Foucault's Analogies, or How to Be a Historian of the Present without Being a Presentist

C L I O 31:1 2001DANIEL M. GROSS Foucault's Analogies, or How to Be a Historian of the Present without Being a Presentist Among the cultural inventions of mankind there is a treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot exactly be activated, but at least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point of view which can be very useful as a tool for analyzing what's going on now—and to change it. We don't have to choose between our world and the Greek world. But since we can see very well that some of the main principles of our ethics have been related at a certain moment to an aesthetics of existence, I think that this kind of historical analysis can be useful. —Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics" It is easy to construct a story in which analogies as traditionally conceived have no place for Foucault in the writing of history.^ Prompted hy Foucault's own methodological proclamations in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," commentators have generally characterized genealogy as a skeptical, even nihilistic strategy for writing history. It is supposed to shatter our ability to identify a historical event in a continuous narrative, to identify with past subjects, to 1. Along these lines see also Jan Goldstein's definition of genealogy, culled from articles collected in Foucault and the Writing of History, 14; Larry Shiner, "Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-Knowledge," History and Theory 21 (1982): 382-97 and "Introduction" in The New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: U of California P, 1989); and Allan Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians," Journal ofthe History of Ideas 48 (1987): 117. Also, I thank Judith Butler, Daniel Rosenberg, Jonathan Sheehan, Hans Sluga, Hayden White, and Michael Witmore for their comments on earlier versions of this article. 58 Foucault's Analogies identify ourselves in some essential way. Indeed the piirpose of history guided by genealogy, Foucault insists, "is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation."^ And as we will see, classical analogy in the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition is often understood simply as a figure that establishes an element of identity over disparate objects or events. So instead of writing history as reminiscence or recognition, one should, for instance, parody the buffoonery that supplied the French Revolution with Roman prototypes, romanticism with knight's armor, and the Wagnerian era with the sword of a German hero (160). Instead of fixing similarities in an unreñexive history of monuments and origins, genealogical history, according to Foucault, should correspond "to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses, that is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements—^the kind of dissociating view that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of man's being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of his past" (153). In a word, difference, not identity, should serve as the affirmative principle when doing history, and synthetic pretension should be decomposed as it appears. Foucault actually might give the historian advice not unlike what Wittgenstein gives to a great architect in a "bad period": "Don't take comparability, but rather incomparability, as a matter of course."^ For, as we will see, this is precisely what Foucault expressly tries to do in the second chapter of The Order of Things, "The Prose of the World," where he describes how the Renaissance hierarchy of analogies supposedly crumbles under the weight of a "Classical" science of order. Foucault's practice, however, tells a very different story. His genealogies continually propose crucial, synthetic moments that produce new research domains. In fact, my claim can be put in the strongest terms: there is no Foucauldian method, whether genealogical or otherwise. 2. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Countermemory, Practice, trans. D. F. Bouchard and S. Simon (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 162. 3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 2d ed., ed. G. H. Von Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980), 74E. Wittgenstein sees these fields composed of various human practices. what institutional conditions made them stick. the way Foucault uses analogies is complex and atraditional. 106. 1980). yielding the following proportional formula: as the libertine was to tbe deployment of alliance. analogy bad a potentially universalfieldof application. R. trans. Wittgenstein tested the limits of everyday language by way of abistorical thought experiments rather than philology. it builds upon the classical model while radically revising tradition in the direction of his own philosophy of language. Like the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Gross 59 without positive analogies. But always the philosopher. analogical mode. The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction. Foucault explicitly uses Wittgenstein's "kinship ties" to link. Foucault's detective work traces how analogies are situated. In contrast. or sympathies. Foucault locates when particvdar identities were produced in language. and both take the logic of reduction to task. This limitation left man at tbe very center of a complete signifying system. for example) systematically reduce resemblances to identities. Indeed. Renaissance man was only 4. but with only fragments of a decoding manual. nor does language simply impose likeness. but tbis potential could never be realized fully because divine order was ultimately opaque. 40. . However. for instance. The Persistence of Analogy In the Renaissance as Foucault describes it. some of wbicb (logic and psychoanalysis. at whicb point they can he justified against the associated fields that they help compose. this article shows what sort of history one writes when relation is characterized in Foucault's positive.ÜEiniel M.^ But neither for Wittgenstein nor for Foucault are formal resemblances simply read off the world and uniformly named. Distinguishing Foucault's use of analogy from the classical prototype and Wittgenstein's philosophical anti-metaphysics. and how they might be transformed in tbe writing of history. Hurley (New York: Random House. both discursive and non-discvirsive. Resemblances appear first as ad hoc kinships. Foucault. the modern pervert to the pre-modern libertine. so the deviant is to the deployment of sex. Genealogy. no accident that the walnut resembles the human head. his bladder is the sea. But as Foucault insists in "Nietzsche. in the analogy of the human animal to the earth it inhabits: his flesh is a glebe." no episteme completely closes upon itself. I will add. and as he does also to the earth. to metals." as Foucault puts it. just as he does to animals and plants. And this internal limit to the system leads directly to external limits of the world. his bones are rocks. his veins great rivers. and man could all be drawn together in a complex interlocking system of signification. Foucault. but he could nevertheless piece together a tremendous number of natviral signs. physiognomists (Porta)—and." It is. nature. the seven orifices in his head are to his face what the seven planets are to the sky). History. for this is the iconic sign given to man that "wounds of the pericranium" can be cured by the thick green rind covering the shell of the fi-uit. eternal truth. but he is also the fulcrum upon which all these relations turn. 1970). a theologian such as Cajetan—^word. he stands in relation to thefirmament(his face is to his body what the face of heaven is to the ether. There always will be a "slight degree of non-coincidence" between resemblances. to stalactites or storms. so that wefindthem again. for instance. The holy "confusion" of Cajetan that we will see undermines the univocal predication of mein. and so on. The whole world had 5. the nodes of which would be marked viltimately by God's signature: "visible marks for the invisible analogies. an insurmountable misalignment between the graphics of the natural world and the graphics that form its discourse. as Foucault puts it. and God is introduced by Foucault in a different form as the Renaissance episteme begins to crumble. both internal and external. Foucault recites a series of poetic observations drawn from CroUius's Traité des signatures: Man stands in proportion to the heavens. his pulse beats in his veins as the stars circle the sky according to their own fixed paths. 22.^ In the episteme shared by grammarians (such as Ramus). . The Order ofThings: an Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences (New York: Vintage. their similarity unimpaired. Upright between the surfaces of the universe. or transparency of the system as a whole. naturalists (Belon). And the job of the genealogist is ostensibly to draw out fissvires in a given system. and his seven principal organs are the metals hidden in the shafts of mines.60 Foucault's Analogies "half of a universal atlas. guaranteeing certain knowledge. at that archaic level which makes possible both knowledge itself and the mode of being of what is to be known. this knowledge was merely "a thing of sand" (30). So when we read Foucault's description of the trsinsition from the Renaissance to the Classical age (an age that is supposedly "responsible for the new iurangement in which we are still caught" [43]). we should be particularly sensitive to the strategy Foucault employs to compare befores and afters. Gross 61 to be explored if even the slightest of analogies was to be justified andfinallytake on the appearance of certainty. microcosm and macrocosm). How.Daniel M. £ind thus from its very fovmdations. factories. given Foucault's radical stance regarding the absolute uniqueness of a given historical event. "either in our knowledge or in our refiection. the fundamental supposition was that of a total system of correspondence (earth and sky. except perhaps literature—and even then "in a fashion more allusive and diagonal than direct. but rather in his actual language of comparison and transformation. and hospitals—^this illuminating synthesis that has generated research projects across the himian sciences? Then we must look at what stays the same as one historical period gives way to another. or culture. Now. First. "What we must grasp and attempt to reconstitute are the modifications that affected knowledge itself." These modiñcations may be summed up as follows. that still recalls even the memory of that being (43. for instance. and to what end? The key to answering these questions lies not in Foucault's explicit theoretical statements." Foucault insists. period. one would not expect analogy to resurface in Foucault's corpus as an analjrtic tool." But recur analogy does. barracks. the substitution of analysis for the hierarchy of analogies: in the sixteenth century. and given his pronouncement of a total collapse of the Renaissance episteme. will Foucault justify his comparison of prisons. "There is nothing now. we must look at the terms Foucault uses to compare various discourses that compose one historicíd period as well as the objects that those discourses name. schools. First. planets and faces. emphasis mine). In what form. Nor should analogy reappear in Foucault's post-Renaissance episteme unless resuscitated as a politically motivated simulacnim—^history as farce. and each particular similitude was . Nothing. the classical theory of analogies suggests that. svirprisingly. not simply "in" serious statements plucked from the historical record. by proportional analogy. So. Analogies should be motivated locally by a counterhistory and not by a totalizing sensibility. to analysis. focusing now on . to suggest dis-analogies. for instance. every resemblance must be subjected to proof by comparison. it will not be accepted until its identity and the series of its differences have been discovered by means of measurement with a common unit. is to be superseded by an ordered world. an analogous term can be generated. as it functions in the sixteenth century. and order no longer needs divine sanction to do its work. that is.62 Foucault's Analogies then lodged within this overall relation. So we will return to the text. But once again we are presented with a contagion of positive analogies. in short. we should expect those that he does use to waiver. to function as ad hoc sympathies—unless. for instance. But why does Foucault rehearse this transition? In order to pinpoint which sixteenth-centuryfiguresare "substituted" for byfigfuresin the seventeenth century. that is. Though it might be unfair to ask Foucault to purge analogy completely from his thinking. the sixteenth-century accumulative sensibility gives way to analysis. accumulation. And. moreover. Foucault sets himself the task of "reconstituting" the modifications that characterize a transition between periods and thereby grasp the conditions that affect the production and solidification of knowledge. and Cartesian/Newtonian mathesis (to name a few of Foucault's favorite reference points)." These are. the term "order" functions analogically in two historically distinct expressions: "divine order" and "the science of order. Linnaean taxonomia. or. anedogies that function on the metalevel of Foucatdt's critique. more radically. by its position in an order. For example. Foucault himself is playing the Renaissance Man. which compare. From now on. The universe of analogies. as we will see. for each proportional analogy. as it functions in the seventeenth century. resemblances £ire redistributed within or without modern scientific categories. And how then are the two figures related? It seems. (55) Clearly Foucault wants to say the figures that composed sixteenth-century knowledge have been iraresfigured and recontextualized in the wake of Baconian skepticism. The Order of Things (1966) was first published five years before Foucault's supposed turn toward genealogy. are to taxonomy: a constitution and evident manifestation of the order of things. Again the Classical age. and words in particular. signs. Foucault still allows himself a range of tools familiar to structuralists when writing The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). similitudes are resuscitated on the level oí imagination by ñgures such as Condillac and Hume. despite his explicit claims about our radical break from the Renaissance episteme." And what's more.« However. Gross 63 the mode of description in order to see if Foucault's analogies actually defeat his genealogical intentions. Thus it is not too surprising that analogy functions as a synthetic tool for Foucault. Indeed. as Foucault describes the Classical episteme. Hence the following: "Variations of price are to the initial establishment of the relation between metal and wealth what rhetorical displacements are to the original value of verbal signs. a work designed to distill the method motivating his 6. and the possibility of causing a sign to shift in relation to what it designates. Like the latter. the analji. it unites into one and the same function the possibility of giving things a sign. and the Analysis of Wealth all coincide in the seventeenth century around the figure of mathesis universalis. Similitudes function. Natural History. and this despite the fact that the new sciences of General Grammar. "the theory of money and prices occupies the same position in the analysis of wealth as the theory of character does in natural history. . as the "mute and ineffaceable necessity" that make knowledge possible. then. Foucault does say explicitly that when scientific knowledge begins to dominate." And finally: "What algebra is to mathesis. For without the power to cause two impressions to appear as "quasi-likenesses" one could not begin to establish more exacting identities and differences (68-69). positive analogies seemed to multiply recklessly. proportional einalogy now seems complete within Foucault's description of one historical episteme.Dziniel M.ic grid designed to decompose vague analogies into scientifically justified identities and differences (202)." A breathless series of comparisons by positive. Despite the Classical period's radical distance from the Renaissance. Classical identities apparently did not map completely over the vagaries of similitude. of representing one thing by another. In fact. J. 227-28. eds. A. we find both a synchronie use of analogy ostensibly enmesbed in tbe historical record and analogies at work on tbe metalevel of Foucault's descriptions. positive analogies turn up tbrough all of Foucault's work—^his modernism notwithstanding—^though tbe function of analogies does change. Anotber power."^** For Cajetan. trans. tbe plants or tbe eartb. The Analogy ofNames and the Concept of Being.^ As we will see later."^ We are tbus presented witb two distinct technologies functioning in two distinct bistorical contexts. trttns. 66. Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard. Here is one crucial example from tbe panopticon cbapter—an example tbat in fact ties Discipline and Punish to The Order of Things. as we will see. It turns out that relations of opposition. tbe appearance of analogy during tbis period in Foucault's work is no mere anachronism. E. N. 10. The Archaeology ofKnowledge. De conceptu entis. In order to vmderstand 7. the traditional theory of analogy suggests tbat tbe recurrence of tbis term is deeply significant. 1972). complementarity."' More svirprisingis tbat little changes witb tbe publication six years later of Discipline and Punish. Cardinal Tomasso de Vio Gaetano (Cajetan) calls analogy "a mean between pure equivocation and univocation. 226. 1959). "[Disciplinary] investigations are perhaps to psychology. yet Foucavdt refers to tbem witb tbe same analogous term: "enquête" ("investigation"). Moreover. trems. Sherid£in Smith (New York: Pantheon. Zammit and H. £Uid so many other strange sciences. analogy bas an ambiguous epistemologicíd status marked by the recurrence of a term. 1952). anotber knowledge. psychiatry.64 Foucault's Analogies archival researcb. 1977). £ind analogy can indeed all still be used to study tbe economy of wbat Foucault calls a "discursive constellation. In Discipline and Punish. 8. Hering (Rome: Institutum Angelicum. M. Bushinski and H. 1975). Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House. . Thomas De Vio Cardinaüs Caietanus (1469-1534). Foucault. pedagogy. Foucault. In De nominum analogia. Foucault. Indeed. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. 9. A. criminology. the late fifteentb-century work designed to systematize Aristotelian/Thomistic theory. wbat the terrible power of investigation was to tbe calm knowledge of tbe animals. 30. De nominum analogia. Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP. S. We may illustrate the principle with two examples drawn from J. Ross's Portraying Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Miller's Analogies Tests operate as follows: proportionalities suggest an apt common word generating one literal and one metaphorical sentence.Daniel M. 12. a stone. 32: fanner:seed::sun:fleunes {sows)." say."^^ Given the Aristotelian formulation "knowledge:object of knowledge: :sensation:object of sensation. 1989). Of course. Förster (Ctimbridge. In our discussion of Foucault we will exploit the possibility of moving between the doctrine of analogy of proper proportionality among referents to the doctrine of analogical terms (analogy of attribute). an expression that reduces to a common ratio "2. 108a 7-17. Aristotle. . a possibility not realized in medieval discussions. If strict proportionality is maintained. then we are left with the impossible proposition that an idea such as "Helen is in love" is perceived no differently than is a stone. F. the kejrword "perception" functions neither equivoctilly nor univocally with respect to ideas and objects—an observation of the sort that launched the scholastic debate on the function of analogy. Analogy is no simple phenomenon of language according to Cajetan. Mass. No interpretive problem arises if "perceiving" is understood equivocally when ranging alternatively over ideas and stones." we would look for a term such as "perception" that would be the ratio expressed on both sides (this understanding of analogies is still with us in the form of Miller's Analogy Tests). however. but then again nothing has been gained by proposing the formula in the first place. The Classical Theory of Analogy and Its Scholastic Legacy In its most basic form. So tacked on the end of Cajetan's infiuential treatise is a chapter entitled 11.^^ The semantic point would be that we can "perceive" the idea "Helen is in love" as readily as we "perceive. 1981). trcins. Ignoring pragmatic considerations thus has its price. Topics. E. Only then can we begin to clear away the metaphysical assumptions that obscure the function of analogy in Foucault's work. and it must be handled carefvilly. Gross 65 how Foucault's analogies work. thief:money::age:beauty (steals). we must in fact get a better sense of this traditional scheme against which Foucault's innovation is contoured. tradition suggests that we analyze analogy by means of the quasi-mathematical paradigm 2:4::3:6.: Loeb Classical Library. Almost all analogous names first were univocal and then by extension were rendered analogous. 1981). Cajetan first asks us to approach seemingly univocal terms such as "wisdom." in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Walter Schulz zum 60. For example." writes Cajetan." For such metaphors ironically extend the range of a common noun that has "absolutely one 13. The same is true of other terms (73).56-59 (translation mine). In this way what was xuiivocal to us was made analogous to us and God. see Erich Heintel.e. common by proportion to those things in which they are univocal and to others or to another. Constitutiones Concilii quarti Lateranensis una cum Commentariis glossatorum. For an interesting philosophical reading of this passage. Antonius García y Garcia. Geburstag. 2 (Vatican: Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticsuia. Then. Indeed pantheist heresies ofjust this sort provoked from the Fovirth Lateran Council of 1215 a famous tenet of negative theology still effective for Cajetan: "no similarity between creator and created is to be noted without noting a greater dissimilitude. semantic extension in this case differs from metaphorical extension ofthe sort that figures in an expression such as "God is a lion." Apparently the semantic nodes in a language fork periodically."" So the common term "wisdom" does indeed originate univocally. Hohnut Fahrenbach (Pfullingen: Günther Neske. 1973)." "good. when men rose to a knowledge of the divine nature and saw the proportional similitude between us insofar as we are wise and God. ed. 267-90. vol. Series A: Corpus Glossatorum. the name wisdom was at first given to human wisdom and was univoctil to the wisdom of all men. "Transzendenz und Analogie: Ein Beitrag zur Frage der bestimmten Negation bei Thomas v. allowing them a complexity denied simple generic terms such as "animal. ed. Aquin. Monumenta Iuris Canónica. they extended the name wisdom to signify in God that to which our wisdom is proportional." and "powerful" with caution. Moreover." It is introduced as an hors-text rebuttal to those relativizing sophists who would overlook the "mode of unity" hidden in antdogous terms. as does the name "animal. i. "First of all. we must beware lest from the univoca tion of an analogous name with respect to certain things we are led to think that this name is univocal in an absolute sense. and if we are insensitive to the division we n m the risk of following the low road to blasphemy." But only "wisdom" accrues analogous meaning when extended as a predicate of God.66 Foucault's Analogies "Precautions to be Taken in the Understanding and Use of Analogous Terms. . Constitutio 2. medicine. one might incorrectly take a person and tuine to be indistinguishable insofar as they are both intrinsically "healthy. An allegory with its temporal. Cajetan affirms that the scheme thus generated is discreetly valued as well. and other similar things are called healthy not because of health inherent to them. Gross 67 formal mesuiing" in order to indicate some shared property: though Grod is not a lion. comparing the propositions "Socrates is wise" and "God is wise" is no heresy.Daniel M. or have some other relationship to it" (17). and to medicine. De nominum analogia is conceived of as an extended commentary upon "De nominibus dei. not simply intrinsic or nominative identities. the sign of health in an animal. On the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination see Aquinas." So for Cajetan. 15. one might view the health of a person and the health of medicine as materially unrelated. By way of contrast. and after which the others are denominated good in the order of exemplarity. "The notion oí good also. insofar as they signify it. on the contrary. In fact it generates a story compatible with religious doctrine. cause it. To interpret analogous terms naively—as isolated and unevaluated linguistic samples—^is to misunderstand everyday speech and to deny the harmony of natural order. Petri Caramello (Italy: Marieti. It is the situation of concepts and things in a universal story of creation that determines their relations. and evaluative force is what saves analogous terms from the fate of mere equivocation. which is verified in the essential good. in an analogous manner. 1952). . "For example. but extrinsically after the health of the animal. Summa theologiae. Summa theologiae.4. and then by mesins of "extrinsic denomination" to urine. ed.13.6.^^ Turning abruptly from the profane to the sacred. But "health}^" applies first to £inim£ds. Without knowledge of natural harmony (and vdtimately of divine order). 1. literally speaking. 1. In fact it is precisely such measurable and directed relationships that give analogous terms a status far superior to that of simple univocity or accidental equivocity." or. "proper" analogy equitably extends the range of a common property." in Thomas Aquinas. causal. the cause of health in an animal. is realized formally only in 14. in this case God and the lion share courage. whereas urine. the animal itself is cfdled healthy formally. the others are called good by extrinsic denomination and in relation to the first good" (15. or "incompleteness. 16. each good thing occupies a unique place determined by its relative distance from the Good. "Concealing. for instance. it is this nagging threat of linguistic failure that keeps Cajetan's system from calcifying. only divine revelation could gfuarantee perfect correspondence between word. the inseparably concomitant diversity." or culturally sanctioned. in Cajetan's scheme. Moreover." is structurally unavoidable. Cajetan's theory thus cannot help but murmur colorfully about the d5niamic and contoured process that generates his analogical system. 1. For Cajetan those limits appear to be a result of a theological doctrine that posits the realm of Godly perfection as "ineffable. emphasis mine)..68 Foucault's Analogies the first good. Constitutiones quarti Lateranensis. Not simply a means to produce neo-Aristotelian categories. speech act from stabilizing. But even if we desire to conform to this perfectly ordered system. we can say that Cajetan describes the role analogy plays in fixing a discursive system (or language game) at the same time that he indicates the internal and external limits that system must generate. 1978).^* Moreover." the analogon "both unites the diversity of notions by proportional identity and confuses them in a certain way" (43). our imperfect knowledge of God and his creations means that the language we use will always be subject to slippage. "things that are")." See Martin Heidegger. and idea."" whereas for Foucault it is the absence of strict formation rules that ultimately keeps a "serious.und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (Frankfurt: Klostermann.e.3. because "being" in its ideal form will always be obscured. . we abstract the emalogon "being" from its analogates (i. Anticipating Foucault. where. as it were. this confusion. As it turns out. for example. we gedn both the insight that comes cloaked in identity and the confusion hidden beneath. Die Kategorien. When. and therefore even the devout are usually left to their own devices as they attempt to understand the world they live in. It is precisely this scholastic confusion regarding how the analogon "being" moves across its antdogates that leads Heidegger to the "question of being. Garcia y García. Cajetan's extrinsic denomination turns out to follow as well the mies of a Platonic hierarchy. object. 17. Similarly in Foucault's scheme. even if that scbeme exists only ideally. By proposing a patently false identity while insisting nonetheless upon kinship. that is. To call God and Socrates "wise. tbe term "investigation" becomes a predicate of botb the clinical £uid tbe natviral. as Cajetan bad once observed. Drawing analogies generates similitude. Tbe result is a new understanding of how analogies work. Writing in the wake of The Order of Things. Analogies are irreducibly ambiguous speech acts that perform a metalinguistic function. Foucault forcefully rejects the suggestion of a universal scheme underl3dng specific analogies. Cajetan tells a story in whicb the univocal term "wise. analogy does tbe impossible. a repressive episteme or a "myth"—tbat fixes identity and underwrites perfect semantic convertibility. Tbe conditions of discursive formation are also a deep concern for Foucault. but only grapbic or pbonic identity remains. is to disambiguate context and bigbligbt tbe . But semantic context matters. If restrained in tbe semantic field. To call Plato and Socrates "wise" is simply to predicate univocally. thereby instituting both a kinship and a radical difference. However. on the power of God. And it is faitb in tbis universal scbeme tbat ultimately dulls Cajetan's sensitivity to tbe role buman babits and bistories play in creating semantic stability. leaving only human culture as tbe force driving language. Cajetan's system remains viable even if a materially effective "God" is reduced to a structureil function. in tbe end. and bistory woiild again become farce. Despite our inability to grasp oiir relationsbip to God in its exactitude. tbe phenomenon of einalogy serves Foucault botb as an object of analysis and as a vital analytic tool—as it did Thomas and Cajetan. is extended to God.Daniel M. It formulates the nondiscursive in a linguistic scheme and manifests simultaneously the absurdity of doing so. This is the insight that led the traditional tbeory of emalogy away from tbe matbematicsil paradigm outlined above. as long as the rhetorical context of the analogy is specified. for Cajetan tbe power of buman institutions depends." a predicate of someone sucb as Socrates. Moreover. Foucault tries to "think" anidogy against any such epistemological guarantee—^for example. Gross 69 In fact." on the other band. Foucault's analogical terms could be reduced to mere identities. instituting botb tbe kinsbip of bumans and God. as well as their radical difference. The "clinical investigation. that is. interviews. it demands an interpretation. passively disciplines the subject by way of micro-procedures instituted from the bottom up: tests. all analogies come pre-justified. Discipline and Punish is a transitional work. for Cajetan. pace Bacon and Linnaeus. And it is on the level of situating analogies that Foucault most obviously diverges from Cajetan's totalizing scheme—and as we will see. . But precisely because analogy manifests such blatant semantic confusion. In summary. from Wittgenstein's ahistoricism. Indeed. seemingly disparate practices of judicial. the comparative act becomes inscribed in myth). in Discipline and Punish. was intentionally designed to extract a truth from its objects. we will see. and so forth. and a new research project is formed around "technologies of the body. Though long aware of the possible uses and abuses of systematic comparisons. natural. ordered spaces. Their function is to confirm that order from which they have emerged. Foucault specifies context by modifying his key term." So drawing analogies carries a rhetorical as well as a historical burden. sensitive to the disparate fields it draws together. as modern logic would have it—analogy is either meaningless or paradoxical. In terms of method. in terms of isolated semantic identities—understood. the "clinical investigation" is distinguished fi-om the "investigation of nature. then. For example. The investigation of the natural world. Cajetan specifies both the natviral causal order and the permanent divine order that together underwrite the analogous predication of man and God." and this distinction figures in a broad argument about the difference between Classical and disciplinary order.70 Foucault's Analogies limits of identity." Understood." on the other hand. this comparative act generates a new rhetorical field and new historical data to be assimilated (when calcified." "another knowledge. or argument. while The History of Sexuality is Foucault's showpiece for the dual treatment of analogies: seemingly "natural" comparisons are subjected to sharp historical criticism. In Foucault's The History ofSexuality. For example. while new comparisons are drawn along ethicsd lines. Foucault nonetheless employs analogies in The Order of Things to regularize his "epistemes" and their transformations. "Another power. When successful. and clinical investigation are drawn together. This central virtue of analogy is recognized explicitly by Wittgenstein in The Blue Book lecture notes and absorbed ten years later into the famous Investigations treatment of "family resemblance" (especially ^67-^76).. The resemblances between different uses of a general term resist any sort of identification.. Ian Hunter. whether godly or scientistic. the critical distinction has never been adequately characterized. a system of relatioHsls no longer guaranteed a priori. . I have always taken one over from someone else. The "crystalline purity" of Wittgenstein's Tractarian fantasy is thereby shattered. and in this respect his method depends upon Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Dreyfus.. That distinction can be formulated most precisely by comparing their use of analogies. —The Blue Book I don't believe I have ever invented a line of thinking. and Rabinow among others. and in its place grows a rhizomatic network of resemblances characterized . is imposed_after the fact. especially as it is formulated in The Blue Book. When Foucavilt writes. —Culture and Value An emerging virtue of analogy—a term that Wittgenstein sometimes uses interchangeably with "simile" and sometimes employs as a justified simile—is that it provides a means to make synthetic statements without appeahng to a strict rule. and it can be boiled down to a fundamental difference between two disciplines: history and philosophy. Can one take the case of Breuer and Freud as an example of Jewish reproductiveness? What I invent are new similes [Gleichnisse]. Though methodological similarities between Wittgenstein and Foucault have been noted by Alec McHoul. Wittgenstein's Analogies By our method we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies. Gross 71 the story is practically reversed (though of course Foucault never explicitly addresses Cajetan or the scholastic problematic). . But that order. .Daniel M. Analogies are ad hoc sympathies that can both mark the emergence of true genealogical thinking or prefigure the tyranny of identity and order. and this fact in turn precludes the possibility of appropriately extending the term according to a strict rule. sjnithetic statements are perilous. nor that Classical order and disciplinary order differ (Foucault). for instance. Instead. But Wittgenstein does not rely on sophisticated forms of discursive knowledge to provide a diseimbiguating context for analogical terms. Ludwig Wittgenstein. cardgames. whether that view be old scholastic or new. and they share practical faith in the heuristic power of analogy. And since Foucault's analogies extend precisely this turn in the philosophy of language toward a new historicism. They agree in their distaste for metaphysical unities. We do not have to know. relationships. Olympic games. and grammatical analogies in particular—can lead one astray: just because I can talk about an "unconscious thought" does not mean that I can talk about an "unconscious toothache. but look!—Look for example at board-games. To repeat: don't think. and so on. it is helpful to examine first in some detail how Wittgenstein's ahistoric£d theory of analogy works. Without a rule against which synthetic statements can be tested. 23. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There musí be something common. or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything common to all. Wittgenstein asks us in the Investigations simply to consider the proceedings that we call "games. and a whole series of them at that. with 18.72 Foucault's Analogies and extended by analogy. that is. but similarities. doing so in a meinner somewhat different from Foucault. Wittgenstein's theory of anedogy thus contradicts the view that everyday language is rule governed. 1958). if they are to make sense without depending on formal rules. —For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all. As Wittgenstein sees it." I mean board-games. Wittgenstein asks us simply to look and see how analogical terms fimction in different ways as they are used in a variety of practical situations."^^ Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion that the disciirsive resemblances that first caught his attention are most appropriately understood against a background of nondiscursive practices. It is also the point at which Wittgenstein most forcefully recasts the traditional theory of analogy with a rhetoricíd sensibility. . ball-games. that Socrates and God are incomparable in their mutued wisdom (Cajetan). the seductive force of similitude. Reversing Descartes's famous plea for introspection. The Blue Book (New York: Harper. Now pass to card-games. but many common features drop out. M. Anascombe (New York: Macmillan. trans. he refuses to circumscribe discursively the intended domain of perception. in a set of activities similarly named." that they involve winning and losing. Anedogies perform no single linguistic or metídinguistic function that would render them for systematic treatment. Studies in Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff. here you find many correspondences with the first group. David Burrell. Wittgenstein preempts the possibility that we could ever talk about his "theorj^ of einalogy in a traditional sense. Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale UP. the ambiguous domain where tinalogy does its work. 1968). Each reader will "look" at different board games. Wittgenstein asks the reader instead to 'look for example at board-games" and then to "pass to card-games. Anascombe and R. We are not asked first to consider what Cajetan. I am asked to give up my assumption that. 20. ed.*^ Both by means of his style and his explicit imperative." setting me on a path that teeters precariously between spheres of discourse and nondiscursive practice—that is. Nor can I begin with a definition of "game" (that they are "amusing. Instead / the reader am asked to consider what is shared between the various proceedings that we call "games. E." But he refuses to specify in words what properties the two geimes might share. and so forth) and derive from this examples that instantiate the rule. Philosophical Investigation. but look!" is the imperative that undermines the tyranny of systematic thought that superimposes discursive identities over related human activities. Rhees. Ralph Maclnemy.Daniel M. 224. Ludwig Wittgenstein. But which s3Tithetic observations exactly? Oddly those indicated by a general term—in this case "game. and at different aspects of these games. 166. manifesting in practice the ad hoc nature of normal synthetic observations. 1973). Gross 73 their multifarious relationships. that is. Portraying Analogy. and others appear. or new schoolmen such as Ross and Mclnemy. G. . all share something in common. "Don't think. See Ross." After a 19. at different card-games. 1958). would call the analogical term "game" as it variously signifies—an approach that tends to privilege some original or paradigmatic use of the word and then systematically derives others by way of a causal or logical argument. we wind up together back at tbe beginning. 22. trans. tbe far side of wbicb took us tbrougb tbe lonely realm of silent refiection. and so on" (Investigations. 1973). Now. 1175). in my describing examples of various kinds of games. 3d ed." or alternatively. Rudolf Teuwsen specifies at least four similarities between the scholastic theory of analogy and Wittgenstein's "informed" theory of family resemblance. "Isn't my knowledge. 1988)." Wittgenstein is suggesting that analogy is the proactive means by wbicb a concept such as "game" can reach beyond extant cases. A. sbowing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these.antik genereller Termini bei Wittgenstein und Thomas von Aquin (München: Karl Alber Freiburg. the term functions analogically. 173. bowever. . In a very helpful study entitled Familienähnlichkeit und Analogie: Zur Sem. Rhees. saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games. but what criteria do we use to make such a judgment? Here The Blue Book helps us: When we say that by our method we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies. Philosophical Grammar. 159. we are now justified when we specify that the term "game" functions neither equivocally nor univocally. ed. that is. Wittgenstein asks. it is important that you should understand that the idea of an analogy being mislea<üng is nothing sharply defined. my concept of a game. For an interesting variation on this passage. The use of expressions constructed on analogical 21.. R. completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? Tbat is. how do we know when our analogies are overextended? Analogies can certainly be misleading.^^ Moreover. But without semantic rules to differentiate games from non-games. and tbe "network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing" between game activities bas been cbaracterized in terms of "family resemblances. thereby created: two sides of the same coin. relationsbips of identity have been left behind. Tbere we wonder once again about relationships between various activities gatbered under tbe rubric of a common term. but ratber in a manner akin to that described by Cajetan.74 Foucault's Analogies sbort lap around the hermeneutic circle. Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell. see Ludwig Wittgenstein. by analogy. wbereas "family resemblance" provides the retroactive means to describe the spacings. or relationships. No sharp boundary can be drawn round the cases in which we should say that a man was misled by an analogy. within a family. but it will have neither use nor meaning if not tied in some understandable way to the network of inherited language g£imes. in most cases. and the rules for systematic change that would restore order and intelligibility on the other. Jekyll and Mr. (28) Are we bound to say that Dr. It is. Beyond . But Dreyfus and Rabinow believe that such question-begging fails to resolve Foucault's archaeological "hesitation. This is Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language. Dreyfus and Rabinow continue: "In the last analysis. Gross 75 patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart. whether Husserlian or Wittgensteinian. claims Wittgenstein in The Blue Book. 1982). In their critictd work Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. in the struggle between ultimate dispersion and discontinuity on the one hand. Foucavilt seems to hesitate.' But this 'system' turns out to be more like a case of Wittgenstein family resemblance. Michel Foucault: Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: U of Chicago P. impossible to show an exact point where an analogy begins to mislead us. And by doing this these expressions may be extremely useful. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow draw Wittgenstein and Foucault together precisely at this point. Hyde are two people or the same person who merely changes? Neither. where. Hubert L. are there metarules describing transformations? he answers that 'archaeology tries to establish the system of transformations that constitute change.^^ "To the question." "For the ordinary use of the word 'person' is what one might call a composite use suitable under the ordinary circumstances" (62). Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. than like rule-governed restructuring of the sort one might find in Piaget or Lévi-Strauss" (74." and so they 23. as if he is drawn to both tdtematives and finds neither entirely satisfactory. and it is as well an argument for the value of analogy that echoes through the writing of Cajetan and Foucault. All depends on how we use the word "person. certain similarities persist while others drop out and new ones show up. original emphasis).Daniel M. Like a true phenomenologist. his solution is to stick as closely as possible to the facts of dispersion and then to call the resxilting description a 'system of transformation' " (74). We can try to make up a new notation or language game if we so desire. linguistic exfoliation occurs according to chance. In the final section. ^540). citing Porta's Magie 7iature«e: "Sympathy plays through the depth ofthe universe in a free state. It can traverse the vastest spaces in an inst£int: it falls bke a thunderbolt from the distant planet upon the man ruled by . It is a principle of mobility. no links prescribed" (The Order of Things. take Foucault beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Foucault's Sympathetic Analogies The later Foucault researches how sympathies have been systematically confined. and not paradigms. sympathy "is not content to spring from a single contact and speed through space. no path has been determined in advance. Foucault continues. and nothing general can be said that might circumscribe such extension. I show how Foucault's poststructuralist methodology crystallized in The History of Sexuality. leaving analogical terms behind. no distance laid down. Foucault describes the magical play of sympathies first in a passage firom The Grder of Things—a passage that purports to describe a figure unique to the Renaissance.76 Foucault's Analogies ultimately tease fi-om Foucault's later work a theory of Kuhnian "paradigms and practices" designed to explain how transformations happen (197-202). circumstance and need. say. Unlike a systematic analogy. They provide a means to make unsystematic moves in a language game. Semantic nodes in our language fork periodically and unpredictably. but actually appears to be a displaced description of Foucault's own poststructuralist methodology. My thesis is precisely that historically sensitive analogies. . But ultimately such moves must confront what Wittgenstein calls "the institution of language and all its surroundings" (Investigations. it excites the things of the world to movement and can draw even the most distant of them together. None have shown more clearly than Foucault that the surroundings of lfinguage one must confront when drawing analogies are composed in terms of history. But fi'om Wittgenstein's perspective. while plotting in his own creative comparisons new routes for escape. . Here.. by Cajetan. to stretch the boundaries of language as described. rather than according to a divine plan. However. No strict rules determine how an expression can be extended by analogy. 23).^* In the History of 24. Foucault's subtle game of argumentative defamiliarization shapes the very last passage of his entire published that planet. and the latter are not projections of the father on a different scale. for the populationist incitements. In "Theatrum Philisophicum" (1970). 72). no direct causality. is a nomadic and ad hoc form of similitude. but one worth close scrutiny. (100) A typically knotty passage. precisely to the extent that it was insular and heteromorphous with respect to the other power mechanisms. Analogies that could march lock-step across a grid of categories inscribing themselves in allegory along the way are left instead to wander from the system that justifies them. and no predetermined proportionedity generates the similarity between the father and the sovereign. like sympathy. for the medicalization of sex and the psychiatrization of its nongenital forms. The point is that no strict rule. Practice. just as society does not imitate the family. But the family organization. Counter-Memory. Sympathetic ansdogies are rendered in their stead. it can be brought into being by a simple contact—as with those "mourning roses that have been used at obsequies' which. That is genealogy in its negative moment. will render all persons who smell them 'sad and moribxmd' " {The Order of Things. 192.'' (And note that this passage comes from a chapter of The History of Sexuality on "Method"): the father in the family is not the "representative" of the sovereign or the state. Its positive moment—exploited by Foucault throughout his scholarly life—can best be seen in volumes two and three of The History of Sexuality. And it is Foucault's job to generate an argument around this seemingly natural analogy that reinscribes its local and accidental character." Resonance. the Renaissance concept of sympathy recurs importantly as "resonance" and the "phantasmatic. Take Foucault's pointed deconstruction of a typically modern analogy: "father:family::sovereign:society. on the other heind. contrasting identities that would be justified against a grid of categories. Gross 77 Sexuality it is the contingency of analogies that matters. Language. See Foucault.Daniel M. The family does not duplicate society. Rather these "insular and heteromorphous" pairings were used at a particular historical moment to implement and justify a particular kind of social policy. . was used to support the great "maneuvers" employed for the Malthusian control of the birthrate. simply from their former adjacency with death. a review of Gilles Deleuze's Différence et Répétition and Logique du Sens. or between the family and society. in many ways. but derive "from a different way of constituting oneself as the ethical subject of one's sexual behavior. 1986). view as our own "remain analogous" to those of fourth-century Greece. the analogical term "pathology" is proposed first as necessary. according to the double meaning of the word pathos." in the scare quotes that remind us that he is making a discursive point. one "sees" it at least in the grapheme. . .78 Foucault's Analogies corpus—a passage d e s i g n e ^ originally to serve as a transition to Les Aveux de la Chair. the anticipated fourth volume of The History of Sexuality. nor could they be univocally related to modem sex pathologies. R. (142) In fact. 3. Foucault. It is important to understand that this medicine of the chrsesis aphrodision [or "uses of pleasure"] did not aim to delimit the "pathological" forms of sexual behavior: rather. Foucault's genealogies regularly entail a reflexive moment when analogical terms are carefully isolated: isolated both from the xmivocal interpretation that produces a mistaken history. Foucault must explain precisely how the "sex pathologies" that begin to emerge in austere medical tracts are not exactly Christian evils. when sexual behavior was perceived as a bearer of unhealthy deviation. The kinship is proposed as self-evident."^^ This historical claim is set up in part by meeting the rhetorical burden demanded by analogical terms lurking in the record. andfromthe antihistory of equivocation. But there must be no misunderstanding on this point: the development in question is in no way similar to the one that occurred much later in Western societies.iliar. 143. The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Vol. . trans. . The sexual act is not an evil." Foucault reminds us. an element of passivity that was also a source of illness. one proposition logically 25. "In these [ancient] medical regimens. Here Foucault does insist upon the kinship of an ancient and a modern sexual "pathology. But the next sentence insists that an ancient sexual pathology is in no way similar to the modem. one sees a certain "pathologization" of the sexual act take place. In a manner reminiscent of Hegel's dialectic. it manifests a permanent focus of possible ills. and then as insufficient to capture the diversity of the practices to which it refers. There he argues that the Christian ethics that we still. This paradox with a purpose should now be fam. 239. on the discursive level. Hurley (New York: Random House. at the root of sexual acts. it uncovered. Among other things. 27. Witness for instance bow tbe classicist David Halperin structures Saint Foucault aroxmd tbe analogical term "homosexual ascesis.Daniel M. tbe past is prepared for strategic use. Foucault takes any weigbty description as a function of power. to characterize in language tbe troubled relationsbip between language and practice marked by tbe analogical aporia. Foucault's passive positivities loosen tbe ties tbat bind form to identity. 1992). and what purposes are tbereby served. I have been arguing that the style that draws these two periods of Foucault's work together is speciñcally analogical. Catherine Porter and Arnold I. not Christian . ed. out of tbis logical contradiction.'^^ It is tbe bsillmark of Foucavdt's work.. However." in Goldstein. Arnold I."^^ Tben the "structviral isomorphism" between ancient and modern forms of ascesis is detailed as Foucault would do in his skeptical moments: "it is secular. 102. Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford UP. . calls not for less pleasure but for vastly more pleasure. Second. "The Final Foucault and His Ethics. Foucault believes tbat tbe precise contours of tuiy a fortiori description are critical. Tbey can be used. in wbat historical context. Wbat a study such as Halperin's suggests. Sodometries: Renaissance Texts. See also Paul Veyne. tbe psirticular danger of using discursive means recklessly to identify tbe nondiscursive is set before tbe eyes stylistically. 18. Davidson. be it the "certain constant manner of speaking" of Foucault's early texts or the style renversé of his genealogies. two new directions are opened for tbougbt: first. Gross 79 negates tbe otber. In sbort. unlike Wittgenstein. 1995). it makes room for an argument detailing bow two practices can differ in every way wbile maintaining a kinsbip—in tbe sense first described by Wittgenstein." and so on. but neitber are tbey inert descriptions. "Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault." trans. as do works by the likes of Paul Veyne. ." The Content of the Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. His analogies do not commit tbe bistorian to a surreptitious metapbysics. 139-40. by wbicb modern subjects can acbieve transcendence. Critical Inquiry 20 (Autumn 1993): 1-9. or tbe work of any rigorous analogical tbinker. Modern Sexualities (Stanford: Stanford UP. Davidson. Hayden White indeed claims that a Rousselian nongeneralized "style" holds Foucault's works together. Jonathan Goldberg. Tbis done. 1987). the History of Ethics. It matters wbo tells tbe story. and Ancient Thought. 25. 63-80. Arnold 26. David Halperin. But." Tbe term is first elaborated as tbe "spiritual exercises of etbical selffasbioning. "Foucault's Discourse: The Historiography of Anti-Humanism. See White. one of which he terms "metaphorical acquisition": "Metaphorical acquisition works by teasing out latent homologies." Like Foucault describing the play of sympathies in the Renaissemce. the New Historicism. . and Jonathan Goldberg. painting. analogies between political and aesthetic 28. Stephen Greenblatt famously articulates the logic of analogous thinking in Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England (Berkeley: U of California P. in Jacqueline Lichtenstein's The Eloquence of Color: Rhetoric and Painting in the French Classical Age (a book that appeared in the "Cultural Poetics" series edited by Stephen Greenblatt): "in painting. Zwicker.80 Foucault's Analogies Davidson. but it depends equally upon a deliberate distímcing or distortion that precedes the disclosure of likeness. color had the same relation to drawing that the body had to discourse in rhetoric: the same uncomfortable place that Platonic metaphysics assigned to the visible and its images. Hence a play will insist upon the difference between its representation and the "real. . 1988). the French Revolution deconstructed the romantic self "^® For literary historians. "Thus we can understand that the eloquent body and pictorial color provoked similar perplexities in different domains that are centuries apart. There Greenblatt defines cultural poetics as "study of the collective making of distinct cultured practices tind inquiry into the relations among these practices. Rhetoric wished to control its eloquence within the regulated discourse. 29. Not surprisingly." only to draw out to the analogy or proportion linking them." and then specifies the relational modes that transfer a social practice to the stage. Greenblatt's characterization of historical "content" bleeds into his own methodology. . 6-7. 1993). 5-12. Zwicker's Refiguring Revolutions: Aesthetics and Politics from the English Revolution to the Romantic Revolution: "where the English Civil War had fractured the Renaissance body politic. systems of likeness. The Eloquence of Color: Rhetoric and Painting in the French Classical Age. Refiguring Revolutions: Aesthetics and Politics from the English Revolution to the Romantic Revolution (Berkeley: U of California P. Kevin Sharpe and Stephen N. 15. . for instance. to inscrihe the rules of discoiirse within its images. similitudes."^^ Or consider the diachronic analogy already formed in the title of Kevin Sharpe and Stephen N. Analogy in a Foucauldian mode plays a central role. is that Foucault's revisionist history of ethics far exceeds the tour de force of a clever and contrary antihistorian. trans." Jacqueline Lichtenstein. and especially its literary offspring. 1998). Emily McVarish (Berkeley: U of California P. a historical method that allows one to move fiuidly between disparate discourses also has informed cultural history. It in fact provides a positive historical method for scholars working in gender studies and beyond. S. 1980). and Politics in the Age of Milton (Ithaca: Cornell UP. Whether the relation30. Liberty. Foucault's historical method is not completely without precedent. The Death ofNature: Women. What purposes are served in comparing the pervert to the libertine? What research programs created? What historical narratives rewritten? Though innovative insofar as power is an explicit concern when establishing sympathetic analogies.^" If anything. . "The Anglican Origins of Modem Science: The Metaphysical Foimdations ofthe Whig Constitution. G. Remember. Foucault avoids overextending analogies by asking in each case how discursive similarities are a function of power. Otto Mayr. Surprising is that the precedent is not established by Nietzsche—Foucault's chosen master—but rather by the very masters of late nineteenth-century German historicism against whom Nietzsche's genealogical method is positioned: Ranke. while historians of science have favored analogies between political and scientific discourses. later in the tradition. "Social Uses of Science. a form of relationship between I and Thou.Daniel M. and. sympathy is a basic condition for historical knowledge." in The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth Century Science." including Carolyn Merchant. Poetry. ed. Jacob. who argues in his preface that discourses of seventeenth-centiuy political philosophy and natural philosophy are inseparable. and two early works by Stephen Shapin. Gross 81 discourses are a favorite topic. Rogers reveals his methodological inspiration: "I have found more congenial to my own approach the histories of science that have studied the politics of natural philosophy with an eye to the analogical rhetoric of physical explanation. and "Of God's and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes." Isis 72 (1981): 187-215. Dilthey. 95-139. literary and other sorts of cultural historians overextend analogies just as Wittgenstein feared. James R. as for Foucault. Jacoh and Margaret C. 1996). as Gadamer describes it. rather than providing causal explanations for apparent similarities—the dirty work of historical reasoning. It is. hopping nimbly firom one discourse to another or one historical period to another. and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row. A kind of Foucauldian analogy in the history of science is exemplified by John Rogers in The Matter of Revolution: Science. For these proponents ofthe hermeneutic method. Droysen. 1986). Rousseau and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Authority. HansGeorg Gadamer. Ecology. a form of love that allows the historian to achieve an understanding ofthe past that would otherwise be impossible. and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. In a footnote. 1980)."/sis 71 (1980): 251-67. What is more. nor does the object leave the historian unaffected. Historical analysis that relates modern ethics to an ancient aesthetics of existence is "useful" to Foucault precisely for this reason. 2d ed. it can relate and transform ways of being as well. sjnnpathy is also much more than simply a condition of knowledge. Iowa 31. or even inanimate things." The University of Iowa Iowa City. "iuiother person is transformed at the same time. Thus researching what we are not. But as Gadamer is quick to point out. the austere art of living in fourth-century Greece from the familiar nsirrative that renders it proportionally analogous to a modern science of sex. it need not be just an emotional condition relating two people. Foucault frees it to resonate with and transform our modern way of living. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. sympathy guides the choice of historical object and initiates interpretation. trans. 1991). it is when things enter into analogical resonance that "it becomes worthwhile to think. is not the historian's only task. Through it. sympathy is an intense and mutually transformative attraction. By isolating. or how things differ. .. Hans-Georg Gadamer. for instance.g2 Foucault's Analogies ship of Thucidydes to Pericles or Rsuike to Luther. Marshall (New York: Crossroad."'^ The sympathy (or antipathy) a historian feels toward his or her object is not pristine and detached. On the contrary. 232-33. 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