves High test peroxide International Electrotechnical Commission Instruction governing storage and transport of Swedish Armed Forces’ explosive goods Insensitive Munition Infrared Lightning ElectroMagnetic Pulse Less Sensitive Munition Military Standard (USA) Maximum Operating Pressure Memorandum of Understanding MegaPascal Not applicable Nuclear. Biological. Chemical Nuclear ElectroMagnetic Pulse Development Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems Plastic-bonded Explosives Printed circuit board Pentaerythritol tetranitrate IM IR LEMP LSM MIL-STD MOP MOU MPa NA NBC NEMP P1 P2 P3 PBX PCB PETN 6 219 . 6 Definitions PHA PHL PHST PMP ppm PTTFO RFP Rg RSV SAI SACLOS SFS SFRJ SRP SSPP SV Preliminary Hazard Analysis Preliminary Hazard List Proposed Handling. Arming and Ignition unit Semi-Active Command by Line-Of-Sight Swedish Code of Statutes Solid Fuel Ram Jet Safety Requirement Proposed System Safety Program Plan Safety Verification Swedish National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Safety Instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces Transport and storage Tactical Technical Financial Objectives Unmanned Aerial Vehicle United Nations 6 SÄI SäkI TS TTFO UAV UN 220 . Storage and Transport Regulations Permissible Individual Maximum Pressure Parts per million Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives Request for Proposal Advisory Group (at FMV) Hollow charge Safety. Definitions 6 PTTFO VDU VDV Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives Video Display Unit Vibration Dose Value 6 221 . . USA 7 223 .5 7.1 7. magazine articles.2 7. AUS Allied Ordnance Publication. measurement methods. Proceeding.7 The following acronyms and abbreviations have been used for the standards referenced herein: AOC Proc. the reader is referred to the special search systems that are available on the market.g. AUS DEF STAN DOE Defence Standard. At FMV there is a subscription system so that MIL-STD is available on CDROM. The documents referenced are grouped as follows: 7. NATO DEF (AUST) Australian Defence Standard. To find complete information in MIL-STD and STANAG documents. manuals.g. UK Department of Explosives. AOP Australian Ordnance Council. etc. studies) Textbooks Documents relating to the environment (fundamental studies.3 Documents governing safety Standards relating to design and testing (e. STANAG) Design principles and experience (e. MIL-STD.6 7.References 7 7 REFERENCES Owing to constraints on the space available in this manual it has been necessary to severely restrict the number of references. for example. 7.) Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition Accident investigations.4 7. FR International Electrotechnical Commission International Test Operation Procedure. BRD Test and Evaluation Command. USA US Naval Ordnance Laboratory.7 References DOD-STD FSD GAM IEC ITOP Department of Defense Standard. USA MIL-STD NAVORD OB Proc. BRD MIL-HDBK Military Handbook. USA Ordnance Board Proceeding. USA Test Operation Procedure. NATO National Swedish Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Code of Statutes Technische Dienstvorschrift. UK Swedish Code of Statutes Swedish Standard National Swedish Institute of Radiation Protection Code of Statutes Standardization Agreement. SFS SS SSI FS Military Standard. USA STANAG SÄI FS TDv TECOM TOP 7 224 . USA. USA Swedish Defence Standard Delegation General Pour l´Armement. References 7 7.1 Documents governing safety Table 7:1 Documents governing safety Designation Title AFS 1996:2 AFS 1994:8 AOP-15 DEF STAN 13-131 DGA/AQ 4112 H SystSäk M7740-784851 IEC 60825-1 MIL-STD 882 TjF-FMV 97:12 SFS 1977:1160–1171 SFS 1982:821 SFS 1988:220 SFS 1988:868 SFS 1988:1145 SFS 1994:536 SSI FS 1980:2 SSI FS 1993:1 SÄIFS 1986:2 SÄIFS 1999:2 Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupational Safety and Health Lasers Guidance for the Assessment of the Safety and Suitability for Service of Munitions for NATO Armed Forces Ordnance Board Safety Guidelines for Weapons and Munitions Guide pour la construction de la securité System Safety Manual Laser Classification and Safety System Safety Program. Requirements Regulations governing weapon and ammunition safety activities within FMV Work Environment Act (AML) and directives Transport of Dangerous Goods Act Radiation Protection Act Explosive and Flammable Goods Act Directive on Explosive and Flammable Goods Directive on International Supervision of Weapon Projects Classification of lasers Directives on lasers General advisory statements concerning SÄI directives on sensitivity testing of explosives Directive on the handling of hydrogen peroxide 7 225 . 2 Standards relating to design and testing Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing Designation Title ADA-086259 Vol.94 Guidelines for the Preclusion of Electro-Explosive Hazards in the Electromagnetic Environment AOP-22 Design Criteria for and Test Methods for Inductive Setting of Electromagnetic fuzes DEF (AUST) 5168 The Climatic Environmental Conditions Affecting the Design of Military Materiel DEF (AUST) 5247 Environmental Testing of Service Materiel DEF STAN 00 35 Environmental Handbook for Defence Material DEF STAN 00 36 Test Methods (draft) DEF STAN 00 55 Requirements for the Procurement of Safety Critical Software in Defence Equipment DEF STAN 00 56 Requirements for the Analysis of Safety Critical Hazards DEF STAN 59-41/1 Electromagnetic Compatibility DEF STAN 59-41/2 Electromagnetic Compatibility Management and Planning Procedures DEF STAN 59-41/3 Electromagnetic Compatibility Technical Requirements Test Methods and Limits DOD-STD-2168 Software Quality Evaluation DOE/EV/06194-3.7 References 7.93 Assessment of Munition Related Safety Critical Computing Systems AOC 236.REV2 DF DOE Explosives Safety Manual 86 OV1154 GAM-EG-13 Essais Generaux en Environment des Materiels ITOP 3-2-829 Cannon Safety Test ITOP 4-2-504/1 Safety Testing of Field Artillery Ammunition ITOP 4-2-504/2 Safety Testing of Tank Ammunition ITOP 5-2-619 Safety Testing of Missile and Rocket Systems Employing Manual Launch Stations IFTEX Instruction governing the storage and transport of Part 1 M7762-000082 Armed Forces’ explosive goods IFTEX Part 2 M7762-000220 226 . 4 7 Joint Services Safety and Performance Manual for Qualification of Explosives for Military Use AOC 218.93 The Qualification of Explosives for Service Use AOC 223. Design Requirements and Test Methods Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems. Effects and Criticality Analyses Environmental Criteria and Guidelines for Air-launched Weapons Munition Rocket and Missile Motor Ignition System Design. Electrically Initiated. Electrically Initiated. Equipments and Computer Software Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode. Criteria for Safety Criteria and Qualification Requirements for Pyrotechnic Initiated Explosive (PIE) ammunition Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems Equipment and Facilities Noise Limits for Army Materiel Electroexplosive Subsystems. Measurement of Software Development and Documentation Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines Fuze Design. Basic Qualification Tests for Fuze and Fuze Components. General Requirements for Dispenser and Sub-munition. Safety Criteria for Preclusion of Ordnance Hazards in Electromagnetic Fields. Requirements for Equipment Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics. Environmental and Performance Tests for Electronic Reliability Design Handbook Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics. Safety Criteria for Hand-Emplaced Ordnance Design.References 7 Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing. Safety Design and Safety Qualification. Air Delivered. Safety Criteria For 7 227 . continued Designation Title M7762-000220 MIL-STD-210 MIL-HDBK-217 MIL-STD-322 MIL-STD-331 MIL-HDBK-338-1 MIL-STD-461 MIL-STD-462 MIL-STD-498 MIL-STD-810 MIL-STD-1316 MIL-STD-1385 MIL-STD-1455 MIL-STD-1466 MIL-STD-1472 MIL-STD-1474 MIL-STD-1512 MIL-STD-1521 MIL-STD-1629 MIL-STD-1670 MIL-STD 1901 MIL-STD 1911 FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition Climatic Information to Determine Design and Test Requirements for Military Systems and Equipment Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment Explosive Components. Safety Evaluation 228 . functional aspects – design principles Design of Aircraft Stores for Fixed Wing Aircraft and Helicopters Design Safety Principles and General Design Criteria for Weapon Fuzing and Safety and Arming Systems Definition of pressure terms and their interrelationship for use in the design and proof of cannons and ammunition Development Safety Test Methods and Procedures for Fuzes for Unguided Tube-launched Projectiles Principles and Methodology for the Qualification of Explosive Materials for Military Use Fuzing Systems – Safety Design Requirement Safety and Suitability Testing of Artillery and Naval Gun Ammunition 76 mm and Greater Safety Evaluation of Mortar Bombs Assessment of Safety and Suitability for Services of Underwater Naval Mines Safety Testing of Airborne Dispenser Weapons Gun Munition of Caliber 20 to 40 mm. Pillar Proceeding Electric detonators. general requirements and testing Machine safety – emergency stopping. continued Designation Title MIL-STD-2105 OB Proc 41 849 OB Proc 42 202 OB Proc 42 240 OB Proc 42 242 OB Proc 42 351 OB Proc 42 413 OB Proc 42 491 OB Proc 42 496 OB Proc 42 610 OB Proc P114(1) SS 49 90 701 SS-EN 418 STANAG 3441 STANAG 3525 STANAG 4110 STANAG 4157 STANAG 4170 STANAG 4187 STANAG 4224 7 STANAG 4225 STANAG 4226 STANAG 4227 STANAG 4228 Hazard Assessment Tests for Navy Non-Nuclear Munition Climatic Environmental Conditions Safety of Fuzing Systems Safety of Fuzing Systems.7 References Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing. Mines Environmental Testing of Armament Stores Assessment of Gun Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and Above Principles of Design and Use for Electrical Circuits Incorporating Explosive Components Solid Propellants for Rocket Motors Life Assessment of Munitions Assessment of Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and Above Assessment of Land Service Weapons Installations excluding Rocket Systems and GW. Model Regulations 7 229 .Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces Electrostatic Environment Conditions Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces Lightning Environmental Conditions Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces Design Principles for Safety Circuits Containing EED Electrostatic Discharge Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Electronic Systems Munitions and Weapon Systems Liquid Fuel Fire Test for Munition Bullet Attack Test for Munition Implementing Document for AOP-15 Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) Test Information to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of Electro-Explosive Devices and Associated Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems Air-launched Munitions. Safety Evaluation Safety Assessment of Munition-Related Computing Systems Index of Test Operations Procedures and International Test Operations Procedures Bewerten von Waffenrohren kal 5.11 Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) 200kHz to 40 GHz Environment .References 7 Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing. continued Designation Title STANAG 4234 STANAG 4235 STANAG 4236 STANAG 4238 STANAG 4239 STANAG 4240 STANAG 4241 STANAG 4297 STANAG 4324 STANAG 4325 STANAG 4326 STANAG 4327 STANAG 4337 STANAG 4338 STANAG 4370 STANAG 4404 STANAG 4423 STANAG 4452 TECOM Pam 310-4 AD No A204333 TDv 018 TOP 2-2-614 UN ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.6 mm bis 20.3 cm Toxic Hazard Tests for Vehicles and Other Equipment Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. Safety Evaluation Environmental Test Planning for NATO Material Safety Design Requirements and Guidelines for Munition-Related Safety Critical Computing Systems Aircraft Guns & Ammunition. Safety Evaluation Underwater-Launched Munition. Safety Evaluation Implementing STANAG for AOP-8 Lightning Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems Surface Launched Munition. 115. Ca US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l29 US Army Material Command Pamphlet No 706-114. 116.3 Design principles and experience Table 7:3 Design principles and experience Designation Title 7 R N Gottron National Defence May/June l975. 1971 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l79 January l974 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-2l0 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-235 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l86 The Army and Fluidics Characterizing of Electric Ignitors Electronic Firing Systems Engineering Design Handbook. Manual of Test and Criteria 7. Military Pyrotechnics. Explosive Trains Engineering Design Handbook. continued Designation Title UN ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev. Safety Procedures and Glossary 230 . Hardening Weapon Systems against RF Energy Engineering Design Handbook. Electromagnetic Compatibility Engineering Design Handbook. Explosive Series – Properties of Explosives of Military Interest Engineering Design Handbook. Environmental Series Engineering Design Handbook. 118.2 Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 119 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-177. 464-466 Kurt Nygaard AB Bofors FKP-2 l978 Reynolds Industries Inc. Part Two.7 References Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing. 117. San Ramon. Fuzes Engineering Design Handbook. Ca SÄIFS 1989:15 K O Brauer Chemical Publishing Co Inc. April 1972 US Army Material Command EMA-89-RR-22 Engineering Design Handbook. l46-l48 G Hall. l965 Ove Bring UD 1989:5 W C Schumb. Part Four. San Ramon. 1955 FFV FT 102-04:79 M Gunnerhed FOA 3 C 30420-E M A Barron National Defence September/October l974. continued Designation Title US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l80. Design of Ammunition for Pyrotechnic Effects ESD. New York l974 NAVWEPS OP 3199 Vol 1 0609 319 9100. Solid Full Propellant Hazards with Special Application to Manufacture and Handling Operation in Sweden Exploding Bridgewire Ordnance Exploding Foil Initiator Ordnance List of directives and general advisory statements within SÄI’s field of operations Handbook of Pyrotechnics The Handling and Storage of Liquid Propellants Humanitarian rights and weapons control Hydrogen Peroxide Long-term storage ZP81 Microelectronics in safety critical applications Multi-Option Fuzing Software in safety critical applications 7 Risks involved in the use of glass fibre reinforced plastic as reinforcement material for explosives 231 . S Jahnberg. Ca Reynolds Industries Inc. N Y. C N Satterfield.7 FMV-Vapen A 761:62/85 Engineering Design Handbook.References 7 Table 7:3 Design principles and experience. Principles of Explosive Behavior Reynolds Industries Inc. R L Wentworth Reinhold Publishing Corporation. San Ramon. New York. B Spiridon FOA C 20649-2. M Ohlin. 105 mm HE shell m/61A 25 units Safety field trials with ammunition l960–l965 Olof Nordzell FMV-A:VAB2 Order no. 105 mm HE shell m/60Z 120 units. Stockholm l97l Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics RTCA/DO-178 FMV-A:A A761: 3/82 1982 H Almström FOA Report Franklin Institute. l969 S Lamnevik FOA C 20302-D1 FMV-Vapen A761: 342 83/86 TRC 829/l03 TRC 829/072 Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification Final report of cavity group Study of risks associated with cavities in high explosive shells Summary of Test Data for 75 Hot-Wire Bridge or EBW Initiators Tested at the FIRL Explosive trains for detonation transmission UK Qualification Programme for Introduction of PBX into Service Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the smallest detectable cavity using gamma metric analysis Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the smallest detectable cavity using gamma radiography with Co60 Investigation of electric igniters for ammunition. Data for igniters in Swedish ammunition and knowledge status concerning testing Instantaneous point detonation supersensitive m/484D – investigation of certain risks for inadvertent arming and initiation of composition dust 7 Ola Listh FOA report C 20457-Dl(D4) Part l: Ola Listh FOA report C 20228-D1 (D4) March 1978 232 . 28-3600-0l FMV. July/August l972.7 References Table 7:3 Design principles and experience. 59-62 NAVWEPS OP 2943 (First Revision) l965 Report FFV MT 225/72 l972 Safety/Arming Devices Safety Precautions for Prepackaged Liquid Propellants Safety inspection of 105 mm light HE shell m/34 60 units. continued Designation Title M E Anderson Ordnance. l979 Johansson C H and Persson P A Academic Press.4 Textbooks Table 7:4 Textbooks Designation Title Roy L Grant Bureau of Mines. GmbH D-6940 Weinheim. Washington D. USA S Lamnevik l983 Rudolf Meyer Verlag Chemie. Fundamentals for future sensitivity research Chemistry of explosives. London (l970) B T Fedoroff m fl Picatinny Arsenal. l993 ISBN 3-527-28506-7 G Blomqvist FOA report A l577-Dl l973 S Lamnevik m fl l983 Ingvar Seilitz Nobelkoncernservice A A Shidlovsky Report FTD II-63-758 (trans DDC AD 602 687) Air Force Systems Command Wright-Patterson AFB. Revised extract from MHS compendium in chemistry l972-ll-06 Knowledge of explosives Foundations of Pyrotechnics (translation from the Russian original Osnovy Pirotekhniki) 7 233 . Compendium FOA Inst 24 Explosives Explosives and their sensitivity properties..C. Dover New Jersey.References 7 7. l964 A Combination Statistical Design for Sensitivity Testing IC-8324 Ammunition doctrine for the Army Analytical Methods for Powders and Explosives Detonation Detonics of High Explosives Encyclopedia of Explosives and Related Items Explosive processes – Fundamentals for consequence and risk analysis. l967 FMV-A M77:21/79 AB Bofors Wezäta. Dept of the Interior. l960 W Ficket & W C Davis Univ California Press Berkeley. Göteborg. l979 J M Mc Lain The Franklin Institute Press Philadelphia. l98l NASA-AP-8076 Instrumentation Techniques and the Application of Spectral Analysis and Laboratory Simulation to Gun Shock Problems. L Holmberg I Mellgard. Fort Halstead. China Lake Ca (l97l) Military Office of the Swedish Ministry of Defence ISBN 91-38-31004-X (M 7740-804001) B M Dobratz Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report UCRL-52997. R F Wood Franklin Institute Monograph APL-69-l. The Shock and Vibration Bulletin. conventions of international law applicable during wartime. L Westerling FOA-R-94-00035-2. Bulletin 42 Joint Services Evaluation Plan for Preferred and Alternative Explosive Fills for Principal Munitions Vol IV International rules of warfare. GB (l988) E Lidén. V F De Vost U S Navy NAVORD OD448ll Naval Weapons Center. interaction protection Systems and Techniques Employed by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories to Determine the Responses of Electro-explosive Devices to Radio Frequency Energy Weapons doctrine for the Army Weapon System Safety Guidelines Handbook 234 . Kent.7 References Table 7:4 Textbooks. Jan l972. l980 RARDE. Manual of Tests Warheads. March l972 NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Propulsion): Solid Rocket Motor Performance Analysis and Prediction. neutrality and occupation LLNL Explosives Handbook Properties of Chemical Explosives and Explosives and Explosive Simulants NASA-SP-8039 7 C L Mader Univ of California Press Berkeley. continued Designation Title D W Culbertson. May l97l Numerical Modeling of Detonations Pyrotechnics Sensitiveness Collaboration Committee. 1968 M7742-108001 US Navy NAVORD OD 44 492 NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Propulsion): Solid Propellant Grain Design and Internal Ballistics.3-SE October 1994 ISSN 1104-9154 P F Mohrbach. 33:Rl René Renström FOA report C 2525-D3. June 1979 SAAB SAAB TCP-0-72.References 7 7. Basic data for technical specifications Plan for analysis of ammunition environment 7 235 . II Composite propellant HMX. I Double-base propellant Methods for testing rocket propellant. 2l330-Xl6 August l977 S Almroth FOA C 23204-41 1969 S Lamnevik FOA 1 report A146l143 (40. Dec l978 ITT Research Institute (For Naval Surface Weapon Center USA) Report NSWC/WOL/TR 75-l93 FOA 2 Reg. Analysis of measuring methodology Acceleration stresses in projectile-borne rocket propellant DNA EMP Awareness Course Notes. 4l) January l969 Bofors KL-R6775 Anders Schwartz FOA report A 200l5-Dl March l976 Anders Schwartz FOA report A 2003l-Dl February l979 S Lamnevik FOA A-1510-41(40) 1970 Küller.1972 ITT Research Institute (For Defense Nuclear Agency. N-E FMV A:A m/4/l4:85/75 30 mm automatic cannon m/75 Fuze accelerations with forced driving band Acceleration measurement in fuze. August l973 Electric interference EMP Design Guidelines for Naval Ship Systems.5 Documents relating to the environment Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment Designation Title Saab-Scania AB TCP-37-7. l975 Fourier analysis of water shock waves from underwater charges Casting properties and sensitivity for octol Copper acid corrosion Sensitivity of octol NSV10 and octonal NSB 9030 Methods for testing rocket propellant. no. Washington) Teleplan E3-MPA-0236.76:R2. June l977 H J Pasman DREV Report 707/75 DREV Québec. Dec l976 Institute for water & air purification research IVL no. no. 02:0464. Canada. and properties of gaseous air pollutants Shell Prematures by Compression Ignition and their Laboratory Simulation Study of organic substances present in ammunition surroundings that have a harmful effect on ammunition and packaging Study of Accidental Ignition of Encased High Explosive Charges by Gas Compression Mechanisms Safety testing of ammunition with regard to resistance to cook-off Test Operations Procedures Pressure and temperature in the air cushion in front of a projectile in a barrel Investigations concerning composition dust in fuzes Investigation concerning water shock wave severity at various distances from a detonating underwater mine Some shock wave parameters for warheads detonating above ground The influence of age on the adhesion of insulation on gas generator charges Ageing testing of rocket propellant 236 . content levels. G Åqvist FOA report A 20027-Dl May l978 A D Randolph and K O Simpsson. 2l840-Xl6 October l976 FOA 2 Reg. continued Designation Title 7 A Magnusson FOA 2 report A 2l48-242 October l96l AB Bofors KL-R-5696. no. 1975 J Hansson. Nov l982 US Army TECOM Pamphlet No 3l0-4 AB Bofors KL-R-5776. Univ. Tucson. Arizona 1974 AB Bofors KL-R 7742.7 References Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment. 2278-Xl5 Anders Schwartz FOA report A 200l6-Dl (D3) 1976 T Liljegren FOA 2 report A 2234-242 October l963 Rheological properties of viscoelastic materials Risk for self-initiation of round rammed in a hot barrel Collocation of the presence. Dec l976 S Lamnevik FOA report C 20l68-Dl (D4) April l977 FOA 2 Reg. Arizona. 6.1 Environment specific specifications Mechanical testing Table 7:7 Mechanical testing Designation Title FSD 0098 FSD 0099 FSD 0102 FSD 0103 FSD 0104 FSD 0105 FSD 0107 FSD 0113 FSD 0114 FSD 0115 FSD 0116 FSD 0117 FSD 0118 FSD 0120 FSD 0121 FSD 0122 Constant acceleration Shock firing Sinusoidal vibration Jumbling Broadband random vibration Free-fall drop from maximum 12 m Free-fall drop from high altitude or equivalent Bump Shock Shock with high peak value and short duration High-frequency transient vibration Small arms bullet attack Loose cargo Static load Fragment attack Shock waves in water 7 237 .6.2.References 7 7.2 7.6.1 Table 7:6 System specific specifications Designation Title FSD 0060 FSD 0112 FSD 0168 FSD 0212 FSD 0213 FSD 0214 FSD 0223 Safety testing of ammunition Testing of electric igniters with regard to electrical properties Environment types Testing of systems containing electric igniters Testing of fuze systems Qualification of explosives for military use Shelf-life engineering 7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition System specific specifications 7. methods A and B Thermal shock and temperature change Low temperature.2.2.2.3 Chemical testing Table 7:9 Chemical testing Designation Title FSD 0130 FSD 0224 Gaseous air pollutants and ozone Testing with contaminants 7. methods A. methods A and B Transient over voltages when current is interrupted Electromagnetic fields relevant to radar and radio radiation Inductive interference of wiring 238 .7 References Table 7:7 Mechanical testing. continued Designation Title FSD 0123 FSD 0234 FSD 0124 Acoustic noise Sand and dust Recommended severity of mechanical testing 7.2 Climatic testing Table 7:8 Climatic testing Designation Title FSD 0044 FSD 0045 FSD 0059 FSD 0072 FSD 0073 FSD 0125 FSD 0126 FSD 0127 FSD 0128 FSD 0129 Low barometric pressure and during change of air pressure Humidity. B and C High temperature.4 Electrical and electromagnetic testing Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing Designation Title 7 FSD 0046 FSD 0047 FSD 0058 FSD 0100 FSD 0101 Lightning Static electricity. B and C Salt mist Water spraying Simulated solar radiation High water pressure Recommended severity of climatic testing 7. methods A.6.6.6. 2.References 7 Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing. EMP Electric igniter tests: electrical properties (excluding EBW and EFI) Testing of semiconductor components with regard to ionizing radiation High Power Microwaves Recommended severity of electrical and electromagnetic testing 7.5 Fire and explosion testing Table 7:11 Fire and explosion testing Designation Title FSD 0159 FSD 0165 FSD 0166 FSD 0167 Gas pressure shock (explosive atmosphere) Fire Cook-off Recommended severity of fire and explosion testing 7. Final report Analysis of m/5l fuze clockwork as a result of the firing accident at Ravlunda Expert group for the Grytan accident l969 7 239 . continued Designation Title FSD 0106 FSD 0112 FSD 0225 FSD 0235 FSD 0119 Electromagnetic pulse.7 Accident investigations Table 7:13 Accident investigations Designation Title A:VA 036577:9l/70 FOA-report A l520-40. l970 A:VA A684/24/7l l97l-l0-ll Expert group for Ravlunda accident 1969.2.6.6.6 Combined testing Table 7:12 Combined testing Designation Title FSD 0160 FSD 0161 FSD 0162 FSD 0163 FSD 0164 High temperature – vibration Low temperature – vibration High temperature – low barometric pressure Low temperature – low barometric pressure Recommended severity of combined testing 7. 2:1985 Initiation of Explosive in Shell Threads S D Stein. l20-MM. Tl5 E3 R L Huddleston Diagnostic Significance of Macro.7 References Table 7:13 Accident investigations. PB l28 979 Ordnance Corps (USA) Report on Investigation of Premature Occurrence with Report No. Investigation report no. continued Designation Title A:V A684:75/74 l974-l0–02 A:VA A684:80/73 l973-l0–09 A:A M4808/4:6/78 Expert group for the Väddö accident l970 Expert group for the Kungsängen accident l97l Final report regarding accident when firing with 84 mm Carl Gustaf at InfSS in January l978 The committee (KN 1981:02) Firing accident at Stockholm coastal artillery defence for investigation of serious force on 17 May 1984 accidents.and Microscopic Aberdeen Proving Ground Features of Catastrophic Gun-tube Failures ADA 026 046 7 240 . S J Lowell Picatinny Arsenal l957. HE. DPS-220 Cavitated Composition B Shell. 6. Date 2000-02-07 Page 2 (30) Item: Project phase: Requirement no.: Content: Requirement met: Flame thrower Product definition phase 1.4 Yes No Not applicable A technical requirement specification was established (Ref. the requirements from the RFP have been broken down into the relevant subsystems. Some advisory groups require specific checklists to be submitted. 8.22003 Requirement type: Desired (SHOULD) Supplement to supplier’s SRP in accordance with Section 3.N. which define requirements. contain basic checklists of all requirements. To provide a clear overview of the requirements that apply to a weapon and/or ammunition system some form of checklist is advisable. Refer also to Chapter 3. Chapter 2. In addition.Checklists 8 8 CHECKLISTS This chapter provides some examples of how checklists can be designed. More detailed information is often required for the advisory groups and when monitoring projects which is why more specific checklists are necessary. 4 and 5. Comment: 8 241 . These lists provide a good overview but have limited use for monitoring purposes in the various advisory groups. Section 3. No. A number of examples of specific checklists have been compiled in this chapter. 08 222 221) in which all requirements from the RFP have been formulated with regard to the concept in question.1 Checklist example 1 CHECKLIST FOR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SAFETY MANUAL Compiled by: N. for example. no.8 Checklists 8.2 A list of weapon related safety requirements are stated in report FMV:Armament Directorate: 123/00 a) NA = Not applicable 8 242 . Reqmt. type Content Activities 1.2 Checklist example 2 Comment Yes No NA a) Description/ repor Reqmt.22001 SHALL × Supplement to safety requirements in TTFO (Tactical Technical Financial Objectives) shall be performed as per Section 3. 48 Ageing 140 Aiming and firing limitations 97 Air conditioning system 64 Air-breathing engines 139 Alcohol 92. 88 Backflash 81–82. 173. 142 Bullet attack test 142 Bump 131 Burst simulators 135 Bursting discs 141 C Cannon primers 143 Carbon monoxide 64 Carrier wave 165 Cartridge case 143. 141 Base-bleed 139 initiator 139 Blast pressure 62. 154 Ammonia 64 Ammunition 113 Anti-laser goggles 74 Anti-slip surfaces 64 Arming carrier wave 165 conditions 157 delay 180 enabled 175 failure 171 full 180 hazard 174 inadvertent 170 indication 172 mechanical deployment 175 phase 178 power cut 173 process 159.Index INDEX A Abnormal delay 182 Accident 23 Accumulated pressure 72 Advisory Group 43–44 Advisory Group for Environmental Engineering 44 Advisory Group for Explosives (Rg Expl) 32. 133 Base plate 123. 167 Barrel 82 rupture 82. 69. 46 Advisory Group for explosives (Rg Expl) 116 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems (Rg T) 44–45 Advisory Group for System Safety 44 Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D) 44. 89 Barrier 188 Base of the shell 124. 44. 145 Axis of bore 96 B Backblast 69. 125 Casting propellant directly 147 Cavity 124 CE marking 100 Changes in barometric pressure 189 Charge casing 132 Chassis 75 Checklist for safety activities and requirements 34 Circuit breaker 158–159 Classification 51 243 . 120. 145 Casing 115. 177 safe separation 173 safety features 174 safety limit 176 short-circuits 173 signal outside 174 single conductor 173 time-dependent 166 unauthorized 174 Artillery primers 139. 145 Bag charge 143 Bangalore torpedoes 130. 121 Body vibration 70 Bomb 93 Bomblets 93 Booby traps 60 Booster 158–159 charge 143 Breech mechanism 79 Breech ring 81 Bullet attack 121. 190–191 resistance 128 Co-storage 130. 172 Deformation 120. 46 composition dust 123 cutters 167–168 train 170 External ballistic stability 115 External environment 188 Extraneous circuits 162 D Danger area 61–62. 132 Countersunk 145 Cracks 123. 89 Fault mode 42 Filler material 126. 162 system 93 Driving bands 83. 129. 127.Index Clearance 78 Clearly marked 188 Climatic conditions 67 Combustible cartridge case 143 Combustion catalysts 141 Commencement of rifling 82 Compatibility 33 Composite barrels 89 Compound barrels 89 Compressed pellets 132 Conducted interference 80 Confined spaces 101 Consequence 42 Constituent materials 191 Contact with the seabed 176 Cook-off 83. 148. 121. 163. 141 Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Project 33 Demolition charge 130 Description of function 139 Desired requirement 18 Destruction 121 Detonation 124 Direction of recoil 88 Disassembly 142 Dispensers 93 Dividing wall (partition) 134 Doors 64. 129 Fire 68 . 163. 73 zones 98 Data transfer 99 Deactivation 93. 145. 99. 189 ESD 66 Ethyl alcohol 154 Evacuation fan 101 Explosive 33. 171. 95 Draining devices 154 244 F FAE 120 Fall-back 76 Fastening element 72 Fatigue 82. 171 Copper content 47 Corrosion 67. 163 Copper azide 41. 141. 171. 115 Drop test 50 DTTFO 36 E EED 172 EFI systems 159 Ejection of empty cartridge cases 73 Electric primer 139 Electrical fields 66 subsystems 164 Electromagnetic pulse 189 radiation 189 Electromechanical device 80 Electron incendiary bomb 135 Electronics 165 Electrostatic charging 148 Emergency stop 63 EMP 164 Empty cartridge cases 63 Environment extreme 116 severe damage 60 Environmental aspects 121 factors 178. 177 Debris 151 Deflagration 124. 119–120. 176–182 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges 157 H Hail 189 Hand-grenades 168 Hatches 64. 48–49. 157. 182. 164 Hydraulic systems 71. 148 0112 46. 120–121. 179 composition 134 energy 180 friction 131 inadvertent 131 leads 181 of propulsion agents 139 premature 123 pyrotechnic composition 134 self 140 spontaneous 162 spontaneous contact 135 temperature 140 voltage 179 Illuminating ammunition 131 IM 118 Impact of shrapnel 148 245 G Gas pressure 70 Guidance signals 99 Guidance systems 97 Guided weapons 120 . 129. 51. 173 0213 46. 191 Igniter cup 141 Ignition cables 172–173 capacitor 177. 116. 159. 51. 173 0113 48 0114 48 0117 48 0121 48 0165 68 0166 48 0212 46. 116. 88 stance 88 Flame guard 84 Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act 21 FMEA testing 170 FMV Manual of Regulations for InService Surveillance of Ammunition 53 Footholds 64 Forced recoil 87 Forces 70 Fording 67 Fragmentation 62. 119. 176 0214 46–47. 178. 51. 125–126. 191 Hazardous event 23 Hazards 28 HE charge 120 Heat flux 84. 128. 141. 167–169. 144. 154 I IEC 60825-1 74 IFTEX 130. 170 Fume extractor 84 Fuzing system 45. 162–174. 51. 170 FSD 0214 47.Index Fire extinguisher 101 Fire-fighting equipment 100 systems 101 Firing 97 button 80 circuit 182 mechanism 79. 51. 142. 115 treatment 141 Heating 64 High test peroxide 154 Hollow-charges 130 Hose charges 130 HPM 66. 113. 157–160. 124– 127. 78 Hydraulics 72 Hydrogen peroxide 93. 132. 83 Fragments 115 Friction initiation 131 FSD 0060 37. 95 Hazard firing 78 Hazard initiation 93. 163– 164. 181 ISO 2631 70 5349 70 Lifting devices 100 Linear charges 130. 47 Leakage 162 of propulsion agents 150 LEMP 66 246 . 95 Mine counter-blasting charge 168 Minelayers depth charges 91 landmines 90 naval mines 91 Mines 116 Missile launch tubes 63 Missiles 93 Moisture content 132–134 resistance 67 Monitor 63 Monitoring system 90 Montreal protocol 66 MOU 28 Moving parts 73 system parts 78 Multiple weapons 120 J Jackets 83 Jet engines 150 Joint surface 131 L Laser 74 fuzing systems 166 protection filters 74 weapons 60 Launch tubes 92 torpedoes 91 Launchers 77 Laying systems 96 Lead 65 azide 41. 74 mechanism 96 LOVA 140 M Magnetic fields 66 Mandatory requirements 18 Marking 191 Mass detonation 191 Material recycling symbols 191 Materiel environment 119.Index with the ground 176 Impulse 139 blasts 69 Inadvertent initiation 140. 170 Incendiary ammunition 131 weapon 60 Incorrect assembly 171 Inherent safety 176 Initiate 157 Initiation designed 181 devices 181 Initiator 158–159 In-line explosive train 158. 179 Insensitive munition 37 Inspection X-ray 123 Installation 76 Insulation adhesion 132 material 141 Internal protective paint 141 Interrupted fire 84 Interrupter 158. 140. 162 publications 55 Mechanical barrier 179 interrupter 182 Melting point 121 Memorandum of Understanding 28 Micro-electronic circuits 162 Micro-environment 188 MIL-STD-1474 69. 178–179. 167 Liquid fuel rocket engines 149 gas generators 149 Loading devices 73 Locking devices 64. 139. 154 PBX 118 Peacetime 25 Percussion caps 129. 67 PTTFO 36 Publications from Armed Forces headquarters 55 Pulverization 162 Purity 132 Push-out 92 Pylon 93 Pyrotechnic warheads 130 Q Quality inspection 171 R Radiated interference 80 Radiography 120 Rain 189 Ram rocket engines 139. 188 Paraffin kerosene 92. 88 systems 78 Recoilless weapon systems 87 Recuperator 73 Recycling 191 247 . 115 Optical axis 96 Out-of-line explosive train 158 Overpressure 73 P P1 Development 27 P2 Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems 27 P3 Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems 27 Packaging 113. 152 Ramjet engines 150 Rammer 86 Ramming 86 Reading instructions 2 Recoil 88 amplifiers 84 buffer 73. 53 Propulsion agents 149 device 139. 169 devices for torpedoes 153 force process 141 systems 138 unit 113 Protective clothing 63. 145 Peroxide 92 PHL 41 PHST 53 Pipe 123 Plugs 129 Pneumatics 72 Potential difference 164 Preliminary Hazard List 32. 143.Index Multi-purpose ammunition 169 Muzzle brake 84 flash 85. 89 MOP 145 time curves 141 vessels 100 Pressure vessels 100 Production control 171 Programmable subsystems 166 Propellant gas generators 146. 88 N National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI) 21 NBC 120 NEMP 66 Neutralized 173 Nitric oxide 65 Nitrogen dioxide 65 oxide 65 Non-discriminatory effect 32 Nozzle plug 141 O Obturation 81 Obturators 83. 153 rocket engines 146 Propelling charge 141 charge casing 141 Proposed Handling. 86 forces 73. 41 Pressure 70. Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) 32. 171 separation time 171 Safety circuits 74 covers 74 devices 78. 37 Rocket assisted projectile 139 engine initiators 139 systems 87 Rotating parts 73 Rupture 83 S Sabots 83. 123 Service life 33 Shock 131 absorbers 188 Sighting systems 96 Signal agents 167. 115 SACLOS 98 Safe separation distance 64. 121. 114 RFP 31.Index REQDOC Technical Specification Manual 38 Request for Proposal 37 Requirements of International Law 60. 89 Sub-calibre barrel 86 Submunitions 168 Supplier’s Safety Requirements Proposed 32 Swim-out 92 Symbols 63 System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) 19. 27 . 129 Separating surface 119 Separation 98. 100. 145 Static electricity 189 load 189 Steam generator 153 Storage stability 132 Stowage 76 Stress chemical 163 chemical environmental 190 climatic environmental 190 dynamic 189 electrical environmental 190 mechanical 162 mechanical environmental 189 physical 163 Structural strength 89. 22. 116. 167. 177 Semiconductor switches 174 SEN 580110 70 Separate case 143 charges 126. 132 Sub-calibre adapters 85 barrel 85–86. 180 rounds 135 Spring 71–72 forces 71 SRP 39 Stability 74 Stabilizer 154 STANAG 4110 70. 180 ammunition 131 Single conductor system 173 248 Single failure 101. 115. 170 Smoke ammunition 131 candles 135 hand-grenades 135 Smoke ammunition 131 Soldering defects 173 Solid Fuel RamJet engine (SFRJ) 151 Somersault 176 Sources of radiation 98–99 Spotting agents 131. 168. 89. 158 interrupter 80–81 surveillance 52 system 157 testing 50 Safety Requirements Proposed 39 SAI units 159 Sealed 123 Sealing 126 agents 141 Self-destruction 99. 93 Transport and storage classification 26 Transport of Dangerous Goods Act 21 TS classified 191 TTFO 21. 31 Tandem systems 169 Temperature cycles 140 Terminal guidance 98 Thermal shock 189 Threads 120. 31. 101 Verification 40.Index T Tactical Technical Financial Objectives 22. 35–36 Tube-launched ammunition 142 Turbojet engines 150 Turbo-rocket engines 139 Type testing 176 VDU 63 VDV 70 Ventilation 64. 189 Vibration dose 70 W Warheads 113. 131. 178 Toxic substances 62 toxicity 121 weapons 60 Transient currents 164 Transmission safety device electrical 158 optical 158 Transport 75 safety device 88. 50 Verify other safety requirements 50 Vibration 131. 118 Warning signs 74 Wartime 25 Water resistance 67 spraying 67 Weapon platforms 94 Weapons difficult to aim 60 Wear protectants 141 Work environment 67 Work Environment Act 21 X X-ray 120. 123 U UAV 145 Ultrasonic testing 120 UN coding 191 recommendations 190 Uncontrolled base bleed combustion 124 Underwater ammunition 127 mines 116. 128 Unloading 115 Unloading tool 115 V Variations in temperature 140 249 . 134 Thunder flashes 135 Time fuzes 181 Tolerable level of safety 21 Tolerance range 179 Torpedo propulsion 139 Torpedoes 116. . Notes 9 NOTES . Notes . .................. 26 1....... 28 2.......... 25 1............................................................2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement .................218 7 References .......2 Safety activity requirements ..........2 Warheads .........241 8.... 52 3................................................................................2 Common requirements ................1 Joint ammunition requirements ..............7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers .....................2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO ......1 Terminology ................................. 20 1.......4 Requirement checklist for weapons 102 5 Ammunition ..1 General ..........................................................4 Textbooks ...... 27 2.................................................................................... 43 3...........................113 5.......................4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges ...8 Test directives for safety surveillance .3 Requirements common to all materiel ....................9 Proposed Handling............ 41 3......... 34 3 Methodology ......113 5............................243 .. 17 1....2 Checklist example 2 .... 50 3............... 37 3.........2 Instructions for use ................................5 Packaging for ammunition ............ 27 2..................................................4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) ..193 6...118 5.................1 Documents governing safety ..1 General ...............................................3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ........242 Index .................1 General .......... 35 3..193 6.........................................3 Design principles and experience ......235 7.........6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities .1 General ..57 4...157 5............2 Key to abbreviations ...........1 Purpose of this chapter .................................... 15 0....3 Weapons and ammunition safety ..241 8........ 53 4 Weapons ...... 15 1 Introduction ..............................230 7...... 21 1....1 Checklist example 1 .60 4......3 System requirements .............5 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ....5 Documents relating to the environment ...........................................4 Objectives for safety activities ........6 Obtaining advice from advisory groups ............7 Safety testing ...77 4..................... 15 0................... 26 2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ...................................................................................188 6 Definitions ...................57 4..6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition ........................ 39 3................ 17 1.........................3 Propulsion systems ..223 7......................................Abbreviated list of contents 0 To our Foreign Reader ......... Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) ............................7 Accident investigations ......... 15 0......237 7........................226 7.233 7... 35 3...............4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ..5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV ..............225 7.......239 8 Checklists .............2 Standards relating to design and testing .................................. 35 3...... 25 1......138 5............................................ 32 2....3 About the manual ...........