Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma Face and politeness: new (insights) for old (concepts)§ Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini* Department of English and Media Studies, Nottingham Trent University, Clifton Lane, Nottingham NG11 8NS, UK Received 10 November 2001; accepted 30 October 2002 Many gods have been done away with, but the individual himself stubbornly remains as a deity of considerable importance. He walks with some dignity and is the recipient of many little offerings. He is jealous of the worship due him, yet, approached in the right spirit, he is ready to forgive those who may have offended him. Because of their status relative to his, some persons will find him contaminating while others will find they contaminate him, in either case finding that they must treat him with ritual care. Perhaps the individual is so viable as god because he can actually understand the ceremonial significance of the way he is treated, and quite on his own can respond dramatically to what is proffered him. In contacts between such deities there is no need for middlemen; each of these gods is able to serve as his own priest. E. Goffman 1967 [1956]: 95 Abstract The article re-examines Erving Goffman’s concepts of face and face-work and their roots in the ritual and sacred essence of the social order as expounded in the work of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim. Both Goffman and Durkheim are referred to in Brown and Levinson’s classic work on politeness but the originality of their ideas has become somewhat diluted. Using three of Goffman’s early essays, the article argues that his observations on the interactional order and his sophisticated notions of face and face-work could be the starting point for a re-appraisal of politeness and its fundamental role in the social order. # 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Face; Politeness; Durkheim, Goffman, Brown and Levinson’s theory I am indebted to Sandra Harris, Barbara Pizziconi and two anonymous reviewers for their encouragement and insightful comments. * Tel.: +44-115-848-6354; fax: +44-115-848-6632. E-mail address: [email protected] (F. Bargiela-Chiappini). 0378-2166/03/$ - see front matter # 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S0378-2166(02)00173-X § Incidentally. Goffman’s interactional order ‘‘remains almost fundamentally problematic’’ (Ditton. 1980: 36. is the subject of this article. Brown and Levinson (1987) also cite Durkheim’s notion of the sacredness of the individual in their opening quote.2 In Goffman’s early discussion of ‘face-work’ may lie the key to a novel understanding of the widely researched. Goffman’s notion of ‘face-work’ needs re-examining with reference to Durkheim’s work The elementary forms of religious life. ‘‘face-work’’ in double quotation marks refers to Goffman’s definition of ‘face-work’. Interestingly for the discussion in this article. which provide apt material for a critical re-appraisal of Goffman’s early treatment of ‘face’. 18. In the revised edition of their 1978 essay. Unlike Durkheim. is suggestive of ‘face-work’1 as the default in interpersonal behaviour. Brown and Levinson also make a number of references to Durkheim’s work in relation to their elaboration of ‘ritual’ and ‘positive and negative rites’ (Brown and Levinson. 1980). goal-oriented nature of ‘face-work’ and of social interaction. 1987: 61). Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1. ‘The ritual elements of social interaction’. As well as his treatment of ‘face’. which appear to be woven into an (originally?) socio-psychological construct of ‘face’. Background The concept of ‘face’ is commonly thought to have originated in China. note 8). the authors write: ‘‘our notion of face is derived from that of Goffman and from the English folk term’’ (Brown and Levinson. 1987: 3. together with ‘Embarrassment and social organization’. 2. Introduction The concluding paragraph of Goffman’s essay ‘On the nature of deference and demeanor’ is a revealing sketch of a characteristically Western. Hence their model’s obsession with Face Threatening Acts (FTAs). of Durkheiminan resonance. phenomenon of ‘politeness’. heavily indebted to Durkheimian sociology and somewhat diluted in Brown and Levinson’s account. 285. Ditton. 1987) into a cognitive model of ‘face’ based on Western ethnocentric assumptions such as the existence of a predominantly rational actor and the strategic. Goffman expounds his early social anthropological model based on a ritual account of self which is most directly influenced by Emile Durkheim’s ideas of social solidarity (Manning. 2 1 . The sub-title of Goffman’s Interaction Ritual (1967). 129. are the three essays republished in 1967 in the volume Interaction Ritual.1454 F. originally published one year before. however. and Goffman himself acknowledges Chinese sources. original emphasis) as the third essay on embarrassment graphically illustrates. in 1955. 1992. The re-examination of face and face-work in the light of Goffman’s original elaboration. These. Goffman is acknowledged as a distinct influence on Brown and Levinson’s work. In this article. A careful reading of his essay on face-work. individualist persona which also informs the author’s seminal piece ‘On face-work’. which they dedicate to Goffman’s memory. but never convincingly defined. reveals some distinctly individualistic traits. which also inspired Goffman’s ‘deference’ and ‘demeanor. In the first two essays. This individualistic emphasis has been picked up and elaborated by Brown and Levinson (1978. 43. but from all kinds of social order’’. The cultural relativism of Brown and Levinson’s ‘face’ and their preoccupation with face-threatening acts (FTAs) has forced researchers in a number of non-Western languages to re-consider Goffman’s notion of ‘face’ (e. thus privileging cognitive notions implicit in the Gricean understanding of communication over the social ones favoured by Goffman. for example. I will attempt to: (1) discuss the social orientation of Goffman’s elaboration of ‘face’. However. status and prestige require acknowledgement through normative. if not antisocial. 3 . even within Europe one cannot ignore substantive cultural and social differences between. in this article I will continue to use the existing. as a prerequisite for politeness to occur. ‘‘introduces the remarkable premise that there must be. at the same time. and social morality. (2) tackle the question of the relationship between ‘‘face-work’’ and ‘politeness’ by arguing that we need to distinguish between the two. on the one hand. A cognitive. Werkhofer (1992: 180) submits. intentions. where hierarchy. Konrad Werkhofer (1992: 178) laments the selective interpretation of Goffman’s face metaphor in ‘‘unambiguously individualistic terms. can be gained by placing it within the domain of cultural theory. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1455 In this article. individualistic interpretation of ‘face’ meets with further resistance in research in many non-Anglosaxon cultures. but he is also critical of Brown and Levinson’s formal adherence to Gricean theory of communication while. and that a deeper understanding of the roots and workings of ‘politeness’. 3. Whereas the former appear to be preeminent in so-called Western societies’. Goffman’s version of ‘face’ In his historical study of politeness. in its non-linguistic manifestations. of its subsequent treatment in conjunction with a theory of ‘politeness’. ‘‘face-work’’. Mao. postulating a polite speaker with face-threatening. on the other’’. which will be shown to be closer to the richer Chinese construct of face. As Barbara Pizziconi correctly pointed out to me (personal communication). as well as strategic. This modern understanding of politeness. in turn. 1998) so as to engender a version of ‘politeness’ that accommodates both strategic (volitional) and social indexing behaviours. if imperfect. a fundamental antagonism between the speaker’s intentions. stems from a society traditionally dependent on a highly complex network of social obligations. whilst work is in progress towards a new vocabulary of cross-cultural analysis.g. which.F. The growing body of criticism on cultural grounds of Brown and Levinson’s notions of ‘negative face’ and ‘imposition’ also testifies to the limitations of the original notion of ‘face’ and. some of the Northern European countries and the Mediterranean countries. Werkhofer (1992: 176) concedes that Goffman’s notion of face ‘‘has inherent limitations’’. descriptive categories. in particular. and social aspects. 1994. in general.3 thus supporting Brown and Levinson’s I am well aware of and dissatisfied with the use of vague labels such as ‘Western societies’ and ‘’hierarchical societies’ for often quite distinct and complex national realities. possibly. abstracting not only from the dimension of ritual order. de Kadt. to which he is directly indebted to Durkheim. The choice of Goffman’s essays that build on the ritual metaphor of society will be shown to be relevant to the discussion of Goffman’s ‘face’ and to Brown and Levinson’s repeated and. 1980. 1992. 1997). 1967: 99). is predominant in the first four essays collected in Interaction Ritual (Branaman. then these variations must be held within certain bounds and nicely counterbalanced by corresponding modifications in some of the other rules and understandings’’ (ibid. significant references to Durkheim’s The Early Forms of Religious Life. the rules that regulate social encounters (Goffman. Of particular interest to my argument is his subsequent elaboration on the interdependence of the individual and the social in interaction: ‘‘And if a particular person or group or society seems to have a unique character all its own. added emphasis) individuals become ‘‘interactants’’ when they agree to be ‘‘mobilised’’ as ‘‘self-regulating participants in social . According to Goffman (1967: 44. But if an encounter or undertaking is to be sustained as a viable system of interaction organized on ritual principles. Instead of much pride. I shall return to both the critics of Brown and Levinson and the cultural alternatives to their model presently. by contrast. After reading Durkheim. Manning. to which Goffman explicitly refers and which influences especially his early essays. it comes as no surprise that Goffman (1967: 45) should sum up his essay on ‘face’ and ‘face-work’ with a statement about the function of the ‘‘moral rules’’ that guide choices aimed at maintaining ‘‘ritual equilibrium’’. by implication. three of which have been chosen as particularly relevant to my discussion. it is because its standard set of human-nature elements is pitched and combined in a particular way.1456 F. The first two essays deal with the function of ‘face-work’ and demeanour in maintaining the ritual order of social life. The quotation at the beginning of this article encapsulates some of the themes Goffman developed in the essays collected in the volume Interaction ritual. The elementary forms of the religious life (1915). In later essays. Among them. such as ‘The Presentation of the Self’. Drew and Wootton. Goffman (1967: footnote 1) cites sources for both the Chinese and the American Indian concept of face.. Essays on face-to-face behavior (1967). there may be little. Goffman’s ritual analysis of social life. The potential for embarrassment in every social encounter and the study of what Goffman calls ‘‘dissonance’’ enables the sociologist to study the causes of interactional breakdown and. I would maintain. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 interpretation of ‘‘polite behaviour’’ as essentially strategic. which are somewhat remote from the earlier ritual and sacred characterisation of self that so critically informs Goffman’s early notions of ‘face’ and ‘‘face-work’’ which are the object of this article (Ditton. Lemert. 1988. Goffman introduces game theory and the dramaturgical self. Instead of abiding by the rules. thus indicating some of the influences on his own thinking. added emphasis). concentrates on instances where the delicate balance of the ritual is broken. is often referred to in the literature of politeness as the source of Brown and Levinson’s notion of ‘face’. there may be much effort to break them safely. the first of which ‘On face-work’. the latter are more typical of hierarchical societies. In that volume. where relative status determines many of the ‘politeness’ norms in interpersonal contact. one stands out: Durkheim’s work on the religious origins and nature of social activities. 1997). while the third. the so-called ‘‘rites’’. 2000: 82. For Durkheim. considerateness. honour. 89). Durkheim’s morality is relative to the group and emanates from the hierarchy within the group. 1924. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1457 encounters’’ through. tact and poise are learned. morality cannot be imposed but must be ‘‘desired’’ and ‘‘desirable’’ (Steiner. Durkheim’s classification is more complex than the one we have become familiar with through the literature on politeness. Of singular importance to Goffman’s ritual metaphor of society. quoted in Steiner. however. that is a form of religion. such as. in turn. these two worlds are mutually exclusive and in competition. indeed. the fixing of collective feelings on an external object come to constitute a cult.F. however. 2000: 82). the sacred has a strong emotional association for it represents the ‘‘collective conscience’’ of society (Steiner. and between those he posits an absolute distance. among other things.] Therefore the moral must be in the religious and the religious in the moral’’ (Durkheim. and referred to by Brown and Levinson in their monograph. In her recent reconsideration of Durkheim’s thought. 2000: 85). 2001: 213). positive rites. He concludes that religion should be stripped of any supernatural and divine element and that beliefs and rites are the two basic components of any religion. with its symbols and ideals and its drive to action. In Durkheim’s model of society. Durkheim underlines that all rites enable social communion while being of three different types: negative rites. Durkheim turns to an empirical study of a simple religion: totemism. is the Durkheimian fusion of the moral and the religious: ‘‘it is rather difficult to understand moral life if we do not place it alongside religious life [. reinforces group identity and the direction of action is central to Durkheimian sociology. 2000: 87). and a self expressed through face’’. 2001: 202). When the belief becomes passionate. Durkheim concedes that there are relations between these two worlds. and ‘‘feelings attached to self. . Goffman’s social morality. In an attempt to understand the roots and practices of religion. is located in social solidarity. solidarity generates rights and duties based on values that are not inherent in things but are ascribed to things by collective thinking . Stedman Jones observes that modern individualism is comparable to religion because it is a form of belief. Negative rites are performed in preparation to positive rites. as in periods of effervescence. Beliefs rest on a classification of all things into two categories. Social values such as pride. respectively. ‘‘a rite guides and anticipates social experience and governs the terms under which action is undertaken’’ (Stedman Jones. like Durkheim’s. In Durkheim’s social order. my translation from the French). Secondly. In this context. which. Religion emanates from the common conscience on which collective beliefs are founded (Stedman Jones. 2000: 84–85). Religion works both as a representation of the natural and social worlds and as a direction towards an ideal (Steiner. A religion that originates in the collective. modern individualism (Stedman Jones. On the subject of ‘‘rites’’. as is perceptiveness. which Durkheim labels as ‘‘sacred’’ and ‘‘profane’’. performed in the face of disaster or loss. lead on to asceticism and ability to cope with suffering (Steiner. through which the believers communicate with their gods. Thirdly. 2001: 202). so very important to the early Goffman. dignity. . and sacrificial rites. which keep the sacred from contact with the profane. ritual. which enable communication between the (profane) believers and their (sacred) gods (Steiner. he continues. and often become habitual. ‘‘demeanor’’. 4 Face-work applies to mediated as well as direct encounters. which includes self-evaluation. In this respect Goffman’s thinking is different. 2001: 191). quoted in Stedman Jones.1458 F. 2001: 190). Defensive practices (saving one’s own face) and protective practices (saving others’ face) are seen to be exercised simultaneously. ‘‘tact’’ etc. Moreover. ‘reciprocal self-denial’ and ‘negative bargaining’ (making the terms more favourable to one’s counterpart) are all practices available to interactants as ‘socialized’ individuals. an individual’s response to others’ evaluation of his own face is not purely rational: emotions are involved. whilst ‘face-work’ refers to ‘‘the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face’’ (Goffman.e. . Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 (Stedman Jones. This dimension of interdependence of social beings is not lost to Goffman. suggest. In fact. is the study ‘‘of the traffic of rules of social interactions. and more elaborate. and ‘‘the aggressive use of face-work’’. Ritual is sustained by the fulfilment of certain duties or obligations that Durkheim sees as invested in the individual towards society so that ‘‘the duties of the individual towards himself are in reality duties towards society’’ (Durkheim. according to Goffman. and harm to one’s own face is expressed in ‘‘anger’’ (Goffman 1967: 23). The selfaware interactant has replaced the collective self of Durkheim. Elsewhere. 1967: 12). so that harm to another’s face causes ‘‘anguish’’. abiding by ‘the ground rules of social interaction’ (Goffman. all of which have been given pre-eminence in Brown and Levinson’s model. the maintenance of which requires a ritual order. an awareness of other interactants’ reactions and feelings is famously expressed in Goffman’s (1967: 5) definition of face as ‘‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact’’ where a ‘‘line’’ is the interactants’ own evaluation of the interaction and of all its participants. Cross-cultural variation in facesaving practices nevertheless reveals similarities that suggest that there may be a fixed repertoire of ‘‘possible practices’’ (Goffman 1967: 13–14). than Brown and Levinson’s. to spoken interaction as well as nonverbal behaviour. Goffman (1967: 19) postulates the sacredness of the interactants’ face. as his social values of ‘‘deference’’. ‘‘acts through whose symbolic component the actor shows how worthy he is of respect or how worthy he feels others are of it’’. Goffman elaborates on ‘‘face-work’’ by saying that such ‘actions’ may be conscious or unconscious. face-maintenance is not usually the objective of the interaction. Goffman’s concept of face cannot be dismissed as simply ego-centric. another indication of the social value attached to ‘face’. the study of face-saving practices. Whilst the individualism of Goffman’s ideal social actor is a sign of the influence of the contemporary Anglo-Saxon values of independence and privacy. but rather a condition of it.e. i. he devotes equal space to the discussion of tacit co-operation that makes possible the performance of face-work:4 ‘tact’. whose main concern is with linguistic manifestations of ‘politeness’. It is true that Goffman describes in some detail what he calls ‘‘avoidance process’’. ‘‘corrective process’’. However. 1967: 11). 1893. 1967: 30–31). Social encounters are enacted in such a way that own face and others’ face are maintained through self-respect and considerateness (Goffman. However. i. and a negative element (‘‘avoidance rituals’’) through which actors refrain from doing something so as to avoid invading the others’ personal space. too. 1967: 31). Moreover. not least that of the person as a ‘ritual object’. Hence the religious language of some of Goffman’s characterisations. embarrassment and flustering are the opposites of comfort and ease and are considered. to preserve which they may have to sacrifice their own identities and possibly the encounter. morality and ethics) and rules of conduct that pertain to ‘ceremonial rules and ceremonial expressions’. embarrassment occurs (Manning. The first edition of Brown and Levinson’s . moral guilt. individuals seek to mediate often contrasting organisational principles. low status. The loss of face through embarrassment is the gain of the society. Brown and Levinson Subsequent research on ‘face’ and ‘politeness’ has often been more intent on quoting Goffman selectively than on examining critically the potential of his analytical constructs and original observations. defeat. In the essays that I have chosen.F. ‘‘deference’’ comprises a positive element (‘‘presentational rituals’’) or ‘‘other appreciation’’. In encounters. ‘‘evidence of weakness. and this led him to draw heavily on seminal work by Durkheim where the symbolic value of social action is seen to have originated in religious practice. and ‘his own priest’. Goffman’s individual is thus sacrificed for the social system. the individual merely loses composure’’ (ibid. In particular. a ‘deity’. Goffman chooses organisational sites to illustrate how embarrassment ensues from a ‘‘conflict of the selves’’. spreading. and other unenviable attributes’’ (Goffman.: 106). in ever widening circles of discomfiture’’ (ibid.: 112). 1967: 102) The moral language that describes the ‘‘flustered individual’’ warns against the unsustainable position of the interactants who break the ‘‘ritual equilibrium’’ to which they had committed themselves by moving ‘‘into one another’s immediate presence’’ (ibid. projecting selves with a ‘‘social positive value’’ that must be protected to preserve the equilibrium of the encounter. When the projected self cannot be sustained. once started. ‘‘Deference’’ and ‘‘demeanor’’ are the two components of ceremonial behaviour that Goffman (1967: 73) ‘translates’ from Durkheim’s religious notion of ‘‘positive and negative rites’’ (Durkheim. Goffman’s individuals are ‘‘guardians of face-to-face situations’’. in Goffman’s contemporary society. Goffman (1967: 55) distinguishes between rules of conduct that inform ‘substantive rules and substantive practices’ (law. 1992: 38–39). Engaged in conflicting relationships of equality and distance. Goffman v. or etiquette. 4. In this perspective. inferiority. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1459 These are the clear indicators of social awareness and concern for others (albeit out of possible concern for self-preservation) that Goffman’s ideal interactant is expected to display. Moreover. a scenario that is strongly reminiscent of the Durkheimian solidarity on which the ‘‘collective conscience’’ is founded. or. Goffman’s primary interest is in a theory of social interaction rather than a framework for polite behaviour. in Goffman’s laconic ending of his third essay: ‘‘social structure gains elasticity. for his nature is that of a ‘ritually delicate object’ (Goffman. 1915). embarrassment ‘‘seems to be contagious.: 99). and that of ‘face’ as ‘sacred’. could not have been derived from Durkheim. they are therefore used to maintain the essential separation between the two domains [sacred and profane]. not surprisingly. . Politeness. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 work appeared twenty years after Goffman’s and has been enormously influential. negative politeness. usually on cultural relativistic grounds. 1915: 309).1460 F. On p. The negativity that connotes one side of ‘face’ and a type of ‘politeness’. 61 (note 8 printed on p. It is their dualistic notion of ‘face’. added emphasis). consequently. 1987: 61). are not the only difficulties. 18.] men and their moments. although Brown and Levinson’s debt to the French sociologist is signalled at least six times in the re-issue of their essay [pp. from which a notion of ‘negative face’ emerges that does not find correspondence in Goffman’s or Durkheim’s work. 1967: 2–3). Durkheim points out that ‘‘negative cult’’5 is ‘‘one means in view of an end: it is a condition of access to the positive cult’’. with matching positive and negative politeness behaviours. consequently. i. 1. At the beginning of their 1987 revised essay. 2000: 87. . (Durkheim. 39. . . Brown and Levinson state: ‘‘That there must be simple and direct links [between interpersonal politeness and formal rites] we dimly saw when we borrowed the distinction between negative and positive politeness from Durkheim’s distinction between negative and positive rites’’. their social psychology. that have generated the most criticism. 5 . have argued with the universality of their definition of ‘polite behaviour’. for instance sacrifices or fertility rites’’ (Steiner. Brown and Levinson’s cognitive concept of ‘face’ and the rational actor does not fit into Goffman’s study of interaction. that is at the heart of their model and that departs most radically from both Goffman’s elaboration of ‘face’ (and ‘‘face-work’’) and Durkheim’s ‘‘positive and negative rituals’’. It was the search for the ‘‘general properties’’ that individuals share in social interaction. 43. Critics.e. which he understood to be about ‘‘not the individual and his psychology. I shall attempt to illustrate the ways in which Brown and Levinson’s understanding of ‘face’ and ‘politeness’ falls short of Goffman’s original ideas. that led Goffman to analyse ‘‘not [. are mainly nonAnglophone researchers who find Brown and Levinson’s particular concept of ‘face’ difficult to apply in their own cultures and. it is ‘‘negative face’’ and. or public self-image. Whereas Goffman views ‘avoidance’ as a process whereby individuals avoid face-threatening situations. ‘‘Negative rites are used to keep sacred beings from contact with the profane world. my translation from French). In his The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. a task beyond the scope of this article. generating a huge amount of literature. Rather than retracing the lines of criticism. this is not reduced to a clear-cut distinction between ‘‘freedom of action and freedom from imposition’’ that characterises Brown and Levinson’s negative face (Brown and Levinson. In particular. Rather moments and their men’’ (Goffman. ‘‘Avoidance rituals’’ have found extensive application in Brown and Levinson’s elaboration of ‘‘negative politeness’’. 3. Some universals in language use. criticised by many as culture-bound. Brown and Levinson (1987: 13) point out that their notion of face is ‘‘highly abstracted’’ and subject to ‘‘cultural elaboration’’. but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another’’ (1967: 2. The two types of ‘face’ and the notion of ‘imposition’. Positive rites are those through which believers communicate with their god. . 285)]. criticism has been made of Brown and Levinson’s assumptions that only one type of face can be threatened at any given time. Lim and Choi.6 The Chinese ‘face’ is essentially a more public and more positive concept.g. consisting of three positive On the other hand.F. Goffman and the critical literature on ‘face’ Criticism of Brown and Levinson’s model has concentrated on the apparent conceptualization of negative and positive politeness as mutually exclusive (the unidimensionality proposition) and on the suggestion that the former is approachbased and the latter is avoidance-based (the approach-avoidance distinction) (Lim and Bowers. Towards the end of the nineties. ‘Giving’. Durkheim (p. 1996) seems to point towards an understanding of face as a socio-psychological/affective construct. enhancing or maintaining face are less important objectives of interactional practices than protecting one’s own and the other’s face. ’Negativity’ is in fact a positive and necessary contribution to an overall worthy endeavour from which both the individual and society ultimately benefit. As early as 1984. Goffman’s tendentially individualistic treatment of the ‘sacred self’ becomes an obsessive attempt by an ideal rational actor to mark and protect personal territory from potentially harmful interpersonal contact.. and that all FTAs can be analysed by looking at decontextualised speech acts (Wilson et al. findings from experimental research appear to expose ‘a British cultural bias’ in the typology originally presented by Brown and Levinson in 1978 (Baxter. 311) states more unequivocally that ‘‘normally. a requirement and the threat to face is a much weaker predictor of face-work than the right to perform a certain act (Lim and Bowers. 1999. 1991–1992: 218). the negative cult serves only as an introduction and preparation for the positive one’’. Rathmayr. Moreover. establishing ‘conceptual equivalence’. 1989. remains a fundamental aim of a (universal) theory of ‘face’ (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi. 6 . Emotions may indeed be present in Brown and Levinson’s model (1987: 61) but they appear to be mostly concerned with defensiveness and protectiveness. 1984: 453). we are nowhere near a universal construct. multiple face-work is not only a possibility but. Garcı´a. From a different angle. Hwang. that is uncovering the multiple meanings attached to the construct of ‘face’ which are shared across cultures. Placencia. This is hardly in line with Brown and Levinson’s (1987) elaborate description of ‘Face Threatening Acts’ (FTAs) as a major concern of ‘polite behaviour’. 1996. 1987. but to date. 1991: 448). 1998: 216). 5. Empirical evidence reveals the co-existence of many types of face-work in situations where many face wants are threatened. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1461 A little further on. 1992: 107). 1996. It has been observed that ‘‘[t]he question of universality is a specifically modern question that only emerges on the horizon when societies are made insecure by the anthropologists’ revelation of a multitude of human forms of life’’ (Ehlich. Ide. sometimes. The non-Anglosaxon literature in the eighties and nineties (e. one could argue that a cultural theory of social interaction does not require universals. It appears that in Brown and Levinson’s treatment of ‘face’. 1991: 418). or being in the wrong face. 1967: 6). group’’ (Herna . 1996). 1996). who place a high value on social relationships and invest much personal time in developing and maintaining them (Lim and Choi. is the expected norm-governed behaviour in social interactions (Placencia. 1994. Lim. Apart from having. and firmly embedded in relations. or out of face. translated from French original). being or maintaining ‘face’. it is a situational construct (Ho. ‘Face’ is definitely a concern of Korean speakers. The Chinese notion of ‘face’ on which Goffman draws in his essay remains a primary focus of interest in the situated study of interpersonal behaviour. Chang. Research in various cultures published after 1987 has had the twofold effect of prompting a redefinition of both the validity and the weighting of ‘face’ as a determinant of interactional dynamics (e. 1997). 1990. 1999: 41). which share equal status (Goffman. an open issue. where expression of deference. 1999). precisely with respect to cross-cultural validity. but again.) directly recalls the Chinese notion of quantifiable ‘face’ (Ho. and indeed Goffman (1967) himself. 1993. 2000) as well as research on related aspects of Chinese interpersonal communication that throw light on the importance and the workings of ‘face’ (Ma. Chen. 1996. which reflect ‘‘the acceptance of the individual inside the ´ ndez-Flores. were not intended for application to inter-cultural communication. however. 1989. Similarly. but rather to cast some light on important aspects of (intra-cultural) interpersonal behaviour. Mao. 1967: 6–8). 1996. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 face-types (Lim.g.1462 F. is purported to be the motivator of the extensive use of diminutives in Standard Modern Greek (Terkourafi. ‘face’ seems to apply in Spanish everyday interactions. The lack of original Chinese discourse studies and the frequent borrowing of Western analytical frameworks and tools continues to hinder the development of much needed indigenous theories and empirical work (Chen and Gu. expressing solidarity (in in-group relationships). respectively. The interlocutor’s status is also a fundamental societal norm governing formal interactional behaviour in Russia. The contents of the Korean ‘face’. . It is perhaps worth remembering that seminal works on ‘face’ such as Hu (1944). Gao. Goffman’s expression of ‘‘how much feeling one is to have for face’’ (ibid. The discussion on the cultural variability of face is one that leaves Brown and Levinson’s uneasiness about ethnocentrism. that is. ´ ndez-Flores (1999: 41) observes how ‘‘self-affirmation’’ and confianza (‘‘sense of deep familiarity’’). with different contents (‘‘wants’’) to those predicated by Brown and Levinson. 1996: 124). are different from those of Brown and Levinson’s ‘face’ in that che-myon refers to ‘‘the image of the sociological self’’. Garcı´a. However. 1999). 1996).] ‘‘individuals protect it by meeting the expectations of the society’’ and it ‘‘consists of positive social values’’ (Lim and Choi. i. where it coexists alongside ‘the ‘‘authentically Russian’’ politeness that ‘‘comes from the heart’’’ (Rathmayr. . interpersonal behaviour can be seen to ‘enhance’. Chinese scholars have provided some of the most developed and consistent critiques of Brown and Levinson’s work to date (Gu. Ide. Herna whilst superficially appearing to refer to positive and negative face.e. their conceptualization of ‘face’ is actually weaker than Goffman’s. On the bright side. Ji. 1994).7 Extant research 7 A comparable case is that of the Ecuadorian society. This clearly echoes Goffman’s understanding that normative and situational factors determine the degree of sensitivity to face and the concern to be shown for all faces involved in an interaction (own and others). are in fact interdependent ‘‘wants’’ in Spanish interactional behaviour. status awareness. 1994. to increase ‘face’ (Goffman. [. i. 1994). it is ‘‘given by society’’. 1999: 76. Back in Europe. rather than concern for ‘face’. Brown and Levinson (1987: 14) claim that their model was designed to accommodate ‘‘cross-cultural conflicts grounded in different views of what constitutes ‘good behaviour in interaction’’’.e. 1994). and how to deal with it. often (and. which for Goffman seem to be equivalent to ‘‘facework’’. but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter [. guilt. . it is the interactional order that is the focus of Goffman’s study. ‘‘face-work’’ consists of ‘‘the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face’’ (Goffman. For Goffman. for instance. 1992. shame v. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1463 appears to indicate a split between those cultures where ‘face’ is an important. Goffman’s ideal social actor is based on a Western model of interactant. relationship with nature) one other dimension. for Goffman (1967: 7) ‘face’ is much more than just verbal behaviour: ‘‘At such times [in interpersonal contact] the person’s face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body. 6.]’’. The cult language of the opening quotation is an unmistakable signal of the importance Goffman attaches to the individual personality and its needs. if not central. However. I think. as well as verbal behaviour. Lim and Bowers. In guilt-based societies. 1996) and deference.g. I want to re-visit the notion of ‘face-work’. Early’s conclusions point to the need to understand and compare cultural conceptualizations of the social self and its relationship to others as an alternative and possibly more fruitful way of studying the relevance and dynamics of ‘face’ and ‘face-work’ in interpersonal contacts. 1967: 12). though they may be . are different for every individual. It has been suggested that other factors must be considered in a culture-situated understanding of ‘face’ and its dynamics: personal values. 1997: 139). and although individual psychology matters. Among the well-known universal dimensions of cultural variation (individualism–collectivism. ‘‘Face-saving practices’’. respeto (Garcı´a. role expectations and normative constraints (Earley. ‘‘face-work’’ has to do with self-presentation in social encounters. 1989). where both normative and strategic ‘politeness’ are present. one’s own self-concept. almost obsessively concerned with his own self-image and self-preservation. may account for the dominant role of the controlling and sanctioning groups (e. Finally. Goffman’s ‘face-work’ and politeness In this section. family. and normative politeness is therefore much less in evidence. in less hierarchical societies such as the northern European and the North American ones. but the concern with ‘face’ seems to be as relevant as it was four decades ago. Socially stratified societies where normative ‘politeness’ is dominant (e. group or society. masculinity–femininity. power distance. Mexico and the Zulu in South Africa) can be contrasted to ‘face’ and status-based societies such as China and Korea. face-work will be affected by one’s sense of individual responsibility and internal moral standards (Earley. . fellow workers) on face-work. explanatory key to interpersonal behaviour and those where ‘face’ takes second place to seemingly more dominant notions such as discernment. status is allegedly far less marked in verbal and non-verbal interaction. Similarly. incorrectly) treated as synonymous with (linguistic) politeness in research inspired by Brown and Levinson (e.F.g. Japan. Holtgraves. when Goffman first wrote his essays. but see Watts. 1997: 95–96).g. 1991. self-identity in various groupings. Arundale. but see Kwarciak. Despite the variety of studies which focus on linguistic politeness (see. Holtgraves and Yang. Watts et al. ‘‘face-work’’. on the other hand. 1995) all represent attempts to pin down a complex phenomenon that intuitively extends well beyond its linguistic manifestations. the bibliography compiled by DuFon et al. I take Watts et al. goaloriented behaviour (Haverkate. in other words.. has to do with self-presentation in social encounters which is dynamically realised in the interactional order. Brown and Levinson’s own discussion of politeness does not exclude non-verbal behaviour. It encompasses. and ‘‘protective’’ (of other’s ‘face’). although ‘‘aggressive face-work’’ is also discussed with reference to ‘‘making points’’ (Goffman. 1995: 390). commonsense notions of politeness. for instance. In the meantime. 1990. If ‘‘face-work’’ is an integral aspect of communication. although at times Goffman’s terminology may be confusing. These rules affect self. 1988). 1967: 24–26). should it be considered equivalent to ‘politeness’. is a theoretical construct. ‘‘politic behavior’’ (Watts. Most research within the last decade or so is primarily concerned with one of the two types of ‘‘first order politeness’’.1464 F.and other-evaluation. or appropriate behaviour (Meier. the field still lacks an agreed definition of what ‘politeness’ is. 1967: 45). As a point of departure. according to Goffman. (Goffman. 1993 for an alternative view). as much post-Brown and Levinson literature maintains? The perspective on ‘politeness’ outlined here is seen as inextricably connected with the social order. Second-order politeness. emotional display and ritual practices (Goffman. 1992: 50). but concentrates on linguistic strategies. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 drawn from a possible common framework. a position forcefully defended by Eelen (2001) in his state-of-the art monograph on politeness theories. politeness typologies (Kasper. .’s (1992) twofold notion of ‘‘first-order politeness’’ and ‘‘second-order politeness’’ as a bridge between research on verbal and non-verbal politeness (or first order politeness) and what I would define as the regulatory dynamics of social order (second order politeness). doubts have been cast on the need of a ‘model of politeness’ on the grounds that ‘‘[l]inguistic phenomena are necessarily embedded within a larger framework of social interaction and must also be explained therein’’ (Meier. Interpersonal behaviour thus defined appears to incorporate the notions of ‘‘face’’ (evaluation and emotional response) and ‘‘facework’’ (ritual practices).’s (1992: 3) own definitions are helpful here: ‘‘We take first-order politeness to correspond to the various ways in which polite behaviour is perceived and talked about by members of socio-cultural groups. 1988. 1990) and perspectives on politeness (Fraser. 1990) have been proposed. 1967: 13). Similarly. 1994). They are of two main types: ‘‘defensive’’ (of one’s own ‘face’). More recently. namely linguistic politeness. Goffman finds that interpersonal behaviour is governed by moral rules imposed on a social actor from outside. it seems possible in the end to distinguish between facesaving practices as ‘the rules of interaction’ and face-work as ‘the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face’ (Goffman. 1999.. 1967: 1). At the end of an essay in which he had set out to identify the ‘‘natural units of interaction’’ (Goffman. Notions of politeness as rational. a term within a theory of social behaviour and language usage’’. Politeness has also been elevated to the status of ‘theory’ (Coupland et al. 1967: 12). ] heuristics. on which explanations of politeness usually rest. . a critical appreciation of the construct of ‘culture’ becomes necessary. according to which. Accordingly. the authors also call for interdisciplinary research as a pre-requisite to capture the dynamic and context-dependent nature and workings of a concept that remains elusive (Watts et al. Werkhofer (1992: 191) remarks that politeness exercises both enabling and constraining functions on behaviour and that a commonly agreed upon and accepted framework of rights and duties would permit the disabling functions to be neutralised. conventions and expectations undergird its workings in much the same manner as ‘social behaviour and language usage’ underpin ‘‘second-order politeness’’. then. ’Polite behaviour’ Social-embeddedness and dynamism are two features of ‘polite behaviour’ that the literature on first-order politeness has treated as given but which need revisiting. In turn. of ` -vis ‘everyday life’ [. I also take on board the scope of Watts et al.) afford a multi-layered and dynamic conceptualisation of social identities acting within a moral order that is partly interactionally-constructed and partly regulated by mutually agreed norms and conventions. Quite appropriately. Social norms. I think.F.. 1992: 10–11).’s enquiry. as various ‘ideologies’ of politeness are often seen to emanate from specific cultural settings. if one attempts to introduce this rich construct into a discussion of the relationship between social order and interaction. The notion of ‘face’ embedded in ‘‘face-work’’ poses serious problems.8 Eelen (1999: 167) notes that ‘‘[I]t is rather a question of epistemology. Eelen explains. The important corollaries of (a) co-existing multiple social identities and (b) the clash between the rights and duties of these different identities (ibid. 7. For this reason. as they illuminate aspects of the debate which have been neglected. because the speaker’s judgement is never sought (Eelen. Interactants’ own understanding of what is ‘polite’ or ‘impolite’ rarely matches the analyst’s (‘scientific’) construction of politeness. . 1999: 171). 1992: 6). Interpretations of ‘politeness’ are usually provided by analysts on the basis of empirical data and assume a ‘‘sharedness model of communication and understanding’’ that Eelen questions as simplistic (Eelen.. ‘[I]n studying politeness. as ‘face’ has become a term with a great deal of theoretical and cultural baggage. I propose to use the label ‘polite behaviour’ instead. our place as scientists vis-a Eelen (1999) warns against easy reliance on such ‘ideologies’—whether common-sense (pertaining to ordinary speakers) or scientific (elaborated by researchers attempting to provide explanations)—and social ideologies (‘worldviews’). 8 . 1999: 166). Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 1465 ‘‘Face-work’’. indeed of philosophy. however. and seek to widen and deepen Watts et al. we are automatically studying social interaction and the appropriacy of certain modes of behaviour in accordance with socio-cultural conventions’ (Watts et al.’s definition of ‘‘second-order politeness’’. and this is so. and which could provide the key for a new understanding of the nature of ‘polite behaviour’ and its place within a theory of social behaviour. deals with norms beyond linguistic and para-linguistic politeness. ‘polite behaviour’ is a multifacetted social phenomenon that originates within the moral order. We cannot escape commitment to an interpretative framework if we wish to make progress in understanding. he also brings back individual agency to be the shaping force behind cultural and societal change. And yet. a definition that reflects Brown and Levinson’s positive and negative face. are derived which constitute the social order expressed in interpersonal and inter-group encounters. we have slowly moved towards duties to self. what is owed to the individual. original emphasis) words: ‘‘Postmodernity is an ‘era of morality’ in one sense only: thanks to the ‘disocclusion’—the dispersal of ethical clouds which tightly wrapped and obscured the reality of moral self and moral responsibility—it is possible now. In the so-called Western societies. In all their naked truth. embedded as it is in the social order (in fact. ‘group’ and ‘individual’ on which to build our argument. expectations that govern social encounters. 2000: 82). A theory of rights and duties illuminates the individualism-collectivism dimension of cultural variation (Triandis. in the individualism–collectivism opposition the contrast is between the individual (i. nay inevitable. It is the manifestation of an individualistic ontology. possibly the canvas of such order). which also means that we need to re-visit concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘society ‘. as opposed to a ‘‘communitarian ontology’’ that rests on a group-based society (Moghaddam et al. through Goffman’s ‘‘dissonance’’. In fact. In his monograph. while normative politeness is concerned with duties to self and other as members of a social group. to face the moral issues point-blank.9 9 I am indebted to one of the anonymous referees for pointing out that the association between individualism–collectivism and ‘duties to self ’– ‘duties to other’ is flawed. strategic politeness reflects the paramount concern for individual rights. It is from human values that norms. or rather. conventions. Moghaddam et al. the flux of change has swept moral codes away. as they emerge from the life experience of men and women. Duties have not disappeared. These cognitive attributes of the moral act seem to me tantalising pointers to the possible affective dimension of ‘polite behaviour’. they argue. . 1995). and as they confront moral selves in all their irreparable and irredeemable ambivalence’’. Strategic face is therefore concerned to duties to self and other as individuals. It could be argued that in the post-modern age. In fact. the self and the other) and the group. it is Eelen (1999: 170) himself who provides another useful insight on politeness as an ‘‘inherently ethical’’ phenomenon. which for him is obligatory but also ‘‘desired’’ and ‘‘desirable’’ (Steiner.e. and provides a normative explanation for it. Bargiela-Chiappini / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1453–1469 our role in defining that reality’’. is reminiscent of the Durkheimian ‘‘moral act’’. (2000: 276) write about ‘‘an age of rights of both positive and negative valence’’. pace their inevitable ideological nature. This rights-based social order is constructed around and for individuals. In Zigmunt Bauman’s (1995: 43. The nature of ‘polite behaviour’ is then grasped through the system of rules.. what is owed to the group. often used as an explanation for ‘politeness’. or impolite behaviour. the crisis of ethics has not resulted in the loss of morality. they have only been re-interpreted. Eelen (2001) re-states his understanding of politeness as a phenomenon that is embedded in social reality and therefore requires a multi-pronged analytical approach that only multi-disciplinarity can afford to provide. i. 2000: 297). including ‘politeness norms’. Significantly.e.1466 F. so that from the earlier orientation of duties towards the group. The moral nature of ‘polite behaviour’. whereas in many nonWestern societies. normative or indexical politeness signals a concern for duty. 119–154. pragmaticians. Its roots go deep into the history and moral constitution of a society and as such require more than just attention to verbal and non-verbal manifestations. 427–456. sociologists and social psychologists to share insights on the very essence of the social order. An investigation of compliance-gaining as politeness. Bauman. Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction. (Ed. Penelope. Blackwell. Its origins and workings are woven into the social fabric of interpersonal behaviour and only multidisciplinary research can hope to shed further light on them. Cambridge University Press. The core of the argument was a critical re-examination of some important aspects of Erving Goffman’s contribution to politeness theory that had been either neglected or only partly explored in previous work. 8. Blackwell. Levinson. 56–289. pp. References Arundale. 1987. Branaman. Yueguo. Can we return to the concept of duty in a culture of rights? Implications for morality and identity. 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