Evidence Cases (Jopep)

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents. 1992 Nov 26 2nd Division G.R. DECISION NOCON, J: No. 96492 weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.'" PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI, accusedappellant. 1991 Jan 18 No. 81561 BIDIN, J.: 3rd Division DECISION G.R. Juan Mendoza, father of Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 in Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. The lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979. Upon the death of Julian, Eufrocina succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots. Between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the case in the agrarian court, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Eufrocina filed before the agrarian court a case for the recovery of possession and damages. The agrarian court decided in favour of Efrocina and ordered petitioner to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Ruling: The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the 'Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.' The same provision states that 'In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.' Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is: 'Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (proprietress) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size. Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith reported the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. 3 NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. An Information was filed against Martie for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the trial court found accused/appellant guilty. Issues: 1. Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the object found in the four parcels. 2. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that his rights under custodial investigation were violated. 3. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that the four parcels was not that of the complainant. Ruling: I In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]): 1. This 'constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . .. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. 2. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, 3. Marti would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom Marti met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10). We find Marti's disclaimer as incredulous, selfserving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so". As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative selfserving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]). Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SALVAMANTE (at large), accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, accusedappellant. 1995 Mar 22 1st Division 112983 DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: G.R. No. The prosecution filed an Amended Information with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded against Maqueda only, after he entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court found accused Hector Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, Prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sur-rebuttal witness. The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as follows: Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as was her wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted. At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores. Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house. Julieta villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. She got In the sanctity of their own home, Horace William Barker was brutally slain and his wife Teresita Medoza badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims' former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the ghastly crime. As to Rene's coconspirator, the prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries. Only Richard Malig was arrested. On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him. The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested and he filed an application for bail. He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Enriquez and Maj. the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would lead to Naguilian. came to the hospital bed of Mrs.scared and immediately closed the door. Virgilio F. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad. Speaking in Tagalog. Ray Dean Salvosa. they heard the moans of Mrs. After he received an affirmative answer. which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. however. When informed of the investigation. At 7:00 a. Basilio Requeron. had been arrested in Guinyangan. While locked in their room. On 9 April 1992. and at the hearing. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case. The two men boarded it. and after she had recovered. Barker: "That's enough. Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he. Dr. her eyesight had not yet improved. Quezon. Benguet. they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the back of her right hand. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder. Calauag. Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that "Putol. Mike replied that it did not. She went down the stairs and proceeded to the dining room. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan. he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. She rose from her bed and went out of the room. a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. She fell to the concrete floor. and asked her to identify the persons who had Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) assaulted her. Executive Vice President of the BCF. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs. He did so and according to him. Moreover. they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial. the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. leaving behind her husband who was still asleep. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. to coordinate with the police in determining the whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante.m. directed SPO3 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. In the meantime. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991. he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. her visual acuity was impaired. that's enough. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail. The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. Barker and the shouts of Mr. she held on to it and shouted for help. Suddenly. Five minutes later. ordered Glen Enriquez to go to Guinyangan. she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion. In Guinyangan. she called Julieta. that's enough. When the two men reached the shed. Maqueda. Chief of the Tuba Police Station. In the investigation conducted by the Tuba police. A police team from the Tuba Police Station. Rodolfo Anagaran. he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. together with another policeman. Tuba. Its commanding officer. On 4 March 1992. Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain. Benguet. On 29 November 1991. and she had double vision. Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he boarded it." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor. August 1991. proceeded to Guinyangan. she ran to the garage and hid under the car. they already left the place. she went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. La Union. Renton. Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. After a few seconds." who is none other than accused Hector Maqueda. he identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante. while he was under detention. Before Maj. Maj. was the only accused on trial. showed her pictures of several persons. Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City ." When the noise stopped. Barker. it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her. Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. Quezon. 27. When they saw that the door knob was being turned. of that same day. Metro Manila. he never saw accused Salvamante again. There he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang Salaysay . 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August 27. Quezon. Calauag. On December 20. After he felled Mrs. he was teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron. He was employed as a caretaker since July 5. After that occasion. Although the trial. who found him the job as caretaker. then Mrs. then to the Tuba Police Station. Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother.and an extrajudicial admission . He was supposed to report back for work on March 2. he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. He told them that he could attest to the fact that he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder. Ruling: We find no merit in this appeal. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. 1991.the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. Tuba. Quezon. Quezon Province as it was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail. testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. one of the househelps was already there. 1991. He knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood playmates. he would be freed and he could also become a state witness. Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos. Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry. It was his sister. he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad. having gone to the same elementary school. to attack her with the lead pipe provided him by Salvamante. when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house. Hence. He and his 8 co-employees all sleep inside the factory. he accompanied Roselyn home to Guinyangan. 1992. Posadas Bayview Subdivision. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. 1992. 1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the CAFGU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag. Barker came down. who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her work at the factory. Myrna Katindig. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. Norie Dacara. 1991. it was his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not around. The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno. As caretaker. Muntinlupa. After Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) his Christmas vacation. His testimony is summarized by the trial court in this wise: Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. Block 21. There is a distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33. Quezon. he went home to Gapas. It is only an extrajudicial admission. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan. forcing him. Benguet where he has remained under detention up to the present. He stated that on August 27. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca. They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother.was to rob the Barkers. Castrence. Benguet. Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him (Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27. When the two accused were at Calauag. Difference between an Extra-Judicial Confession and Extra-Judicial Admission From its ratiocinations. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows: . They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante. he initially objected to the plan. On March 5. he saw accused Rene Salvamante. Barker. he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house. Maqueda seasonably appealed to the SC his conviction. the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked. Quezon Province and roam around. On August 26. but later on agreed to it. court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker. When the Barkers were already unconscious on the floor. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. he went back to work at the polvoron factory until February 29. SPO3 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay. he was in charge of the sales. and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1. Maqueda. 1991. Sukat. Guinyangan. or of any offense necessarily included therein. Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. of facts pertinent to the issue and tending. declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant." They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power. It was. an admission is something less than a confession. Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. or restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited.SEC. and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. of his guilt of the crime charged. this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person. taken during custodial investigation. the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government.The act. but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people. 33. it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. he is subjected to such investigation. wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1). he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge. then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. . In a confession. As disclosed by a reading thereof. declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. . Extra-Judicial Confession Without Assistance of Counsel is In Admissible The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court. a private party.The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged. to prove his guilt. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation. an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Article III of the Constitution. or state tyranny and abuse of authority. Section 12. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. And under Section 3 of Rule 133. nevertheless. xxx xxx xxx SEC. Accordingly. that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect. Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa. direct or implied. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3. in connection with proof of other facts. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1). In other words. and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person. 26. are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26. If we follow the theory of the trial court. may be given in evidence against him. Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness. If. therefore. In Aballe vs. People. Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not." The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1). Article III of the Constitution. Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense. by a party in a criminal case. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Extra-Judicial Admission voluntarily and freely given not in the course of an investigation and those given to a private person are admissible The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. and as to the other admission. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. otherwise competent to testify as a . Admission of a party. Confession. then Section 12(1). it was given to a private person. while an admission is a statement by the accused. Benguet. The guilt of Maqueda was also established by circumstancial evidence Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa. diaries. established beyond doubt by circumstancial evidence. Tuba. is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban. Martin and his alleged paramours. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Cecila." Section 4. on 4 March 1992. greetings cards. cancelled checks. Or. Quezon. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN. After trial. and both left the place sometime in September 1991. as the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) guilty person. and photographs. a driver and Alfredo's secretary. By analogy. Cecilia entered the clinic of her Alfredo. On . Dr. the lower court rendered judgment for Dr. respondents. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad.. thereby belying his testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991. We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2. and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty. to the exclusion of all others. the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. it suffices if he gives its substance. (3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case: (1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was committed there. and in the presence of her mother. a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused. On March 26. who is still at large. Norie Dacara. Barker. as jurisprudentially formulated. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Cecilia had filed against Alfredo. 1982. vs. who heard the confession. a doctor of medicine. Quezon. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other. (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty. rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance. Martin and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. as correctly ruled by the trial court. forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in Alfredo's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. petitioner. Martin's passport. 107383 MENDOZA. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed. he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. (4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan. and (c ) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Alfredo Martin. his guilt was. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. (2) Rene Salvamante. Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991.e.m.R. Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. (5) He was arrested in Guinyangan.: G. the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession. he also admitted his participation therein. was positively identified by Mrs. Maqueda’s Defense of Alibi must fail This conclusion having been reached. it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a. it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case. Dr. and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime. a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. Moreover. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case. that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed. 1996 Feb 20 2nd Division No. i. CECILIA ZULUETA.witness. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper." In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness. J. declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief. 113271 DAVIDE. A person. such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. stated in his affidavit: 4. by contracting marriage. No. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. 1989. which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. Control Clerk Eugenio C. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals. in light of the decision in the People v.00. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee. the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. illegal dismissal. Marti 34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico.appeal. In the present case. thus. respondents. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31. made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. Catolico. through Ms. through her counsel. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. as counsel for Catolico claims. petitioners submit that. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise. On appeal. Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation. Ms. which has a previous price of only P320. it declared that the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . EMMA CO. the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. Co asked Catolico to explain her side of the reported irregularity.00 per bottle of 50 mg. petitioners. Marti." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. vs. Inc. Valdez. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what they alleged as complainant's dishonesty". and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. who claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. through a China Bank Check No.R. Ruling: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant. It is not true. RULING: Catolico was unjustly dismissed." WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision. check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information.. 892068 dated November 9. Forthwith. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Catolico in violation of the company procedure. 1989. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 1997 Oct 16 1st Division DECISION J: G. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. Unfortunately for petitioners. explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice. JR. But. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640. issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On the contrary. and illegal suspension. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384. It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. as prescribed by law. Catolico filed a complaint for unfair labor practice. 5. and as said counsel admits. we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Here. a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible. petitioner. In the instant case. During their investigation. the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the allegation. Jr.” Under the above rule. not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land. 1990. what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner. Coaccused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. J. they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses.VIRGILIO BON. together with Rosalio Bon Prosecution’s evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano. Manuel Dangalan. she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. it may be admitted. He said that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21. even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay. vs. testified to by the prosecution witnesses. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705. Julian Lascano. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. a party’s verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. respondent. According to this provision.whether oral or documentary -. Gotesco Investment Corporation v. but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Nestor Labayane and Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza which shows that Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. who in turn wrote a letter to one of the barangay tanods. .is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness. The trial court convicted Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre. administered by Virgilio Bon. Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12. 1990. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence. declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen. and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . On the land. Ricardo Valladolid. Sorsogon. On this basis. On February 7. 2004 Jan 13 1st Division No. to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza’s] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. cut and sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers.” This rule is based upon Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. Hence. 1990. Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. not to show that the statement was true. Rosalio Bon. the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge. which are derived from his own perception. petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalan’s testimony. Third. Ruling: The Petition has no merit. If credible. because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. In their defense. any evidence -. that he had ordered the cutting of the trees. First. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes Moreover. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge. Chatto ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but primary. 1990. 36. Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. but that it was in fact made. together with Julian Lascano. they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception. Issues: 1. Jr. except as otherwise provided in these rules. Oscar Narvaez. thus. information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. Sorsogon. he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre. Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane. It is admissible in evidence. Alexander Mendones. On February 12. hearsay excluded.A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge. 6666 located in Basud. Jr. Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre. Therefore. it is not covered by the hearsay rule.R. all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. as amended. “the act. they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. 1990. First Issue: Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows: “Sec. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January. 2. 152160 D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN. the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees. Second.: G. for the crime charged. Manuel Dangalan. that is. one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. The testimony of petitioner may. is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. fruit trees and big trees. (3) [o]n February 13. 2. Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court.R. Appellee. Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees.] went to private complainant[. certainly. Jr. accused Alejandro Jeniebre. and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-inlaw. the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre. vigilant and independent representation. In its assessment of the evidence. (2) [o]n February 12. therefore. but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. not to police authorities. LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extrajudicial confession. In the present case. Furthermore. No. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. This kind of evidence. / ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS. Ulysses Garcia. to saw the lumber. This fact. We have no reason to depart from this rule.] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which they had cut. Jr.” The appellate court. it is necessary that the following elements concur: 1. found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioner’s culpability: “x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan. There is more than one circumstance. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. 145176 PANGANIBAN. Virgilio Bon and his son[. together with the circumstantial evidence.: The right of the accused to counsel demands effective. if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial investigation. the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission. Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. This Court refrains from disturbing the CA’s findings. . as in this case.. Julian Lascano. LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI. ARMANDO DATUIN JR. J. and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta. Appellants. 2004 Mar 30 1st Division DECISION G.] x x x Rosalio Bon[. the investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees. MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself. the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances: “Accused Virgilio Bon.. Jr. y GRANADOS (at large). He admitted before the barangay tanod. however. 3. on the other hand. ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS. suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and. Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC). be received in evidence against him.” A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting. we affirm the lower courts’ assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land. Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission. with other Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) witnesses present[. 1990. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged. Accused. unless it is true. Hence. [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees. Second Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. and the CENRO’s computation of the value of the timber generated from the felled trees. Versus SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large). MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO. 1990. Armando Datuin.] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[. gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps. Sanchez anymore since then. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. Sanchez. accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have Atty. he was brought to the office of Col.m. SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter’s name. Atty. SPO4 Coronel supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia’s wallet and the former insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from accusedappellant’s wallet. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel. at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia. and Ruling: The appeal has merit. upon being requested. Loyola. The arrival of Mr. and Mr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused. Before these notes could be shredded. who gave the answers appearing in accused-appellant Garcia’s alleged three sworn statements. and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession. Labita. Labita took pictures while he was doing the said act. Sanchez to be his lawyer. it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia’s wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr.00 and P500. The RTC found the accused guilty. and Mr.190. interrupted the interview. Sanchez allegedly signed the alleged three (3) sworn statements. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside. Hence. when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty.” Moreover. were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita. including the admissibility of Garcia’s confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes.Miguelito de Leon. Librando Flores and Antonio S. even if it indicated Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word “SAKSI. the investigating officer at WPDC. but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each of his coaccused. In such case. 1992. He did not identify his co-accused. Labita. 1992. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told him that Atty. counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences. while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. He was not present when Atty. However.00 bills with a face value of Php194. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of Mr. Moreover. they were stolen from the BSP by the private respondents. As a result of the investigation. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant Garcia’s wallet and examine the contents thereof. Sanchez would be his lawyer. During the hearing of the case on April 6. punctured currency notes in P100. On November 5. Garcia during trial alleged was actually Mr. The written confessions. Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel. age and address. Issue: the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate Subdivision. it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for shredding.. and not accused-appellant Garcia. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation. Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Atty.” The trial court found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Las Piñas City. The lower court’s action is manifest error. The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions. however. 2000. Central Bank of the Philippines. as such disclaimer was “an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused. he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police. First Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence Extrajudicial Confessions It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions13 that Garcia was not assisted by Atty.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. and accused-appellant Garcia had not met Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney’s Office on November 4. At 8:00 p. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for circulation. but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession. and that he signed the three (3) sworn statements only as a witness thereto. not having raised the matter before entering his plea. the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. he could not. Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb. the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. At this point. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. or where the accused was acting suspiciously. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid. Garcia was not lawfully arrested. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search. The Constitution states that “[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12 shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x. ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN WATES. 141137 CARPIO-MORALES. SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were. otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban. who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle. said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. Perforated Currency Notes The police arrested Garcia without a warrant. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. 2004 Jan 20 3rd Division DECISION J. the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed. Nonetheless. At the time of his arrest. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. however.R. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air. vs. The trial court. hence. found appellants guilty as charged. where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates. was not committing.” Hence. appellee. while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. Note. and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search. A waiver in writing. however. however. albeit reiterating that it was only a mat. to be afraid and acting suspiciously. Ruling: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. In the present case. the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest. as were his co-appellants. SPO1 Haydenburge Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . The accused is entitled to effective. Again Vinecario obliged. and attempted to flee. however. retorted that he is a member of the army. No. vigilant and independent counsel. appellants. following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Obliging. that this waiver is limited to the arrest. In light then of appellants’ speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having On the night of April 10. 2735. SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it. returned it to Vinecario. he told Vinecario to take the same out. they are inadmissible in evidence. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present. SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse. he had not committed. Without the assistance of a counsel. as police officers were manning a checkpoint in Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection. because of existence of probable cause. like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case. One of the police officers blew his whistle and ordered them to return to the checkpoint. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO.: G. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. Hence. 1999. it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. is not enough. a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. Goc-ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped away to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario).compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. by Decision of July 20. When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card. 1995. Where the arrest was incipiently illegal. he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. who in turn passed it to Roble who. offer any. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Gocong noticed something wrapped in paper. and was not about to commit any crime. but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics. he did not pay much attention to the sound. their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another. persuaded him to give them the keys. and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon. Victor Francisco Keyser.R. Antipolo City. No. With them was Felix Marcelo.. vs. This enabled the police to open the gate. The categorical and consistent testimonies. Keyser. prosecution witness Romualdo Campos.. Ten minutes later. Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. The victim’s head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown. The police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape. 147786 QUISUMBING. particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal. that he was a member of the Philippine Army. He The victim. Finally.. 2004 Jan 20 En Banc DECISION G. On opening the boxes. SPO1 Carlito Reyes. and the reply of Vinecario. The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees.m. who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. As to Vinecario’s allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted by the police officers. appellant. Lornaville. Once inside. SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo. which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos’ assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act. When the police asked how he did it. On March 22. 1998. He stopped to listen. Jr. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well. he dismembered the body with a carpenter’s saw. all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station.. an official police photographer. Keyser arrive. and after Keyser fell. appellee. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. he saw Victor F. but found the gates securely locked. while a reaction team was being dispatched to the scene.been flagged down by police officers. after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos was making some entries in his logbook. They were immediately met by Campos. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA. The part of the wall made of lawanit had two large holes. there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense. San Roque. arrived at the crime scene. a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. he saw appellant Eric G.m. and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal. when he heard some loud noises coming from the Keyser Plastics area. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes. According to Campos. at around 10:00 a. must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Shocked by this revelation. Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. At around 8:00 a. At around noontime. Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained. a manufacturer of faucets. a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp. When asked as to his motive for the killing. which was located in the area of Greatmore. Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall. while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. J.: Guillermo. with principal place of business at Sitio Halang. the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks. Vinecario harps on his defense of denial. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection.vThe defense of denial. Campos ignored Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . and the implements used in committing the crime. like alibi. when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint. the dismembered corpse. In the case at bar. Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood. the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw. the trial court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Photographs were taken of the suspect. An hour later. as he knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. according to the prosecution witness. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Later. Campos’ testimony was not rebutted by the defense. In view of no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights. who was then in police custody. As the Solicitor General points out. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. Moreover. the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known. Despite the absence of counsel. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. Absent that understanding. was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters. he was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. if it was made without the assistance of counsel. Appellant Guillermo.” as it cannot be said that the person has been truly “informed” of his rights. no regret whatsoever about his The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. Dano. According to the testimony of the security guard. there is a denial of the right “to be informed. The rights enumerated in the Constitution. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the custodial investigation. without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. As well said in People v. on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Issue: the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He disclosed to David the details of the crime. namely: Augusto “Gus” Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. In fact.expressed actions. which he placed in sacks and cartons. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation. the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. appellant’s statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. He alleged he was a victim of police “frame-up. Under Article III of the Constitution. or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Appellant’s alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. but found the prosecution’s evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence. He points out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him. including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body into pieces. a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary. At the trial. It convicted the appellant. Keyser’s death shocked the nation. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellant’s right to be represented by counsel. When asked why he killed his employer. (c) the confession must be Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) express. The right of a person under interrogation “to be informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. Romualdo Campos. appellant Guillermo’s defense consisted of outright denial. however. even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth. the inadmissibility of the appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel.” Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their respective interviews with him. Under . In the instant case. Article III. Be that as it may. and (d) the confession must be in writing. Section 12. he says. and treated him “like an animal. the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said constitutional guarantees. must be deemed inadmissible. the officer proceeded with said investigation. Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years. did not feed him properly. Ruling: The confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station. including his alleged confession.” The trial court disbelieved appellant’s version of the incident. also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements. The two officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the sacks. he repeatedly admitted what he had done. immediately went to Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas. members of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7. including the instruments of the crime. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. the death of his employer. not just once. Mabalacat. 5 feet in height. Balibago. Galvez. The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-Og of Lacnog. Appellant. reasoning that appellant’s defense of frame-up was not supported by evidence and thus could not prevail over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. the informer pointed to them a woman bearing the same description given by the former. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Victor Francisco Keyser.R. Thus. the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving the appellant’s guilt beyond Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Further. Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to conduct surveillance operation against their target female who was described by their informant as about 50 years old. Said information was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses. The trial court found the prosecution’s version to be credible. appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters. The positive evidence. Agbanawag Tabuk. Kalinga Province. 142356 CORONA. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers and requested the woman to put out the contents of the said sacks. As held in Andan. their informant went to their headquarters and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas. Instead. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing. Two weeks before August 13. J. the prosecution has amply proven the appellant’s guilt in the killing of Victor F. are not covered by the Miranda principles and. Abelgas and David. No. who testified in court. a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act. At around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of August 13. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. The TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant. received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. we have no hesitation in saying that. together with the informant. statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.75 kilograms of marijuana. The law enforcer’s testimonies carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. versus LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG. not an agent of the State or a law enforcer. Appellee. admissible in evidence against him. when interviewed on separate occasions by the media. PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Each time. They were not under the direction and control of the police. straight long hair and coming from Kalinga province. (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise. 2004 Apr 14 3rd Division DECISION G. Mabalacat.the Rules of Court. as res gestae. The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top. which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves. Ruling: After a thorough review of the records. 1999. While they were in their car. Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to a private security guard. Angeles City. The record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions. but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer. His admission to Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. 1999. All these requisites are present in the instant case. Rhodel O. and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. A brick. in the gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court. the res gestae is a startling occurrence. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence. Pampanga to some drug pushers. PO3 Sagum and PO3 Galvez.: with Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged transporting 14. despite the inadmissibility of appellant’s alleged confession to the police. Keyser. Barros. Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest. appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. vs.transporting marijuana. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. (This is in addition to her argument that the 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible since the warrantless search was invalid. Aruta. the inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor ones involving negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses’ testimonies nor detract from their credibility. Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. the appellant waived any irregularity that may have attended her arrest. petitioner. That same morning. When complainant called up. After they had decided on the proposed conditions. however. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. went on a business trip. Besides. The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellant’s alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. No. the person to be arrested has committed. not having been made pursuant to a lawful arrest. in this case. who is a lawyer to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer. complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. respondents. pursuant People vs. complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault" Twenty minutes later. In this case. This Court has already ruled that tipped information is Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. Regarding the credibility of witnesses. by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively participating in the trial. Leon Gonzaga.R. Atty. According to the request. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested . The decision of the trial court was supported by the evidence on record. J: Complainant Atty. the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from their informant. are act prohibited by law. this Court has ruled time and again that this is a matter best assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand. The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. In the present case. Here. the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime.reasonable doubt. Appellant also assigns as error the illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda rights. that there was no such waiver. Thus.) This contention is without merit since this Court has repeatedly ruled that. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the . they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant’s arrival was not known by the informant. However. Laconico answered `Yes'. Jaime Alarcon’s house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest. This section provides that a peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when. in his presence. in submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. L69809 D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ. the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges. 1986 October 16 2nd Division G. GAANAN. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal. JR. EDGARDO A. Laconico telephoned appellant. Assuming. the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113. an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and warrantless search. Since a lawful arrest was made. the police officer should be spurred by probable cause in making the arrest. otherwise the objection is deemed waived. the waiver of the nonadmissibility of the “fruits” of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure is not to be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to retain vitality. Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. reiterated in People vs. by their very nature. Ruling: We rule for the petitioner. revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement. in effect. The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. Act No. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary. ORTANEZ. The main issue in the resolution of this petition. however. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature. ROMEO F. vs. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Presiding Judge. COURT OF APPEALS.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. intercept. We have to consider. the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. that is. TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ. the lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 94.office of the then Department of Public Highways." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear. 4200. intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature. they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Furthermore. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) matter. Br. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone." After trial on the merits. ZAMORA.000. intercepting. complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's. Issue: whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. HON. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because. . or annoying the call may be. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone. petitioner. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent. would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law? The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing. respondents. criminal. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results. Regional Trial Court of Quezon city and RAFAEL S. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. 4200. insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. 4200. or record the spoken words. that affirmance of the criminal conviction would. or recording the communication. in case of doubt as in the case at bar. telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". however. Thus. GARCIA. J. where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. However. or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder. the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. Act No. insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality. orally formally offered in evidence three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. Ramirez alleging that Ester S. 4200. 93833 KAPUNAN. substance. the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent. the trial court granted the Motion to Quash." In support of her claim. Act No.R. Any communication or spoken word. on the same day. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone." Clearly. . Private respondent. 4200. respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. In an order dated May 3. petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Zamora. allegedly vexed. RAMIREZ.: A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. or any information therein contained. intercept. quasijudicial. contents. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. in a confrontation in the latter's office. RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment. good customs and public policy. petitioner. on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same. incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. and ESTER S. 4200. SOCORRO D. of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. purport. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez. As a result of petitioner's recording. Upon arraignment. including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. . Rep. not being authorized by all the parties to any Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) private communication or spoken word.1994 Aug 4 2nd Division G.R.A. . private respondent filed a criminal case before Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200. obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial. and that 2) the violation punished by R. to secretly overhear. 1995 Sep 28 1st Division DECISION G. agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R A. or meaning of the same or any part thereof. J. No. or the existence. The relevant provisions of Rep. or by using any other device or arrangement. Ruling: The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. 4200 are as follows: "Section 1." "Section 4. 1989. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992. after presenting his evidence. to tap any wire or cable. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner." contrary to morals. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication. The complaint was raffled to Branch 94. the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. particularly a violation of R A. the court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. It shall be unlawful for any person.: Rafael S. Act No. respondent. or however otherwise described. No. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. . Garcia. vs. Issue: Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992. In the present case. 110662 DECISION PADILLA. in lieu of a plea. and received the evidence of the parties consisting of affidavits which were subject to cross-examination.A. "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R. Uniwide is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P6. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing. the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. and (4) Whether Uniwide is liable for deficiencies in Project 2. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION. (c) it is entitled to liquidated damages for the delay incurred in constructing Project 1 and Project 3. moreover. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R. intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.075.A. the decretal portion of which is as follows: “WHEREFORE. as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded. 126619 D E C I S I O N TINGA. (b) it is not liable to pay the Value-Added Tax (VAT) for Project 1. actual and exemplary damages. Upon Uniwide’s motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and Titan’s open court manifestation agreeing to the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Respondent. the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision. in such amount as may be computed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to be paid directly thereto. 4200. \ Uniwide asserted in its petition that: (a) it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional works in Project 1 and Project 3. Project 2 – Edsa Central: Uniwide is absolved of any liability for VAT payment on this project. denying the material allegations of the complaint. Issue: Whether Section 1 of Republic Act 4200 apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. suspension. supports the respondent court' conclusion that in enacting R. Consequently. An action for a sum of money was filed by TitanIkeda Construction and Development Corporation against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation arising from Uniwide’s non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects covered by agreements they entered into with each other. An Arbitral Tribunal conducted a preliminary conference with the parties and thereafter issued a Terms of Reference (TOR) which was signed by the parties. 4200. Before the CIAC. On the other hand. judgment is hereby rendered as follows: On Project 1 – Libis: Uniwide is absolved of any liability for the claims made by [Titan] on this Project. What R.301. and attorney’s fees. Second.A 4200. Issue: Whether Uniwide is entitled to liquidated damages for Projects 1 and 3.A. the Court of Appeals declared the trial court's order of May 3. On 17 April 1995.364.: G. J.63 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 08 September 1993 until the date of payment.On appeal. 2006 THIRD DIVISION No.R. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". [Uniwide] is held liable to pay in full the VAT on this project. On Project 3 – Kalookan: Uniwide is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P5. the case was suspended for it to undergo arbitration. TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. [Titan] is absolved of any liability on the counterclaim for defective construction of this project. Ruling: Section 1 of R. with counterclaims for refund of overpayments. Titan’s complaint was thus refiled with the CIAC. 1989 null and void. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. and holding that the allegations sufficiently Constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R. after the parties submitted their respective memoranda.A 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records. vs. not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.A. hearings. and (d) it should not have been found liable for deficiencies in the defectively constructed Project 2. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.158. December 20. The tribunal also conducted an ocular inspection.77 which is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 19 December 1992 until the date of payment. the same being for the account of the [Titan]. Petitioner. Uniwide filed an answer which was later amended and reamended. if not the letter of the CIAC rules. was completed in June 1993. Hypothetically admitting that there is such a provision. “no attempt was ever made by the [Uniwide] to modify the TOR in order to accommodate the issues related to its belated counterclaim” on this issue. the CIAC held that there is no legal basis for passing upon and resolving Uniwide’s claim for the following reasons: (1) no claim for liquidated damages arising from the alleged delay was ever made by Uniwide at any time before the commencement of Titan’s complaint. Titan was not given a chance to present evidence to counter Uniwide’s claim for liquidated damages. Furthermore. This is for the reason that the formulation of the Terms of Reference is done with the active participation of the parties and their counsel themselves. (2) the claim for liquidated damages was not included in the counterclaims stated in Uniwide’s answer to Titan’s complaint. Verily. The Tribunal holds that such importation of the Rules of Court provision on amendment to conform to evidence would contravene the spirit. the CIAC should have applied procedural rules such as Section 5. expense and aggravation which commonly accompany ordinary litigation. Rule 10 with more liberality because it was an administrative tribunal free from the rigid technicalities of regular courts. issues outside thereof may not be resolved. while Project 3. their respective counsel and all the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. the CIAC held: The Rule of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration promulgated by the CIAC contains no Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) provision on the application of the Rules of Court to arbitration proceedings. The TOR is further required to be signed by all the parties. whose policy and objective is to “provide a fair and expeditious settlement of construction disputes through a nonjudicial process which ensures harmonious and friendly relations between or among the parties. It cites the pertinent provisions of the written contracts which contained deadlines for liquidated damages. the CIAC can only resolve issues brought before it by the parties through the TOR which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. Uniwide asserts. In fact. Uniwide also noted that the evidence show that Project 1 was completed either on 15 February 1992. Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages in its memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. suppletory application is made only if it would not contravene a specific provision in the arbitration rules and the spirit thereof. Uniwide insists that the CIAC should have applied Section 5. The Rules of Court cannot be used to contravene the spirit of the CIAC rules. as shown by Titan’s own evidence. In this case. According to Uniwide. which is not necessarily bound by the Rules of Court. the CIAC cannot make a ruling on it.” Further. delay. As an arbitration body. on the other hand. On this point. according to Uniwide’s President. In rejecting Uniwide’s claim for liquidated damages. As already noted in the Decision. Also. (3) the claim was not formulated as an issue to be resolved by the CIAC in the TOR. The basic objective is to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to avoid the formalities. On this matter. as noted by the Court of Appeals. and is intended to avoid the formalities. the members of which are chosen by the parties themselves. Uniwide claims that the required evidence for an affirmative ruling on its claim is already on the record. Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. the delay. Arbitration has been defined as “an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter. the CIAC rejected such claim while the Court of Appeals held that the matter should be left for determination in future proceedings where the issue has been made clear. the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. if Uniwide’s claim for liquidated damages was not raised as an issue in the TOR or in any modified or amended version of it. Thus. or 12 March 1992. a party may not be deprived of due process of law by an amendment of the complaint as provided in Section 5. and (4) no attempt was made to modify the TOR to accommodate the same as an issue to be resolved. involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body.” Voluntary arbitration. which parties freely consent in advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties had the opportunity to be heard. the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of liquidated damages goes against the established judicial policy that a court should always strive to settle in one proceeding the entire controversy leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigations. instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice. the Court of Appeals found that the issue has never been made concrete enough to make Titan and the CIAC aware that it will be an issue. even in a suppletory capacity. Unless the issues thus carefully formulated in the Terms of Reference were expressly showed [sic] to be amended. . Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts. the Court of Appeals held that the CIAC is an arbitration body. as found by the CIAC. The Court of Appeals also noted that the only evidence on record to prove delay in the construction of Project 1 is the testimony of Titan’s engineer regarding the date of completion of the project while the only evidence of delay in the construction of Project 3 is the affidavit of Uniwide’s President.Ruling: Liquidated Damages On the issue of liquidated damages. Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages in its Memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. for the sake of argument. 12 of Rule 123.L. It must further be shown that delay was attributable to the contractor if not otherwise justifiable.. on the ground that it was Juan Consunji. Uniwide’s belated claim constitutes an admission that the delay was justified and implies a waiver of its right to such damages. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. which the Court issued motu-proprio." Manifestly. It must be remembered that the purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified because such evidence may be admissible for several purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility. petitioner. "SEC. in connection with the making of a certain extrajudicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness. may be given in evidence against him. according to the following remarks were made: "FISCAL LUSTRE: Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) transcript. 9 The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion. nevertheless. that said testimony on the date of completion of Project 1 is admitted. the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object." Annex "B" of the petition. Evidence submitted for one purpose may not be considered for any other purpose. or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence. 14. and another whose identity is still unknown. as in this case. vs. It now claims that by virtue of Engr. but again the motion was denied. providing that: "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. p. being hearsay as to the latter. conditions and circumstances as required by law. Tablante was offered only to prove that Project 1 was indeed completed.Uniwide alludes to an alleged judicial admission made by Engr. . Furthermore.: G. NICASIO YATCO. The testimony of Engr. counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused freely and voluntarily made. Contrarily. 1955 Nov 28 En Banc DECISION J. Arturo Xavier of the NBI. the confession of Consunji was. while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses. THE HON. J. as evidence against him." Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18. Atty. long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN. 1955. and circumstances. or may be admissible for one purpose and not for another. Ruling: We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Alfonso Panganiban. otherwise the adverse party cannot interpose the proper objection. Tablante’s statement. We disagree. even assuming. Rule 123. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to. but upon an altogether different ground. Luzon Tablante wherein he stated that Project 1 was completed on 10 March 1992. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban. conditions. May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself? COURT: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts.The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged. the . No. It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel. Rules of Court. Section 14. the establishment of the mere fact of delay is not sufficient for the imposition of liquidated damages. and not to a confession made. L-9181 REYES. Thereafter. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban. Titan had admitted that it was in delay. Confession.B. but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them.R. were charged with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. It was not offered to prove the fact of delay. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts. Quezon City Branch. respondents. and should have been admitted as such. admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt. on the other hand. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee. By so doing. conditions. skilled therein. also known as Yui Yip. Teresita Sy. declaring: (1) petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales. L-55960 November 24. (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him.000. namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact. Rule 130 section 45 states that: SEC. TERESITA SYBERNABE. and. when admissible for any purpose. G. on its own motion. a Chinese national died on January 17. SZE SOOK WAH. the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee. (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate. etc. petitioners. Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen. Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat and. vs. Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19.hearsay as to the latter.00 more or less. since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the People's Republic of China. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . AIDA SYGONZALES. is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country. or by his deputy. No. The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law . Issue: Whether the CA erred in declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Yee as not have been proven valid in accordance with the laws of the People Republic of China. Proof of public or official record. With respect to an unwritten foreign law. and SY CHUN YEN. SZE LAI CHO. J. respondents. as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country. (d) they nominate Aida SyGonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. 25. Manuel Sy. willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat. the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power. Sze Sook Wah. 12 Phil. to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. and accompanied. vice consul. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country. MANUEL SY. if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. put up its own objection to the confessions .that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts. Thereafter. consul general.Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego. YAO KEE. 45. is provided for under Rule 132 section 25. Teresita SyBernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.. On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court. After hearing.R. 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing. Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. if the record is not kept in the Philippines. RODOLFO SY. Manuel Sy. or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. Aida Sy-Gonzales. (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.: Sy Kiat. and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made. circumstances. thus: SEC. Held: To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven. consul. (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent. 1988 CORTES. Manuel Sy. and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. Reyes. leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300.—The oral testimony of witnesses. (3) Aida Sy-Gonzales. and. 1). an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years: (2) oppositors Sze Sook Wah. Unwritten law. instead of ruling on this objection. Proof of a written foreign law. But the Court.—An official record or an entry therein. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. with a certificate that such officer has the custody. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. finding among others that: (1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee (2) Sze Sook Wah. the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation. the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive. 1931 in China. the probate court. may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. Accordingly. which she promised to do. respondents. the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1. In fact.In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage." Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus: . 35. "A-2". No. Inc. . and then again it may decide not to do so at all. and Damasa Timtiman. which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. and did. JR. to resolve the ownership of the subject lot. "B" and "C". Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. As we said in Interpacific Transit. the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A". "B" and "C". G. in arriving at its factual findings. such documents cannot be considered evidence. her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Offer of evidence. first. it may still be admitted against the adverse party if. even if true. there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . the property and he refused. In the latter event. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. and consequently. She remained on the said land until her death. nor can they be given any evidentiary value. The trial court also erred when. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. At the same time. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence." Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows: Sec. complaining that. but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. it should be presumed that it is the same as ours. Ruling: It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A". Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River. which he inherited from his parents. it JOSE TABUENA. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA. the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Tabuena appealed to the respondent court. following which the Jose Tabuena. cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. took possession thereof. claiming it as his own. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property." were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix. who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Sy Quia.. Jr. it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land. the lot was sold by Juan Peralta. conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. 1991 An action for recovery of ownership was filed by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. "At the trial on the merits. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934. We did say in People vs. J. in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage.:p May 6. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom. the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom. petitioner. Napat-a that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit. "C" and "C-l. the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause. "B". It is true that Exhibits "A. This contention is erroneous." "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below. vs.. Jr. it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat. 85423 CRUZ. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. acting upon her son Juan's instruction. vs. As the trial court found. she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. but more importantly. The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated. Aviles.R. After trial. judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. in violation of existing doctrine. that this exception is applicable only when. conformably to the Rules of Court. Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund.491. seeking the refund of the amount of P112. Nevertheless. Our own finding is that the private respondent.00. the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him. The Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297.492.492. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered because. 2000 PANGANIBAN. all she did was identify the documents. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK. It appears from the 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297. failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws." "with the knowledge of the opposing party. COURT OF APPEALS.492 inclusive of the P112. one of the plaintiffs witnesses. On the contrary.: This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112. petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112. petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. 1990. and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge. . which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded. G. as plaintiff in the lower court.90. in the adjudication of cases pending before them. J. testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice. and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. It is clear. a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it. 122480 April 12.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297." or "at the request or with the consent of the parties. and as a matter of convenience to all parties. On October 11. Cunegunda Hernandez.491. of the contents of the records of other cases. The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it." These conditions have not been established here.has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and. We do not agree. "in the absence of objection. it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. No. even if they had not been formally offered. Issue: whether petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112.00 (inclusive of the amount P112. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. By contrast.00 (including P112. even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court.00 representing petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989. with the knowledge of the opposing party.492. But we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us.491.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. leaving him no opportunity to counteract. is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . respondents. it applied the exception that: . 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner.491.. the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. As the petitioner puts it. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits. or when the original record of the former case or any part of it. petitioner.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability. However. Although she did testify. by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated. there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.R. vs.491. when. reference is made to it for that purpose. "B" and "C". though.491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. at the request or with the consent of the parties.491. Inc." the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending. representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989. second. The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A".00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year. in the absence of objection. strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the trial. it could not have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit. the manager of petitioner's accounting department. the CTA ignored the said Return. DORIS HAO. Ruling: The Petition is meritorious. 134972 KAPUNAN. 1990. Indeed. however. 1986. respondent. Section 2. claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof. Galang and Hao executed a contract of lease on the second and third floors of the building. Verily. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. A final adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year.480." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990. the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's case. Metro Manila. the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return. ERNESTO and MINA CATUNGAL. Aniana Galang. In the same vein. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. it did not do so. Hence. stating that the amount of P112. In failing to consider the said Return." Respondent. the CIR could have easily disproved petitioner's claim. Ms. During the trial before the CTA. denied the claim for tax refund. the appellate court committed a reversible error.173 as net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA. 2001 The original owner. respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. failed to controvert petitioner's claim. testified to this fact. as well as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial. as it had done before the CTA. BPI subleased the ground floor of said building to respondent Doris Hao. J. vs. In any event." Be that as it may. More important. . Clearly. The lease was for a term of four (4) years . It likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by Mr. they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision.491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31. It did not even file an opposition to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . Again. No. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy. In this case. the Decision in CTA Case No. however. even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court." The paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. petitioner's vice-president. True. to BPI for a period of about 15 years. G. the CA concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund. to expire on June 20. . the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. In fact. for its part. the quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. To repeat. The CTA and the CA. specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence. which would have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. Yolanda Esmundo. "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount as a tax credit. that Return clearly showed that petitioner incurred P52. As a rule. Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. During the existence of the lease. In the first place. In that case. however. it presented no evidence at all. Gil Lopez. however. leased a three-storey building situated in Parañaque. a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. . petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. 4897. It should not bar courts from considering Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) In the present case. SPS. to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No.R. In this case. urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. petitioners. The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. the CA did not pass upon that significant document.: March 22. Significantly. Since petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year. Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court. commencing on August 15, 1984 and ending on August 15, 1988. On August 15, 1986, petitioner spouses Emesto and Mina Catungal bought the property from Aniana Galang. Upon expiration of the lease agreements, spouses Catungal sent demand letters to Hao for her to vacate the building. The demand letters were unheeded by Hao causing spouses Catungal to file 2 complaints for ejectment. The MeTC of Parañaque rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of Sps. Catungal. The MeTC ordered Hao to vacate the premises and to pay spouses Catungal the amount of 8,000 a month for the first floor of the building and 5,000 per month for the second and the third floors. On appeal, the RTC fixed the monthly rentals to be paid by herein respondent at the total of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 for the occupancy of the first floor, and P10,000.00 each for the occupancy of the second and third floors. The Court of Appeals, reinstated the ruling of the MeTC, that the monthly rental rates should be P8,000.00 for the first floor and P5,000.00 for each of the second and third floors. Issue: What constitutes the fair rental value in the case at bench? Ruling: The plaintiff in an ejectment case is entitled to damages caused by his loss of the use and possession of the premises Damages in the context of Section 17, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to "rent" or fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. In ruling that the increased rental rates of P40,000.00 should be awarded the petitioners, the regional trial court based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice. The RTC held, thus: While this Court is fully in agreement with the Court of Origin that plaintiffs-appellees have the better right to the possession of the premises in question being the present owners and the contract of lease between the former owner and herein defendant-appellant had already expired, the amount of rentals as laid down in the Clarificatory Order dated 3 March 1997 is inadequate if not unreasonable. The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its location and the business practice in the vicinity and indeed committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the aforementioned Order. Said premises is situated along Quirino Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila, a fully developed commercial area and the place where the famous shrine of the Mother of Perpetual Help stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically people from all walks of life visit said Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to mention thousand of residents therein. Needless to say, every square meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or commerce of man. Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and strategically located along the main road and consistent with the prevailing rental rates in said business area which is between P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 as testified to by Divina Q. Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor and P10,000.00 a month each for the second floor and third floor or a total of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate and reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of said premises. Finally, worth mentioning here as parallel is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Bay Oub Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. It reads as follows: It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the Contract of Lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business establishments like the leased building owned by the private respondents. We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice in the case at bench. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of legal procedure or otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known to him, or is assumed to have, by virtue of his office. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are "commonly" known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the case at bench based on its location and the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the Baclaran area, where the subject property is located, is fairly grounded. Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion, the same being based on testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal. The RTC rightly modified the rental award from P13,000.00 to P40,000.00, considering that it is settled jurisprudence that courts may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease contract renewals much more with business establishments. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, respondent. x------------------------x FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RODRIGO S. CASPILLO, Pairing Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 23, Cabanatuan City and the Department of Agrarian Reform, respondents. January 13, 2004 D E C I YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: S I O N Land Valuation dated June 18, 1992; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. On the other hand, DAR and LBP presented the Land Valuation Worksheets. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. Issue: Whether the compensation arrived at is supported by evidence Ruling: In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered by TCT No. NT-206422 and situated in Nueva Ecija In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the DAR for P14.9 million. In November 1991, after the DAR’s evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the LBP, a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon review, was modified to P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the DARAB for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. DARAB required the parties to submit their respective memoranda or position papers in support of their claim. Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, and instead filed a case for determination of just compensation with the RTC. The DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the determination of just compensation by the Cabanatuan court. The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. The Trial Court thereafter rendered judgment adverse to the plaintiff Elayda. Issues: Whether the rejection of the proffered statement of Elayda’s accountant is proper. Whether Elayda’s failure to deny under oath the allegation of usury raised by the Roxases constitute implied admission. Ruling: The Court declares the rejection to be correct. Such rejection is entirely in accord with the "familiar doctrine" that "an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . ." That doctrine, by the way, has since been embodied in the revised Rules of Court, effective on January 1, 1964, Section 2, Rule 129 of which reads as follows: Judicial admissions. — Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake. Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her complaint were indeed "made through palpable mistake." Also correct was the Trial Court's ruling, sustained by the Appellate Court, that Elayda's failure to deny specifically and under oath the accusation of usury set out in the Roxases' Amended Answer with Counterclaim — alleging that Elayda required and received from the Roxas Spouses, "kickback and interest in excess of the legal rate" –– constituted an admission of that accusation. The ruling is entirely in accord with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that "(a)llegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath." The admission is a judicial admission, albeit implied, and cannot be negated "unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake," supra, a showing which Elayda has not made. AMELIA C. ELAYDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES PEDRO ROXAS and LEONORA T. ROXAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-49327 NARVASA, J.:p July 18, 1991 Amelia C. Elayda filed a complaint against the Spouses Pedro Roxas and Leonora T. Roxas. Elayda sought recovery of loans extended to the defendants in the aggregate sum of P90,000.00, with interest, the loans having been secured by post-dated checks issued by the spouses and receipts signed by them purporting to show that they had received jewelry to be sold on commission. The Roxases admitted having received said loans but claimed that the loans had been paid in full; that in fact, their total payments exceeded the total obligation justly and actually due from them, and they had been required to pay usurious interests. On these issues, trial was had. The plaintiff, Elayda, presented her testimonial and documentary proofs in due course, in substantiation of her cause of action for recovery of P90,000.00 plus interest. The Roxas spouses in their turn, adduced evidence which tended to show that they had received the loans aggregating P90,000.00 on two separate occasions –– one in the sum of P40,000.00 and the other, in the amount of P50,000.00; that they were required to give, and did give, a "kickback" of P10,000.00 and to pay, as they did pay, interest at the rate of four percent (4%) a month; and that the total payment made by them to Elayda amounted to P112,674.00. To counteract this evidence of the Roxases, Elayda tried to submit a statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total loan given by her to the spouses amounted to P186,000.00, not P90,000.00 (as stated in her complaint and as sought to be established by her in her evidence-in-chief); that the payments made by the spouses on account thereof came up to only P110,474.00 –– of which the sum of P14,223.81 was charged to interest at 14% per annum and P96,250.19, to principal –– thus leaving a balance due from them of P89,749.81. The proffered statement was rejected by the Trial Court, on objection of the Roxases, on the ground that it was contrary to the judicial admissions in plaintiff s complaint and was being presented after conclusion of the trial. MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents. MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Amado. and baptized on June 26. 222 over the said lot at the price of P428.00 each. 1910. was paid on December 17. through the Director of Lands. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.. Petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. together with Vicente Santillan. passed away on September 14. The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married. that. etc. where it was docketed as Civil Case No. listed her name as Macaria Torres. Antonina married and had six children. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres. Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura). ms. however. The rental/s previously paid of P17. subject to certain exceptions. alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole. the father. 551. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres. On August 25. while Leon. she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents. 551 in favor of petitioner. the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres. however. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares. but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary. Margarita Torres. who died in Tanza. payable in 20 annual installments of P20. during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts. Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the onehalf (1/2) portion of Lot No. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite also in the name of said heirs. which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents. 1953.00. for the sum of P300. Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole. had been leased temporarily by the Government (Lease No. On December 13. 551 of the Sta. an urban lot with an area of 1. Cavite on December 20. Cavite. Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu". are the private respondents.: The propositus. 1931. July 31. 1957. Demetria and Adelina. and that she is their legitimated child. 551. Subsequently. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza. without taking account of the sworn statement of March 5.NARCISO and respondents. Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso. issued to Margarita Torres. 1909. 5547 (Ejectment Case).622 sq. Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents. without progeny. Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto). without benefit of marriage. MELENCIO-HERRERA. all surnamed Narciso On appeal. Transfer Certificate of Title No.80. 1931. 1936. Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. or three (3) years after his death. the mother. Antonina died before the institution of the cases while Vicente died on June 4. The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed. Margarita. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. . petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20. The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading: the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Salud. 1898. On June 6. Another Baptismal Certificate. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name. with which we concur. 1958 with a finding that Lot No. the appellate coursed reversed the trial court. and to petitioner a onethird (1/3) portion. which Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) he filed with the Bureau of Lands. fact of delivery by the mother. Tomas. 1933. twenty (20) days before his death. Out of their cohabitation. Sale Certificate No. that they are her only heirs. who. 1933. The court declared Macaria A. The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child. died on December 20. Lot No. or on June 7. petitioner has conceded. namely: Alfredo. 1898.40 was credited to the purchase price. will not amount to automatic recognition. and 2/6th in equal shares to Alfredo. After the death of her husband. Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry. 1984 AMADO NARCISO. The last installment. while her father's name was left blank. Based thereon. more or less. was married to Claro Santillan. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. during the Spanish regime. J. The court also adjudicated 4/6th of the lot to Macaria Torres. the Government. which private respondents opposed. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres and that Lot No. The court granted reconsideration and amended its earlier judgment. 1930. Ruling: As we understand it. Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan). GARDNER and FRANK GARDNER. 1931. We are not persuaded. 1967. for failure to offer it in evidence. On September 30. the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission. cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties. fictitious. the GARDNERS were still denominated in the Subdivision Joint Venture Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . praying for the declaration of nullity of all the Five Transfers and the cancellation of all titles issued pursuant thereto on the ground that they were all simulated. GARDNER. new titles were issued in favor of the SANTOSES. who died at Tanza. the other lot to Juan Cuenca. 1967. petitioners. COURT OF APPEALS. Juan Cuenca and Jose Cuenca. VERROYA constituted a mortgage on both lots in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina. the GARDNERS continued to remain in possession. in their Answer. Despite the "sale. and that throughout the successive transfers. required its formal offer. including the mortgagees. the Adverse Claim of the GARDNERS continued to be carried. DEOGRACIAS R. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. married to Amanda Relova. Jose Infante. aside from their documentary evidence. and (3) Supplemental Agreement. No. and without consideration. G. L-59952 August 31. adduced in their favor the testimonies of Ruby GARDNER herself. the NATIVIDAD transferred the lots to Ignacio Bautista (the Fifth Transfer). In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment Case. For the protection of both parties they executed the following documents all on the same date and referring to the same parcels of land: (1) Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the SANTOSES. It appears from the evidence that the sale to the SANTOSES was one "in trust" for the protection of the SANTOSES who had obligated themselves to give cash advances to the GARDNERS from time to time. transferred the lots to Michael C. according to petitioner. On December 5. On November 27. 1964. On March 29. the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read: That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres. was the registered owner of two adjoining parcels of agricultural land situated in Laguna. the SANTOSES transferred one lot to Jose Cuenca. the GARDNERS filed suit on July 8. Petitioner Ruby H. petitioner 'Ruby GARDNER. with the SANTOSES binding themselves to advance to the GARDNERS the amount of P93.: A chain of successive transfers of real property. Aggrieved by the series of transfers. as evidence. or over a span of approximately six years. NATIVIDAD and JUANITA A.000. Titles were issued in VERROYA's name with the adverse Claim carried over. and became merely an extrajudicial admission. Jr. is involved. 1984 MELENCIO-HERRERA. VERROYA ARROYA executed a deed of transfer of the properties to respondent Deogracias Natividad (the Fourth Transfer). married to Soledad Advincula (jointly. No titles were issued to Bautista. If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence.The statement. Unknown to the GARDNERS. 1969 for "Declaration of Nullity. caused the inscription of an Adverse Claim on the titles of the CUENCAS with the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 2. 1961. 1961. respectively. Agreement and in the Supplemental Agreement as "owners" and Ariosto SANTOS merely as "broker".R. the admissibility of which. Rescission and Damages" against the Five Transferees. an RUBY H. married to Frank Gardner. and on June 15. is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed property. Upon learning of the Transfer of the properties to the CUENCAS. five in all. It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents. the Second Transfer).". Cavite. The GARDNERS. VERROYA an office assistant of Ariosto SANTOS (the Third transfer). an American. J. respondents. the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. On June 29. vs. 1965. SANCHEZ. on December 20.00 in installments. on June 10. Having been amended. denied the legitimacy of petitioner. 1967. which encumbrance was registered on the existing titles. the GARDNERS and the spouses Santos entered into an agreement for the subdivision of the two parcels. Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 1964.. Contrary to petitioner's submission. Titles were thereafter issued in their respective names. (2) Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement. In virtue thereof. JR. therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint. which would have required no proof. It should be noted that from the titles of the CUENCAS (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the NATIVIDAD (the Fourth Transferee). thereby corroborating the declarations of the GARDNERS. Defendants Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalima. Deogracias NATIVIDAD was SANTOS' close and trusted compadre who agreed to put the titles in his (NATIVIDAD's) name because of the pending cases against SANTOS. only respondent Deogracias NATIVIDAD testified on his behalf. On equal footing is the Fourth Transfer from VERROYA VERROYA to private respondents NATIVIDADS. ordering the GARDNERS to reimburse the SANTOSES the total cash advances of P36. The JOSE CUENCAS and the JUAN CUENCAS neither presented any testimonial evidence but just adopted the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS.00. It was SANTOS who had caused the preparation of the deed of sale in favor of the NATIVIDADS after sensing that VERROYA was not inclined to return the title to the properties. Defendant Ariosto SANTOS merely adopted as his own evidence the declaration he had given as an adverse witness. As concluded in the original Decision of respondent Court. 1972. void ab initio. 1979. has. which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Trial Court. therefore. The Third Transfer in favor of VERROYA was similarly without consideration and. The latter further declared that VERROYA was only coerced to sign the deeds after he was boxed by NATIVIDAD in SANTOS' office at the Escolta. therefore. By his own admission. Such sales are inexistent and cannot be considered consummated. Of the eight answering defendants. merely to conceal his ownership and "to protect them from persons who had filed suits against him and were running after the properties registered in his name. The only purpose of the transfer was to enable VERROYA to secure for SANTOS a loan with the Veterans Bank so much so that when the documents of sale were signed by the CUENCAS in their respective houses in favor of VERROYA.000. That sale was executed merely as a means of protection to the SANTOSES for their promised cash advances to the GARDNERS in one year in the sum of P93. In its Resolution reversing the original Decision. as shown by the evidence. never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. all Five Transfers starting from that of the SANTOSES down to the NATIVIDADS. The amount of P 80." It was SANTOS who had caused the execution of those deeds of sale and had them notarized by his own counsel. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement (Exhibit "E") eloquently express that the true and real nature of the agreement between the GARDNERS and the SANTOSES was for a subdivision and not a sale transaction. the disputed properties. which appears therein as paid. the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the GARDNERS declaring as null and void the five Transfers. The evidence also establishes that the Second Transfer to the CUENCAS was fictitious and simulated for not having been supported with any consideration. The First Transfer in favor of the SANTOSES was "indubitably established" to have been without consideration and is.80 which theGARDNERS had received. submitted their case after the genuineness of the deed of mortgage executed in their favor by VERROYA was admitted by the parties. in fact.employee of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. for being without consideration. The evidence on record shows that Ariosto SANTOS himself caused the execution of the deeds of sal in favor of VERROYA. . The Fifth Transfer to the BAUTISTAS partook of the same nature a simulated and fictitious transaction. rescinding the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement as well as the Supplemental Agreement. Added to this is the admission against his own interest by Ariosto SANTOS that the GARDNERS did not receive from him any consideration. The CA subsequently reconsidered its earlier affirmance of the trial court’s decision insofar as the Natividad is concerned and declared as valid the sale of the land to him as well as the titles issued pursuant thereto. therefore.712. the mortgagees. the latter was not even present. and defendant Ariosto SANTOS who was presented as an adverse witness.00 stated in the document of sale was not actually paid by the NATIVIDADS to VERROYA. authorizing the cancellation of the corresponding titles issued pursuant to the deeds of sale and the issuance of new ones in favor of the GARDNERS Respondent NATIVIDAD appealed to the then Court of Appeals. who are his "compadres". void ab initio and inexistent. Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever where the price. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . On January 15. who is SANTOS' office manager in his brokerage business. Ariosto SANTOS transferred to the CUENCAS. respondent Court discredited the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS for being at variance with the Ruling: We find reversible error in the reversal of respondent Court's original Decision of January 11. according to SANTOS' own testimony. void and inexistent. were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were. together with others that he owned. The evidence preponderantly shows that all Five Transfer were null and void for having been simulated and fictitious. That coercion did exist is shown by VERROYA's telegram to the Register of Deeds of Laguna to dishonor any transaction involving the subject properties.000. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon. 1988 with Michell Lhuillier whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. however.000. did not formally ratify nor acceded to the personal agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter.888. Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement which provides as follows: 4. Since the board of Amancor.89.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR.11.: On August 15. and Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March 1989. Pursuant to this stipulation. From the aforesaid agreements. petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that: 3. In his petition in the SC. petitioner. del Rosario St. INC. absolved of any personal liability therefor. 1989. assisted by their respective counsels. if the latter is liable. petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of personal liability is manifest error for being contrary to law..000. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted to P199.R. petitioner assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan balance of P300. LHUILLIER was. 119053 January 23. Atillo III may dispose off his properties at P. arguing therein that as LHULLLIER signed the Memorandum of Agreement without the official participation nor ratification of AMANCOR. In all the subject dealings. facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it. What rate of interests shall the defendant corporation and Michell J. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 June 1988. it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without the official participation of Amancor. had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his Answer and against his own interest. 1989 by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him.00 with Metrobank. And on the basis of such admission. It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that petitioner appealed to respondent court. petitioner and LHUILLIER each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%. After offsetting the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) .000. respondents. Cebu City which may involve prepayment of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at P300. No.L.888.00 with Metrobank. F. petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 14.14. Lhuillier personally liable to the plaintiff? b. xxx xxx xxx 3. Amancor.89 as of October 1. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove. and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial court: a. Atillo III . 1990. 2. 1985. petitioner. Inc. it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate. ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the amount of P199. J. the amount which remained due to the petitioner was P199. AMANCOR. stipulated on the following: 1. vs. COURT OF APPEALS. unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned. Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner. pay the plaintiff? On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties. that the allegations made by Ariosto SANTOS in his pleadings and in his declarations in open Court differed win not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent Court.888. Before the said loan could be paid. LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR. but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. the Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989. his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. at most. As Ariosto SANTOS himself. As an addendum to the foregoing. a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the petitioner and LHUILLIER on March 11. 1997 RESOLUTION FRANCISCO.. Inc. Inc. G. In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support the business operations of AMANCOR. the latter filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against AMANCOR and LHUILLLER. At the pre-trial conference. in open Court.000. but it is not evidence.allegations in his Answer. is Michell J. secured by real estate properties owned by the petitioner. As a general rule. AMANCOR and LHUILLIER. contracted a loan in the amount of P1. amount of P300. and MICHELL LHUILLIER.000. the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. however. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate prevailing. a corporation then owned and controlled by Florentino L. petitioner and LHUILLLER executed another Memorandum of Agreement on February 13. The fact. Lhuillier. the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are. FLORENTINO ATILLO III. PLUS BUILDERS. This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear. for the corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre-terminated corporate loans with the bank and. and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. . Petitioner is seemingly misleading this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner. We hold that such admission is not conclusive upon him. the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake. Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer. does not require proof. . "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he made in his answer. . Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. should be ignored. pending improvement of Amancor's finances. 12 of the Actionable Memorandum of Agreement and par.. the question of whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner. or that his admission was taken out of context. Contrary to petitioner's allegations. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. but cites the admission "out of context". the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner. verbal or written. No. if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party. .12.11 has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject of the present case. LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) AMANCOR's corporate debts. while Amancor may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him. It is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading. 4 of Annex C. Lhuillier . an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him. As evident in the wordings of par. A careful scrutiny of the Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3." That is the reason for the modifier "such". Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO. Lhuillier did not engage to personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiff's property as to release the property to plaintiff. only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. Ruling: We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision of law and jurisprudence misplaced. . Petitioners. petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal liability for the said obligation. Furthermore. the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. It is more than obvious that paragraph 3. whether objection is interposed by the party or not . G. Here. J. As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A". . This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence presented. Respondent. 4 of the actionable Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement. At most. vs. 2006 D E C ISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made with AMANCOR through stock purchases. . In fact. only agreed. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case. . Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by adverting to the consistent pronouncement of this Court that: ".particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that: An admission." 3. and in the succeeding paragraphs of the said Answer asserted the following: 3. for said corporation to pay interest at prevailing bank rate. Thus.: . The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. On the contrary. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into during the pretrial conference. For instance. ". IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate. . then the one making the admission may show that he made no "such" admission. . therefore. Paragraph 3. as explicitly stated in the aforesaid par. INC.R. in delineating the issues to be resolved by the trial court.11 of his Answer "out of context". and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith. . both parties submitted for the determination of the court. 154430 June 16. petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.13. Here. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.95 within 15 days thereafter. 1998. but they refused to pay. Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Sec. is in charge of the construction and sale of the houses therein. 4. SY v. in their answer. Judicial admissions. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.000. On appeal. Consequently. respondent filed with the MTC a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners. Ang Bian Huat Sons Industries. which was filed with Branch 2. Branch 7. petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondent’s complaint. it was complainant who is guilty of dishonesty for his failure to disclose the filing of a second amended complaint in Civil Case No. gross ignorance of the law/rules and dereliction of duty. However. Complainant alleged that he was not given a fair chance to prove the necessity of the ancillary remedy prayed for. does not require proof. 04-1652-MTJ First Division April 3. The complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. He claimed that he cannot be held administratively liable even assuming that his decision was erroneous considering that complainant failed to impute to him fraud. respondent. Plus Builders.00 upon signing of the contract. 2006 Constantino G. and its sister corporation. Appeals. and the remaining P91. the Regional Trial Court. Delfin Hermanos. as well as dereliction of duty.791. Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay respondent P96. respondent judge clarified that Civil Case No. BRANCH 2. Consequently. FERNANDO. Inc.95.Bahayang Pag-asa. and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case) . OCA IPI No. purchased a house and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of P327. Issue: Whether petitioners admitted absolutely in their answer their liability under the proposed payment plan. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same. An amended complaint was later filed. rendered a Decision. Binarao. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three installments. Sy v. holding that petitioners.. Inc.000." A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings. affirming in toto the MTC Decision. MANDAUE CITY A. 4. JUDGE CARLOS C. or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.571. 3825 entitled Constantino G. As correctly ruled by the Court of Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . petitioners failed to comply with their undertaking.491.22. Spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. he filed a motion to cite complainant and counsel in contempt of court for misleading the Court. He likewise took exception to the denial of his "impromptu motion and prayer for an ocular inspection" by the respondent judge.. Respondent’s counsel sent petitioners another demand letter. (b) during the trial.22 payable in three installments. Sy accused respondent judge of "unbridled bias and mental dishonesty. Inc. verbal or written.571. On July 6. (b) they still have a balance of P65." a condition. either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations. petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20. leaving a balance of P65.000. and Edilberto Ang Gabonsseng (sic) for damages with prayer far a writ of preliminary injunction. did not deny respondent’s allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P65.00.00. MTCC. thereby rendering the alleged refusal of the judge to grant the same moot and academic. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent." which amounts to gross ignorance of the rules. 3825 had already been decided in favor of herein complainant.571. dishonesty or corruption in the performance of his judicial functions. Manila. no amount of rationalization can offset it. and had been executed and satisfied. Sy charged Judge Fernando with grave partiality or bias. Sec.M. For his part. On the contrary.791. – An admission. Inc.72. and the decision had already become final. prompting respondent’s counsel to send them a demand letter. which complainant claims to be not found in the Rules. CONSTANTINO G. seeking a TRO and a writ of preliminary prohibitory Injunction against the defendants.95 in the following manner: P5. 3825 in which he abandoned his application for a TRO or preliminary injunction. petitioners paid respondent P20.. For these reasons. as respondent judge "brushed aside" the injunctive relief sought on the pretext that "only in matters of life and death are courts allowed to issue the same. are the owners and developers of Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision in Cavite City. Petitioner. it is not only in this case that respondent judge decided in favor of the complainant. compounded by devastating typhoons. P-6679. However. During the hearing on 20 May 1997. P-4226 and P-6679. 8. the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price was P1. By abandoning his prayer for injunctive relief. claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.” After the DBP filed its Ans wer but before the parties could proceed to trial. Subsequently.: 153034 DECISION September 20. with Damages. But the DBP countered that the redemption price under its 1986 Revised Chapter must be based on its total claim. he is deemed to have abandoned his prayer therefor. attaching therewith an affidavit exec uted by its officer and counsel Att y. Annulment of Titles. Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100. allegations. Effect of amended pleadings. As to the properties covered by OCT Nos. G. Conception. T7609 and OCT No.927. second. 3825. she had six years from 17 January 1990 to redeem the same.Ruling: The complaint is premised on the denial by the respondent judge of the prayer for a TRO or preliminary injunction in the amended complaint in Civil Case No. DEVELOPMENT B ANK OF THE PHILIPPINES.GO.50 as of 30 September 1995. the prevalence of diseases. DAVIDE. The sale was evidenced by a Certificate of Sale and registered on 17 January 1990.882. they being free patent titles. On 22 May 1997. if any. and that it failed to state the reasons for the admiss ion or denial of matters for which an admission was requested. Thereafter. In fact. Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property covered by TCT No. In January 1996.700. thus: Sec. In response. comply with her obligations to the DBP. Nonetheless. the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under oath as required by Section 2. the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the DBP. Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSALINDA CANAD ALLA. but in two other cases as well. complainant has no factual or legal basis to question the inaction of the respondent judge on his earlier plea for such relief as well as the motion for ocular inspection. 3825 was decided in favor of complainant belies the allegation of partiality against the respondent judge. On 5 September 1989. and documents contained in the Request for Adm ission are substantially the same as those in the Supplemental Complaint.An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. herein private respondent Rosalinda A. all of which have already attained finality. the DBP manifested that. Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. On 10 August 1979. Go offered to redeem the properties for P526. . Canadalla failed to Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . T-7609 within the redemption period of one year from 17 January 1990. which emerged as the only bidder. she allegedly assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter. Perla Melanie Caraan. Canadalla procured another loan in the amount of P150. the latter being intertwined with the ancillary remedy sought for.40.729. Nullification of Consolidation. the DBP filed a manifestation inc orporating its response to Go’s objections during the 20 May 1997 hearing. taking into consideration the provision of Section 8.R. CJ . Plus Injunction and Temporar y Restraining Order. which was secured by a mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel covered by OCT No. Canadalla-Go.000. can only be viewed as an error of judgment because complainant failed to prove any act constituting bad faith. CAN ADALLA. On 5 October 1995.5 million. 235 SCRA 597 (1994)]. malice or corrupt practice on the part of the respondent judge [Dela Cruz v. No. the DBP consolidated its titles over the subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in its name.in-fact BENITO A..814. which was P1. P-4226. the statements. For its part. As security. the DBP filed its Comment. represented by her Attorney. A perusal of the records. Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents. Subsequently. When Go failed to redeem the properties. the reasons for the denial or admiss ion had already been specifically stated therein. whatever error that may have been committed. she offered to redeem the properties for a redemption price of P1. Go filed a Request for Adm ission by Adverse Part y. Consequently. first. they had already been either spec ifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Ans wer. That Civil Case No. Canadalla executed on 19 January 1977 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. revealed that complainant opted not to pursue this ancillary remedy by filing a second amended complaint without reiterating the same remedy therein. and destruction of her store by fire. Go filed a Supplemental Complaint for the “Exercise of Right of Redemption and Determination of Redemption Price. vs.000 from DBP for purposes of financing her piggery business. however. and third. 2005 JR. admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader.58 representing its total claim as of 17 January 1996. just as it provides the amount to be paid by a redemptioner. which. DBP’s Ans wer itself controverts the averments in the complaint and those recopied in the request for admission. 1905 TORRES. Court of Appeals that “a part y should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and to make a second denial of those already denied in his ans wer to the complaint. that the land formerly belonged vs. conc lusions. t wo subject properties being redeemed are covered by Free Patent titles.” The Po doctrine was brought a step further in Concrete Aggregates Co. Macario Angeles. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Moreover. plaintiff ’s offer to redeem t wo subject properties. then held under a lease a certain tract of land 15 yards square in the barrio of Uaua. a response to the request is no longer required. which merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. contemplates of interrogatories that would clarif y and tend to shed light on the truth or falsit y of the allegations in the pleading. G. A substantial compliance with the requisites in law was met. We have held in Po v. A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. as amended. Indeed. recognizes the right of redemption. 22. and Rule 39 of the Rev ised Rules of Court and such offer to redeem should be well-placed in la w and procedure. Rev ised Rules of Court specifically defines the amount which a redemptioner must pay. Section 30. the DBP did not even have to file its Comment on Go’s Request for Adm ission. 3135. as a mode of discover y. It becomes. and (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. as earlier mentioned. as pointed out by the DBP. 1903. as amended. Rule 26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings. MACARIO ANGELES. Rule 39. plaintiff-appellant. some of the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission were matters of la w or opinions. Plaintiff exercised the right of redemption on Januar y 11. . within the prescribed period of six (6) years.The RT C issued an order granting the motion of Go to consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission and all those denied by the DBP in its Comment. and for the payment of rent due. the matters stated in Go’s Request for Adm ission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint. defendant-appellee. therefore. unnecessar y to dwell on the issue of the propriet y of an unsworn response to the request for admission. She made a tender of the offer. the scope of matters that a part y may request the adversar y to admit are (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request. v. Hence. Miguel Pascual brought an action to recover the possession of a certain tract of land unlawfully occupied by the defendant. Section 6 of Act No. they had already been either specific ally denied or admitted in DBP’s Ans wer to the Supplemental Complaint. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant. or opinions. 1511 July 26. MIGUEL PASCUAL. The rule authoriz ing a part y to call on the other part y to make an adm ission implies the making of demands for admiss ion of relevant and material matters of fact – and not for admiss ion of matters of law. Accordingly. 1996. Issue: whether matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court – which are mere reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the answer – may be deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto is not under oath. 21. they are improper matters and cannot therefore be deemed impliedly admitted under Rule 26. Court of Appeals where we ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the ver y same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied or other wise dealt wit h in the answer. Since the afore-quoted allegations are matters of la w or opinion. Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. J. Ruling: We find for petitioner DBP. municipality of San Jose de Navotas. The reason is obvious.: On January 15. and costs. 3135.R. No. damages. to wit: 20. wer e in accord with the said provis ions of Act No. On the other hand. Angeles. To require the DBP to admit these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and superfluous. Bes ides. he asked for and obtained an extension. This shows that both parties agree that there is but one certain tract of land in dispute. to whose rights. as appears from the will on page 17 of the bill of exceptions. Ruling: The existence of the lease under which Macario Angeles held the land in question having been proved. 4776 TORRES. and that he had since been in the wrongful possession of the land. This action arises out of the contract of lease and presupposes in the lessor a right to the ownership or possession of the property. Macario Angeles. when her executor asked for and obtained a copy of her will executed in January of the same year. If the juridical personality of the deceased testatrix is transmitted to the heir and the latter is considered as identified. a copy of which appears on page 15 of the bill of exceptions. having during that period built houses and planted trees thereon. The tenant can not deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Navotas. plaintiff-appellee. No. which is the only basis of his judicial claim. not extinguished by her death. Angeles. defendant-appellant. 1900. rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. the court stating that it established a fact relating to the question at issue. Angeles is now barred from questioning the rights of the deceased owner of the land and much less Pascual's capacity and rights in the lease. then there is no doubt that the plaintiff. J. action. of which the land Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) in question was a part. that defendant refused to pay rent for that and the two preceding years. therefore. To him. The plaintiff was recognized by the lessee. The defendant.: . 1909 Mar 18 En Banc DECISION G. with costs to the plaintiff. alleging in support thereof that it was not necessary to show that the land in question had been allotted to the plaintiff in the partition of the state of the deceased Ciriaca Pascual. a sufficient cause existed for the ejectment of the tenant. The court. and 1901 under the terms of the lease written in Tagalog and attached to the complaint.R. is that the contract was executed for a good and sufficient consideration.to Ciriaca Pascual. was in the actual and adverse possession of a tract of land in Uaua. that the defendant owed him 30 pesos for the use of the land during the years 1899. and thereupon presented a motion for a new trial. since it satisfactorily appeared that Macario Angeles had paid rent to plaintiff under the lease in question. and it appearing that he failed to pay rent for several years. 11) the presumption. that a subsequent demand was made upon the defendant about the end of the year 1901 for the payment of rent due and for the possession of the land. deceased. vs. that by virtue of this extension the lease was continued in force. p. alleging as a special defense that he was the actual occupant of the land claimed. that. Again. As to the identity of the land referred to in the complaint. 1899 and 1900. and uninterrupted possession of the same for more than thirty years. and obligations. from whom he inherited it. had a right to oust the defendant. or any other right entitling them to the use of the same may maintain an action for ejectment against a wrongful possessor. His possession dated from the death of the testatrix. when he decided to keep the land. Angeles had been paying rent from 1894 to 1898. For this reason he can not be compelled to prove his title thereto. he succeeded. He himself recognized it and it was admitted in evidence during the trial. as successor of the deceased. for failure to pay the stipulated rent. thus recognizing him as the lawful heir and successor of Ciriaca Pascual. It was not until the year 1901. entered a general denial to the complaint. He stated that he had not been in possession of the land in question as tenant but as owner. Angeles paid him rent for the land from the time of the death of the former lessor until the year 1898. 1894. right of usufruct. (Bill of exceptions. after hearing the evidence. SANTIAGO TRILLANA. MANUEL ORMACHEA TIN-CONGCO. his sister. represented by the CHINAMAN TIU TUSAY. it may be said that this was fully established not only by the lease and the evidence introduced at the trial but by defendant's answer as well. Those in the actual possession of land under a claim of ownership. Angeles. He denied specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the lease attached to the complaint. that the defendant refused to do either. peaceful. demand having been made upon the defendant for payment of the rent due for the first two years. as shown by the record. as testamentary successor of his deceased sister Ciriaca. To this judgment the plaintiff excepted on the ground that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained in the judgment were against the law and the weight of evidence. public. quiet. as testamentary heir of his sister. Miguel Pascual is now vested with the rights of the lessor. the defendant can not question the genuineness and due execution of the written lease. and had been in adverse. with his devisor. under her will. judicial administrator of his estate. Miguel Pascual. as such owner and lawful possessor and as heir and successor to the deceased Ciriaca Pascual. and that his possession covered a period of more than thirty years. who must have died prior to April 7. the accused waited for the deceased. where they conducted an Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . that two years prior to that date. a cousin of the deceased: "Letty. On the night of October 22. They aggregate 135 documents. defendant-appellant. thereafter. The accused was very angry and said: "Ganyan na lang ang pagmamahal ko sa iyo. some of which are written in Tagalog with their corresponding translations. he therefore asked the court below to enter judgment absolving the defendant of the complaint. and that in the course thereof the defendant purchased from them merchandise to the value of 4. JR. at which instant the former called for help. Shortly. Nona Salazar Padiernos and the deceased. she came out of the room and asked Letty Basa. with costs. which he used to keep under the mattress of their bed. the authorities of Waterous Clinic notified the San Juan Police Department. reading a newspaper. Trillanas debts was shown by the 135 vales which are attached to the complaint and which were admitted as authentic by the defendant. including the accused.22. the accused returned inside and closed the door. but the latter came home only at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23.: The accused. Having been informed that the things of the deceased were in their bedroom. the sum of P2. and the deceased sprawled in a bloody mess on the floor. a blood-stained knife. to pay to the Chinaman Florentino Tiu Tusay. the accused and the deceased came out of the room. under the same conditions stipulated between the debtor and the copartnership for the working of the distillery of Luis Vizmanos and the late Chinaman Manuel Ormachea. and then proceeded to the residence of the deceased at San Juan. At about 6:30 in the morning of the same day. Meanwhile. the deceased a tall. the family driver. plaintiffappellee. all accounts and debts of the defendant were allotted to the plaintiff. using the family car driven by Roberto Valeriano. the judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased plaintiff.832. the trial judge. Rizal. On the way." When they reached the hospital. owing to their character and the manner in which they were constituted. shouting: "Vale. local currency. by means of periodical payments in tuba or the liquor of the nipa palm. the deceased was pronounced "dead on arrival". Ruling: Since the vales existed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Immediately. Arsenio Santos arrived. Rizal. Rizal. as is customary in Hagonoy. A few minutes later. iyan ang nababagay sa iyo. the accused brought her son Ronald to the Lourdes School in Mandaluyong.000 pesos is 1. After hearing the evidence presented by the parties. niloloko mo pa ako. Santiago Trillana. Defendant alleged that he had already settled his accounts and obligations contracted in the business to which the complaint refers." Thereupon. a Chinaman. the accused was still mad at the deceased and cursed him. and that if any accounts are still pending. be paid in kind and not in money as the plaintiff claims in his complaint. with the costs against the plaintiff. Ormachea Tin-Congco. big and robust man was an agent of the Bureau of Customs and as such was issued a gun. Vale".500 pesos which makes the total debt amount to 5. Roberto Valeriano together with the other members of the household. after which he went to bed by himself. During his lifetime. and when he entered the house. vs.500 pesos. Enrique Aguinaldo and Pat. groaning and moaning in pain. 1968-drunk. nasaan ang gamit ng Kuya mo?" At that time. such class of obligations are settled.Manuel Ormachea Tin-Congco. 1968. The accused helped him change his clothes. and the same has not been paid by the defendant. 1976 CONCEPCION. and should be paid at the time and under the circumstances which. NONA SALAZAR PADIERNOS.000 pesos. alleging that the plaintiff Ormachea and Luis Vizmanos Ong Queco were engaged in business in the Province of Bulacan. that the legal interest on the said 4. L-37284 February 27. the deceased was already awake and was on the bed lying on his stomach. rendered judgment ordering the defendant. and proceeded to the hospital (Waterous Clinic) at Mandaluyong. it was because the amounts they called for had not yet been paid. Vale (Roberto Valerians). thereafter. he saw the accused holding with her' right hand. in tuba. carried the deceased inside the car. pag namatay ka magpapakamatay na din ako. the same should. Capt.R.. inasmuch as an obligation can only be presumed to have been fulfilled when the proofs of its existence have been returned to the debtor. Upon her return to the house half an hour later she went directly to their bedroom. the family driver. the partnership was dissolved and the business was divided up between the partners. the indebtedness is proven by the documents signed by the defendant or his agents in favor of Ormachea or of Vizmanos Ong Queco or their agent named Lawa in charge of the business. and became the individual property of Ormachea Tin-Congco. responded to the call. G. Rodolfo Padiernos were husband and wife. The documents of indebtedness are inserted in the complaint and duly numbered. presented an amended complaint against Santiago Trillana. J. saying: "Putang ina mo. No. and were in the possession of the creditor. that is. papatayin kita. but the bedspread was "spilled with blood". but fled and went into hiding and surrendered only after almost four (4) years from the commission of the crime. in order to avoid criminal liability. the appellant must suffer the consequences of her unlawful act. consistent and supported by facts and circumstances. However. these stab wounds. and gave it to the officer. for having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased it was incumbent upon appellant. Believing that the deceased would kill her. as aptly observed by the court below. The deceased followed her but he fell on the floor in a bloody mess. covered her eyes with her right hand. Ruling: Appellant's plea of self-defense is untenable. Upon a review of the records. After a heated argument. The room was well arranged. the knife under the bed. Inside. While witnesses may be said to be interested by reason of their relationship with one of the parties. she opened her eyes and seeing that the deceased was about two (2) meters away from her. she opened the door and ran out fast. she grabbed. she returned to their house at about 7:15 or 7:30 in the morning and went directly to their M. if the appellant covered her eyes with her right hand when she began to swing the knife from left to right and from right to left. and. "It is now a well-settled rule that one who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence. now appellant. Moreover.investigation. being located at the left part of the back of the deceased. the appellant did not surrender to the authorities. She had fled and gone into hiding. If such evidence is of doubtful veracity. for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the killing. she found that the deceased was already awake and was on the bed reading a newspaper. with her left hand. The deceased stood up first. and began swinging the knife from left to right and from right to left to prevent the deceased from coming near her. one of which. it tends to establish her guilt. Then she stood up and with the deceased in front of her. which she allegedly gave to her brother Jose Salazar. they fell on the floor together. However. The accused. immobile like a post without avoiding the knife and allowed himself to be killed? If it were true that the deceased was standing in front of her with a gun pointed at her and angry enough to kill her. and then. Such conduct of the appellant is inconsistent with and casts doubt upon her claim of self defense. kicked her on the stomach. the fatal wound. the defense must necessarily fail. When the policeman lifted the mattress of the bed. Letty saw thereunder the gun of the deceased. their declarations should not be disregarded or rejected capriciously on the ground of bias alone where-as in the present case-they are reasonable." Having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence her plea of self-defense. While she and the deceased were in the room. by swinging the knife sidewise from left to right and from right to left. saying: "Putang ina mo. shows that the deceased sustained three (3) stab wounds. after the stabbing incident.00 from his brief case. however. likewise. after taking Ronald to school. If she really inflicted the wounds sustained by the deceased in the manner claimed and demonstrated by her during the trial. and when the latter pushed her back. maintains and insists in this appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim of selfdefense. These physical facts belie and negate the appellant's claim of selfdefense. the appellant's contention that prosecution witness Letty Basa is biased because she is the cousin of the deceased. assails the trial court in admitting and in giving 'weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. After awhile. the deceased pulled her hair and slapped her on the face." Then. Besides. is without merit. he got his gun under the mattress and pointed it at her. She held the clothes of the deceased. the latter accused her of stealing P1. to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him without relying on the weakness of that of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence. Nor do We find merit in the contention that the non-presentation of the written statement of this witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign. appellant's version of the indent is highly incredible and improbable. The foregoing version of the accused was disbelieved by the trial court. Arsenio Santos entered the bedroom where the stabbing took place-followed by Letty Basa-and searched the place. On the Contrary. they were not able to investigate the accused as she could no longer be located. she claims that she did it in self defense According to her. We find no reason to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court. After interviewing Letty Basa. The accused admitted that she killed the deceased. To begin with. Thus. specially the fatal wound at the back. The knife u by the accused in stabbing the deceased was likewise taken by Pat. why didn't he shoot her? Furthermore. The autopsy report. could not have been sustained by the deceased if he had been facing the appellant. then the deceased would have sustained "slash wounds and not stab wounds". The nature and location Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) of the stab wounds indicate that the appellant inflicted those wounds while she was behind or at the back of the deceased. Arsenio Santos. how was she able to hit her husband without seeing him? Why did her husband remain standing in front of her. and is not clear and convincing.000. The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence . gave rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case". Pat. leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building. petitioner further alleged that respondent. Else. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. Hence. Ruling: No. That Francisco died intestate on January 21. their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s daughter. the following: 1.R. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for. In the petition. there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s mother. stand as proved. the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. At best. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about. and Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she. save for respondent’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth. decedent’s wife by his second marriage. are the surviving heirs of the decedent. Court of Appeals. who are both Francisco’s siblings. the trial court. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA. In the case at bench. To stress. instead of respondent. that per certification of the appropriate offices. and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally.was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. 2005 DECISION GARCIA. In the case at bar. A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. the correct lesson of Tison vs. that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall. together with petitioner. which the appellate court evidently misapplied. That she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. as petitioner a quo. a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. For. 1998 in the City of Manila. respondent alleged. that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. were destroyed. 153798 September 2. 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. However. although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter. vs. Eventually. it could not have possibly done so. mayor. Angeles.: Maglaya filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. 2. G. and. therefore. the Court of Appeals. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. i. who died in January 1988. unless overthrown. the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor. inter alia. judge. Pampanga where the alleged 1938 FranciscoGenoveva wedding took place. they cannot now argue that said statement if produced would have been adverse to the prosecution. or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. implies a valid and lawful marriage. J. is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock. in its decision under review.. Respondent. Petitioner. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. respondent alleged. Respondent.” Contextually. No. among other valuable properties. trial ensued. Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother. the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor. In her reply to opposition. no marriage certificate or marriage contract – doubtless the best evidence of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage. dismissed the petition Issue: Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. And one Jose Carreon BELEN SAGAD ANGELES. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . For. told them so. Issues having been joined. She testified having been born on November 20. A legitimate child is a product of.e. but as the defense failed to do that. Belen S. despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. But even if perhaps it wanted to. the defense could have requested the court below to issue a subpoena requiring the police to produce such statement. let alone affirm. Genoveva Mercado. and. among other things. did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. it cannot be overemphasized. commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand. Pressing on. Angeles. that supposed marriage. the alleged statement of prosecution witness Letty Basa was in the possession of the police authorities. if one had been solemnized – was offered in evidence. the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. No priest. has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco. For example. Theresa were married. Genoveva and Francisco were already “spouses”. when and where their marriage was solemnized.m. Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all. there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut. we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Ma. Ma. Reversing an earlier decision upon an MR the CA held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. would necessarily have to be bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. vs. 2005 G. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. THERESA ALMONTE. hence void. 123450 CORONA. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. therefore. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. DECISION August 31. She. Almost a year later. thru the years. While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and Genoveva.that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. on December 8.R. No. In all. Ruling: The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Applying the “best interest of the child” principle. however. She held him responsible for the ‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. 1990. Gerardo and Ma. Quezon City. Theresa’s parents in Fairview. Clearly. On December 19. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. As it were.” She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte. As may be recalled. as above explained. following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. After their marriage. there is no presumption of legitimacy and. Quezon City. petitioner. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision “INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation rights’ between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p. and like significant details. the persons present. 1989. that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname. J. quite clearly. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy. Ma. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Article 167 of the Family Code provides: GERARDO B. she had married one Mario Gopiao. respondents. then. The trial court ruled that Ma. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. if. they lived with Ma. as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived. To reiterate. her maiden name. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence. Theresa’s motion. Angeles in 1948. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. the trial court denied Ma. the identity of the solemnizing officer. for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938. 1980. however. the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which. should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. a “surviving spouse” of the decedent. absent such a marriage. Now. respondent herself undermined her very own case. she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion – as well as the appellate court’s conclusion . which marriage was never annulled. or prior to Genoveva’s death. respondent never. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa on December 10.would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in Francisco’s house in Caloocan. The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma.” She argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. therefore. the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. in which case petitioner could not be. CONCEPCION. 1991. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29. implying. Parenthetically. Ironical as it may seem. respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988. it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948. of any Sunday. even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Gerardo opposed the motion. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract. as here.: Gerardo Concepcion and Ma. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. to give credence to Ma. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. the import of Ma. the husband was in prison during the period of conception. stands. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband. his heirs. There is no such evidence here. Second. Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. This may take place. the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.Article 167. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage. Not only did both Ma. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Theresa and her lawful husband. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy. who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. Theresa were living together in Fairview. during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. To rebut the presumption. Theresa’s husband Mario or. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. Thus. Sexual union between spouses is assumed. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. for instance. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. or in a proper case. Gerardo relies on Ma. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Only Ma. Thus. Mario. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. for reasons of public decency and morality. The language of the law is unmistakable. the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo. as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. Or. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . his heirs. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth. their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. Considering these circumstances. even assuming the truth of her statement. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. Third. Theresa’s statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of marriage that she never lived with Mario. Here. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario. Court of Appeals: The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. Gerardo’s argument is without merit. his heirs. Hence. Finally. it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. the separation between Ma. particularly during the period of conception. Quezon City. in exceptional cases. Theresa was void from the very beginning. an admission that was binding on her. in a proper case. First. unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. He cannot. it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Ma. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. 157906 Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her. If the Court were to validate that stipulation. in effect. however. or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. 2006 QUISUMBING. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Respondents. Moreover. JOAQUINITA P. As prima facie evidence.filed a case for damages against petitioner.R. (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned. the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. The fact that both Ma. The fact. the latter shall prevail. it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff. the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for. a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. That was. Otherwise. she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on December 15. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child. Petitioner. his heirs. the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. her parents Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña . SPS. Gerardo’s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence. as the status of a child is determined by the law itself. only by the husband or. in extraordinary cases. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting. an agreement that the child was illegitimate. vs. The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15. CAPILI. Ruling: In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Eufronio Lerios. The Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter. Jasmin. the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child. On appeal. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. In addition. even then. November 2. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. J. 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale. To prove her point. (2) the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner. that respondents’ daughter. DECISION G. Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. Not only does it bear more weight. Hence. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA CARDAÑA. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasiconclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy. the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. 1992. a resident of the barangay. causing her instantaneous death. Thus. the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. Here.: No. died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The appellate court found the petitioner liable for Jasmin’s death Issue: Whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaña. then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband.offspring is illegitimate. DATALIFT MOVERS. or. 2006 No. August 30.M.120. Belgravia put up a warehouse occupying an area of about 3.000. x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption. petitioner is expected to oversee Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) the safety of the school’s premises. 1990 and ending on October 5. Consunji. The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply.00 beginning November 1994 onwards. Aquino.: The premises involved in this case is a warehouse used by Datalift Movers. Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift. subject to extension upon mutual agreement by the parties. Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse. Belgravia Realty & Development Corporation whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own use. Subsequently.967. Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint for ejectment against Datalift. instead of using the said warehouse for itself. Petitioners. that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. and/or JAIME B. In their Answer. Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60. As school principal. The demands having proved futile. pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease dated October 2. may outweigh the inference. reasonable evidence. INC. as sometimes stated. Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of P4. literally. Monthly rental was again increased from P60. In the case of D. vs. The warehouse stands on a 3.000. The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise: While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed. After the one year contract period expired. and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part. this Court held: …As a rule of evidence.00 starting June 1994 to October 1994. Inc.70 square meter lot owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR). Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company. commencing on October 5. AQUINO. Court of Appeals. DECISION G. the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. 2) Under the PNR-Sampaguita contract of lease over the PNR lot.R. allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on Sampaguita for the latter’s lease of the former’s lot whereon the warehouse in question stands. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and. However.accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of. Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia. . Sometime in 1987. represented by its president Jaime B. INC. that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself. and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care. there is sufficient evidence. such as that of due care or innocence. being in charge of the school. 1990. evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties. Sampaguita is prohibited from subleasing the property. Respondents. v. 144268 GARCIA. which means. 1991. Thereafter. or some other person who is charged with negligence. not being a party nor privy to the Datalift-Belgravia contract of lease. or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. or in one jurisdiction.000. BELGRAVIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SAMPAGUITA BROKERAGE. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. the defendants interposed the following defenses: 1) Sampaguita has no cause of action against them. in the absence of explanation by the defendant.00 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption. lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.000 squaremeters of the lot. PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage.00 to P130. the thing or transaction speaks for itself.000. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence. J. For the same period. Saniel's report. act or omission. Respondents. vs. -. because so long as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee relationship has terminated. regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship. BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE. from being questioned by the petitioners as lessees. the petitioners have no personality to raise any factual or legal issue relating thereto. She incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34. or barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance. 2002 to October 15. she and her husband. Dr. act. During her confinement. The MeTC rejected the defendants’ challenge against Belgravia’s title over the PNR lot occupied by the subject warehouse. 2002. Edmundo Saniel. she paid the amount of P11. were constrained to settle the bill. ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were excluded from the coverage. Section 2. Dr. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care. respondent Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the Medical City which was one of the hospitals accredited by petitioner. Consequently. No. She stated that she is invoking patient-physician confidentiality. On November 30. 2002. On December 5. he cannot. February 12. 4) Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because it was neither the owner nor lessee of the lot whereon the warehouse stands. Rule 131. NEOMI* and DANILO OLIVARES. she underwent several laboratory tests. INC. the former. be permitted to falsify it. She was discharged from the hospital on December 3. For the period October 16. They thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner. In the health care agreement. That she no longer has any relationship with petitioner. Conclusive presumptions.: D E C Neomi T. When petitioner still refused. Rule 131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the petitioners may be validly ordered to vacate the leased premises for nonpayment of rentals. and to act upon such belief. intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true. Neomi T. respondent Danilo Olivares. Petitioner. 2002. In its answer. (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. by his own declaration. as lessees. Likewise. the logical consequence of the operation of this conclusive presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have the personality to question whether an implied new lease was created between PNR and the respondents. however strong. Conclusive presumptions have been defined as “inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The lower court rendered judgment for Sampaguita and Belgravia. 2003. in any litigation arising out of such declaration. or omission. a health maintenance firm.. And that I should not release any medical information . Inc. as lessor.20. being non-privies to the contract of lease between PNR and respondent Sampaguita.117. 2003. In fact. 2008 G. She paid these amounts in full on October 17. 2. Ruling: The petition lacks merit. the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted Section 2. Saniel stated that: This is in response to your letter dated February 13. the lessor’s title or better right of possession as against the lessee Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) will eternally be a non-issue in any proceeding before any court. as correctly pointed out by the CA.R.The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has. Additionally. informed her that she could be discharged from the hospital. the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession as their lessor. petitioner maintained that it had not yet denied respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr. 169737 ISION CORONA. But petitioner refused to issue the letter and suspended payment pending the submission of a certification from her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not caused by a preexisting condition. she demanded that petitioner pay her medical bill. 2002. 2002. Olivares called by phone on January 29. her attending physician. 2002.” As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case. she requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a letter of authorization in order to settle her medical bills. In a letter to petitioner.217. of the Rules of Court provides: SEC.. J. The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia. she also availed of the additional service of limitless consultations for an additional amount of P1. 2003. cannot by any proof. The application was approved on October 22. On December 2. overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.000.3) The same PNR-Sampaguita contract had allegedly expired. CA.000. It could not just passively wait for Dr. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of which must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. It failed to prove this. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence. 3. they should be construed strictly against the insurer. She was accommodated. Nicasio. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 2008 D E C AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. It held that the best person to determine whether or not the stroke she suffered was not caused by “pre-existing conditions” is her attending physician Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. v.concerning her neurologic status to anyone without her approval. It was privileged communication between physician and patient.” Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability. for until and unless it can be shown from the findings made by her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not due to pre-existing conditions could she demand entitlement to the benefits of her policy. based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best. Issue: Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a preexisting condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health care agreement Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. It was not able to discharge that burden. petitioner cannot be faulted from suspending payment of her claim.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be raffled every month. . This doctrine is equally applicable to health care agreements. respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. It merely speculated that Dr. as already stated. went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account. JESUSA REYES AND CONRADO B. (b) the suppression was not willful. the RTC reversed the ruling of the MeTC and ordered petitioner to pay respondents. it contends that the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced should apply in its favor. Saniel from submitting his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi.R. Section 3 (e). ― The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted. 157177 ISION February 11. Inc. they should be scrutinized by the courts with “extreme jealousy” and “care” and with a “jaundiced eye. Saniel who treated her and conducted the test during her confinement. but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties. (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Disputable presumptions. Furthermore. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi. REYES G. Hence. In Philamcare Health Systems. we ruled that a health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance. xxx The lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a preexisting condition. Accordingly. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. Hence. it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P 2. by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having homosexual inclinations. Joan Reyes. Ruling: We agree with respondents. the same day I instructed my secretary to inform your office thru Ms. Saniel's report was justified. J. in lieu of the bank manager Mr. On appeal. Respondents counter that the burden was on petitioner to prove that Neomi's stroke was excluded from the coverage of their agreement because it was due to a pre-existing condition. Bernie regarding respondent's wishes. Here. limitations of liability on the part of the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way as to preclude it from evading its obligations. No. The RTC held that it was the burden of petitioner to prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from the coverage of the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing condition. They were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza. It is an established rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability. But since the evidence on record reveals that it was no less than Neomi herself who prevented her attending physician from issuing the required certification.: Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss the problem. Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P 200. afterwhich the amount of P 100. indicative of the fact that he was not lying when he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P 500.00 interest.00 was made.000. Plaintiff filed this instant case. however. Thereafter.000.000. The same was received by defendant on July 25.00. was sent only with On February 6. 1991 and October 7. It does not mean She then sent her daughter to inquire.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller. Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector test.Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount of P 200.00 stapled at the outer cover of said passbook.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7. In civil cases.00 will be given by her in cash.000.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.000. or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. On December 14. never learned of the result of said test. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer demanding return of the missing P 100. P 100. he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 02332433-88 and the other P 100.00.000. The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test. When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank.000. to update her savings account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for P 200. whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will be investigated into. While she was being entertained by Capati. however. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was returned. plaintiff instructed Efren Luna. 1990.00.000. her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the signature cards and several other forms. Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the validation. 1990 Ruling: It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P 100. Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated. 1991.000. as the date. she got angry. plaintiff left for the United States and returned to Manila on January 31. Plaintiff and daughter then left.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 1990. Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P 200. 1990.00 only and then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change. 1991. 0235-076748 and brought the same to the teller's booth. Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion thereof.000.00 plus interest. Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from said bank. respectively. the bank manager assured her that they would look into the matter.000. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P 200.000. Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the amount of P 100. one of her employees. 1991. Thereafter on December 26. When she went to her pawnshop. it was the only amount she deposited and no additional cash deposit of P 100. After a while. Plaintiff.000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the express teller account she opened on December 7. she made aware by her statement of account to her by BPI bank that her ATM account contained the amount of P 100. the latter passed the same with flying colors. however. the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. Mrs.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P 200. their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying. the witnesses' manner of testifying.absolute truth.00 in words and figures are written.00.000.000. we note that the space provided for her signature is very near the space where the amount of P 200. thus: SECTION 1.00 cash.000. although corroborated by her daughter. Hence. she could not have failed to notice that the amount of P 200. Preponderance of evidence. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash deposit. the nature of the facts to which they testify. However. Thus. we find that respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P 200. considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer terminal. that she was going to withdraw and transfer P 100. the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. thus. respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller account for P 200. and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial.000.000.000. which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of business. such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit of P 100. . and there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim. to be transferred as her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account. The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount of P 200.000. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case.00 was written instead of P 100. The court may also consider the number of witnesses. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape.00. from her savings account. the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account.000.000.00.000. respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip.000. This is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only P 100. it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip for P 200.00. the teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions. Moreover. it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros.00 in her Express Teller account.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account. it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Respondent Jesusa's bare claim.00 in cash with her.00 as she claims.In civil cases.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros. that the former deposited P 100.00 from her savings account to her new account. Yet.00.. We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only P 100.000. and not P 100.000. would make sure that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. not having heard the testimonies himself. rather.00 from her savings account to the Express Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Teller account she was opening. the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.00 from her savings account and deposit P 100. how determined. the probability or improbability of their testimony. Significantly. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence. and finally the fund transfer of the amount of P 100.000. respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer of P 100. For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand. to arrive at the truth. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip was in the amount of P 200. their intelligence.000. Section 1. their interest or want of interest. as a businesswoman in the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her concerns.000. for respondent Jesusa. these assertions are not borne out by the other evidence presented. though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record. is not established by physical evidence. The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of P 200.00. After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties. and that she had an additional P 100. and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. Notably.000.000. Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset.000. he has not been heard of. according to which the person to be presumed dead must be unheard of for at least four years.R.. from the facts of his case. on many occasions.which among other include that: the Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was not applied in determining whether or not Pedro Icong should be considered dead.. vs.. the nearest approach to the matter. i. Awakened by the fire. Ruling: The respondent Commission obviously did not apply the rule on presumption of death because in the employer's report of the accident submitted by petitioner. Inc. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office: First Message: REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS WEATHER WITH STRONG . it had been definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary. we reproduced with approval the explanation of the respondent Commissioner therein that Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case wherein the vessel cannot be located nor accounted for. Jr. respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence. INC. 1980. M/V "Miss Leyte". the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila. L-9268 PARAS.. It was not lost or missing.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits. Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth. as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the Hongkong-Manila route. In the instant case. none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist. We agree with this conclusion. his father was his partial dependent. with the salary of P5.This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan. petitioner. his wife. the persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence.20. On April 30. 1959 Pedro Icong. an employee of the petitioner. G.. No. JOSEPHINE LUCERO. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Since then. C. or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts. unless renewed. vs.038. was sleeping on board the latter's vessel. Josephine Lucero.00 with meals estimated at P1. there is as yet legal presumption of death on which to base any award for compensation. vs. Capt. in Manila. and respondent Juan Icong. L-60101 August 31. In fine. while abroad. the latter filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and a petitioner a notice of claim for death compensation. And in view of the further fact that when petitioner's vessel caught fire.00 for burial expenses and P20. J. his employment was good for one (1) round trip only. In the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co. petitioner. The employee was unmarried.R. supra. ET AL. 1983 ESCOLIN. The petitioner reported the matter to the Commision only on August 17. inference of immediate death may be drawn. VICTORY SHIPPING LINES.e. G. Inc. No. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death. Julio J. we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail. is the provision on the presumption of death established in Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. in the case of Madrigal Shipping Co. As a matter of fact. laborer Pedro Icong was reported as the only casualty. respondents. respondents. 1980. should be paid to Mrs. The Commission rendered an award in favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2. inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane. Under the contract. that inasmuch as Pedro Icong had been missing only for a few months from the alleged accident. The fate of petitioner's vessel is not unknown. while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18. and in transmitting Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) EASTERN SHIPPING LINES. 1954. The petitioner contends that in the absence of proof of the death of Pedro Icong. relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. INC. November 28. We have. the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not apply. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping.00 as legal fee.560. On February 16. The petitioner has appealed to this Court for the review of the award and has presented three points of law. though diligent search has been made. Quite recently. Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had not been heard from. Nieves Baens del Rosario.40. said report petitioner's counsel had implicitly admitted the fact of Pedro Icong's death. Pedro Icong jumped overboard.. when it caught fire. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION. and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.. 1954. receiving daily P4. plus P200.J. Lucero.: Capt. we said: Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again. two (2) vessels of the respondent were also dispatched to the area last reported by the Master for search and rescue operation. respondent below.m. Ansang where.00. The foregoing facts. and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. immediately reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. the Company.183. 1980. was a call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch". Respondent also released radio messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route requesting them to be very cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to scan the area whether there are signs of debris from the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered In the meantime. the Company received three (3) radio messages from Capt. holding that the victims were dead. who refused to accept the same. where besides the act of treason the accused is held responsible for the death of persons he had or . but the collective efforts of all parties concerned yielded negative results. known or knowable. confirmed the loss of the vessel. the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port. Thereafter. where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which. Navarro "Where there are facts. Sasota. Similarly. of that day. There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The Board held that the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year period provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired. took the following steps: RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation. and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE VESSEL ROLLING AND PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT Second Message: RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO ON PORT SIDE AND HAD BEEN WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE REGRET WE HAVE TO JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL NOW ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL STILL LABORING VIOLENTLY Third Message: NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 1935 N 116-40 E SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO ABANDON ANYTIME Acting on these radio messages. the Lloyds of London. the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. Lucero filed a complaint for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3. Subsequently. the appellant aboard a vinta ignited three home-made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the victims. Air Force based at Clark Air Base. the claim of the appellants therein that there was no conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body was never found was overruled by this Court in this wise: In a case of murder or homicide. Mrs. The Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs. Ruling: It is undisputed that on February 16. received at 9:50 p. this Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency be proven. Upon this premise. and that the payment of death benefits to the heirs of the other crew 'members was based upon a voluntary agreement entered into by and between the heirs and the Company. Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. except respondent Josephine Lucero.' After this message. insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors. nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time. Moreover. Lucero who was not a party thereto. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence. in open sea. the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members. it may be remembered that in several treason cages decided by this Court. from which a rational conclusion can be made. and did not bind respondent Mrs. the presumption does not step in." In People vs. it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found. in People vs. and the said boat was later washed ashore and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen again by anybody. which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. quite logically are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. 'Mere are cases like death at sea." and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time. tortured and later taken away. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. Wang. Redentor Teck.S. Thus. it has been presumed that they were lulled or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused this. because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p. and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons. the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang. the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence. Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar. for unlawful possession of shabu. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. Then and there. At the same time. namely.m. Captain Margallo. Respondents. who was described to the operatives by Teck. Indeed. (b) cash in the amount of P650. They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996. where the proof required for conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt. namely. in his capacity as Presiding Judge. At around 11:00 p. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. with more reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Respondent judge granted Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest. However. (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales. respectively. or be substituted for. of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made. asked his name and. Branch 18. introduced themselves to him as police officers. the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing shabu. DECISION G. where the victims were never later seen or heard from.000.R. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. 2007 At about 2:10 a. vs. of 17 May 1996. and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. the process cannot be reversed. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal. and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate. Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the DILG.m. JR. Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search. for the purpose of fixing the penalty. alias Frank. PERFECTO A.m. the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest. RTC. arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios. the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. We cannot permit Article 391 to override.. When frisked. Manila. No. that same date. Ruling: There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case. 128587 GARCIA. 1980. Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang. HON. Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.00. J. On nearing the car. Wang filed his Demurrer to Evidence. Questioned. it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed established. if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime. Petitioner.: FIRST DIVISION March 16. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. LAGUIO. came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. Manila. and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN. on February 16. If in the foregoing criminal cases. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu. the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street.A peace officer or a private person may. As she removed her brassieres. there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. because this is my job. Aminnudin. and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. together with one Mario Ilagan. because it had been illegally seized. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. the floor manager. absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers. At that point. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun. Alex Sioco. and c. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5. b. respondents. Upon the duo’s declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day.R. When. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer. went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. the person to be arrested has committed.The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide: Sec. provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. Section 5. David Lee. petitioner. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. Arrest without warrant. May 17. Dante Liquin. a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. the employer of Teck and Junio. When an offense has just been committed. And doubtless. which was later on found to be owned by his friend.: No. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam. The inevitable conclusion. He was not committing any visible offense then. In the evening of February 4. 1999 Aug 26 2nd Division G. as correctly made by the trial court. is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. 1990. 121087 MENDOZA. 5. Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan. is actually committing. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang. he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. is actually committing. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid. DECISION J. two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed. the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him. frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car. and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. which is only a few hours thereafter. who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City. . there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed. Therefore. or is attempting to commit an offense. vs. (b) arrest of a suspect where. with a security guard. In People v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. without a warrant. the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. in disregard of the Bill of Rights FELIPE NAVARRO. when lawful. It is settled that "reliable information" alone. arrest a person: a. (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture. or is attempting to commit a crime." Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending. in his presence. Ipso jure. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in appellant’s possession during a search without a warrant. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R. Capt. ganoon?" As Lingan was about to turn away. lacked any motive to make false accusation. This court finds that the prosecution witnesses. press. The law prohibits the overhearing. Indeed. pushing him to the wall. In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution. proceeded there. Añonuevo. Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. This angered Lingan. are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence.A. di ilagay mo diyan. and. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not. the station commander. Jalbuena could not affix his signature. 4200. this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible. He tried to get up." He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. the postmortem report issued by Dra. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. In a while. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena. na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer. Sgt. distort the truth." He said to Sgt. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private. petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and. testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or injury. but he Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) (petitioner) was able to duck both times. Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. called petitioner Navarro to his office. having a grudge against him. Ruling: The appeal is without merit. Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice.Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. and tones of voice of a witness while testifying." The two then had a heated exchange. which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions. unreliable. its tape recording is not prohibited. Coronado. blood flowing down his face. Finally. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan." Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko. hindi mo ba kilala?" Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it. Boy Casañada. uutasin na kita?" At this point. Trial courts. The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence. In the instant case. Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. said to him: "Putang ina. including petitioner Navarro. buhay kang testigo. I am here to mediate. but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin. anak yan ni Kabo Liquin. Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first. each time hitting his head on the concrete. to report the incident. arrived and." He then turned to Sgt. intercepting. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter. But Lingan died from his injuries. and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice. The station manager of DWTI. concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible. Going over the evidence on record. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. No. which prohibits wire tapping. who said: "O. for this reason alone." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah. "Ano. pressing it on the face of Jalbuena. were having drinks in front of the police station. A voice recording is authenticated . First. said. mag-sampu pa kayo. Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado. petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. gestures. Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha. pumarito kami para magpa-blotter. Lingan fell on the floor. si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. Unknown to petitioner Navarro. more particularly Stanley Jalbuena. Afterwards. the trial court stated: After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense. Three of the policemen on duty. learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital. kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin. The answer is in the affirmative. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness. or recording of private communications. while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Walang press. that the tape played in court was the one he recorded. Petitioners would insist that we take judicial notice of the affidavit of petitioner Natividad C. and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. J.by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation. (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded. Accordingly trial proceeded on the issue of non-payment of rentals. 1996 Feb 1 1st Division BELLOSILLO. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. neither the alleged certification by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had fixed a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine (29) sacks of palay for the rainy and dry seasons.: G. thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight (8) cavans representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest. and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan. On 21 July 1986 petitioners lodged a complaint against respondent Dabu for termination of tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals from crop-year 1983. 7 The affidavit of petitioner Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate of rentals was never formally offered. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . A document. Not having been formally offered. it must be formally offered. or any article for that matter. COURT OF APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU. If they neglected to offer those documents in evidence. petitioners. not respondent who was not even given a chance to object as the documents were never offered in evidence.R. This is futile since this is not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires to be taken judicial notice of. which respondent failed to pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the filing of the complaint. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case. the affidavit and certification cannot be considered as evidence. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. Second. respondents. Ruling: Petitioners would impress upon us that the verified complaint and the affidavit presented by petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these documents. We are not persuaded. Candido despite absence of any formal offer during the proceedings in the trial court. It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. however vital they may be. vs. is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification. After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove the provisional rental alleged to have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. petitioners only have themselves to blame. He denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and at the same time maintained that only a proposal for thirteen (13) cavans for the rainy season crop and twenty-five percent (25%) of the net harvest during the dry season was put forward. and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.193 square meters located in Orion. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. Private respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that until 1983 their sharing system was on a 50-50 basis. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. assisted by her husband ALFREDO CANDIDO. In the instant case. RUMBAUA. assisted by her husband AMOR RUMBAUA. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena. the lower court dismissed the complaint. neither can we consider it of public knowledge. He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing thirteen (13) cavans of palay for the 1984 rainy season crop. Respondent Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. No. Bataan. Thus the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them. that his share in the crop year 1983 dry season was still with petitioner Natividad Candido who likewise retained his water pump. Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording. with the latter getting the worst of it. Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class irrigated riceland with an area of 21. or capable of unquestionable demonstration. or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. respectively. 107493 The DAR certified that the case was proper for trial but only on the issue of non-payment of rentals and not on the ejectment of respondent Dabu. and VICTORIA C. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. NATIVIDAD CANDIDO. the lower court dismissed the complaint. SPS. but it is not evidence. during her lifetime. After acquiring the subject property. as shown by their signatures affixed therein. 169129 NAZARIO. Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. and TADEO F. On 2 May 1986. DECISION No. Ruling: Upon examination of the aforesaid documents. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO. & LAGRIMAS SANTOS. SANTOS. Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. On the second occasion. in petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages. 817297 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa. March 28. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation. vs. As the exclusive owners of the subject property. On the first occasion. the estate left by Maria. facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him. denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. On two separate occasions during her lifetime. which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. in his cross-examination. petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their Answer that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document. However. Respondents." dated 17 August 1979. in the case at bar. for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother. Ernesto and Tadeo. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS." dated 17 August 1979. Victorino. acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another. Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa." dated 9 January 1981. Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo. respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa. the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered petitioners to reconvey 107 square meters of the property.VICTORINO F. adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs." dated 17 August 1979. all surnamed Santos. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly published as required by law. but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. Maria Catoc. the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. As a general rule. otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. and thereafter upon herein petitioners. Moreover. which repealed Presidential Decree No. ERNESTO F.R. who died on 20 October 1985. Issue: Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable. However. 2007 CHICO- letter. J. Virgilio’s answers were unsure and Virgilio. Spouses Lumbao sent a formal demand letter to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Noticeably.SPS. respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita." dated 17 August 1979. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-inlaw of Rita. the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners. After trial. are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos. Consequently. And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death. in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa. Petitioners. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove. they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with damages. On the contrary. On appeal." petitioner Virgilio. SANTOS. they prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages. both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa. this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa. thus. 7160. SANTOS. SPS. executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement.: THIRD DIVISION G. VIRGILIO F. one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat. one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. On the other hand. respondents.[19] and as he had become the absolute owner of the property. In addition. Petitioners’ contention does not persuade. Hence. both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a notary public. The trial court found for petitioners Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas and accordingly dismissed the complaint. SOLOMON ACABAL. 15856. his wife Lacorte.00 which he had already paid. It is wellsettled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. statute of limitations. along with his wife. the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.quibbled. MELBA ACABAL.000. his parents transferred for P2. To overcome this presumption. petitioners.000. More specifically.00 ownership of the said land to him. Villaner thus filed a complaint against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the property. relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence are never presumed but must be established not by mere preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas. Leonardo asserts that what Villaner executed was a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of P10. Furthermore. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. he executed on April 19. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud. Ruling: Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply Section 8. 1990. EVELYN ACABAL. it appears that Villaner became a widower. in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption. Maria Luisa Montenegro) wherein he leased for 3 years the property to Leonardo at P1. respondent Villaner having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the April 19. to the execution of the document corroborated Leonardo’s claim. vs. it was incumbent on the plaintiff-herein respondent Villaner to prove that LEONARDO ACABAL and RAMON NICOLAS. Carmelo Cadalin who admittedly prepared the deed of absolute sale and who appears as a witness. and want of consideration. GRACE ACABAL. he validly transferred it to Ramon Nicolas on May 19.R. the presumption must be upheld. Nonetheless. Subsequently. VILLANER ACABAL. In the case at bar.00 per hectare and which was witnessed by two women employees of one Judge Villegas of Bais City. 1990 document he executed now appears to be a “Deed of Absolute Sale” purportedly witnessed by a Bais City trial court clerk Carmelo Cadalin and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . 2005 CARPIO MORALES. Villaner’s parents. what he signed was a document captioned “Lease Contract” (modeled after a July 1976 lease agreement he had previously executed with previous lessee. DECISION THIRD DIVISION G. 1990 a deed conveying the same property in favor of Leonardo. there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. for annulment of the deeds of sale. RAMIL ACABAL. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. For the circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. estoppel. assuming different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many different ways. In dispute is the exact nature of the document which respondent Villaner Acabal executed in favor of his godson-nephew-petitioner Leonardo Acabal on April 19. the authenticity. this Court rules in petitioners’ favor. who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan. owned a parcel of land situated in Negros Oriental. compromise. 1971. Villaner was later to claim that while the April 19. If he claims a right granted by law. he must prove it by competent evidence.000. 1990. Absent such evidence. By a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6. Sometime after the foregoing transfer. 148376 March 31. Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. payment. hence. ARMIN ACABAL. described in Tax Declaration No. EDUARDO ACABAL. due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld. 1990 Deed of Absolute Sale. On the merits. mistake. and BYRON ACABAL. No. the conjugal partnership was terminated. all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the property. In Bucoy v. he could not claim title to any definite portion of the community property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. The property being conjugal. Prior to partition. Having inherited one-ninth (1/9) of his wife’s share in the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2) or nine-eighteenths (9/18). As a result then of the death of Justiniana. With the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. For the presumption to be invoked. And now. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. 160. 1971 during Villaner’s marriage with Justiniana Lipajan. This they failed to do. Justiniana's rights to the other half. the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in favor of Leonardo does not bind them as they did not consent to such an undertaking. applies to all properties acquired during marriage. Atty. Except for his bare allegation that the transaction was one of lease. While Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property. Villaner. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case at bar. for facts not conjectures decide cases. this Court has held. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares. While on direct examination. Cadalin under the documents which I signed the contract of lease. as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided share thereof. vested upon her death to her heirs including Villaner who is entitled to the same share as that of each of their eight legitimate children. upon the death of Justiniana Lipajan. The burden is on petitioners then to prove that it is not. It cannot be seriously contended that simply because the tax declarations covering the property was solely in the name of Villaner it is his personal and exclusive property. Attempting to seek corroboration of his account. Vicente Real who notarized the document. but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the coowners who possessed and administered it. this Court held that registration alone of the properties in the name of the husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties.he was deceived into executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana. Atty. Reyes which both apply by analogy. the disposition affects only Villaner’s share pro indiviso. On Villaner’s claim that two women employees of Judge Villegas signed as witnesses to the deed but that the signatures appearing thereon are not those of said witnesses. he failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. in turn. applying the provisions on the law of succession. the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code is that it is the couple’s conjugal property. her eight children and Villaner each receives oneninth (1/9) thereof. Villaner’s total interest amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). the property must be shown to have been acquired during the marriage. the property was acquired on July 6. the same must be discredited in light of his unexplained failure to present such alleged women employeewitnesses. Following the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Villaner’s co-heirs’ claim that as coowners of the property. Real virtually corroborated Villaner’s claim that he did not bring the document to him for notarization. Villaner. Since the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage of Villaner and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Justiniana. There is no question that the property is conjugal. Villaner’s interest in the conjugal partnership became actual and vested with respect to an undivided one-half portion. The presumption. a regime of co-ownership arose between Villaner and his co-heirs in relation to the property. What is material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner. Villaner presented Atty. Paulino and Mendoza v. and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in common. therefore. it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the . Thus. however. sold the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners. Real conceded that it was impossible to remember every person who would ask him to notarize documents. With respect to Justiniana’s one-half share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides: ART. however.” must fail. His conjecture that “perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. on crossexamination. respondents. T-128456. After trial on the merits. 1989.Revised Rules of Court. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case. Among the properties provisionally seized and taken over was the lot on which Piazza Hotel stood. Criminal Case No. as the new owner of the property. Nos. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a sequestration order against BASECO pursuant to Executive Order No. both located in Mariveles.” Such admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties. (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations. Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero. Admissions obtained through depositions.” Petitioner could not possibly be the owner of a building merely leased to it. the title of the land on which Piazza Hotel stands was in the name of respondent. ROMEO SISON. vs. On July 19. SECOND DIVISION G. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo. or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 1 of former President Corazon C. JOEL TAN. inter alia. Bataan. Aquino. Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes to respondent Province of Bataan.: BASECO was the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge. After the expiration of the three-year lease period. as complainant-intervenor. Criminal Case No. was the legitimate owner of the Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge. “To be considered as a judicial admission.: Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. PROVINCE OF BATAAN. petitioner acknowledged that it was not the owner of the property when it stated that “BASECO leased to petitioner the building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles Lodge xxx for monthly rentals of P6. . filed a motion for leave to intervene on November 22. 86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon. that petitioner be ordered to vacate Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge for lack of legal interest. petitioners. NILO PACADAR. from January 1. 144635 SECOND DIVISION June 26.00. J. J. Respondent. was issued to the Province of Bataan. No. and Criminal Case No.R. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. 1986. Respondent. i.500 for three years. First. After its motion was granted. Criminal Case No. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS. RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS. 86-49007 and 8649008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo. petitioner was allowed to continue operating the hotel on monthly extensions of the lease. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 2006 DECISION CORONA. The Rules of Court states that “[a]n admission. Criminal Case No. the parties agreed that the case be tried on the sole issue of whether respondent province. 1989. 12782 was in the name of respondent as owner of Piazza Hotel. Ruling: The evidence clearly established respondent’s ownership of Piazza Hotel. 108280-83 November 16. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Tax Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Declaration No. PROGRAMME INCORPORATED. TCT No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia. Petitioner filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and collection of sum of money against BASECO. as in the pre-trial of the case. Petitioner. The title of the property was transferred to respondent. does not require proof. In the lease contract annexed to the complaint. BASECO granted petitioner a contract of lease over Piazza Hotel at a monthly rental of P6. 86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia. respondent filed a complaint-in-intervention praying. the same must be made in the same case in which it is offered. G.500.e. During the pre-trial of the complaint-inintervention. however. and JOSELITO TAMAYO. written interrogatories or requests for admission are also considered judicial admissions.” In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money. 1995 PUNO. 1986 to January 1. verbal or written. 1990. Third. On May 14. BASECO’s TCT No.. subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the parties. petitioner was doubtlessly just a lessee. vs. petitioner in fact admitted BASECO’s (respondent’s predecessor-in-interest) ownership then of the subject property.R. T-59631 was cancelled and a new one. Second. Earlier. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos. saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow. recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. both local and foreign." He cried: "Pulis. the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. Nuega added "Sige. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. several persons. Marcos pa rin. pulis. and when he tried to stand. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow tshirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres. the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District. habulin iyan. Tulungan ninyo ako. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo. 1986. a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. they saw Annie Ferrer. Atty. and on the basis of their identification. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. Wala bang pulis?" The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. On July 27." Atty. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them." of "hemorrhage. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly. rush to Salcedo's aid. mauling Sumilang in the process. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival. intracranial The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people. Cory Iyan. Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. were apprehended and investigated.. an electrician at the Luneta. shouting: "Iyan. In support of their testimonies. Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim. Pabalikin si Marcos. Pabalikin si Marcos. including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang. arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. including the accused.m. Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo. boxing him with stones in their fists. they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities. Several persons. Eventually.The cases were consolidated and raffled to the RTC of Manila. jogging around the fountain. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. . brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan. Salcedo died traumatic." Renato took off his yellow shirt. No permit could be produced. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. There. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) body. cooperated with the police. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators. He sat on some cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him. Sison repeatedly boxed him. a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. the color of the "Coryistas. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin. capturing national and international attention. then Police Chief. a cigarette vendor. the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling. three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape. At about 4:00 p. Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police. Despite this setback. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses. including two eyewitnesses. Phase III of the Luneta. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti. both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.000. sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense. the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison. The other accused. specifically Attys. merely viewed the incident. Romeo Sison. the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others. On the contrary. 28 Ruling: There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) announced by General Lim. Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos. the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. even before announcement of any reward. According to them. Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo. Roberto Garcia. Joel Tan. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's death. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. doubtful and do not deserve any credence. because they are unreliable. found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos. he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused Rolando Fernandez. however. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution because on July 27. Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. Unlike the other accused. Except for compelling reasons. His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances.For their defense. In the court's discretion. On the whole. It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. On December 16. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several times. Dr. We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Rolando Fernandez. we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. 1988. Issue: Wether the lower court erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses. Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. the testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. . As trial courts. According to him. kicks and blows from rough stones. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. he was in his house in Quezon City. a commercial photographer. 1986. The maulers however ignored him. He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. Nilo Pacadar. therefore. The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible. the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling. Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The court. He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility. The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. On the witness stand. Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. testified that the victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches. The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows. they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony. the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and documentary evidence on record. Gerry Nery. Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D. Bautista is a surplusage. Cavite. and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. At subsequent hearings. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused. Besides. However." "V. The objection of Atty. who were absent." it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. Lazaro. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos. acting as . 181494 SECOND DIVISION March 17. Upon arriving at the rest house. Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. J. The photographer. Exhibits "V. Mr. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses.: The Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV). Atty. they should have placed Pat. a team arranged a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Arguson’s rest house in Barangay Lambingan. namely. the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. Magazine. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. Photographs. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof.R. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them.— as he was being chased by his assailants and as he sat pleading with his assailants. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs." "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard. Richard de los Santos. counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V". kicked and punched. Jr. JR. Acting on this bit of information. "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star. Tanza. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie. Exhibits "W". Winlove Dumayas. not until Atty. and Ms. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. 2009 DECISION VELASCO. Atty. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. Pat. although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. MONALYN CERVANTES y SOLAR. Flores and Pat. is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken." "W. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. Identification by Pat. when the accused presented their evidence. they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. G. vs. must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced." "V-1" to "V-48. Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he. No. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original." "G." and "P. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Alfredo Lazaro. PlaintiffAppellee. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit. Flores on the witness stand. including Atty." "W-1" to "W-13. An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants. The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took the same. the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to. the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. when presented in evidence. Accused-Appellant. however. PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos. therefore. through counsel Atty. appellants. after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled. received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence.. Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification. And at this hearing. "V-1" to "V-48" to prove Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. Bautista. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo. and the Malaya. accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz and that on the day in question. Vito Cruz branch. were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP 500. accused CERVANTES was with him. were also boarded into the same van. while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonald’s]. Ocampo St. as may be expected. offered in evidence the following exhibits. On April 6. D-115800 prepared by C/I Geronimo. Arguson instructed the would-bebuyers to wait for someone who will come out from the nearby Estrella St. The CA decision likewise summarized the defense’s account of what purportedly transpired. he was boarded into the van together with the other accused. PO3 Ramos gave the prearranged signal to indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. and Richard Requiz. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon. to wit: Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella Street near F. when he bumped a parked van. requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags. At about three o’clock in the afternoon of that day. whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ. he was riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center. later found to contain 473. As he moved backward from where he stood.poseur-buyers. and (d) Exhibit “F” – Receipt of property seized signed by PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia and PO3 Ramos as witnesses. Accused-appellant and her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim. that he was taken to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to Camp Vicente Lim. Harrison on April 4. to buy ice cream.B. and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly containing the confiscated shabu. who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. Since Arguson did not have enough supply of shabu in the premises. Per her report. Laboratory Service. a commotion happened near his post. in front of the McDonald’s branch in P.. Pasay City. which. On the other hand. were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit “B” – Chemistry Report No. C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time. The black plastic bag containing the six small selfsealing bags of white crystalline substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty as charged Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged despite the insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution. only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson. like accused-appellant. Apart from the witnesses’ affidavits and other documents. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag. Thereafter. the prosecution. one of whom [was] an old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. For his part. two (2) younger male persons. he was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ. After being shown the money bundle. he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow him to Pasay City. 2000. (b) Exhibit “C” – Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5. the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter. 2000. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and took them to Camp Vicente Lim. Del Monte testified.B. Vito Cruz branch. 2000 to the Chief. accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question. simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. saying “pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan! ” The man left and when he returned.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags. Finally. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on the specimen referred to her. Harrison St. wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him. he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia. For the purpose. there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. considering certain circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt. These testimonies remained uncontroverted. accused-appellant left. her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonald’s]. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions. and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos. While not stated in the CA decision.000 worth of shabu. 2002. inclusive of its sub markings. D-115800 on the crystalline substance. Very much later. the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant. who was holding a black plastic bag. passing by F. (c) Exhibits “D” and “D-1” to “D-6” – Black plastic bag with markings. Wilson Del Monte.. in the hearing of March 4. whom he did not know prior to that incident. and approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money. accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Ruling: After a circumspect study. with confederating with each and several others to sell shabu. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered from. the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. Del Monte came accompanying Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson. each testifying that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonald’s at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4. checked on the purchase money. And as we stressed in Malillin v. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale. or the “Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs. the RTC went on to write: x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte and then taken from him by accused Arguson. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug. when both accused are complete strangers to the policeman? To paraphrase an unyielding rule.” extended to Del Monte the “benefit of the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) doubt. In the witness box. it could have been possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag. PO3 testified that. or sold by. in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. disappearing from the scene and then coming back with the principal player. Sec. what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller. there is no other evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. As may be noted. stating: “Clearly. carrying the bag would relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of regulated drugs. this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug.” a benevolence denied to accusedappellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street. Without hesitation. Series of 2002. after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the street whence Arguson would enter. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. a laundry woman. consisted of allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase money. PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it over to PO2 Balosbalos. But the trial court.We start off with the most basic. On the other hand. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as charged. We shall explain. accused Monalyn Cervantes’ complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos. and later re-appeared. during the actual buy bust––are being indicted. a car park boy. the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness. Any reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant. and Del Monte. the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte. the “chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution. Essential. Arguson. then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. Before us then is a situation where two persons–– accused-appellant. if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations. who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. but convicted accused-appellant. ever handled the merchandise or its container. in the company of the ostensible pusher. and the payment for it. coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance. PO3 Ramos. in its observation that “it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant. and . 1. but an unreliable one as against Del Monte. asked the operatives to wait. the delivery of the thing sold. as indicia of conspiracy. a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. Yet. having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation. As between the two acts performed.” So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the prosecution’s failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal. on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness. People. But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule. is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accusedappellant’s guilt. the object and its consideration. while at the crime scene. the accused. accused-appellant emerged from said street. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence. therefore. 2000 when they were apprehended. one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt.” But two paragraphs later. There is no suggestion that accusedappellant. Art. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood. no one testified on how the specimen was cared after following the chemical analysis. only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). “[T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item. What is on record is Exhibit “C. As a mode of authenticating evidence. the analyzing forensic chemist. a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied. a more exacting Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. is a memorandum PO3 Ramos prepared dated April 5. Hence. too. alteration or tampering––without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not––dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical. the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall: immediately after seizure and confiscation. i. tampering. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson. contamination and even substitution and exchange. Needless to stress. he did not indicate how he and his companions. or at least the possibility. submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable. In other words. or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received. As the Court observed aptly in People v.e. right after the buy bust.” which. as earlier described.Laboratory Equipment. was not also presented. xxxx A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. As the Court distinctly notes in this case. and the final disposition. however. 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration. alteration or substitution of substances from other cases––by accident or otherwise––in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Ong. And she did not as she could not. the date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession. PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service. as embodied in Sec. the condition in which it was received. Otherwise. of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized regulated items.” defines “chain of custody.” thusly: “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering. The need for the punctilious observance of the chain-ofcustody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following wise: While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain. or his/her representative or counsel. it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation.” It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. . even if she wanted to. In the witness box. handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. in authenticating the same. this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain. II of RA 9165. Given the foregoing perspective. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility. from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence. 21(1). In context. Then. And C/I Geronimo.. physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. In it. In this case. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty always yields to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard. the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not presented. and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. the chemistry report in question only established. there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black bag in P. To a point. It should be pointed out.. a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. We held in one case: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because. et al. that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court. unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Tria’s competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report. At any rate. the Court. Lest it be overlooked. she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. at best. and (3) accused Bandang. The Court need not belabor this matter anew. due Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) execution. thus. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.e. Inspector Tria’s testimony on. C/I Geronimo’s resignation from the service is not. Bandang. It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. The facts and the law of the case call for this kind of disposition. no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles at the crime scene. This presumption is. Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties. standing alone. The prosecution cannot. then the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. And as earlier discussed. she. In net effect. Second. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang. however. a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonald’s was the same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime. has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony. Laguna. Inspector Tria. . any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. Evidently. implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout. did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial. however.In this case. Ocampo St. a circumstance not obtaining in this case. Withal. and the presentation of. Adding a negative dimension to the prosecution’s case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. Once challenged by evidence. Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. i. (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist. as in this case. So it was that in People v. the existence. the buy bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its operation. the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable.” For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. rightfully assert that the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in proving the corpus delicti. the presumption is precisely just that—a mere presumption. x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that “unwavering exactitude” be observed. notably in People v. disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellant’s guilt. the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory. To be sure. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti. “first. was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis. Superintendent Reynaldo B. specifically PO2 Borda and PO2 Pineda. of small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance believed to be Methamphetamine Hcl or shabu with marking as "ERC-BB" Forensic Chemist Albert S. the team recovered from him one (1) piece of One Hundred Peso bearing Serial Nos. HL 034748 and with markings AL representing the initials of PO2 Allan Llantino. PO2 Allan Llantino. EMILIO RIVERA Y CABLANG ALIAS `BOY. PO2 Llantino. the substance weighing 0. 2008 Group (DDEG) NPD Chief Reynaldo B. During the operation. Thereafter. Confidential information was relayed to PO2 Allan Llantino of the District Drug Enforcement Unit. LS 034778 was prepared to be used in the operation. PO2 Henry Pineda. PO2 Joel Borda. and PO1 Ronald Mesina. Thus. together with the confidential informant. sustain accused-appellant's In the afternoon of 21 October 2002. PO2 Llantino handed the money to accused-appellant and the latter took from his right pocket one plastic sachet and handed it to PO2 Llantino. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE. 182347 CHICO-NAZARIO: THIRD October DIVISION 17. VS. Arturo examined the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance. Accused-appellant was arrested by PO2 Llantino with the help of his companions.' ACCUSED-APPELLANT." meaning one hundred pesos. No. a team composed of Police Inspector Rodrigo Soriano. PO2 Henry Pineda. The plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance allegedly recovered from accusedappellant was submitted to the NPDO-CLO for chemical analysis. PO2 Joel Borda. The RTC convicted accused-appellant and found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt Issue: Whether the police officers failed to follow the procedure outlined in paragraph 1. The Request for Laboratory Examination indicated that the following evidence was submitted: One (1) pc. Rodrigo Soriano. Conviction is proper if the following elements concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller. and PO1 Ronald Mesina) proceeded to where PO2 Llantino was. Ruling: We conviction. went ahead to the target area at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. One marked one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. then known to them only as alias Boy. Malabon City. the defense contends there is a gap in the chain of custody and a clear doubt on whether the specimen examined by the chemist and eventually presented in court were the same specimen allegedly recovered from accusedappellant. The seized item and request for laboratory examination were delivered by PO1 Mesina to the Northern Police District Office Crime Laboratory Office (NPDO-CLO) for analysis based on the request for laboratory examination signed by District Drug Enforcement Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) In prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs. They then approached accused-appellant and the confidential informant introduced PO2 Llantino as a friend. DECISION G. to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant. what determines if there was a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. PO2 Llantino turned over the confiscated plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance to the investigator who put his markings "BB" (meaning buy-bust) and made a laboratory request.R. After the introduction. and while walking. as contained in Physical Science Report No. Section 21 of Republic Act No. Orante. who immediately ordered PO2 Llantino to organize a team to conduct a buy-bust operation.25 gram was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Orante. and the consideration. appellant asked PO2 Llantino if he would buy shabu. a confidential informer personally appeared at their police station. as the buy-bust money used in the operation. and was brought to the Caloocan Police Station. PO2 Llantino was designated as poseur-buyer while the rest of the team served as his back-up. Northern Police District Office. He replied positively and told accused-appellant "piso. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Thereafter. PO2 Llantino raised his right hand as the pre-arranged signal to his companions. D-1162-02 dated 22 October 2002. the police officers conducted a physical inventory and photographed the same. After conducting a qualitative examination on the above-said specimen. coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti as evidence. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. his companions (P/Insp. 9165 on the seizure and custody of the suspected dangerous drugs as nothing in the records would show that immediately after the seizure. Caloocan City that one alias `Boy' was selling shabu. the object. they saw accusedappellant alias Boy standing. Larangay. was dispatched at Pitong Gatang. a dangerous drug. Accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante . Said information was then relayed to the Chief of the Station Police. Dampalit. After the accusedappellant handed the plastic sachet. as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. paragraph 1. D-1162-02 of Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo. which was bought from accused-appellant in consideration of P100. or his/her representative or counsel. the chain of custody is unbroken and thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved. 9165 which stipulates: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall. and turned-over the suspected shabu to the investigator. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. the substance. Indeed. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) immediately after seizure and confiscation. Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. In a buy-bust operation. arrested the accused. further. the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. In the case at bar. Del Monte that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.delicto in a buy-bust operation which is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted to be a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. PO2 Llantino testified in a frank.' The same provision clearly states as well. so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed. without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards. He positively identified accusedappellant as the seller of the shabu. straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. the implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that `non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. the offer to purchase. His testimony was able to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial contact between the designated poseur-buyer PO2 Llantino and the pusher accused-appellant. Article II of Republic Act No. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. Thus. or his/her representative or counsel. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided. that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. Per Report No. is not fatal and does not automatically render accusedappellant's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. . The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines. was examined and found to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride. 9165.00. physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized.25 gram. To be admissible. acted as the poseur-buyer. the prosecution must show by records or testimony. it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The idea to commit a crime originates from the offender. weighing 0. that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved. a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction. The same is implemented by Section 21(a). the totality of the testimonial. the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. spontaneous. Moreover. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21. PO2 Llantino's testimony proved all the elements of the crime. this Court has explained in People v. viz. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The shabu subject of the sale was brought to and properly identified in court. He testified that he was the one who prepared the marked money. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. if any. ways and means are employed for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their plan.: (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall. Be that as it may. He testified vividly on the buy-bust operation. immediately after seizure and confiscation. shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. documentary, and object evidence adequately supports not only the findings that a valid buy-bust operation took place but accounted for an unbroken chain of custody of the seized evidence as well. A certified true photocopy of the NPDO-DDEG logbook indicated that a team was officially dispatched at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon for a buy-bust operation at Pitong Gatang, Dampalit, in Malabon City, and brought with them one (1) piece of one hundred peso bill with Serial Number HL 034748 to be used as buy-bust money. The testimony of PO2 Llantino established that the buy-bust operation occurred between 4:00 o'clock to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of 21 October 2002. Accused-appellant was brought to the Larangay police station at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. PO2 Llantino testified that the seized evidence was turned over to the police investigator who put his markings "ERC-BB." DDEG Chief Reynaldo Orante made the request for laboratory examination dated 21 October 2002. The request, together with the seized item (one sachet) was brought to the NPDO-CLO at 11:30 o'clock in the evening that same night and received by Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo at 11:35 o'clock in the evening. The parties stipulated on the qualification and competence of the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was stipulated that the Forensic Chemist was the one who prepared the report on the examination of the specimen submitted and that he can identify the specimen. While the Court notes that there is a slight discrepancy in the Serial Numbers of the buy-bust money as stated in the affidavit of PO2 Llantino vis-a-vis the Serial Numbers reflected in the NPDO-DDEG Police Blotter[51] and the actual buy-bust money presented. This minor inconsistency does not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant in consideration of which he sold and delivered the shabu. Moreover, any discrepancy on the the buy-bust money was resolved on the categorical statement of PO2 Llantino that he put the markings AL on the buybust money, corresponding to his initials Allan Llantino. Thus, beyond his bare allegations, accusedappellant has not shown any evidence that will destroy the identity of the sachet. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RANILO DE LA CRUZ Y LIZING, APPELLANT. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 177222 October 29, 2008 DECISION TINGA, J.: On 12 September 2002, the Office of the Station Drugs Enforcement Unit (SDEU), Mandaluyong City received information that appellant, alias "Boy Tigre," was engaging in the trade of illegal Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) drugs. A team composed of Peregrino, Boyles, Drilon and Resuello was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust operation in the area at around 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Peregrino, Boyles, and Drilon positioned themselves at a nearby area while Resuello, the designated poseur-buyer, approached appellant described as a long-haired, medium built, not-so-tall male, sporting a moustache and frequently seen wearing short pants. At the time, appellant was standing outside of their gate and kept on glancing from side to side. Resuello then told appellant that he wanted to buy shabu. Dela Cruz looked surprised prompting Resuello to repeat what he had said and handed him the P100 bill with Serial No. XY 588120. Appellant, in turn, handed him a plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance. At which point, Resuello executed the prearranged signal and Peregrino immediately rushed to the scene. Peregrino, identifying himself as a policeman, held appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights. Peregrino then recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. Subsequently, appellant was brought to SDECU for investigation. Thereat, Peregrino placed his initials (BP) on the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance before sending it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for chemical examination. The sachet was later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Subsequently, Peregrino and Resuello accomplished the booking and information sheets regarding the incident. Peregrino also executed an affidavit on the matter. Appellant was later identified as Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lising. Forensic Chemist Perdido testified that the plastic sachet was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. He, however, admitted that he examined the specimen and had made the markings on the same without the presence of appellant. Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him Issue: Whether the police officers failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165 and that failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized from him. Ruling: In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the offense. In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the guidelines prescribed by the law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms. While there was testimony regarding the marking of the seized items at the police station, there was no mention whether the same had been done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present during the inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory. Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused, the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecution's case. Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the IRR in the absence of proof of entitlement to such leniency. The prosecution rationalizes its oversight by merely stating that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in accordance with law. The allegation hardly sways the Court save when it is accompanied by proof. According to the proviso of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such noncompliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Clearly, there must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met before any such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only does the present case lack the most basic or elementary attempt at compliance with the law and its implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any justificatory ground showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved. Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers' non-compliance with the procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellant's acquittal is in order. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. NORBERTO DEL MONTE Y GAPAY @ OBET, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) DECISION THIRD G.R. No. 179940 2008 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: DIVISION April 23, At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. When the team arrived at appellant's place, they saw the appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100 bills. The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1 Tolentino's initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a prearranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the marked money. The white crystalline substance in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002, the substance bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged despite the inadmissibility of the evidence against him for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen's failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him. Ruling: At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers' alleged noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. In People v. Pringas, we explained that noncompliance with Section 21 will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised. We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules. We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the nonadmissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Adamczuk v. Holloway 338 Pa. 263, 13 A.2d 2 (1940) Plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against defendants for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff, Jack J. Adamczuk, and a car owned by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by defendant, Elmer Holloway. A certain photograph of the locus of the accident and the approach to it on Highway Route 6 was offered as evidence. When plaintiff, Jack Adamczuk, was on the stand, he was shown "Exhibit No. 3" and he identified the roads and buildings appearing in the picture and stated, in answer to his counsel, that "the conditions represented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark." They were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulay’s house which was about a meter to the south from where he was. be admitted. then it should not come in at all. and wanted to accentuate the curve of route six to the west." At the close of plaintiff's case the picture was again offered in evidence and was objected to and the objection sustained. be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Issue: Admissibility of a certain photograph of the locus of the accident and the approach to it on Highway Route 6. Civil Engineer and County Surveyor." The court then sustained the objection to the picture's introduction. accusedappellants. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not. JAIME CARPO. another son of Warlito.97. After transferring his cow nearer to his house. EN BANC G. could you not?" He answered: "I think you could. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. There was also moon in the sky. No. it is simply the exaction of those testimonial qualities which are required equally of all witnesses. In other words.)." which is always in effect the tenor of a witness's oath. 2. plaintiffappellee. His mother who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen prodded him to check the disturbance." The court refused to admit the photograph. any more than an anonymous letter should be received as testimony. He had no experience in photography. WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO. He knew Jaime and Warlito very well. but it is of no validity. But so also can any witness lie in his words. if a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it. If a qualified observer is found to say. As soon as he . Warlito’s son Roche was also there. "The following words represent the fact as I saw it. subject to reversal for substantial error. The fallacy of the objection occurs in assuming Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) that the photograph can come in testimonially without a competent person's oath to support it. hid himself behind the bamboo slats and peeped outside to observe. it isn't shown where the camera was standing. It does not have to be verified by the taker. that is. Then the noise grew louder thus arousing his suspicion that something was really wrong. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor. he was standing by the mango tree. farther to the east of the intersection. to be admissible. Ruling: The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. Section 793: The map or photograph must first. The darkness helped conceal him from outside view while the light from the two (2) bulbs positioned at about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered through the slats and illumined the surroundings. There is nothing anomalous or exceptional in this requirement of verification. it should. sec.Then the exhibit was offered in evidence. or any identity as to the picture.R. which is not clear to the court. 132676 April 4. 2001 The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows: On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening while he was watching television with his family his dogs barked. If no witness has thus attached his credit to the photograph. in other words. says: The objection that a photograph may be so made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness." This witness was asked if he took photographs and developed them. yes. was on the stand. you could accomplish that by taking the picture farther away from the intersection. It was offered in evidence again when Herbert C. OSCAR IBAO. other than the physical view thereon. There is no proof of who took it. "This photograph represents the fact as I saw it. A few minutes later. To allay her fears he stood up. it must be verified. Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed. On cross-examination it was disclosed that the witness did not know who took the picture or when it was taken. He also saw Oscar Ibao. he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao suspiciously stooping near his barn. striding towards Dulay’s hut. he went inside the kitchen. if relevant. to procure the original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants' counsel of the photographer. and court saying: "There is some mystery about exhibit number three. He was asked on cross-examination by defendant's counsel: "If you were taking a picture. Vol. He said he did not know whether the photographer tilted the camera up or down when the picture was taken. vs. Dillard." there is no more reason to exclude it than if he had said. under what conditions it was taken." The court then commented on the fact that plaintiff had two days "since adjournment last Friday. He answered: "Very little. 792. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide. Jaime was his uncle and Warlito lived in his neighborhood. stood atop the concrete washbasin. He stated that when the picture was taken the location of the camera was on route 6 but he did not know at what distance from the intersection. It is true that a photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. the application merely takes a different form. took his flashlight and trudged the unpaved path towards his cow that was tied to a mango tree. and he did not know whether the photographer "endeavored to accentuate certain parts of the picture. p. testified that at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day.R. Then. where accused-appellant was also staying. Dr. solely on the basis of Ruben’s testimony. Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. EN BANC CURIAM: In the afternoon of July 10. Dr. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. Nida looked for Daisy in her brother’s and sister’s houses. the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. Daisy and accusedappellant went back to the latter’s house.reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled something inside. vs. Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben. Ruben Meriales rushed outside. He further said that Florentino was killed because he was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the murder of his brother Delfin Meriales. Warlito Ibao. 1999. she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the “compuerta” by a certain Freddie Quinto. Daisy came back with accused-appellant. a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay’s screams broke into the night. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. either. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o’clock after an afternoon nap. but she was not there. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE. could help Daisy with her lessons. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. and a motionless Norma whose head was oozing with blood. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. Ma. accused-appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. At the trial. so that Aimee Vallejo. Another witness. No. He ran towards Florentino’s hut but was deterred by darkness. Ruben went to the police station where he gave his statement to Police Officer Osio. Ligtong I. who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate’s house to borrow a book. When Ma. Jessiemin Mataverde. She asked Daisy and her G. Rosalina O. He named Jaime Carpo. In convicting Jaime Carpo. she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house. Victorio." Forthwith. and there saw accusedappellant. Daisy’s tutor. They were looking for a book which accusedappellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. It accepted his straightforward testimony and ruled that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of falsehood on his lips. Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor’s house. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. An hour later. 144656 DECISION May 9. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. But. Warlito Ibao. the mother of the victim sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor’s house in Pilapil. Aimee’s house. the accused filed an Addendum to Appellant’s Brief urging that the favorable result of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records. Nida went there. 1999. a criminal complaint for the murder of Florentino Dulay and his two (2) daughters Norwela and Nissan as well as the frustrated murder of his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo. Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of Florentino. is about four to five meters away from Daisy’s house. At about 7:00 o’clock that evening. the prosecution presented Ruben. Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao. Nida saw her daughter. when Ma. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche following him. when he is not telling the truth. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house. Ma. After finding the book. the sister of accused-appellant. Ma. On 3 October 1996. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant. Inside the hut he was stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him – a bloodied Florentino cradled in the arms of his weeping widow. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive. Cavite. capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body. Rosario. Seconds later. plaintiffappellee. 2002 PER Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. Ma. Ruling: A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes. Emiliano Subido and Police Officers Virgilio dela Cruz. At the barangay hall. Warlito Ibao. she was told that Daisy had not been there. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee. He returned home to take his flashlight and raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Aimee’s mother told Ma. Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo Osio as witnesses. Noemi. she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of June 11. After the filing of briefs. Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot both doused in blood. they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant: In conclusion. 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination. About five minutes later. as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim. Appellee. to obtain a more conclusive result. namely. conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes. The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-appellant. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples. Later. the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity. NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant. Lu of Cavite City. and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). the two were released. The vaginal swabs from Daisy’s body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accusedappellant. On July 31. considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.” Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence. in its weight and probative force. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence. and the violet basketball shorts. Ma. with the number 9 printed on it. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . or 3) The samples are similar. contamination. When a crime is committed. however. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. Evidence is weighed not counted. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample. The test may yield three possible results: 1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). or failure of some aspect of the protocol. we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. a certain Raymond and Esting. courts should consider. 2000. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. Vertido. Except for identical twins. were also taken into custody because they were seen with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of July 10 1999. based on the results of the test. therefore. accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something. Forensic Chemist of the NBI. how they were handled. 13 printed at the back. vs. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. the following data: how the samples were collected. 2) It is not possible to be sure. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc. This is how it is in this case. the samples are found to be similar. Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemin’s house. The shirt and shorts. RUFINO UMANITO. In such a case. worn by accused-appellant the day before. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests. the possibility of contamination of the samples.playmates to stop playing as their noise was keeping Jessiemin’s one-year old baby awake. This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion. Two others. among others things. such evidence. as a result of which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the “compuerta. material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. Appellant. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation. the policemen went to the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 11. At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Ruling: DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Upon analysis by the experts. which were bloodstained. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. with the name Samartino and No. This is the evidence sample. may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method. Under Section 4 of the Rules. while on her way to her grandmother’s home. She further recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO laid her down on a bench. a happenstance may provide the definitive key to the absolution of the appellant. Issue: Whether the prosecution has successfully met the level of proof needed to find appellant guilty of the crime of rape. not to report the incident to the police or else he said he would kill her. It was only then when the victim. DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime. AAA and AAA’s child to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules). as we pointed out in People v. the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. which may be accomplished through DNA testing. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape. After hearing private complainant [AAA]’s story. the RTC rendered judgment against him. private complainant [AAA’s] mother. when private complainant [AAA] was accosted by a young male. DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. noticed the prominence on [AAA]’s stomach. Verily. National Science Research Institute (NSRI). securing the acquittal of the innocent. 6 months after the incident.: No. If he is found not to be the father. we are directing appellant. where we stated that “DNA.” In Vallejo. and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. which conducted the DNA tests in this case. this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. subject to guidelines prescribed herein. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. With PCR testing. not admissibility. Among the many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense. the disharmony on a certain point stands out. 4 meters long and 24 inches wide. It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child. used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. private complainant [AAA]. the process of obtaining such vital evidence has become less arduous – The U. It was only later when she learned the name of accused-appellant UMANITO. The Court moved from the issue of according “official recognition” to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis. Accused-appellant UMANITO then left. For purposes of criminal investigation. which took effect on 15 October 2007. while this Court retains jurisdiction over . She recounted that accused-appellant UMANITO waited for her by the creek. efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty. It can aid immensely in determining a more accurate account of the crime committed. 1989. October 26. after due hearing and notice. J. motu proprio to order a DNA testing. and then with a knife pointed at [AAA]’s left side of the abdomen. and to his pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the Home Economics Building inside the premises of the Daramuangan Elementary School where accused-appellant UMANITO first undressed her [AAA] and himself with his right hand while he still clutched the knife menacingly on his left hand. Yatar. Ruling: Amidst the slew of assertions and counter-assertions. while the victim [AAA] went on to her grandmother’s house and she noticed that it was already around 1:00 o’clock in the morning when she reached there. where biological evidence is available. or to absolve one erroneously accused. accused-appellant UMANITO dressed up and threatened [AAA] while poking the knife at her neck. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case. 172607 RESOLUTION In the evening of July 15. Thus. 2007 TINGA. If he is not. then mounted her. Private complainant [AAA] recounted that she could not shout because she was afraid.P. 1989. the courts are authorized.SECOND DIVISION G. he forced her to give in to his kisses. her mother brought her to the police station. The 2002 case of People v. Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. being a relatively new science. of DNA evidence. [BBB]. divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told her the details of what had happened in July. By 2002.R. set the knife down. Thus. it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child. the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in this case. inserting his penis into her [AAA’s] vagina and shortly thereafter. Vallejo discussed the probative value. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) alleged victim’s child. In January 1990. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. However. there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. his acquittal may be ordained. x x x has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. to his holding her breasts and stomach. tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. to wit: SEC. it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique. the court shall consider the following: (a) The chain of custody. Hence. including how the biological samples were collected. that is. which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. Application for DNA Testing Order. and (f) The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles. The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples. either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at bar. among other things. in conformity with Section 5 of the Rules. Section 4 (d) notwithstanding. the following data: how the samples were collected. the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure. (b) The DNA testing methodology. including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation. in the course of daily routine. Reliability of DNA testing methodology. the possibility of contamination of the samples. with due notice to the parties. the RTC shall consider. conduct hearings. (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested. at the behest of any party. as hereinafter provided. the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the records. 4. capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy. and (d) The reliability of the testing result. (b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods. shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence. The RTC. it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings. (d) The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data gathered. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.: that the samples are . how they were handled. If the laboratory is not accredited. Given our earlier pronouncements on the relevance of the DNA testing. – In assessing the probative value of Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) the DNA evidence presented. it shall order the same.– In evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is reliable. SEC. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case. before a suit or proceeding is commenced. What should be the proper scope of such hearings? Section 4 of the Rules spells out the matters which the trial court must determine. It is also the RTC which shall determine the institution to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice of DNA testing center. The trial court is further enjoined to observe the requirements of confidentiality and preservation of the DNA evidence in accordance with Sections 11 and 12 of the Rules. order a DNA testing. the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not. (e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database. it would be unbecoming of the RTC to conclude otherwise.the case at bar. and the possibility of contamination of the samples. (b). and (e) The existence of other factors. and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests. The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Section 4 (a).–The appropriate court may. 8. (c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community. The Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing. if any. without need of a prior court order. whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested. how they were handled. including law enforcement agencies. (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests. (c) and (e) of the Rules. the court shall consider the following: (a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used. After the DNA analysis is obtained. (c) The forensic DNA laboratory. Moreover. thus: SEC. or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing. at any time. the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established. 7.e. including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples. but the results may require confirmation for good reasons. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. i. To illustrate. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile.collected by a neutral third party. Court of Appeals that more than a passing mention was given to DNA analysis. 2005 Rosendo Alba. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. for the individual from whom the sample is taken. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother. If the DNA types match. where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. Genetic identity is unique. Halos. when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case. support and damages against petitioner. Presiding Judge. Teehankee. then he is not excluded as the father. respondents. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute. As earlier stated. a person possesses two genetic types called “allele”. Ph. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. Quezon City. filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same. it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. DNA Analysis as Evidence Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Ruling: The petition has no merit. Although the term “DNA testing” was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES. However.D. certain regions of human DNA show variations between people.9999% in establishing paternity. Dr. it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners’ youngest son. Petitioner denied that he is the biological father of respondent. When she testified. a DNA analysis laboratory. that all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation thereto. In each of these regions.R. 148220 June CARPIO. except for identical twins. petitioner. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child. Fortunately. The University of the Philippines Natural Science ROSENDO HERRERA. and HON. The trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner. the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the “known” print. This DNA profile is unique for each person. vs. in DNA typing. the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different. respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Hence. Issue: Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. which match the paternal types in the child. “matches” are determined. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish parentage. Manila. Branch 48. that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their sample collection appointments. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. one inherited from each parent. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child. minor. the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. we observed that: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. Jr. we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. respondent and Armi Alba. the man is excluded as the father. No. DECISION FIRST G. To support the motion. But then. In her testimony. In Tijing. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern. ROSENDO ALBA. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. In [a] paternity test. J. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99. Regional Trial Court. a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity. represented by his mother Armi Alba. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman. or a DNA profile. ALBA. Just like in fingerprint analysis.: DIVISION 15. Dr. represented by his mother ARMI A. that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the collection site. it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother.9%. it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing. which governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Right Against Self-Incrimination Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against selfincrimination. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child. evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence The 2002 case of People v.” In Vallejo. following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards. trial courts should require at least 99. the following data: how the samples were collected. where we stated that “DNA. being a relatively new science. Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests. how they were handled. in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues. Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. therefore. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. xxx For it was said. the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence. Section 49 of Rule 130. Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility. then he is not excluded as the father. that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of nonpaternity. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child. such as the Philippine population database. mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father and child alone.” Indeed. This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. since to reject said result is to deny progress. among other things. If the DNA types match. experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence. is required to compute for W. then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (“W”) prior to a paternity inclusion. the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. However. We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases: In [a] paternity test. trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father. xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. For this reason. Indeed. An appropriate reference population database.9% or higher.Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. contrary to the belief of respondent in this . Here. which match the paternal types in the child. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. courts should consider. If the value of W is less than 99. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. the possibility of contamination of the samples. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing. the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. In our jurisdiction. the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. the man is excluded as the father. If the value of W is 99. W will never equal to 100%. provides as follows: The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. skill. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples. even evidence on collateral matters is allowed “when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. Luz Yatar. will not violate the right against selfincrimination. the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva. through Kathylyn’s friend. Before Judilyn and her husband departed. indicates that no hymenal lacerations. and that Isabel could use it. This privilege applies only to evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken under duress. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there. earwax. Most importantly. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. and vaginal and rectal cells. She found that the door was tied with a rope. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. During his testimony. At 12:30 p. denim pants. with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect. because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure. and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. sweat. DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime. appellant Joel Yatar. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT". not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. of the same day. Later. Significantly. at 10:00 a.m. while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan. bone. together with Isabel Dawang. Dr. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. vs. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. Pej Evan C. contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim. Anita Wania.. showed that the of the sperm the victim was appellant’s gene PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. brassiere. Judilyn’s husband then Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Ruling: DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. but in the event she would not be able to leave. Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. appellant. left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. the root and shaft of hair. to her husband. Judilyn and her husband. While she groped in the dark. appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide Although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician. Isabel Dawang.. pacing back and forth at the back of the house. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. Cecil Casingan. urine. At 9:00 a. he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime. At 1:30 p. Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. so she went down to get a knife. Rizal. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter. Kathylyn.m. mucus. The door to the ground floor was open. 150224 CURIAM: EN BANC May 19. Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked. she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt. 2004 G.m. skin tissue. DECISION No. She called for help. in Liwan West. where biological evidence has . Judilyn and her husband arrived. They saw appellant at the back of the house. no two individuals have the same DNA. subsequent testing Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) specimen from the vagina of identical the semen to be that of type. Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. She later noticed appellant.R. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp. seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba. PER Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin. Dr. Bartolo. After trial. bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime. The police discovered the victim’s panties. Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. Kalinga. Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide. who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants. appellee. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked. she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. Dr.. were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother. with the notable exception of identical twins. She called out for her granddaughter. and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel. she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.m. This time. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. Kathylyn Uba.action. In the evening of the same day. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt. under Daubert. the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. has proven instructive. This contention is untenable. III of the Constitution. and thereafter ran away. Under Philippine law. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. From the light of the fluorescent lamp inside the house. but he was declared dead on arrival. how they were handled. it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair. 155023 28. the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis. Judges. inter alia. Dr. Apolinario Mirabueno.m. Appellant was charged with Murder. FIRST DIVISION G. which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. and removed the fish net covering the window and looked inside the house. 1999. we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. blood. Verily.R. For purposes of criminal investigation. Specifically. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed. so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. in general. while the deceased. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. vs. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion. including the introduction Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) of new kinds of scientific techniques. skin tissue. courts should consider. semen. In the case at bar. Admittedly. and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. Hair and fiber from clothing. we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system. CORNELIO CAJUMOCAN. appellant. TH01 7/8. of September 30. 2004 DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO May At 11:30 p. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar. Scientific . crime scene or assailant. de Ungria’s testimony. a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. the possibility of contamination of the samples. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19. No. Fortunately. DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of Murder Issue: Whether the negative findings of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is conclusive proof of his innocence Ruling: Paraffin tests. but against testimonial compulsion. the latter was roused from his slumber by the rustling of dried leaves outside the house. securing the acquittal of the innocent. appellee. it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence. Margarita and they brought Apolinario to a hospital in Morong. and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. the prevailing doctrine in the U. Based on Dr. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples. paused outside their room. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty. If properly collected from the victim. who drew a gun and shot Apolinario in the head. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence. Leo cried out to his older sister. the following factors: how the samples were collected. Merrell Dow. were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests.S. Leo recognized the man as appellant Cornelio Cajumocan. He saw a solitary figure walk toward their house. bedding.been left. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. 12 and 17 of Art. The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. In Daubert v. DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. carpets. was asleep beside his fourteen year old brother Leo inside their house Rizal. evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. No. as in the instant case. Appellant’s argument that the negative result of gunpowder nitrates from the paraffin test conducted on him the day after the crime was committed. The same police officers brought him to the municipal jail and detained him. Bryan and Manilyn ran away from the scene to a cousin's house nearby. fireworks. All other matters. P/Insp. ARTHUR.45 Caliber pistol. . since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.R. such as the paraffin test. The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun.m. OF THE THIRD DIVISION G. Pangasinan. He alleged he was with the company of his brothers. The test yielded a negative result since there was no gunpowder residue found in his hands. the positive. Balungao. fertilizers. Verily. After getting drunk. sister. pharmaceuticals. After witnessing the shocking incident. at the distance of two and a half meters. we stressed: xxx even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding. The RTC found Arturo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of homicide Arturo insists that his conviction is tainted by reasonable doubt since the paraffin test conducted on him resulted negative. who looked infuriated. 177564 October 31. et al. as police officers were looking for him. A person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives. it cannot establish that the source of the nitrate was the discharge of firearms. clear and categorical testimony of the lone eyewitness to the crime deserves full merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant. 2008 D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO In the evening of 23 July 2002. and leguminous plants. Manilyn Rangel (Manilyn). but the latter. a paraffin test cannot be considered as conclusive proof of appellant’s innocence. However. of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. is untenable. he was in the house of his sister situated in Sitio Bantog. Manalo. tobacco. we reiterated the rule on the admissibility of this kind of evidence: A paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand. it must be emphasized. wife. Arturo proceeded to the direction of Flordeliza who was coming out of her house towards the terrace. she personally knew. Leo Mirabueno. the bullet was fired from a . He claimed that when the killing of Flordeliza occurred on 23 July 2002. when Arturo arrived. PEOPLE PHILIPPINES. When Arturo was already close to Flordeliza. Bryan and his cousin. it must be borne in mind that appellants were not convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test. The following morning. Barangay Rajal. Emelda Besarra Roderos testified that when she conducted a paraffin test on Arturo. VS. Flordeliza fell down. that there was no electricity in the house of the victim during the fateful night. enjoying a drinking spree while waiting for the arrival of his sister from Spain. RESPONDENT. In the case at bar. establishing the identity of the malefactor through the testimony of the witness is the heart and cause of the prosecution. merely corroborate direct evidence that may be presented by the prosecution. Bryan saw the incident since the place was illuminated by a light coming from his aunt's terrace. Barangay Rajal. Hence. Hence. the test alone cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. it cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test. Witnesses Lemie. The Court has even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand if. Balungao. In People v. through the billing statement. In the case of People v. Pangasinan. children and some friends. he went to sleep only to be awakened by his wife at around 8:30 to 9:00 p. Arturo denied the accusation against him. Bryan asked Arturo where he was going. still. It can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. the presence of nitrates should only be taken as an indication of a possibility that a person has fired a gun. Teodoro and Rolando corroborated Arturo's testimony that he was in his sister's house and that they were there the whole time when the incident was supposed to have happened. she found that the latter was negative for the presence of gunpowder nitrates. However. he was brought to Urdaneta City where he was subjected to a paraffin test. Abriol. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) ARTURO REVITA "ALIAS" PETITIONER. did not reply. are of lesser consequence where there is positive identification by the lone eyewitness. he shot the latter with a baby armalite several times.experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. were idly talking at the yard of Flordeliza in Sitio Bantog. Paraffin tests. thereby showing an absence of physical evidence that he fired a gun. Lemie further testified that as the finance officer of the Barangay Power Association. Nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder.. who was wearing a red T-shirt. there were only two groups of men inside the beerhouse. Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Ruling: The appeal lacks merit. VS. the result is negative. the method used is the diphenyl amine test. RUDY BUDUHAN Y BULLAN AND ROBERT BUDUHAN Y BULLAN. fireworks. a positive result occurs when blue specks are produced in the paraffin casts. The Court thus once held: Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the paraffin tests conducted in order to exculpate themselves. For the second stage. Romualde. there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. the Letter of Request addressed to the Officer-in-Charge the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region 2 for the conduct of paraffin examination. Guinhicna and Robert.Ruling: Even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun. Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao testified that she was the one who conducted the examination proper of the paraffin casts taken from Robert Buduhan. while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese. wind direction. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites. Issue: Whether appellant’s guilt were proven beyond reasonable doubt. The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding). climate conditions. 2008 J. which caused them to fall down. Instantaneously. viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun. Immediately. 178196 CHICO-NAZARIO. or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. She likewise brought before the trial court the original Letter Request of the Maddela Police Station for the conduct of paraffin casting. the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose's Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie). which then indicates the presence of gunpowder residue.m. When no such reaction takes place. and Cherry Rose hid below the table. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. The process involves two stages: first. Rudy Buduhan. all four men from Robert's group fired their guns at Larry and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm. The group that went there first was that of the appellants. The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police Inspector Chua-Camarao conducted yielded a negative result for all the four accused. which refers to the actual chemical examination to determine whether or not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted. this Court defers to the findings of the trial court which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. wherein the diphenyl amine agent is poured on the paraffin casts of the subject's hands. A paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable. such as explosives. Ginyang. The trial court found appellants guilty of the charges. the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely a corroborative evidence. the paraffin casting. In numerous rulings. beans. Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred. The man in blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up. The positive or negative results of the test can be influenced by certain factors. and alfalfa. In fine. Police Inspector Chua-Camarao explained that the purpose of conducting a paraffin test was to determine the presence of gunpowder residue in the hands of a person through extraction using paraffin wax.R. Rudy Buduhan. which was composed of Robert Buduhan. In this test. and leguminous plants such as peas. fertilizers. wind velocity. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. THIRD DIVISION G. Boyet Ginyang and Boy Guinhicna. who was wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano. in which the hands of the subject are covered with paraffin wax to extract gunpowder residue. the paraffin examination per se. pharmaceuticals. neither proving nor disproving that a person did indeed fire a gun. PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE. and another man wearing a blue Tshirt with a black jacket. a man wearing a blue T-shirt.. wears gloves at the time of the shooting.: No. Robert approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Whether the trial court erred in the appreciation of the evidence for and against them. such as the wearing of gloves by the subject. and second. At 10:40 p. humidity.. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. August 06. perspiration of the hands. who was seated at the counter. and they are not conclusive with Witness Cherry Rose was working as a GRO at the RML Canteen in Quirino. The said witness herself promptly stated that paraffin test results are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by any party. we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman. Nonetheless. At about 9:00 to 10:00 p. and the paraffin casts of subjects Rudy.m. Besides. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable." Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. 'A1'. We do not think so. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said. Q. Such testimony is admissible. Cuento.' He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in French — 'First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. a commotion ensued. The subject of inquiry is not the entry. humidity. What for? and she said. but at Bangkok. From Manila to Bangkok. issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. as petitioner underscores. and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. 'B'. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. I said. as hereinabove shown. He told me. As previously mentioned. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Who is that attendant and purser? A. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. Inc. 1958. and. 1966 Sep 28 En Banc DECISION J. defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a 'first class' accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. Q. On March 28. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager]. in the words of the witness Ernesto G.respect to the issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a gun. No. If. from a reading of the transcript just quoted. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. the positive and negative results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors affecting the conditions surrounding the use of the firearm. but the ouster incident. Furthermore. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane.: G. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. thus — "Q. wind velocity. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees. respondents. a written document speaks a uniform language.defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the 'first class' ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. The excitement had not as "Plaintiff. VALTE — I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject.R. 'I have recorded the incident in my notebook. climate conditions. 'B-1'. Was she able to note it? A. according to said Ernesto G. the Manager alleged. refused.' MR. many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. Philippine Air Lines. 1958. the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm. Such is the case here. You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer. that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30. L-21438 SANCHEZ. through its authorized agent. and paid for." Ruling: Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for. the defendant. when the dialogue happened. the plaintiff. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer. About that purser? A. AIR FRANCE. when they found out that Mr. a civil engineer. 'C' and 'C. and that the captain refused to intervene. perspiration of the hands. petitioner. had a 'better right to the seat. You mentioned about an attendant. Cuento. there was a 'white man'. Your Honor. and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued. who. they came all across to Mr. No. 'We will note that you were transferred to the tourist class'. wind direction. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man'. because I did not give my ticket. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that. I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. as a rule. 'Nothing of that kind. Well. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat.. to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket.' And I also said. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence. and plaintiff's Exhibits 'A'. plaintiff traveled in 'first class'. vs. Petitioner draws the SC’s attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony. the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation . Air France. COURT — I will allow that as part of his testimony." Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) .1' belie the testimony of said witnesses. as was to be expected. the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room. and was issued a 'first class' airplane ticket. This matter has received consideration from the foremost commentator on the Rules of Court thus: "When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet. and that the originals of the sales invoices are transmitted to the main office in support of cash journal sheets. so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by the used of the carbons in the course of the preparation and Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) Ruling: The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question and we need not elaborate on the reasons for the rule. the special prosecutor claimed that the evidence of the prosecution the originals on account of their loss. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for sales. which requires the production of the originals. "D-1". "A-1". Cebu branch. XIII. ANGELITA CENTENO. We. two carbons were used between the three sheets. the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. in this environment. Br. already above referred to.. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous. It forms part of the res gestae. 1520. such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression. Issue: Whether the invoice sought introduced is a duplicate original. PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES. Another witness. Tan. thus: . It was at this stage that the judge below told the prosecution that the law applicable is Section 46. to be In Criminal Case No. respondents Pacita MadrigalGonzales and others are charged with the crime of falsification of public documents. petitioner. HON. no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever been made. Exh. the duplicate and the triplicate. Hon. hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence. He declared that sales in the provinces were reported to the Manila office of the Metro Drug Corporation. If it were really true that no such entry was made. and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to the Manila office of the company. Cebu City.' It has also been decided in favor of the petitioner by Us in the case of People vs. are admissible as part of the res gestae.: G. and CRISPULA R. so that the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. And. In response to the above ruling. the duplicates to the customers. As the witness was explaining the figures or words appearing on the triplicates.yet died down. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. BIENVENIDO A. Exhs. "D-1". the entry was made outside the Philippines. while only the duplicate or pink copies are submitted to the central office in Manila. when in fact and in truth. Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. accountant of the Metro Drug Corporation in Manila. CALIXTO HERMOSA. Bienvenido M. by an employee of petitioner. therefore. No. vs. was also called by the prosecution to testify. "A". Gaz. The booklet contained the triplicate copies. the prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts. No. they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 44 Off. to "A-10" he further declared that he received these from the Metro Drug Corporation. 1525. In order to prove the charge of falsification. 36885 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers. interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and can not be produced. and that the said cash journal sheets contained the sales made in the Cebu branch.R. 1959 Jul 31 En Banc DECISION J. At all events. The witness giving the testimony was the salesman who issued the triplicates marked as Exh. "D". the original. PAGARAN alias PULA. then presiding in the court below. Statements then. which was marked Exh. Quinones. 5. signing of the originals. Magallanes corner Jakosalem. containing blue invoices numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro Drug Corporation. After the cross-examination of this last witness. the prosecution again went back to the identification of the triplicate invoice. and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. including the signature of the party to be charged thereby. L-14257 LABRADOR. produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath. Testifying on certain cash journal sheets. all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others. in their capacities as public officials and employees. JULIA CARPIO. respondents. TAN as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. For. but that the original practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers. in such quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public documents. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit). He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. .: G. being carbon copy of the original and bearing as it does the signature of the appellant. Balistoy. like a xerox copy thereof. other substitutionary evidence. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. and the same does not require an accounting for the nonproduction of the original. as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves. Rule 123. alleging that he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon. prior to the filing of the compliant. Barangay Singkamas. is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original. and these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. THE UNITED STATES. and any one of them may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the other."It is argued in the second assignment of error that the confession Exhibit B is not admissible because it is merely a carbon copy. 420. in the justice of the peace court of Libog. however. or exists. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant and took from him the marked money. Nicanor Candolesas. The said confession Exhibit B. Jr. 1910 Dec 17 1st Division 5791 D E C I S I O N G. concurrently with the original. three men approached Singayan. 47. and in which Balistoy states that he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it . J.92. as a creditor against Eustaquio Balistoy. vs. LTORRES. The other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. vs. J. No. when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original. The target area was a store along the said street. "SEC. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10. and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. plaintiff-appellee. On the 18th of the same month. A "duplicate sales slip' has been held to be primary evidence. 1908. Duplicate originals. p.. defendants-appellants. (Sec.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money. and Detectives Pablo R. was set as the date for the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties to the highest bidder.00 and two P5. without accounting first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and must be reversed. 616. . THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. two rural properties belonging to the debtor were attached and the 27th of May.Where letters are produced by mechanical means and. Ruling: The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. For the execution of the said judgment. . Makati. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. as by placing carbon paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface at the same time. Rules of Court)" Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of th admissibility of duplicate originals. The exchange was made then and there two Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) In the suit instituted by Pedro Salazar. or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution. 386. Salido. duplicate are produced. BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO BALISTOY. Estanislao Dalumpines. No. all are duplicate originals. Singayan. rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10. We find that the ruling of the court below to the effect that the triplicates formed by the used of carbon papers are not admissible in evidence. the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy. for the payment of a certain sum of money. 616. Lorenzo Gregorio.R. In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper. The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. plaintiffappellee.: On May 27. One of them was the accused-appellant. are duplicate originals. is admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the original. judgment was rendered wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275. gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. 100. Bernardo Gregorio attached thereto the document Exhibit D. and Cirilo Valla. as follows: "SEC. defendant-appellant. Herino de la Cruz. . Carbon copies. Soon. Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St.R. one of the properties levied upon. for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor. in 1905. Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. MARIO TANDOY y LIM. at the end of which and among other particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22. "SEC. Luisito de la Cruz. 1905. 1990 December 04 1st Division 80505 DECISION CRUZ. 1986Lt. the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact p. who said without preamble: "Pare. and D. The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra. he made or simulated a conveyance of one of the attached properties in favor of the said Bernardo Gregorio. and not hearsay. 1930. Ruling: The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. 1952. and we hereby do acquit Eustaquio Balistoy and Bernardo Gregorio. with malicious intent. and for the purpose of avoiding the attachment and sale of one of the properties belonging to him. in our opinion. 4501 and 4502. NICANOR HALEBAS and LAURENTINO LL. L-35366 1931 VILLAMOR. Ruling: In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document. L-28999 24. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution. pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it. pronounced in both of them the judgment appealed from. whether or not the crime of falsification was committed. another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly. did. BADELLES. whereby Balistoy were found guilty. Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false. In view of the evidence produced in both of the aforesaid criminal causes. which were afterwards. Defendants in a criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until their guilt be fully proven. the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence. The court overruled the demurrer. there is reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendant's innocence. he having published only one libelous article in the Ing Magumasid for July 13.R. For the foregoing reasons a complaint was filed charging each of the defendants with the crime of the falsification of a private document. So ordered. 1908. For the foregoing reasons. this case does not furnish decisive and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged. and although. LLUCH. intended to impeach the honesty. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published. and also. No. written in duplicate. and. the aforementioned Exhibits A. in case of reasonable doubt and when their guilt is not satisfactorily shown. and its translation into Spanish. SALVADOR T. published on page 9 of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid in its issue of July 13. BADELLES. judging from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes. counterfeited. Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence. with the costs of both instances de oficio. SECOND DIVISION G. The defendant demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations. EN BANC G.to Bernardo Gregorio for P300. withal. Pedro Salazar. according to the aforesaid copy. B. The informations alleged that the defendant. Issue: Admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. 1909. 1930. and its translation. MARIANO LL. 1905. No. A joint trial was held of criminal cases Nos. it is proper. vs. Judge of First Instance of Pampanga. said causes can only be terminated by such a finding. . and proceedings having been instituted in both causes. with only a copy of the said original in view. on November 6. plaintiff-appellee. wherefore he signed as such vendor. respondents. C. they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. with intent to injure his creditor. which are copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo. to secure the payment of the judgment obtained by his creditor in the aforementioned suit. to acquit. is applicable to the present case. in order that they may find. The contract was to be effective for one month counted from August 12. it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated. execute or write the said memorandum whereby. it is improper to hold. when in fact the said memorandum was written in April. vs.: August 5. at the same time. or falsified. with a reversal of the judgment appealed from. with disregard of the truth in the narration of the facts. that the crime prosecuted was committed. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) On August 11.R. The charge consists in that Balistoy. by agreement of the parties thereto. integrity. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA. and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. J. which objection was sustained by the court.: May THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA. and ANDRES GUEVARRA. yet. constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. a squib in verse. 1952 the Compañia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees’ vessels at Iligan City. This being so. individually and officers of Allied Free Workers Union. 1977 AQUINO. respectively of the Allied Free Workers Union. of which a translation into Spanish was included therein. individually and in their capacities as President and Vice-President. J. on February 25. the court. to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the falsification under prosecution. consolidated. petitioner. HERMOGENES REYES. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION. The evidence must be relevant. Contrary to the trial court's impression. The picket lasted for nine days. On August 31. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense. The union agreed to the stipulation that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the loading. was preferable to having no work at all. Arrastre. 1954. the issue of whether the company should pay for the stevedoring service became a sore point of contention between the parties. The shippers and consignees paid the union both for the arrastre work.215. the union on August 26. 1954 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition praying that it be certified as the sole collective bargaining unit. the company on August 24. to the company by reason of the depreciation of the said items of equipment amounted to P38. and that the shipowner would not be liable for the payment of such services.37. On the other hand.000 on the basis of the auditor's reports. So. in accordance with payment of the 1952 contract. The company's counsel. 530 pieces of wire rope slings and two pieces of tarpaulins in the total sum of P27. amounting to P450. the said contract was verbally renewed. Thus. the lower court rendered a decision which declared the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated on August 1.It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render proper service.835 or more than the cost thereof. those documents show that the total damages. As already noted. Despite that certification case. The consignees counsel relied oth on the auditors' reports. Upon the expiration of the one-month period. On the other hand.835 indicated by Teves in Exhibit K. submitted a statement (Exh. Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract was disadvantageous to the union. K) showing the alleged cost of three forklifts. and for the recovery of damages. of P38. 1954. the union had just been organized. he claims that the damages.245. During trial Teves. awarded. in his summary of the damages. stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. Exhibits A to I. how the same were computed. comprehends the handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship's tackle. In that statement. to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo. C and D are not auditors' reports. Ruling: After analyzing the nature of the damages. 1954 filed in the CIR charges of unfair labor practice against the company. The company ignored that demand. the work of the union consisted of arrastre and stevedoring service. the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the contract explicitly provided that the compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees. The contract could be renewed by agreement of the parties. 1954 the company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. 1954 served a written notice on the union that. The trial court awarded actual damages. They refused to pay for the stevedoring service. the same would be terminated on August 31. September 1. Exhibits A and E to I and on Exhibit B. The company allowed the union to continue performing arrastre and stevedoring work. On September 8. it did not terminate the contract because its members were in dire need of work and work. The union members labored under the impression that they were not being compensated for their stevedoring service as distinguished from arrastre service. which was not adequately compensated. Its primordial desire was to find work for its members. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) On July 23. It did not carefully examine the said exhibits. Under the contract. 200 pieces of pallet boards. On the following day. the union filed on August 6. ignored the alleged damages. At the time the contract was entered into. the consignees branch manager. The service is usually performed by longshoremen. claimed by the company amounted to P349. Exhibits B. the union members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and stevedoring work. as was the alleged practice in Iligan City. unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the cargoes" as "has been the practice in the port of Iligan City" The union found out later that that stipulation was oppressive and that the company was unduly favored by that arrangement. 1954 the union sent a letter to the company requesting that it be recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit to load and unload the cargo of its vessels at Iligan City. a Spanish word which refers to hauling of cargo. the chief clerk's statement. Because of that notice. After trial. 1954 the company sued the union and its officers in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for the rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract. and the trustworthiness of the . on which the accountants' reports were based.37. bills of lading.000. 29 Am Jur 2nd 529).. VILLA REY TRANSIT. The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole". EUSEBIO E.000. 2[e]. The union objected to Jayme's report as inadmissible under the hearsay rule or as not being the best evidence. that the seller (Villarama) "shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale. That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records.751 bags of fertilizer and other cargoes covering the same period (Statement A of Exh.00 was subscribed by the brother and . Inc. or on March 6. was not duly established (U. FERRER. His opinion is not evidence. The rule is that the auditor's summary should not include his conclusions or inferences (29 Am Jur 2d 519). Razon and Tayag. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company. plaintiff-appellant. of the summary may be tested on cross-examination (29 Am Jur 2nd 517-8. 856. 1959: a corporation called Villa Rey Transit.000 fixed by the trial court. vs. INC. EN BANC 29. On January 8.00 divided into 5. They are not supported by reliable evidence. The pertinent records of the company should have been produced in court. a private auditor. We have already stress that. No such exhibits were presented. the original writings need not be produced (Sec.000. Villarama (wife of Jose M.00 with the condition.. P200. Natividad R.: October Prior to 1959. Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company was not able to collect the stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should have been proforma in evidence as supporting papers for Jayme's report. They can hardly be sanctioned by the "generally accepted auditing standards" alluded to in accountant's report. 32A C. which authorized him to operate a total of thirty-two (32) units on various routes or lines from Pangasinan to Manila..) and enabled the court and the union's counsel and its expert accountant to verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries. if any. among others. The purser and steward did not testify. Jose M. is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records. his inflated guesses are inherently speculative and devoid of probative value. INC." Barely three months thereafter. or much less than P450. Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation. A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports reveals their lack of probative value. PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. for P350. 1954 overlapped with his computation of the lost freight for the unloaded 74. 1959. yet the complaint to show good faith and fair dealing. claimed by the complaint as a matter of simple addition. The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have been the sales invoices instead of the oral testimony of Teves. Furthermore.000.245.S. and she subscribed for P1. etc. could have brought the records in court (manifests.00 was the subscribed stock. Obviously. books of accounts. It would not be proper to allow accountant’s estimates as recoverable damages.000.000 shares of the par value of P100. 37 Phil. or the testimony of. No. he sold the aforementioned two certificates of public convenience to the Pangasinan Transportation Company. his estimate of the unrealized freight revenue for January 1 to August 31. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) The trial court unreservedly gave credence to the conjectures of Jayme. and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. receipts for the freights. Rule 130. the damages. Rules of Court). 111). reports or the like" (Anno 52 ALR 1266).R.J. on the basis of the reports of the two accountants. 1968 G. Even if the presentation of the records themselves as exhibits should have been dispensed with. was organized with a capital stock of P500. Jayme allegedly based his computations on the records of the company which were not produced in court. He did not produce the sales invoices. vs. A). 861.000. L-23893 ANGELES. That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court (29 Am Jur 2nd 529). What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by. J. under the business name of Villa Rey Transit. defendants. S. does not reach the sum of P 450. Inc.00. The damages. Villarama) was one of the incorporators. pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted him by the Public Service Commission. we find the first assignment of error meritorious. apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer.00 each. the balance of P199.company's evidence. shown in the accountants' reports and in the statement made by the consignees chief clerk amount to P349. On November 4. judgment creditor. respectively. The applications for approval of sale. 1959. and that of Ferrer and Pantranco. of the subscribed capital stock. 59494 and 63780. Pantranco filed a counterclaim against the Coproration alleging that it violated their agreement that the corporation will not compete with Pantranco for 10 years. the best evidence being the originals themselves. that until the issue on the ownership of the disputed certificates shall have been finally settled by the proper court. the Sheriff of Manila." The very same day that the aforementioned contract of sale was executed. 1959. contending that no evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely photostatic copies of the originals. and the balance of P50. and the subsequent sale thereof by the latter to Pantranco. Villarama purchased and paid with his personal checks Ford trucks for the Corporation. Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party. the parties thereto immediately applied with the PSC for its approval. Assistant Accountant of Manila Trading & Supply Co. 1959. Case No. The lower court decided in favour of the corporation and held that the Sheriff's sale to Ferrer is null and void and that the agreement between Villarama did not bind the corporation since Villarama and the Corporation have separate and distinct personalities.00 was paid upon the signing of the contract. to wit. 1959. In less than a month after its registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Pantranco therein prayed that it be authorized provisionally to operate the service involved in the said two certificates. 124057. defendant. the Corporation. 126278. Thereafter. which decreed. On May 19.00 "shall be paid by the BUYER to the different suppliers of the SELLER. Exhibits 20 and 21 disclose that the said purchases were paid by Philippine Bank of Commerce Checks Nos. pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. filed before the PSC. 13798. 992618-B and 993621-B.000. The Sheriff made and entered the levy in the records of the PSC. 22. forty-nine buses. a public sale was conducted by the Sheriff of the said two certificates of public convenience.000." Before the PSC could take final action on said application for approval of sale.000. (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original. are very illuminating evidence. and a certificate of sale was issued in his name. in favor of Eusebio Ferrer. an employee of the Philippine Bank of Commerce. P105. from which the trucks were purchased9 and Aristedes Solano.00 was payable upon the final approval of the sale by the PSC. against Valentin Fernando. against Ferrer. the Corporation should be the one to operate the lines provisionally. and jointly submitted for approval their corresponding contract of sale to the PSC. Case No. who was Natividad R. which are photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of the Corporation.. On July 16. namely." According to him. tools and equipment from one Valentin Fernando. Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. The Corporation took issue with this particular ruling of the PSC and elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. 1959. the PSC issued an order disposing that during the pendency of the cases and before a final resolution on the aforesaid applications. were scheduled for a joint hearing. bought five certificates of public convenience. Villarama. after deliberation.500. Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits. P50. upon the condition that "it may be modified or revoked by the Commission at any time.00.000. 1959. These checks have been sufficiently established by Fausto Abad. In the meantime. plaintiff. of which P100. Villarama.sister-in-law of Jose M. Pantranco and the PSC. Ruling: The evidence shows that when the Corporation was in its initial months of operation.00 one year after the final approval of the sale. on July 22.000. Ferrer was the highest bidder. thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original.10 as having been drawn by Villarama. Ferrer sold the two certificates of public convenience to Pantranco. however. judgment debtor. on April 7. and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in . the Corporation filed in the CFI of Manila.00 was paid to the treasurer of the corporation. (3) satisfactory proof of its existence. shall be subject to whatever action that may be taken on the basic application and shall be valid only during the pendency of said application. it was the most likely possessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able to produce the alleged photostat copies thereof. by Fernando and the Corporation. those issued under PSC cases Nos. for the sum of P249. levied on two of the five certificates of public convenience involved therein. the Pantranco shall be the one to operate provisionally the service under the two certificates Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) embraced in the contract between Ferrer and Pantranco. a complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale of the aforesaid two certificates of public convenience in favor of the defendant Ferrer. with a prayer for the issuance of a provisional authority in favor of the vendee Corporation to operate the service therein involved. on July 7. at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits. P49. the PSC granted the provisional permit prayed for. petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Since then and up to the present. are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10. However. the trial court admitted.00. together with Celso Rivera's testimony. 1993 CAMPOS. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. 1960. petitioners. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should.. the Corporation was no longer in possession of the same. transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1..500. all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona. on being notified to produce it. HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO.R. When the mortgage had matured. In her Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) lifetime.195 square meters. the originals were already missing. SECOND DIVISION G. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11. respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. Viewed upon this light.00 as appearing in the books. Meycauayan Cadastre. as even the Corporation admits such loss.court. they filed a falsification case against the respondents. et al. . they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. 1980. On February 13. 1980. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28. True to petitioners' threat. 83377 February 9. LUIS DE VERA. On July 20. P-1356(M)."15 The originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed to have been lost. 337. On September 27. such as trucks and equipment. 3621. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same. For. Eustaquia and Maria. BASILIO DE VERA. Luis. Taking account of the foregoing evidence. Leonardo Bordador. Felipe. over the objection of the respondents. Case No. the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe. 1956. he admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and also that he had seen some of them. FELIPE DE VERA.17 there was no actual payment by the original subscribers of the amounts of P95. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners. married to respondent Mariano Aguilar. The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing that Villarama has been too much involved in the affairs of the Corporation to altogether negative the claim that he was only a part-time general manager. On March 26. Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum. Meycauayan.19 and the Corporation paid his personal accounts. Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig. 1981. J. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.12 As to the third.11 Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth requisites. 4.16 it would appear that: Villarama supplied the organization expenses and the assets of the Corporation. with an area of 4. JR. No. the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. Cad. therefore. designated as Cadastral Lot No. admit having it in his possession. or cannot be produced in court. 1977. AGUILAR. On September 1.14 Hence. secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his possession.00 and P100. They show beyond doubt that the Corporation is his alter ego. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. 1959. respondents. among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case. there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22.18 Villarama made use of the money of the Corporation and deposited them to his private accounts.13 Regarding the first element. it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. Bulacan. 1959 by the respondents selling. Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28.000. the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. 1981. However. destroyed. on March 31. vs. The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty.: Petitioners Basilio. 1956. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control.000. the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly installments of P40. Atty. Inc. 2005 G. After the due execution of the document has been established. Morales in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Hence. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco. since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved.00 as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. DECISION SECOND DIVISION July 29. notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. its contents may be proved by a copy. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of P1. as of 09 March 1984. a domestic banking and trust corporation. Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states: Sec. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28.000..55. after its execution. or by any one who had made. execution. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss. the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS. or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence. We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to wit: Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or destroyed. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale. Jr. In the case at bar. or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.R. the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies. the full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who. lost. positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be that (sic) of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela. Emiliano Ibasco. upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction.000. R e s p o n d e n t s. 1959.332. INC. NARCISO G. Under the promissory note. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK).. all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. vs. or by the recollection of witnesses. loss.000. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit A. Jr. in the judgment of the court. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation but notwithstanding these demands. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence. In the case at bar. in his capacity as Notary Public who ratified the document. 4. 143338 CHICO-NAZARIO. by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged. P e t i t i o n e r. a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was. MORALES. or cannot be produced in court. it must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness which.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document. contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. No. Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5. AND SPOUSE. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments. and has been unable to find it. For. impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. saw it and recognized the signatures. In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it. retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like). all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.Ruling: We rule in the negative. This petitioners failed to do. The Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. respondents Del Monte Motor Works.474. stood at P1. Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents. However. Petitioner. Petitioner . or unavailability. alleges therein that on 23 April 1982. that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face value of P220. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit “E” was not properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioner’s Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) exhibits.attached to its complaint as Annexes “A. a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983.”[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents marked as Exhibit “D. was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. petitioner presented as its sole witness. . Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino). the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party.” Further. Sellner. In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. under oath.” petitioner’s 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit “B. Substantially. The trial court granted respondents’ motions for reconsideration. the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses… Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law.” The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit “E” and granted respondents’ motion that they be allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence. that as a result of this demand letter. Lavarino also identified the following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit “A.” “B. How to contest such documents. but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. respondents’ obligation again became stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter which. In the early case of Songco vs. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this order which was denied by the court.[25] this Court held that – Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein.” respectively. specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit “E” was not the original of Exhibit “A” which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer.” the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit “A. wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for some consideration because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then buffeting their business operation. Lavarino (Lavarino). respondent corporation’s controller. During the trial on the merits of this case.” stating that the “promissory note sued upon. petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. and statement of account pertaining to respondents’ loan. a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by respondents. Liberato A. However.”[10] On 26 September 1985. that after receipt of this partial payment. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof. The trial court then dismissed the complaint. unfortunately. copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section. one of which was Exhibit “E. since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.020. irrelevant. Ruling: The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides: SEC. petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter to respondents. then the manager of its Collection Department. and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties.” and “C. as there were markings in Exhibit “A” which were not contained in Exhibit “E.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial payment to their company’s obligation to petitioner.” Tolentino’s letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit “C.” Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit “E” should not have been admitted as it was immaterial. 8. Mariano Velarde. subject of this case. petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit “E. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his “denial under oath. – When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument. viz. the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document.” Lastly. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. Lavarino stated that respondents obtained the loan. was unheeded by respondents.: This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. from petitioner and due to respondents’ failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan. assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant. as the original copy of Exhibit “A” could no longer be found. Respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order admitting into evidence petitioner’s Exhibit “E. 000. 1991. This being the case. an authority on the rules of evidence. at Cenizal’s house located at 70 Panay Avenue. PACIFICO B. admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner. petitioner obtained an additional loan of P50. petitioner. the authenticity and due execution of these documents must. Walter E. The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the “best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing – meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein). Petitioner then issued in favor of Cenizal. without having been expressly introduced in evidence. the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant. (2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting. Olsen & Co. respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity.00. Besides. may and should consider. without the introduction of evidence. both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioner’s complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission. greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. the preference for the original writing is justified.”[28] According to McCormick. there is a special risk of error. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned. petitioner. therefore. there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question.000. accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection.” we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1991 came. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit. to all intents and purposes. the wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement. since a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence. respondent. an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point. particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments. largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself. 2006 D E C I S I CORONA O N On March 14. Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because petitioner promised that he would replace the . 1991. this Court held that – Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition. 163255. SECOND DIVISION G. In their responsive pleadings.” It was. the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. Quezon City. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. in that case.000. Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the “best evidence rule. and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing. vs. This was no error. No. be deemed admitted. BPI Check No. it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit “A” was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the “best evidence rule. respondents’ principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note. In effect. Several weeks thereafter. and as discussed earlier. wills and contracts. respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. such as deeds. JR.00 from Cenizal. had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo. “the only actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing the rationale being: (1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents. These contentions clearly do not question the “precise wording” of the promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the “best evidence rule. The court.” Significantly. for P150. 142641 July 17. respondents had. ARCEO.00. postdated August 4. for the proper decision of the case. As quoted earlier. the “best evidence rule” as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) absolute.R. the facts admitted by the parties. When August 4. when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint.. Indeed. obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal in the amount of P100.In this case. The latter deposited the check on October 1. 1992. After trial. Cenizal referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving petitioner three days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. not its content. but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds” stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check. and issued in payment of the petitioner’s obligation with Olvis. 1991 in the amount of P600. Ricky Olvis.P. petitioner. [Cenizal executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. entered a plea of not guilty. petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. So. He never denied that the check was presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.check with cash. The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. petitioner was found guilty as charged. The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check.000. Blg. he agreed. After due investigation. No. Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. 399967 dated September 30. vs. 2004 CALLEJO An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B. the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. When arraigned. Issue: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial. 1991. 1993. Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment. DECISION SECOND DIVISION G. the petitioner. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B. he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution. When the case for trial was called on June 7. 1992. Here. Petitioner still failed to make good the amount of the check. Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16. but because of the latter’s absence and that of his counsel. Taking pity on the petitioner. but the latter again failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay the P600.000. of the Rules of Court. 1995 for the prosecution to adduce its evidence. the petitioner and his counsel were absent. The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one for P400. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution. Dipolog City Branch.00. 1991.00 and another for P200. the petitioner drew and issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. The prosecution presented the private complainant. otherwise known as the best evidence rule. the direct examination on the witness could not be . Moreover. BAYANI MAGDAYAO. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16. On motion of the prosecution. Hence. Thereafter. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check. but reneged on his promise. The said check was drawn against the latter’s account with the PNB. 1992.000. the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. When his patience ran out. the court allowed it to adduce evidence. informed Cenizal that the check bounced because of insufficient funds. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based on Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) the documents. 1992. 152881 August 17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Ruling: Petitioner’s contention has no merit. The head office of the BPI through a letter dated December 5.000. Dipolog City Branch. Section 3. ENGR. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130. docketed as I.00. respondent.S. a case for violation of BP 22 was filed against petitioner on March 27. who testified on direct examination that on September 30. He then returned the original copy of the check to the petitioner. Cenizal went to the house of petitioner to inform him of the dishonor of the check but Cenizal found out that petitioner had left the place. No. 22 on September 4.R. the petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof. 92-368. assisted by counsel. Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored.P. 1991 in his account with the BPI-Family Bank. 22 on September 16. However.00 payable to Olvis. Blg. 00 and the other for P200. coincidental with the attendance of the two other elements. provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered. secondary evidence may be admitted. and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession. 1995. Such photocopies must be disregarded. the date and amount and the dishonor thereof. The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No. in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. The prosecution moved that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on another date. hence. Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice. he returned it to the petitioner upon the latter’s offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks. the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party. 399967 to prove the contents thereof. Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because the photocopy of PNB Check No. the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. Rule 130 of the said Rules. Petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution’s failure to produce the original thereof. such as photocopies. he and his counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial.000. 399967 as Exhibit “A. Olvis. no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967. They again failed to appear when the case was called for continuation of trial on November 21. We rule against the petitioner. and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum. it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. and that the petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check. 1997. 399967. the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature.terminated. The law creates a prima facie knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit. Section 3. more specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place. as well as the reason for such dishonor. testified that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. the petitioner admitted that he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant and that he caused the nonpayment of the dishonored check. As to the second element. and in his Special . The trial court granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13. in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8. the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis. The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. In this case. As long as the original evidence can be had. under Section 3(b). The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. Furthermore.00. However. T The trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. In fact. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud. the private complainant. In his “Motion to Suspend Proceedings” in the trial court. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it. is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129. 1996. being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight. which the court admitted. that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence.000.” and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit “A-1. In the meantime. Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence Ruling: The petition has no merit. adduced in evidence by the prosecution.” After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner. 399967. one for P400. knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of the funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the drawer. Manifestation filed on May 28. as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court.00 and the other for P200. The petitioner. which are also FILIPINA Y. Sto. much less offered to produce the same. November 15. according to her. Tomas. Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. then in Apalit. Teresita Parish. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner. as cited by petitioner. Pampanga. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to identify the petitioner after his direct examination. is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent. respondents. 2000 QUISUMBING.000. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. their son Frederick transferred to his Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony Ruling: Petitioner. the petitioner complained of the prosecution’s violation of the best evidence rule. The direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to enable him to point to and identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check. Sta. however. as shown by the testimony of Olvis. which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent. is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. September 17. the petitioner drew and issued two other separate checks. never produced the original of the check. in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation. but the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to appear. to replace the dishonored check. 1974. No. on November 15. There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the employee of the drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the dishonored check to testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. In fact. she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.00. and private respondent's answer admitting it. the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to overcome that of the prosecution’s. DECISION SECOND DIVISION G. SAN FERNANDO. Manila. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando. Since then. Pampanga. do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate. The petitioner’s contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of the subject check is nettlesome. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. However. and later at San Matias.000. vs. PAMPANGA. one for P400. also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates. raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. Because of his dilatory tactics. The petitioner had already been informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. 1993. BRANCH XLI. Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning. 1996. the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. It appears that. 1993. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15. during her direct examination. Their union was blessed with two children. petitioner. father's residence at and from then on. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor.R. for the first time. denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. in open court.: Petitioner Filipina Y. on January 22. J. Frederick and Farrah Sheryll. SY. Both were then 22 years old. and FERNANDO SY. 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. in its decision dated December 9. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. lived with his father. and their two children were in the custody of their mother. 1973. the spouses lived separately. 1973. The spouses first established their residence in Singalong. 127263 April 12. Pampanga. 277 square meters. Madrid brothers. Isabela with a total area of 3. in disposing of the case. as Exhibit "A. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Consequently. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . Accordingly. Meanwhile. San Mateo. while they admit petitioners' possession of the land. To begin with. was issued in Carmona. these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below. petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost.attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. the CA concluded that the same had no probative value to support the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them in 1959. there was no marriage license. While ruling that Exhibit "A" was admissible. they assert that this possession is in defiance of their repeated demands that the former relinquish the same. private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the said land. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. the trial court ruled that Exhibit "A" was inadmissible in evidence. neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.R. the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15. A marriage license is a formal requirement. No. Likewise. the same is fictitious and falsified. These petitioners failed to do. From the documents she presented. it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. 1998 Oct 21 3rd Division DECISION G. On appeal. sometime in October 1986. we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. for P4.5 During the trial. numbered 6237519. the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said document exists. Hence. yet. which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court.000. On the other hand. In their complaint. no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15. petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony. the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint. the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled that Exhibit "A" was admissible in evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it was offered during the trial. 1973. There being no claim of an exceptional character. COURT OF APPEALS. PACIFICO MARQUEZ. much to their dismay and surprise. continuous and open possession of the property.: Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance against private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion. records show that none of these five copies was even presented during the trial. However. physical. Moreover. they were constrained to offer. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. 1973. FILOMENO and GREGORIO. In addition. the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. the marriage contract shows that the marriage license. and since then they have been in actual. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office. respondents. both surnamed MADRID. Sevillano Tabangay.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18. HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ. petitioners.117384 ROMERO. with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto. 1959. Atty. Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record. Ruling: While we concur with the Court of Appeals' finding that Exhibit "A" does not prove that the sale of the land indeed occurred. Cavite. therefore. However. We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. Moreover." a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction. that having been admitted in evidence. with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. We are of the view. J. the notary public who notarized the deed of sale.1974. and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the circumstances present in this case. the marriage license was issued on September 17. Nevertheless. vs. Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code. The construction of various infrastructure on the land . even if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence. when Atty. Tabangay. February 9. JR. Case No. are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10. the land was enclosed.rice mill.e.195 square meters. petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. married to respondent Mariano Aguilar. 1980. regarding its execution. Ruling: We rule in the negative. 337. 4.. the same becomes primary evidence. Atty. Atty. Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig.It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented. vs. 1956. 1993 No. 1959. On September 1. thus signifying petitioners' exclusive claim of ownership. Felipe. when Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents failed.R. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value." the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners' predecessor-in-interest presented to him. Tabangay typed Exhibit "A. all is not lost for the petitioner. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. upon private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" when it was presented. during all this time. we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. garage. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) SECOND DIVISION G. the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Forthwith. the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.. P-1356(M) was issued in his name. i. Bulacan. despite our prescinding discussion. 1981. Eustaquia and Maria. et al. 1956. the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe. secondary evidence. the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's decision. In her lifetime. They have since been introducing several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of the Madrids. all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona. 1977. J. Cad. 1960. Oddly. However. Leonardo Bordador. not only to object. . not one of them protested. HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO. On appeal. Meycauayan. they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. respondents. Worse. Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Issue: whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11. designated as Cadastral Lot No. pavements and other buildings was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. In other words. As earlier stated. but even to crossexamine the notary public. all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for. respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. 83377 CAMPOS. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28. On July 20. LUIS DE VERA. without bothering to check his own files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. The trial court ordered the reconveyance of the property in favour of petitioners. petitioners. Furthermore. On February 13. BASILIO DE VERA. 3621. P-1356(M). Since then and up to the present. To be sure. When the mortgage had matured. and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.: Petitioners Basilio. Luis. AGUILAR. Notwithstanding this procedural lapse.. The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. FELIPE DE VERA. On March 26. Hence. presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible. storage house. Tabangay's failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners' predecessor-ininterest renders Exhibit "A" unreliable. with an area of 4. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Meycauayan Cadastre. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. We cannot accept the Madrids' explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the unexplained killings within the area. The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. That they failed to do. This petitioners failed to do. has not been lost or destroyed.. loss. after its execution. saw it and recognized the signatures. RTC of Cebu. 170491 April 4. What was lost or destroyed in the custody of Atty. a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping. 19. 15412 and of David Montenegro. Respondents. and WALLEM SHIPPING. by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged. representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan. JR. or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence. bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original copies of the document in question. no excuse for nonproduction of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.. INCORPORATED. We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public. Hence. RAMON G. In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it. Hence. the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. it must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. to the effect that he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax declaration No. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28.. Atty. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration. notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. 2007 D E C I S I O N M/V Dibena Win. Nor did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo. therefore. or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal. in the judgment of the court. BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY. therefore. HON. or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who. retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like). Jr. Petitioner. to the effect that he did not have a copy of the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street.Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. Emiliano Ibasco. However. THIRD DIVISION G. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION. CODILLA. 1959. Br. In the case at bar. since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved.R. contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. No. should have asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. Jr. After the due execution of the document has been established. vs. all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. Jr. Thus. The loss or destruction of the original of the document in question has not. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss. petitioner filed before the Cebu Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence. The appellees. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies. secondary evidence of it is inadmissible. and has been unable to find it. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. or by anyone who had made. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale. Indeed. was but one of the duplicate original copies on file with him.e. lost. on 26 April 1996. upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question. Co. Ibasco. and that most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites. Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 establish the loss or destruction of the original document in question. Presiding Judge. been established. In the case at bar. Jr. Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco. or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. a purported xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B. For. of the National Archives to the effect that his office had no copy of the document in question because the notary public might not have submitted a copy thereof. execution. a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was. We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise. processed. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence. Consequently. recorded. upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part. "E". the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h). what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed. "E". "O". for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges. "J" and its submarkings. Petitioner. "P" and its submarkings. and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the Issue: Whetherthe photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. symbols or other models of written expression.. "I". The CA certiorari. "L". "M" and its sub-markings. similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. after adducing evidence during the trial of the case. processed. "K". Furthermore. readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. and "R". "J" and its submarkings. by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished. "K". figures. stored. transmitted. Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received. interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents. if not preposterous. transmitted. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received. "Q" and its sub-markings. such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents.RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co. Hence. retrieved or produced electronically. "N" and its sub-markings. "L". stored. recorded. "C". "O". However. Ruling: We do not agree. or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed. "C". as included in the section’s catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output. it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. "D". readable by sight or other means". "P" and its submarkings. Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A". "N" and its sub-markings. processed. stored. "H" and its sub-markings. contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court. or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. clearly. An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information. recorded. This would suggest that Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . the offeror. "D". then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous. The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received. the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms. "M" and its sub-markings. "Q" and its sub-markings. processed. retrieved or produced electronically. recorded. retrieved or produced. filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. When the original document has been lost or destroyed. "H" and its sub-markings. described or however represented. may be recorded or produced electronically. recorded. petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically. which is received. "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. the information contained in an electronic document is received. Petitioner insists that. Rather. "I". such as photocopies. dismissed petitioners petition for an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations. transmitted. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout. or cannot be produced in court. retrieved or produced electronically. and Wallem Shipping. (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy. private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A". or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document. data. the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein. stored. and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. retrieved or produced electronically. Inc. transmitted. may prove its contents by a copy. Ssangyong rejected the request. Chan. to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of US$1. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC. ST2-POSTS080-1. on August 15. again by fax. by way of a fax transmittal. The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC. It requested that the opening of the L/C be facilitated. related interests and charges. considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was US$1. However. 2000. Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO). Ssangyong Manila Office sent. Exasperated. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2).00/MT. 2000. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 dated August 16. a domestic corporation with office at Binondo. respondents. MCC Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation]. Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for breach thereof amounting to US$96. Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer. both dated April 17. on September 11. its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong. petitioner. MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170. vs. Pro Forma Invoice Nos. through counsel. 2000. Ssangyong. On August 17. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and another for 110MT Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-POSTSO401. In the meantime. and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a recent strike. to Ssangyong. J. On April 17. Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit. On June 20. 2000 were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. 2000 signed by Chan. Following their usual practice. by fax. 2000.132. 170633 NACHURA. that it was ready to ship 193. 2000 invoices submitted to the court. and. a letter addressed to Gregory Chan. payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong.000. on August 23.066.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. through its Manila Office. warehousing expenses. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same. canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS04011 /ST2-POSTS0401-2. Manila. ST2-POSTS080-2. As can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said August 16.R. informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan. Chan failed to reply. though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence. because of its confirmed transaction with MCC. Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC.000. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation. 2000. it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. inclusive of warehouse expenses. Later. if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26. and demanding payment MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION. As stated in the pro forma invoice.8 On April 13. Ssangyong. sent a demand letter to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of US$170. on behalf of the corporations.700. delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened. wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the L/C's were not opened. by fax. in South Korea and paid the same in full. in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the price was reduced to US$1. 2000. we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence. No. 2000. MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22. 2000. one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No.860. Consequently. 2007 Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC). Accordingly. they both bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan. 2000) and other damages for breach. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2.document in the proper place or places. requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for US$64. is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. the order for 220MT of steel was split into two. despite Ssangyong's letters. interests and charges as of August 15.597MT of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. However. DECISION G. if the latter conforms thereto. assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.00 per MT. MCC failed to open a letter of credit.18.99 (representing cost difference. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. in the case at bar. ST2-POSTSO401 containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. SSANGYONG CORPORATION.00 with a warning that.: THIRD DIVISION October 17.500. 2000.00 per MT. In resolving this issue. the following terms are defined. After Ssangyong rested its case. stored. retrieved or produced electronically. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information. Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence. transmitted. figures. pp. a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC. the best evidence under the law and the Rules. recorded. 8792. Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan . defines the terms as: Sec.A. on November 16. For the purposes of this Act. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule. the Department of Budget and Management. Section 1 [h]. described or however represented. which is received. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Ssangyong. "E-1" and "F".37 representing losses. The argument is untenable. the contract was perfected. the following terms are defined. and then Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The lower court denied the demurrer and ruled that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R." The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic document as follows: Sec. processed.A.) No. 2001. symbols or other modes of written expression. shown to reflect the data accurately. 6. defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. 215-218. optical or similar means. the appellate court ruled as follows: Admissibility of Pro Forma Invoices. 2000 by the then Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry. 5. A. although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. received or stored by electronic.A. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules. which was signed on July 13. and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated. Such facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence. Definition of Terms. otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. appellants argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best evidence rule. as follows: Xxx .A.of US$97. Definition of Terms.M. otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. R. interests and charges.317. 2001. because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. No. Thus. After trial on the merits. On the other hand. Records). data. to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule. 8792. 01-7-01SC). The trial court ruled that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1. The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and. No. No. as follows: xxx c. (Rule 2. 8792. which came into effect on August 1. Ssangyong then filed. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the nonproduction of the original fax transmittals. No. xxx f. or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed. Breach of Contract by Appellants Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with Reference Nos. by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished. warehousing expenses. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R. respondent posits that. the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document. 8792.860 per MT. if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E". sent. therefore. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws. from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence. stored. electronic data interchange (EDI). unlike an electronic document. recorded. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal. As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction. telegram. which is received. there is a slight difference between the two terms. the interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin and the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade relations. in House Bill 9971. symbols or other modes of written expression. electronic mail. electronic data interchange (EDI). transmitted. telegram. at first glance. electronic mail. electronic data interchange (EDI). recorded. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output. consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law. Throughout these Rules. data. sent. Be that as it may. optical or similar means. the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law. Throughout these Rules. data." And to telecopy is to send a document from one place to another via a fax machine. which is received. telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). (h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information. No. Evident from the law. described or however represented. the following terms are defined." Given these definitions. telegram. as discussed hereunder. optical or similar means including. by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished. of the phrase "electronic data message" and the House of Representative's employment. of the term "electronic document. 8792 were taken. stored or transmitted. The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document" was the result of the Senate of the Philippines' adoption. which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. electronic mail. or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed. telegram. received or stored by electronic. figures. the term "electronic document" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic data message. we go back to the original question: Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document? The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000." The phrase "but not limited to. sent. it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation. the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message. processed. is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction. received or stored by electronic. figures." xxxx (h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information. its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence. telex or telecopy. by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished. as follows: xxxx Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) (g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated. convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means. but not limited to. the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. – For purposes of these Rules. . readable by sight or other means. in Senate Bill 1902. The generally accepted principles of international law and convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be considered. from which majority of the provisions of R. telex or telecopy. further supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to. The expanded definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR. Obviously. Definition of Terms. optical or similar means. transmitted. retrieved or produced electronically. symbols or other modes of written expression. received or stored by electronic. stored. the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic document. and the UNCITRAL's definition of "data message": "Data message" means information generated. telex or telecopy. however. but not limited to.A. processed." In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two versions. The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the following manner: SECTION 1. or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed. electronic mail. the technical working group of the Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each one. sent. described or however represented. For purposes of these Rules. While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent. Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that Unless otherwise expressly provided for. retrieved or produced electronically. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. electronic data interchange (EDI).(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. in a manner strikingly similar to Sen. "but not limited to. printouts that are used only as paper records and whose computer origin is never again called on are treated as paper records." This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term's "international origin" has bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the law. since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. This provision focuses on replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records and using standards to show systems reliability. though when the video is transferred to a Web site it would be. except computer-generated faxes. it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-generated faxes). It is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is intended to apply. and using standards to show systems reliability." Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada." and replaced the term "data message" (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data message. this time. Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules about . because of the involvement of the computer. such as printouts. while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message. being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. Though when the video is transferred to a website. electronic data interchange (EDI)." it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes. the reliability of the computer system that produces the record is irrelevant to its reliability. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. Senator DefensorSantiago had in mind the term "electronic data message. In short. not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. telex or telecopy. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record subject to the usual rules about copies. It is electronic because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or a similar device. electronic mail. but the original printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this bill. unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce. they may well be admissible under other rules of law. The record is the data. The record may be any medium. The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The term "ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the scope of our bill. The record is the data." In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after the ECommerce Law of Canada. it would not apply to telexes or faxes. not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disc would be covered. Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as printouts are themselves electronic records being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the record. are themselves electronic records. It accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase "but not limited to. since the information is not recorded. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this Act. to data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations. proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records. Likewise. Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system. for example. Likewise video records are not covered. for example.is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data message. in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure. A computer or similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would be covered. consonant with the term "electronic record" in the law of Canada." This term then. Congress deleted the phrase. Thus." has assumed a different context. telegram. This Act focuses on replacing the search for originality. electronic mail. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this bill. The record may be on any medium. A computer or a similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. or in smart cards. telegram. to data on magnetic strips on cards. It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations since the information is not recorded. electronic data interchange (EDI). It would apply to voice mail since the information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer. As drafted." as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act. video records are not covered. explains the term "electronic record. the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. In that Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) case. The amendment is intended to apply. Indeed. telex or telecopy. However. these may well be admissible under other rules of law. In short. it would be covered because of the involvement of the computer. unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce. except computer-generated faxes. It would apply to voice mail." However. Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations: "Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data message. As drafted. unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce. and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current." and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court. are treated as paper records." it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law.copies. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. See subsection 4(2). a modem and a computer printer combined into a highly specialized package. printouts that are used only as paper records. which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission). the law's definition of "electronic data message." which excludes telexes or faxes. the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. After all. This construction of the term "electronic data message. In fact. These two copies are distinct from each other. in an ordinary facsimile transmission. where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax machines. electronic mail. a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes. which have an original paperbased copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received." but verily are paper-based. There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data message. in this sense. telegram. there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage. there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned. therefore." without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to." which. as aforesaid." could not have included facsimile transmissions. is interchangeable with "electronic document. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. and are considered as originals. it excluded the early forms of technology. technically." The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. Accordingly. the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions. in fact. x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. Thus. in a virtual or paperless environment. Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document. one elemental area at a time. "paperless. the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message. Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Ineluctably. and have different legal effects. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. telex or telecopy.. Jr. We." Clearly then. and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original document. be a sham pleading. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law. It is. there is no original copy to speak of. like telegraph. in all respects. we ruled that: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy. but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act. ST2- . Pro Forma Invoice Nos. the modem sends the image data over a phone line. with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses. do not include a facsimile transmission. as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same. sent through a phone line. at best. conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document." as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. In the present case. when it defined the term "electronic data message. It may. and re-printed at the receiving end. except computer-generated faxes. in Garvida v. electronic data interchange (EDI). as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. and whose computer origin is never again called on. because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance—an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.91 Thus. Further. Accordingly. However. therefore. The scanner converts the content of a physical document into a digital image. Facsimile transmissions are not. if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation. it is the former that prevails. A fax machine is essentially an image scanner. Without the original. In this case the reliability of the computer system that produced the record is relevant to its reliability. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. Sales. POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"). contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts. Joselito Thomas Ghadry Paloma Baena (Personal Digests) . which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals. are not electronic evidence.