NDCP Executive Policy BriefA PUBLICATION SERIES ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 29 Dec 2017 BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES No. 2017-02 Philippines-U.S. Alliance under the Duterte and Trump Administrations: State and System-Level Foreign Policy Considerations Christian Oller Vicedo Introduction security cooperation shall remain stable under the Duterte and Trump administrations due to foreign The beginning of President Rodrigo Duterte’s policy considerations, on both the state and system political leadership coincides with dramatic changes in levels, which situate the military alliance well within the geopolitical landscape of the Asia Pacific. His the strategic interests of both countries. It is argued, assumption into office has occurred against the however, that in promoting a robust Alliance under the backdrop of the great power rivalry between U.S. and Duterte-Trump Administrations, the Philippines and China, the expansion of Japan’s strategic horizon, and the United States must enhance their diplomatic the increasingly unstable nuclear situation in the engagements, diversify platforms of bilateral security Korean Peninsula. Amidst these security concerns, his cooperation, and explore the viability of defense administration opted to adopt a more pragmatic technology transfer. approach to foreign relations. Meanwhile, just as the Philippines shifted its foreign policy approach from Philippines-U.S. foreign policies amid the balancing to hedging, the United States witnessed a evolving security landscape of the Asia Pacific political milestone with the assumption of President Donald Trump. In vowing to “Make America Great Central to the geopolitical changes in the Asia Again,” President Trump touted a foreign policy Pacific is China’s meteoric rise, which signaled a approach designed to serve “America First.” forthcoming regional power shift. China’s territorial and maritime expansionism and militarization of the In view of the unconventional foreign policies South China Sea (SCS) disputes create profound of President Duterte and President Trump, it is anxieties over Washington and Beijing falling into the essential to examine Philippines-U.S. security relations Thucydides Trap.1 On the other hand, Japan has against the backdrop of an evolving Asia-Pacific become utterly mindful of China’s increasing regional security environment to determine prospects assertiveness. Treading a path towards normalization, for enhancing bilateral security cooperation. In Japan has announced its commitment to make a attempting to shed light on the subject, this policy brief “proactive contribution to peace” and reinterpreted its shall address the following questions: 1) How can the Constitution to incorporate the concept of “collective foreign policies of President Duterte and President defense,” thereby expanding its strategic horizon. Trump amid an evolving regional security landscape be Notably, the territorial and maritime dispute between characterized?; 2) How do state and system-level Japan and China in the East China Sea (ECS)—over foreign policy considerations influence the status of which the latter has declared an Air Defense Philippines-U.S. security relations?; and 3) how can Identification Zone (ADIZ)—adds another layer of robust security relations be promoted under the potential major power conflict in East Asia. Duterte-Trump Administrations? Guided by Cheng Chwee Kuik’s Hedging Theory and Barry Buzan and Ole Meanwhile, the nuclear threat in the Korean Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory, this policy Peninsula remains a security concern not only for the brief mainly argues that the Philippines-U.S. Republic of Korea (ROK) but for the rest of the region. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division, National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries, please call Tel/Fax. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ndcp.edu.ph strictly along these lines. all existing foreign policy. President Trump swore to always put America missile tests widen the latitude for operational first in the same way he expects other leaders to put miscalculations and increase the risk of a full-blown their own countries first.S. the Democratic Relatedly. it appears that President Duterte.ndcp. President shoulder the cost of the THAAD missile system and Duterte’s independent foreign policy has displayed subsequently noted the need for the U. security clout may see the need to deepen their Economically and militarily. President Trump’s America however.”5 President Trump’s less aggressive stance against At the same time. Relatedly.ph .S. Japan. National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries. that continuing cooperation under a First Foreign Policy has been described as refocused agenda characterizes the status of “protectionist” and “neo-mercantile. the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement. In his foreign visits to “open United States.”7 Under this Philippines-U. “transactional”9 foreign policy. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division.S. Indeed. foreign policy.6 Indeed.S. It has Trade Agreement to be renegotiated. mechanisms—in managing the WPS and SCS disputes. requirements. In the same vein. such as China. Notably.As had been recently observed.S. please call Tel/Fax. bilateral cooperation have raised some concerns regarding his diplomatic between the Philippines and Japan remained robust as ability to effectively manage tensions in the region. President Duterte promote closer security ties with other great powers in has secured major trade and infrastructure deals3 with the Asia Pacific. the Philippines sought to assuage the main thrust of President Trump’s America First tensions in the SCS and promote amicable relations Foreign Policy is maximizing economic gains in a with all regional powers. Aside Beijing and a military cooperation agreement with from this paradigm shift in the U. Alliance engaging the great powers of the Asia Pacific through an independent foreign policy.S. Countries that have traditionally benefitted from the U. Defense Treaty. in Considerations vis-à-vis the PH-U.. they may see the need to alliances”2 with China and Russia. Notably. Alliance had been cemented by trade and investment deals to address the rising various agreements.8 Demonstrating a seemingly nuclear war among the regional and great powers. under to prevent potential inter-state conflicts. in addressing trade imbalances against the People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) provocative U.10 strategic ambiguity on the West Philippine Sea (WPS) dispute as well as the absence of an international police If the new U. policies that emphasize the value of maximizing gains President Trump had conveyed that the ROK must in international relations.edu. a closer examination of current bilateral security engagements between the two countries reveal. President Duterte remained adamant China’s territorial and maritime assertiveness in East in his commitment to the Philippines-Japan Strategic Asia as well as his message of “fire and fury” in Partnership.S. zero-sum game of international relations. it shall have profound President Duterte opted to re-open bilateral implications on how nation-states manage their mechanisms—which may complement ASEAN-led economic and security relations with the United States. while Philippines-China relations response to DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests have improved considerably.-ROK Free pragmatism in dealing with relevant powers. security relations. On the one hand. President Trump expressed on one occasion that Japan should purchase Amidst these security developments. Alternatively. Hence.S. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www. President Duterte was Notwithstanding the ambiguities and able to derive material gains essential in supporting the uncertainties surrounding the foreign policy country’s growing development and security approaches of President Duterte and President Trump. foreign policy shall be pursued to enforce the favorable arbitral ruling of 2016. and Russia. this independent economic relations with America to ensure their foreign policy approach has diversified Philippine inclusion in the regional security priorities of the foreign relations. the a lot of military equipment from the United States Duterte and Trump Administrations have taken foreign to protect itself from DPRK. On the other hand. drive to boost its domestic economy and pursue foreign The Philippines-U. should promote global interdependence other claimant states in the SCS disputes.11 can be gleaned from the investment and development assistance pledges and naval and coast guard assets State and System-Level Foreign Policy which Manila received from Tokyo. recognizing U. including the 1951 Mutual unemployment concern in the United States. President Trump has underscored that platforms of communication and cooperation are being America’s foreign relations shall be guided by a strong utilized under the Duterte-Trump Administrations. contrary recognized the realpolitik in East Asia as well as the to the traditional positions held by his predecessors on stark military capability gaps between China and the how the U. Moscow4 while maintaining “ties with America.S.S. 20 HADR. the Philippines and the United States operations. Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD).ndcp. PACOM 30 MAY 2017 25 Combat Rubber Raiding Crafts Commander Admiral Harry Harris Jr and then AFP with outboard motors Chief-of-Staff General Eduardo Año met in Hawaii for 28 JUNE 2017 12 Ford F-550 Trucks the Philippines-U. National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries. under the terrorist threats as well as various humanitarian and Duterte and Trump administrations.16 meaningful insights.14 In the same 1 FEB 2017 400 M203 grenade launchers.S.12 Last May 2017. Military Hardware received by the AFP Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana under the Duterte-Trump Administrations19 described the exercise as a perfect demonstration of Date Military Hardware collaboration and noted that both countries will Transferred become stronger if they work together. Notably. held last 29 November – 1 December 2017. The meeting focused on counterterrorism and violent extremism and included 27 JULY 2017 2 Cessna 208B aircrafts 23 AUG 2017 1 Tethered Aerostat Radar System discussions on the WPS and up-scaled bilateral (28M Class) exercises. Marines conducted the 33rd PHIBLEX. now more consisting of 3 drones than ever. as of this writing. where a sovereign actor pursues a bundle of _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division. The counterterrorism exercise facilitated behavior under high-stakes and high-uncertainty a more comprehensive set of exchanges between situations. As can be gleaned from the table Philippines (AFP) and the Armed Forces of the United below. cybersecurity. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.ph . Exercise Tempest Wind was Kuik has defined hedging as “an insurance-seeking inaugurated. the President Duterte and President Trump in Manila last Philippines and the U. and 100 M203 grenade launchers Meanwhile. “great relationship” between the Allies. committed to the Alliance notwithstanding their and 3) peacefully resolving disputes in accordance with foreign policy shifts. Last construed as a hedging approach. MDB-SEB. during the 7th BSD between the Philippines and the U. 2) upholding freedom of navigation and In understanding why both countries remain overflight and other lawful uses of the sea in the SCS. and countering terrorism. two new bilateral independent foreign policy. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim 85 M40A5 sniper rifles. and conduct counterterrorism and security agreements. manner. it must be essentially exercises were held under Duterte and Trump.18 are regularly utilized. In analyzing the state level considerations that guide President Duterte’s On top of these engagements.S.13 Noting the success of the 33rd Balikatan. U.15 18 MAY 2017 300 M4 carbines. expressed their joint 13 November 2017 at the sidelines of the 31st ASEAN commitment to the following: 1) deepening Summit in Manila.edu. as reflected in the Law of the Sea (regional and global)-level considerations may provide Convention (LOSC).S. Aside from the sharing of knowledge and Last October 2016.S. and 1 RQ-11B noted that as both countries face an increasingly Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system complex and volatile security environment. last September 2017. Dr Cheng Chwee- September 2017. U. and PHIBLEX. the AFP has received several States (AFUS) also conducted the 33rd Balikatan military assets and materiel from the United States Exercises which focused on counterterrorism and since February 2017. among others. the KAMANDAG (Cooperation engage each other through joint platforms such as the of the Warriors of the Sea) Exercises were held last Mutual Defense Board (MDB)-Security Engagement October 2017. both countries reaffirmed their Together with the successful Bilateral Meeting between commitment to the Alliance. Specifically. Agreement.S.S. an analysis of state and system international law. they must work closely together. In implementing these coordinate. This Philippine-led exercise focused on Board (SEB). humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). please call Tel/Fax. a joint and security dialogue and military exchanges. U. 200 Glock 21 pistols.17 Likewise. the Armed Forces of the military hardware. promoting operational readiness in addressing Balikatan Exercises. these engagements accentuate the collaboration in areas including maritime security. among others. 4 M134D Gatling-style machine guns.and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation the two countries to improve their ability to plan.S. the Philippine Marines and expertise facilitated by these mechanisms for defense the U. Furthermore. the training that combines amphibious capabilities and live Philippines has likewise substantially benefitted from fire exercises with humanitarian and civic assistance this sustained bilateral security cooperation in terms of projects. all these platforms maritime contingencies. ” 26 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 4 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division.e. and 4) social as a superpower may shed light on the future of its constructions covering patterns of amity and enmity security engagements in the region. In Buzan and (i.g. these security threats may thus influence Ole Waever.. an RSC is defined by the following the global distribution of power. As RSCs. competing powers in the Asia Pacific. distribution of power. 3) polarity or the within the Asia Pacific.. variables: 1) boundary differentiating it from its neighbors. Buzan and Waever further noted that through changes in its constituent units). However. Oceania thru DPRK’s nuclear missile tests.ph . unlike the Indeed. Mongolia. and certainly. President Duterte’s varying policy Southeast Asian RSC. it has two distinct features: country’s deepening economic relations with China.S.. 1) its power distribution affects the global balance of nascent security cooperation with Russia. and Taiwan. the Northeast Asian RSC may be pronouncements on Philippine relations with the U. or patterns of military-political capability. and should circumstances change (e. however. while simultaneously seeking to offset long. Northeast many returns from different powers when relations are Asia and Southeast Asia have their respective systems positive. should circumstances change. 2) anarchic structure (i. East Asian RSC. ensuring that the Alliance continues. two recurring and initiatives. 2) global reach and exercise of such constituent units. its fallback position 1) China’s territorial and maritime assertiveness.. to wit: of the Philippines. whether as threats. the regional powers include the theorized that the objective of hedging is to “acquire as 10 ASEAN-Member States (AMS).. Relatedly.S. National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries.opposite and deliberately ambiguous policies vis-à-vis The Northeast Asian regional powers include China. specifically categorized as a great power RSC in view of and China and on the WPS and SCS disputes emulate the relative capabilities of the nation-states comprising the policy of deliberate ambiguity in dealing with this region. of power distribution and patterns of amity and enmity term risks that may arise in worst-case scenarios. Notwithstanding these foreign policy Proceeding from this theory. influence of history in foreign relations). guarantors. distribution of power across units. DPRK.. or nearly all. Based on these conceptualizations. please call Tel/Fax. Alliance remains central to the have externally transformed and combined the country’s defense and security posture.25 preserving economic gains in adopting counteracting measures. the threat in the Korean Peninsula has considerations. changes in the number of capability. Northeast of the regions in the system.”21 Dr Kuik further in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile. unravels the impetus in As security threats situated within a great power RSC. the as a great power RSC. it is noteworthy that the increasingly provocative regional security concerns Philippines-U. the strategic interests of the U. towards the externally transformed may spill-over to RSCs beyond Southeast Asia such as regional security complex (RSC) of East Asia will be South Asia thru China’s string of pearl strategy and largely influenced by its interests as a superpower.e.g. and external transformation in rhetoric and behavior—by others of its rank as a (i.S.edu. the predisposition of the United States expanded to cover Southeast Asia and other countries as a superpower with a vital interest in the Asia Pacific.e. Based on the theory of Buzan and Waever.e.ndcp. RSC as being In view of these developments in the RSCs composed of two or more units). If left According to the theory of Barry Buzan and unchecked. within Pyongyang’s nuclear reach (e. Guam). and 3) acceptance— amity and enmity). or interveners. The United Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian RSCs into a wider States continues to be the primary security guarantor and interconnected. Asia and Southeast Asia both qualify as RSCs. Specifically. the China’s expansionism and DPRK’s nuclear provocations behavior of the U. Chinese armed 2) DPRK’s nuclear missile threat.S.24 superpowers “must be active players in processes of securitisation and desecuritisation in all. expansion or contraction of the RSC boundary superpower.”22 that have been shaped by their respective politico- economic and military histories. and robust power. considering DPRK’s recent series of ballistic As regards the regional and global missile tests. competing powers to prepare a fallback position Japan. allies. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www. especially in East Asia. On the other hand.23 Buzan Waever’s Theory on RSC. a superpower is defined by and Waever explained that an RSC may evolve in three the following characteristics: 1) a first-class military- ways: 1) maintenance of the status quo. and 2) it presupposes the higher probability of strategic partnership with Japan represent the policy of security threats spilling-over to adjacent regions. 2) internal political capability and an economy to support such transformation (i. ROK. Tensions arising from attack on Philippine vessels in the SCS or China’s China’s island-chain strategy which covers both the construction of military facilities in the Scarborough ECS and SCS have connected the two RSCs under one Shoal). security concern: Chinese expansionism. Navy recognition of America's superpower status and Freedom of Navigation Operations in the disputed function as a security guarantor may likewise vary waters. rebranded the Asia Pacific as the “Indo-Pacific” to acknowledge the crucial role of India in promoting Aside from addressing these military and security and stability in the region.29 China’s military modernization.S.ph . extended that the Philippines may be considered as a “prime deterrence to its allies in East Asia. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. the function of U. Additionally. as a superpower the U.S.. Resolutions that impose stricter sanctions to pressure Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. the U. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www. with other status as a superpower. influence in the East Asian RSC if it ought to secure its the “quadrilateral cooperation” of the U.. and free electron laser projection capabilities of the United States by paving weapons). Under the Trump military security threat against the U. no longer stands as the preeminent borders” in the SCS before the United Nations General Pacific power. while the U. ROK.S.S.N. Australia. Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments within an RSC.e.S. has guarantor has experienced military and political maintained the alignment of its security interests and challenges. the U..”30 Through Notwithstanding its involvement in the the establishment of a system of alliances and security securitization process of East Asia. the East Asian acceptance and Assembly and intensifying the conduct of U.S. One Road. Japan. as had been piece of real estate from a military standpoint.e. President Trump has East Asian countries receive from the United States.g. and its allies in Administration. partnerships in East Asia and the wider Asia Pacific superpower function of being a regional security region before the turn of the 20th century. Highlighting the geopolitical and security threat for the United States. political influence of America in East Asia. Pyongyang into irreversibly abandoning its nuclear Xiangshan Forum.S.g.28 penetration.. identifying existential threats to a Pacific Ocean. and Taiwan). and offshore military bases and gray.-led regional security architecture in the advantage in the near future (e..ndcp. Security Council regional initiatives such as the One Belt. Asian Infrastructure Investment weapons development program. global force projection capabilities and cutting-edge Philippines. President Donald Trump noted continues to challenge the credibility of U. electromagnetic Asia Pacific and significantly enhanced the global force railgun. locations under the sovereignty of its allies and zone coercion tactics in the SCS pose a regional military security partners. “what links the overarching pattern of may be also be viewed as a form of balancing against distribution of power among the global powers to the China in defense of the rules-based international order regional dynamics of RSCs is the mechanism of which the latter seeks to alter. the U. Bank. as a security Japan and ROK to deter DPRK from using its nuclear guarantor is likewise marred with a China challenge. observed last September 2017 when DPRK tested a Indeed. weapons. has been actively involved in East Asia.e. President Trump has elevated In presenting an alternative arrangement for global DPRK’s nuclear provocations as an international issue and regional security and development—thru various by sponsoring various U. the way for the establishment of offshore American Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the 1st and 2nd military bases as well as military access to strategic Island Chains. Singapore.S. and prospective Chinese Maritime Courts—China aims to On the other hand. hypersonic missile.S. must ensure its military principally focused on confronting DPRK. the securitization of the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula by conducting joint military exercises with Politically. Presented President Trump has securitized the SCS dispute by with an alternative (Chinese) vision of the future in underscoring the value of sovereignty and “respect for which the U.S. Japan.S. please call Tel/Fax. Militarily. the U.S. Aside from this.27 Corrolarily. notwithstanding his less significantly diminish if not completely erode the confrontational stance on China’s expansionism.”31 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 5 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division. Anti. Aside from its provocative ballistic valued referent object) and de-securitization (i. has unparalleled that of East Asian countries (e. missile tests. Thailand. This military technology that may secure its operational forged the U. According to Buzan and democratic powers (i. has exercised ballistic missile which flew over Japan’s territorial a combination of hard and soft powers to influence airspace in Hokkaido Island before landing in the securitization (i. Although political challenges. National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries. and India) Waever.edu. military relevance of the strategic spaces provided by DPRK’s nuclear weapons development program East Asian countries. Pyongyang’s allegedly successful downgrading an existential threat to a valued referent hydrogen bomb test purports that it shall remain a object) in the East Asian RSC. as indicated in his National depending on the level of security commitment which Security Strategy (NSS).S. however. straining Philippines-China (economic) relations might It is therefore essential for both parties to project their have prompted President Duterte to order the halt of shared commitment to the Alliance in such a way that it the sandbar construction. the continuation of it may be prudent to assume the possibility of the Philippines-U. has been a precondition in This policy. campaign such as the military response to the Siege of Politically. For instance. foreign policy in dealing with China. and China military capabilities—the risk of by all relevant regional actors as such.32 As capabilities (e. anti-piracy. investment. This urban warfare training For instance. and noted above.ph .g. it had been reported activity that relates to the SCS and WPS in policy that even before the Marawi Siege had been concluded.S. reveal demonstrated how a highly urgent anti-terror military political and military challenges to the Alliance. is primarily been reported that President Duterte expressed that he dedicated to developing joint maritime security will not declare war with China over a Sandbar. which is primarily focused on addressing maximizing America’s military presence in East Asia the nuclear threat posed by DPRK. recognizes the role and the wider Asia Pacific. backburner. mechanisms for defense and security _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 6 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division. please call Tel/Fax. promoting an enduring President Trump has called upon President Xi's system of alliances and security partnerships in East cooperation in cutting off the supply chain that Asia is imperative in preserving the U. security relations under the short-term deals between the two great powers to Duterte-Trump Administrations is expected. National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries. including China. level foreign policy considerations.S. joint statement that notes their shared possible that China's trade. Using trade as an “incentive. there is development considerations of the Duterte a possibility that Philippine-U. nonetheless. In order medium-term policy for Beijing in view of the notable for the Alliance to remain robust. such as the Philippines.. as its name suggests. transactional U. Citing the WPS sandbar construction as an recommendations: example.34 Should another major relations is predicated upon the economic and terrorist incident akin to a Marawi Siege occur. the relations of both countries with China Marawi may shape the security agenda of the Alliance may constrain the conduct of large scale joint military and side-line other equally important security exercises.” President within the East Asian RSC from spilling over to other Trump called upon President Xi to impose stricter regions.S. infrastructure initiatives in the Philippines may be used In addressing these challenges. Likewise. and maintaining the regional and global sanctions upon DPRK. maritime HADR.S. Such security alignment of China as a regional player in East Asia as well as its remains essential in maintaining its role as a regional vital links with DPRK. may be regarded as a key element of regional security. the security alignment of East is central to the Trump Administration's Asia Policy. On the part of the Philippines. it had earlier Sama Sama which. the use of may continue its reorientation from traditional to non- economic statecraft has been a major element in traditional security threats notwithstanding the China's foreign policy in the Asia Pacific. the improvement of Philippines-China maritime domain awareness). In view of these state and system. it has concerns of both countries would. Duterte-Trump Administrations Militarily.S-led regional supports the survival of the Kim Regime and DPRK's security architecture. security relations violent extremism in Southeast Asia has revealed the is expected to continue under the Duterte-Trump vulnerabilities of small powers. secure China’s support in addressing the DPRK threat on the one hand and secure U. the hedging initiatives such as external defense and maritime approach of President Duterte may place any military security cooperation.S. Historically. On the other hand. Hence.S. and commitment to maritime security cooperation. the Philippine in the future as a political leverage in the SCS and WPS Government may consider the following policy disputes. an analysis of the current security to ISIS-sponsored acts of terror. preventing security threats economy. the AFP and AFUS have already begun their joint training on urban warfare. it must be noted that China Suffice it to say. security guarantor. it must be understood that more than the threat of an actual war with China—an imprudent Enhance Diplomatic Engagements.ndcp.S. aside from ordering the halt of the became part of the Maritime Training Activity 2017: sandbar construction near Pag-asa Island. In this light. it must be recognized gap in U. it is Philippines-U. In this regard. security cooperation Administration.edu. however. the resurgence of terrorism and Although the Philippines-U. Asian countries with the U. As part of this Asia Policy.S. disengagement or Promoting an Enduring Alliance under the ambiguity in the SCS dispute on the other. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www.33 Given these signs of a balance of power. Administrations. and stability in East Asia. has Diversify Platforms for Defense and Security acquired thru its years of military Research and Cooperation. creates opportunities for exploring the viability the Duterte and Trump Administrations. Furthermore. and HADR). BSD. Explore Viability of Defense Technology ### Transfer. inaugurated military exercises such as the Exercise as evidenced by the future establishment of the Tempest Wind. naval presence in the Asia Pacific. Guided by Kuik’s hedging theory and Buzan and Meanwhile. Although the geostrategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated. military resources and complement capabilities.S. allies must be able to share on the relevance of the Alliance in promoting peace.S. the something that is difficult to achieve by the mere transfer regular conduct of existing joint military exercises such of excess defense articles. Although such a joint between the Philippines and the United States initiative may take years before it can take off in view underscore the relevance of the Alliance in promoting of the tedious process of negotiating its scope and terms security and stability in East Asia and the Asia Pacific. Based on identified political and military between the Allies. non-traditional security concerns. it must be borne in _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 7 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division.. it shall stir the Alliance into a more it must continue to facilitate a wide-range of military sustainable direction. Alliance.. maritime domain awareness). Interestingly.S.edu. To emphasize of defense technology transfer. however. please call Tel/Fax. specifically the U. the AFP engagements relevant in addressing traditional and may reach its fullest potential as an effective partner. considerations situate the military alliance well-within counter-terrorism.ndcp. the Philippine challenges to their bilateral security cooperation.S. navigation and overflight in the SCS under the Law of One way how the Alliance can have a more significant the Sea Convention. knowledge and technical expertise which the AFUS. the growing as the Balikatan Exercises and PHIBLEX and recently interest in developing the Philippine defense industry. which had been largely immensely benefit from the transfer of operational influenced by U. Allies must be maximized to highlight their shared view As effective partners. and Maritime Philippine Government Arsenal Defense Industrial Training Activity Sama Sama must be sustained under Estate. focus on determining means the shared commitment of the Allies in preserving a by which the Alliance can provide a more substantial rules-based international order must be effectively contribution to the modernization program of the AFP. In this regard. Kamandag Exercises. Moreover.S. therefore.g.ph . the strategic interests of the Philippines and the United the emerging need for the conduct of joint training on States. anti-piracy. of implementation. diversify as the institutionalization of Coast Guard-to-Coast platforms of defense and security cooperation. policy brief has likewise argued that the Allies must security cooperation by proposing new initiatives such enhance their diplomatic engagements. the Balikatan Exercises and PHIBLEX must continue to focus on Conclusion promoting interoperability between the AFP and AFUS in the areas of external defense and maritime security. both statement following the 7th Philippines-U. against China's territorial and maritime expansionism Although the defense industry in the U. to ensure that the Alliance remains robust.g. and Guard Cooperation as well as the establishment Joint explore the viability of transferring defense technology Centers for Maritime Security and Cyber Security. Navy Office of Naval Research. the continuation of security relations urban warfare may be addressed through a specialized under the President Duterte and President Trump may joint exercise to further diversify military exchanges be expected. Relatedly. joint and long-term impact on the AFP modernization statements and unilateral policy pronouncements process is transferring defense technology from the imply the shared interest of the allies in checking AFUS to the AFP thru joint development initiatives. from a realist perspective. countries must. National Defense College of the Philippines For inquiries. more than capabilities relevant to addressing security issues of underscoring a shared recognition of the freedom of mutual concern (e.policy dialogue and military exchanges between the mind that an alliance is a two-way military partnership. Through this initiative. Hence. this Government may widen the area of Philippines-U. As in the recent joint promoting an enduring Philippines-U. communicated in other joint statements and unilateral especially with respect to the development of policy pronouncements. In security. the new military exercises may be Waever’s regional security complex theory. is primarily and limiting its options in seeking to alter the regional led by the private sector. this policy maximized to develop essential joint capabilities in brief argued that state and system-level foreign policy addressing non-traditional security threats (e. their geostrategic significance. (63-2) 912-9125 * Trunkline: 911-6001 local 4591/4558 * www. In ensuring that military exchanges Development experience.S. the AFP can nonetheless security architecture. navy.usembassy.S. April 4. 2017. Military Delivers china-idUSKCN11W17T (accessed November 29.com/headlines/2017/08/23/1731846/rody-carpio-no-need- comes-to-a-close/ (accessed November 29. (accessed November 29.philstar. 2017. 2017. and Ole Waever.philstar." 12 Nunez. 2017). 2017).com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2103718/trump- 2017). navsog/ (accessed November 29. alignment behavior towards China." http://www.inquirer. 2017)
[email protected]. Ibid.S. October 23. fury-the-world-has-never-seen/ (accessed November 29.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co17207-trump-and.mil/Media-Center/Fact-Sheets/Free-Electron-Laser (accessed November 2. 2017. December 1. "Duterte says felt rapport with Trump.ph/news_releases/president-duterte-affirms-ties-us- https://www." thediplomat.com." (NDCP). Eric.edu. September 26.com/2017/03/philippines-to-receive-first-2-aircraft-from-japan/ Ibid. https://www.com/headlines/2017/10/26/1752600/philippines-russia-ink. counterterrorism-equipment-philippine-army-marine-corps/ (accessed November 29." www.onr. Salman. 2017). speech transcript. Embassy Manila. Embassy in Manila.gov. February 1. November 30.marines. Counterterrorism Equipment to the Philippine Army and Marine Corps. 35 27 (accessed November 29. 2017.gov. Ahmed.htm. 2016.N. ahead of Xi talks. https://ph. August 23. Embassy Manila. "Joint Press Statement: U. David. University Press. 2017). 2017. August 23.http://www.usembassy. November 11. October http://www.gov.ndcp.S. March 23. November 29. 2017). "President Duterte 5 Petty.reuters. 2017 . 2017. 2017). "Exercise KAMANDAG begins in the Philippines. p.marines.com. 2016. Malacanang.mil/en/Media- September 9.navy. 2016. Frances. 2016. 2017). Laura. 2017. https://www. "Philippines Commissions New Japan Coast Guard Ibid. new-weapons-equipment-philippine-marine-corps-commandant-counterterror-fight/ 2017).navy. Ambassador Kim’s Statement on Tempest troops-train-filipinos-urban-warfare.d. December 2.philstar. 2017." Journal of Contemporary China.reuters. stops building of fishers' shelters on disputed reef.mil/News/News-Display/Article/974393/phiblex-33.gov/us-delivers-new-aerostat-radar-system-philippine-navy/ philippines-politics-duterte/philippines-duterte-wants-to-open-alliances-with-russia. 2017).-Philippines ties intact." http://www. 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The views expressed in this policy brief are those of the author alone http://www.Wh9b2VVKvs2 (accessed Missiles Fired from a Submarine.com/2017/03/philippines-commissions-new-japan-coast-guard.gov.net. https://ph.com. http://www.com/headlines/2017/05/20/1701776/philippines-us. The readers are free to Display/Article/1330743/exercise-kamandag-begins-in-the-philippines/ (accessed reproduce copies or quote any part provided proper citations are made. 2017.S. Graham.ph.com/headlines/2017/06/30/1715052/marawi-siege-rages-us- 17 U. Christian Oller Vicedo is a Senior Defense Research Officer at the Research 18 and Special Studies Division of the National Defense College of the Philippines Flanagen. 9 Chong.mil. "Philippines' Duterte wants to 'open alliances' with Russia. 2017)." www. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 Produced by the Research and Special Studies Division. 20 pact-military-technical-cooperation (accessed November 27.scmp.org/2017/08/17/trump-s-national-security-strategy-new.S.gov/us-military-delivers- pledges to Duterte.com.inquirer.gov.inquirer. August 17. "Electromagnetic Railgun. 2017." Buzan.gov/us-ambassador-kim-statement-tempest-wind/ (accessed November 29. Amy. Office 2017-full-text-transcript-242879 (accessed November 29. "Trump signs off on plan to allow US Navy more freedom to patrol in 7 The White House." http://nationalinterest.com. asean-2017-asean-philippine-us-relations-military-bases (accessed November 30. https://www. http://nationalinterest.com. 2017). 2017) https://www. "Full text: Trump's 2017 U. 13. "Free Electron Laser.-Philippines Bilateral Morallo. Alexis. 2017.rsis. Barry. Navy. 2017. Prashanth. 2017). report says.philstar.mil/News/News- and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDCP. 2017." 3 Rem. transfers surveillance planes to the Philippines.onr. November 29. "Trump Threatens North Korea With ‘Fire and http://globalnation.S. 24 vessel/ (accessed November 29." www. 11 30 Manning.