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The Historical Journalhttp://journals.cambridge.org/HIS Additional services for The Historical Journal: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here FRENCH AND BRITISH POST-WAR IMPERIAL AGENDAS AND FORGING AN ARMENIAN HOMELAND AFTER THE GENOCIDE: THE FORMATION OF THE LÉGION D'ORIENT IN OCTOBER 1916 ANDREKOS VARNAVA The Historical Journal / Volume 57 / Issue 04 / December 2014, pp 997 - 1025 DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X13000605, Published online: 12 November 2014 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X13000605 How to cite this article: ANDREKOS VARNAVA (2014). FRENCH AND BRITISH POST-WAR IMPERIAL AGENDAS AND FORGING AN ARMENIAN HOMELAND AFTER THE GENOCIDE: THE FORMATION OF THE LÉGION D'ORIENT IN OCTOBER 1916. The Historical Journal, 57, pp 997-1025 doi:10.1017/S0018246X13000605 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/HIS, IP address: 129.96.82.202 on 14 Nov 2014 The Historical Journal, , (), pp. – © Cambridge University Press doi:./SX F R E N C H A N D B R I T I S H P O S T - WA R IMPERIAL AGENDAS AND FORGING AN ARMENIAN HOMELAND AFTER THE GENOCIDE: THE FORMATION OF THE L É G I O N D’O R I E N T I N O C T O B E R * A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA Flinders University A B S T R A C T . In October , the French government agreed with Armenian political elites to establish a Légion of Armenian volunteers in British Cyprus to fight the common Ottoman enemy. Despite British, French, and even Armenian rejections of such a Légion during different times throughout and early , all sides overcame earlier concerns. Understanding how they managed to overcome these concerns will allow for this little-known episode in the history of the Great War in the eastern Mediterranean to contribute to the knowledge on () the complex French and British wartime stances towards this region, driven by imperialism and humanitarianism; () the ability of local elites to draw concessions from the Allies; () the important role played by local British and French colonial and military officers; and () broader historiographical debates on the responses to the Armenian Genocide. This article explores the origins of how the Entente co-opted Armenians in their eastern Mediterranean campaigns, but also made them into pawns in the French and British reinvention of their imperial rivalry in this region in order to achieve their post-war imperialist agendas. I On October , in the comfort of the French Embassy in London, Boghos Nubar Pasha, the founder and first president of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (–), and the head of the Armenian National Delegation in Paris from December , was shown the Sykes–Picot Agreement. The British and French diplomats present at the meeting, Mark Sykes and Francois Georges-Picot respectively, the co-authors of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, led Nubar to understand that the Armenian-populated areas of the School of International Studies, Flinders University, GPO Box , Adelaide , South Australia andrekos.varnava@flinders.edu.au * I would like to acknowledge the following people in the making of this article: Dr David Close, Dr Matthew Fitzpatrick, Dr Evan Smith, and Ms Justine Tilman from Flinders University, and the anonymous reviewers for The Historical Journal. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA Ottoman Empire would be divided into two parts after the war: one composing the eastern vilayets of Van, Erzerum, Bitlis, Dersim, and Trabzon, under Russian control, and the other including Cilicia and the three western vilayets of Sivas, Kharput, and Diayarbekir, under French control. Thus, the Armenianpopulated areas of the Ottoman Empire would come under the protection of two of the Allied powers of the Great War. Nubar recalled that Georges-Picot had asserted that the French would be willing to grant the Armenians an autonomous state under their control, but ‘the Armenians should earn the right to the liberation of their fatherland, by providing volunteers for a planned expedition in Asia Minor’. Accordingly, they agreed to form the Légion d’Orient, with the following particulars: . The constitution of the Légion d’Orient aimed to have Armenians contribute to the liberation of their fatherland in exchange for granting them new entitlements in line with their national aspirations. . The Armenian Légionnaires would only fight against the Ottoman Empire and only on the soil of their fatherland. . The Armenian Légion would constitute the future nucleus of the Armenian army in the future Armenian state. This agreement planned for the establishment of a French protectorate over the Armenian-populated areas of western Armenia in exchange for creating an Armenian Légion in the French army and thus contributing to an Allied victory against the Ottoman Empire. This article does not deal with the operational history of the Armenian Légion, yet it is important to understand its wider military and geo-strategic significance once operational. Six battalions with roughly men were formed and trained on Cyprus, and those that served in the Palestine Campaign, specifically at the battle of Arara, exhibited ‘good fighting qualities’ according to General Edmund Allenby, who was in charge of the campaign. The Légion d’Orient, which also contained Syrian Arabs (initially trained on Cyprus, but later moved to Syria), was renamed Armenian Légion after the armistice when it formed a part of the French Army of Occupation of Cilicia and its surrounding areas. Its role in this capacity has been the subject of some Boghos Nubar memorandum on creation of Légion d’Orient, Dec. , London, The National Archives (TNA), Foreign Office (British) (FO) //; Boghos Nubar, ‘Note on the circumstances and conditions under which the Légion d’Orient was created in ’, Dec. , Paris, Nubarian Library (NL), ‘Légion d’Orient’, Armenian Volunteers, Ibid. ‘Miscellany’, box . Despatch from General Allenby, Oct. , London Gazette, Dec. , TNA, War Office (British) (WO) /; Boghos Nubar, ‘Note’, Dec. , NL, ‘Légion d’Orient’, Armenian Volunteers, ‘Miscellany’, box . See Simon Jackson, ‘Diaspora politics and developmental empire: the Syro-Lebanese at the League of Nations’, Arab Studies Journal, (), pp. –, at pp. –. See N. E. Bou-Nacklie, ‘Les troupes speciales: religious and ethnic recruitment, –’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, (), pp. –; Eliezer published a potted account of the first proposals for the establishment of an Armenian Légion and the implications on the proposal to land forces at Alexandretta. The Légion d’Orient was formed to serve the British and French (in particular) strategic-military agenda against the Ottoman Empire and post-war French imperial ambitions as these had evolved in spring in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. –. ed.. which was held in the Armenian Library and Museum of America from Sept. Of note is the exhibit honouring the Armenian Légion titled ‘Forgotten heroes: the Armenian Légion and the Great War’. as well as for Armenians during the implementation of the Genocide. Albeit in a limited way. The hope of Armenian political elites for a secure autonomous homeland was merely a corollary of these broader French and British agendas. Not much academic material exists. or as an Allied humanitarian response to the Armenian Genocide. French. It attempts to show that the Légion’s formation transpired after many rejections – first from the British. the Légion has also been discussed in relation to the Armenian Genocide (see below). both in relation to the Franco-Turkish War and the subsequent exodus of Armenians. and Turkish language historiography to reconstruct the story of the formation of the Légion d’Orient in October . More recently. MA. ). then the French. Armenians of New England: celebrating a culture and preserving a heritage (Belmont. pp. pp. mostly memoirs. Robert O. nothing definitive has been published in the English language on its formation (particularly of the Armenian component) in October . This article uses British. and then from Armenian political elites – during a transition period for British and French policy-makers in relation to their approach to the war in the Near and Middle East and their post-war role there. ‘The Armenian Légion and its destruction of the Armenian community of Cilicia’. ). ‘In defence of the homeland: New England Armenians and the Légion d’Orient’. The Armenians in the late Ottoman period (Ankara. Armenian. an employee of the Turkish embassy in Washington. in Marc A. Tauber. Krikorian. pp. –.. Yucel Guclu. –. let alone the rather long build-up that included numerous rejections. Ibid. –. ‘La Légion d’Orient et La Légion Arabe’ (The Légion d’Orient and the Arab Légion). and Cypriot archival sources as well as British. Yet.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T controversy. ). to the end of Feb. ed. There is little English-language historiography on the Légion d’Orient and what there is betrays a deep politicization: Turkish authors primarily use its existence to justify the Ottoman government’s ‘deportation’ policy. Revue Française d’Historie d’Outre-Mer. see also Mim Kemal Oke. Most publications lack a comprehensive archival research base. Mamigonian. in Turkkaya Ataov. French. despite some works on its role in these events. This argument will contradict the claims of Armenian Genocide ‘denialists’ that the Légion was established because of French and British support for ‘Armenian aspirations’ in a conspiracy to topple the Ottoman government. while Armenian authors portray it as a celebration of Armenian national awakening. The Armenian question. . – (Nicosia. pp. .. Stanford Shaw. (). – (London. but was far more schematic and patchy. KıbrısAnadolu ekseninde Ermeni dog˘u Lejyonu (Armenian Eastern Légion in the Cyprus-Anatolia axis) (Ankara. ). A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA As part of justifying his denial of an Ottoman Genocide of Armenians. – (Salt Lake City. ‘Establishment and activities of French Légion d’Orient (Eastern Légion) in the light of French archival documents’. ). and subaltern agency are most important. –: Fransız Ermeni kampları I˙ ngiliz esir kampları ve Atatürkçü Kıbrıs Türkü (Cyprus. –. The Jewish Legion and the First World War (New York. –: Lawrence sets Arabia ablaze (Oxford. . see my review of Gucel’s book in Reviews in History. The exceptions are Akaby Nassibian’s book from . and even Armenian elites rejected a Légion during various periods in and early . Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia. he claimed that the British and Armenians (i. See David Murphy. There is a significant historiography on the formation of Arabs into fighting units and the Jewish Legion later in for the purposes of defeating the Ottoman Empire. Kıbrıs’ta Monarga (Bog˘aztepe) Ermeni Lejyonu Kampı (Monarga camp of Armenian Légion in Cyprus) (Ankara. ). using the Turkish Military Archives. –. NY. confusing the chronology of events and the context of French and British decisions. particularly the Ottoman Empire. ). Donald Bloxham. yet no French archives. nor does he explore the circumstances that led to the creation of the Légion in October . see also M. –. the entanglement of humanitarianism and imperialism. which provides much narrative and not as much analysis and context as the less detailed account in Donald Bloxham’s study. to justify the Ottoman ‘deportation’ policy of spring . Kıbrıs. There is a broader historiography than that of the Légion d’Orient and Armenian Genocide. Halil Aytekin. The Turkish-language historiography on the Légion d’Orient is no better. nationalism and the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford. The former produced two monographs on the subject. ). Serdar Palabiyik. Britain. and France.uk/ reviews/review/). the interconnected and sometimes contradictory themes of rival imperialisms and nationalisms. Review of Armenian Studies. ). British prisoner camps and Kemalist Cypriot Turks) (Istanbul. Both were fundamentally flawed because they use the existence of the Légion. and Martin Watts. and that is the British recruitment of Ottoman subjects into the ‘grand coalition’ against the Central Powers. with the Yucel Guclu. pp.e. The great game of genocide: imperialism. ). UT. French. –. pp. pp. –: French Armenian camps. but also because there was a greater level of humanitarianism involved. Here. centring on the work of Armenian Genocide denialists Ulvi Keser and Halil Aytekin. The Armenian case differs because it was under French command. ). pp. all of them en masse) colluded to topple the Ottoman Empire.ac. Ulvi Keser. thus justifying the ‘relocation’ of the Armenians. The Arab revolt. Ulvi Keser.history. whereas the British justified encouraging the Arab revolt and the formation of the Jewish Legion by propagating against the oppression of Ottoman rule. while the latter accessed archives from Turkey. Akaby Nassibian. (). –. His account fails to explore let alone identify the reasons the British. So. Britain and the Armenian question. not formed until October . () (www. ). Against massacre: humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman Empire. NY. and Andrekos Varnava. An empire divided. Religion. The role of protecting Ottoman Christian minorities was extended to the Armenians. needed more than humanitarianism to propel it and was often an ex post facto justification for intervention. Davide Rodogno has argued that European humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman Empire date back to the s. thus motivating both the French and the British to form the Légion d’Orient. the incentive to win the war was linked to post-war imperial expansion. particularly earlier in the century. In his recent study. Fitzpatrick. –: images of the self and others (Boulder. ‘British and Greek liberalism and imperialism in the long nineteenth century’. ). Daughton. After the Crimean War. and Michael Boro Petrovich. CO. ). in the case of the French. although there was a religious dimension to Russian feeling.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T Armenians both the British and the French had used the Armenian Genocide to create a public humanitarian response against Ottoman savagery. a corollary of the ‘Eastern Question’ was how the Ottoman state recognized the European Powers. the Catholic presence in Syria and to a lesser extent Palestine propelled French imperial interests in this part of the Ottoman Empire. ). imperial. –. . European humanitarianism and imperialism and their links with the ‘Armenian Question’ must be understood within the broader ‘Eastern Question’. In the Anglo-Turkish Davide Rodogno. This. ed. See. and/or strategic. British imperialism in Cyprus. and specifically on how the three Allied powers in the First World War all had a traditional claim to ‘protecting’ the Christians in the Ottoman Empire and a ‘special’ relationship with the Armenians. as Rodogno showed. Ibid.. – (Princeton. Armenian protection was not guided by religious affiliation. and the making of French colonialism.. Egypt is an exception to Rodogno’s interpretation. but with significant differences. of course. NY. For information on French liberal imperialism. For example. During the nineteenth century. In the case presented here. see J. – (Oxford. and New York. but by liberalism (particularly for the British and French) and imperialism. but the ‘humanitarianism’ usually hid behind the real motivations (and sometimes was an ex post facto justification). for example. Liberal imperialism in Europe (London. did not automatically result in a decision to form the Légion. For British liberal imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. as the protectors of the Catholic (Maronite and other ‘eastern’ Catholics) and Orthodox Christians respectively. which were usually political. since intervention. This explains why the determination to form it materialized only after the Sykes–Picot Agreement was signed. ibid. particularly the French and the Russians. – (New York. Panslavism and national identity in Russia and in the Balkans. NJ. in Matthew P. see Andrekos Varnava. pp. and intervention could only be made if more than one European power was involved. –: the inconsequential possession (Manchester. P. ). republicanism. economic. Russia and the Balkans. also Benedict Humphrey Sumner. The emergence of Russian panslavism. Russia focused on the Slavic Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. ). ). – (Oxford. See Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric. But by the eve of the First World War. chs. NY. For the reforms issue. see TNA. others on the Russo-Ottoman border joined the Russians. Contemporary Review. Armenian political elites were influenced by British. actual and possible: a study in the Eastern Question’. –. From Dardanelles to Palestine: a true story of five battle fronts of Turkey and her Allies and a harem romance (Boston. British imperialism in Cyprus. Daughton. –. and French alliance during the First World War. pp. In God’s empire: French missionaries and the modern world (Oxford and New York. See also Bloxham. ‘Armenian exiles in Cyprus’. most European governments sympathized with the Armenians after the massacres perpetuated against them by Abdul Hamid’s regime in the s. pp. eds. India Office Records (IOR) Political and Secret Annual Files. Bloxham. ). pp. Contemporary Review. – and . The great game of genocide. ). yet no action was taken to prevent them at the time or in the future. and relations between the two countries deteriorated. for the British case. Varnava. Patrick Geddes. (). –. were closer to the French and British. The great game of genocide. pp. Lord Beaconsfield’s Conservative government aimed to establish informal imperial hegemony over Asia Minor and Syria. now led by the Committee of Union and Progress. He later served in the Légion d’Orient after discovering that family had died during the Genocide. for French missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. pp. having set aside violent revolutionary approaches. –. This helps explain the readiness of Armenian political elites to seek protection and to align themselves with the Russian. and European powers were locked in discussions with the Ottoman government. ‘Cyprus. it was British and French liberals who sympathized more with the ambitions of Armenian secular political elites for more representation. IOR/L/PS// . with further massacres in . –. Bloxham. but especially the revolutionary character of opposition groups in the latter. Sarkis Torossian. but this failed because Sultan Abdul Hamid II refused to implement reforms. –. the British government led the way in compelling the Ottoman Empire to agree to reforms for its Christian communities in its eastern provinces – a clear reference to Armenians. Nevertheless. Although conservative governments were in power in both France and Britain at the time. Sarkis Torossian was one fascinating case. Although some Armenians fought in the Ottoman army. IOR/L/PS// .. IOR/L/PS// . while political elites in Europe and the US advocated a British Armenian Légion. Britain and the Armenian Question. The great game of genocide. British and French governments were able to create much public humanitarian feeling and action in support of Armenian refugees. on implementing reforms that would benefit Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. both of . pp. P. see Owen White and J. British. Political and Secret Annual Files. . pp. –. FO//. the work of the following people in Cyprus: Emma Cons. See. Armenian political elites.. and –. –. For their part. More generally. and Russian political developments. – and . French. MA. and Political and Secret Annual Files. Nassibian. (). Ibid. British Library (BL). A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA Convention and in the Treaty of Berlin. pp. He was in charge of the first fort at the Dardanelles entrance and was awarded for his bravery in stopping the British attempt to force the Dardanelles. November –April ’. Armenian. The British and French governments linked the protection of Ottoman Armenians with their own imperial interests in the eastern Mediterranean. which helps explain the delays in forming the Légion d’Orient. and trans. . the war second: the British. The Armenians were pawns in the greater game of post-war French and British imperial expansion. in this case in relation to the Armenian Genocide. Yet the Gallipoli failure did see them reconsider their traditional imperial interests on the Ottoman periphery in the eastern Mediterranean. Hereafter. Andrekos Varnava. July . French Foreign Ministry Archives (FFMA). Paris. Cairo to Paris. doc. . especially General Sir John Maxwell. But even then it took the best part of a year after the Gallipoli failure for the British and French to start focusing their military strength there. vol. Early View () (http://onlinelibrary. – AA (hereafter. to Dec. and thus. . The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war did not result in the start of a serious military front in any of the areas where either the British or French had imperial interests. the war second’. Boghos Nubar papers). Subsequently. MA. –: documents (Waltham. on April . See Varnava. ‘Imperialism first. ). who he feared would be massacred by the Ottomans in revenge for Armenians near the Russian border joining the Russian army. French and British imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire remained informal until well into . humanitarianism. II Boghos Nubar first proposed using Armenians as part of an Allied landing at Alexandretta in November in order to protect Cilician Armenians. The landing at Alexandretta appealed to many British strategic planners. Boghos Nubar requested to go to Paris to defend the interests of Ottoman Armenians because he wished to convince the French government of the need for the Entente to protect the Armenian population. . Historical Research. land troops at Alexandretta. Turkey. succeed or fail. as their withdrawal from Gallipoli took them to Salonika. ed. Paris./.wiley. I. Apr./abstract). volume in Arabic numerals and issue in Roman numerals will be provided..com/doi/. Boghos Nubar’s papers and the Armenian question.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T which the British rejected in March . Boghos Nubar to Kevork V. the Armenian Genocide had no impact on British and French war strategy. Consequently. This was despite the fact that originally the plan was to force the Dardanelles by ships alone and. War –. Despite the many decades leading up to the Great War when such interests were cultivated informally (more formally in the British cases of Cyprus and Egypt). an Armenian Legion. This was overlooked instead for landing troops on Gallipoli. and deliberations on where to attack the Ottoman Empire. through incorporating them into a Syria under French control. as Rodogno has shown for the century before the Great War. Aug. . was not the main motivation for the British and French to take the side of the Armenians by forming the Légion. Vatche Ghazarian. ‘Imperialism first. . including: the uncertainty over the Alexandretta landing. and the unsuccessful attempt to force the Dardanelles with the navy alone on March . to FO. Yanky Fachler. informed Sir Edward Grey. having also rejected in Cypriot and Jewish Legion proposals. ‘Pinhas Rutenberg and the establishment of the Jewish Légion of ’. TNA. pp. the British ambassador to Washington. FO// . FO telegram to Sir C. of course. TNA. pp. and George H. Secretary to Army Council to under-secretary at FO. the war secretary. –. Lord Kitchener. p. did he know what had transpired four days earlier. Spring-Rice. ). the Russian ambassador to Washington had told him that the Armenian National Defence Committee were offering to send . (). that they were cold about forming such Légions. Studies in Zionism. In any event. but I feel little doubt that it would lead to the massacre of a large number of innocent Armenians. see also Matityahu Mintz. pp. the British considered that the proposal would result in the killing of non-combatant Armenians. Spring-Rice. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA commander-in-chief of the British forces in Egypt. Cassar. pp. Jan. upon the advice of the naval and army high command in charge of forcing the Dardanelles. and CO//. BL. On the day ( April) that the Ottoman government arrested leading Armenian elites in Constantinople. pp. Cecil Spring-Rice. Mar. and Winston Churchill. Apr. . Kitchener’s war (Dulles. Apr. ‘The Zion Mule Corps and its Irish commander’. CO//. before and after the Genocide. . TNA. the first lord of the Admiralty. Les A. and as shown below. Cassar. Cassar. the day that Armenians commemorate the Armenian Genocide. FO// . Harold Eustace Satow opined: ‘I don’t know what value from a military point of view an Armenian rising in Cilicia would have. NY. . ). Under-secretary at WO to under-secretary at FO.’ Little. Decipher of telegram from Sir C. CO//. History Ireland. . Watts. CO//. The Jewish Légion and the First World War. CO//. Colonial Office (British) (CO) //. F/. . But there were complications. Harold Eustace Satow. Curzon papers. London. (). The original plan was to land troops at Alexandretta regardless of whether the forcing of the Dardanelles by the navy had succeeded or failed. Washington. VA. . The Foreign Office was equally opposed. the British government had rejected the formation of a Légion of Armenian volunteers on March for various reasons. –. Carlyon. TNA. p. Gallipoli (New York. The French and the Dardanelles. Minute. Apr. . Churchill to Kitchener. FO//. In a minute on April. TNA. – and –. –. George H. –. the British foreign secretary. . men via Canada to fight in operations in Cilicia and would pay for uniforms and passage to a Canadian port. ). –. The War Office would not entertain this or any other scheme and Spring-Rice was accordingly informed. FO///. such as the French demanding a role in a landing. FO//. See files TNA. But this plan was overlooked for landing troops at Gallipoli. Apr. pp. that George Bakhmeteff. The French and the Dardanelles: a study of failure in the conduct of war (London. but it could not remain idle as reports of massacres continued to pour in. the committee now wanted to ‘concentrate a force in Cyprus and make landings at Mersina and. The committee was certain of . and all that it wanted was for British officers to train them on Cyprus. various quarters pushed for one after the Ottoman extermination policy. a Cairo attorney and secretary to Boghos Nubar. Bulgaria. which called for the raising of . on August. FO to CO. . that he rejected it because ‘the Army Council have repeatedly expressed the view that half organised volunteer risings of this description would have little military value and that they should not be encouraged. McMahon to Grey. which was being included in the discussion because the scheme involved training the Armenians on Cyprus. July . and Mihran Damadian. Moutafoff and A. who would be trained on Cyprus to land on the northern Syrian coast. enclosures signed by T. he discussed the proposal with Vahan Malezian. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur Henry McMahon. Greece. Sykes informed Maxwell of the plan. these actions could paralyse Ottoman movements in Asia Minor. FO//. TNA.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T In any event. TNA. May . /.’ Despite the Army Council rejecting the Armenian scheme to raise a contingent. About a week later. landing about men to seize Suedieh and create disorder in the vicinity. Modifying their earlier proposal. men now in Russia. McMahon to Grey. CO//. disclosing that a volunteer movement under their direction was developing in America and elsewhere. p. the Committee of Armenian National Defence reiterated their appeal to Maxwell. TNA. There is also little doubt that such an expedition . . a Conservative MP and a long time traveller to the Ottoman Empire. British officials in Egypt continued to show interest. TNA. especially now that the latter are fully occupied with the Russians on the Caucasus and the Anglo-French in Gallipoli’. July . . Grey informed the Colonial Office. Gamsaragan. There. and the rest workers in the US. Armenia.. at Beilan’. In July . . Anti-Taurus and Amanus Mountains against the Turks. Once they had ‘disembarked a large force from Cyprus they would have no difficulty in holding the Taurus. July . FO//. a Hunchak and a leader of the Sassoun rebellion of –. If successful. FO//. the Armenian Committee of National Defence addressed a letter to General Maxwell in Egypt. The committee recognized that it was useless for the Entente to now land at Cilicia as previously suggested. incl. and America. the high commissioner in Egypt since January . p. sent Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Sykes. notes on military operation at Cilicia by the Committee of Armenian National Defence. to consult with Armenian representatives in Cairo. if strong enough. . calling on British military action on the Cilician coast in order to stop the massacres against the Armenians and that there were Armenian volunteers in Egypt willing to participate. of whom had fought in the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies. . Armenians. would result in the massacre of many innocent Armenians. From approval of the scheme. [but] the difficulty is that the Turks would immediately take reprisals on the Armenians actually in their power. Buchanan told Torcom that he sympathized with the scheme and its cause. leaving with him his scheme for the organization of Armenian volunteers for service against the Ottoman Empire. TNA. Aug. July . TNA. Torcom outline of Armenian Corps. The Armenians only needed from the Allies arms. Aug. FO//. and might be useful as a feint to conceal other operations’. FO to Findlay. Aug. Aug. . WO to FO. and there operate as comitajis (irregular fighting units) along Macedonian lines. and cover for their landing. ‘causing the enemy uneasiness as regards a vulnerable point. men into thirty battalions. The corps would be concentrated at Egypt and under the command of either the French or the British. . TNA. Minute. . TNA. H. Marseilles. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA with the rest forming bands of about fifty and landing at various points between Ayas and Piyas. the War Office stood firm in rejecting the schemes. Also. Torcom visited George Buchanan. TNA. TNA. Aug. allowing the force to enter the mountains before the snow began. Buchanan to Grey. pushing north towards Zeitun and Albistan. incl. and the military benefits outlined by the Armenian committee in Cairo and Torcom. FO//. desirous of having another front in Anatolia or Syria to relieve pressures in Transcaucasia. . Langley to Army Council. operations would commence on October. Sykes opined that the concentration of such a force on Cyprus would be profitable even if held in reserve. . Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Office minuted that the scheme proposed by the Committee is not over ambitious and might be successful. and New York. p. Sykes added that it would be better to give the Armenians something to do rather than have them become restless and perhaps divided. Harold Nicolson. men into ten battalions. transport. munitions. FO to DMO. Sykes to Maxwell. Torcom. Torcom claimed that he could recruit . the Ottoman extermination policy. Aug. and massacres would immediately follow in Constantinople and elsewhere. but believed it would be hard to gather the volunteers and provide them with arms. FO//. TNA. Aug. through recruiting centres at Alexandria. if only in creating a diversion . a decision the Foreign Office supported. FO//. TNA. . . so if approved on August. FO//. .). a Bulgarian Armenian serving in the Russian army. .. and perhaps even . the British ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Petrograd.. Aug. The Russians. . the force would be operational in eight weeks. . Despite Russian encouragement. FO// // (M. FO//. FO//. . pushed the British with a similar scheme put forward by Captain A. the French would need to approve and could provide their contingent at the Dardanelles as an army of occupation of the Adana Vilayet if the scheme succeeded. Torcom. Liverpool. . What was missing from the equation was the additional gains – war spoils and therefore imperialism – and these had not been considered let alone determined. that they were bewildered that the British and French had not attacked Alexandretta in because the area was an Ottoman point of weakness in so many ways. .. the war second’. the British also determined that the investment in finance. which was to defend themselves against the inevitable through the formation of an Armenian Légion. See Varnava. . and of the Financial responsibilities in which it would involve this country’. and Andrekos Varnava. warrants a separate article. . This takes further the cases explored by Rodogno across the century before the Great War started. ‘but the results likely to be achieved .F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T As for Torcom’s proposal. pp. The story of the Musa Dagh refugees. alongside the Armenian approach. . In a ‘reverse-type’ of humanitarianism. usually imperial. (). Ultimately. TNA.. See various cases in Rodogno. In weighing up the idea.e. Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Ellison. chief of the German General Staff. and in the subsequent French rejection of a French Armenian Légion. and the WO to FO. are not such . Against massacre. where he shows how humanitarian intervention required both a favourable European political climate and one or more European powers believing that their interests. so with the benefit of hindsight. to justify His Majesty’s Government in supporting the scheme in view of the difficulties that its adoption would entail. this was a weak position. while the area was as much a French interest as it was of British interest. imperialism). and training did not justify the potential results. made famous in Franz Werfel’s epic tale. ‘British military intelligence in Cyprus during the Great War’. materials.). ‘Imperialism first. Sept. while British intelligence in the area was certainly aware of this. –. . their approach to preventing massacres was not to provoke the Ottomans or to embark upon a ‘humanitarian intervention’ in response to predicted massacres of ‘allies’ in the event of a landing. FO//// (M. were at threat before intervening. the Army Council thought it ‘more practical’ than any of the others previously submitted. yet for the purposes of this article it is necessary to establish how the refugees played an important part in why the French were approached to form the Légion in and rejected it. War in History. Both British and German military personnel wrote after the war. These ‘potential results’ must be understood in two ways: defeating the Ottoman Empire and in post-war spoils (i. The War and Foreign Offices had a number of reasons to oppose the formation of an Armenian Légion. III The British rejection of an Armenian Légion was further reflected in the British and French rejection of General Maxwell’s plan to use the able-bodied Musa Dagh survivors to launch raids on Alexandretta. and Paul von Hindenburg. deputy quartermaster general during the Gallipoli campaign. see also Le captitaine de vaisseau Chamonard. . the colonial secretary. in which he bluntly wanted the admiral informed that I greatly regret that in view of the very limited accommodation in Cyprus which has already hypothecated for other refugees it is quite impossible to receive them. . replying to a distress signal. Sept. . in Arthur Beylerian. ). I may add that the introduction of victims of insurrectionary fighting amongst this partly Turkish and partly Christian population is politically inadvisable. See Sourian intro. . Sept. first published in German. Sept. rather than ethnic or For the dramatization. various. Yet. the high commissioner of Cyprus. Sept. Telegram. Escarde de la Mediterranee to Elgood. The British authorities did not want the responsibility of looking after the Musa Dagh refugees and neither they nor the French knew what to do with them. telegraphed him that . The eventual introduction of the Légion into the Christian–Muslim mix of Cyprus did not see Christians (Cypriots and Armenians) ‘teaming-up’ against Muslims. but the Armenians wanted the safe removal of about . and various other documents. to novel in ibid. Commandant la Division et p. FFMA. telegram by McMahon to FO. and successfully thwarted several Ottoman assaults for fifty-three days. ). immediate. I. ed. Clauson to Bonar Law. NY. Bertie to Foreign Ministry (French) (FM). l’Empire Ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives françaises (–) (Paris. Fournet needed a reply by September when he would head for Port Said. Peter Sourian (New York. Sept. children. The admiral. Both of Clauson’s points were misplaced. and elderly to Cyprus. pp. Cambon to Delcassé. Sept. John Clauson. and opposition to ‘outsiders’ (in this case Armenians). instead exposed a peasant and labouring class still emerging out of a pre-modern Ottoman millet tradition with an identity based on religious affiliation. women. intro. issued with deportation orders. CO//. FO //. a reply that also reached the French Foreign Ministry on that day. which transported them to Port Said. TNA. immediate.. Sept. that three days earlier Louis Dartige du Fournet. f led to the mountain where they prepared a camp and defensive lines. . they communicated with French warships patrolling the Syrian coast. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA subsequent decision to establish the Légion d’Orient almost a year after in October . On September . until almost a year later when the men fit for military service formed the nucleus of the Légion d’Orient. provided them with munitions and provisions. . Just when defence was becoming impossible. Clauson waited three days before sending his reply to London. . TNA. the French admiral on the Syrian coast. Les grandes puissances. Bertie to FM. The forty days of Musa Dagh. –. Le contreadmiral Darrieus. –. pp. . . telegraphed Andrew Bonar Law. The inhabitants of the region. see the famous novel by Franz Werfel. I. . Musa Dagh (‘Moses Mountain’) was the site of an Armenian resistance to Ottoman extermination efforts. Starting in July . the village. Chef d’état-major de la Escadre de la Mediterranee to Lieutenant-Colonel Elgood. Port Said. Armenians were bravely fighting the Ottomans at Musa Dagh. Andrekos Varnava. –. TNA. Famagusta: city of empires (– ) (Newcastle upon Tyne. ). The Musa Dagh Armenians were resisting deportation. . ‘Famagusta during the Great War: from backwater to bustling’. wanted more information because it disbelieved the number of Armenians holding off the Ottoman forces. Paul Cambon. ‘Sophronios III. –. Secret. with either Cyprus or Rhodes taking their women and children. GOC Egypt to WO. it will make an important diversion from the Dardanelles if we can promote the Armenian movement. Sept. Mediterranean Historical Review. in ibid. French admiral. in Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. whereupon he was posted to Ireland and notoriously put down the Easter Rebellion). FO// (also in CO/ /). Bloxham.. eds. pp. TNA. in ibid. see Andrekos Varnava. see Michalis N. Sept.. –. Sept. –. ‘Panaretos. I think it is advisable to exercise a little pressure in Cyprus. in ibid. pp. was also wrong.. Maxwell to Kitchener. Louis. I think. eds. The archbishops of Cyprus in the modern age: the changing role of the ArchbishopEthnarch. . Sept. –: the last of the “old” and the first of the “new” Archbishop-Ethnarchs?’. British imperialism in Cyprus. Clauson’s other claim that the Armenians fighting at Musa Dagh were part of an insurrection. –. pp. . Kyprianos D. and doing a good job of fighting the mutual Ottoman enemy. while on the same day Maxwell informed the War Office that the French admiral had already loaded the . Secret. TNA. see Rolandos Katsiaounis. ‘Kyrillos II. informed the Foreign Office that the admiral wanted to transport the refugees to Cyprus or Egypt. The great game of genocide. Maxwell was bored with his role of providing training and supplies to troops destined for Gallipoli and Salonika (his transfer request was honoured in March . TNA. General Maxwell believed this. ). WO to GOC Egypt. Maxwell to Kitchener. forthcoming ). . p. for an exploration of the Cypriot political-religious elite and their gradual move away from co-operation with the Ottomans and British to hostility. –: the first Greek nationalist and Enosist ArchbishopEthnarch’. ‘The port-city in the fields: investigating an improper urbanity in mid-nineteenth-century Cyprus’. See Varnava. –. pp. part of one of the Armenian revolutionary groups that had now revolted. pp. Michael. the French ambassador to London. Sept. . refugees onto cruisers and that they should be taken to Cyprus or Rhodes. The War Office. and. not understanding the urgency of the situation. for an understanding of how Europeans and educated Cypriots established a provincial ‘high society’ and exploited the peasantry and working classes.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T racial factors. for an introduction into Cypriot society at the time of the Great War. writing to Kitchener that everything should be done. With no answer on September. ‘Makarios I.. Andrekos Varnava and Irene Pophaides. –: the Tanzimat and the role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch’. –: his struggle for absolute power during the era of Ottoman administrative reforms’. that is. their identities and politics (Newcastle upon Tyne. Michael. so action closer to Egypt excited him. society and politics in Cyprus (Nicosia. and Marc Aymes. . TNA.. CO//. pp. FO//. Labour. the importance of the Cypriot Mule Corps and the impact of the Armenian Légion. Michael Walsh and Tamas Kiss. Secret. FO//. FO// (also in CO//). . (). to help the movement. Oct. . women. . I. . . . –. on September. girls. Defrance informed his superiors that Maxwell had proposed forming an Armenian Légion. the Foreign Office informed Baron Bertie of Thame. Morocco. . the Foreign Office debated where the . Sept. . FO//. TNA. so Defrance visited the camp on September. Morocco. and about of these would make good soldiers. which could raid Ottoman coasts in the Alexandretta region. . Darrieu report. I. and that the French should arrange to take them to Rhodes or Algeria. TNA. one minute stating that pressure should be exerted on Cyprus. On September. . This not only reflects the power of allies to influence policies. p. the French political and military authorities were in a weak position alongside their British allies. . and Varnava. Sept. FFMA. Sept. Armenian refugees should be taken. see Varnava. . Clearly. They tried and failed to have them accepted in Rhodes. Algeria. Paris wanted more information about Maxwell’s plan and the refugees. Sept. . where the Armenians were under British quarantine. . Sept. . While the British pushed the French to relocate the Armenians elsewhere and to take complete responsibility for them. . In the event. and the authorities in London. that the ‘importation of victims of insurrectionary fighting between Turks and Christians would in present state of feeling in both Cyprus and Egypt be wholly undesirable’. Russians. then Grey minuted that both Cyprus and Egypt were out of the question. . in total: men. Tunis. p. between John Clauson. no doubt desirous of getting back to his work and relieving the refugees. Defrance to Paris. the French admiral. . I. the French should deal with them in Algeria. Algeria. Russians. . Tunis. . or the Italians in Rhodes. General Maxwell proposed forming them into a fighting unit to raid the Syrian and Cilician coasts. and Grey minute. . but also of local bureaucratic elites on the periphery to do so as well. In other words. . even against their own central state authorities. . who insisted to London that this could only be temporary. –. Finally. He confirmed that men were fit to fight and Nicolson minute. Pierre (or Peter) Dimlekian. the British ambassador to Paris. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA On September. p. and informed Paris that there were . so much so that they attempted to accommodate the British position to relocate the refugees. but Dimlekian preferred to fight with the French. p. a week after they had been dumped at Port Said. . Sept. informed him that those in a condition to bear arms numbered and were aged between fifteen and sixty. p. FO// FO to Bertie. . much to the annoyance of the Egyptian authorities. FFMA. . and by the Russians in the Caucasus. Sept. informed Paris that a leader of the Musa Dagh resistance. TNA. Jules-Albert Defrance. CO//. the French minister in Cairo (since ). For an example of how this happened in Cyprus. the high commissioner. Russians. British imperialism in Cyprus. Sept. pp. pp. disembarked them at Port Said. Sept. Sept. boys. and infants. . Algeria. ‘British military intelligence in Cyprus during the Great War’. McMahon to FO. . Sept. Sept. p. p. FFMA. . –. Maxwell pushed for a decision because he wanted the refugees to leave as he worried they would become frustrated if they remained idle. Indeed. journalist. Sept. . FO//. Defrance to FM. an Ottoman Armenian in Paris. –. he was not interested in those that could not fight. TNA. in one of his last acts as foreign minister. Oct. p. Ibid. pp. and suggested work on the Gallipoli beaches. p. to FM. Arshag Hovhannes Tsobanian (or Chobanian). .. . Although Maxwell was interested in using the Musa Dagh Armenians to form a Légion. Ibid. Ibid. I. Sept. . Defrance and Maxwell proposed to their respective governments that the French would cover the expenses of the Armenian refugees and an Armenian Légion should be formed to launch raids on the Syrian and Cilician coasts. . Defrance to FM. the various opinions on the formation of an Armenian Légion manifested. French military. Defrance informed Paris that Maxwell had spoken to Dimlekian about the British using the Armenians to raid Alexandretta and that Defrance had told Dimlekian that the French and British were co-operating on this because the French were not competing with the British. Lord Bertie to FO. suggested to the Foreign Ministry that the refugees be formed into combat units. p. Ibid. Defrance to FM. Defrance informed Paris that Perhaps this is where Werfel got the idea of the forty days. . . Paris to FM. and editor. like the British government. Sept. p... both governments would decide together. Oct. FFMA. however. . Ibid. informed Cairo that he had agreed with Grey that the Armenian refugees should be sent as labourers to Mudros. Théophile Delcassé. Three letters. Indeed a French military agent in Egypt attempted to recruit from the Musa Dagh refugees for service at Gallipoli and Mudros. Sept. Yet the voices supporting the formation of the Musa Dagh refugees into a combat unit were numerous. notably in the US. . . Oct. since it was actually fifty-three. Tsobanian to Paris. pp.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T to work. Defrance. . Bertie.. the French did not want to encourage a rebellion which did not have good prospects of success. . Defrance to FM. Sept. The Armenians told Defrance that they had resisted the Ottomans for over forty days and wanted to continue fighting the Turks. Soon. Lieutenant de Saint Quentin in Cairo opined that a raid by Armenians in the Alexandretta region would attract the Ottomans to the region and should therefore not be attempted so long as the French and British still had designs on the region. Ibid.. . Grey informed his French counterpart that the French were responsible for finding work for the refugees.. undated. . pp. . . Ultimately. the Armenian struggle in Cilicia and the surrounding mountains was not lost. and a famous writer. A member of the Foreign Ministry suggested forming a committee of Armenians to appeal for support from the Armenian diaspora. especially since. I. FFMA. p. but the bottom line was that. in his view. . they should be pushed to work as labourers at Mudros. . . Cairo. De Jonquires of the French navy. p. Oct. IV One of the reasons given for rejecting an Armenian Légion in was that it would incite the Ottomans to implement more massacres. Vice-Admiral Gabriel Darrieus. Ibid. agreed. Nov. . Note to FO. Ibid. pp. rejecting an Armenian corps of irregular troops because this might provoke the Turks. . Ibid. p.. Defrance to FM. War Ministry (French) (WM) to FM. Jan. FM to Defrance. The French War Ministry agreed. I. . Dec. the new commander of the rd Squadron on the Syrian coast. In a letter to the French military authorities in Egypt. Then. Then. . p. The French Foreign Ministry and Defrance in Cairo thought establishing an Armenian Légion and using it to raid the Alexandretta area would be a bad idea and it was best to employ them at Mudros. Nov. Defrance messaged Paris that the male Armenian refugees wanted to return to their mountains after being trained and armed and that if the government approved the French authorities in Egypt would arrange this. . . . which were also shared by Defrance.. . I.. In December . weighed in. informing Paris that the Armenian refugees wanted revenge on the Turks. particularly in a raid to cut Ottoman rail communications. WM to French military. Oct. Cambon reported that the British and he were sceptical about encouraging an Armenian uprising in Cilicia because of Ottoman reprisals and were coming around to the idea of employing them at Mudros. FFMA. . Nov. . not to work as labourers. He favoured using them as combatants in their native region. in a letter to members of the Armenian Defence Committee in Ibid. Ibid.. agreed with the reservations over forming an Armenian Légion. it seems that the French authorities in Cairo were not informed of this decision. Nov. I. FFMA. and although the Armenians may not like it. FFMA. –. I. the naval authorities were opposed to forming them into a fighting unit. But the voices of opposition weighed more heavily. . FFMA. Captain E. . p. Officially. because it would merely provoke further Turkish massacres. Jonquires to Paris. Aristide Briand. although worried about using the Armenians as labourers because of their ‘lack of aptitude’. Defrance to Paris. . Nov. . Darrieus to Paris. well away from Egypt where they might cause mischief. but this reason was overcome in January . . The new French foreign minister and prime minister. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA the Musa Dagh leaders did not want to work as labourers and they should not be treated like Ottoman prisoners or like Somalis employed at Mudros.. . –. the War Ministry instructed it to proceed with forming an Armenian Légion. pp. however. p. the Armenian committee was responsible for proving each volunteer with a ration allowance and pay totalling PT (Egyptian Piastres) per diem. however. the Allied Governments are free of any moral responsibility for reprisals or acts of violence on the part of the Turks that may be regarded as reprisals for the employment of these volunteers. –. to Mar.. Based on this extraordinary condition. . he confirmed his position first taken on March that he opposed any Armenian action that could lead to retaliations on Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. He argued that if Armenians wanted to fight. . the only object of their employment is to give to the Armenians some material claim to their reinstatement in their original country. Ibid. Port Said. British MIO. . [Therefore]. The number of Armenians likely to serve is so small as to be at the present time of no interest to the Allied Powers. Mar. . however. and employ the volunteers ‘only in the districts of Cilicia and Lesser Armenia with which the Armenians are as natives familiar’. The Hunchak party. On the other hand. Boghos Nubar to Admiral Moreau. was pressing the French naval commander to hasten the arming of Armenians. he Ibid. but Vice-Admiral Moreau. this time it was the Armenians who rejected the formation of a Légion. . . which Defrance sent to Briand. six trained men as sous-officers. The Allied governments would administer military training. –. Defrance informed Paris that the matter of forming an Armenian force was in doubt because the Armenian National Defence Committee believed that activities by such a force would provoke dangerous Turkish reprisals. The strongest opposition came from the most influential Armenian. . Defrance. ammunition. opposed using the Musa Dagh refugees in this way. Feb. extra pay of PT a day for volunteers given responsible positions. Despite this change of heart. believed that the option should be open. Ibid. p. Cairo. pp. Ibid. it is therefore a matter of purely Armenian interest . The deal the Armenian National Committee was being asked to accept was unbalanced.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T Cairo. . commander of the rd Squadron. In Nubar’s letter. Boghos Nubar. Feb. II. to Armenian committee members. the British and French military representatives in Egypt agreed to form a Légion only if they would not be held responsible for more Ottoman massacres. and material for clothing since not all the volunteers would wear uniforms. . the Armenian committee was told that ‘the Allied Governments are prepared to form a Volunteer force from the Armenian refugees of Djebal Moussa and from such other Armenian Volunteers as may be sent in by the Committee’. Jan. provide arms. pp. including the formation of a volunteer Légion.. accoutrements. they should enlist with one of the Allies. FFMA. In a letter to Moreau on March. It is obvious from both the tone and the content of the letter that the French government had approved the detailed and specific proposals. Defrance to Paris. funded by the committee. Turkey. and boots. Ibid. p. Cambon to FM. the final nail in the coffin. p. at French expense. June . and WM to Cairo. . May . Defrance believed that the question of raising an Armenian Légion was finally closed. Apr. July . Here lies the reason for the resurrection of the proposal to form an Armenian Légion. suggested that the Armenian refugees in Egypt and those imprisoned in India could be made into soldiers and grouped on Cyprus to dissuade the Ottomans from moving all their troops southwards against the sherif of Mecca. seemingly. Ibid. . since a recent agreement ceded large parts of Armenia to France. p. May . Mar. on July. Over two weeks followed before Cambon updated the Foreign Ministry that Brigadier-General Gilbert Clayton. p. . The British suggested that the Armenians be trained and armed by French officers. Defrance to Briand. the British Foreign Office informed its French counterpart that it had received a request to free Armenian prisoners of war held in India and wanted to know whether the French had any plans to use the Armenians in any way related to the war. FFMA. which announced that French law forbade the enlistment of enemy nationals into the French army. p. . The concerns over retaliations must be understood within the context of the Genocide and its progress. Defrance to Briand. . p. including Nubar letter. but before exploring this further it is important to complete the story. p. despite the obvious power imbalance alongside the French and British. The proposal was resurrected and agreed to in August by the commander-in-chief of the French army and the French government and officially agreed to by all parties concerned in October... since it implies that there were still some Armenians in the Ottoman Empire that had escaped it. V It was not. Cambon informed the Foreign Ministry that an idea was being examined to form an Armenian corps on Cyprus. in discussions with Georges-Picot. . . Nubar’s rejection carried much weight. . . Indeed. July . also commander-in-chief French armies to FM. Then. . .. Mar. Then. p. . I. Ibid. which Cambon thought would show French strength without enlarging their field of operations and control the Armenian partisans who might seek to create principalities in Ibid. but unlike six months earlier these Armenians were isolated and not in a position to be protected by an Entente landing with an Armenian contribution. the final nail in the coffin came from the French War Ministry.. FO to FM. WM to Cairo. however. . On June . of the Arab Bureau in Cairo. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA expressed concern over the British training about Musa Dagh Armenians in order to blow up railway bridges in Alexandretta and was relieved that the idea was abandoned after the Armenian bishop in Cairo and the Eastern Orthodox patriarch of Alexandria objected for fear of Ottoman reprisals. Aug. . Varnava. ). Andrew and A. it did not take long for them to embark upon a determined effort to form an Armenian Légion. Joffre agreed with General Pierre Roques. FO//. British imperialism in Cyprus. pp. the minister of war. that forming an Armenian Légion on Cyprus was an opportunity to threaten the Ottomans and allow the Allies to support a revolt against the Ottomans if desirable. the British and the French (and indeed the Russians) needed to work together more closely. pp. See file. Kanya-Forstner. On August the commander-in-chief of the French army. Also. negotiated and signed by François Georges-Picot for the French and Mark Sykes for the British on May . resulting in Bulgaria joining the Central Powers. Consequently. and British interests in Egypt and Mesopotamia. p. July . General Joseph Joffre. Cambon to FM. . who refused to take jobs or act as auxiliaries. Cilicia (mostly in the Adana vilayet) and neighbouring Ottoman vilayets with a substantial Armenian population would come under direct French control. These interests were captured in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. The resurrection of the idea to form an Armenian Légion was largely due to the Sykes–Picot Agreement. with the other vilayets populated by Armenians coming under Russian protection. also failed. and given Russian ambitions on Constantinople and Transcaucasia (reflected in a separate agreement with the Russian foreign minister. they decided that they needed to focus on what their aims were in defeating the Ottoman Empire. . Christopher M. Sazonov played an important role in the agreement.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T northern Syria. British and French imperial rivalry was suddenly reinvented and a new collaborative relationship was formed. –. pp. linking the successful prosecution of the war with post-war imperial expansion. TNA. sent to FM on same day. S. it became obvious that the military effort needed to concentrate on where the British and French interests were. . commander-in-chief army. When the Gallipoli expedition failed. Cilicia). French interests in Syria and Cilicia. who was ‘in the highest spirits over his new Castle in Armenia’. This was what Cambon meant when he mentioned the cession of Armenian populated territories to France in a recent agreement. Joffre. a close friend from their days at the École Polytechnique in the s. France overseas: the Great War and the climax of French Imperial expansion (London.e. If the Ibid. The Sykes–Picot Agreement divided the Ottoman vilayets from Adana to Basra into either direct or indirect (where an Arab state would be created) spheres of French or British control. since it was he who proposed to Picot that France obtain a share of Ottoman Armenia (i. and when the British offer of Cyprus to Greece. Once French and British post-war imperial expansion was settled upon. to Roques. –. accepted the proposal to form an Armenian Légion. –. I. which pleased Picot. Sergei Sazonov). it offered a solution as to what to do with the Musa Dagh refugees.. FFMA. in order for that country to aid Serbia immediately. The second option would best maximize the investment and was therefore more economical. CO//. TNA. . CO//. and wanted Cambon to ask Whitehall if it agreed and if so to inform the French on how many fit Armenians there were in Egypt and India who could join. Aug. Ibid. opined Joffre. He backed the scheme because it was a necessary Ibid.. French ambassador. w//. as Joffre indicated. or both. Roques to Briand. FO//. The Foreign Ministry was anxious for the War Ministry to decide. Roques to Briand. Aug. pp. Sykes’s minute was most revealing. receiving the same supplies as French troops. because ultimately it was in the interests of the Allies to keep Ottoman forces dispersed and engaged in Asia. –. .. arms. Ibid. Four days later. to FO. and from the scattered individuals assembled from Asia Minor and Syria in various places. . . TNA. Cambon informed Grey but did not mention if the Légion would be trained by the British. FM to Cambon. thirty officers would suffice. Roques would immediately send this mission to Cyprus. following the suggestion of Brigadier-General Clayton. FO to CO. with the head of this mission becoming the commander of the corps. Aug. and so he wanted the Légion to be under a commander who was responsible to the rear-admiral commanding the Naval Division of Syria. Aug. and the affirmative decision from Roques came on August. Ibid. the French Foreign Ministry informed Cambon that the War Ministry was ready to send a mission to Cyprus to organize an Armenian corps. therefore. He told President Raymond Poincaré and Briand that he would be willing to supply personnel. –. . and then would have to submit to Roques his proposals for organizing the corps. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA Bosnian battalion at Salonika was an example. Joffre wanted the Armenian corps to be ready to exploit any political situation in order to cause the Ottoman Empire insurmountable difficulties in this region. . pp.. London. Aug. Cambon to FO. Aug. constituted like the Bosnian battalion in regular units. p. which could act either as ‘partisans’ or as one of several foreign battalions. putting it forward as a joint Anglo-French idea. . the British. If this was agreeable to the navy. . Roques wanted to know if the British had agreed and was worried that there were not enough Musa Dagh refugees (on May he was informed no more than ) and their mediocre value had led the War and Naval Ministries to reject using them. the French. p.. Aug. He wanted an Armenian revolt and would direct the rearadmiral to supply them with arms. Ibid. and Poincare and Briand. TNA. He would have to reach an understanding with local British authorities. FM to WM. and provisions for an Armenian Légion on Cyprus. Roques wanted French officers sent to ascertain the conditions in which the first units would be created. He assumed. . and with the rear-admiral commanding the French naval division. that the units formed would be drawn from the Armenian population in Egypt and India. . the director of military intelligence. W. B. Clauson was a notoriously stubborn high commissioner: in October Sykes minute.). TNA. but that he had failed to induce any to volunteer for the Macedonian Mule Corp or for a labour camp. FO to Cambon. Secret. FO//// (M. FO//. . Sept. Aug. This was a gross generalization.. Ministry of the Interior to McMahon. telegram from India Office secretary to viceroy./. . while Maxwell was considering using them as muleteers in Salonika to augment the Macedonian (Cypriot) Mule Corps. . Aug. Grey to . The Foreign Office replied to Cambon without stating that the British government had accepted or rejected the proposed scheme. he asked how many militarily fit Armenians the British held.. to under-secretary for India. Aug. TNA. CO. Major-General Macdonogh. TNA. believed that few had martial qualities. military secretary India Office (British) (IO). . CO. FO//// (M. WO to under-secretary at FO. I. June . Aug. the India Office opined. TNA. The prisoners at Sumerpur. FO//.). The letter disclosed how many Armenians were under British authority and that Clauson had been requested to provide information on a camp. The War Office informed Grey that there were – in Egypt (Musa Dagh refugees) and another prisoners of war in India. Aug. Sept. I. Bonar Law to Clauson. TNA. having been taken from the Ottoman army in Mesopotamia. . As for the Musa Dagh refugees in Egypt. of the Ministry of the Interior in Cairo. India Office to FO. FO to CO. CO//. TNA. viceroy to Lord Bryce. while he claimed that Brigadier-General Clayton was against the idea because they were not of good fighting material. Aug. CO//. TNA. TNA. TNA. . TNA. India. There was. CO// . CO// . M. . Sir Ronald Graham. a minute stated. Aug. B. M. and felt that compulsion might be needed. TNA. FO to CO. CO//. Aug. ‘no reason why such a body should not be sent to Cyprus were it not that it might have very bad political results on the Moslem population of the Island who do not like Armenians’. Sept. would do well. In any event. June . CO//. CO//. June . TNA. Graham. . FO to Cambon. Grindle. Cambon did not ask if the British agreed to the Légion. FO//. contradicting French views of Clayton’s position. p. Sept. India secretary. to FO. w//. The initial Colonial Office view was neither negative nor positive. . Secret. H. TNA. A labour company was formed in Egypt from amongst the refugees for work on the defences of the canal. .F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T corollary of the Sykes–Picot agreement and because it would propel AngloFrench military co-operation in the Levant. instead.. . FO//. Cambon to Grey. but how many were fit for combat and would consent to fight was unknown. TNA. FO//. although it implied that it had accepted it because it only encouraged it. Secret. R. . . The Colonial Office decided to wait for Clauson’s views before officially giving its own. Cubitt. revealed that there were about capable men at the Armenian refugee camp. FO//. w//. WO. . Minute. . . British imperialism in Cyprus. He was also unhappy with Cyprus’s selection as the training base: ‘I do not consider that Cyprus would be a desirable place in which to train these men but no doubt it will be possible to find some other locality which is in French occupation. TNA. TNA. For these reasons I would recommend that a secluded site in the north or east of the island be sought. Sept. so the French had to take all responsibility. TNA. FO//. . CO. commander-inchief of the troops in Egypt. –. CO//. Minute. . FO to Cambon. Varnava. The military and government authorities in Egypt had mixed views about the scheme. the French remained apprehensive about the British position on an Armenian Légion on Cyprus. and finally his rejection of the Musa Dagh refugees. Sept. as the French wanted Cyprus and Clauson had agreed. see also FO//. On September. . The French now hold several islands in the eastern Mediterranean. pp. . he had refused to inform the Greek and Turkish Cypriot political elites that the British government had formally offered to cede the island to Greece because he did not want to upset the ‘loyal Muslim’ elites. TNA. . Murray. Clauson implied a ‘grudging acceptance’. he had a difficult relationship with the military intelligence officers working on Cyprus and Egypt because they considered him too negligent on security and he considered the military intelligence officers too intrusive. FO// . Sept. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA . w//. FO to CO. This time. which are equally. . TNA. FO////. . . and it was ‘advisable to minimise contact with the Cypriot Turks who are uneasy . to FO. w. Oct./. . FO//. but Murray stated that the British authorities were unable to provide equipment or training. FO//. were pleased to be rid of the Musa Dagh refugees and that the force was not going to be trained in Egypt. Sept. Defrance Cambon. suitable for the purpose.’ Graham agreed. CO to under-secretary at FO. CO//. . w. Sept. During September./. commander-in-chief Egyptian Expeditionary Force. and General Archibald Murray. Grey to Cambon. Graham. stating that ‘there seems no reason that we should undertake their training in Cyprus and I imagine that the authorities in Cyprus would not encourage any idea of the kind. although he had never been asked to agree or disagree – as one Foreign Office minute put it. McMahon to Grey. or almost equally. Varnava. TNA. Paraphrase telegram. . . TNA. to McMahon. Sept. Sept. . .’ Both Graham and Murray were wrong. CO//. Aug. TNA. TNA. informing Bonar Law that there were difficulties of sea and land transport and the necessity of importing many necessities at much expense and delay. Sept. CO//. TNA. CO//. /. ‘British military intelligence in Cyprus during the Great War’. McMahon. Clauson was obliging.’ Bonar Law informed Cambon that he agreed with Clauson on minimizing contact with the Cypriot Turks. Clauson to Bonar Law. Ibid. . but it was stopped without explanation. Defrance to Briand. Sept.. Cambon to FM. They had started military training. Sept. Discussions between Defrance and McMahon showed that the British had found the Armenians difficult. adding that the Armenians were not worth the money to compensate the British. p. They were now told that the planned operations (i. .. and would be pleased to be rid of them. although the British merely wanted to be rid of them.e. Sept. Colonel T. .e.e.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T informed the Foreign Ministry that the French were training about Armenian refugees in Port Said. but the British preferred to send them to Salonika as muleteers. thanked France for saving them from certain extermination and declared that they considered themselves under French protection. the Musa Dagh refugees were growing restless. about being enrolled in the British army and asking to be employed as paid guides for the French in their country. and the British offered them work (i. General Althem and Colonel Elgood.. . . Sept. at Alexandretta) could have devastating consequences for Armenians still in the Ottoman Empire. He also informed Briand on the number of Armenians under British control (in Egypt and India) who could form the nucleus of the corps. The French navy in the Mediterranean reported to the Naval Ministry that some Musa Dagh Armenians had protested to the minister of state. It was not until September that Cambon informed Briand that the British did not oppose the creation of an Armenian Légion. . and the constructive discussions with two British officers. Sept. I. . But then Defrance sent to Briand two documents detailing discussions on the ground between French and British officers over what to do with the Musa Dagh refugees that showed that a Légion under French command in Cyprus was feasible. as muleteers in Salonika). Ibid. they wanted to continue Defrance to FM. Defrance to Bremond. and if the French wanted them whether they would pay the cost of keeping them and their families. He wanted advice on whether the French government wanted them or not. –. Hamelin to FM. p. FFMA. Ibid. . Denys Cochin. . Ibid. over using the Armenians. . . p. which did not match the assurances they were previously given (i. Yet. The letter.. In Bremond’s letter to Defrance he detailed the number of Musa Dagh refugees at Port Said. Bremond to Defrance. that they would fight the Ottomans on their home soil). .. G. pp. Sept. learned that the British were opposed to using Cyprus and so the French should drop the idea. those fit for service. . but wanted it camped in northern or eastern Cyprus where there were fewer Muslims. the training already undertaken. . Although the proposal for a Légion was moving towards acceptance. Admiral Pothuau to Navy Ministry (French) (NM). p. . a final decision had not yet been taken. Hamelin. dated September (but not sent to Briand until October). of the French General Staff second section Africa. p. Sept. Ibid. p. Ibid.. Meanwhile. Defrance suggested that the French government could reimburse the British for the costs of looking after the Musa Dagh Cochin. They claimed that the British were threatening to send them to work on the Port Said roads. .. Cairo. . Defrance and the French military attaché in Egypt informed the Foreign Ministry that General Murray was fed up with the Armenians because they had refused to serve as muleteers and had failed as labourers. . they wanted the French to honour the assurance given when they were saved. Duport to Briand. The French authorities in Egypt.. so long as they and their families were removed from Egypt. FFMA. p. FFMA. Ibid. Serop Kabaghian. Sept. Finally. London. . Defrance to FM. and although they have nothing against the British. the role of local agency again came to the fore. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA training to help France when it needed them to aid in reconquering their villages and Cilicia. I. state minister to Briand. Sept. II. Sept. Ibid. informed Briand that London had finally consented to the formation of a French–trained Armenian corps in northern or eastern Cyprus (letter received from French Military attaché in London dated September). Sept. Duport added that the corps may be recruited from Armenians outside Egypt as well. pp. to FM. . . observed a change in the British. p. Briand.. Saint-Quentin to FM. . Ibid. General Pierre-Georges Duport. including their families. p. . Duport was sending Commandant Louis Romieu. referring to a further letter by Bremond on the subject. Defrance highlighted the restlessness of the Musa Dagh refugees to the Foreign Ministry on September. The problem was that there were only about refugees in Port Said available and the French vice-admiral had agreed to their employment as muleteers by the British in Egypt or Salonika. on Sept. so he would be relieved if the French took responsibility for all of them. the project gathered momentum. Sept. Duport informed Briand that Romieu had left for Egypt to start recruiting and finalize discussions with the British. . In October. p. Briand to Roques. . the office of the chief of General Staff.. p. Sept. . Port Said. informed Roques that it was vital to form the Légion to end British and Armenian frustration. an infantry officer. Sept. and military attaché. Djabra Kazandjian. p. Defrance to FM. p. to Egypt to resolve the situation with the British. on September. Ibid. . Sept. and military attaché. Clearly. Oct. –. and Sarkis Andonian. . Ibid. p. . Duport to FM. Saint-Quentin informed the Foreign Ministry that British authorities were willing to leave employment of the Armenians to the French. Subsequently. . . On October. . asserting that a decision was vital because of friction with the British. enclosing letter signed by Kardiros Boyadjian.. . since the actions (or inaction from a British view point) of the Musa Dagh refugees in Egypt frustrated the British in Egypt into becoming the strongest advocates for their formation into the Légion. . who were not updated on the latest developments. . . to NM. . . Grey informed Egypt that the French had appointed Romieu to arrange with the Egyptian authorities for the transportation of the militarily fit Armenian refugees to Cyprus for training. p. earning the ire of one Colonial Office minion: ‘I am not impressed with this method of raising troops. Oct. As late as October. I. Oct. would only comply if the War Office. TNA. Oct. . Defrance to FM. TNA. arrangements were also made for the British to transport the Armenian prisoners of war in India to Cyprus. . Romieu telegram. francs a month) over the last year and take on the expense of caring for the women. to FO. Egypt. . Oct. Eventually. Cambon to FM. TNA. . FO cypher to McMahon. . For the British. however.. FO//. WO to FO. Although the Foreign Office had consented to the French government. p. FO to Cambon. Ibid. FO//. FO//. TNA. –. w//. however. McMahon. Oct. . Oct. FO to DMI. and Defrance to FM. but Murray would await approval from the War Office and Clauson. Oct. FO to Cambon. TNA. Confidential. IO to FO. . FO to IO. . Meanwhile. Sept. FO/ /.. FO//. . and elderly. Oct. /. . .F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T refugees (. . Defrance had informed the Foreign Ministry that he had word that Murray opposed Cyprus as the training base. FO/// Minute. the Foreign Office informed the War Office of its decision. . commander-in-chief Egypt to chief of the General Staff. on October. Oct. Dec. . CO//. approved.). . pp. The Foreign Office agreed. . The British military in Egypt. CO//. Oct. . /. p. TNA.’ The French government was so pleased with the British government that Cambon asked the British also to send to Cyprus the Armenian prisoners of war near Bombay. Cambon to Grey. FO to IO. . CO//. informing the authorities in Egypt that the Armenian patriarch was travelling to India to ‘persuade them to enrol themselves under French flag’. TNA. . . McMahon asked the Foreign Office for answers after two French officers visited him about transporting the Armenians to Cyprus. FO//. W. TNA. Oct. Ibid. however. FO//. and FM to Cairo. Oct. FO//// (M. TNA. the Foreign Office officially informed Cambon that there was no objection to releasing any of the men in the refugee camp to form the Légion on Cyprus. . the Ibid. FO//. p. Nov. Oct. Oct. which Grey had kept in the dark. TNA. . Indeed. FFMA. Oct. On October. I.. TNA. Telegram. . it had not been informed of French procedures to transport and train the Armenians on Cyprus. Romieu met Murray and they agreed for the Légion to be trained on Cyprus. p. FO to McMahon. Oct. . Cambon informed the Foreign Ministry that London had informed its authorities in Egypt to facilitate departure of Armenians to Cyprus. TNA. . Duport to Briand. children. TNA. .. FO to McMahon. Oct. Finally. M. was not informed about the official decision. TNA. On that day. CO//. . I.. where Armenians were a small minority. Oct. there remained convincing Boghos Nubar Pasha. and Marina Elia. . In Paris. a Muslim Cypriot hamlet (despite earlier concerns about interaction with Cypriot Muslims) sixteen miles north of Famagusta. FO////. Nov. Cypriot State Archives (CSA). before Clauson telegraphed Bonar Law with this fact. . Nov. Nicholas Coureas. John Fenn to officer commanding troops. Lastly. as was inadvertently stated by the Foreign Office to the India Office. Three weeks passed. Indeed. Defrance to FM. . The minorities of Cyprus: development patterns and the identity of the internal-exclusion (Newcastle upon Tyne. Defrance to FM. Accordingly. . CO to Grey. . –. Clauson to Bonar Law. Romieu informed his superiors of his meeting with Clauson on October. eds. pp. leaf . who had been left out of the decision-making process until October. a letter dated October reveals that the Cyprus government informed Romieu that a site had been found at Monarga. The Colonial Office ordered Clauson to keep a ‘strict watch’ on the correspondence from Cyprus with a ‘view to suppressing reference to the Armenian Corps at Monarga’. again reflecting the important role of local agents and men on the ground. . D. it was decided to leave them in Port Said. where he also revealed that the first Armenians would arrive by the end of November. TNA. FO////. Confidential. TNA. . Cyprus. He hoped that Clauson would ‘prevent any difficulties arising’. claimed that ‘you cannot bring some thousands of Armenians to Cyprus without the Government being injured in the matter’. ‘The Cypriot Armenian minority and their cultural relationship with the Turkish Cypriots’. Oct. p. FFMA. . . a secretary in the Colonial Office who had first dealt with Cyprus in . an Orthodox Christian hamlet. Oct. Secretariat Archive (SA). on October . FFMA. John Fenn. CO//. Ahmet An. TNA. W. The final arrangements were left to Clauson and Romieu in Cyprus. SA//. and near Boghaz. p. A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA French Armenian Légion was a joint Allied project. Dec. with the only outstanding question remaining that of transporting and settling the non-combatants on Cyprus. in Andrekos Varnava. The Colonial Office was concerned at the establishment of the French Armenian camp in Cyprus. Letter. SA//. TNA. Nubar was informed about the establishment of the Légion d’Orient and FO to IO. Nicosia. ). Ellis. CSA. ordered the military authorities on the island to suppress references to the Armenian corps. Oct. the acting chief secretary. . The final question for the British was secrecy. I. Oct. FO////. Defrance informed the Foreign Ministry that the British Foreign Office had finally telegraphed Clauson that Armenians would go to Cyprus. Ellis minute. . at the base of the Karpass Peninsula. Ultimately. . . especially because the Armenians were unpopular with both Greeks and Turks – again projecting an observation of Anatolian ‘politics’ onto Cyprus. paraphrase telegram. Nubar recalled that Georges-Picot asserted that the French would be willing to grant autonomy to the Armenians under their control. (no exact date). doc. Erzerum. and that Armenians would have religious freedom in Cilicia. Ostensibly. Russia had been Bolshevik for two years. but now they understood that more of them could be under French rule. disclosed that on October . to FM. He estimated that . and the Russian Armenians. and that with Russia. had established a precarious independent republic in Transcaucasia. led by Dashnak leaders. but in order to survive it needed support from a great power that opposed both Bolshevism and any Ottoman/Turkish resurgence. had to remain a secret because the Ottoman and German justification for the deportation and subsequent extermination of the Ottoman Armenians was their enlistment in Allied armies. . Then. in the French embassy in London. after the success of the Russian army in the Caucasus. and Diayarbekir. Nubar in a memorandum on the Armenian Légion. but ‘the Armenians should earn the right to the liberation of their Boghos Nubar meeting with Gout. By December . and was shown the Sykes–Picot Agreement. The French Foreign Ministry believed that Nubar wanted a guarantee that Cilicia would be separated from Syria. Kharput.–. including some Ottoman Armenian territories. Ibid. Oct. Armenian elites had hoped for an autonomous region under the czar. . volunteers would be raised. in December . FFMA. Boghos Nubar papers. or in the allied campaign in the Balkans. Oct. p. arguing that several months before. Dersim. – FA. Therefore. and Trabzon. Nubar postulated. a member of the French War Ministry in Egypt weighed in. . under Russian control. Nubar believed that the force could be used in two possible expeditions: in northern Syria to aid rebels of the sherif of Mecca. The existence of the force. Paris. over three years later. Nubar worried.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T Romieu’s appointment as commander. Oct. France should promise this in order to recruit as many Armenians from across the world as possible. Bitlis. and recommended that Romieu be authorized to recruit more Armenians in Egypt. and the second part Cilicia and the three western vilayets of Sivas. Returning to the beginning of this article. was ‘the training of a group of military and non-military volunteers for a possible expedition to Asia Minor’. I. and so the Armenian volunteers would become civilian administrators. Russian Armenia had become independent. Romieu’s aim. . . He was confident that the Allies would land troops in Syria and Cilicia.. The anonymous writer also thought it important to French influence in Asia Minor to employ Armenians. FM memorandum (unsigned). . The author was assured that Boghos Nubar and his supporters would aid Romieu’s efforts to enrol Armenians. under French authority. War Ministry. From this agreement. p. he met for the first time Georges-Picot in the presence of Sykes. . Cairo. who would serve in a larger Allied contingent. Nubar believed that Armenia would be divided into two parts after the war: one composed of the eastern vilayets of Van. and what they hoped would lead to Armenian autonomy. and certainly at the time of accepting it. These historiographies included: French and British imperialism in the eastern Mediterranean. This theatre was of growing importance because both the French and the British had imperial designs on the Ottoman Empire once defeated. as well as French and British determination to form it after the Sykes– Picot Agreement. without the British expending any resources. which was becoming a ‘nuisance’ for local officials. it was initially a defence against what they believed would be Ottoman massacres in revenge for Armenians joining the Russian army in the Caucasus. Overall. Accordingly. Ibid. The formation of the Légion also benefited the British. and in the French case they planned to use the Armenians not only as ‘proxies’ to ‘liberate’ their homeland but as part of the army of occupation after. by providing volunteers for a planned expedition in Asia Minor’. The eventual formation of an Armenian Légion under French auspices in October reflected in every way the differing agendas of the three parties involved. with the exception of space for training them in Cyprus. VI This article has tapped into various historiographies in order to answer the complex question of why and how the Légion d’Orient was formed in October . A N D R E KO S VA R N AVA fatherland. it was agreed to form the Légion d’Orient. because troops were preoccupied fighting elsewhere. French and British interventions in the Ottoman Empire and responses to the Armenian Genocide. the French and British war effort and war spoils at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. . FO//. Thus Nubar had been brought on side. Dec. yet exhibited a similar cautious attitude to bringing to fruition these different aims. it allowed them to accept the French as ‘partners’ in the campaign in the Middle East by adding – it was hoped once trained – French troops. British. they had determined on the war spoils in the Sykes–Picot Agreement of May . as shown by the various rejections of the formation of an Armenian Légion. the lure of a safe homeland under French protection was too great. a significant hurdle was overcome. For the French. with the three particulars outlined at the beginning of this article. until. They were relieved of Armenians in their care in Egypt and India. Secondly. For Armenian political elites. . for the French and British. and Armenian efforts to avenge the Genocide and forge a safe homeland. namely the traditional Nubar memorandum on creation of Légion d’Orient. It is important to understand that in order to achieve the formation of the Légion d’Orient. and Armenians had different agendas. the French. the Légion allowed them to contribute manpower to a military theatre of imperial importance where otherwise they could not. especially the western front. and Diyarbakir) of the so-called six Armenian vilayets. but because this territory was of less interest to them than Mesopotamia and Palestine. In this way. they had done so by drawing upon the exact reason the British and French had given to reject it in – the likely Ottoman massacres against Armenians and thus on humanitarian grounds that could not be questioned. since the Légion remained a public secret. the British were willing to accept a formal French empire in portions of three (Sivas. Moreover. It is also important to understand the complex power balances at play. and as evidenced by the Sykes–Picot Agreement. the British were aiding the French in achieving their imperial ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. Harput. parts of Adana vilayet. not because they were not interested in these areas themselves. and humanitarianism. was merely an afterthought. Furthermore. The Armenians were clearly in the weaker position. largely on British military prowess in the Middle East. the Armenian desire to forge a safe and secure homeland was reliant on French imperialism. and new ones in Mesopotamia and Palestine. which was dependent. in response to the Genocide. and the Syrian coast. this episode of humanitarianism clashing with imperialism resembles some of the examples discussed in Rodogno’s book. by providing the French with the use of Cyprus. What kind of Armenian autonomy would the French grant the Armenians – who are being asked to fight for it – when according to the Sykes–Picot Agreement Cilicia and its surrounding areas were to come under formal French imperial control? The French (and British) were using the Armenians for their own postwar imperial agenda(s). This was reinvented to bring about a greater ‘French’ military contribution to the Middle East theatre (via the Armenian volunteers). having failed to convince the British and French to form the Légion in . reflecting the obvious power imbalance. The fact that the French pulled out of their deal with the Armenians in (a subject deserving revisiting elsewhere) indicates the weakness of their humanitarian impulse as much as their weak imperial impulse and imperial capabilities at the end of the long nineteenth century. although tied to the war effort. if that. . Although the Armenian political elites were able to once reject the formation of the Légion early in . while not being able to resist its formation once the great powers had become determined to form it late in . which. as well as facilitating the recruitment of Armenian men for the Légion from Egypt and India. as discussed above. because they were certainly interested in Alexandretta.F O R M I N G T H E L É G I O N D’O R I E N T British and French imperial rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean. especially since there were by now few Armenians left in the Ottoman Empire. If this territory had been of prime imperial interest to the British they would have accepted to undertake the Armenian Légion scheme when first proposed in late or during . could threaten existing British imperial interests in Cyprus and Egypt. which had been under British occupation and administration since and annexed in .
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