Eminent Domain- Constitutional Law 2

EMINENT DOMAINFirst Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881. MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL V LOZADA DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse, annul, and set aside the Decision[1] dated February 28, 2006 and the Resolution[2] dated February 7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu City), Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65796. The antecedent facts and proceedings are as follows: Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of As early as 1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned over to the Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport Corporation and then to the CAA. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozadas name. On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November 16, 1947the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport. Lozada received the amount of P3,018.00 by way of payment. The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established policy involving similar cases. Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of the Republic under TCT No. 25057. The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3 airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that should this Office dispose and resell the properties which may be found to be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy of this Office is to give priority to the former owners subject to the approval of the President. On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport. Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, entitled An Act Creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport to the Authority, Vesting the Authority with Power to Administer and Operate the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport, and For Other Purposes. From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters.[3] The old airport was converted into what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area. Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18823 and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City. The complaint substantially alleged as follows: (a) Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada were the registered owners of Lot No. 88 covered by TCT No. 9045; (b) In the early 1960s, the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation Lot No. 88, among others, in connection with its program for the improvement and expansion of the LahugAirport; (c) A decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance in favor of the Government and against the land owners, among whom was Bernardo Lozada, Sr. appealed therefrom; (d) During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect that the subject property would be resold to the original owner at the same price when it was expropriated in the event that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport; (e) Title to Lot No. 88 was subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (TCT No. 25057); (f) The projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport did not materialize; (g) Plaintiffs sought to repurchase their property from then CAA Director Vicente Rivera. The latter replied by giving as assurance that priority would be given to the previous owners, subject to the approval of the President, should CAA decide to dispose of the properties; (h) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino, through a Memorandum to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), directed the transfer of general aviation operations at the Lahug Airport to the MactanCebu International Airport Authority; (i) Since the public purpose for the expropriation no longer exists, the property must be returned to the plaintiffs.[4] In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof. After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the parties stipulated on the following set of facts: (1) The lot involved is Lot No. 88-SWO25042 of the Banilad Estate, situated in the City of Cebu, containing an area of One Thousand Seventeen (1,017) square meters, more or less; (2) The property was expropriated among several other properties in Lahug in favor of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of a Decision dated December 29, 1961 of the CFI of Cebu in Civil Case No. R1881; (3) The public purpose for which the property was expropriated was for the purpose of the Lahug Airport; (4) After the expansion, the property was transferred in the name of MCIAA; [and] (5) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Department of Transportation and Communication to transfer general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and to close the Lahug Airport after such transfer[.][5] Sr. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was. Cebu City. namely: Vicente M. Branch 57. Godinez. Flores. ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title from defendant[s] to plaintiffs on Lot No. Godinez. Lozada. the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. upon payment of the expropriation price to plaintiffs. 2006. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. Virginia L. Jr. After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs. denying petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC. and against defendants Cebu-Mactan International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO): 1. the RTC rendered its Decision. ordering MCIAA and ATO to restore to plaintiffs the possession and ownership of their land. the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28. Lozada. Socorro L. Lozada. Gacasan. Lozada... cancelling TCT No. 2007. while petitioners presented their own witness. represented by their attorneyin-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez. denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7. Sr. Virginia L. Lozada. Lozada. Lozada. respondents presented Bernardo Lozada. namely.During trial. Sr. Lot No. Marcia L. likewise. [88]. Dolores L. Vicente M. On October 22. Mario M. Flores. as their lone witness. Cafaro and Rosario M. SO ORDERED. Dolores L. 1999. and the heirs of Rosario Mercado. Cafaro and Rosario M. petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. Lozada. Bernardo L. and the heirs of Rosario Mercado. in the light of the foregoing.[6] Aggrieved. Jr. 20357 in the name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on the same lot in the name of Bernardo L. Bernardo M. and 2. . Bernardo M.. Lozada. No pronouncement as to costs. Marcia L. Gacasan. 88 Psd821 (SWO-23803). Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority legal assistant Michael Bacarisas. Socorro L. or the land may be devoted to a different use. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted or abandoned. with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner.Hence. The petition should be denied. giving title in fee simple to the Republic. If x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street. the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. in support of this position. it returns to the former owner. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional. the property would revert to respondents. or municipality. upon the contrary. unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. and the public use may be abandoned. Petitioners cite. then. however. without any impairment . then. of course. (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise settlement between them and the Government. unconditionally. x x x. If. whether it be the State. either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase. Fery v. Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that the Decision in the pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition that should the intended use of Lot No. and (3) the respondents claim of verbal assurances from government officials violates the Statute of Frauds. a province. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple. Municipality of Cabanatuan. then. the former owner retains no right in the land. of course.[7] which declared that the Government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose. of course. and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. being its former owners. when the city abandons its use as a public street. the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title. when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority. no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the LahugAirport will be closed immediately thereafter. this Court had ruled otherwise in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Although Mactan A irport is being constructed. In the absence of such showing. it cannot now be doubted. Then. x x x.[9] thus Moreover. the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon . R-1881 [we] could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival ofLahug Airport. R-1881 validating our discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors of respondent was ordered under the running impression that Lahug Airport would continue in operation As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding. or any reversion to the former owner.of the estate or title acquired.[8] Contrary to the stance of petitioners. respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling portion in the Decision in Civil Case No. It is up to the other departments of the Government to determine said matters. it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic both civilian and military. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the said departments or agencies. While in the trial in Civil Case No. the Court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation (emphasis supplied). .[10] Indeed.[13] andReichling v. [14] all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated real property. following American jurisprudence. respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area. Covington Lumber Co. these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer in operation. particularly City of Fort Wayne v.. which involved an expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market. the Decision in Civil Case No. must be equitably adjusted. petitioner Juan Fery. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it did not pursue its public purpose. The condition not having materialized because the airport had been abandoned. However. Co. the rights vis--vis the expropriated Lots Nos. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project. judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality. Lake Shore & M. in 1915. we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery. petitioners herein. the former owner of the lots expropriated. Instead of putting up a public market. wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which the property was . respondent Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question. Verily. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners.S.[12] McConihay v. as he had admitted that. and (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof. the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property. R-1881 should be read in its entirety.[11] On this note.its understanding that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation. RY. Theodore Wright. sought to recover his properties. it should file another petition for the new purpose.taken.[15] It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose. Otherwise. In light of these premises. the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw. the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed. the title of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple. Obviously. with respect to the element of public use. the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice. fairness. as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain. and equity. In such a case.[16] More particularly. may seek the reversion of the property. it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner. If not. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. the private property owner would be denied due process of law. failing which. 88 . consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain. and is peremptorily abandoned. is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. on the question of whether respondents were able to establish the existence of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase Lot No. subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. namely. the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued. if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Accordingly. if they so desire. we now expressly hold that the taking of private property. and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.[17] Even without the foregoing declaration. is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner. Corollarily. then the former owners. in the instant case. In affirming the factual finding of the RTC to this effect. It bears stressing that both the RTC. there were no expropriation proceedings against his property in 1952 because the first notice of expropriation he received was in 1962. An octogenarian widower-retiree and a resident of Moon Park. though he could not name the government representatives who made the promise. he did not hire a lawyer. He made it clear that the verbal promise was made in Lahug with other lot owners before the 1961 decision was handed down. nevertheless. we just believed in the government. Branch 57. Still. with the former undertaking to resell Lot No. in fact. it will be returned back. we rule in the affirmative. that a compromise agreement was. Based on the promise. in no uncertain terms. It was just a verbal promise. the CA declared Lozadas testimony is cogent. Lozada was firm that he was promised that the lot would be reverted to him once the public use of the lot ceases. This promise was made at the premises of the airport. As far as he could remember. he is a competent witness capable of perceiving and making his perception known. but that When it will not be used as intended. The objection to his competency must be made before he has given any testimony or as soon as the . entered into between the Government and respondents. The minor lapses are immaterial.should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned. he testified that government representatives verbally promised him and his late wife while the expropriation proceedings were on-going that the government shall return the property if the purpose for the expropriation no longer exists. does not dismantle the credibility and truthfulness of his allegation. This Court notes that he was 89 years old when he testified in November 1997 for an incident which happened decades ago. The fact that he could not supply the necessary details for the establishment of his assertions during cross-examination. it is binding. Cebu and the CA have passed upon this factual issue and have declared. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be pursued. California since 1974. The decision of the competency of a witness rests primarily with the trial judge and must not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that it was erroneous. suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts. the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. cannot apply. the testimony of Lozada was based on personal knowledge as the assurance from the government was personally made to him. [20] cited by petitioners. the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith. His testimony on crossexamination destroyed neither his credibility as a witness nor the truthfulness of his words. especially when affirmed by the CA.[22] In this case. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. evade the obligations. Court of Appeals. [19] As correctly found by the CA. the Statute of Frauds. where respondent therein offered testimonies which were hearsay in nature.[18] he nevertheless adduced sufficient evidence to support his claim. if a contract has been totally or partially performed. 88. As regards the position of petitioners that respondents testimonial evidence violates the Statute of Frauds. and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially performed. for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation. the rationale thereof being as follows: In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. invoked by petitioners to bar the claim of respondents for the reacquisition of Lot No. Though Lozada is not part of the compromise agreement. However. are binding and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed. and.[21] Not one of the exceptions to this rule is present in this case to warrant a reversal of such findings. By reason of such assurance made in their . responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby. Verily. at the same time. unlike in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. factual findings of the trial court. A petition forcertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law and not of fact.incompetency becomes apparent. If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee. such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. R-1881 to the effect that the [condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport. these acts were simply meant to cooperate with the government. he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him. On this note. 88 may be enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the property held by the government in favor of the former. No doubt.: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is correct in stating that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. 1454 of the Civil Code. contrary to the claim of petitioners. the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities. To our mind. The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust. respondents relied on the same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. 88 do not conclusively establish that respondents absolutely parted with their property. the fact of Lozadas eventual conformity to the appraisal of Lot No. our ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno is instructive. Moreover. one that is akin to the implied trust referred to in Art.favor. This omission notwithstanding. viz. In the case at bar. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself . 88 and his seeking the correction of a clerical error in the judgment as to the true area of Lot No. and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation would have been ideal. The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. petitioners conveyed Lots No. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due. particularly because of the oral promise made to them. a trust by virtue of law is established. the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. failing to keep its bargain. as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: The only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trust is to decide whether in the numerous and varying fact situations presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant. For. Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest. Accordingly. otherwise. the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property. petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary. the wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity. in this case. 1454 is not perfect. the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary.Of course. his fixed costs for improvements thereon. are . and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport. In the good judgment of the court. the government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them. the provision is undoubtedly applicable. 916 and 920. In constructive trusts. Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by Art. petitioners may keep whatever income or fruits they may have obtained from Lot No. as creditors. the appreciation in value of Lot No. do not have to pay. and respondents need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. which is a natural consequence of nature and time. as well as the monetary value of their services in managing it to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby. 88. the provisions which. with respect to the debtor. 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court. the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x. or by time. which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to respondents.[23] On the matter of the repurchase price. Following Article 1187[24] of the Civil Code. 88. 88 to respondents. 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals.[26] WHEREFORE.echoed in Art. 2007 Resolution are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows: . which provides that (i)f a thing is improved by its nature. affirming the October 22. The February 28. respondents. are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return x x x. the petition is DENIED. while petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot No. When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give. deterioration or improvement of the thing. the latter must return to the former what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of the property. as part of the process of restitution. In accordance with Article 1190[25] of the Civil Code vis--vis Article 1189. shall return to each other what they have received x x x In case of the loss. plus legal interest to be computed from default. Branch 87. Cebu City. Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may have incurred in maintaining Lot No. 1190 of the Civil Code. upon the fulfillment of said conditions. 88. and its February 7. the parties. 2. Branch 57. 88. as well as the appreciation in value of Lot No. Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review on certiorari of the decision promulgated on October 5. 3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot No. 88 to them. only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the amounts that respondents will have to NPC V HEIRS BERSAMIN. the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court. Section 9. which is a natural consequence of nature and time. Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation they received for the expropriation of Lot No. 88. Cebu City. plus legal interest. and 4. Article III. In light of the foregoing modifications. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in maintaining Lot No.1. 1987 Constitution The application of this provision of the Constitution is the focus of this appeal. Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. 88. No costs. plus the monetary value of their services to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby. SO ORDERED. J. 2004.: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. pay petitioners in accordance with this Courts decision.[1] whereby the Court of Appeals . in the case of default. to be computed from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88. Mongkoy and Amir. Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land. the respondents. Edgar. 1999.[2] On November 21. sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property. Gandamra. that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason. as the owners of land with an area of 221. that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent. Manta. Antecedents Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds. all surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit). Putri. both rendered by the Regional Trial Court. Saidali C. [3] They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V. that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural. Sayana. in Iligan City (RTC). had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center. namely: Cebu. 1997.573 square meters situated in Ditucalan. and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground. Bangowa-an. Iligan City. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.(CA) affirmed the decision dated August 13. Branch 1. President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School. NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. that Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the underground tunnel. . industrial and residential value of their land. ordering NPC to pay just compensation to the respondents. with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation). commercial. that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Nasser. 1999 and the supplemental decision dated August 18. 6395.[6] decreeing: WHEREFORE. and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement. an ocular inspection of the land that was conducted by RTC Judge Mamindiara P. That at least three fruit bearing durian trees were uprooted and as a result of the construction by the defendant of the tunnel and about one hundred coconuts planted died. .00) PESOS per square meter.[5] tunnel was After trial.In its answer with counterclaim. The prayer for the removal or dismantling of defendants tunnel is denied.00).065 square meters. Mangotara and the representatives of the parties resulted in the following observations and findings: a. at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.532. 1998. That underground constructed therein. That a concrete post which is about two feet in length from the ground which according to the claimants is the middle point of the tunnel. or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113. However. b.[4] NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. Ruling of the RTC On July 23. any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years. defendant is hereby directed and ordered: a)To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227. the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit). should they be entitled to compensation. already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979. c.500. that their cause of action. under which a mere legal easement on their land was established. premises considered: 1. 00) PESOS from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum. SO ORDERED. that the existence of the tunnel had affected the entire expanse of the land.00. and had since continuously denied its existence.00/square meter based on the testimony of Dionisio Banawan. and that they. b) To pay plaintiff a monthly rental of their land in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30. as attorneys fees.000. 1999. OIC-City Assessor of Iligan City. the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200.00 to P500.[7] viz: Upon a careful review of the original decision dated August 13. the RTC issued a supplemental decision. and had restricted their right to excavate or to construct a motorized deep well. The RTC fixed the just compensation at P500. while the appraised value of their affected land ranged from P400. c)To pay plaintiffs the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200.00) PESOS. 1999. as actual damages or just compensation. the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded. as exemplary damages.PESOS. plus interest. On August 18. a sentence . industrial and residential value of the land.00 to P750. commercial. and to pay the cost.00) PESOS. The RTC found that NPC had concealed the construction of the tunnel in 1979 from the Heirs of Macabangkit. e)To pay plaintiffs.000.00. d) To pay plaintiffs.000. to the effect that the appraised value of the adjoining properties ranged from P700. as moral damages. had lost the agricultural. as owners. The RTC also required NPC to pay rentals from 1979 due to its bad faith in concealing the construction of the tunnel from the Heirs of Macabangkit. that NPC had acted in bad faith by taking possession of the subterranean portion of their land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and prior consent. should be added to paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion thereof. plaintiffs land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation. SO ORDERED.[9] The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution.00) PESOS. the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from implementing its decision. No. upon payment of the aforesaid sum. or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113. Therefore. 1999. as follows: a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227. Furnish copy of this supplemental decision to all parties immediately.532. plaintiffs land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation. to bolster. 141447). Consequently. on August 18. 2006. On its part. at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.R. paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision should read. but the Court upheld the CA on May 4. plus interest. This supplemental decision shall be considered as part of paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision.00) PESOS per square meter.065 square meters. On September 15.500. and conform to the findings of the Court. as actual damages or just compensation. the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. to wit: Consequently. which is quoted hereunder.[8] Earlier. harmonize. 1999.[11] . 1999. NPC appealed to the CA on August 25. The Heirs of Macabangkit elevated the ruling of the CA (G. upon payment of the aforesaid sum.[10] prompting NPC to assail the writ by petition for certiorari in the CA. holding that the testimonies of NPCs witness Gregorio Enterone and of the respondents witness Engr.A. being silent about tunnels. as in the instant case. Now. that can easily be discovered. lake. creek. No.A. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation). the sketch map. namely: I THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT NAPOCORS UNDERGROUND TUNNEL IN ITS AGUS RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC PLANT PROJECT TRAVERSED AND/OR AFFECTED APPELLEES PROPERTY AS THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE INDUBITABLY ESTABLISHING THE SAME II THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES CLAIMS IN THEIR ENTIRETY FOR GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT NAPOCORS UNDERGROUND TUNNEL INDEED TRAVERSED APPELLEES PROPERTY. spring or waterfall in the Philippines for . did not apply. the topographic survey map. without any mention about the claims involving tunnels. it is submitted that the same provision is not applicable. 6395 authorizes NAPOCOR to take water from any public stream. ESTOPPEL AND LACHES On October 5. while it is true that Republic Act No. and the ocular inspection report sufficiently established the existence of the underground tunnel traversing the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit. viz: As regard Section 3(i) of R.Ruling of the CA NPC raised only two errors in the CA. and that Section 3(i) of R. Pete Sacedon. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. particularly those surreptitiously constructed beneath the surface of the land. 6395. that NPC did not substantiate its defense that prescription already barred the claim of the Heirs of Macabangkit. river. 2004. There is nothing in Section 3(i) of said law governing claims involving tunnels. No. The same provision is applicable to those projects or facilities on the surface of the land. THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION. and the supplemental Decision dated August 18. premises considered. the Heirs). 6395. which provided a period of only five years from the date of the construction within which the affected landowner could bring a claim against it. therefore. the appealed Decision dated August 13. 1999. SO ORDERED. to intercept and divert the flow of waters from lands of riparian owners (in this case. and that even if Republic Act No. WHEREFORE. are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. and from persons owning or interested in water which are or may be necessary to said purposes. NPC reiterates that witnesses Enterone and Sacedon lacked personal knowledge about the construction and existence of the tunnel and were for that reason not entitled to credence. 6395 should be inapplicable. the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. NPC contends that the CA should have applied Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. the same Act expressly mandates the payment of just compensation.the realization of the purposes specified therein for its creation. and that the topographic and relocation maps prepared by Sacedon should not be a basis to prove the existence and location of the tunnel due to being self-serving.[12] Issue NPC has come to the Court. Accordingly. the action of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already prescribed due to the underground tunnel being susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil Code due to its being a continuous and apparent legal easement under Article 634 of the Civil Code. as follows: (1) Whether the CA and the RTC erred in holding that there was an . The issues for resolution are. 1999. assigning the lone error that: THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DIRECTING AND ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS. Moreover. particularly after the NPC still fails to convince. the Court should rightly dismiss NPCs appeal. the evidence on the tunnel was substantial. for now. Even assuming. We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation. and CA affirmed them. for the significance of the topographic survey map and the sketch map (as indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong. Factual findings of the RTC. 1. the factual findings and determinations by the RTC as the trial court are generally binding on the Court. It insists that the topographic survey map and the right-of-way map presented by the Heirs of Macabangkit did not at all establish the presence of any underground tunnel. that the Court may review the factual findings of the CA and the RTC. or. for questions of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review on certiorari. (2) Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic Act No. alternatively. On the contrary. being a factual matter.[13] Bearing these doctrines in mind. cannot now be properly reviewed by the Court. viz: Among the pieces of documentary evidence presented showing the existence of the said tunnel beneath the subject . under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code. are binding The existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit. when affirmed by the CA. however. that this appeal should not be dismissed because the Heirs of Macabangkit essentially failed to prove the existence of the underground tunnel. 6395.underground tunnel traversing the Heirs of Macabangkits land constructed by NPC. for NPC to insist that the evidence on the existence of the tunnel was not adequate and incompetent remains futile. as the CA correctly projected in its assailed decision. Ruling NPC argues. All constructions done were beneath the surface of the plaintiffs-appellees property. and then traversing the entire and the whole length of the plaintiffs-appellees property. Sacedon was a credible and competent witness. Another is the Sketch Map which shows the location and extent of the land traversed or affected by the said tunnel. the tunnel can hardly be noticed. simply because Sacedon had personal knowledge based on his being NPCs principal engineer and supervisor tasked at one time to lay out the tunnels and transmission lines specifically for the hydroelectric projects.[16] and to supervise the construction of the Agus 1 Hydroelectric Plant itself[17]from 1978 until his retirement from NPC. . The topographic survey map is one conducted to know about the location and elevation of the land and all existing structures above and underneath it. and considering that both inlet and outlet are bodies of water. This is a subterrain construction. and of the inlet and outlet channels adverted to and as depicted in the topographic survey map and the sketch map. he declared that he personally experienced the vibrations caused by the rushing currents in the tunnel. a former employee of the NPC.[19] Under any circumstances. and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another small man-made lake. These two (2) pieces of documentary evidence readily point the extent and presence of the tunnel construction coming from the power cavern near the small man-made lake which is the inlet and approach tunnel. The CA cannot be faulted for crediting the testimony of Sacedon despite the effort of NPC to discount his credit due to his not being an expert witness.property is the topographic survey map. This explains why they could never obtain any knowledge of the existence of such tunnel during the period that the same was constructed and installed beneath their property. particularly near the outlet channel . based on the declaration in the RTC by Sacedon.[14] The power cavern and the inlet and outlet channels established the presence of the underground tunnel. or at a distance of about two (2) kilometers away from the land of the plaintiffs-appellees.[15] It is worthy to note that NPC did not deny the existence of the power cavern. [18] Besides. Section 3 (i) of Republic Act No. It posits that the five-year prescriptive period already set in due to the construction of the underground tunnel having been completed in 1979 yet. 6395.[21] NPC disagrees. Branch 01. Thus. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. we uphold its conclusion that prescription did not bar the present action to recover just compensation. Without necessarily adopting the reasoning of the CA. not tunnels that were inconspicuously constructed beneath the surface of the land. relevantly provides: Section 3. was intended for public use. as amended. among others.[20] It bears noting that NPC did not raise any issue against or tender any contrary comment on the ocular inspection report.The ocular inspection actually confirmed the existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit. the CA observed: More so. Powers and General Functions of the Corporation. the cited law. The powers. 6395 had no application to this action because it covered facilities that could be easily discovered. such as the underground tunnel. 2. 6395. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation The CA held that Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. This was conducted by a team composed of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court. which limits the action for recovery of compensation to five years from the date of construction. herself and the respective lawyers of both of the parties and found that. Lanao del Norte. the Ocular inspection conducted on July 23. functions. the law applicable was Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. . said underground tunnel was constructed beneath the subject property. and argues that because Article 635[22] of the Civil Code directs the application of special laws when an easement. 1998 further bolstered such claim of the existence and extent of such tunnel. flume. avenue. That after said period. highway or railway of private and public ownership. further. ditch. watercourse.Provided. That the stream.rights and activities of the Corporation shall be the following: xxx (i) To construct works across. The Corporation or its representative may also enter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business and purposes. canal. highway or railway so crossed or intersected be restored as near as possible to their former state. street. plants or other facilities shall have been established. no suit shall be brought to question the said rights of way. transmission lines. including the construction of the transmission lines thereon. The Corporation is hereby given the right of way to locate. construct and maintain such works over and throughout the lands owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches and political subdivisions. the proper authority for the execution of such work.That said action for damages is filed within five years after the rights of way. canal ditch. finally. as the location of said works may require:Provided. substations. Provided. or in a manner not to impair unnecessarily their usefulness. watercourse. plants or other facilities. or otherwise. That said works be constructed in such a manner as not to endanger life or property. further. And provided. any stream. transmission lines. street. flume. . that the owner of such property shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby. substations. avenue. Every person or entity whose right of way or property is lawfully crossed or intersected by said works shall not obstruct any such crossings or intersection and shall grant the Board or its representative. Provided. the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages.[25] Even so. and expresses a single. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages.[26] Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain. and sensible meaning. facilities. but the owners loss. It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works. we consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions. or otherwise. so must we not. Accordingly. substantial.[27] On the other hand. avenue. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real. [23] The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted. and other developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3. as the location of said works may require.[24] Moreover. highway or railway of private and public ownership. even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. full. which may be actual. We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. we still cannot side with NPC. Consequently. . Such interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish. when the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity. ditch. for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land. The former. street. and ample. that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages. has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant. definite. flume.A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of works across. canal. and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. also known as inverse condemnation. watercourse. any stream. the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the time of the taking of such property. NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the land. lease. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation. transfer. the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use. but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. mortgage. rent. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19[28] and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code. In either case. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution[30] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. or exemplary. nominal. easement of right of way shall only be sought:Provided. This was what NPC was ordered to do in National Power Corporation v. That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines. a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which the Corporation was created: Provided.moral. Ibrahim. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking.[31] for the suit is not based on tort. liquidated.[29] The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose.[32] It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.[33] where NPC had denied the right of the owners to be paid just . Indeed. hold. however. temperate. NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel. promote. and the exercise results to the damage of another. thusly: (h) To acquire. sell. That in case the property itself shall be acquired by purchase. but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. or necessary. encumber and otherwise dispose of property incident to. for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. in Nangca and Balo-I in Lanao del Norte and in Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. Ibrahim that NPC was liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land traversed by the underground tunnels. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use. that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law. validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. and entitled owners to just compensation The Court held in National Power Corporation v. NPCs construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land. landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of the . petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time.compensation despite their land being traversed by the underground tunnels for siphoning water from Lake Lanao needed in the operation of Agus II. Agus VI and Agus VII Hydroelectric Projects in Saguiran. viz: In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion. Agus IV. There. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner. Lanao del Sur. violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Significantly. however. to wit: Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of the respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. at any time. Agus III. but the Court resolved against NPC. Petitioner could have. though. NPC similarly argued that the underground tunnels constituted a mere easement that did not involve any loss of title or possession on the part of the property owners.[34] 3. either by sale or mortgage. it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title. Did such consequence constitute taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation? We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC.[35] Here. Based upon the foregoing. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the subterrain portion. are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less. [36] Indeed. to be compensable. whenever it is possible to make the assessment. Respondents. This is so because in this case.[38] It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property. and from disposing of the land or any portion of it. NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. lessening or destroying its value. notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. diminution.[39] nor material whether the property is removed from the . It is settled that the taking of private property for public use. respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. than the money equivalent of said property. or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. restriction. physical possession. as the owner of the property thus expropriated. like in National Power Corporation v.easement is not without expense. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and interests because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface. Ibrahim.[37] Compensable taking includes destruction. or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner. the RTC pegged just compensation at P500. TSN. dated April 4. OIC. marked as Exhibit AA-2 and AA-3. 51.00) PESOS.00 to P750. and that of the City Assessor of Iligan City.possession of the owner. testified. that the appraised value of the land in the area as determined by the City Assessors Office is not uniform. that area is classified as industrial and residential. or in any respect changes hands. a Certification. As between the much lower price of the land as testified by defendants witness Gregorio Enterone. 1997.00 to P500. xxx. In that regard. We affirm the CA. February 9. 57. is of the opinion that the reasonable amount of just compensation of plaintiffs land should be fixed at FIVE HUNDRED (500. as follows: The matter of what is just compensation for these parcels of land is a matter of evidence. Witness Dionisio Banawan.[41] The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint.00 per square meter. Within that area. testified and identified Two (2) Deeds of Sale. 1999).00/square meter based on its finding on what the prevailing market value of the property was at the time of the filing of the complaint. showing that the appraised value of plaintiffs land ranges from P400. pp. this Court. and 71. NPCs silence was probably due to the correctness of the RTCs valuation after careful consideration and weighing of the parties evidence. and the CA upheld the RTC. These parcels of land is (sic) located in the City of Iligan. instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of . He testified and identified Exhibit AA and AA-1. the latter is more credible. testimony of Dionisio Banawan. witness Banawan. the Industrial City of the South. That plaintiffs land is adjacent to many subdivisions and that is within the industrial classification.[40] As a result. NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land.00 per square meter (see. Also. Considering however.City Assessors Office. per square meter.[] showing that the appraised value of the land adjoining or adjacent to plaintiff land ranges from P700. considering that NPC did not assail the valuation in the CA and in this Court. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. would not be just. Court of Appeals. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land. not the time of taking. . 6395. [43] we pointed out that there was no taking when the entry by NPC was made without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority. Awards for rentals. as the RTC provided in its decision.[42] a case that involved the similar construction of an underground tunnel by NPC without the prior consent and knowledge of the owners. We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint. and attorneys fees are deleted for insufficiency of factual and legal bases The CA upheld the RTCs granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of P 30.000. therefore. as NPC submits. and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit.Republic Act No. In National Power Corporation v.00/month from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent. reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted. moral damages. 4. and in which we held that the basis in fixing just compensation when the initiation of the action preceded the entry into the property was the time of the filing of the complaint. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them. possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the part of the RTC. exemplary damages. The CA did not dwell on the reckoning time. 1997. It is never trite to remind that moral and exemplary damages.000. The body of the decision did not state the factual and legal reasons why NPC was liable for attorneys fees. in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated. always require evidence that establish the circumstances under which the claimant is entitled to them. The imposition of interest of 12% interest per annum follows a long line of pertinent jurisprudence. We consider the omissions of the lower courts as pure legal error that we feel bound to correct even if NPC did not submit that for our consideration. no factual and legal bases mentioned for the awards. Moreover. The terse statement found at the end of the body of the RTCs decision. The awards just appeared in the fallo of its decision. Without the factual and legal justifications. the failure of both the RTC and the CA to render the factual and legal justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions immediately demands the striking out of the awards for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the decision must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. which have no place in fair judicial adjudication. until the full liability is paid by NPC. to begin with. and to pay the cost. stating: xxx The contingent attorneys fee is hereby reduced from 20% to only 15% of the . Conformably with the ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. There was. [45] whereby the Court has fixed the rate of interest on just compensation at 12% per annum whenever the expropriator has not immediately paid just compensation. we delete the award of back rentals and in its place prescribe interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21. not by any means liquidated or assessed as a matter of routine.00. Rodriguez.[44] in which the award of interest was held to render the grant of back rentals unwarranted. The RTC did not state any factual and legal justifications for awarding to the Heirs of Macabangkit moral and exemplary damages each in the amount of P200. We also reverse and set aside the decree of the RTC for NPC to pay to the Heirs of Macabangkit the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded. as attorneys fees.Granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification. the awards are exposed as the product of conjecture and speculation. Neither did the CA proffer any justifications for sustaining the RTC on the awards. the date of the filing of the complaint. We have to disagree with the RTC thereon. Yet. An award of attorneys fees has always been the exception rather than the rule. the RTC casually disregarded the fundamental distinction between the two concepts of attorneys fees the ordinary and the extraordinary. and we express our discomfort that the CAdid not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant. an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. To start with. did not indicate or explain why and how the substantial liability of NPC for attorneys fees could have arisen and been determined. the RTC was really referring to a supposed agreement on attorneys fees between the Heirs of Macabangkit and their counsel. the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. As such. By referring to the award as contingency fees. In its ordinary concept. such as those authorized in Article 2208. an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. NLRC. attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. the concept of attorneys fees involved was the ordinary. and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client.[46]thuswise: There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees. and reducing the award from 20% to 15%.total amount of the claim that may be awarded to plaintiffs. without more.[47] Nor should an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of attorneys fees to the winning . The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. Civil Code. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made. In its extraordinary concept. unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. the inclusion of the attorneys fees in the judgment among the liabilities of NPC converted the fees to extraordinary. In assessing attorneys fees against NPC and in favor of the respondents. These concepts were aptly distinguished in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. as part of damages. Ballelos to assert their respective rights to attorneys fees. attorneys fees may still be withheld where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a partys persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. Civil Code. legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision. Attorneys fees under quantum meruit principle are fixed at 10% of the judgment award Based on the pending motions of Atty. both contending that they represented the Heirs of Macabangkit in this case.[53] Sound policy dictates that even if the NPC failed to raise the issue of attorneys fees. Atty. the trial court must make express findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception. the Court. are assessed only in the instances specified in Art.[56] and a motion for early decision. Macarupung Dibaratun and Atty. lastly. [50] Indeed. 2208. we are not precluded from correcting the lower courts patently erroneous application of the law. the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.[48] The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. such fees. in supervising the lower courts. [54] Indeed. When the appeal was submitted for decision in the CA. 5. A look at the history of the legal representation of the Heirs of Macabangkit herein provides a helpful predicate for resolving the conflict.[51] But even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights. possesses the ample authority to review legal matters like this one even if not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties.[55] Atty. . [49] Too. a conflict would ensue from the finality of the judgment against NPC. Manuel D. What this demands is that the factual.[57] Atty.[52] And.party. Dibaratun was the original counsel of the Heirs of Macabangkit. or else. attorneys fees are in the nature of actual damages. Ballelos filed his entry of appearance. i.[68] reply.[64] the Court directed Atty. Yet. Ballelos submitted two motions. a contract for a contingent fees is an agreement in writingby which the fees.e.[69] and (b) a motion to register his attorneys lien that he claimed was contingent. [58] supplemental manifestation. Dibaratun to enter his appearance herein. Dibaratun and Atty. He complied upon filing the comment. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to attorneys fees was contingent.[61] It appears that a copy of the CAs decision was furnished solely to Atty. Contingent fees depend upon an express contract. the only way to determine their right to appropriate attorneys fees is to apply the principle of quantum meruit. However. Ballelos. A similar motion was also received by the Court from Atty.[67] and further imputed malpractice to Atty. Atty. Dibaratun. without which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.[70] Amir Macabangkit confirmed Atty. shortly before the rendition of the decision..Ballelos subsequently filed also a manifestation. Ballelos.[62] alleging that he had not withdrawn his appearance and had not been aware of the entry of appearance by Atty. are made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. Atty. usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action. Dibaratun filed in the CA a motion to register attorneys lien. Dibaratun nor Atty. Dibaratun a few days after the petition for review was filed.[66] Amir reiterated his manifestation on March 6. Ballelos presenting a written agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees.[71] With neither Atty. 2005. 2008. on February 14. Ballelos for having filed an entry of appearance bearing Amirs forged signature and for plagiarism.[59] arguments contained in the pleadings previously filed by Atty. 2006.[63] Thus. . copying verbatim the Both Atty.[60] and ex parte motion reiterating the motion for early decision. to wit: (a) a manifestation and motion authorizing a certain Abdulmajeed Djamla to receive his attorneys fees equivalent of 15% of the judgment award. Dibaratuns representation through an ex parte manifestation that he filed in his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings Mongkoy and Putri.[65] On September 11. b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved. and j) lawyer.[73] An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause. taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.[72]The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. h) The contingency or certainty of compensation. to wit: Rule 20.Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for determining an attorneys professional fees in the absence of an express agreement.[74] Rule 20. The professional standing of the In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client. taking into account the facts determinative thereof. f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs. the determination of the . therefore. g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required. c) The important of the subject matter. the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney fees. d) The skill demanded. [75] Ordinarily. i) The character of the employment. and the intervention of the courts is sought. whether occasional or established. e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case. However. now fixes attorneys fees at 10% of the principal award of P113.attorneys fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. NLRC. Dibaratun or Atty. who should receive attorneys fees from the Heirs of Macabangkit is a question that the Court must next determine and settle by considering the amount and quality of the work each performed and the results each obtained.000. starting from the complaint until the very last motion filed in this Court. unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands of the case. by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records.500.00 out of his own pocket to defray expenses from the time of the filing of the motion to execute pending appeal until the case reached the Court. and examined and cross-examined all the witnesses presented at that stage of the proceedings. He consistently appeared during the trial. Thus. Dibaratun and Atty. .[76] would not be needlessly prolonged. it will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorneys fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy. which was the amount granted by the RTC in its decision. giving to each of the two attorneys 15% of the principal award as attorneys fees would be excessive and unconscionable from the point of view of the clients. Ballelos each claimed attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the principal award of P113.00. Atty. or both.532. the attorney from the outset.00. and substance of each pleading and the motions he prepared for the Heirs of Macabangkit indicated that he devoted substantial time and energy in researching and preparing the case for the trial. which holds and exercises the power to fix attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis in the absence of an express written agreement between the attorney and the client. Dibaratun. Considering that the attorneys fees will be defrayed by the Heirs of Macabangkit out of their actual recovery from NPC. He even advanced P250. The nature. Ballelos. character.[77] His representation of all the Heirs of Macabangkit was not denied by any of them. Whether it is Atty.532.500. the Court. Atty. as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. He diligently prepared and timely filed in behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit every pleading and paper necessary in the full resolution of the dispute. Ballelos. He was a Municipal Mayor of Matungao. not Atty. Dibaratun not having yet filed any withdrawal of his appearance. he deserves the recognition. Ballelos. if it can be called that. The Court did not receive any notice of appearance for the Heirs of Macabangkit from Atty. He formerly served as a member of the Board of Director of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). His written submissions in the case appeared either to have been lifted verbatim from the pleadings previously filed by Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in the prosecution of the clients cause to its successful end. Of the Heirs of Macabangkit. the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun possessed some standing in the legal profession and in his local community. Ballelos. Lanao del Norte. who was entitled to the full amount of attorneys fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney. The motions he filed in the Court and in the CA lacked enlightening research and were insignificant to the success of the clients cause. Manta. It is he. Batowa-an. only Cebu. which he did despite Atty. and was an IBP national awardee as Best Legal Aid Committee Chairman. not much about the character and standing of Atty. In contrast. In fairness and justice.[79] .We note that Atty. Dibaratun. Nasser. or to have been merely quoted from the decisions and resolutions of the RTC and the CA. his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his prosecution of the clients cause. Ballelos to appear in their behalf in the CA. Mongkoy[78] and Edgar gave their consent to Atty. He taught at Mindanao State University College of Law Extension. manifested no depth or assiduousness. Lanao del Norte-Iligan City Chapter. notwithstanding that some of the clients might appear to have retained Atty. but that capacity has meanwhile become doubtful in the face of Amirs strong denial of having retained him. His legal service. Sayana. as well as the nature and quality of the legal services he rendered for the Heirs of Macabangkit are in the records. Given the amount and quality of his legal work. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment. judging from the quality of the pleadings from him. and was enthroned Sultan a Gaus. Batowa-an. WHEREFORE. 1997 until the full liability is paid. subject to the following MODIFICATIONS. Nasser. reckoned from the filing of the complaint on November 21. and P200. SO ORDERED. Manta and Edgar.Atty. the amount of P5.00 as rental fee. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu. and (c) The award of 15% attorneys fees decreed to be paid by National Power Corporation to the Heirs of Macabangkit is DELETED.532. the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 5.000. Manuel D. and Atty. Sayana. . Ballelos is DECLARED ENTITLED TO RECOVERfrom Cebu.000.00 as exemplary damages are DELETED. the only parties who engaged him.500.500.000. Nasser. and only the Heirs of Macabangkit earlier named are liable to him.532.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit. Ballelos is PARTLY GRANTED. His compensation under the quantum meruit principle is fixed at P5. The Court PARTLY GRANTS the motion to register attorneys lien filed by Atty.000. all surnamed Macabangkit. (b) The awards of P30. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.00 as just compensation. P200.00. Batowa-an.00 as moral damages. Macarupung Dibaratun. The Court considers his work in the case as very minimal. 2004 by the Court of Appeals. The motion to register attorneys lien of Atty. to wit: (a) Interest at the rate of 12% per annum is IMPOSED on the principal amount of P113. Dibaratuns attorneys fees on the basis ofquantum meruit at 10% of the principal award of P113. Manta and Edgar. Sayana.00. and FIXES Atty.000. the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world. that after a year of marriage. this Court in addition to resolving the present case. the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14. CV No. During the pre-trial on October 17. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25. Essentially.: The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage. that in March 1987. and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G. Reynaldo left Roridel and their child. 1990.R. Andre O.REPUBLIC V CA PANGANIBAN. that a few weeks later." Hence. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife. 1989. that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served. our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case ofSantos vs. finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. 3 Benguet. Court of Appeals." Since the Code's effectivity. which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money. resulting in frequent quarrels between them. and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage. that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel. 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad. that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance. In his Answer filed on August 28. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila. Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. as a result of which their relationship was estranged. the following were stipulated: . In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Facts This case was commenced on August 16. and had since then abandoned them. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14. and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances. Molina was born. and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. "psychological incapacity. J. that sometime in February 1986. that a son. namely. 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila. (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals. the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art.1. a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29. his or her personal relationship with the other spouse. . 4. . Hence." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference." Then. and of Dr. Lalas. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. 2. We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case. If said conduct. 1991. . a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14. 3." adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child. tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage. it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. as it did. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. 5. 1985 at the Church of St. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Augustine. the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife. That out of their marriage. We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison. the present recourse. In the case at bar." In denying the Solicitor General's appeal. 6. as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. . 1986. On May 14. the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities. The Issue In his petition. then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates." It concluded that: As ground for annulment of marriage. We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union. observed and considered as a whole. a social worker. hence. That the respondent is not asking for damages. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1. Manila. " Citing Dr. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. Justice Jose C. on the other hand. Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions? A Yes. Dr." if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. . Q There is no hope for the marriage? A There is no hope. 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity. argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity. and (c) incurability. and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. ." The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. Court of Appeals 6 this Court. explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties. ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility. In Leouel Santos vs. Your Honor. there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity." On the other hand. Your Honor. in the present case. Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties? A Yes. Vitug. Gerardo Veloso. Your Honor. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem. due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals. it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so. speaking thru Mr. The expert testimony of Dr. . not psychological incapacity.Respondent. (b) juridical antecedence. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. the man is also living with another woman. Sison testified: 8 COURT Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage? A Yes. in her Memorandum. The Court has no more questions. The petitioner. (b) alleged in the complaint. it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. During its deliberations. 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation. not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse. Thus. or knowing them. was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it. (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and jurisprudence. inviolability and solidarity (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. namely." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable. the Court decided to invite two amici curiae. or prior thereto. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family. such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. could not have given valid assumption thereof. which they followed up with written memoranda. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Furthermore. From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations. 1996. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. and Justice Ricardo C." thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. or one of them. such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption .In the case of Reynaldo. but the illness itself must have attached at such moment. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time. The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence. Cruz. the Most Reverend Oscar V. If at all. Puno. 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3. . Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines. bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. "mild characteriological peculiarities. like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law.of marriage obligations. The Solicitor General. Here. neglect or difficulty. as the case may be. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification. nor a refusal. in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision. briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition. Thus. it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization. much less ill will. shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. to the petition. while not controlling or decisive. proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. which will be quoted in the decision. mood changes. In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos. not necessarily to those not related to marriage. the State and the Church — while remaining independent. occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. we have already ruled to grant the petition. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability. should be given great respect by our courts. there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220. Hence. This is one instance where. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. along with the prosecuting attorney. In other words. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. 14 Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people. an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate. which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. R. the March 2. Vega. the Government. 1994 and the July 25. Jr.: For the resolution of the Court are three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 116491-503 assails Acting on the association’s petition.6Petitioners Manapat and Lim and respondents Loberanes. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. thus. But because of the high asking price of RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the Government. G. J. G. 1994 Decision3 of the appellate court in CA-G. No. The Facts Sometime in the 1960’s. Nos. 10200-10212. organizing themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez. RCAM then decided to effect. the occupants.5 MANAPAT V CA DECISION NACHURA.. the latter’s effort to purchase and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property. Later. 1994 Resolutions4 of the CA also in CA-G.R.R. RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that they would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct a school in the area.R. Inc. and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price. its subdivision into home lots.R. Quimque. CV Nos. the petition is GRANTED. The three-decade saga of the parties herein has for its subject parcels of land forming part of what was originally known as the Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City and formerly owned by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and/or the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). 110478 assails the May 27. 27159. in 1963. Oracion and Mercado in these consolidated cases were . through the Land Tenure Administration (LTA). the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Tenants Association. 116176 questions the June 28. the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the public. later succeeded by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). negotiated for the acquisition of the property from RCAM/PRC. as they could not afford RCAM’s proposed price. CV No. did not materialize. 10200-10212. 1993 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. on its own. No. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. CV Nos.R. The plan. SO ORDERED. Santos. however.WHEREFORE. G. C-6232. Aurora Dy dela Costa. C-6235. C-6234. C-6227. C-6238 and C-6255 insofar as said decision granted the expropriation. C-6237.R.R. ordered the condemnation of the involved lots and fixed the amount of just compensation at P180.11 On motion for reconsideration by the NHA in Cases Nos. C-6225.R. C-6228. 3) Ordering the remand of all the appealed cases. C-6237 and C-6435 on the issue of the necessity of the taking. 4) Finding the compromise agreement in Case No. entitled. C-6238. C-6232. C-6237 and C-6435. 27159. In Cases Nos. C-6230. CV No. C-6229. C-6227. C6230. judgment is hereby rendered: 1) Reversing and setting aside the decisions of dismissal in Cases Nos. 10200-10212 disposing of the appealed cases as follows: WHEREFORE. the appellate court rendered its Decision14 in CA-G." in . On May 27. C-6238 and C-6255. C-6228. and in lieu thereof an order of condemnation is entered declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots involved for the public use described in the complaints.2M out of the President’s Special Operations Funds to cover the additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. C-6225. C-6235. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 10200-10212. C-6234. the trial court rendered separate decisions dismissing the expropriation cases.9 The following cases were filed by the NHA with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City: C-6225. the trial court later amended its decision. C-6230. C-6231. The National Housing Authority (NHA). C-6237 and C-6435. C-6233. CV No.among those who purchased individual subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM and/or PRC. 1072. the RTC however denied NHA’s motion for reconsideration. C-6229.12 NHA eventually appealed to the CA the decisions in Cases Nos. C-6232. C-6235. then filed several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area. but annulling and setting aside the just compensation fixed by the trial court at P180. CV No.10 After due proceedings. to the trial court for determination of the just compensation to which defendants are entitled in accordance with Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. C-6229. C-6227.7 A significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. C-6228. with the exceptions of Cases Nos. C-6234. 2) Affirming the decisions in Case Nos. premises considered. C-6238 and C-6255 on the issue of just compensation. "NHA v. C-6230. C-6229. 1993. except for Case No. which was docketed as CA-G. C-6231. and the amended ruling in Cases Nos. C6236.8 appropriating P1. set aside its dismissal of the said cases. C-6230.13 The CA consolidated the appeals and docketed them as CA-G. NHA likewise filed with the CA an appeal from the decision in C-6226. C-6228. PHHC’s successor. C-6226. C-6233 and C-6236 in which it ordered the condemnation of the involved lots. C-6234. declaring that plaintiffappellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots involved for the public use stated in the complaint. C-6255 and C-6435.00 per square meter. C6231. C-6225. et al.00 per square meter in the said cases. C-6232. C-6235. C-6231. C-6227. and not contrary to morals or public policy. No. we denied their Motion for Extension of Time to file a petition for review on certiorari for their failure to submit an affidavit of service of the motion as required by Circular No. No. the owners of the lots in C-6227.24 In the March 2. The motion for reconsideration of movant Alejandro Oracion (in Special Civil Action No.20 Petitioner Manapat. The decision of this Court promulgated May 27. Julia Diez and Remedios Macato. two of the owners of the lots in C-6225. Lot No.17 Likewise. 1993 Decision of the CA. No pronouncement as to costs. Block No. Lot No.21 We initially dismissed this petition for having been filed out of time. . 1994 Resolution. and Remedios Macato in C-6227—moved for the reconsideration of the said May 27. we dismissed their petition for failure to sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible error in the challenged decision. filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the appellate court [Their petition was docketed as G. Block No. Diaz in Case No. 157 owned by Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque are declared exempt from expropriation and the corresponding complaints for expropriation (sic) DISMISSED insofar as said lots are concerned.R. 1993. Alejandro Oracion. 6231) are GRANTED.accordance with law. the portion to be determined by the lower court in the manner most beneficial to the owner and consistent with the objective of PD 1072. 19-91. the defendant-landowner in C-6229. On September 5. Only the remaining Ninety (90) square meters shall be the subject of expropriation. Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque in C-6231. and rendering judgment in accordance therewith. 26.16 An Entry of Judgment was issued on February 2. 1995. 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED.18 After denying their motion for reconsideration. 5) Ordering Remedios Macato to be joined as defendant with Julia C. 6227) are DENIED. Nos. in G. Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos (in Special Civil Action No. 110770.25 the appellate court resolved the motions in this wise: WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. 110462-74]. 4. 6435) is partially granted to the extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters of Lot 22. Block 157. and Lot No. the motion for reconsideration of movants Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and Philippine Realty Corporation (in Special Civil Action No. 22.22but we reinstated it on motion for reconsideration. 1993. 1994. 6435) and movants Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque (in Special Civil Action No. also elevated the case before us via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G. 157 owned by movant Alejandro Oracion is declared exempt from expropriation to the extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters. Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos in C-6435. Gonzalo Mercado.19 we issued an Entry of Judgment on August 27. 157 owned by Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos. Block No. The motions for reconsideration of movants Gonzalo Mercado.R. premises considered. C-6227.R. On July 28. however. 110478. assailed before us the afore-quoted CA decision through a petition under Rule 45.23 In the meantime. the other defendants-landowners in the expropriation cases—RCAM/PRC in C-6225. 6225) and movant-intervenor Remedios Macato (in Special Civil Action No.15 Rosemarie and Dolores Guanzon. The Issues Thus. 1994 are DENIED. as aforesaid. 1994 CA Resolution specifically with regard to the exemption from expropriation of the lots of Loberanes. assailing the March 2.26 IT IS SO ORDERED. NHA moved for the reconsideration of the same. Quimque.R. should not have allowed the expropriation of his lot. elevated the case to us via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G. Santos.R.R. de Guzman of the decision promulgated May 27. Vega. REMOVES FROM THE JUDICIARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING. the beneficiary of the expropriation. NHA’s petition was docketed as G. 110487. 27159. CV No. one of the owners of the lots subject of C-6226. the appealed decision dated October 29. 116491503 of the NHA. Accordingly. The dispositive portion of the July 25. 1993 and of plaintiff-appellant National Housing Authority of the resolution promulgated March 2. together with the belated motion of Vivencio S. and the partial exemption of the lot of Oracion. To further support his stance. No. 1994 Resolutions of the appellate court. reversing the RTC’s ruling in C-6226.R. on June 28. SO ORDERED. In a separate development. Let the record of this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Nos. (2) G.33 II . In G.SO ORDERED. 116176. CV No. No. it would be incongruous to take the land away from him only to give it back to him as an intended beneficiary. Vega and Santos. 10200-10212. the defendantlandowner in C-6255. Nos.R. 1986 is hereby REVERSED for want of merit.27 the appellate court denied NHA’s motion. Manapat raises the following grounds: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ISSUANCE MADE IN THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.R.32 WHEREFORE. Mercado. 1994 and the July 25.R. and (3) G. the motions for reconsideration of defendantappellant Vivencio S.31 Aggrieved by the said March 2. for resolution by this Court are the following consolidated cases: (1) G. NHA filed with this Court a Consolidated Petition for Review29under Rule 45. in its May 27. FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED. petitioner Domingo Lim.R. the CA. rendered its Decision30 in CA-G. In the subsequent July 25.28 With the denial of its motion for reconsideration. 110478 of Manapat. 116491-503 against respondents Loberanes and Quimque (in C-6231). THERE BEING NO SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 1994 Resolution reads: Discontented with the appellate court’s ruling. 1994 Resolution. No. 1994. Oracion and Mercado (in C6435). the CA. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. No. as he is also a member of the tenant association. 116176 of Lim. petitioner Manapat argues in the main that. de Guzman. 1993 Decision in CA-G. SPECIFYING THE LOTS TO BE EXPROPRIATED AND THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED. 1994 Resolution and modified the May 27. therefore.R.42 In G. should not be given retroactive effect. Oracion and Mercado. primarily contends that the CA erred when it issued its March 2. Santos. Republic Act No. CV No. 1020010212 to the extent that it applied retroactively Article VI.) No. Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.39 B. No. 7279 to the subject expropriation cases instituted back in 1977 by petitioner-appellant NHA. 116491-503.R.34 III THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT FERMIN MANAPAT IS NOT ONLY A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT IN THE GRACE PARK SUBDIVISION FOR PURPOSES OF P. Section 10 of Republic Act No. Section 10 of RA 7279 will affect vested rights of petitioner-appellant NHA arising from its exercise of the power of eminent domain.41 II The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the impractical consequences resulting from a selective expropriation of lots. Nos. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992 should operate prospectively and. 7279. 116176.37 A. Quimque. 1072 BUT LIKEWISE HAS A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 42370 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CALOOCAN OVER THE SAME LOT SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED WHICH SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK AS DISPOSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in pari materia. in its petition in G.D. thus exempting from expropriation the 300-sq m lots of respondents Loberanes. Vega. NHA summarized its arguments as follows: I The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Article VI.R.SUPERVENING EVENT RENDERS IMPROPER THE DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION DECLARING THAT NHA HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT TO TAKE THE LOT OF FERMIN MANAPAT FOR SUPPOSED PUBLIC USE AND FOR REMAND OF HIS CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION.40 The retroactive application of Article VI.38 Republic Act 7279 is a substantive and penal law with a penalty clause which cannot apply retroactively especially to pending actions.43 argues as follows: 1 . a non-member of the tenant association who bought from RCAM/PRC four lots of the subdivided Grace Park Subdivision. petitioner Lim. 1993 Decision in CA-G.36 NHA.35 IV THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE EVENTUAL BENEFICIARIES OF ITS BENEVOLENT EXPROPRIATION ARE SQUATTERS. Also called the power of expropriation.44 2 There really was no genuine necessity for the expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy the purpose thereof as alleged in the complaint therefor. The Court’s Ruling The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause. . Over the years and in a plethora of cases. and consider and treat them as one again for the purpose of subdividing it once more into still smaller lots for distribution to its supposed or intended beneficiaries. 51 the power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. one of which is. it is by no means absolute. and (5) the taking must comply with due process of law. Its exercise is subject to limitations. However.52 Albeit the power partakes of a sovereign character. and even to private enterprises performing public services.45 3 Respondent Court did not sustain the clear finding of the trial court that no evidence sufficient to prove its claim that the expropriation of said lots and subdividing them again into much smaller lots for resale to their present occupants would provide the latter with more healthful. Article III of the Constitution. local government units. Section 9. (3) the taking must be for public use. Section 9.46 Stripped of non-essentials. precisely. and that is. this Court has recognized the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property.53 Accordingly. the question that this Court must resolve is whether these requisites have been adequately addressed.49 Being inherent.50 Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State.Respondent NHA may not. legally regroup several smaller lots into which a much bigger lot had previously been subdivided." merely imposes a limit on the government’s exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s right to property. as it would herein. the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution. (4) there must be payment of just compensation. decent and peaceful surroundings and thus improve the quality of their lives was ever presented by respondent NHA. (2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private property.48 and is clearly superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case. it is described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method "in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. Article III of the Constitution. which mandates that "private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation. whether the NHA may validly expropriate the parcels of land subject of these cases. it may be delegated by Congress to the President. the petitions raise only one fundamental issue."47 By virtue of its sovereign character. administrative bodies. Around 510 families with approximately 5 members each will be benefited by the project. Guerrero. . the authority to expropriate came from Presidential Decree No. and the courts have no power to interfere." we examine the purpose for which the expropriation was undertaken by NHA. the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site. said: "Socialized housing" is defined as. At that time.55 However.54 we declared that the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity. issued by then President Ferdinand E. speaking eloquently for the Court." Justice Irene R. Perforce.was directed by legislation.56 Thus. in Sumulong v.It is incontrovertible that the parcels of land subject of these consolidated petitions are private property. In the instant cases. in City of Manila v. and as explicitly recognized under the 1973 Constitution. and that necessity must be of a public character. including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. the question of necessity is essentially a political question. including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres.60 It is an integral part of the government’s "socialized housing" program which. As to the third requisite of "public use. --. 1).D.57 we held: The legislature. Marcos in 1977. or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people. the extent of the public necessity for its construction. it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement. the first requisite is satisfied.58 The only remaining obstacle in the completion of this project is the lots subject of these consolidated petitions as the other lots in Grace Park have already been expropriated. being implemented for government by NHA. par. the expropriation of the subject properties – identified with specificity in the P. As a rule. and it may select the exact location of the improvement. in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 1224. With respect to the second. are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine. This definition was later expanded to include among others: a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the society. the expediency of constructing it. when the power is exercised by the Legislature. draws breath from policy mandates found in the 1987 Constitution. it being a program clearly devoted to a "public purpose. Chinese Community. President Marcos had legislative powers. 1072. Cortes. The issue of necessity then assumed the nature of a political question. it is well to recall that in Lagcao v. "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society. Judge Labra.59 The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP). may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use. In such a case. the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question. Decree No. Thus. NHA justifies the taking of the subject property for the purpose of improving and upgrading the area by constructing roads and installing facilities thereon under the Government’s zonal improvement program and subdividing them into much smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified beneficiaries. mostly underprivileged long-time occupants of Grace Park.61 we deemed compliant with the "public use" requirement. As set forth in its petition. in cooperation with the private sector. parks. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. The General Assembly is "[s]eriously concerned that. schools. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health. 7]. [Art. sec. footpaths. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international community on those problems". the living conditions of the majority of the people in slums and . Emphasis supplied) Housing is a basic human need. such as roads. all at once. drainage. A beginning has to be made. promote full employment. II. 1) The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services. a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. sec. water and power system. by law. a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. d) The provision of economic opportunities. playgrounds and other recreational facilities. community centers. the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries. urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose. and e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No. not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. including the development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth.b) Slum clearance. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that: Population growth. (Pres. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish. where there are none. xxxx Specifically. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. the environment and in sum. sewerage. clinics. maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. Decree No. 757. II. for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it. sec. the general welfare. safety. 9] The state shall. c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved. barangay centers. 1259. 9. sec. undertake. XIII. relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services. despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local levels and of international organizations. and for the common good. open spaces. rearrangement and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services. (Art. given that the Constitution speaks of lands. It is. 1224 which should be construed in relation with the preceding three paragraphs. Our Constitution is much more explicit. not of landed estates.5 square meters per lot64 --. Res. being himself a beneficiary of the expropriation (because he has been a long-time resident of Grace Park). v. nor be entitled to the same area of the land they now have. and Mercado. So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in the above opinion but in another concurring opinion quoted with approval in at least two of our subsequent decisions. We had . 36. that the "public use" requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. Fernando. it would be incongruous for government to take his land away from him only to give it back to him. Reyes in Republic v. and those similarly situated as he. p. L. B. Vol. continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms. This contention sadly fails to comprehend the public purpose for the taking under the "socialized housing" program. Santos. At present. the Court said: This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by the property owner. The parcels of land subject of the expropriation are. Laissez faire. Manapat. we have petitioner Lim and respondents Vega. In that case.squatter areas and rural settlements.66 that the propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis.at an average of 66. This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its "nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions" although not extending as far as the "destruction or annihilation" of the rights to property. 37/221. Yearbook of the United Nations 1982.62 It need only be added. being taken so that they can be subdivided into much smaller lots --. at this juncture. Inc. or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project. J. cannot assert any right to be awarded the very same lots they currently occupy. This is not so under our Constitution. 1043-4] In the light of the foregoing. Land Tenure Administration65 is instructive. petitioner Manapat insists that. Tuason & Co. Upon the completion of the project. this Court adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice J.for distribution to deserving dwellers in the area. M." [G. Speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique M. or slum clearance. Then. did not take too firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Oracion. No. negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. precisely.A.63 Still. Dec. it may not be amiss to state that whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.. this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". especially in developing countries. relocation and resettlement. Baylosis. There is no room for it for laissez faire. as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919. who argue that the lots they own should not be expropriated are already titled in their names and are very small in area. We are not persuaded. being already the subdivided portions of the original Grace Park Subdivision. Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing. our answer to the singular and fundamental issue in these consolidated cases is: YES. Dimayuga68 and the aforecited Sumulong v. This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the expropriation of land is a clear manifestation of such a policy that finds expression in our fundamental law. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. the due process clause. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras in the Baylosis case.72 "Small property owners" are owners of residential lands with an area not exceeding 300 sq m in highly urbanized cities and 800 sq m in other urban areas and who do not own any other real property. the said determination is a judicial prerogative. have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic. So is the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution of which it is an expression. The Court’s departure from the land size or area test finds further affirmation in its rulings in Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association. and only ‘because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. all the parties have been given their day in court. for purposes of urban development and housing under the Act. decided barely two months ago. urban land reform and housing.’ continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. One final matter: the propriety of the application by the CA of R. indeed adopted as a national policy.occasion to reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally. We quote: "The growing complexities of modern society. 70 As to the observance of the fifth requisite.A. the appellate .A. otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted. The Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R. No. not to say obsolete.67 we had occasion to declare that the fact that the property is less than ½-hectare and that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its public use character. however." In a more recent decision. by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. Under case law. where expropriation is resorted to. 7279. No. Guerrero. it is clear that "public use. inasmuch as "public use" now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. the opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal. Why it should be thus is so plausibly set forth in the ACCFA decision. the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land. has been adequately fulfilled. To satisfy the fourth requisite. Thus. Here of course this development was envisioned. as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting opinions of Justice J.L. That they are now before this Court is attestation enough that they were not denied due process of law. From the foregoing disquisitions. 727971 that. we affirm the appellate court’s disposition that the subject cases be remanded to the trial court for the determination of the amount of just compensation.73 Invoking this limitation under the said law.B. v." as a requisite for the exercise of eminent domain in the instant cases. it is unmistakable that all the requirements for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain have been complied with. including in particular.69 Given this discussion. Inc. in the expropriation proceedings. The law looks forward. 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).00 (100% of the value of the property based on . not the past. Mercado. Vega and Santos. REPUBLIC V ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORP VILLARAMA. petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of possession.A. R. Monica. CV No. of Macabebe. 1994 Resolutions in CA-G. the Court finds that the language of R. JR.R. J. shall be traversed by the expansion of the San Simon Interchange. unless the contrary is provided."76 The law’s prospective application being clearly stated. CV Nos. The affected area. consisting of 2. "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect.: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Branch 54. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet. and the March 2. and partially exempted the lot of Oracion. and reduced the annual legal interest awarded from 12% to 6% per annum. 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. almost two decades after the expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977.R. stating that it deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) the amount of P607. CV No. 1994 Decision in CA-G. 1994 and the July 25. Subsequently."75 In these consolidated cases. Pampanga. Section 49 of the said law indicates that it "shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.74 Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares.024 square meters. assailing the July 21. Province of Pampanga and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. an integral component of the construction. non praeteritis. PREMISES CONSIDERED. CV No. 271813-R. 7279 was enacted in 1992. The CA partially affirmed the September 21. 2 3 4 As culled from the records. 27159 are AFFIRMED.. 2002.R. No. 5 On March 1.A. 2010 Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.200. 10200-10212 and the June 28. as amended. Quimque. WHEREFORE. the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from expropriation. the May 27.R. 10200-10212 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 90539. the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) instituted expropriation proceedings against the respondent over a portion of their property. Also assailed is the appellate court's April 28. 1âwphi1 The CA’s ruling on this point is incorrect. not backward.court in the questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the lots owned by Loberanes. SO ORDERED. On the contrary. No. Municipality of San Simon. the following are the pertinent facts: Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation (respondent) is the registered owner of a 17. rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX Project).175-square meter property situated in Barangay Sta. 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. A new statute should affect the future. ranging from P1. Residential . 6 7 On March 19.00 to P3.000.600.was an unofficial valuation.821. and hence the court has the ministerial duty to place petitioner in possession pursuant to Section 2.the BIR zonal valuation .00 to P2. 9 During the pre-trial conference.ranging from P2. 11 On June 9.ranging from P1. as per Vicinity Map hereto attached as Annex "B".200.00 to P2. and industrial (mixed land use).00 per square meter 2.00 deposited by petitioner with the LBP as partial payment for just compensation. 8 In its Answer with Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. 2002.200. Quezon Road. the parties agreed on TRB’s authority to expropriate the subject property but disagreed as to the amount of just compensation. Real Estate Brokers/Independent Appraisers/Owners. Respondent asserted that just compensation should be at P3. not by the Asset Valuation Department of the BIR National Office.ranging from P2. 271813-R.500.036.00 per square meter . 2004.00 or at P1.000. 8974 (R.A. The area is along MacArthur Highway.] In the absence of bonafide sales transaction in the area. the trial court issued an order granting petitioner’s motion and directing the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cause the annotation of the writ of possession on TCT No.ranging from P2.000. Petitioner offered to pay P607. Commercial .000. Industrial .current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR]) in accordance with Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. the Assessor’s Office being aware of the actual conditions of subject property decided to use opinion values in the determination of the current and fair market value for the purpose of payment of just compensation.00 per square meter 2. 2004.000. the trial court granted respondent’s motion to withdraw the P607. commercial. OPINION VALUES A.000.500.00 to P3.00 above per square meter B. being merely based on an internal memorandum issued by BIR Revenue District No. 8794). 1. Residential .00 per square meter plus consequential damages. 21. Municipal and Barangay Roads[. respondent questioned the TRB’s authority to expropriate the subject property and objected to petitioner’s offered compensation which respondent deems unjust because the basis thereof .000. and the RTC Branch Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga as Members. the Commissioners submitted their Report with the following findings and recommendation: The affected lot is within the area wherein the land use are residential. Banks and Financial Institutions 1. The parties eventually agreed to submit the issue of just compensation to three Commissioners composed of the Municipal Assessor of San Simon as Chairman.00. Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.00 for the portion taken but respondent made a counter-offer of P1. Commercial . considering the fair market value and the industrial classification of the subject property.000.00 per square meter 3. etc. 10 On June 1.500. 500. Concerning the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C) notarized on July 19. municipal roads.00 to P1. There is an existing toll plaza on the right lane of the expressway facing the direction of Manila with blue colored roofing. The zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Exhibits A and B with submarkings) is merely a gauge or is necessary in the assessment of correct transfer taxes by the said office. The amount of P1.00 to P1. It has an area of 2. The unexpropriated portion of the land of defendant is presently very much below the level of the expressway In its Decision. 2004.00 to P1. It is swampy with little water.151 square meters. 23-98 took effect only last February 2. the same was undated and pertains only to a right of way.00 to P1. There was no fraud or prejudice that tainted the report.00 was arrived at by the undersigned commissioners due to the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to industrial use as evidenced by the Order of Conversion dated July 8.00 per square meter because the expressway was upgraded. Department of Agrarian Reform. 1991.3. It is immediately adjacent to the existing expressway. and the improvement/development put in place. the Court finds the commissioners’ recommendation of the valuation of industrial lands at P1. absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.00 per square meter to be very low. The Court finds the valuation of the Republic of the Philippines which was pegged at Php300. x x x xxxx Using the recommendation of the three (3) commissioners as guide.000.ranging from P1. 2002. Padilla.00 to be fair. 4. per square meter.500. the just compensation pertaining to easement of right of way should be lower than that in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The expropriated portion which is shown in a sketch which was marked as Exhibit H is indicated by its color: green.00. An easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself. on its right side facing Manila. located as it is. during which the trial court noted the following: 1. Comprised in the aforesaid toll plaza are three toll booths. Series of 1994 issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga (Exhibit E) which was issued eight (8) years also prior to the filing of the complaint.000. Hence. recommended an amount ranging from P1. 2.021 square meters. issued by Renato B. 3. Undersecretary.500. Residential . The third booth located on the extreme right facing Manila occupies a portion of the expropriated portion of defendant’s property. Philippine currency. 17. the trial court ruled as follows: x x x Although there was no documentary evidence attached to substantiate the opinions of the banks and the realtors indicated in the Commissioners’ Report.000. 13 Appraisal conducted by the Assessor of San Simon. Furthermore the Department Order No. 12 On September 23.000. the Court finds the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE . and barangay roads. an ocular inspection was conducted in the presence of the parties’ representatives and their respective counsels. Pampanga for various properties within the area. The remaining unexpropriated portion of defendant’s land has an area of 15. depending on their proximity to the national roads.500. 1998 which was four (4) years prior to the filing of the complaint. The same is true with Ordinance No. a xerox copy of which is hereto attached [as] Annex "C". 14 Petitioner appealed to the CA. 3) Condemning the property subject of expropriation free from all liens and encumbrances for the construction. Thus: It is equally settled that the valuation of a property in tax declarations cannot be a substitute to just compensation. 1316] with an area of 2. hence. Ordinance No. 2002 between San Simon Realty. the valuation of properties therein can by no means be reflective of the current. we cannot appreciate the herein tax declaration in favor of the Republic.A. 16 After examining the records. While the provisional value is based on the zonal value as may be determined by the BIR. It held that while BIR zonal valuation may be a factor in determining just compensation. San Simon.00) per square meter as just compensation for the property subject of expropriation. Inc. No.00 based on the valuation of Php1.024. Certainly.00) representing the net amount of just compensation after deducting the partial payment of P607. just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property. Necessarily. The CA upheld the trial court’s ruling. Monica.500. Accordingly. 17. 1994 or eight (8) years prior to the institution of the herein complaint. Elsewise stated. plan (LRC) Psd246403. Further. the zonal valuation of properties is not equivalent to their fair market value. the value thereof should be considerably lower. was issued on June 22.024 square meters situated in Sta. as correctly found by the RTC. San Simon.00 per square meter and that the correct rate of interest is 6% per annum. the CA noted that petitioner itself admitted that the BIR zonal valuation is only for the purpose of determining the correct amount of transfer taxes. being a portion of lot 329. the same is not a competent basis thereof. the CA found no reversible error in the trial court’s determination of just compensation and held that the valuation of P1. Citing R. 2002) until fully paid less taxes due on the land.300. Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. it is uncontested that the deed of sale dated July 19. arguing that the just compensation should not be more than P300. 8974. 271813-R plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time of taking (March 21. judgment is rendered: 1) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in the amount of TWO MILLION TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php2. It stressed that any valuation for just compensation laid down in statutes merely serve as guides or factors and may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. . the market value reflected in the tax declaration of the condemned property is no longer conclusive. premises considered.300. SO ORDERED. Cad Rec.00 per square meter on the expropriated portion of the parcel of land [Lot 329-A of the subdivision.HUNDRED PESOS (Php1. WHEREFORE. rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway.00 per square meter is more in consonance with the concept of just compensation based upon due consideration of all evidence. LRC. 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs and/or expenses in relation to the transfer of ownership of the property in its favor from defendant Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation. and the Republic pertained only to a right of way. the CA pointed out the distinction between provisional value as a precondition for the issuance of a writ of possession and the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. reiterating the principle that the determination of just compensation is an inherently judicial function.200.000. 15 Further. In this case. We grant the petition. the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 2004. As a rule. The Republic failed to present evidence to controvert he RTC’s finding on the matter. This being so. a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.300. We cannot.4% more than the 1998 BIR zonal value for an underdeveloped industrial land at the time of its taking. on the other hand. A question of fact.A. having conducted an ocular inspection on September 23. 2010. the legal basis of which is allegedly insufficient. Neither has it shown that the property sold thereunder shares the same features as the herein subject property as to warrant a similar valuation. after considering all the arguments raised by petitioner and the evidence on record. On the other hand. respondent contends that no reversible error was committed by the CA in affirming the trial court’s decision 19 For a question to be one of law. and in no case should it amount to the market value ofP1. It asserts that the main issue of just compensation and the findings thereon by the trial court as affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which should not be disturbed by this Court. Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review. Considering such factors and the evidence submitted by the parties before the trial court. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. respondent asserts that the determination by the trial court is entitled to the highest respect considering that the judge has personal knowledge of the condition of the subject property. is unbelievably 433. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of expropriated land taken for national government infrastructure projects. stating that the argument on valuation by petitioner was merely a rehash of what the CA had already passed upon.024-square meter portion of respondent’s 17. 20 Section 5 of R.00 per square meter). 8974. thus. yield to the Republic’s submission that its evidence are the proper basis in determining just compensation for Asia Pacific’s property. 17 However.00 per square meter adjudged by the trial and appellate courts. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.prevailing and fair value of the subject property. On April 28. Moreover. this petition assailing the CA’s affirmance of the trial court’s award of just compensation. thus: . 18 Petitioner argues that the evidence for determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases should be on those factors provided in Section 5 of R. the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. petitioner maintains that just compensation for the subject property should be no more than the zonal valuation (P300. the CA modified the rate of interest imposed on the amount due as just compensation from 12% to 6% in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence. exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.175-square meter property. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is established. the only legal issue raised by petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just compensation on the factors provided under existing laws and jurisprudence.A. Petitioner claims that such huge sum for only 2. the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence. It also found the commissioners’ recommended valuation of P1. 21 Similarly. were not substantiated by any documentary evidence. in National Power Corporation v. the following relevant standards: (a) The classification and use for which the property is suited.000. among other well-established factors. this Court rejected the valuation recommended by court-appointed commissioners whose conclusions were devoid of any actual and reliable basis.SECTION 5. tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land. In National Power Corporation v.00 per square to be fair and just despite the absence of documentary substantiation as said prices were based merely on the opinions of bankers and realtors. – In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation. oral as well as documentary evidence presented. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the . Thus. and (h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation.500. (f) The size. (g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings. the recommended price of the city assessor was rejected by this Court. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. Indeed. but the owner’s loss. 23 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. (d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity. the trial court considered only (a) and (d): (1) the classification of the subject property which is located in an area with mixed land use (commercial. tax declarations or zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments. In this case. tax declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. The opinions of the banks and the realtors as reflected in the computation of the market value of the property and in the Commissioners’ Report. we ruled that a commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. 22 We find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation. the court may consider. and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible. just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily. shape or location. residential and industrial) and the property’s conversion from agricultural to industrial land. (c) The value declared by the owners. but determined after an evaluation of different factors.00 to P1. and (2) the current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity – the only factors which the commissioners included in their Report. The measure is not the taker’s gain. (b) The developmental costs for improving the land. (e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of the improvements thereon. The market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots were found to be mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents. such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned. Diato-Bernal. " The above ruling finds support in EPZA v. However. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. but not necessarily the sole. it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Individual differences are never taken into account. 30 31 . As this Court ruled in Leca Realty Corporation v." (Emphasis supplied. full. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice. shape. the decision of the court must be based on all established rules. or it may accept the report/recommendation of the commissioners in toto and base its judgment thereon. we cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that just compensation for the subject property should not exceed the zonal valuation (P300. Trial courts are required to be more circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner. 26 "x x x [Market value] is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. coconuts or other crops. x x x Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. the current value of like properties. these values may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property. the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. com.00 per square meter). this index cannot be the sole basis of "just compensation" in expropriation cases. we held that -27 The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property. location. Manubay Agro-Industrial held thus: 25 We agree with the trial court that it was not bound by the assessment report of the commissioners and that it had the discretion to reject the same and substitute its own judgment on its value as gathered from the record. substantial. Rep. In Republic v. Such "just"-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property. their size. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. of the Phils. However. and in the particular case of lands. Court of Appeals. National Power Corporation v. By itself. Very often land described as 'cogonal' has been cultivated for generations.) 1âwphi1 Nonetheless. index of the value of a realty. The zonal value may be one. broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives. To be just. and ample. its actual or potential uses. considering that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.property to be taken shall be real. and the tax declarations thereon. Dulay in this wise: "Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises. in alleging that the values were exorbitant. and one who desires to sell. : 28 29 Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition. upon correct legal principles and competent evidence. however. 24 The Republic is incorrect. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. merely because they exceeded the maximum zonal value of real properties in the same location where the subject properties were located. the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. On June 10.: THIRD DIVISION 32 This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation. the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte.It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under R.A. one of the trucks with plate no. 2009 and Resolution dated April 28. RFT-9-6673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a headon-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. On the other hand. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw. ROMERO. NPC V CA WHEREFORE. DECISION On July 22. as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. Marawi City. 8974 and not merely based on the declarations of the parties. in conformity with this Decision. The Decision dated July 21. 1979. NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. Moreover. CV No. 90539 are hereby SET ASIDE. enroute to its destination. Since these requirements were not satisfactorily complied with. . it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latters projects. J. a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. SO ORDERED. Unfortunately. 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. remand of this case to the trial court is in order. and in the absence of reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property. 1980. 55 representing the actual or compensatory damages incurred by the plaintiffs. 1988 absolving NPC of any liability. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. there must exist an employeremployee relationship. (Martin vs. which on November 10.After trial on the merits. as Phesco is admittedly a labor only contractor of Napocor. 205 SCRA 591). the trial court rendered a decision dated July 25. 1994 reversed the trial courts judgment. and 2.154. Inc. National Labor Relations Commission. even if Phesco hired driver Gavino Ilumba. National Labor Relations Commission. judgment is hereby rendered ordering PHESCO.00 representing Attorneys fees. In lieu thereof. 195 SCRA 224). PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals.000. (Ecal vs. WHEREFORE. So. A finding that a contractor is a labor only contractor is equivalent to a finding that there is an employer- employee relationship between the owner of the project and the employees of the labor only contractor (Industrial Timer Corporation vs. the statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). to hold the employer liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. in view of the foregoing consideration. and Gavino Ilumba upon receipt hereof: 1. National Labor Relations Commission. we REVERSE the appealed decision. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan College the sum of P954. Consequently. as there was no employment relationship between Phesco and driver Gavino Ilumba. 202 SCRA 465). the Court renders judgment sentencing defendant National Power Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of . 194 SCRA 525). SO ORDERED. To pay the sum of P50. We quote the pertinent portion of the decision: A labor only contractor is considered merely as an agent of the employer (Deferia vs. The dispositive portion reads: Consequently. Dissatisfied. we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba. Court of Appeals. AND CONSEQUENTLY. .20 plus P20. It alleges that it did not have the power of selection and dismissal nor the power of control over Ilumba.00 as attorneys fees and costs. 1995. and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools. IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT. It must be noted that under the Memorandum.[3] PHESCO.[4] Before we decide who is the employer of Ilumba. denied on February 9.[5] Absent these requisites. it is evidently necessary to ascertain the contractual relationship between NPC and PHESCO. machineries.889. we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only contracting. equipment.P174.000. Was the relationship one of employer and job (independent) contractor or one of employer and labor only contractor? Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method. therefore. NPC assigns the sole error that: THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FINDING THAT PETITIONER NPC AS THE EMPLOYER OF THE DRIVER GAVINO ILUMBA. what exists is a labor only contract under which the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was its employee. SENTENCING IT TO PAY THE ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY COMPLAINANTS. SO ORDERED.[2] As earlier stated. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof. [1] Hence. NPC had mandate to approve the critical path network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO. who is the employer of Ilumba. The principal query to be resolved is.[6] Taking into consideration the above distinction and the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC. would be liable for damages to the victims. however. work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. driver of the dumptruck which figured in the accident and which should. this petition. NPC filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was. Specifically. meanwhile. argues that it merely acted as a recruiter of the necessary workers for and in behalf of NPC. as between NPC and PHESCO. Chagrined by the sudden turnaround. [11] Furthermore. is related to NPCs principal business of power generation. the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Accordingly.[14] After all. NPC cites Section 9(b). Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which reads: In other words.[9] Another consideration is that even in the procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO. [7] However.[13] Since PHESCO is only a labor-only contractor. including the driver of the ill-fated truck. To bolster its position.e. an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the employees of the labor-only contractor is created.[15] Under this factual milieu.[12] employees of NPC.[16] Stated otherwise. NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only to compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions. i. again NPCs concurrence is needed.[8] Then too.[10] Notably. it is considered merely an agent of the latter.. In labor-only contracting. it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. rest periods. NPC maintains that even assuming that a labor only contract exists between it and PHESCO. should be considered as (b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of the employee of the labor-only contractor. either for the performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower. it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters into an agreement with a job contractor.Likewise. the manning schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation by NPC. NPCs favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and equipment can be purchased. there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in labor-only contracting vis--vis NPC and as such. NPCs control over PHESCO in matters concerning the performance of the latters work is evident. it must be emphasized that the project being undertaken by PHESCO. Rule VII. construction of power energy facilities. it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease. In sum. It is enough that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as the employer. the workers it supplied to NPC. assumes responsibility over the employees of the latter. and . its liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasidelicts. wages and shall not extend to liabilities suffered by third parties, viz.: Consequently, the responsibilities of the employer contemplated in a labor only contract, should, consistent with the terms expressed in the rule, be restricted to the workers.The same can not be expanded to cover liabilities for damages to third persons resulting from the employees tortious acts under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[17] The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case. To be sure, the pronouncement of this Court in Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC,[18] is most instructive: The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling in Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co.,[19] finds applicability in the instant case, viz.: It is well to repeat that under the civil law an employer is only liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties. The defense of independent contractor would be a valid one in the Philippines just as it would be in the United States. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the employer retained the power of directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his negligence defendant was responsible. Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the labor only contractor. This is consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a laboronly contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor, including the latters workers.[20] With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver.[21] Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action.[22] Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the driver, could still have disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of due diligence in the selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba. [23] However, for some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said defense. Hence, by opting not to present any evidence thatit exercised due diligence in the supervision of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right to interpose the same on appeal in conformity with the rule that points of law, theories, issues of facts and arguments not raised in the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal.[24] Consequently, its liability stands. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 1994 and its accompanying resolution dated February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement of the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants. No costs. SO ORDERED. ARDONA V REYES This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners: Civil Cases Nos. R-19562, R-19684, R-20701, and R-21608 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch 1). The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. As uniformly alleged in the complaints, the purposes of the expropriation are: Plaintiff, in line with the policy of the government to promote tourism and development of tourism projects will construct in Barangays Malubog, Busay and Babag, all of Cebu City, a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback riding for the use of the public. The development plan, covering approximately 1,000 hectares, includes the establishment of an electric power grid in the area by the National Power Corporation, thus assuring the supply of electricity therein for the benefit of the whole community. Deep wells will also be constructed to generate water supply within the area. Likewise, a complex sewerage and drainage system will be devised and constructed to protect the tourists and nearby residents from the dangers of pollution. Complimentary and support facilities for the project will be constructed, including public rest houses, lockers, dressing rooms, coffee shops, shopping malls, etc. Said facilities will create and offer employment opportunities to residents of the community and further generate income for the whole of Cebu City. xxx xxx xxx V Plaintiff needs the property above described which is directly covered by the proposed golf court. xxx xxx xxx The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil Case No. R-19864. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution. In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Judge, The respondents have correctly restated the grounds in the petition as follows: A. The complaints for expropriation lack basis because the Constitution does not provide for the expropriation of private property for tourism or other related purposes; B. The writs of possession or orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession is premature because the "public use" character of the taking has not been previously demonstrated; C. The taking is not for public use in contemplation of eminent domain law; D. The properties in question have been previously declared a land reform area; consequently, the implementation of the social justice pro- ,vision of the Constitution on agrarian reform is paramount to the right of the State to expropriate for the purposes intended; E. Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain barangays in Cebu City, which include the lands subject of expropriation as within a tourist zone, is unconstitutional for it impairs the obligation of contracts; "F. Since the properties are within a land reform area, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations, not the lower court, that has jurisdiction pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 946; F. The forcible ejectment of defendants from the premises constitutes a criminal act under Pres. Decree No. 583; xxx xxx xxx In their memorandum, the petitioners have summarized the issues as follows: and security of all the people. 6. The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands Covered by the Land Reform Program Violates the Constitution: V. Presidential Proclamation 2052 is Unconstitutional: VI. Therefore. Article XIV allows the State. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity. Section 6. the State shall regulate the acquisition. Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. Section 2. The Filing of the Present Petition is not Premature. Impairment of the obligation of contracts. Unconstitutional: IV. in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership. The Court of First Instance has no Jurisdiction: VIII. 2. Non-compliance with the "public use" requirement under the eminent domain provision of the Bill of Rights. Article II provides: Sec. Section 13. ownership. Presidential Decree No 1533 is Unconstitutional: VII. enjoyment. The Condemnation is not for Public Use. the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more farreaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned.I. Disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated. and . Towards its end. use. welfare. Presidential Decree 564 Amending Presidential Decree l89 is Constitutionally Repugnant: III. Section 6. 3. Enforcement of the Writ of Possession is Premature: II. The petitioners' arguments in their pleadings in support of the above proposition are subsumed under the following headings: 1. While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation. utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the proposition that the actions to expropriate their properties are constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private property for the promotion of tourism. Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. public interest. 550) categorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous and based on a misconception of fundamentals. We cite all the above provisions on the power to expropriate because of the petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision. this Court in Visayan Refining Co. whenever necessary. v. among others.disposition of private property. The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. Understandably the search would be in vain. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution. Likewise there can be no meaningful agrarian reform program unless the power to expropriate is utilized. As early as 1919. v. local autonomy. conservation and development of the national patrimony. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. 12. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other development programs. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these programs. Article XIV provides: See. Do the purposes of the taking in this case constitute "public use"? . In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. The equitable diffusion of property ownership in the promotion of social justice implies the exercise. this Court emphasized that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. xxx xxx xxx Section 12. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and according to place. It is not a grant of authority The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. Samus (40 Phil. The provision found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state. of the power to expropriate private property. To freeze specific programs like Tourism into express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. and general welfare. but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. The thrust of all constitutional provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction. Camus (supra). S. bridges. In the United States. 72 S Ct 405. 424. At the same time. " The petitioners face two major obstacles. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical. 27) as follows: We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. We have never been a laissez faire State. if not eventual abundance. Insofar as the executive and legislative departments are concerned. markets and slaughterhouses. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. 96 L ed 469. We cannot stop the legitimate exercise of power on an invocation of grounds better left interred in a bygone age and time. spacious as well as clean. We remain as a checking and balancing department even as all strive to maintain respect for constitutional boundaries. There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads. we continue to maintain the liberal approach because the primary responsibility and the discretion belong to them. 342 US 421. the traditional concept of checks and balances in a presidential form was considerably modified to remove some roadblocks in the expeditious implementation of national policies. Second. 25. However. parks. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. There was no such change for the judiciary. or "public welfare" and much less "public convenience. "public benefit". The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. In the present case. and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. See DayBrite Lighting. v. ed. well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism. 472.The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use" means literally use by the public and that "public use" is not synonymous with "public interest". Certain aspects of parliamentary government were introduced by the 1973 amendments to the Constitution with further modifications in the 1976 and 1981 amendments. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. Missouri. the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide . It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy. hospitals. government office buildings. electric and telecommunications systems. Inc. waterworks. Parker (348 U. the philosophy of coordination in the pursuit of developmental goals implicit in the amendments also constrains in the judiciary to defer to legislative discretion iii the judicial review of programs for economic development and social progress unless a clear case of constitutional infirmity is established.* As we review the efforts of the political departments to bring about self-sufficiency. ports. hydroelectric power plants. the rule was enunciated in Berman v. First. aesthetic as well as monetary. 99 L. schools. their contention which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and outmoded. 46 S Ct 39. It is not for us to reappraise them. See Luxton v. there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. It stated: The Circuit Court of Appeals. 580. We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use and that the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the still extent of its statutory authority. Co.. 153 US 525. United States v. But whatever may be the scope of the judicial power to determine what is a "public use" in Fourteenth Amendment controversies. ed 843) unanimously reversed the lower courts. Gettysburg Electric R. xxx xxx xxx . The U. Bowles . 16 S Ct 427. and health services unjustifiably expensive. without expressly relying on a compelling rule of construction that would give the restrictive scope to the T. 14 S Ct 891. In an earlier American case. 530. a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields.variety of values. The Court held that use of the lands for that purpose is a "private" and not a "public use" or. at best. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 679. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary..A.A. 546. a "public use" not authorized by the statute. 529. school. 90 L. See Case v. Gettysburg Electric R.V. and thus came to the conclusion that T. 38 L ed 808. where a village was isolated from the rest of North Carolina because of the flooding of the reservoir of a dam thus making the provision of police. 160 US 668." Old Dominion Land Co.S. The district court and the appellate court ruled against the expropriation or excess condemnation. 160 US 668.. Supreme Court inUnited States ex rel TVA v. United States v.'s purpose in condemning the land in question was only one to reduce its liability arising from the destruction of the highway. North River Bridge Co. 679.S. Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the moment of decision. 16 S Ct 427. 66.. Co. 580. The Court of Appeals applied the "use by the public" test and stated that the only land needed for public use was the area directly flooded by the reservoir. 70 L ed 162. Act given it by the district court. . 269. US 55. we are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals. this Court has said that when Congress has spoken on this subject "Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility. the government decided to expropriate the private properties in the village and the entire area was made part of an adjoining national park. Welch (327 U. Once the object is within the authority of Congress. 810. United States. 40 L ed 576. the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. The village may have been cut off by the dam but to also condemn it was excess condemnation not valid under the "Public use" requirement.V. also interpreted the statute narrowly. It first analyzed the facts by segregating the total problem into distinct parts. 40 L ed 576. v. New York v. Congress authorized the Authority to acquire. In the Philippines. determines what is public use. Chief Justice Enrique M. 559. Highland v. 66 S Ct 438. 49 S Ct 314. Private bus firms. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. the constitution in at least two cases. the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. The other is in the transfer. took the tracts here involved for a public purpose. once the public purpose has been established. pp. roadside restaurants. 1946. hold. 66 S Ct 310). inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. and use the lands to carry out the purposes of the T. then the power of eminent domain comes into play. 326 US 572 ante 326. 523-524) The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants. and other private concerns..V. As long as the purpose of the taking is public. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. 2nd ed. The Constitution of the Philippines. as in the case of streets or parks. . There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. stores. ante. Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. . It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. of utilities and other private enterprise to the government.A. if. and other private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. United States. hotels. 437 US 92. taxicab fleets. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation.decided February 4. North River Bridge Co. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. to remove any doubt.. 101. cf. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy. Act. The rule in Berman u. entertainment and service companies. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners.A. commercial firms. We hold that the T. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. (Fernando. Otherwise. 73 L ed 688. Russel Car & Snow Plow Co. 279 US 253. (US) supra. Fernando has aptly summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follows: The taking to be valid must be for public use. As just noted. Parker (supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean taking from one private person and conferring on another private person applies as well as in the Philippines. It is not any more. etc. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine.. 552. as we think is the case. expropriation is not allowable. through the exercise of this power. Once the object is within the authority of Congress. Selb Luxton v.V. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects. 349) and Visayan Refining Co. of strengthening the country's foreign exchange reserve position. traditions and natural beauty. The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Acquisition of Private Lands. by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes. internationally as well as domestically. Presidential Decree No. if they choose. The Authority may use any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land owners: Provided. too. shows that from the very start of constitutional government in our country judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain proceedings. Parker. is a legitimate means which Congress and its agencies may adopt. vs. encourage. . Camus. it is the avowed aim of the government to promote Philippine tourism and work for its accelerated and balanced growth as well as for economy and expediency in the development of the tourism plant of the country. (Berman v. and of protecting Philippine culture.It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote. 348 US 33. (b) prevention of land speculation in areas declared as tourist zones. What we have said also disposes of any contention concerning the fact that certain property owners in the area may be permitted to repurchase their properties for redevelopment in harmony with the over-all plan. The power of eminent domain is expressly provided for under Section 5 B(2) as follows: xxx xxx xxx 2. which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation proceedings. history. (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones. 34) An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. .The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government-or so the Congress might conclude. and develop Philippine tourism as an instrument in accelerating the development of the country. to exercise the power of eminent domain under its own name. — To acquire by purchase. Declaration of Policy. Power of Eminent Domain. the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter III. 99 L ed 38. (d) protection of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism value. Section 8 to 13 inclusively. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 1. of this Decree shall apply. earlier cited. 564: WHEREAS. That. and (e) for any other purpose expressly authorized under this Decree and accordingly. That in case bonds are used as payment. 473) "parties by entering into contracts may not stop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good. According to them.970 square meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the development of the 808 hectares tourism complex. Arenano Law Colleges. 663 [1950]) That doctrine itself is based on the earlier case of City . only two have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. community centers. The invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. reliance is placed on City of Manila v. The Court stated: xxx xxx xxx . And certainly. What is claimed is that there must be a showing of necessity for such condemnation and that it was not done in this case in support of such a view. Of the 40 defendants. As stated in Manigault v.being of the people. the human settlement needs of the many beneficiaries of the 32 hectares resettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of their compatriots. assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate. Petitioners claim that certificates of land transfer (CLT'S) and emancipation patents have already been issued to them thereby making the lands expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. And this 8. the properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the purposes intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer" under the land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive. We see no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interests. schools. And of the 282 disputed hectares. and essential services like water and electricitywhich are non-existent in the expropriated lands. The nonimpairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. however.xxx xxx xxx The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of the government in raising their second argument. have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The Petitioners. almost all of which is not affected by the land reform program. We have considered the above arguments with scrupulous and thorough circumspection. subsidiary employment. and that property already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use. Genato (69 SCRA 544) which involved the expropriation of land for a public plaza.970 square meters parcel of land is not even within the sports complex proper but forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others similarly situated would be provided with proper housing. that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the health and physical well... (85 Phil." The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the 8.S. 2. Springs (199 U. only 8. For indeed any claim of rights under the social justice and land reform provisions of the Constitution deserves the most serious consideration.970 square meters-less than one hectare-is affected by Operation Land Transfer. and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. (Cf. L-24396. 349) also. it continues: "Towards this end. however." Even the most . xxx xxx xxx The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. a 1919 decision. and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. and shall regulate the relation between landowner and tenant. as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take immediate possession. Moreover. Oct. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42. L-32096.of Manila v. ownership. L-21484. 65 SCRA 416) The statement therefore. the State shall regulate the acquisition. Confederation of Unions. the government. its agency or instrumentality. Ericta. that is merely to accord to what of late has been the consistent course of decisions of this Court whenever property rights are pressed unduly. authorize the least violation of it. As could be discerned. They claim that since the necessity for the taking has not been previously established. like Camus. Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution reads: "The promotion of social justice to unsure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State." (That is the second sentence of Article II. in the Arellano Law Colleges decision. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. enjoyment. especially to working women and minors. L-32052. the issuance of the orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises. Edu v. carries its own refutation. Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Alalayan v. 35 SCRA 481. it was the antiquarian view of Blackstone with its sanctification of the right to one's estate on which such an observation was based. July 29. (Article II. 1975." Article XI. even for the public good. and disposition of private property. After stating that the State shall promote social justice. 42. July 25. Section 6 of the Constitution) If there is any need for explicit confirmation of what was set forth in Presidential Decree No. Section 6 of the same Constitution provides: "The State shall afford protection to labor. control and disposition of the property and the improvements. notwithstanding the . 1968. (50 Phil. Under Presidential Decree No. Chinese Community of Manila. 29. Nov. 30 SCRA 649. Court of Industrial Relations. Phil. cursory glance at such well-nigh absolutist concept of property would show its obsolete character at least for Philippine constitutional law. 1533. when it leaves no doubt that a grantee of the power of eminent domain need not prove the necessity for the expropriation. as well as the corresponding writs of possession was premature. unless there exists a very great necessity thereof. As did appear in his Commentaries: "So great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not. the above provision supplies it. 24. that there could be discerned a constitutional objection to a lower court applying a Presidential Decree. 1969. the present Constitution pays even less heed to the claims of property and rightly so. 1970.") What is more. with power of demolition. use. National Power Corporation. It cannot survive the test of the 1935 Constitution with its mandates on social justice and protection to labor. 24 SCRA 172. June 9. 583. instructions and acts promulgated. As a matter of fact. whether the order of respondent Judge in an expropriation case allowing the other respondent.. or superseded by subsequent proclamations.pendency of the issues before the court.. (According to Article XVII. 52449-50. and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution.. 42 issued on the 9th of November. This contention is not valid. Philippine Tourism Authority (G. or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly") would be characterized as either an act in excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse of discretion. issued. Presidential Decree No.. revoked. the expropriated area does not appear in the master lists of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms as a teranted area. respondent Judge relied on Presidential Decree No. . to take immediate possession of the parcel of land sought to be condemned for the beautification of its public plaza. binding. So we rule. or other acts of the incumbent President... In answer to the issue: . upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated. legal. there being no showing that compliance with the Presidential Decree.. Section 3 par. decrees. orders. decrees instructions. They contend that such forcible ejectment is a criminal act under Presidential Decree No. which under the Transitory Provisions is deemed a part of the law of the land.. this Court held that: . It refers to the harassment of tenant. including the amount to be deposited. It is not disputed that in issuing such order. or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land. (Presidential Decree No. It has nothing to do with the expropriation by the State of lands needed for public purposes.") The question as thus posed does not occasion any difficulty as to the answer to be given. Likewise in Ramos v. orders.. 1980). unless modified. and shall remain valid. The petitioners' bare allegations have not been supported . . without a prior hearing to determine the necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. is vitiated by jurisdictional defect. 1972.R.. This petition for certiorari must fail. Genato (supra). this Court held: . In their last argument. Nos. The issue of immediate possession has been settled in Arce v. (2) of the Constitution: "All proclamations. 583 prohibits the taking cognizance or implementation of orders designed to obstruct the land reform program. the petitioners claim that a consequence of the expropriation proceedings would be their forcible ejectment. 42 is entitled "Authorizing the Plaintiff in Eminent Domain Proceedings to Take Possession of the Property involved Upon Depositing the Assessed Value for Purposes of Taxation. condemnation or expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one that is quasi-in-rem wherein the fact that the owner of the property is made a party is not essentially indispensable insofar was least as it conncerns is the immediate taking of possession of the property and the preliminary determination of its value.farmers who try to enforce emancipation rights. higher incomes. Vera. SO ORDERED. The courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case (People v.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. The petitioners may be owner-tillers or may have some form of possessory or ownership rights but there has been no showing of their being tenants on the disputed lands.667 square meters and 3. Mayor of Manila.with particulars pointing to specific parcels which are subject of tenancy contracts. 56). 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares. v. decent housing. predicated on those assurances. 22 SCRA 424).: On December 5. Our dismissing this petition is. Morfe v. Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6. SUMULONG V GUERRERO CORTES. and better living standards. The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners and other displaced persons productive employment. The petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree whose avowed purpose is the legislative perception is the public good. J. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1. Mutuc. . 65 Phil. in part. 20 SCRA 849. etc.333 square meters respectively. sustained. therefore. WHEREFORE. water and electric facilities. (in Antipolo. The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is. the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSE D for lack of merit. And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. Diliman. d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession.00 representing the total market value of the subject parcels of land.980. Quezon City. January 17. 1224. IV. Heart Center Extension Office. the amount of P158. Pasig." notice and without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28. 1978. The NHA deposited the amount of P158. as defined in said Decree. Metro Manila. is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank. Metro Manila. let a writ of possession be issued. Decree No.980. denied.00 with the Philippine National Bank. this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation. to wit: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 2) Pres. Indeed. 1978 without e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation. SO ORDERED. control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Petitioners argue that: 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17. as amended. the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution. . 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration. 9). specifically: On January 17. pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1978. b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding. is not really for a public purpose. Decree l224. This was however. representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land.Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. as amended. respondent Judge issued the following Order: a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated. Hence. Sec. GUERRERO Judge Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. (SGD) BUENAVENTURA S. as amended. determines what is public use. footpaths. relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services. Public use a) Socialized Housing Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. sec. including the development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth. for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people. "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society. Otherwise. 1259. as in the case of streets or parks. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. to remove any doubt. then the power of eminent domain comes into play. a clear case of constitutional infirmity has to be established for this Court to nullify legislative or executive measures adopted to implement specific constitutional provisions aimed at promoting the general welfare. bereft of public character. As long as the purpose of the taking is public. b) Slum clearance. In this jurisdiction. 1). including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. the constitution in at least two cases. One . and e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No. drainage. clinics. or property without due process of law. sec. just compensation. Nevertheless. As just noted. rearrangemeant and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services. par. 757. where there are none. community centers. d) The provision of economic opportunities." "Socialized housing" is defined as. the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: The taking to be valid must be for public use. water and power system schools. Decree No. 1224. (Pres. sewerage. expropriation is not allowable. and due process have to be balanced against competing interests of the public recognized and sought to be served under declared policies of the constitution as implemented by legislation. parks. c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved. IV. 1) The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Petitioners' objections to the taking of their property subsumed under the headings of public use. It is not anymore. 1). playgrounds and other recreational facilities. such as roads.No person shall be deprived of life. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy. Decree No. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. open spaces. 1. liberty. Decree No. barangay centers. This definition was later expanded to include among others: a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the society. 1224. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. [Art.. (p. the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries. 1977) Emphasis supplied]. a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-5 quoting E. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners. FERNANDO. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. sec. (Art. maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health. The General Assembly is Seriously concerned that. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 523-4. XIII. the driving conditions of the majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements. 9. 60549. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish. Reyes. and for the common good. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. 1983. the general welfare. all at once. II. 9] The state shall by law. safety. G. promote full employment. As discussed in the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona: The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctlylocated public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. 11. sec. despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local levels and of international organizations. Emphaisis supplied) Housing is a basic human need. sec.is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. through the exercise of this power. 231) Specifically. undertake. not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. the environment and in sum. A beginning has to be made. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international community on those problems". 60553-60555 October 26. (2nd ed. We have never been a laissez faire State. in cooperation with the private sector. Nos. urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose. for it is not possible to provide housing for are who need it. The other is in the transfer. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. Population growth. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications.R. 7]. especially in developing . " [G. rolling hills. The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. Of these unacceptable dwelling units. 37/221. 36. National Census and Statistics Office. Up to the present. p. Phase I covers about 60 hectares of GSIS property in Antipolo. Phase II includes about 30 hectares for industrial development and the rest are for residential housing development. According to the National Economic and Development Authority at the time of the expropriation in question. such as shanties. 1637 on April 18. 240]. 1980 Census of Population and Housing]. Rizal. 357-361. and. pp. It is intended for low-salaried government employees and aims to provide housing and community services for about 2. and structures intended for commercial. It is situated on rugged terrain 7.000 families in Phase I and about 4. subsidized either partially or totally" [NEDA. The mushrooming of squatter colonies in the Metropolitan Manila area as well as in other cities and centers of population throughout the country. or slum clearance. from Marikina Town proper. Dec. 22 Kms. particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres.A. continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms. and is within the Lungs Silangan Townsite Reservation (created by Presidential Proclamation No. The lands involved in the present petitions are parts of the expanded/additional areas for the Bagong Nayon Project totalling 25. relocation and resettlement.000 families in Phase II. 357]. A significant number live in dwellings of unacceptable standards. this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use". about "50 per cent of urban families.countries. Vol. MEDIUM-TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992. (Rollo. pp. the efforts of the government to initiate housing and other projects are matters of public knowledge [See NEDA. more than one third is located within the National Capital Region (NCR) alone which lies proximate to and is expected to be the most benefited by the housing project involved in the case at bar [See. industrial. The Bagong Nayong Project is a housing and community development undertaking of the National Housing Authority. p.9725 hectares. housing some remains to be out of the reach of a sizable proportion of the population" [NEDA. p. FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977.5 kms. cannot afford adequate shelter even at reduced rates and will need government support to provide them with social housing. pp. 109- . the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project. In the case at bar. 215-228 NEDA. Res. FIVE YEAR PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1983-1987. natural shelters. Official data indicate that more than one third of the households nationwide do not own their dwelling places. or agricultural purposes. They likewise include raw. Yearbook of the United Nations 1982. 266-7) The acute shortage of housing units in the country is of public knowledge. pp. No. It is. FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977. 1224 which opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing. 1977). east of Manila. FIVE-YEAR PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1978-1982. 1043-4] In the light of the foregoing. NEDA. Quoting respondents: 1. To this end." In J. (Art. It is surprising [therefore] why respondent National Housing Authority [would] include [their] two man lots . 57625. No. pp. Absent a clear showing of fraud. should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions. and political inequalities. Rizal hundred of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. L-21064. February 18. May 3. This Court. held that: The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII. the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. Antipolo. involving a considerable number of individuals. The Constitutional provisions on the subject are clear: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. NEDA. but I see no cogent reason why the government. in Pulido vs. and San Isidro.M. The said case of J. R. enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. the State shall regulate the acquisition. No.B. Inc. v. Thus. bad faith. 32049. Dimayuga. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed estates. would allow the taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated. Cupang. b) Size of Property Petitioners further contend that Pres. The right to the use. 847 (1949)] which held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. Inc. Inc. 130 SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. MEDIUM TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992. or gross abuse of discretion. Baylosis. 240-254]. 461 (1955)].. in its quest for social justice and peace. Tuason Co. as amended. Court of Appeals [G. sec. vs.L.1984." The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. No. 1) . section 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis.. G. departed from the ruling in Guido vs. quoting the dissenting opinion of Justice J. "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings. Decree 1224.M.117. for the purpose. economic. 1970. Tuason Co.. June 25. Petitioners claim that "there are vast areas of lands in Mayamot. 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at 73]. II.R. ownership. [96 Phil. this Court stated that. sec.R. Rural Progress Administration [84 Phil. 1983. reduce social. and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. XIII. but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater may only of the inhabitants of the country. Reyes in Republic vs. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. 10) The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity. (Art. Land Tenure Administration [G. which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate. or just as suitable. use and disposition of property and its increments.. 31 SCRA 413 (1970) at 428] this Court earlier ruled that expropriation is not confined to landed estates. Since then "there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the "number of people to be benefited test" " [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association. and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before taking remedial action. its improvements and capabilities. or other crops.the stewardship concept. 794. The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent. as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. Decree No. Just Compensation Petitioners maintain that Pres. The foregoing contentions have already been ruled upon by this Court in the case of Ignacio vs. xxx xxx xxx 2. 1987) which. the foregoing provisions. In addition. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire total with the exception of the poblacion. corn. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. arose from the same expropriation complaint that led to this instant petition. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice. 123 SCRA 245 (1983)] which upheld Pres. Individual differences are never taken into account. L-49088. 5960 April 29. who are its real owners. To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. No. As a mere steward. 1259 and 1313 are the same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. the statements. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Guerrero (G. May 29. They do not even look at. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. ALL the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings.R. 1224. under which private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general.Indeed. much less analyze. 1224. 12-3) . 76. 49439. This Court abandoned the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. (pp. Reyes [G. 464. the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. 464. 70 (1983 ed. Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Decree No.. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW.R. supra at 42-3 citing I. 1987) for being encroachments on prerogatives. would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. 794 and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs. Inc.. No. Very often land described as directional has been cultivated for generations.1983. they assert that the Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be "just compensation". incidentally.)]. No. 1224 and 1259.R. should be considered. which are restatements of the provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. as amended. June 29. emphasize: In said case of Export Processing Zone Authority. this Court pointed out that: . coconuts. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decree Nos. Dulay (G. CRUZ. SO ORDERED. and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance. as amended. the Orders of the lower court dated January 17. Decree No. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid. Decree Nos. The constitutionality of this procedure has also been ruled upon in the Export Processing Zone Authority case. 1224. No costs. Decree 1224. 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. . constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation. the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional. Due Process Petitioners assert that Pres. 14) This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres.3. thus: [I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation proceedings. (p. (p. violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession. WHEREFORE. viz: It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property. the ruling in the Ignacio case is reiterated. 1259 and 1313. as amended by Pres. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing. Rule 67 must be complied with. 1978 and June 28. after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented. However. as previously held by this Court. control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. and in the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process. 13) On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession. and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2. (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion. the President of the Philippines issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. The first one challenges the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.: Before us are two petitions. On December 22. In both cases. defective. did not materialize as the negotiations for the purchase of the property failed. Following this calamity. and patently erroneous.1670 which provides for the expropriation of the property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog. On March 18. JR. the petitioners maintain that the two decrees are unconstitutional and should be declared null and void because: (1) They deprived the petitioners of their properties without due process of law.. Executive Order No. On the same date. (4) The decrees are vague. 1669 which provides for the expropriation of the property known as the "Tambunting Estate" and the second challenges the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 557. 555 instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR). a fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate. This. J. (2) The petitioners were denied to their right to just compensation (3) The petitioners' right to equal protection of the law was violated. 1978. 1978. the President and the Metro Manila Governor made public announcement that the national government would acquire the property for the fire victims. The President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners of the property for the acquisition of the same. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President.6-77 adopting the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the SunogApog area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program (ZIP) because the findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing Authority (NHA) described these as blighted communities. however. 555. the Governor of Metro Manila issued. on July 21. adopting slum improvement as a national housing policy. MANOTOK V NHA GUTIERREZ. the President also issued LOI No. 1977. 1977.(5) The petitioners' properties are not proper subjects for expropriation considering their location and other relevant circumstances. In compliance with LOI No. . The Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the sites included. On June 11. the President issued Proclamation No. xxx xxx xxx Section 6.70 square meters. particularly by Presidential Decree No. with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive development plan for the condemned properties. Inc. Presidential Decree No. Presidential Decree No. is hereby declared expropriated. Block 2918 of the subdivision plan Psd-1 1746. 119059.428. disposition. that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost. 49287 and 49288. the President issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos. among others: Section 1. 1670.000. on the other hand. the just compensation for the above property should not exceed a maximum of SEVENTEEN MILLION PESOS (Pl7. Notwithstanding any provision of law or decree to the contrary and for the purpose of . control and disposition. 122450. 1980. as amended. 1-F and 1-H of (LRC) Psd230517 (Previously covered by TCT No. In assessing the market value. l-E. The real property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog in Tondo. more or less.market value determined by the City Assessor pursuant to Presidential Decree No.. 1533 which is in force and in effect at the time of the issuance of this decree. 1. respectively. Manila formerly consisting of Lots Nos 55-A. The real properties known as the "Tambunting Estate" and covered by TCT Nos. 76.688. provides. 1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area expropriated.On January 28. 55-B and 55-C. 49286. 1669.A. and formerly owned by the Manotok Realty. covered by TCT Nos. 119058) of the Register of Deeds of Manila with an area of 52. The National Housing Authority hereinafter referred to as the "Authority" is designated administrator of the National Government with authority to immediately take possession. 122452 and Lots Nos. The National Housing Authority hereinafter referred to as the 'Authority' is designated administrator of the National Government with authority to immediately take possession. Notwithstanding any provision of law or decree to the contrary and for the purpose of expropriating this property pegged at the -. xxx xxx xxx Section 6. the City Assessor pursuant consider existing conditions in the area notably. with an area of 72.000. 1-C.6 square meters. 122459. control.00) which shall be payable to the owners within a period of five (5) years in five (5) equal installments. more or less are hereby declared expropriated. provides: Section 1. 1-D. with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and their improvements and shall evolve and imagine implement a comprehensive development plan for the condemned properties. of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Subject to the foregoing. through its general-manager. 1980. 1982. as amended. 1670.00 representing the first annual installment for the Tambunting Estate pursuant to P. On August 19. The petitioner was also informed that she was free to withdraw her share in the properties upon surrender by her of the titles pertaining to said properties and that if petitioner failed to avail herself of the said offer. No.00 which also included the amount of P1. 1670. However. Nos. requested the submission of the owner's copy of the certificates of title of the properties in question to enable her to implement the aforementioned decrees.D. inter alia. which shall be payable to the owners within a period of five (5) years in five equal installment. Subject to the foregoing.000.000.000.000. the National Housing Authority. and another P5. the NHA would be constrained to take the necessary legal steps to implement the decrees. with the Philippine National Bank the total amount of P5. furnishing it with a certified copy of P. 1669 and 1670.000. In the meantime.400.600. 76. No.00 or surrender her titles over the properties.00 which included the amount of P3.00 representing the first annual installment for the Sunog-Apog area under P. the lessees of the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area filed a motion for leave to intervene together with their petition for intervention alleging that they are themselves owners of the buildings and houses built on the properties to be expropriated and as such.000.00). that the amounts of compensation for the expropriation of the properties of the petitioners as fixed in the decrees do not constitute the "just compensation" envisioned in the Constitution. She expressed veritable doubts about the constitutionality of the said decrees and informed the NHA that she did not believe that she was obliged to withdraw the amount of P5. petitioner Elisa R. Manotok wrote a letter to the NHA alleging.D.000. The owners of the SunogApog area also filed a similar petition attacking the constitutionality of P. Nos. Manotok. 1533 which is in force and in effect at the time of the issuance of this decree. petitioner Elisa R. On September 27.expropriating this property pegged at the market value determined by the City Assessor pursuant to Presidential Decree No. some officials of the NHA circulated instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties in dispute not to pay their rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of the properties in view of the passage of P. 1669. In assessing the market value. the Register of Deeds in her letter to NHA's generalmanager. No.D. one of the owners of the properties to be expropriated. that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost.000.D. with the request that the certificates of title covering the properties in question be cancelled and new certificates of title be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 1669 and 1670 for registration. on July 16.000. On April 4. the owners of the Tambunting Estate filed a petition to declare P. received from the NHA a letter informing her that the latter had deposited.D. they are real partiesin-interest to the present petitions. 1669 unconstitutional. 1980.D. particularly by Presidential Decree No. .000. 1980. No. wrote the Register of Deeds of Manila. Hence. the City Assessor shall consider existing conditions in the area notably. the just compensation for the above property should not exceed a maximum of EIGHT MILLION PESOS (P8. Subsequently. Moreover. and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature. namely: that no "improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation costs. making them lessees and not squatters as assumed by Presidential Decree No. The petitioners argue that the government must first have filed a complaint with the proper court under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to fulfill the requirements of due process. unreasonable. As far as the Tambunting Estate is concerned. the public use and public necessity of the expropriation. the same can be justified by the fact that the properties in question are only two of the four hundred and fifteen (415) slums and blighted areas in Metro Manila and two of the two hundred and fifty one (251) sites .The petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct expropriation of the properties in question violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled. the foregoing statements in the decrees when in fact the Sunog-Apog area has been subdivided into subdivision lots and leased to the occupants thereof under contracts of lease. the petitioners maintain that aside from the residential houses in the area. each subdivision lot is surrounded by adobe walls constructed by the particular owner of the property: the houses were required to have septic tanks by the City Hall and the. Petitioners likewise state that by providing for the maximum amount of just compensation and by directing the City Assessor to take into consideration the alleged existing conditions of the properties in question. and the courts must respect the decision of the law-making body. the public respondents maintain that it cannot be fairly said that the petitioners' valuations were ignored in fixing the ceiling amount of the properties in question because the only reason why the determination appeared unilateral was because said petitioners did not actually state any valuation in their sworn declaration of true market value of their respective properties. 'They contend that the determination of just compensation should not have been vested solely with the City Assessor and that a maximum or fixed amount of compensation should not have been imposed by the said decrees. further argue that since the Constitution lays down no procedure by which the authority to expropriate may be carried into effect." the City Assessor is forced to accept. and devoid of logic and reason. there is no need to follow the said rule for due process to be observed. and there are adequate water facilities. The public respondents. contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature itself or the President through his law-making prerogatives exercises this power. therefore. Moreover. unless the legislative decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary. there are buildings and structures of strong materials on the lots fronting Rizal Avenue Extension. Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which is invoked by the petitioners may be said to have been superseded by the challenged decrees insofar as they are applicable to the properties in question and. and as far as payment in installments is concerned. 1670. as actual and existing conditions of the property. on the other hand. most of which are leased to proprietors of business establishments under long term contracts of lease which use the same for their furniture business from which they secure substantial income. owners themselves: there is a drainage system. The Government as represented by the Solicitor-General and the NHA. and that all that is required is that just compensation be determined with due process of law which does not necessarily entail judicial process. .00. No. 1986 political upheaval. the respondent states that the payment of just compensation in installments did not arise out of ill will or the desire to discriminate. would have been constitutionally suspect. require a system of payment of just compensation. The financial constraints. or question the amount of payments fixed by decree. this Court presumed the validity of the beautiful "whereases" in presidential decrees governing expropriations and legitimated takings of private property which. In some decisions promulgated before the February.000. the maximum price of which is fixed so as not to exceed P17. orders.00 appropriated from the general fund is not a deposit but constitutes an installment payment for the property. In the exercise of its sovereign right the State is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: first.400. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. Thus. There is no provision for any interests to be paid on the unpaid installments spread out over a period of five years. 40): To begin with. In National Housing Authority v. No deposit before taking is required under the decree. Reyes (123 SCRA 245) the Court upheld the decrees which state that the basis for just compensation shall be the market value declared by the owner for tax purposes or such market value as determined by the government assessor. it must be emphasized that plaintiffappellee in this instant case is the Republic of the Philippines which is exercising its right of eminent domain inherent in it as a body sovereign. the payment of just compensation must be made: and thirdly. whichever is lower. therefore. Emilia (131 SCRA 517) the Court sustained the contention that prior hearing is no longer necessary under P. 42 in ascertaining the value of the property to be expropriated and before the government may take possession. There were then the avowed twin purposes of martial law to first quell the Communist rebellion and second to reform society. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. Thus. Juan (92 SCRA 26.. in normal times.000. but the decisions. rulings. the taking must be for a public use. due process must be observed in the taking. plead their side.for ungrading under the ZIP and that to immediately acquire and upgrade all those sites would obviously entail millions and millions of pesos.D. An appeal may be made to the Office of the President but the courts are completely enjoined from any inquiry or participation whatsoever in the expropriation of the subdivision or its incidents.000. We pointed out the constitutional limitations in the case of Republic vs. or resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond the reach of judicial review. The P3. There was a disregard in the decree for Section 2 of Rule 67 which requires the court having jurisdiction over the proceedings to promptly ascertain and fix the provisional value of the property for purposes of the initial taking or entry by the Government into the premises. The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation.. secondly. in Haguisan v. The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the respondent NHA. We start with fundamentals. 904. & Sons v. squatter colonies and blighted areas have multiplied and proliferated. 508. Backus Jr.ed. 593. 23 Sup. Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: 'Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. (100 SCRA 660. 40. 818. Ross. We agree with the public respondents that there are exceptional situations when. Ct. Rogers. The case of Dohany v. U. 362370) underscores the extent by which the due process clause guarantees protection from arbitrary exercise of the power of eminent domain. adequately funded. 42 L. and more solidly grounded on basic rights and democratic procedures is needed. 384: Bauman v. the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged violation. 666-667) state: There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. 46 Sup. Far from disappearing.S.S. in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.S. (74 L.ed. Michigan. 859. .S. Its requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense. 566. North. 271 U. 966. be the basis for social justice. Rep. 167 U. due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it. 281. 42 L. 563. Reetz v. 17 Sup. 569. the requirement of due process may not necessarily entail judicial process. 18 Sup. 169 U. Rep.'912. it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights.ed. A. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 390. 289. his right to due process of law has been violated. Missouri ex rel. We return to older and more sound precedents. Thus. Hurwitz v. In other words. Ct. 188 U. The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same. Under it he may neither claim a right to trial by jury nor a right of appeal. 505. 270. 548.Subsequent developments have shown that a disregard for basic liberties and the shortcut methods embodied in the decrees on expropriation do not achieve the desired results. Rep. Ct. Section 2.S. We re-examine the decisions validating expropriations under martial law and apply established principles of justice and fairness which have been with us since the advent of constitutional government. Ct. But where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's property. although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law. It appears that constitutionally suspect methods or authoritarian procedures cannot. certain portions of the decision in De Knecht v. 47 L. Rep. ed. 70 L. A program to alleviate problems of the urban poor which is well studied. Bautista. 445. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined beforehand by a statute. genuinely sincere.ed. The due process clause does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or method of state procedure. there are. can deny due process only under pain of nullity. 349) that "(t)he very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. It is. Congressional records can be examined. 433. It is located at the junction where three main city streets converge — Rizal Avenue from downtown Manila.. In these petitions. It is enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or practical necessity. (p. it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence. It frowns on arbitrariness. v. it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. 31 SCRA 413. Tuazon & Co. 'Acts of Congress. Land tenure Administration. The anonymous adviser who drafted the decrees for the President's signature cannot be questioned as to any possible error or partiality. This Court stated in City of Manila v. that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken. we reiterated that a necessity must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes but accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity.. scrutiny by individual members of the legislature. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. The Tambunting estate or at least the western half of the subdivision fronting Rizal Avenue Extension is valuable commercial property. In J. at least. debates in Congress open to the public. The . however. Inc. or other personal motivations which may have led him to propose the direct expropriation with its onerous provisions. the Supreme Court said: The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is necessity. In the same case the Supreme Court concluded: With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation. 663).It is recognized. which of course. 436) In the instant petitions. public hearings before the statute is enacted. In that sense. and Aurora Boulevard leading to Retiro Street and other points in Quezon City. It negates state power to act in an oppressive manner.. Jose Abad Santos Street from Binondo.M. as well as those of the Executive. It is a mandate of reason. the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play. the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow. Arellano Law Colleges (85 Phil. varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of each case. it stands as a guaranty of justice. there is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or selections. It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. act of vengeance. 'That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice. and very often. as had been stressed so often. xxx xxx xxx In City of Manila v. the decrees show no reasons whatsoever for the choice of the properties as housing projects. In expropriations through legislation. cannot expropriate the flourishing Makati commercial area in order to earn money that would finance housing projects all over the country. remains. when the public interest is not thereby promoted. There are no squatters. Rural Progress Administration (84 Phil.Libiran Furniture Company. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to due process of law and. Having failed to provide for a hearing. The Government should have attended to them first. which fronts the entrance to Jose Abad Santos Street is clearly a multi-million peso enterprise. It is a foregone conclusion that the favored squatters allowed to buy these choice lots would lose no time. 847) may have been modified in some ways by the provisions of the new Constitution on agrarian and urban land reform and on housing. After a careful examination of the questioned decrees. There is no showing for a need to demolish the existing valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog. water connection to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System electric connections to Manila Electric Company. to put portions of the expropriated area to commercial use in order to defray the development costs of its housing projects cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. therefore. 1669 and P.D. any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties. Obviously. may not take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another. according to the Guido case. No. alone. The principle of nonappropriation of private property for private purposes. the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. The Government. The provision of P. 1670 suffers from a similar infirmity. moot and academic. by their very passage. The decrees. it did not deem it necessary because of the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered. 1669 which allows NHA. In effect. and telephone connections to the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. however. the properties. Nos. provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation.D. to either lease out or sell their lots to wealthy merchants even as they seek other places where they can set up new squatter colonies. drainage and sewer facilities. for instance.D.D.D. they must fail the test of constitutionality. even for a full compensation. The provisions of the decree on the relocation of qualified squatter families and on the re-blocking and re-alignment of existing structures to allow the introduction of basic facilities and services have no basis in fact The area is welldeveloped with roads. The many pictures submitted as exhibits by the petitioners show a well-developed area subdivided into residential lots with either middle-income or upper class homes. The public use and social justice ends stated in the whereas clauses of P. once it is possible to do so. This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe when it exercises the power of eminent domain. There are many squatter colonies in Metro Manila in need of upgrading. we find P. There is no showing how the President arrived at the conclusion that the Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. P. The Government still has to prove that expropriation of commercial properties in order to lease them out also for commercial purposes would be "public use" under the Constitution." This became more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners. under the decrees were "automatically expropriated. do not by themselves. furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its request. The legislature. at its sole option. . The leading case of Guido v. 1670 would not be served thereby. the President even made a public announcement that the government shall acquire the estate for the fire victims. provides for the procedure on how to contest assessments but does not deal with questions as to the propriety of the expropriation and the manner of payment of just compensation in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. the due process requirement is fulfilled. According to the government. Santos." (see also Republic v. the basis of the just compensation is the market value of the property "prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government Office to acquire the property. the cut-off year must be 1978 because it was in this year that the government decided to acquire the properties and in the case of the Tambunting Estate. 506. 1533. we have upheld the determination of just compensation and the rationale behind it either at the time of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court. Municipality of Daet v. commenced a proceeding. This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for the purpose of just compensation.D. The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which are the assessed values of the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher value because. the actual or symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were promulgated. otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. In these petitions. 519): . whichever came first. The Government argues that with this procedure. We cannot sustain this argument. it must approximate the value of the property at the time of its taking and the government can be said to have decided to acquire or take the property only after it has. The decision of the government to acquire a property through eminent domain should be made known to the property owner through a formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding is contemplated as provided for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. as amended. No. We find this wholly unsatisfactory.D. at the least.The government states that there is no arbitrary determination of the fair market value of the property by the government assessors because if the owner is not satisfied with the assessor's action. a maximum amount of compensation was imposed by the decrees and these amounts were only a little more than the assessed value of the properties in 1978 when. A television or news announcement or the mere fact of the property's inclusion in the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) cannot suffice because for the compensation to be just. according to the government. he may within sixty (60) days appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city as the case may be and if said owner is still unsatisfied. It cannot in anyway substitute for the expropriation proceeding under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. Another infirmity from which the questioned decrees suffer is the determination of just compensation. it decided to acquire said properties. (1 41 SCRA 30. 35). he may appeal further to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to P. judicial or otherwise. Presidential Decree No. Court of Appeals. (93 SCRA 503. for this purpose. In the following cases. Pursuant to P. 464. 464. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. National Power Corporation v. et al. We find the valuation determined by the Court of Appeals to be just. xxx xxx xxx We hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the market value of the property to be that obtaining. Indeed. municipality of La Carlota v. directing that compensation "be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaints" would never be operative. the provision of Rule 619. at least. petitioner had not actually taken possession of the property sought to be expropriated and secondly.. (1 29 SCRA 665. 1969. The owner of property expropriated by the State is entitled to how much it was worth at the time of the taking. otherwise.And in the case of J...M. (1. Court of Appeals. Furthermore. In the case of Garcia v. and that the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value. fair and reasonable. not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. This has been clarified in Republic v.00 per square meter is in conformity with doctrinal rulings hereinabove cited that the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of the possession of the property because firstly. the so-called "conditions" of the properties should not be determined through a decree but must be shown in an appropriate proceeding in order to arrive at a just valuation of the property. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less. not of filing of the complainant. the commencement of the proceedings. than just compensation. 45 SCRA 235 (1972)). reiterated the 'wen-settled (rule) that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. it is now settled doctrine.06 PhiL 1017 (1960)). PNB (1 SCRA 957) thus: 'It is apparent from the foregoing that. as of the date of the rendition of the judgment on December 2. 673): xxx xxx xxx (5) And most importantly. Tuason & Co. the Court. (102 SCRA 597. which is the measure of the indemnity. following the leading case of Alfonso v. which the Court fixed at P200. Inc. when the of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to. speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando. The Spouses Baltazar. the basis should be the price or value at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government. v. the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession. 1969 as prayed by private respondent. at the time judgment was rendered on December 2. Pasay City. section 3. 31 SCRA 413. 608) we ruled: . Court of Appeals.on the issue of just compensation... Land Tenure Administration. that no determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government. when plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings. .D. Nos. and P.D. in estimating the market value. 59603) With more reason should the method in P. In P. null and void ab initio. therefore.D..s 1669 and 1670 be declared infirm. are declared unconstitutional and.D. No. No. there are other factors to be taken into consideration. which were provided for in the questioned decrees cannot adequately reflect the value of the property and. whichever is lower. The City Assessor is warned by the decrees to "consider existing conditions in the area notably. The statements made in tax documents by the assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered but they cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination made after expert commissioners have examined the property and all pertinent circumstances are taken into account and after the parties have had the opportunity to fully plead their cases before a competent and unbiased tribunal. G. the petitions in G.. To enjoin this Court by decree from looking into alleged violations of the due process. find the questioned decrees to likewise transgress the petitioners' right to just compensation. should not be binding on the property owners for. et al. P. It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny to a property owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced. all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. in any case. and 1533. P. 55167 are hereby GRANTED. Nos. No. thus. 76. Ceferino E. 55166 and G.D.s 1669 and 1670 go further. Having violated the due process and just compensation guarantees. 794. 794. SO ORDERED. Dulay. 76. There is no mention of any market value declared by the owner. equal protection. The maximum amounts. Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670 which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings.D. that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation costs. P. this Court has decided to invalidate the mode of fixing just compensation under said decrees. No. No. The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation proceedings. No. 464. (See Export Processing Zone Authority v. No. We. . P. as stated in the above cases. Hon.D. WHEREFORE.R. D. Sections 6 of the two decrees peg just compensation at the market value determined by the City Assessor. 1669 and 1670 are unconstitutional and void." In other cases involving expropriations under P.R. the basis for determining just compensation was fixed at the market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor. therefore.Hence. 1533. its improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value.R. and eminent domain clauses of the Constitution is impermissible encroachment on its independence and prerogatives. 464. 1997 in CA-G. 41860 affirming the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court.A. SP No.: Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility.be considered to be for public use. Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. J. such taking cannot In a letter dated January 6. The facts of the case are: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4. 1994. now City of Pasig. Likewise assailed is the Resolution[3] of the same court dated November 20. respondent. notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away. Metro Manila. Pasig City. . MASIKIP V CITY OF PASIG SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ. Branch 165. Caniogan. Its expropriation is not valid. In this case. 873. 1996 in S. This was pursuant to Ordinance No.C. notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1. the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. 42. Pasig City.R. the then Municipality of Pasig. 1998 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.521 square meters located at Pag-Asa. This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 31. No.500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. dated May 7. 1995. 1994. respondent wrote another letter to petitioner. and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners. In its letter of December 20.Again. on March 23. (C) EVEN ASSUMING ARGUE NDO THAT DEFENDANTS PROPERTY MAY BE . 873. petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional. petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: I PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. docketed as SCA No. Respondent prayed that the trial court. respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioners property is to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents. On April 25. 1994. CONSIDERING THAT: (A) THERE IS NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED. but this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. after due notice and hearing. issue an order for the condemnation of the property. on February 21. as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. 1995. invalid. (B) PLAINTIFF HAS ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED. respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. 1994. and oppressive. On May 2. that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation. Subsequently. THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P78. (B) PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PREREQUISITES LAID DOWN IN SECTION 34. THE INSTANT EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS PREMATURE. III THE GRANTING OF THE EXPROPRIATION WOULD VIOLATE SECTION 261 (V) OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF. IV . THUS.000. RULE VI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. CONSIDERING THAT: (A) PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE WITH CERTAINTY THE PURPOSE OF THE EXPROPRIATION.00) II PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE. 1998. Forthwith. C. it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. docketed as CA-G. As to the issue of just compensation. the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.R. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONERS PROPERTY. Hence. 41860. this petition anchored on the following grounds: THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997 (ATTACHMENT A) AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1998 (ATTACHMENT B) ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. the trial court held that the same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.PLAINTIFF CANNOT TAKE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY MERELY DEPOSITING AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%) OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY BASED ON THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. SP No.[5] on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. 1996. On October 31. B. 1996. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action forcertiorari. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR .[4] On May 7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order of July 31. 1997. the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. THE RULES OF COURT AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT: I A. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 20. At that time. WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 1996. Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: SEC. EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONERS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW: II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OF RULE ON ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIGS COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUOS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21 APRIL 1995) III THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE ON HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW WAS THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILED UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT. The foregoing arguments may be synthesized into two main issues one substantive and one procedural.THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. 1995. in lieu of an answer. THE COURT A QUOS ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996. each defendant. Within the time specified in the summons. We will first address the procedural issue. Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25. 3. the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3. . shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief. Defenses and objections. It was denied by the trial court on May 7. Pursuant to the above Rule. Rule 67 now expressly mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiffs attorney of record. specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property for public use. after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. It is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern. Significantly. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendants property for the use specified in the complaint. is of no moment. the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues. SP No. The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G. the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In the early case of US v. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading. which took effect on July 1. instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. 41860 on October 31.R. This is especially so considering that the purpose of the expropriation was squarely challenged and put in issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss. Section 3. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. We now proceed to address the substantive issue. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service. whenever the public exigency requires .[6] The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 1997. Toribio.[7] this Court defined the power of eminent domain as the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use. What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property. further.[11] In this case. fully operational and being utilized by its residents. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.[10] Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking. the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use. including those from . which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. (b) the necessity of the taking.it. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose.[8] The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided. based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. That. there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. According to petitioner. upon payment of just compensation. That. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units. It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. other public entities and public utility corporations. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may. nonetheless. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise. however. the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted:Provided. the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless. [9] subject only to Constitutional limitations. finally. That. thus: SEC. 19. there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. which is the Rainforest Park. The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. the taking of the land. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. not clearly and categorically public. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones property is clearly established. non-profit organization. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from the necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Moreover. which must be of a public character. . Applying this standard. must also be shown to exist.Barangay Caniogan. does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity. Important as the power of eminent domain may be. In City of Manila v. Evidently. the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The necessity has not been shown.[13] we ruled that necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. In City of Manila v. such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit. The genuine necessity for the taking. the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. Chinese Community of Manila. Arellano Law College. 1994. 42 s.[12] we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area. Respondent does not dispute this. a private. including those of Caniogan. therefore. not the residents of Caniogan. The purpose is. available to all residents of Pasig City. it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association. 1993 authorizing the expropriation. quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. is ordered DISMISSED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.WHEREFORE. Arceo. 189063. Thus. for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 41860 are REVERSED. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITUION OF CASES PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN 2011 DECISION BERSAMIN. J. the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman if the aggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in the disposition of any case. No. 873. No.R. Rosario S. . SO ORDERED. in G. Ernest Escaler. Perez. 3019. SP No. The Case The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify.: The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial. and Ramon A.R. 188165. as amended. and. the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People of the Philippine v. docketed as SCA No. in G. Hernando Benito Perez.R. the petition for review is GRANTED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig. Villarama of Bulacan (Cong. a Special Panel composed of Atty. for robbery under Article 293. On the same day. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact-finding investigation. of the Revised Penal Code. On November 26. 2002.the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of SB-08-CRM. On November 25. 2002. Ombudsman Marcelo formally requested Cong. Cong. 2003. Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man referred to in Cong. Mark Jimenez. 12 . Jimenez complied on December 23. and Ramon A. Jimenez. submitting the supplemental complaint-affidavit dated April 4. Cong. for the criminal case in which the respondents were Secretary Perez. Jr. through counsel. 2003 from the counsel of Cong. 10 On January 15. Perez.0857L. for the administrative case involving only Secretary Perez as respondent. Secretary Perez. through counsel. the Office of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30. On November 18. 2002. the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti. and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in February 2001." In reaction. the Special Action Team of the 6 7 On January 2. Villarama’s privilege speech. Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar Man. in relation to Article 294. however. Cong. then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit documents relevant to the exposé. Evelyn Baliton.. Jimenez’s complaintaffidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and to the Administrative Adjudication Board.Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the exposé of Cong. 2002. Rosario S. Jimenez delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong. Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special Panel to refer the complaint of Cong. The complaint-affidavit of Jimenez was re-docketed as OMB-C-C02. 2003 of Cong. Jimenez. PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Mary Susan Guillermo and Atty.0266 entitled People of the Philippine v. 2003. Villarama. Jose de Jesus was created to evaluate and conduct an investigation of CPL-C-021992. The complaint-affidavit was initially docketed as CPL-C-02-1992. Perez inviting them to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery subject of the exposé. 8 Common Factual and Procedural Antecedents On November 12. Jimenez to submit a sworn statement on his exposé. 11 On June 4. 2002. requested Ombudsman Marcelo that the Office of the Ombudsman itself directly verify from the Coutt’s Bank whether he (Secretary Perez) had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum of US$2 Million had been remitted by Cong. 2003. for preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication. Escaler and Ramon C. Villarama. Fact Finding and Intelligence Research Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong. and as OMB-C-A-02-0631L. Arceo. Atty. On even date. 2002. Villarama responded by letter to PAGC’s invitation by confirming that Secretary Perez was the government official who "ha[d] knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose. 9 1 2 3 4 5 On November 25. respectively. Arceo. both of the Office of the Ombudsman. Cong. Jimenez. sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause." In his own letter of November 18. Ernest L. Secretary Perez. Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama’s exposé. 2002 by submitting his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. Hernando Benito Perez. Ernest Escaler. In his letter dated July 3. 2003. creating a new team of investigators to assist in the preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L.On July 17. 2005. 2005. Escaler. 6713. Ernest L. 13 On August 22. the Special Panel ordered the respondents to file their counter-affidavits within ten days from December 4. Perez (Mrs. the respondents filed a manifestation to which they attached the affidavit of Atty. No. Perez. Ernesto L. Perez" had no account with it. they submitted a consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated December 12. Series of 2005. No. 1379. 17 A. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. 2005. 4 (Falsification) of the RPC. or until December 14. 3019. par. 2005. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. 2005. 2005. the counsel for Escaler entered his appearance and sought the extension of the time to file Escaler’s counter-affidavit. Perez. Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. the Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact-finding investigation and filed complaints against the following individuals. 1379). 2005. 16 On November 29.A. to conduct administrative and preliminary investigations. 2005. 20 21 On December 15. B. 22 . 18 19 15 On December 12. The office order cancelled and superseded PAMO Office Order No. On December 2. Perez and Arceo filed an urgent motion to be furnished copies of the complaints. OMB-C-C-05-0633-K. C. 22. the Special Panel directed former Secretary Perez to file his counter-affidavit in OMBC-A-02-0631-L (administrative case).A. thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January 2. OMB-CC-05-0633K to OMB-C-C0635K (forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. Series of 2003. Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate CPL-C-02-1992. 2005. Ramon C. Chona Dimayuga. Apostol informed Secretary Perez about the letter from Coutts Bank stating that "Hernando B. 2005. if warranted. Arceo and John Does for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. In another order of the same date. the Special Panel directed Secretary Perez (who had meanwhile resigned from office). Arceo and John Does for violation of the provisions of R. Ramon C. Perez. Perez. and. Perez for violation of the following: Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of R. Rosario S. OMB-CC-05-0634-K and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (criminal cases). and On December 7. and assured that the letter would be considered in the final resolution of the case. 01-2003. 14 On November 14. his wife Rosario S. Perez). Escaler and Arceo to submit their counteraffidavits in OMB-C-C-02-0857-L. Article 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal Code. 2005. 2003. the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file their counter-affidavits. 2005. and Article 171. Rosario S. 2003. Asst. 2005. namely: On November 23. OMB-C-A-020631L (administrative case). On December 5. former Secretary Perez. On December 13. Escaler. Mrs. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO Office Order No. Perez. Ernest L. for Extortion (Robbery) under par. On September 4. 2006. attached to and forming part of the complaints" of the cases. Arceo. Escaler and Ramon S. 2006. the last of them seeking an extension until February 10. 35 On August 23. Cong. and to be granted a new period to reply to the consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes and Arceo. No. On May 15. copy and obtain any and all documentary evidence described. directed the FIO "to let respondent Escaler examine. the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their urgent motion to be furnished copies of the complaints. Escaler. the respondents submitted the affidavit of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for extension of the period to file his opposition to the motion earlier filed by Escaler. 2006. 2006 and February 10. Arceo. the preliminary investigation was terminated. Jr. Escaler and Ramon S. Cong. Jr. Jimenez’s opposition. Jimenez sought leave to file a rejoinder to Escaler’s reply. instead of filing his counteraffidavit. Cong. 2006.R. On March 28. 173967-71. 4) Former Secretary Hernando B. 2006. 3019. Ernest L.A. Perez for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 par. finding probable cause and recommending that criminal informations be filed against the respondents. 7. 2006. the Special Panel issued a joint resolution. Perez. 2005. 2006 (or until March 9. the Court required the Office of the Ombudsman to comment on the petition of Escaler. Escaler replied to Cong. 26 Between January 9. Rosario S. the Special Panel denied the motion to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation. for violation of Section 3 (b) of Rep. 36 On January 4. Cong. Jimenez filed urgent motions for time to file his opposition. 2006. Rosario S. Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the order of December 29. 34 On December 22. 2006. 2006. 27 On February 21. 24 On December 29. Perez for violation of Sec. 2006. Jimenez’s opposition to his motion. and granted Escaler an extension of five days within which to submit his counter-affidavit. Perez. moved to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation. 3019 in relation to Section 8 of R. as follows: 1) Former Secretary Hernando B.On December 20. 29 30 31 32 33 3) Former Secretary Hernando B. 2006. 2005. 2005. 2006) within which to reply to Cong. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. the Special Panel denied Escaler’s motion for reconsideration. 6713. 25 After Escaler failed to submit his counter-affidavit despite the lapse of the five day period given to him. R. On the same date. 5 of Article 294 in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code. On March 9. 38 . Escaler commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) docketed as G. 2005. Perez. 23 On May 25. and to require the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February 17.A. 2) Former Secretary Hernando B. 28 37 On November 6. compare. and ordered Escaler to submit his counter-affidavit within five days from notice. On February 22. 2006. Jimenez opposed Escaler’s motion to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman. Act. for violation of Section 7. 2007. 44 On September 18. 2007. Jimenez. Jimenez asked for time to comment on the respondents’ motion for reconsideration. 3. they filed a motion to dismiss. Merceditas Gutierrez (Ombudsman Gutierrez). and supplemented their motion for that purpose with additional arguments on January 15. on October 4. Escaler also filed a motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad cautelam.On January 5. 46 47 Criminal Case No. 2007. the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four informations against respondents. No. Rep. 45 50 On April 18. Ombudsman Ma. for Robbery (Art. approved the joint resolution of the Special Panel. Act 6713. 294. and was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. al.. 42 On January 24. 3019. the Perezes filed an ex parte motion for resolution on the basis of the desistance by Cong. for violation of Sec. for Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art. 2007. the Special Panel issued an omnibus resolution denying the original and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the Perezes and Arceo. Escaler’s motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad cautelam. Rep. Thus. 51 On October 2. the Court required the respondents in G. in relation to Art. 2007. which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2007. 39 On January 11. the Perezes prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance to await the ruling on their application for intervention in Escaler’s action in the Court. 2008. 2008. Act 3019. 43 On March 15. 2007. 2007. Cong. the Perezes and Arceo sought the reconsideration of the joint resolution. 2007. averred: 52 . Revised Penal Code. 182360-63). 182360-63 to file their comments on the petition. On February 6.R. In due time. the Perezes brought a petition for certiorari with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction in this Court (G. 3019] The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Cong.R. 3 (b) of Rep. et. 2. namely: 1. 2007. their motion to suspend the proceedings. 49 On January 17. 2007. SB-08CRM-0265 entitled People v. the Perezes and Arceo filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings. Act 3019. He filed another motion for extension of the time to comment on April 27. 2007. 48 40 41 On April 18. and the Perezes’ motion to dismiss. in relation to Section 8. On January 25. Jimenez submitted his affidavit of desistance. and 4. No. On October 1. Hernando Benito Perez. 293. as amended. 2008. as amended. Arceo filed an ex parte motion for leave to admit attached supplemental motion for reconsideration. SB-08-CRM-0265 [Violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. who had meanwhile replaced the resigned Ombudsman Marcelo. 000. the Court is inclined to grant the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused and perforce grant their motion to quash the Information filed against them in this case. the complaint or information should be quashed by the court.965. Accordingly. in view of the foregoing. let the arraignment of the accused herein proceed on July 18. Arceo. Escaler presented a similar motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam on May 12. Mario B. If the facts in the Information do not constitute an offense. Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the resolution of denial of their motions to quash. did then and there wilfully. and on additional facts admitted or not denied by the prosecution. disposing thusly: It is axiomatic that as a general rule prerequisite. Perez’s desisting from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the government. 2008. 54 55 56 57 On July 17. 2008. over which transaction accused Hernando S.That during the month of February. and thereafter succeeded in receiving from the latter the sum of US$1.Abudanti Ad Cautelam Motion to Quash of accused Ernest Escaler are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. the First Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution denying the motions to quash. Crespo. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. accused Hernando B.a. xxxx 58 WHEREFORE. or any offense for that matter. unlawfully and criminally request and demand the amount of US TWO MILLION DOLLARS ($2. 2008. confabulating and confederating with accused Ernest L. Rosario S. On June 4.00) for himself and/or other persons from Mark Jimenez a. Escaler. 2008. It is limited only to contracts or transaction involving monetary consideration where the public officer has authority to intervene . the Perezes moved to quash the information. all private individuals. Philippines.k. Perez. conspiring. while in the performance of his official function. the Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for reconsideration. 2001 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the City of Makati. the Office of the Ombudsman countered with a consolidated opposition. Perez and Rosario S. 2008. while Arceo adopted the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13. to wit: 59 xxxx After a second hard look on the respective contentions of the parties. being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice. On November 13. a high ranking public officer. 2008 at 8:30 in the morning as previously set by the Court. a motion to quash on the ground that the Information does not constitute the offense charged. should be resolved on the basis of the factual allegations therein whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. to the damage and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.999. Ex. Perez and the urgent It is clear that the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. the Motion to Quash of accused Hernando B. 2008.00 in consideration of accused Hernando S. Perez and Ramon C. rendering the following ratiocination.000. SO ORDERED. Perez had to intervene in his official capacity under the law. committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage thereof. CONTRARY TO LAW. 53 On May 8. The Court finds untenable the prosecution’s contention that the execution by Mark Jimenez of the affidavits in connection with his pending application for admission in the WPP (and not the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. the Supreme Court in Soriano. present. by any stretch of the imagination. share." (Emphasis supplied) Thus. cannot. it bears stressing that the principal consideration for the said application of Mark Jimenez is the latter’s obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on one hand and his entitlement to the protection granted to a witness in the WPP on the other hand and as such. More precisely. as follows – "It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. and that all the elements of a contract contemplated therein are present as there is allegedly consent between the government and Mark Jimenez. vs.000. does not entail any money consideration. object or subject matter which is the execution of affidavits in connection with his application for admission in the WPP. such alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. the Court believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B.000. Moreover. Perez (and even the application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP as argued by the prosecution) can hardly be considered as a "contract" or "transaction" that is contemplated in Section 3(b) of RA 3019. this is not the (monetary) consideration which is essential or involved in credit transactions. Perez "from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP of the government". Neither was it a transactionbecause this term must be construed as analogous to the terms which precedes it. however. what appears as the main consideration of the alleged demand or receipt of accused Hernando B. Jr. applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench. percentage. or benefit covered by said Section 3(b) must be in connection with a "contract or transaction" involving "monetary consideration" with the government wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. Perez from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against President Estrada) is the very contract or transaction required by the offense charged in this case. Certainly. the Court takes note of the admission made by the prosecution in its Memorandum that the transaction involving . as amended. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan construed the term "contract" or "transaction" covered by Section 3(b) of RA 3019.under the law. is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission in the WPP can be considered as a contract or transaction. In this regard. Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may be incurred by the Government as a result of the implementation of the program in favour of Mark Jimenez is purely incidental. Sandiganbayan. Thus. Perez of the sum of US$2. the requesting or demanding of any gift. Such alleged monetary benefit is definitely not the reason that impelled Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the government. supra. A transaction like a contract. be considered as"contract" or "transaction" as defined within the ambit of the fourth element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because no "monetary consideration" as in credit transaction is involved.00 from Mark Jimenez is the former’s alleged desistance from pressuring the latter to execute affidavits implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case against former President Estrada. and a cause or consideration which consists of security and monetary benefits to be given by the government to Mark Jimenez in exchange for his participation as a witness under the WPP. holding thusly: 60 xxxx The core issue raised in the submission of the parties relates to the meaning of the word "transaction" as it is used in Sec. that the filing of the Information charging the accused with Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266 pending before the Second Division of this Court on the basis of the same acts complained of in this case. It is settled that a defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions upon the same act by splitting the same into various charges. the rule against splitting a single act into various charges. 2009. SO ORDERED. Criminal Case No. Finally. If a single act results into two or more offenses. the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss/resolve the other issues raised in the subject motions for reconsideration of the herein accused and/or disturb the other findings contained in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered. 3 (b) of RA 3019 was enunciated in the Soriano case when the Supreme Court stated: .Mark Jimenez’s execution of affidavits for his admission to the WPP is not yet a perfected contract between the Government and Mark Jimenez since it is still in its "negotiation phase" because of the refusal of Mark Jimenez to execute the affidavits against certain individuals. the Third Division denied the Ombudsman’s motion for reconsideration. with the absence of the fourth element. as amended. all emanating from the same law violated. To do so would violate. if not the principle of double jeopardy. and therefore. 3019. During the pendency of the State’s motion for reconsideration. when the prosecution could easily and well embody them in a single information because such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular. On April 21. More particularly.A. constitutes a bar against the information for said lesser felony as it would result into two differently charged felonies from a single act and thus. 3 (b) of RA 3019 to constitute an element of the offense. would unnecessarily or unjustifiably expose the accused to the danger of suffering two penalties for a single offense if the subject information is not quashed. The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. has the meaning of the term "transaction" as enunciated in the Soriano case been modified by subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court? The meaning of "transaction" in Sec. the instant Motions for Reconsideration of the herein accused are resolved accordingly and the subject Information for violation of Section 3(b) of R. the Court finds that the factual/material allegations in the subject Information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. they should not be charged and/or punished separately unless the other offense with different elements is penalized under a special law. for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before different courts. This admission is another indication that there is indeed no contract or transaction to speak of that is covered under the fourth element of the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. it may be argued that while the material allegations in the subject information may not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. as amended. In this regard. SB-08-CRM-0265. All told. as amended. It is constrained to quash the said Information. is hereby QUASHED. WHEREFORE. the same material/factual allegations nevertheless constitute Direct Bribery or another felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged herein so that the subject information in this case should not be quashed. however. It is believed. it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved. which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged. as amended. that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer. P2. The petitioner states: Assuming in gratia argumenti. share. civil or administrative in nature. 3 (b) of R. wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. But it did not.00 which was allegedly solicited. the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms".) It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. p. otherwise. The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows: SEC. as amended. This must be so. (Petition. subparagraph (b) of Rep. present. petitioner’s guilt. Pelegrino and Chang cases does not persuade. Therefore. Act 3019. which is for violation of Section 3. subparagraph (b) of Rep.00 of which was allegedly received. pending with the government. A transaction.) Upon the other hand.000. the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3. 3019. the respondents claim: A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term ‘transaction’ as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction. Peligrino and Chang cases reveals that the main issue adjudicated in those cases involved an interpretation . if at all the offense of Direct Bribery.As stated above. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit. The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support. for himself or for any other person. if at all is Direct Bribery. (Emphasis Supplied) The argument of the Prosecution that the interpretation of the term "transaction" defined in the Soriano case has been modified by the Mejia. 8. like a contract. is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. percentage. (Comment. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) … (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift. whether commercial. Corrupt practices of public officers. 5. No. p. the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him.A. in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party. in consideration of P4. the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. Section 2 thereof. which may or may not constitute a crime. Neither was it atransaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A review of the Mejia. 3. Act 3019.000. or benefit. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to have been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration of a promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases. Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction.Therefore. has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime. Business Revenue Examination. (4) and (5) of the offense are present. acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. on those various meetings.that he had no authority to accept an amount less than the assessment amountis too shallow to merit belief.of the element of Sec. the Supreme Court ruled: San Mateo’s justification behind such refusal. gone out of his way to negotiate the settlement of the assessed deficiency tax. Direct bribery. the Supreme Court ruled: Petitioner is a BIR Examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked "xxx to undertake verification of tax liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region 4-A. share. In the Peligrino case. the Supreme Court ruled: Clearly. In addressing the second issue. (Emphasis Supplied) In the Chang case. the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. not for a different one. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. the Supreme Court ruled: Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not formulate resolutions thereof. in the Mejia case. elements (1). . not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. on the other hand. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift. namely: the right to intervene of the public officer in the contract or transaction and not the element of what is a contract or transaction with the government. the Supreme Court identified the issues raised in the Petition as follows: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to believe petitioner’s evidence over that of the prosecution and (2) the Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize that Petitioner was placed in double jeopardy. In the recent case of Merencillo vs. While they have common elements. Thus. (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do. (Emphasis Supplied) Prosecution’s argument that the statement of the Supreme Court above-quoted is an obiter dictum is specious. Manila xxx" Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private complainant. People. 3 (b) of RA 3019. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense. The branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. present. who had. Moreover. he being the Chief Operations. the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. Audit Division of the Treasurer’s Office. as admitted by the Prosecution. 3 (b) of RA 3019 are different offenses with their own different elements. The Prosecution further argued that a close examination of RA 3019 in its entirety would show that the term "transaction" appears several times and was never confined to transactions involving monetary consideration. 3 (b) of RA 3019. Sec. SB-08-CRM-0266). i. The two sections. 61 Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0266 [Robbery under Art. the Court denied the Perezes’ urgent motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading. On May 2. The rule of law on which a later court thinks that a previous court founded its decision xx" The Prosecution argued that it is a maxim in statutory construction that a law must be read in its entirety and no single provision should be interpreted in isolation with respect to the other provisions of the law. Revised Penal Code was raffled to the Second Division (Criminal Case No. 293. the principle or rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded. among other things. On May 6. in relation to Art. Suffice it to say that a maxim in statutory construction cannot be superior to an express interpretation of the law made by the Supreme Court. Escaler filed a motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam. 294. Furthermore. 2008. 2008 is DENIED. 5 of RA 3019 and not on Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct Bribery. alleging that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE.e. 62 On May 6.An obiter dictum is a "judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion. the reference to the deliberations of Congress which it cited involved deliberations on Sec. Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the First Division dated November 13." In the Merencillo case. but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive). one issue raised by Petitioner was precisely the issue of double jeopardy which the Supreme Court resolved by distinguishing the elements of violation of Sec. The above-quoted resolution was not a mere obiter dictum but the ratio decidendi which is defined as: "1. 2008. On November 18. the transaction must involve monetary consideration. The reference to the Congressional record by the Prosecution does not disprove the fact that for violation of Sec. the provisions in RA 3019 cited by Prosecution constitute different offenses with their own different elements. Likewise. 2. As pointed out earlier. there is no further need to discuss the other arguments of the Prosecution in its Motion. Revised Penal Code] The information charging robbery under Article 293. the Perezes filed their own motion to quash the information. 5 and Sec. 2008 quashing the information in Criminal Case No. and instead required the respondents to comment on the petition. 3 (b) of RA 3019. Arceo filed an ex 63 64 . the Court adopted the meaning given to the term "transaction" in the Soriano case. no less than the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of the term "transaction" as an element of violation of the said section. As one of the elements of the offense of violation of Sec. 2009 denying the State’s motion for reconsideration. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution promulgated on April 21. On June 22. 2009. in relation to Article 294. with their own different modalities of commission. 2009. 2008. Having resolved the core issue in the Motion For Reconsideration of the Prosecution. 3 (b) of RA 3019. the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via petition for certiorari the resolution of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17. . is persuaded. Complaint-Affidavit of Mark Jimenez. 2001 to May 23. Gutierrez. from Trade and Commerce Bank. 2008. 2001. Records) 2. 4-69.00 was transferred to Coutts Bank Hongkong in favour of the beneficiary of Account No. Ramon Arceo and several John Does (Mrs. and Violation of Section 5 (2) of R. among them a $250. Crespo – pp.. Vol. On December 23. Obstruction of Justice. 70-88. that the Robbery (extortion) took place on February 13. Violation of the Penal Provision of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards R. or at least as claimed by Complainant Mark Jimenez. Having established.A. 66 On June 30. Records. The Perezes filed their own motion for reconsideration on July 11. Cayman Island through the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. It was subscribed and sworn to on (the ) 23rd day of December 2002 (Complaint-Affidavit of Mario Mark (MJ) Jimenez B. 2008. Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service. and approved by Ombudsman Mr. Grave Misconduct. wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place. 70-88 Records). Escaler moved to reconsider the denial. Subsequently from March 6. 65 On June 26. 2002 Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the Ombudsman charging Hernando Perez. 2008. On February 23. 6713.A. the FIRO (Fact Finding and Intelligence Research Office) recommended that the case be referred to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (p. Graft and Corruption. 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18) months. holding as follows: 70 xxxx The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on hand. the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the respective motions to quash of respondents.000. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on February 13. 1. Committing acts Punishable under the Anti-Graft Law. Mary Susan Geronimo. the Ombudsman should have demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a Congressman. 6 of the Records) 5.999. 6713. SB-08-CRM-0266. signed by Asst. 2008. Extant in the record and which the prosecution admits or at least does not deny are the following: 1. Extortion. 3. 67 68 69 On November 20. pp. 1. 2001 (Joint Resolution signed by members of the Special Panel composed of Orlando Ines. Rosario Perez was not among those charged) with criminal offenses of Plunder. 2008. 4. Arceo (pp. and Administrative Offenses of Dishonesty. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing the complaint. 2001 funds were transferred from Coutts Bank to other accounts. HO 13706.00 bank draft/cheque issued to Ramon C. Adoracion Agbada. 2002. Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol. On July 10. and dismissed Criminal Case No. Arceo also moved to reconsider the denial.) (pp. Ernest Escaler. 10-11 Records). On December 23. 2001 the amount of US $1.965. quashed the information charging respondents with robbery. 2008. Jose de Jesus Jr. The information was filed with this Court only on April 18. (sic) Merceditas N. Vol. why he was filing the complaint only on December 23.parte motion to adopt the Perezes motion as well as Escaler’s motion to quash. Oppression. the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the motions for reconsideration. 3(b) R. and John Does with Violation of Sec. Ramon Antonio C.A. 2005 charging Hernando Benito Perez. all persons are entitled to a speedy resolution of their cases be it civil. With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on February 13. 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1. Thus under our present fundamental law. the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the office of the Ombudsman as nominal complainant filed a complaint with the Ombudsman on November 14.999. (Pp. it has failed to discharge its duty as mandated by the Constitution to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officers and employees. it is not only the honor and reputation but even the liberty of the accused (even life itself before the enactment of R. 2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or to dismiss it are on hand. since they are . 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18. but virtually in doing so. Rosario Salvador Perez. Sec. It is so. because in criminal cases. The case is more than ripe for resolution. 6713. 9346) is at stake. making the applicability of the doctrine enunciated in Anchangco Jr. The act of intimidation was there. Escaler. Arceo Jr.965. in criminal cases however where the need to a speedy disposition of their cases is more pronounced. The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justifiable motive and has unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional prerogatives to a speedy disposition of the case. 3 Sec.A. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. 4 Falsification. 16: All persons shall have a right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial(. administrative or criminal cases. As Justice Laurel said. The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay. 1379. 132 to 170 of Records) Robbery is NOT one of the charges. Ernest L. The charge is a simple case for Robbery. the prosecution is ousted of any authority to file the information and we hereby order the quashing of the information and the consequent dismissal of this case. The Constitution of the Philippines provides: Art. 11 of R. A healthy respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act within a reasonable time. Accordingly. Perjury (Art. 2001 in favour of the accused. there is no reason why within a reasonable period from these dates. This is an impermissible course of action that our fundamental law loathes. 3019. the complaint should not be resolved. and Duterte cases cited in the parties’ pleadings irrefragable. It may have its novel. the government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. there being a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused. It is. RPC and violation of R. 183 RPC) and Art. While the ground upon which the Court banked and relied this dismissal order was not invoked in the motions for reconsideration of accused Escaler and Arceo. Certainly it does not involve complicated and factual issues that would necessitate painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and perusal on the part of the Ombudsman.A.) quasijudicial or administrative bodies. 171 par. 8 in relation to Sec.At any rate. and to it. the asportation was complete as of February 23. Calamba 63 Phil 496). valid reason for departing from the established procedure and rules.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23.A. It is the moral and legal obligation of the Court to see that criminal proceedings come to an end (People vs. it is not disputed that the accused-spouses received through registered mail their copy of plaintiff’s motion only on December 16. 2009. 2008 while accused Ernest Escaler received his copy after December 18. and considering the argument of the prosecution that the different offenses in the four (4) cases consist of different elements necessitating presentation of different proofs and evidence for each case. even as. Accused’(s) bonds are ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order issued against them in this case is lifted and set aside. the situation. but the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration on June 19. the three (3) Rejoinders of the accused of different dates. 2008. and that all the parties were given ample time to file and submit their respective pleadings which at the time the issue was to be resolved had grown voluminous.similarly situated with their coaccused spouses Perez. as well as accused-spouses Perez Opposition dated December 22. 2008 giving the same situation as accused Perezes. 2008 seeking to reconsider the Resolution of this Court promulgated on November 20. the accused in each of the cases were charged with different offenses. and the different cases are already at different stages of the proceedings. All these shall be considered and taken up by the Court in seriatim. On record too. 2008 the date specified on plaintiff’s motion. 2008. We hereby consider the Motion for Reconsideration of our resolution denying the motion for consolidation moot and academic. It must be taken note of that the Court set the hearing of the plaintiff’s motion on December 18. as on December 12. this resolution applies to them with equal force and effect. Accused Ramon Arceo received his copy of the motion only on December 17. 2009 to Perezes(‘) Manifestation. 4 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which provides in substance that in every written motion required to be heard. stating thusly: 71 72 This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the People of the Philippines dated December 8. Nonetheless. are the Plaintiff’s Consolidated Reply dated January 19. considering the transfer of the date of hearing. . 2009 of accused Ernest L. 2009 to the three (3) Opposition/Comment of the accused. per Manifestation of accused Escaler he is not in any way a party to all the cases pending. We rule that the said motion lacks persuasiveness considering that. 2007 thus the motion was set for hearing before the other party received it. accused Arceo’s Comment/Opposition of even date. So ordered. the plaintiff’s sub-rejoinder dated February 9. On the basis of the foregoing disquisition. there seems plausibility for the accused claim of transgression of the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court. the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing. 2008 dismissing the case. 2008. the Court is not inclined to give due consideration for this procedural impropriety. and the Opposition dated January 5. no accused has received his copy of the said motion. The State moved to reconsider the resolution of November 20. Considering thus. Escaler. Of course. 2009. accused Perezes(‘) Manifestation and Plaintiff’s Comment dated February 16. The first issue brought up by the accused is a supposed procedural lapse of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration in that the same was filed in violation of Sec. 2008 while it set the date of hearing on December 12. " The first and foremost impression We can gather is that the alleged about two million dollars which supposedly was the result of accused Perez’ alleged extortion was delivered already to the accused. wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place. The first ground cited in the People’s motion was that the filing of complaint against former secretary Hernando B. and this definitely is not a legal impediment. But the Court shall keep track of the movant’s argument about this supposed legal impediment. This is even admitted in the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. All along therefore.The Court takes note however that the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was filed only on December 8. With or without ill-motive. "xxx the plaintiff’s duty is to determine whether there exists probable cause to hold the accused for trial for simple robbery". since it received a copy of the Resolution of this Court on November 21. if the claim of the prosecution is to be believed. This was the reason why Jimenez did not immediately file a complaint against Secretary Perez and his coaccused. the Ombudsman should have acted within a reasonable time. Ipakukulong kita sa Quezon . 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18) months. 2008 beyond the fifteenth day period within which it should be filed. 2008 were due to legal impediments which were beyond the control of the office of the Ombudsman. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing the complaint. are mere evidentiary matters. the prosecution reasoned out that the case can not be filed in Court at that time due to insufficiency of evidence. sinasalsal mo lang ako. 2008. Robbery has long been committed that was on or about February 2001 as alleged in the information. We will now tackle the merits of the grounds invoked by the People. Hindot ka. Admitting that the asportation was complete on February 23. 2001. Perez was not attended by ill motive since it reasoned out that it was the intimation of the Court when it stated in its Resolution the Ombudsman xxx "should have demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a congressman. Certainly eighteen (18) long months from the filing of the complaint can not be considered within a reasonable time. The movant then argued that the filing of the information only on April 18. The Court can not understand those alleged "legal impediments" in the prosecution for Robbery. The Resolution in question therefore which finally disposes of the case is not only final but executory as well which is virtually beyond the reach of the motion for reconsideration belatedly filed. certainly too this is not beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is the only impediment we can think of. Consider these facts all explicitly admitted by the prosecution: On February 13. Secretary Perez would stop threatening him and would leave him in peace for good. the latter delayed his filing of the complaint because he thought the accused would leave him in peace. why he was filing the complaint only on December 23. 2008 after which the said Resolution has become final and executory. and those documents which the prosecution so capitalized it exerted so much offer to obtain. Here is the prosecution claiming strongly that the filing of the complaint was not attended by illmotive and that after the pay-off even if a crime has been committed against complaint Congressman Mark Jimenez. the fifteenth day fell on December 6. Thus. xxx "We take note of the response of the prosecution "Jimenez thought that after the pay-off. As averred in the Opposition of accused Ernest Escaler. 2001 accused former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez accompanied by accused Ernest Escaler supposedly threatened complainant Congressman Mark Jimenez to send him to jail where he will die of boil (Putang ina mo. On February 23. We have already resolved and passed upon rather adequately this issue in our Resolution with the observation that not anyone of the cases cited involved the charge of Robbery. and this case. Because of the intense pressure upon me and my family.999. 2007 the accused submitted their Motion for Reconsideration. it could still proceed with its information to charge the accused. 2006 why did it take the Ombudsman only on January 5. Angchangco. 2008. Meanwhile.0 Million. and wrongfully conclude there was no delay in their handling of the case at bar. Soon after his appointment. 2001 the amount of US $1. Perez sent feelers that I am his first target for inclusion in the criminal cases that he will file against Pres. Duterte and other cases for transgressing the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. Sec. Perez. on January 11. The new Secretary of Justice. We however pose this question to the prosecution. If Asst. Estrada. Estrada and his cronies and associates. Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol recommended the filing of the information against the accused on November 7. 13. why did it take the Ombudsman up to April 15. This. 2001 and it was only on April 18. Pres. Doon mamamatay ka sa pigsa). The movant’s discussion asserted no new and substantial reason and argument to persuade us to reverse or modify our considered opinion. Taking exception to our ruling that the totality of facts and surrounding circumstances bear unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay. 2002 as stated in our Resolution that Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the Ombudsman. was appointed by Pres. Arroyo. It is clear the socalled legal impediments are but empty assertion to belatedly justify an impermissible action. To argue "that the authority of the Ombudsman is not . 2008 – a matter of about fifteen (15) months to resolve the same when there was NO OPPOSITION nor comment from the other party? The argument that "the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay in filing the information as this authority is vested by law" is a reckless reasoning that only shows that while admitting there was undue delay in the disposition of the case. Estrada stepped down as President after the Armed Forces of the Philippines withdrew its support to him. 2001) Congressman Mark Jimenez did not file my complaint against the accused in any Court or prosecutor office.965 owned by Congressman Mark Jimenez was transferred to Coutts Bank. The complainant had hesitated into filing his complaint for about eighteen (18) months while the Ombudsman with double hesitation dillydallied for about six (6) years. Hongkong in favour of Account Number 13706 in the name of Ernest Escaler (confirmed by Trade and Commerce Bank Payment Detail Report dated February 23. the movant made a comparison of those cases dismissed by the Supreme Court for violation of the Constitutional right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases. and the Arroyo Administration was installed on January 19. And if. (Page 73 of the Records) It was only on December 23. 2001 to April 18. I was forced to come across with US $2. despite his claim in his counter-affidavit that: "12. the delay from the supposed commission of such a simple offense of Robbery took more than seven years – that is from February 13. 2007 to approve the recommendation. He also threatened and intimidated me and my family with bodily harm and incarceration in a city jail with hardened criminals and drug addicts unless I execute damaging affidavits against Pres. The prosecution need not be reminded of the uniform ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court dismissing the cases of Tatad. Hernando B. All in all. 2001.City Jail. even if the said offense was alleged to have been committed on Feb. 2008 that the Ombudsman presented the information with this Court. in the third division the accusation was for Falsification of Public Document under Art. of testimony. while the accused have been indicted for violating Sec. it is not correct to say that the counting of the period for delay should commence only in November 2005. 2005 when the Field Investigation Office (FIO) filed its complaint. and then unabashedly it argues that is not part of the preliminary investigation. The Court can not say whether there is need for paper trail or monitoring of documents in those cases.A. 6713 before the Fourth Division. is not making nor indulging in mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved. 8 of R. Third and Fourth Divisions all junked the claimed inordinate delay of the accused and asked that the Second Division should "xxx co-exist not work on cross-purposes with the other Court’s Division xxx". to indulge in a prolonged fact-finding process is not a boon but a bane on the part of the prosecution In a distasteful exhibition of unsavoury language. the information in the first division charges the accused of Violation of Sec. As to fact-finding investigation. This only goes to show that the prosecution is totally ignorant of the hierarchy of Courts in our judicial system. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The conclusion thus. and that statutes.divested by the claimed delay in filing the information xxx" is to limit the power of the Court to act on blatant transgression of the constitution. As argued by accused Ramon Arceo. 3019 in relation to Sec. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt. In its sixth ground the movant argued that the First. the Court finds it so baseless for the movant to capitalize on what it supposedly did in the process of the fact-finding stance. But it took the movant six (6) years to conduct the said fact-finding investigation. This Court. but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion. Determining probable cause should usually take no more than ninety (90) days precisely because it only involves finding out whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the persons charged could be held for trial or not. and the other Divisions in error. That is already the function of the Courts. as the Divisions concerned can competently resolve and pass upon it but certainly in this instant case of Robbery. the claim of the movant that the preliminary investigation of the instant case commenced only on November 14. Moreover. what would happen now to the argument of the movant that "xxx there is rhyme or reason for the Sandiganbayan. As such. bordering on derision and contempt.A. enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. it must be made clear. The argument begs the question! Suppose if and when the incident reaches the Supreme Court. easily commands assent. even by mere natural lapse of memory.A. that the long waiting of six (6) years for the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of Robbery is clearly an inordinate delay. 3019. is rather specious and does not hold water as Robbery was not among the offenses included in the charge of the FIO. They are not . Second Division to co-exist xxx with the other Court’s Division xxx". 7 R. 2002 when Mark Jimenez filed his complaint-affidavit. blatantly intolerable. contemptuous and outright illegal for it mooted the same issue of inordinate delay pending with the Honorable Supreme Court xxx". xxx It must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State. 3 (b) of R. and grossly prejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases. the highest Court of the land ruled that it is the Second Division which is correct. the prosecution argued that "xxx the assailed resolution is a wanton display of arrogance. and then reasoning out as if clutching on straws that the sequences of events should excuse it from lately filing the information. It does not require sifting through and meticulously examining every piece of evidence to ascertain that they are enough to convict the persons involved beyond reasonable doubt. and not on December 23. 2013. No. 182360-63 moot.R.R. et al. 74 II. No. 2010. Perez and Rosario S. III. 189063). Nos. JR. Nos. I.R. No.). the Court deconsolidated G. No. The Office of the Ombudsman. 173967-71 and G.R. Perez v.R. the State assailed the resolutions of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in this Court (G.A. the State raises the following issues: On August 24. 173967-71 and G. and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. No. 75 G. to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns. No. the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated December 8.R. 3019 AS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING MONETARY CONSIDERATION. Field Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman and Mario B. SANDIGANBAYAN AND DISREGARDED JURISPRUDENCE THAT SHOWS SECTION 3 (B) OF RA 3019 EXTENDS TO ANY DEALING WITH THE GOVERNMENT. the Court directed that G. 188165 and G. 173967-71 (Ernest B. 189063 on the ground that the intervening filing of the informations in Criminal Case No. In G.R. No.R. No. No. 182360-63 (entitledHernando B. WHEREFORE.a. 182360-63 on the ground of their intervening mootness WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING SOLELY ON THE CASE OF SORIANO. Hon. No. No. G. 182360-63 and G. 189063 (People of the Philippines v.R.R. 2009. SB-08-CRM-0266 had rendered the petitions in G. Crespo a.R.R.R. 76 Issues So ordered. BY CONFINING THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TRANSACTION" IN SECTION 3(B) OF R. Mark Jimenez) and G. Escaler v.). 188165. 173967-71. 173967-71 and G. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM265.R. 173967-71 and G. but checks imposed by the State upon itself.k. Deconsolidation and dismissal of G. 182360-63 were special civil actions for certiorari to prevent the filing of the criminal informations against the respondents. No. 73 Consolidation of the petitions On October 26. 2009. No. No. No.merely acts of grace.R. On April 7. 188165 with G. SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. premises considered. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WTH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED . The Ombudsman. 2008 is denied for lack of merit. VS. 189063 be consolidated with G.R. the Court consolidated G.R.R. No. 182360-63 from G. et al. On February 11. 2nd Division.R. No. Sandiganbayan. 77 In G. 131 SCRA 188. No. Jr. 188165 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information by applying the definition of transaction in Soriano. resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the criminal charges against the respondents through petitions for certiorari instead of petitions for review on certiorari. not the Office of the Ombudsman. I.R. Whether or not it was the Office of the Solicitor General. as the petitioner in G. No. 189063 Whether or not the Sandiganabayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the criminal case due to the inordinate delay of the Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal action against respondents as to violate their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases. MAKING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN ANGCHONGCO JR. that had the authority to file the petitions to assail the Sandiganbayan resolutions. 78 The foregoing issues are restated thuswise: I. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES BEARS UNMISTAKABLY THE EARMARKS OF INORDINATE DELAY.R. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-0266 BY HOLDING THAT "THERE BEING A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED. No.THE MOTIONS TO QUASH (ON THE GROUND THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE) BY GOING BEYOND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION AND CONSIDERING SUPPOSED FACTS WITHOUT ANY BASIS." B. 189063. THE PROSECUTION IS OUSTED OF ANY AUTHORITY TO FILE THE INFORMATION. Whether the State. 189063. No. the State submits the following issues: A. Ruling The petitions for certiorari are devoid of merit. 188165 and G.R. . No. II. Specific Issue in G.R. AND DUTERTE CASES CITED IN THE PARTIES’ PLEADINGS IRREFRAGABLE. Specific Issue in G. v Sandiganbayan.R. as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate. the Office of the Ombudsman. 14 and 14-A. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. the filing of the petitions in these cases by the Office of the Ombudsman.which pertinently states: Section 35. through the OSP. Title III. II. 2. 1. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned. represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court. it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. the Office of the Ombudsman. as such. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and. 14 and 14-A. shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. xxxx The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. through its special prosecutor. issued in 1986. 292 . Powers and Functions. Book IV of the Administrative Code as amended by E. 1. investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.O. Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. through its special prosecutor. proceedings. 2. shall represent the People of the Philippines. issued in 1986. 8249 authorizes the exception. 14 and 14-A. 1. its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation. and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file the petitions for certiorari because only the Solicitor General could file the petitions in this Court pursuant to Section 35. Chapter 12. shall represent the People of the Philippines. except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines. 2. relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan . viz: xxxx c. except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 129. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to file an appeal or certiorari from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court." More specifically. issued in 1986. but the rule admits the exception concerning "all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme 79 Court. xxxx The contention of the respondents is grossly erroneous. No. was authorized by law. (Bold emphasis provided) xxxx Consequently. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court. That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule. the Court of Appeals. whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. two. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. one. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s judgment was rendered without authority. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose. acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) – is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. speedy. they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. In De los Santos v. the tribunal. a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court.The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless be dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed resolutions. supra. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. . order or resolution subject thereof. Petition for certiorari. 1âwphi1 The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. if allowed to stand. copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i. so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice. or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the inferior court or judge is alleged and proved to exist. the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. the Court has expounded on the nature and reach of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal. In this jurisdiction. Section 1. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. and there is no appeal. the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. or the King’s Bench. the petitioner must show that. If the inferior court acted without authority. to wit: not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts..e. A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the specific grounds provided in Section 1. In the common law. viz: 80 We remind that the writ of certiorari – being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. and. from which the remedy of certiorari evolved. and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. there is neither an appeal nor any plain. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court. Rule 46. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment. however. board or officer. and can prosper only the jurisdictional error. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was Section 1. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. — When any tribunal. the writ certiorari was issued out of Chancery. or any plain. The errors were of such a nature that. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3. (1a) Pursuant to Section 1. commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them. A. that with certiorari being an extraordinary remedy. or of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the term transaction in Soriano. Court ruled in the negative. or that the respondent judge." The Soriano. Sandiganbayan In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 3 (b) of R. the writ of certiorari would not issue for being bereft of legal and factual bases. A transaction. share. for himself or for any other person. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. (citations omitted) Did the petitioner show grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for? A. or benefit. tribunal or board evaded a positive duty. 188165 The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the restrictive meaning of the term transaction as used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. (Emphasis supplied) The State now argues. In the light of the foregoing. present. the herein petitioners’ stance that a writ of certiorarishould have been issued even if the CA found no showing of grave abuse of discretion is absurd.R. 3019 adopted in Soriano. In this regard. Jr. Jr. percentage.Considering that the requisites must concurrently be attendant. or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party. like a contract. such as when such judge. too. they must strictly observe the rules laid down by law for granting the relief sought. No. and positing that Soriano. The abuse of discretion must be grave. then a Fiscal. v. however. in which the principal issue was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by petitioner Soriano. was a "contract or transaction" as to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. citing for . 3019.. is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. The commission of grave abuse of discretion was a fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to issue against the RTC. Jr. tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. the Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano. Jr. We need to emphasize. No. and pronounced: 81 It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Without their strong showing either of the RTC’s lack or excess of jurisdiction. mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. v. Jr. Sandiganbayan. G. wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. Jr. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. was already abandoned by the Court. which punished any public officer for "[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift. SB-08CRM-0265. considering that the term transaction should be construed more liberally. 3019. Chang v. etc.that purpose the rulings in Mejia v. decided en banc on April 15. People. notwithstanding that it had not settled with them on their assessed deficiency tax ofP494. was a case in which two persons – Chang and San Mateo – were convicted of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. secondly." 85 And. but the money was just given to him. of the termtransaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. percentage. to the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. Pamaran. 2001. although the Sandiganbayan found that the amount was different from that charged in the information. Chang and San Mateo contended that the charge had resulted from an involuntary contact whereby complainant Magat had simply tossed to them the brown envelope. The issue was whether or not Mejia could be convicted under the information that alleged that she had demanded a certain amount. 3019 by holding that the latter is "limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. money or present. that there had been no conspiracy between them. People. 3019. The Court dismissed her petition. The ruling had nothing to do with the interpretation of the term transaction. the interpretation in Soriano. of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a differentiation between bribery under the Revised Penal Code and the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 for demanding the amount of P200. Peligrino’s defense was that he did not "demand" the money. not an entrapment. People. 3019 after being found to have received P125. 86 . and that the complainant had then requested the reduction of the amount claimed as his tax deficiencies. Peligrino v. Jr. 1988. in the later ruling in Merencillo v.00 from the complainant in connection with the latter’s tax liabilities. and liberally against the party sought to be charged. is immaterial xxx [w]hat is penalized is the receipt of any gift. defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them. People. an examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally. the Court did not touch on the proper interpretation of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. The Court found no merit in Peligrino’s argument. Jr. it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. The three rulings the State has cited here did not overturn the interpretation made in Soriano. 2006. promulgated in 2007. People. 3019 because the proper interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases.000. and that what had transpired had been an instigation. Peligrino. and find for the respondents. wherein the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity. In Mejia v. decided on July 21. was convicted of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. share. In affirming their conviction. He argued that he had only informed the complainant of his tax deficiencies. or benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract or transaction with the Government. 82 83 84 We disagree with the petitioner. Pamaran.000.00 in consideration of their issuance of a Certificate of Examination to the effect that the complainant had "no tax liability" in favour of the municipality. On the contrary. present. decided on August 13.00.000. In Peligrino v. the Court reiterated the restrictive interpretation given in Soriano. Jr. 3019 has not been overturned by the Court. First of all. considering that laws creating. and Chang v. and ruled that "[i]n a prosecution under the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift." The Court nowhere ruled on the proper interpretation of the termtransaction. Mejia had demanded and received money from some persons involved in certain cases in a trial court where Mejia was then serving as the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she would help in getting a favorable judgment for them. Sandiganbayan. including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had supposedly occurred in the period from February 13. v. is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious. No. 2006. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases. The Special Panel 93 . But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman.R. 2001. Jr. or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured. 2007. or whimsically. capricious. and oppressive? We answer in the affirmative. the right to the speedy disposition of a case. capricious. and in all proceedings. such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. 2001 to February 23. or capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. which declares: Section 16. quasi-judicial. or administrative bodies. 90 According to Angchonco. 91 92 Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious. 2002 when Ombudsman Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents relevant to the exposé of Cong. inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint. 88 B. SB-08-CRM-0266 Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in resolving the complaint Cong. and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves. Jimenez submitted his complaintaffidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only on January 5. the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily. Jimenez’s criminal complaint issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be filed against the respondents. Ombudsman. 189063 The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that there had been an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the charge in Criminal Case No. 89 G. 3019. 87 The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution.Clearly. on December 23. being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases. including civil and administrative cases. and oppressive delays. Yet. 2002. While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. Subsequently. however. Villarama. in which the Court held that speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with reasonable delays. like the right to speedy trial. Jimenez had brought against the respondents. warrants the dismissal of the criminal case. It was only on November 6. Cong. the State supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the investigation. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. when the Special Panel created to investigate Cong. the criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25. or that the delay was not attributable to it. the FIO submitted its report only on November 14. and Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this resolution only on April 15. 2005 from Liza Favre. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive. 2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh. 95 96 97 It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. to Atty. the informations charging the respondents with four different crimes based on the complaint of Cong.issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents’ motion for reconsideration on January 25. 2005. like not having a document showing that the funds (worth US$1. and the reply of the Office of Justice of Switzerland dated February 10. and to enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed to await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR Agreement). the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months. the State miserably failed. in Tatad v. 2005. Acting Assistant Ombudsman. That period accounted for a total of two years and 10 months. SB-08. To emphasize. namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected only after the accused had a falling out with former President Marcos. and that it could not obtain the document. Jimenez) had reached Secretary Perez. Melchor Arthur Carandang. the Ambassador of Switzerland. 2008. Jimenez were all filed on April 15. the Deputy Government Counsel of the Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to the request for assistance dated June 23. however. which was after the Department of Justice had received on September 8. together with documents pertaining to the bank accounts relevant to the investigation. In sum. In addition. 2008. (b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation. For one. the Court ruled that a delay of almost three years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his case. when the FIO completed its fact-finding investigation. it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable. and (c) the simple factual and legal issues involved did not justify the delay. 2003.965. indicating that political motivations had played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process. 2008. the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court primarily because of the insufficiency of We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State would thereby deliberately gain an advantage over the 94 98 99 . Ultimately. the evidence to establish probable cause. there is a greater reason for us to hold so in the respondents’ case. The fact-finding investigation had extended from January 15. thereby leading to the commencement of Criminal Case No. when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. 2005. because the respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.999. and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RPSwiss MLAT). until November 14. SB-08-CRM-0266. FIO.00 as averred in the complaint of Cong. capricious and vexatious.CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents’ right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. Jimenez for fact-finding investigation. the State’s dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a sufficient justification for the delay. For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the HKSAR Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate before it would proceed with the preliminary investigation was oppressive. To us. If. 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21. In both regards. Sandiganbayan. taking into account the following. WHEREFORE. the intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated. The act of intimidation was there. The obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish probable cause to charge them with the offense. had been adequately bared before the Office of the Ombudsman. Jimenez. 101 In fine. To allow the delay under those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law – fair play. quasijudicial or administrative bodies. and that the period spent in the former should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation. the preliminary investigation would not require more than five years to ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters. because no less that our Constitution guarantees the speedy disposition of the case. 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18. There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper court. and the respondents had been identified as the perpetrators. On the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. the Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari for their lack of merit. the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents' right to due process as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused.965. 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1. The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial. The basic elements of the offense. The case is more than ripe for resolution.respondents during the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement on costs of suit. 2008. We thus agree with the following observation of the Sandiganbayan. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hairsplitting distinction by the State is accepted. 2001 in favor of the accused. For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or dismiss it are on hand. because the field of contest between the accuser and the accused should at all times be level. 100 The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny. already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its resources. . the asportation was complete as of February 23. the manner by which the money extorted had been delivered. SO ORDERED. and due process of law. the complaint should not be resolved. The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the former was only preparatory in relation to the latter.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23. there is no reason why within a reasonable period from these dates. that is. viz: With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on February 13. an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation.999. At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation of a criminal case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would provide to the prosecutorial arm of the State. A healthy respect for the constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act within reasonable time. chaired by Atty. et al. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain. Zaldy B. The Chancellor of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP Manila). a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). which sought to reverse and set aside the Orders dated 8 June 2004[3] and 9 November 2004[4] of the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UPManila. Capt.the Court of the Appeals in CA-G. SP No.. Private respondent Imelda O. 87776 entitled. Docena with Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara as members. The undisputed facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: ROQUERO V UP MANILA DECISION PEREZ.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated 22 March 2007. and the Resolution[2] dated 1 February 2008. Wilfredo G. J. of Petitioner Wildredo G. The instant controversy arose from a complaint by private respondent Abutal . Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH.R. Roquero v. IMELDA ABUTAL who was then applying for the position of Lady Guard of ExBataan Security Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH. that despite the fact the MS. sometime in April 1996.O. while conducting an interview on MS. that you. Roquero. ABUTAL rejected your proposal. 292 on Civil Rules. The formal charge filed on 1 October 1998 and docketed as ADM Case No. you would facilitate her application and give her a permanent position. a prima facie case has been found to exist against you for GRAVE MISCONDUCT punishable under the University Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and Employees in relation to the Civil Service Law. paragraph (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E. Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of the UP Manila Police Force. UPM-AC 97007 reads as follows: After preliminary investigation duly conducted in accordance with the Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and Employees. therefore. . you still insisted on demanding said sexual favor from her. proposed to her that if she agreed to be your mistress. committed as follows: That you. are liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT under Section 22.with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. however. Docena. 292 and Omnibus Rules. represented the prosecution. Flor merely called . you are hereby preventively suspended for ninety (90) days effective upon receipt hereof. Thereafter. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Flor. Leo G. private respondent Abutal. On 1 October 1998. the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Paul A. After the completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness. Atty. when the case was called. xxxx While on preventive suspension.x x x x. the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July 1999. Thereafter. was organized to hear the instant case. Atty. as University Prosecutor. The prosecution. He was later on replaced by Atty. Asteria Felicen. failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period agreed upon. Lee of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was then replaced by Public Attorney Philger Inovejas. Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara. the petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days by Chancellor SantosOcampo. the material portion of said Order reads: Considering the gravity of the offense charged and pursuant to Section 19 of Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty Members and Employees and Section 26 and 27 Rule XIV of Book V of Executive Order No. only petitioner and his counsel appeared. on 10 August 1999. you are hereby required to appear before the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) whenever your presence is necessary. The Prosecution presented its only witness. Zaldy B. The continuation of the hearing of this case is hereby set to September 29. By reason thereof.by telephone and requested Atty. SO ORDERED. On 11 August 1999. Due to the unreasonable delay. the prosecution. and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case. Felicen in view of the . on 19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative case against him. Flor again called and asked for the postponement of the hearing. No representative from the prosecution appeared before the ADT. which reads as follows: On said date. Atty.. only petitioner and his counsel came. petitioner. Atty. The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not formally offered its evidence. that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed on 22 October 1999. with the understanding that if and when the parties fail to appear at said hearing date.m. 1999 at 2:00 p. Docena to reset the case to another date. Atty. Docena issued an Order. that the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to harass him. this case shall be deemed submitted for resolution based on the evidences already obtaining in the record of the case. Docena then ordered the resetting of the hearing on the following dates: 11 August and 21 August 1999. represented by Atty. The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. On 22 October 1999. the representative from the prosecution again failed to appear. On 26 May 2004. petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant (private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days from 1 July 1999 or up to 16 July 1999. 11 August 1999. on 30 January 2004. the Exhibits (A to G-1) of the Prosecution are hereby ADMITTED for the purpose for which the same have been offered. the prosecution explained in its Comment/Opposition that in view of the resignation of Atty. Jamie Limbaga. 2004 at 10:30 in the morning. had been in and out of the hospital due to a serious illness. and finding that said Motion to Dismiss to be bereft of merit. Docena issued the assailed Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. Flor. Atty. to wit: Acting on respondents Motion to Dismiss. Flor in August 1999. per registry return receipt. filed its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. the same is hereby DENIED. Lee. petitioners counsel. Meanwhile.The prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits had been filed on 24 January 2004. SO ORDERED. However. thus the delay in the filing of the prosecutors Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits. Furthermore. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in an Order dated 9 November 2004. of which a copy thereof was received by Atty. the Formal Offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the transcript of stenographic notes have been furnished to the counsel that replaced Atty. On 8 June 2004. In view of the failure of the respondent to file his comment on the Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence. Flor in August 1999 but who had been on leave by midJuly 1999. petitioner has not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer.resignation of Atty.[5] . the stenographer. as well as the University Prosecutors Comment and/or Opposition to said Motion. The respondent is hereby directed to present his evidence on June 22. thus: The main issue to be resolved is whether the ADT gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him. The Court of Appeals ruled. We do not agree.Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The appropriate rule in this case is Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. which provides. Petitioner argues that the administrative case against him should be dismissed because of the failure of the prosecution to file its Formal Offer of Evidence within the agreed period. Failure to submit the same within the given period shall be considered a waiver thereof. the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. After which. alleging therein that the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him. SP No.R. In a Decision dated 22 March 2007. both parties may be given time to submit their respective memorandum which in no case shall [be] beyond five (5) days after the termination of the investigation. We rule in the negative. . 87776. to wit: When the presentation of evidence has been concluded. docketed as CA-G. the parties shall formally offer their evidence either orally or in writing and thereafter objections thereto may also be made either orally or in writing. In case of doubt. Section 27 of the Uniform Rules states that the failure to file a formal offer of evidence amounts to a mere waiver thereof. There is no provision in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service akin to Section 34. . he shall allow the admission of evidence subject to the objection interposed against its admission. petitioner cannot claim a vested right to a dismissal of his case below just because a formal offer was not filed within the agreed period. In addition thereto. and not a dismissal of the action. particularly. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Thus. Furthermore. records show that in fact. where the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service applies.The failure to file a formal offer of evidence amounts to no more than a waiver of the right to file the same. the Uniform Rules give the hearing officer a leeway when it provided that x x x the hearing officer shall accept all evidence deemed material and relevant to the case. the same is not true in administrative cases. Section 3 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. While under the Rules of Court. a formal offer may be indispensable because the rules on evidence so require it. the absence of a formal offer of evidence does not bar the adverse party from presenting its evidence.As such. a formal offer of evidence was filed by the prosecution. the tribunal acted within the bounds of its authority. In administrative cases. The action of the ADT in admitting the prosecutions exhibits was consistent with the above-mentioned Rules. In the case at bar. [7] It must be noted. 27. Roquero is now before us seeking the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. or personal hostility. for utter lack of merit. The core issue of this case is whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roqueros Motion (to declare complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit) which he seasonably filed on 22 October 1999 and the assailed Order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the constitutional right of Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases. In fact. The Court of Appeals faulted petitioner for his failure to present his own evidence which he could have done as early as 11 August 1999. and 28 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. that petitioners 22 October 1999 motion to declare complainant to have waived her right to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit .[6] Roquero moved for reconsideration of the Decision. the instant petition with prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED. We find merit in the petition.Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. the admission of the exhibits for the prosecution is in accordance with Section 3. and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. but the same was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on 1 February 2008. or in other words. To reiterate. petitioner was not denied the opportunity to present his evidence. In admitting the exhibits for the prosecution. WHEREFORE. however. he could have presented his evidence as early as 11 August 1999 but he did not do so. where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion. prejudice. who had by then already been on leave since mid-July 1999. it was pointed out that the stenographer. the prosecution could have easily manifested with the ADT of its predicament right after Roquero filed his motion to declare the waiver of the formal offer.[9] The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor hook. If the excuses were true. Indeed. Paul Flor in August 1999.remained unresolved. line and sinker without asking why it took him almost five (5) years to make that explanation. had been in and out of the hospital due to a serious illness.[8] The admission by ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits belatedly filed did not cure the 5-year delay in the resolution of petitioners 1999 motion to deem as waived such formal offer of evidence. It is evident too that the prosecution failed to explain why it took them so long a time to find a replacement for the original prosecutor. file a motion to dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion. contributed to the delay of the filing of the formal offer and that the formal offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the transcripts of stenographic notes had been given to him. petitioner was presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to. This is reason enough for Roquero to defer presentation of his own evidence. Also. the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004. . a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel. the delay of almost five (5) years cannot be justified. as he did. The prosecution tried to explain in its Comment/Opposition dated 26 May 2004. the stenographer who had been in and out of the hospital due to serious illness should have been replaced sooner. We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ADT because a formal offer of evidence was filed by the prosecution. while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall be considered as waiver thereof. And. Jaime Limbaga. Starting on that date. Indeed. that the resignation of Atty. While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings,[10] the same however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[11] The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[12] Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.[13] Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage. The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.[14] The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.[15] WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 22 March 2007 and Resolution dated 1 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are hereby ORDERED to DISMISSthe administrative case against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases. SO ORDERED. right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not disputed. Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2 On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows: 2-8-86 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION RIGHTS People v judge Ayson NARVASA, J.: What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86. (s) Felipe Ramo (Printed) F. Ram At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated. About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) — .. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and roundtrip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party .. . On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K. The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.' By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission." The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited." These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question. The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue — of whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows: SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely: 1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and 2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against selfincrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13 Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against selfincrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17 The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18 Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative. This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20 Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; 22 and 3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23 In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. 24 He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25 The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court." 28 .. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance. Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances. Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation." But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against selfincrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30 Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32 The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the . he may do so. Thus. In fine. not to be subjected to force. b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation. but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way. d) WHILE TESTIFYING. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). he may decline to answer that specific question. and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel. His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will. In so doing. threat. c) to testify in his own behalf. To be sure. This is his right. 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give. a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court. however. has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence. for preliminary investigation). or connected therewith . assuming that in a prosecution for murder. the accused should testify in his behalf. subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. he has grossly erred." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination. then he "may be crossexamined as any other witness. would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged. he may not on crossexamination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder. say." 35 If he should wish to testify in his own behalf. or the evidence he will produce. not for the crime with which he is charged. distinct from that of which he is accused. violence. and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37 a) to refuse to be a witness. equating one with the other. It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might incriminate him. It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20. on the strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20.neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. and to be informed thereof. and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected. estafa. But if he does testify. but for some other crime. were of no relevance to the inquiry. or his colleagues and friends." etc. they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects. whether called "position paper. with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel. because he had not been accorded. annulled and set aside. refuse to submit any statement at the investigation. offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. But if he should opt to do so. They should be as they are hereby. In such an event. It is also clear. in negation or mitigation of his liability. His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person against selfincrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties. on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. Indeed. 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded. or complaining employers because being interested parties. prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.case before him tantamount to totally unfounded. that violence or intimidation." "answer. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20. undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation — or for that matter. just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8. it would be absurd to reject his statements. undue ascendancy and undue influence. by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. to repeat. February 9. are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee. Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized. any admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence. was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. whether at the administrative investigation. are relevant only in custodial investigations. of course. in his defense to the accusation against him. his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof. etc. on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent. that is his privilege. but simply on the general. oral or written. complaining companies. The employee may. the day before the investigation. by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense. too. the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A. The requirement entails the making of statements. whimsical or capricious exercise of power. incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in . whether employees or not. unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect.. or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due process. that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation. it is self-evident that the employee's statements. to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. not because of a violation of Section 20. They may not be excluded on the ground that the socalled "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. prior to his making and presenting them. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion.1986. as the term should be properly understood.) which. the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. unlawfully and feloniously. a Special Collecting Officer of the Bureau of Domestic Trade at General Santos City. was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Sandiganbayan of malversation of public funds. General Santos City. At the pre-trial inquest conducted by the Sandiganbayan. Exhibits A and A-1. on 29 March 1989. 1988. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea. WHEREFORE. He appealed to this Court. as well as the fact that they are faithful reproductions of the originals. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. When arraigned. 1988 and September 14. concur. being the Special Collecting Officer. to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforesaid amount. 3488-R. and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all. 3488-R. did then and there wilfully. and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. accused Luciano Kimpo. a public officer. "not guilty. The temporary restraining order of October 26. and as such is an accountable officer responsible for the funds collected by him by reason of the duties of his office.00). in General Santos city. In . JJ. That on or about April 30. 1988 having become functus officio.justice be received against the makers thereof. Bureau of Domestic Trade. 1 pleaded. Gancayco. and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. with grave abuse of confidence. petitioner. embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit the sum of Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred Nine Pesos (P15. assisted by counsel.. which amount constitutes his collection. filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner with having committed the following offense: Cruz. 1985 and/or sometime prior thereto. the following exhibits were admitted: 1. The case was initiated by Special Prosecution Officer Mothalib C. Contrary to law. dated August 9.309. is now declared of no further force and effect." Kimpo v Sandigan Petitioner Luciano Kimpo y Niñanuevo. appropriate. Onos who. 6. L-1 to L-44 (carbon copies of official receipts) and his signatures thereon. E 8.connection therewith. and of Milda de la Peña. Exhibit H as the Official Cash Book of the accused and his signatures appearing between the entries therein beginning August 1. The existence of Exhibits D and D-1. and L. thus: Accused herein having admitted his public position as alleged in the information and the existence of a shortage of P15. subject to the qualification that the entries therein were not made by him. the validity and accuracy of which are questioned. B 8-1. Exhibit N.309. M 8-2. 1985. and Reconciliation Statement of Accountability (Exhibit B-3) were made and signed. subject to the qualification that the data mentioned therein were based on the results of the audit examination. M and M-1. Trade and Industry Analyst of the Department of Trade and Industry at its South Cotabato Provincial Office. for the defense. 9. N 7-1. The existence of Exhibits C. 5. G 8. including the fact that they are faithful reproductions of the originals. Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms without Money Value (Exhibit B-1). T 2-1. The existence of Exhibits I. L 3-1. General Santos City. as well as the signatures appearing on the last page of each exhibit and the fact that they are true copies of the originals. 7. 1985. the accused admitted that he was on or before April 30. I-1 to I. Bureau of Trade. as well as that of petitioner Kimpo himself. State Audit Examiner of the Commission on Audit. including the fact that they are faithful copies of the originals. 3. H 8. including the fact that they are correct copies of the originals. that the corresponding Report of Examination (Exhibit B). U 7-2. J-1 to J-95. for the prosecution. 1985. The testimonial evidence consisted of the testimonies of Lydia Mendoza. L 7. B-1 and B-2. K. D 8. G 8. subject to the same qualification made with respect to Exhibits B. That an audit-examination of the cash and accounts of the accused was conducted on April 30. 1984 and up to April 31. the Sandiganbayan concluded. K-1 to K-26. Y8-2 AND Y 8-2 AND Y 8-3 (xerox copies of official receipts).00 upon audit . J. N 2-2. Special Collecting Officer. C 8. and that the signatures appearing on the dorsal side of Exhibits B and B-1 are those of the accused. F. all these admissions being subject to the qualification that the accused is questioning the validity of the audit examination and the accuracy of the results thereof on constitutional grounds. F 4-2. From all the evidence adduced. Exhibits A 1-1. 8.40. Exhibits J 8 to O 8. 4. with the qualification that the said entries were not made by him. but not their relevance. 2. E. A 5. what were collected and reflected in the duplicate ORs were not the correct amounts appearing in the original ORs issued to the payees and which were verified and confirmed later by the payees. accused "restituted and deposited with the Bureau of Treasury thru PNB. An Inventory of Cash and/or allowed Cash Items produced P912. Therein. who also entered the amounts collected by her in accused's cashbook.00. 1985. 1985. she sent a letter of demand to the accused on October 14. "after cash count and confirmed by us (Please see Scheduled 2). While the certifications and official receipts were pre-signed by him. Mendoza as the difference between the amounts appearing in the originals of the Official Receipts/Letter of Confirmation and the duplicate Official Receipts.00 from individual payees were reflected in the original ORs which were confirmed by said payees through confirmation letters and which totalled P15. leaving a balance of P16.50. testimonial and documentary. and fees for repair shop establishments.309.50.486. On October 18.50. whom he admitted to have been retained by him as his unofficial clerk/collector in his office and who attended to the receipt of payments for the registration of business names and issuance of certifications and official receipts for such payments. accused submitted his letter-explanation to Auditor Mendoza wherein he laid the blame for the shortage on his office clerk whom he had already relieved and alleged that he had not benefited. due to the fact that he had made deposits amounting to P11.309.00 per Report of Collections with the Confirmation Letter and/or Original Official Receipts" for the period from July 17. from the missing funds. he was required to produce immediately the balance of P3.890. The amounts collected between the period from July 17. 1985.00 or P110. 1985 totalled P100. leaving a shortage of P15. the amounts reported to have been collected and which were reflected in the duplicate ORs were only P2. directly or indirectly. accused lays the blame for the shortage on one Yvette Samaranos." On October 17. the collections thereunder were made by Samaranos. from which should be deducted total remittances of P85.examination of his accountabilities. which the accused received on the same date.00.00 which was determined by Auditor Lydia R.221. In other words.50. Auditor Mendoza supported her findings of a shortage and the reasons for such shortage thru a formal "Comparison of Duplicate Official Receipts of P2.00 or P112.00. it clearly appeared that while the amounts to be officially collected should be P110.50. 1984 to April 30. including penalties. GSC" the amounts .177. Therein. After the cash count made by Auditor Mendoza as a prelude to her Report of Examination and subsequent verification/confirmation. 1985 and November 7. The unreported and unrecorded collections of P108. 1985. then what remains to be resolved only is whether any criminal liability is attributable to him by reason of such shortage. 1984 to April 30.50. As can be deduced from the defense evidence.418. 00. Samaranos collected the proper official fees. which he entrusted to Samaranos who then fills up the said receipts and certifications and makes the corresponding entries in his cashbook. of which he was the Provincial Trade Development Officer. therefore. accused herein cannot blame anyone else for the predicament that he found himself in. For the reason that he was out in the field for days at times. filled up the duplicates thereof with reduced amounts. 1985. Accused's defense cannot be accepted. hence. issued the original receipts with the proper amounts.309. then it behooves the Court to determine if accused herein had rendered himself liable or not under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code by reason of such shortage. conduct meetings for retailers and consumers and repair shop establishments. if added to his previous deposits from June 2. he should not have allowed . was a one-man operation. albeit a private individual. 1985 to November 7.of P2.00 and the fact of accused's settlement for such shortage through installments deposited with the PNB. 1985 to August 23. General Santos City between June 2. however. There being no dispute. as well as certifications. and (4) he had to leave someone in the office to attend to the general public in the registration and/or renewal of business names and the issuance of certifications and official receipts for the collection of the proper fees. As it turned out. as to the existence of the shortage in the accounts of the accused.309. 1985 amounting to P11. as found by Auditor Mendoza as of April 30. was responsible for the misappropriation thereof. nor can it absolve him from criminal liability for the missing public funds which the audit examination on his accountabilities as of April 30. respectively.50. 1985. Such determination must perforce go into the merits of his claim that the responsibility for such shortage should be laid on the doorstep of Yvette Samaranos. which was not definitely or conclusively established by his evidence. made the corresponding entries in the cashbook based on the amounts reflected in the duplicates and made the proper remittances based on the improper entries. As Special Disbursing Officer. that another person. understaffed. which. 1985 had revealed.890. cannot be considered in exculpation or justification of such primary accountability. whom he inherited from his predecessor who had allowed her to work in the office as clerk-collector and whom he retained for the following reasons: (1) the Office of the Bureau of Domestic Trade at General Santos City. (2) he had to go out to the field to campaign for increased registration of business names.50 and P485. a private individual. would total P15. First of all.50. he was the primary accountable officer for such funds and the fact. hold symposiums of consumers' groups. amounting to P15.933. xxx xxx xxx Consequently. he pre-signed official receipts in blank. (3) he occasionally goes out to attend raffles conducted by private establishments as representative of the Bureau of Domestic Trade. Fourthly. SO ORDERED. SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS.Yvette Samaranos. in any way. his admission that he had to pay the salaries of Samaranos through honoraria received by him from raffles is fatal to his cause since he should have realized that. amounting to a definite laxity resulting in the deliberate non-performance of his duties. he should have refrained from pre-signing official receipts and certifications. In this appeal. after discovery of the shortage upon audit examination. His bare and unsupported claim that. who did not possess any appointment. as defined and penalized under Article 217. to pay a fine of P15. Thirdly. judgment was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner Kimpo and sentencing him. accused was more interested in conducting field trips and raffles whereby he would be able to collect per diems. Apparently. to perform official acts which he was ordained to do. he should have ensured that the collection of official fees was properly made. erase his criminal liability which could be characterized as malversation of Public Funds through negligence. recorded and remitted. FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum. In his case. accordingly: WHEREFORE. such negligence may be described as gross and inexcusable. To allow public accountable officers to adopt the practice resorted to by the accused in allowing private individuals to perform public functions would lead to chaos and anarchy and would render nugatory all applicable norms of public trust and accountability. under such circumstance. Secondly. judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Luciano Kimpo y Niñanuevo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Malversation of Public Funds. if he were that desirous of rendering conscientious public service. after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. and favorably appreciating the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and full restitution. to ELEVEN (11) YEARS. No civil liability is awarded in view of the full restitution of the amount involved. paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SEVEN (7) YEARS. to further suffer perpetual special disqualification.309.00 equal to the amount malversed and to pay the costs of this action. travelling allowances and honoraria from private firms. On the basis of the above findings. he took steps to charge Yvette Samaranos for Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents does not. petitioner submitted the following assignment of errors: That — I THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED EXHIBITS B TO B-3 AGAINST THE ACCUSED OVER ACCUSED'S . since the collection of official fees was a sensitive area. Samaranos would be subject to the most severe temptation to fool around with the agency's collections. likewise of prision mayor as the maximum. G. The appeal has no merit. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3). 17 December 1987. No. and a Reconciliation Statement of Accountability. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for having considered Exhibits "B" to "B-3. originals and duplicates. SECTIONS 12 & 17 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. Indeed. there is not much that the . The Letters of Confirmation (Exhibits Z to II.309. wherein it could clearly be seen that payments for P110. On the so-called confirmatory letters. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. IV THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING ACCUSED LIABLE FOR MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH NEGLIGENCE. 186 SCRA 536). KKKKK to KKKKKKK to JJJJJJJJ and JJJJJJJJ) were not the primary evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the manipulations and irregularities in question but the originalsand duplicates of the Official Receipts (Exhibits L to I-40.00 only. AS EVIDENCE TO PROVE ALLEGED SHORTAGE. all of which were admittedly signed by the accused.00 were reflected as P2.00 BECAUSE HE FAILED TO HAVE THE AMOUNT FORTHCOMING UPON DEMAND. which are official forms prepared and accomplished in the normal course of audit regularly conducted by the Commission on Audit. II THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED — OVER PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS — ALLEGED CONFIRMATION LETTERS NOT SIGNED OR NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED. K to K-26 and L to L44). We cannot agree. and Section 17. denied that the abovementioned official receipts. not being at the time under investigation for the commission of a criminal offense. AAAA to JJJJJ. Sandiganbayan. TT to GGG. let alone under custodial investigation. REPEAT. considering all the evidence on record. HHH to WWW. clearly cannot be said to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogatives he invokes (Villaroza vs. XXX to ZZZZ.OBJECTIONS ANCHORED ON ARTICLE III. the Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms without Money Value. Petitioner. had not. the Letters of Confirmation are only secondary evidence to support and prove the principal facts in issue. Hardly can the above findings be validly challenged. despite what he claims to be an impairment of his constitutional rights under Article III." inclusive. Accused had not. The questioned exhibits pertain to the Report of Examination. People vs. respondent court concluded thus — III. are genuine and correctly reflect the amounts which appear to be listed therein. III THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT ACCUSED IS PRESUMED TO HAVE MALVERSED P15.R. 79636. JJ to SS. Olivares. Thus. J to J-95. 2. shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. which petitioner questions. or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. reads: Art. in full. shall appropriate the same. wholly or partially. The validity and constitutionality of the presumption of evidence provided in the above Article. Malversation. be adjudged as the evidence so yields. nevertheless. and the same penalty is imposed. if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. Petitioner has been charged with having violated Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. 3 that point need not again be belabored. Even while an information charges willful malversation. 217. by reason of the duties of his office. — Any public officer who. 3. which. if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. or through abandonment or negligence. is accountable for public funds or property. 4 . or shall otherwise be guilty the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall suffer: 1. — Presumption of malversation. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable. if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. conviction for malversation through negligence may. if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. upon demand by any duly authorized officer. 4. the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. has long been settled affirmatively in a number of cases heretofore decided by this Court. In all cases. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. If the amount exceeds the latter.questioned letters could have lent to augment the case for the prosecution. Malversation of public funds or property. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence. unlike other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code. is consummated. 927. four by two and a half meters. Bernarda had six stab wounds in the chest. Lito Siao and Jose Magdaraog. a mountainous portion of Agban. Andrea Magdaraog-Siao and her nephew. Catanduanes. and her two grandchildren who were staying with the old woman. fracturing the skull. 6 WHEREFORE. Record). . Bernardo da Salvador Magdaraog. beggars description (Exh. a hack wound in the occipital region. six stab wounds in the neck. 202. a hack wound in the forehead. B). cutting the carotid arteries. can merely affect the accused's civil liability thereunder 5 and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender. F): SO ORDERED. or fourteen wounds in all (Exh. were the dead bodies of Bernarda. fifteen wounds in all (Exh. 15. went to her hut located in Sitio Banog. 13. and a hack wound in the head.) Leo did not appeal. A-2). fractures on the left temple. after the commission of the crime. gaping wounds in the chest. People v Tawat PER CURIAM: This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes. In the morning of January 23. severing the bone with only a thread of skin remaining. two stab wounds in the abdomen (one gaping).000 to each set of heirs of the three victims. The horrible and gory sight. Baras. 79. or reimbursement of funds misappropriated. finding Felicito Tawat and Leo Tawat guilty of robbery with triple homicide. and the appealed decision of respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMEDin toto. A). Andrea's son Lito Siao. and Leo to an indeterminate penalty within the range of reclusion temporal and ordering them to pay solidarily damages of P32. mandible and ribs and a hack wound in the lower left leg. the petition is DISMISSED. and a stab wound which penetrated his heart. at most. which greeted them. A-1 and A-3. p. who were residing in the barrio proper of Agban. fracturing the bone. The argument not only is an inappropriate defense in criminal cases but it also even at times tightens a finding of guilt. Bernarda Salvador. Sprawled on the floor of the humble abode. bathed in their own blood (Exh. Jose Magdaraog had three stab wounds in the chest which injured his lungs. sentencing Felicito to death Lito had eight stab. In malversation of public funds. does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which.Petitioner argues that the restitution made by him of the full amount should exonerate him from criminal liability. indemnification. payment. and Luis' brother Jose. Case No. Luis Magdaraog. They wanted to find out what happened to her mother. 1980. (Crim. which penetrated his lungs. five serious wounds in all (Exh. 6. p. they unexpectedly arrived at the hut of Floro Ogalesco. C.Bernarda was prostrate on the floor with her teeth showing. 1982). The accused's confession to Ogalesco is in part corroborated by the sworn statement of Alejo Tawat. He stabbed and killed her. G). three kettles. Alejo learned that the mother-in-law of Jovito Siao. blanket. I. Julio (father of Leo). As they passed Siao's hut. (Nos. Leo in his sworn statement confirmed that the shorts belonged to Felicito (No. Her waist was slashed. The belongings were scattered on the floor. Baras (No. Leo Tawat. He finished the sixth grade at Barrio Agban. that was the story narrated in court by Ogalesco. 32. one of whom was Andrea Siao's son. Felicito recounted that they were drunk.) After Felicito and Leo had finished eating. and from there they repaired to Capipian. chickens. a mosquito net. Catanduanes. pork and other belongings in the hut and proceeded to the house of Julio Tawat. Rollo). went to their abaca plantation in Sitio Calabiga. Alberto. Baras in 1972 (Exh. 1980 (the crime was committed at night) when he gave cigarettes to Felicito and Leo (4 tsn October 8. Felicito killed one while Leo killed the other. Exh. one frying pan and plates and spoons. M. a dog barked. linking Felicito and Leo to the robbery with triple homicide committed on the evening of January 22. 11 and 12. His father saw him on January 22. 46. his son Lito and his wife's nephew Jose were killed and that the pig. in Barrio Agban. 23. He found Felicito and Leo cooking chickens in a kettle. four chickens. 26 tsn Oct. D) which was later proven to have been worn by accused Felicito Tawat. Felicito. C. Felicito killed the dog. There was a black underwear with garter belt marked "Armin" and "No. Barrio Paraiso. Exh. At about three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day January 23. where she kept her money. 15-17 and 22-23. '"15. The two boys shouted also. The door of the hut wits destroyed. The cloth-belt. Camarines Norte from 1963 to October 1980. He testified that he was in Mercedes. He saw a mosquito net in the hut. confessed to Ogalesco that they were taking refuge in his secluded hut because the night before they had killed at Sitio Banog. 5. was missing. father of Felicito. C). Who were the perpetrators of the dastardly misdeeds? They were Felicito Tawat. D). Exh. 16. father of Leo. She was naked from the waist down. 1980 he and his brother. Record. kettle and chickens of Jovito Siao were stolen (Nos. Exh. Alejo declared that at about eight o'clock in the morning of January 23. and his first cousin. in the remote and isolated forest of Sitio Capipian. They took the dead dog. Alejo and Julio accompanied their sons to the forest of Capipian. .M. Alberto. all valued at P705. 7" (Exh. Alejo and Julio left them there and returned to Barrio J. mosquito net. Baras an old woman and two boys. 1980. 211. Baras. This claim is manifestly false because he was only seven years old in 1963. 1980. 1981). From his neighbors. 1980 at Barrio J. Felicito relied on an alibi. San Miguel. in the presence of Leo. This provoked an old woman to shout at Felicito. Luis Magdaraog testified that the shorts were worn by Felicito in the morning of January 22. Also missing were a pig. Barrio Agban. A pig had been killed and was about to be cooked. an abaca and rattan stripper. Any doubt as to the connection of Felicito with the robbery with triple homicide was removed by the finding at the scene of the crime of black shorts with belt (Exh. p. J). G. 1979 in Tigaon. Felicito stabbed to death with a dagger Jovita Lim. In connection with that case. December 21. Felicito was not immediately arrested. Ogalesco was not a peace officer. p. Tawat. G. Baras. Incidentally. 1983.) Counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in relying on that admission of Felicito in his confession which he later repudiated. He argues that the confession during custodial interrogation cannot be admissible in evidence. The crime in this case may be mitigated by drunkenness but it was aggravated by dwelling. 61016. embarked on a criminal career. 1982.R. 1983. a storekeeper. 1983). 1980 (subsequent to the instant case). committed another robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide on November 30. That admission was only alluded to in passing by the trial court. may be given in evidence against him" (Sec. . July 30. Catanduanes. San Miguel. He was sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment (Exh. Rules of Court). 13 and 18. Catanduanes. Camarines Sur (Exh. Pedroso. H-6. In 1975. Record. while a companion got the loot of P110. with Nestor Rojo and Jimmy Tarraya. 1980 at Barrio Bugao. We agree with the learned trial judge that the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt. No.supra. where the death penalty was commuted to reclusion perpetua. It was not the basis for Felicito's conviction in this case. As already noted. K and HH). While still a teenager. he had hidden himself in the hut of Ogalesco in Capipian. He. The testimony of Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is competent evidence. R. Felicito. 115 SCRA 599. He was convicted and sentenced to death. Felicito executed a confession on January 9. Ponce Enrile. Exh.The trial court concluded that although there was no eyewitness testimony to the perpetration of the crime. "The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged. 29.despoblado and disregard of sex and old age in the case of the 79-year-old woman victim. as held in Morales vs. 62547. L-32997. No. His guilt was predicated on his confession to Ogalesco which was not taken during custodial interrogation. The second and third homicides may be also regarded as an additional aggravating circumstance (People vs. he was convicted and the judgment was affirmed in People vs. abuse of superiority. Bagamanoc. He pleaded guilty. He was suspected of being implicated in a case of murder and frustrated murder committed in December. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction but commuted the death penalty to reclusion perpetua (People vs. Tawat. for another robo con homicidio committed on November 30. 163. J-2). 62547. G. What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. who. finished the elementary course in 1972. alimbuyogon andbalawon (Exh. April 26. as already stated. (Nos. 121 SCRA 538. he stated therein that he wanted to get out of Catanduanes because he was wanted by the police for the killing of three persons in Barrio Agban. No.R. 609). December 21. he was charged in the Baras municipal court with theft of two cocks. 1981 before the chief of police of Bagamanoc. nevertheless. the totality of the circumstantial evidence is so overwhelming as to prove Felicito's guilt to a moral certainty. Rule 130. a malversation case. p. 85 Phil. "In these days of rampant criminality. Corrales' counsel assailed the admissibility of the auditor's testimony. the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the slight modification that Felicito Tawat is also ordered to pay the heirs of Bernarda Magdaraog the value of the articles taken in the sum of P705. 611. 362.) "Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present. WHEREFORE. but in such case it must be given in its substance. Niblack. it should have a salutary effect upon the criminally minded to know that the courts do not shirk their disagreeable duty to impose the death penalty in cases where the law so requires" (People vs. Corrales. Ed. and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases. Corrales did not issue any receipt but merely gave Melliza a copy of the judgment of conviction with a note at the bottom: "Multas y costas pagadas". 635). clerk of the Court of First Instance. acted corrective in imposing the death penalty." (Underhill's Criminal Evidence. understood.The rule is that "any person.88 in the office safe only in the afternoon of June 13 after the auditor's examination. On the witness stand. 35. . A week later. as long as that penalty remains in the statute books.S.S. Society must protect itself against a dangerous criminal like him "by taking his life in retribution for his offense and as an example and warning to others". This testimony was contradicted by the auditor who testified on Corrales' confession that he placed the amount only in the afternoon of June 13. 278. is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. "However. and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused. SO ORDERED.88 from a man named Melliza as payment of the fine and costs imposed on Melizza. heard. Jose Corrales." (23 C. no one deserved the death penalty more than Felicito Tawat.) In U. On June 14. layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty Today. 196. Gayapa. 88 Phil. Limaco. who heard the confession. vs. otherwise competent as a witness.. No costs. 28 Phil. court.J. It was held that the auditor's testimony was admissible and properly taken into consideration by the trial. sec. Carillo and Raquenio. an information for misappropriation was filed against Corrales. 551.had always been in the drawer for personal funds in his office safe. The sum paid by Melliza was not turned over to him. there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. Justice Montemayor says: "We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else. In the afternoon of that day. Corrales went to the auditor's house and confessed to him that he placed that amount of P321.43). or on June 13. Judge Graciano P. the accused claimed that the amount . it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions" (People vs. received on June 6. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim. 1913 P321. Jr. In the annals of criminal law. the auditor examined Corrales' accounts. 4th. the co-accused of Tampus. a group hostile to the Oxo gang. Makati Branch 36. 28. another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado (Exh. sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim Celso Saminado. Criminal Case No.The accused. who were tubercular patients in the hospital. in another case. Avila did not appeal. assaulted him. 1187. a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa. Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila. 27. 37. The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. Tampus. Celso Saminado. J. went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck (Exh." AQUINO. The death sentence is under review in L-38141). sir. Tampus inflicted eight incised wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times. convicting Jose Tampus of murder. 1975 by a member of the Batang Mindanao gang. 18510). Rosales was a member of the Oxo gang. Tampus and Avila. pleaded guilty to the charge of murder . J dated January 14. 1976. avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales in December. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired. The evidence shows that at around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14. Two days after the killing. Gumanti lang po kami. by means of their bladed weapons. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami. Saminado died upon arrival at eleven o'clock on that same morning in the prison hospital. People v Tampus After emerging from the toilet. Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital. Saminado was a member of the Batang Mindanao gang. or on January 16. he stated that. together with Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala. Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives (Exh. both members of the Oxo gang. prisoners in the same penal institution. He and Avila.: This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. followed Saminado to the toilet and. with the assistance of counsel de oficio. and Avila. an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the same indemnity. The motive of the killing was revenge. 1976). In the same decision. (He was sentenced to death. according to his on-thespot investigation. Rodolfo Avila. A and C). B and D). There is no question that the guilt of Tampus was established beyond reasonable doubt. The investigator in taking it endeavored. affirmed their confessions and testified as to the manner in which they repeatedly wounded Saminado. The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propioexclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. In this review of the death sentence. Rules of Court. L35279. evident premeditation and quasi recidivist At the arraigmment or after they had pleaded guilty. sec. section 20 applies thereto (People vs. to comply with section 20. vs. 270). The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Article IV of the Con constitution which provides: SEC. 4 Phil. See 21 Am Jur 2d 305. threat. So. No force. Ang may salaysay matapos maipabatid sa kanya ang kanyang mga karapatan tungkol sa pagbibigay ng malayang salaysay sa ngayon sa . The trial court required the fiscal to present the prosecution's evidence. Dumdum. be held at the national penitentiary in Muntinlupa.S. 304). The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and hearing. Mercado. refused. July 30. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. (Sec. assigned to present the side of defendant Tampus. the counsel de oficio. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain anent and to court and to be informed of such right. as shown in the following parts of the confession.aggravated by treachery. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. to allow him to be brought to Makati. this Court directed that the arraignment and trial in the instant case. upon request of the defendant. Rizal because this Court in its resolution of July 20. Rule 119. or any other m which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 1979). intimidation. They reiterated their plea of guilty. As the confession in this case was obtained after the Constitution took effect. exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense. the trial court called their attention to the gravity of the charge and informed them that the death penalty might be imposed upon them. for ty reasons. according to his understanding. The court may also. contends that he was denied his right to a public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary. and not the trial court's session hall at Makati. 14. violence. 1976 in L-38141. There is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U. No person shall be compelled to be a witness at himself. where Rodolfo Avila was one of the accused-appellants. where Avila was a co-accused of Tampus. 20. Tampus and Avila took the witness stand. by the officer of the day. regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation. 436. The two accused. 1976.ipinag-uutos ng panibagong Saligang Batas ay kusang loob na nagsasabi ng mga sumusunod bilang sagot sa mga tanong ng tagasiyasat: xxx xxx xxx 6.S. (Exh. and that at that alleged custodial interrogation. 35 Phil. Katulad sa mga bagay-bagay na ipinaliwanag ko saiyo kanina ay uulitin ko sa iyo na ikaw ay aking tinawagan dito sa aming tanggapan dahil sa ibig kitang maimbistiga tungkol sa pagkakapatay sa isang bilanggo rin na nagngangalan ng Celso Saminado noong petsa 14 ng buwan ding ito ngunit bago tayo magpatuloy ay uulitin ko rin saiyo na sa imbistigasyon naito. ed. A). plea of guilty and testimony in court. Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent. Not only that. Lahoz. Under the circumstances. the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. The truth is that. and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. Eustaquio. Illinois. ikaw ay hindi ko maaaring pilitin. Arizona. 16 L. 378 U. . ikaw bay magpapatuloy pa sa pagbibigay ng salaysay bilang sagot sa alin mang itatanong ko saiyo — Sagot — Opo. 2nd 977 and Miranda vs. the scene of the crime.S. the first guard whom thuy encountered. was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. ed. Tampus was interrogated two days before. vs. 384 U. the trial court should have advised him of his constitutional right to remain silent. waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. confession. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. That contention is not welltaken considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession (U.12 L. takutin o gamitan ng puwersa para makapagbigay ng salaysay o statement. That spontaneous statement. sir. Na sa imbistigasyon naito ikaw ay may karapatan na magkaruon ng isang abogado na magtatanggol saiyo.S. Binayoh. Na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik o tumanggi na paimbistiga. counsel de oficio points out that before the confession was taken by investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta on January 16. It should be stressed that. even before Lahoz investigated the killing. after coming out of the toilet. Ngayon at maulit ko saiyo ang mga karapatan mong ito. elicited without any interrogation. by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion. it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. 2nd 694. they surrendered to Reynaldo S. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession. It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify. Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when. However. even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt. 478. 23). or on the day of the killing. Vivencio C. plea of guilty and testimony. The mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender to the authorities. Hence. vs.. 122. he was serving sentences for homicide and evasion of service of sentence. Indeed.S. for lack of the requisite ten votes. When death is prescribed as a single indivisible penalty. he was not able to make any defense at all (61 tsn). which is reclusion temporal to death. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand. made a deliberate and sudden attack upon the unarmed victim. WHEREFORE.alevosia qualifies the killing as murder. At the time of the assault. should be imposed in its maximum period and that is death (Art. vs. 426. it should be commuted toreclusion perpetua. Grant.S. Hence. because of the unexpected attack. 18 Phil. while he was inside the toilet. which can be appreciated in favor of Tampus. p. U. Revised Penal Code). However. People v Chavez DECISION KAPUNAN. Revised Penal Code). 63. Evident premeditation is also aggravating. The evidence shows beyond peradventure of doubt that Tampus and Avila planned the killing by providing themselves with bladed weapons and waiting for an opportunity to kill Saminado and thus satisfy their desire for revenge. in Criminal Case No. The two accused. Branch 32. cannot offset quasi-recidivism nor reduce the penalty. 4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. as coconspirators. three meters wide and three meters long. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 10499 finding herein appellant Antonio Chavez y Estamante alias Tony guilty of the crime of murder [1] . the lower court's judgment as to Jose Tampus is modified. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Costs de officio SO ORDERED. Rota.The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent.The lower court's judgment as to his civil liability is affirmed.: This is an appeal from the February 24. 1970 Ed. The crime was correctly characterized by the prosecutor and the trial court as murder. it shall be applied regardless of any generic mitigating circumstances (Art. 9 Phil. 160. the death penalty cannot be affirmed. Exhibit H. 196). Tampus was a quasi-recidivist. As alleged in the information and as shown in his prison record. J. then he waives that right (U. Because of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi recidivist the penalty for murder. Tampus and Avila. The accused resorted to a mode of assault which insured the consummation of the killing without any risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim could have made. was also presented as a witness. The victim was then squatting near the door inside the house of Navarez. Agripina Ablejina. She then requested Navarez to finish her statement. arrived and stabbed Jaos with a knife. The house of Jaos was about two (2) meters away from that of Navarez so that from there. [2] [3] [4] [5] The prosecution. His body was brought to the Siaton morgue. one could look down on the front door of Navarez who sold goods to his neighbors. sought to establish the following facts: The victim. through its principal witness Agripina Ablejina. Agripina was standing by the window of her home. When she was investigated at the police station. Tan. Agripina went to Jaos and removed the knife which was left sticking out of his body. 1992. moral damages of P16. She delivered the knife to the PNP station in Mantiquel. Chavez pushed Jaos. Their nearest neighbor was Efraim Navarez whose wife was the sister of Jaos.000. The information for murder was filed against appellant on November 26. in Sitio Tampaga. Negros Oriental. As the accused was then on probation for the crime of robbery. Chavez then ran to the house of his mother. Jaos was stabbed above his umbilical cord. municipal health officer.000. Mitylene B. Navarez and Jaos were smoking and conversing with each other when appellant. lived with his common-law wife. Bernabe Jaos. Dr. where she could observe the Navarez household. Barrio Mantiquel.00 and the costs of suit. [6] At around 8:00 oclock in the evening of October 18. first cousin of Navarez. Her husband Jaos was buying cigarettes at the house cum store of Navarez.00. Siaton. Tan testified .00. Agripina saw that Efraim Navarez was with his wife and younger brother.000. [7] [8] [9] Dr. Agripina could not finish her statement because her child was crying. causing his blood to spurt and his intestines to come out. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.committed against the person of one Bernabe Jaos and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the payment of civil indemnity in the amount of P50. 23 years old. his probation was revoked by the trial court. 1992. who fell to the ground. interment expenses of P10. PNP members came for appellant. Her examinationrevealed that the victim had sustained a perforating 2 1/2 inches long stab wound with intestinal herniation at the mid-upper abdominal region. As Jaos fell downstairs. please help me because Bernabe was killed. Nong. a first cousin of the victim. appellant did not report the incident to the police because it is very far. and his version of the events that transpired on October 18. of October 19. Appellant told his brother. mother and appellants wife. Jr. parried the blows and kicked Navarez. With Navarez then were Melvin and Henry Jaos. He identified the weapon used. Appellant testified on his behalf. claimed that he had gone to Mantiquel . a 10-inch long bolo. hitting his chest. Jaos arrived and. Quimada. Navarez faced him and stabbed him in the right arm. Appellant informed the police that it was Navarez who killed Jaos but the police replied. [15] Appellants story was corroborated by Melvin Quimada. Sebastian Chavez. Navarez pulled out a weapon and stabbed Jaos stomach.that she conducted a postmortem examination on the body of Jaos at the morgue of the Siaton District Hospital at 8:00 p. [11] [12] [13] [14] The defense interposed denial. addressing Navarez said. Having heard Jaos utterance. [10] PO3 Marcial Dingal in his testimony stated that he reflected the stabbing incident on the police blotter in the afternoon of October 19. 1992. Just go with us and relay the incident to our higher up. Malabuhan.. They told him that he was responsible for the death of Jaos. 1992. who was at home with their sister. Then appellant jumped downstairs and ran to the house of his elder brother. However.Navarez invited appellant to take a meal. 1992. She found the body rigid and had been dead for approximately fifteen (15) hours. which was surrendered by CAA Atanacio Caminade who was also a member of the CAFGU.m. While appellant was eating. Appellant leaned on the wall. who was from Sitio Saksak. 1992 is as follows: At around 6:30 in the evening of October 18. he went to Navarezs place to buy bread. That same evening. Its good that you are here. let us finish each other. appellant stood up and at this juncture. Agapito testified that it was Antonio Merlo and Navarez who had requested for appellants arrest at around 10:00 oclock in the evening. informed everyone that since appellant had run away from the crime scene. Melvin did not report the incident to the police because he knew that they would not believe him. Agapito arrested appellant at the house of his brother and later conducted an investigation at the crime scene. as they had presented to him the letter of Serafin Sibol. Jr. appellant and Melvin both tried to jump from the house. [18] On rebuttal. [17] Agapito investigated Navarez and then. In the evening of October 18. However. Melvin was in the house of Navarez when he heard Jaos shout at Navarez. father-in-law of Sebastian Chavez. Agapito Quimada. Navarez got a knife. Sebastian. He learned the following day that Jaos was dead. CAFGU members fetched appellant because Navarez had reported that appellant was responsible for the stabbing of Jaos. [19] [20] . went to the front door and stabbed Jaos. He saw the body of the deceased near the house of Navarez which was around one (1) meter away from the house of the victim. I will kill you. As Jaos fell to the ground. Jr. testified that he let appellant into his house and applied herbal medicine to his right arm. Sebastian reiterated that it was Navarez who stabbed the victim but Agapito repeated the standing order that both appellant and Navarez should be brought to the police station. they took appellant to the CAFGU headquarters. Jaos made one step and shouted. the matter should be investigated by the police. who accompanied his brother.. after the investigation. Sebastian Chavez. He did not accompany appellant to the police station because he had fever then. a barangay councilman. appellant was stabbed by Navarez so that Melvin stepped back to hide behind the door.When he noticed that he had a way out. Instead. Sebastian protested that his brother was even wounded during the incident but the CAFGUs did not listen to him. 1992. sitting with Agapito Quimada. requesting such arrest. [16] Appellants brother. the prosecution presented Agapito Quimada. You have eluded before and ran away but now I will kill you. Melvin jumped out of the door and ran to the house of his uncle. Later. Agapito even made a sketch of the two houses.to help out in the harvest of crops and was staying with his uncle.. saw Navarez at the headquarters. Jr. Serafin Sibol and Elsa Quitay. Appellant answered that he was ganged up. [23] Once again recalled to the witness stand. Agripina told the court that she gave the knife to Agapito Quimada and that the bolo labelled as Exhibit E was not the murder weapon. At the house of Sebastian Chavez. Upon learning that a bolo was brought to the court and identified as the murder weapon. The weapon that he surrendered was not a bolo but a hunting knife. Agapito asked appellant why he stabbed Jaos. Caminade saw how the killer in that case himself surrendered the bolo but it was he (Caminade) who surrendered the hunting knife used in killing Jaos. Agapito drew the sketch of the crime scene showing the victim lying between the houses of Jaos and Navarez. Benedicto Trumata and Antonio Sombilon. [24] As a surrebuttal witness. the weapon used in the crime. Agripina was recalled to the witness stand. a member of the CAFGU. On his own volition. It was in the house of Sebastian that he arrested appellant. was surrendered to him by Agripina but it was Tating (Atanacio Caminade) who gave it up to the police. the weapon wrongly brought to the court by Dingal was the bolo used in the killing of a certain Sayson in Mantiquel. Another CAFGU member. Sebastian Chavez. The court verified from her as to whom she surrendered the knife she had pulled out of the victims body. used to be in good terms with each other. Melvin Quimada. who was then in the company of Nelson Apostol. She gave the knife to Agapito Quimada. a CAFGU. A double-bladed knife. According to Caminade. Jr. According to Agapito. Antonio Fabillar. surrendered the weapon to the police. [21] On the trial courts initiative. had given it to him. Agripina testified that she pulled the knife out of Jaos body in the presence of the barangay councilman. went to his place in Mantiquel. When Agapito went to the crime scene.. claimed that while it was true that he and his father-in-law. their relationship turned .Agapito likewise denied that his nephew. Agapito Quimada. [22] Atanacio Caminade. the bolo marked as Exhibit E was not the murder weapon. the victims wife and Serafin Sibol were around. he confronted policeman Marcial Dingal. Nevertheless. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ANTONIO CHAVEZ Y ESTAMANTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER. the issue in this appeal boils down to credibility. Toribio. Melvin Quimada insisted that he was in Mantiquel in the month of October. Its findings on the issue of credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and respect on appeal. with whom Sebastian had an altercation when Toribios horse nibbled Sebastians rice and corn plants. we find no persuasive reason to depart from this well entrenched rule on credibility as to warrant a reversal of the decision of the trial court. asking why he (Melvin) had become a witness in this case. Melvin answered that he only wanted to tell the truth. [25] Not satisfied with the trial courts decision. . if considered might affect the result of the case. and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which. [27] [28] After a careful scrutiny of the records and evidence of the case. Agapito went to his house. As this Court has time and again said. the trial courts evaluation on the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect by appellate courts. appellant appealed to this Court assigning the following errors: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE. harvesting rice. Agapito murmured to him. 1992. II Considering that the parties presented contradictory facts. the issues raised by the appellant should be faced squarely. having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand. [26] When he himself returned to the witness stand.sour when Agapito sided with his son. When he returned to Cama after the incident which resulted in the death of Jaos. The trial court is more competent to so conclude. He had gone there to harvest several times already. Appellant posits that she could hardly be considered as an eyewitness as she was in her house at the time of the killing. does not necessarily impair their credibility as witnesses. This Court has held that there is no legal provision that disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying. simply because Agripina was a common-law wife of the victim.Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court accorded great weight to the testimony of the common-law wife of the victim. This is specially so when the witnesses were present at the scene of the crime. it does not necessarily follow that her testimony is biased. whether by consanguinity or affinity. [33] Lastly. Well-settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive. explained by Agripina when she testified that she could not finish her statement because she had to attend to her crying child.are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. being taken ex-parte. it is the prosecution which determines who among the witnesses to a crime should testify in court. The prosecutor handling the case is given a wide discretion on this matter. however. while there were other persons at the scene of the crime. [32] Thirdly. being otherwise competent. [34] [35] [36] . much more the defense. [30] Secondly. It is definitely not for the courts. Mere relationship of witnesses to the victim of a crime. who were not even presented as witnesses. regarding the facts and circumstances of the crime. the trial court did not err in finding that Agripina was a credible witness whose testimony should be deemed as nothing but the truth. This omissionwas. The appellant himself admitted that there was no reason why she should testify against him. In the first place. the presumption is that such witness was [31] not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. incredible or self-serving. does not even mention the stabbing incident itself. the defense further attacks Agripinas credibility on the ground that her affidavit before the police. to dictate what evidence to present or who should take the witness stand at the trial of a case. Affidavits. [29] This is argument has no basis in fact and in law. the Court emphasized in People v. The production of the weapon used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of such burden. This bare assertion. Bello. 214 SCRA 227 [1992]). Appellant attempts to support his denial of guilt by asserting that he informed the police that it was Navarez who killed Jaos but the police appeared to have been bent on pinning him down as the culprit. it is enough that the prosecution establishes by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the author thereof. However. the positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime may not be overturned by his denial. the police presented a bolo.Appellant points out that Agripinas testimony is not credible because her claim that her house was elevated and therefore higher than that of Navarez. the former indisputably deserve more [39] [40] . In other words. for the same may not have been recovered at all from the assailant (People v. Furthermore. This is the material aspect of the prosecutions case which the defense failed to disprove satisfactorily. both the testimony of Agripina and Agapitos sketch show that the window of the victims house faced the front door of the Navarez residence. The mistake on the part of witness Dingal in presenting the wrong murder weapon was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution.This. That it was not Dingal himself who rectified the error on the stand is of no moment. Agripina had an unobstructed view of the incident. when it said: [37] [38] For the purposes of conviction. Florida. unsupported as it is by other evidence. was contradicted by prosecution witness Agapito Quimada. appellants claim that Navarez had a motive for harming Jaos because the latter allegedly disallowed (Navarez) to use the carabao in plowing the fields cannot be appreciated in the absence of independent proof thereon duly presented at the trial. It would not be amiss to point out that the production of the murder weapon is not even essential for a conviction. is simply self-serving and deserves scant consideration. Moreover. It is well-settled that between the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accusedappellant. Another matter which appellant stresses as indicative of Agripinas incredulous testimony is the fact that while she claimed that the murder weapon was a knife. credence and are, therefore, entitled to greater evidentiary weight. Q Have you seen the act of stabbing? [41] Appellants last-ditch effort towards exoneration is his allegation that the trial court was biased against him because it was the same court which convicted him of robbery inCriminal Case No. 9958 and, hence, there existed in the mind of the court that the accused-appellant who is under probation would be prone to commit the act imputed against him. The Court finds this assertion misplaced. If indeed there was reason for the appellant to doubt the courts impartiality, his counsel could have sought the inhibition of the presiding judge from hearing the case. [42] The trial court correctly qualified the killing to the crime of murder as treachery was duly established by the prosecution. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness issignificant on this matter: A Yes, I really saw it. Q And when you saw the act of stabbing, what weapon was used by Tony Chavez in stabbing Bernabe Jaos? A A knife. xxx Q. Now, when Tony Chavez stabbed your commonlaw husband, was your common-law husband hit? A. Yes, he was hit. Q. Where was your common-law husband hit? A. He was hit above the umbilical cord. Q. And when your husband was hit above the umbilical cord, did you see blood spurting? A. Yes. xxx Q And when Tony Chavez arrived at the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez, what happened next? A He then stabbed Bernabe Jaos. Q. What else have you seen aside from blood spurting? A. His intestine. Q. And since you saw the act of stabbing, did you not warn your husband that there was an impending assault on his person? particularly in the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez was your husband situated? A. Near the door. A. No, because the stabbing of Tony Chavez was so sudden. Q. When your husband was hit, blood spurting, the intestine came out, what happened to your husband? A. He died right away. Q. When Tony Chavez stabbed your husband, what was the position of your husband, was he sitting or he was standing. Q. When you said near the door, was he inside the store or outside the the store of Navarez? A. He was inside the store. Q. When your husband was sitting and he was on a squatting position, what happened to your husband, did he remain squatting of did he attempt to rise? A. He fell down because he was pushed by Tony Chavez. A. He was sitting. Q. On what was he sitting? Q. Will you clarify that, he fell to the ground of he fell to the floor? A. He was squatting. A. He fell to the ground. Q. Was he talking with a friend Ephraim (sic) Navarez at that time? Q. You mean to say the store at the house of Ephraim (sic) Navarez is elevated from the ground? A. Yes, they were talking. A. Yes, about two (2) feet. Q. Was Ephraim (sic) Navarez also squatting? Q. You have seen also how Tony Chavez pushed your common-law husband? A. Yes, he was also squatting. A. Yes. Q. And when Tony Chavez delivered that stabbing blow on your common-law husband, where Q. And when your husband fell to the ground, what happened? A. He was lying on the ground. victim, the attack was frontal and, therefore, not treacherous. It held that even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed. [45] xxx Q. After Tony Chavez pushed your husband and your husband fell to the ground, what did Tony Chavez do next? A. He ran. Q. Towards where did he ran? A. Towards their house. Treachery clearly characterized the commission of the crime. In this case, the assault was undoubtedly made not only suddenly but also while the victim was defenseless.The fact that the victim was attacked frontally does not negate the existence of treachery. The situation in this case is similar to that obtaining in People v. Saliling where the victim was conversing with another person when the accused emerged from behind them, stabbed the victim twice and quickly ran away. In holding that there was treachery, the Court brushed aside the appellants contention that by the location of the wounds inflicted upon the [44] In the absence of proof of other circumstances attending the commission of the crime, whether mitigating or aggravating, the penalty that should be imposed upon the appellant for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the herein decision of the trial court finding Antonio Chavez guilty of murder is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. Right to Remain Silent People v Alvarez MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p With all three accused, namely, Ronald ALVAREZ, alias "Onie," Leopoldo SABERON, alias "Oyet," and Christopher ARANETA, alias "Topper," convicted of Murder 1 for the death of Ismael Magpantay, and sentenced to "life imprisonment three (3) times each," they have filed before us their separate appeals. The facts disclose that at about 6:30 A.M. on 13 June 1984, the Valenzuela police station received a phone call from an unidentified caller that a dead man was found inside the Palasan Cemetery, Palasan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The police proceeded to the place immediately and found "a lifeless body of a male person lying on his belly with multiple stab wounds all over his body." Only a brown-colored wallet was found on his person with no other identification papers. The cadaver was then photographed and taken to the NBI, through Funeraria Popular, for autopsy. According to the report of Pfc. Rolando Masanque, a Valenzuela police officer, in the early morning of 13 June 1984, a "grapevine source who refused to identify himself' called up P/Lt Carlos A. Tiquia by phone and disclosed that the victim was killed by three men, namely, "Onie" Alverez, a former resident of Bgy. Palasan, Valenzuela, one alias "Oyet," and another alias "Topper." Following the lead, Lt. Tiquia asked Alfonso Alverez, a former Valenzuela policeman and father of Appellant ALVAREZ, to go to the station to shed light on the investigation. The father was an old friend of Lt. Tiquia. After their talk, forthrightly, Lt. Tiquia created a team to apprehend the three Appellants. At about 12:30 A.M. of 14 June 1984, the arrest was effected, without a warrant, at the Alverez residence in Tangali St., Bo. Manresa, Quezon City. Only ALVAREZ alias Onie and SABERON alias "Boyet" were apprehended, as "Topper" (ARANETA) was not around. A fan knife (Exh. C) was recovered from the person of ALVAREZ, while a bamboo stick (Exh. D), identified as a scabbard of an icepick, was discovered in front of the residence (Tsn., 25 June 1986, p. 7). ALVAREZ and SABERON were taken to the police station for investigation that same morning. In the course thereof, ALVAREZ, assisted by Atty. Reynaldo P. Garcia, executed a sworn confession, which he signed in the presence of his father and another lawyer, Atty. Antonio Dalag. Atty. Garcia signed as "Saksi at gabay sa panahon ng pagsisiyasat" (Exhs. 5-12), while Atty. Dalag and Alfonso Alverez, the father, separately signed as "Saksi" (Exhs. B13 and 1-D). ALVAREZ signed his Sworn Statement twice at the end thereof, once before the Investigating Officer and the second time, on 15 June 1984, before Fiscal Victoria F. Bernards, who had administered the oath (Exh. B10 ALVAREZ's signature further appears twice on the left hand margin of pages 1, 2 and 3 of his Statement. Others present during the investigation were SABERON, Lt. Tiquia, and ALVAREZS brother. In said extrajudicial confession, ALVAREZ disclosed: 16. T: Papaano ba naganap ang pangyayaring pagpatay kay ISMAEL? S Ganito po iyon, dahilang sa ito pong si ISMAEL ay nangholdap sa Blumentritt, Manila na kung saan ay nakuhanan niya ang biktimang babae ng alahas, at pitaka at sa dahilang parang niloloko kami ni ISMAEL sa partihan ay ipinasiya ni CHRISTOPHER na patayin si ISMAEL. Itong si RODOLFO SABERON JR., na kabarkada din namin ay isinama namin sa Palasan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Umalis kami sa Quezon . Alias BOYET at isinama na kami dito sa Valenzuela. In the same confession.. 1).. ALVAREZ Identified the slim bamboo found in his house as the "baena" of the ice-pick belonging to SABERON. Ako. Alias BOYET ay pinagsasaksak din si ISMAEL. matapos na iyon ay kanyang hugasan para maalis ang dugo. RODOLFO SABERON JR. Valenzuela. pero sinabi nina CHRISTOPHER at BOYET sa Tatay ni ISMAEL na hindi nila alam kung nasaan si ISMAEL. si RODOLFO SABERON JR. Dumating kami sa Palasan. 27.City ng alas 9:00 ng gabi. Alias BOYET at itong si CHRISTOPHER ARANETA naman ay pinagsasaksak si ISMAEL hanggang sa mabali ang panaksak rin CHRISTOPHER at kinuha ni CHRISTOPHER ang hawak kong patalim. ano ang masasabi mo tungkol dito? . nagkita-kita na lang kaming tatlo sa Quezon City sa bahay nina CHRISTOPHER sa bahay ng kapatid ng kanyang Nanay. T: Anong uring ice-pick ba naman ang dala nitong si CHRISTOPHER? S Iyon po ay g turnilyong inilalagay sa trak na mahaba at pinatulis at iyon ay ipinapasok sa isang payat na ka wayan. Nang makita ko na pinagsasaksak nina CHRISTOPHER at BOYET si ISMAEL ay umalis na ako. ika-12 ng Hunyo 1984 nina ISMAEL. kinabukasan. Doon sa may sementeryo ng Palasan. Noong gabi ng ika-1 3 ng Hunyo 1984 ay hinuli na lang ako ng mga Pulis at nahuli ko ding kasama si RODOLFO SABERON JR. MM ng makatalikod si ISMAEL ay bigla na lang siyang sinakal mula sa likod ni RODOLFO SABERON JR. at CHRISTOPHER ARANETA. ika-12 ng Hunyo 1984. (Exh.. at ipinagpatuloy ang pananaksak kay ISMAEL. 26. ika13 ng Hunyo 1984 doon sa aming bahay ay dumating ang tatay ni ISMAEL at tinanong ng Tatay rin ISMAEL ang kanyang anak kina CHRISTOPHER at BOYET. Metro Manila. T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang kawayan na payat. Tapos ay nag- inuman na kami. Valenzuela. Ipinauli sa akin CHRISTOPHER ang aking patalim. MM ng humigit kumulang gawing alas 10:00 ng gabi. he knew that his son and Appellants were 'barkada. trial ensued. SABERON bolted jail and was re-arrested only after the defense had rested its case. J that at around 12:00 o'clock midnight of 13 June 1984. after which they ran away leaving the victim and hoping that nothing untoward had happened to him." that at around 12:00 noon of 12 June 1984. the son replied that they were going to Valenzuela (Exh. The respective fathers of the victim and of ALVAREZ. or on 15 June 1984. ALVAREZ claimed: 36. Alfonso wanted him to verify if the man that was killed was his son. of 14 June 1984.M. Continuing. fetched him and together they proceeded to Valenzuela. that he also knew SABERON when the latter pawned his watch to their neighbor. because his son had not gone home. as well as ARANETA who used to go to his house before his son was killed. p. by counsel. Rosauro Magpantay. Apprehensive that some misfortune had actually befallen his son. 1C) ARANETA. He was represented throughout the proceedings. mayroon ka pa bang nais sabihin. Idagdag o kaya ay bawasin sa salaysay na ito? S Wala na po. he found the three Appellants drinking Upon seeing him. In the ALVAREZ residence. when asked where he was going. he went to ALVAREZ's house to inquire about his son knowing that the latter and the three (3) Appellants had gone to Valenzuela around noon the previous day. he saw his son and the three (3) Appellants together. that they had boarded a jeep when the victim robbed a woman passenger of her necklace. who was his good friend. his son Ismael. Rosauro Magpantay went home. they proceeded thereto and Rosauro confirmed that the dead man was. (Exh. 1-B) As to his participation. Rosauro narrated that at around 2:00 o'clock A. Having pleaded their innocence upon arraignment. 11). in fact. ALVAREZ's father. When told that the body was at Funeraria Popular. SABERON stated that they were together in Valenzuela. (Exh. Then. recounted that he knew ALVAREZ since 1984. kundi kaya lamang ako nagbigay ng salaysay ay sa dahilang gusto ko pong patunayan na ala akong kasalanan at malinis ang aking konsiyensa sa naganap na pagpatay kay ISMAEL. Rosauro and Alfonso then proceeded to the police station where Alfonso told Rosauro that he had the . was arrested on 14 June 1984 by the District Anti-Narcotics Command and turned over to the Valenzuela police. In no time at all. who turned out to be "Topper". however.. tayo pa ang pinagbibintangang pumatay sa anak niya" SABERON pacified ALVAREZ stating: "Pare. replying to the victim's father. an Information charging all three Appellants with Murder was filed. the victim's father. Alfonso. nadudulas ka na" (Tsn. ALVAREZ shouted: "Anong ginagawa ng putang-inang matandang iyan dito. who were good friends. T Pansamantala ay wala na akong itatanong sa iyo.S Iyan po ang pinakabaena ng kanyang (Christopher) icepick (At this juncture declarant identified a slim bamboo stalk approximately 18 inches long). had their roles to play. 23 October 1987. that the Captain initially denied his request for lack of basis. the victim's father arrived inquiring about his son. since the description of the dead person fitted that of the victim. ALVAREZ's father admitted that he had signed his son's extrajudicial statement but explained that although previously he had wanted his son in jail that was not his wish any longer." that the father called his son at the house and asked for the possible identification of El Magpantay. he saw the three (3) Appellants "Ronald. At around 9:00 A. who then arrested ALVAREZ and SABERON from his residence at around midnight. that while they were conversing Capt. that because his son was hooked on drugs. On the second day of his testimony. the victim and the three (3) Appellants together at his house. p. Alfonso ted that at around 8:00 P. to ask for help from Capt.M. to which said officer acceded with a warning that he might be sorry for the consequences of the request. the latter also denied any knowledge. that around 10:00 A. After ALVAREZ and SABERON were jailed. 2 March 1988. That done. ALVAREZ's father. that on 12 June. Valenzuela cemetery and since he was a former resident thereat. that his intention was to help and to avoid the circumstance that they (apparently referring to the boys) might be lulled or might kill somebody. The two persons referred to were his son ALVAREZ and SABERON. to return to his house only on 13 June where he saw the three (3) Appellants. He then told the elder Magpantay that he caused the incarceration of ALVAREZ and SABERON just to punish them and not because they were responsible for the victim's death. Alfonso. noticing that the three (3) Appellants were having a heated conversation and seemed to be high on drugs. Christopher and Saberon" conversing. his son ALVAREZ was left behind and did not seem his usual self. the dead individual was described as a "person with tattoos. he left the house with some members of the family and stayed at the Premier Hotel. to give a written statement but it was he (the father) who fabricated the story given (Tsn.. that he then suggested to Capt. with other people. that he then went home and waited for the boys to fall asleep. Tiquia that Appellants be charged with the victim's death. At the time. of 14 June. Lastly." the son answered that the latter had a "bahala na tattoo" on his body. then he went to the police station. he brought them to the Premier Hotel to prevent their involvement. Tiquia talked about the preparation of the statement but the former told him to return the following morning so that two (2) lawyers' could be present. the victim and the three (3) Appellants were also there.M. pp. 1-7). until the next day when they checked out after he had signed the hotel bill.. Tiquia informed him that an unidentified dead person was found in the Palasan. ALVAREZ.. Thereafter.two persons who had killed his son arrested (ibid.M. that he did not know where their son was going but at about 5:00 P.M. while he was at home at around 8:00 P." that is. he went to the victim's father to ask him to identify the man who was found dead. a friend of his. he forced his son. of 11 June 1984 he saw the barkada. that because there was trouble in their place. he and Capt. that the victim's father is his childhood friend. since he would not Haten to scolding he and family left the house at around 9:00 P. that in the afternoon. the victim's father then left.M. he saw his son alone in the house without his friends and that it seemed he was high on drugs again. His son had been incarcerated for four (4) years and had promised .M. that he asked the latter to incarcerate the boys because they were hooked on drugs.M. ARANETA had already left the house. that when he (the father) returned home on 13 June at around 9:00 A.. they returned to the precinct. Tiquia. he went to the police precinct at about 10:00 P. of 12 June. 12). perhaps he could help in identification. who used to be a Valenzuela policeman. fetched the police. had his own version.M. He stated that ARANETA and SABERON were friends of his son. that he replied he did not know and when the victim's father addressed the Appellants. a soundman. ARANETA. SABERON escaped from jail while trial was in progress and was re-arrested only after the defense had rested its case. that he was compelled to sign by the police. that he suffered two (2) incised wounds in the forearm. four (4) of which are punctured wounds caused by an ice pick. evident premeditation. that he was not in the house of ALVAREZ when the victim's father went there because he was then finishing the painting job of Jesse Reyes. testified that he could not remember his "Sinumpaang Salaysay. in holding the presence or existence of conspiracy.. alternately by Attys. However. about six (6) houses away from ALVAREZ's. On the part of the defense. that he also knows the victim's father who forbade him from going to their house as he was just teaching the son "katarantaduhan. Said physician further declared that there was more than one assailant and that a double-bladed and a singlebladed weapon had both been used in addition to an ice pick. He was accordingly unable to take the witness stand. that he had known the victim since school days since their respective schools were near each other. An Appellant's Brief has also been presented on his behalf by Atty. that although lawyers were present. they were given by the police.not to take drugs any more. to refute which the Solicitor General has also filed separate Briefs. single. Augusto Montilla. ALVAREZ. he was represented by Atty. gave an alibi as his defense and declared that the charge of Murder against him is false. in admitting and considering the extrajudicial confession. thirteen (13) wounds in the chest. Before us now are their respective appeals. and twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the back caused by a single bladed weapon and inflicted when the victim was already helpless or dying. attended by treachery." that he had signed something without knowing its contents. abuse of superior strength and nocturnity. The post-mortem findings of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI revealed that the victim had been brutally attacked and killed. 26. Mainly premised on ALVAREZ's extrajudicial confession. Augusto Montilla and Ricardo Perez. a house painter. Melody Javier during the initial stages of the case and. thereafter. four (4) stab wounds on the left side of the neck. the Trial Court found a clear indication of conspiracy and convicted Appellants of Murder. Allegedly. that although he admits his signatures. ." ARANETA's mother corroborated her son's alibi. he does not remember that the Fiscal had explained anything to him. that he knows ALVAREZ and SABERON as they play basketball together.. the Trial Court erred Per ALVAREZ: . and that he never complained to the Fiscal because he was confused and bewildered as to why he had been taken there. . laborer. 26. because of which he had forgiven his son. the contents of his statement are not true and he does not affirm them. that although he was brought before the Investigating Fiscal... As heretofore stated. For one.R.. Ismael Magpantay. the evidence discloses that Atty. not to provide him with the best defense. Garcia. they maintain that ALVAREZ's constitutional right to counsel was not protected. whom the police had called. No.. Atty." What is sought to be protected is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. who admitted that the confession was "executed legally and properly" (p. and with aid of counsel.. Antonio Dalag. So did ALVAREZ's father. Two others presented the execution of the statement. SABERON and ALVAREZ's brother. After asking the investigator to leave them alone. Layuco G. in convicting (him) on the sole basis of the extrajudicial confession of co-accused Ronald Alvarez. He testified that he was requested by Capt. . in not declaring the extrajudicial confession of accused Alvarez inadmissible.. Besides. much less provide the details contained therein.. Tiquia.. in not taking into consideration that there was no motive by accused Saberon to lull the victim.. to assist his son in the execution of his extrajudicial confession (Tsn. ALVAREZ decided to give it just the same. he explained to ALVAREZ the consequences of any statement that he would make and that it could be used against him but that notwithstanding. Garcia. With the exception of SABERON. Under the circumstances. in finding that the escape of accused Leopoldo Saberon from jail indicates his guilt. A lawyer is an officer of the Court and upon his shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that protection has been accorded the rights of the accused and that no injustice to him has been committed. . the elder Alvarez's testimony that he had invented the story and thereafter forced his son to sign the document "in order to give him a lesson" should have been given credence and weight by the Trial Court and the extrajudicial confession struck down as inadmissible evidence. . ALVAREZ never signified his desire to have a lawyer of his choice..175 SCRA 47). 5 July 1989. 6. While it may be that a lawyer was provided by the police. was equal to his duties as a lawyer. For another... ALVAREZ and ARANETA assail the admission of said confession as evidence against them for having been executed irregularly and involuntarily.. without force or intimidation. in convicting accused Leopoldo Saberon when in its decision appear facts that will lead to his acquittal. the Trial Court can not be faulted for holding that the confession was "freely given. Crucial to the determination of Appellants' culpability is ALVAREZ's extrajudicial confession. a lawyer randomly picked by the police not being a sufficient safeguard thereof. 12 December 1986)... whom ALVAREZ knew.. in not giving credence to (his) defense of alibi. PER SABERON: . Absent any showing that the lawyers who assisted ALVAREZ were . . The averments do not persuade. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false (People v. Per ARANETA: . Reynaldo P. That being so. Brief for SABERON). they claim that ALVAREZ was in a drunken and drugged state when he executed it such that he was in no position to either read or comprehend the same. was also on hand and signed as a witness to the confession. Aside from Atty. a friend of ALVAREZ's father.. 69210. in sentencing accused to suffer life imprisonment (3 times each).. More. that said confession is not admissible as specie of proof against him because firstly. 123 SCRA 614). p.remiss in their duties. as well as his two signatures on the last page thereof. the clothes the assailants were wearing. a drugged and drunken state and was in no position to provide details nor read and comprehend his Statement is shorn of merit. 140 Cal. G. App. the manner by which it was accomplished. with no tremors or unsteadiness which would have characterized the handwriting of one under the influence of either liquor or drugs. They reflect spontaneity and coherence. it lacks the indispensable requisite of corroboration by other evidence (Brief for ARANETA.25 SW 784. in the presence of counsel. Besides. People v. once during custodial interrogation and the other before the subscribing Fiscal. G. The contentions are not tenable. the confession contains exculpatory statements. It should be borne in mind that a confession constitutes evidence of high order because it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his conscience (People v. admits of exceptions. 26 July 1988. Cr. To top it all. No. 8 & 9). 25 July 1983. Nos. The weapons described in the statement were the same ones recovered on the person of ALVAREZ and picked up in front of his residence at the time of arrest. State. 163 SCRA 574). which have been considered by this Court as an index of voluntariness (People v. The father's disclosure of having masterminded his son's confession is a futile and late attempt on the part of a parent to exonerate a child from criminal responsibility. 1963 Edition.. 288. the established doctrine is. the details contained in the confession relative to the knives and the icepick used by the assailants and the relative positions of the actors conform to the testimony (Tsn. As to the second ground. ARANETA contends. It gives the motive for the killing. 48319-20. 13 October 1986) and autopsy report (Exh. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the conspirator. and particularly belying the elder Alvarez's claim that it was he who had concocted the story. A comparison of his signatures on the left-hand margin of the first three pages of his written confession. shows that they are identical to the other. indeed. a confession made by an accused while intoxicated is admissible. 74 Pac. who could have taken all steps necessary for his protection. Tex. ARANETA was represented by counsel all throughout the trial. the kinds of weapon used. The confession speaks for itself. The assertion that ALVAREZ was in.R. Balane. the exact location of the crime. 77964. 625. Appellants' evidence falls short of the required quantum of proof to overcome the presumption. Farrington. that confession is .. 250). Comments on the Rules of Court. however. if he was physically able to re-collect the facts and to state them truly (White v. and secondly. were regularly conducted. the same is hearsay as he never had any opportunity to crossexamine the confessant. however. 656. G) of the medicolegal officer. This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise. the relative positions of the assailants and the victim. He further states that the Trial Court erred in convicting him based solely on ALVAREZ's confession. cited in 5 Moran. that an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. That rule. leaving no room to doubt its veracity. as is the case with ALVAREZ's confession.R. the weather condition that fateful evening all of which are particulars that could have been supplied only by someone in the know. Salvador y Kiamco. pp. the Court holds that the proceedings during the custodial interrogation of ALVAREZ. 54117. support the Trial Court's finding of conspiracy characterized by treachery. G. 23. The detailed narration contained in the ALVAREZ confession. acted within its competence.R. With respect to SABERON." actually an admission against interest. People v. and a bamboo scabbard of an ice pick found in front of his house. 15 February 1988. G. p. 5). that the victim was last seen together with Appellants about to go to Valenzuela (Exh. Condemena. No. Mar.. he went to the Alvarez residence immediately the next evening to inquire and saw thereat all three Appellants drinking.. or the night immediately before the incident on 12 June at around midnight.. abuse of superior strength and nocturnity. only to be cautioned by SABERON stating "Pare. that when his son failed to return home.R. 28 February 1961. 22426. 1988. he should now be held barred from seeking the same." ARANETA was there (as separately testified to by the two fathers) and said nothing. There is. "anong ginagawa ng putang-inang matandang iyan dito. 2. 14 March 1988. The Trial Court.receivable as evidence against a co-accused (People v. Even assuming that his escape was not an indication of guilt. The corroboration by other evidence is disclosed by the records. in including SABERON in its judgment.. SABERON. he did not dispute its admissibility and even admitted its proper execution (Brief for SABERON. direct evidence to prove his participation in the commission of the crime. pp. He alleges that the lower Court should have given him the opportunity to present his side of the charge and explain the reason for his escape instead of haphazardly convicting him even after he was re-arrested. a knife was also recovered from the person of ALVAREZ. Vasquez. the confession is admissible against him for two reasons. 92415.14 May 1991. No. tayo pa ang pinagbibintangang pumatay sa anak niya. Amajul. so much so. Firstly. p.R. . R. see Rule 11 5. that all three Appellants and the victim were together in the Alvarez residence in the evening of 11 June (Tsn. G. Nos. p. 27 April 1982. he loses his standing in Court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the Court unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the Court (People v. J the victim's father knew of his own personal knowledge that the group was going to Valenzuela. Secondly. 113 SCRA 772). Oct. G. therefore. and the requirement of motive for conviction by circumstantial evidence needs no looking into. even when ALVAREZ pointed to him. one of the malefactors. 1 SCRA 682). Sec. All these corroborate the extrajudicial confession and prove that ARANETA was. 2 March 1988). His defense of alibi can not prevail over such convincing evidence. or "barkada" (Tsn. upon seeing him ALVAREZ reacted with an outburst. p. 29 May 1968. which show that Appellants and the victim were close friends (Tsn. indeed. p. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General: Evidence adduced on record clearly shows that appellant Alverez and his co-accused were close friends (barkada) and that they were drug-addicts (tsn. Mapalao and Magumnang. Additionally. he acquiesced in or adopted the confession since he did not question its truthfullness considering that it was made in his presence and he did not remonstrate against his being implicated therein (People v. 8). 12-13). however. 1 [c]). 1987. hence. 14626-27. further disputes the Trial Court's finding that his escape from jail was an indication of guilt. The records neither disclose that SABERON moved for the reopening of the case when he was re-arrested. once an accused escapes from prison or confinement. 14 March 1988. No. nadudulas ka na. 13). 23. that he usually plays basketball with ALVAREZ and SABERON on Sundays (Tsn. 23 SCRA 910. 5). so that he (Rosauro) could Identify the body of his son (id." that does not excuse him from criminal liability as a principal. Alfonso Alverez did not only point to the three accused as the culprits. pp. Alfonso Alverez even fetched Rosauro Magpantay (father of the victim) to accompany him to Valenzuela. When appellant Alverez executed and signed his confession. but he also gave the information leading to the arrest of his own son (appellant Ronald Alvarez). his father (Alfonso Alvarez) was present. Oct. All of the above. In the instant case. Even assuming that ALVAREZ. 1986. "B"). Under Rule 113. 10-11). Surely. Alfonso Alverez. appellant Alverez together with his two co-accused were last seen with the victim and that they reportedly boarded a jeep and snatched a necklace from a woman passenger (tsn. 1987.). also call attention to their warrantless arrest effected at around midnight of 13 June 1984. been committed and said peace officer or private person has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it.' To which statement. Decision). and his coaccused Leopoldo Saberon (tsn. a life and a bamboo scabbard were recovered from the accused (pp. 1 2. acted as a mere "look-out. however. accused Saberon made the following reply 'Pare nadudulas ka na (tsn. together with the detailed narration in Questions Nos. pp. Feb. Appellants. a former policeman and father of appellant Alvarez. contending that it was in violation of their constitutional rights sufficient to nullify subsequent proceedings.). Tayo pa ang pinagbibintangan pumatay sa anak niya. a warrantless arrest can be effected by a peace officer or private person when an offense has. pp.Accused Araneta even admitted that he usually played basketball with appellants Alvarez and Saberon on Sundays (tsn. 1987. the act of one is the act of all. 3. On June 13. abuse of superior strength and nocturnity as defined under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (see p. 23. 12-14). 11-12). in fact. as he claims in his Sworn Statement. 'BN'. Id. Oct. Having been once a policeman. was not lying when he pointed to the three accused as the killers of the victim (tsn. Oct. 1988. 12. appellant Alvarez and his two co-accused were again seen drinking together by Rosauro Magpantay who heard appellant Alverez saying — 'Anong ginagawa ng putang inang matandang ito. In fact. 23. 'B-l' to 'B-3'). Exh. evident premeditation. At the time of their arrest. 4 to 35 of the confession of appellant Alverez (quoted in pages 9 to 12 of the lower court's Decision). The reason why appellant Alvarez and his co-accused killed the victim was their differences in the partition of the criminal effects of their various robberies (see Question No. it was the elder Alverez who initiated the arrest a day after the crime was committed. 23. one day after the murder of the victim.4). 15. There being conspiracy. he . Section 6 of the old Criminal Procedure (1964). 12-13. pp. and the latter also signed the confession as witness (see Exhs. 1987. July 14. clearly shows that conspiracy among the three accused was characterized by treachery. 1213). 1984. pp. Ronald Alvarez. p. J. Quezon City. SO ORDERED. is reclusion perpetua for each of the Appellants. however attributable to the Trial Court in imposing the sentence of "life imprisonment.00 should be required. I. 1989. arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on information that the victim was last seen with Daniega. 2 March 1988." In the second place. the proper penalty is not "life imprisonment" but "reclusion perpetua. the imposition of multiple penalties is improper.00. the arrests without a warrant were validly effected. the Revised Penal Code. the heirs of the victim. it is logical to infer that his act of going to the police. with the MODIFICATION that Accused-appellants. Police authorities investigating the gruesome crime on August 31.. Friends of Canoy volunteered the . Right to Counsel People v Deneiga KAPUNAN. This being so." In the first place. to indemnify. WHEREFORE. jointly and severally.000. since there is only one victim and only one offense of murder. considering the attendant circumstances and in the light of the 1987 Constitution. The body bore thirty nine (39) stab wounds. 3). 1976 Edition. p. Error is. the proper penalty. physically and sexually. it is always desirabale to employ the proper legal terminology in the imposition of imprisonment penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code because each penalty has its distinct accessory penalties and effects (Aquino.: The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in an ill-frequented back corner on the left side of the Mt. three times each. Vol. And having had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the three Appellants. for which appellants should be held jointly and severally liable. Her hands were tied behind her back by a shoestring and pieces of her own clothing. Carmel Church in New Manila. informing them that Appellants were the perpetrators of the crime and even fetching them to make the arrest sprang from a went grounded belief that a crime had been committed and that Appellants had committed it. and Leopoldo Saberon are hereby each sentenced to suffer a single penalty of reclusion perpetua. in the sum of P50.may be said to have been equipped with knowledge of crime detection. Ismael Magpantay. the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. 1 a waiter at the Gathering Disco where Canoy used to work. There was evidence that she had been brutally assaulted. The death indemnity of P50. Thus. and to pay the costs. 540). who were at his house the whole day following the commission (Tsn. before she was murdered. Christopher Araneta. In this regard.000. unlawfully and feloniously. in Quezon City. Rey saw Hoyle Diaz (a. the confessions obtained by law enforcement authorities during their (separate) custodial investigations formed the centerpiece of the prosecution's case for Rape with Homicide against both accused. unlawfully and feloniously. without her consent and against her will. There they had an altercation because she wanted to break up with her already. While waiting. Rey told Hoyle that he is going to take Marlyn to the Mt. He accompanied Marlyn afterwards to Rolando's Disco Pub where Marlyn works. A second sworn statement. in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the New Civil Code.information that the former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with Daniega. Ana Manila. and on the basis of a confession obtained by police authorities from him during custodial investigation (where he allegedly admitted raping and killing Canoy). by then and there stabbing her with an icepick several times. Boyet) pass by. They agreed to see each other at 3:00 in the morning of August 29. then and there wilfully. In the said statement. thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death. with lewd designs. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. said accused. committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of August. to meet again after she gets (sic) out of the Disco Pub to have a final talk about their relationship. They agreed however. with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause. 5 Armed with the said extra-judicial confessions. At trial. Sta. the abovenamed accused. substantially similar and corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit. by means of force. confederating with and mutually helping each other. 3 desperately tried to patch up the relationship. he and Marlyn were at her house at Onyx Street. violence and/or intimidation have sexual intercourse with MARLYN CANOY BENDO. conspiring together. 1989.a. assault and employ personal violence upon the person of said victim. an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Following the latter's arrest.k. it was bruited. summarized by the trial court in its Decision dated August 23. attack. but denied that he had something to do with the victim's death. Metro Manila. Carmel Church compound and if Boyet wants to take revenge on Marlyn (makaganti) Boyet can hold-up her there. 2The latter. 7 These confessions allegedly disclosed details of the killing. Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy. He arrived there earlier than Marlyn. 1989 at a waiting shed along Aurora Boulevard near San Juan. 1991.6 charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide. . to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Marlyn Canoy Bendo. did. and by reason of and on the occasion thereof. did. was later extracted from Diaz. 1989. pursuant to their conspiracy. 4 appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the investigators for questioning. CONTRARY TO LAW. Philippines. thus: Rey Deniega's confession essentially stated: On August 28. then and there wilfully. He saw Rey Deniega on a bridge near Broadway Avenue and Aurora Boulevard. vehemently denied the claim that they had voluntarily executed the said confessions. Afterwards. and there executed a sworn statement to the effect that their respective confessions were coerced and obtained through torture. They contended that they were arrested without . Rey boxed Marlyn and was finally able to take off her clothes. He asked Hoyle to accompany him. Tony and Carlos stabbed Marlyn. Carmel Church compound. Then Rey faced Hoyle (hinarap) and so Hoyle ran away as Rey chased him. Rey left leaving the three men behind. Carmel a man followed them but the man was no longer in the vicinity when they reached the Mt. Rey took out an icepick and stabbed Marlyn. 9 Appellants Daniega and Diaz went to the extent of seeking the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. Carmel Church compound with Hoyle Diaz following behind. suddenly the two companions of Boyet by the name of Tony and Carlos pulled with a jerk the apparel of Marlyn and undressed her. bag and wristwatch of Marlyn. He was courting Marlyn there and used to take her as a table partner. hurling and hollering bad words at each other. As Hoyle ran he threw away the icepick.When Marlyn and Rey were already at the Mt. Carmel Church Compound. He does not know if Rey returned to get the necklace. Rey told Hoyle that so that there will be no more trouble (aberia) they better finish off Marlyn. 10 Both testified that they were subjected to electrocution and water treatment. The two talked for about 20 minutes. There Rey told Hoyle that he will teach Marlyn a lesson and will hold her up. Hoyle also stated that he saw that Rey was heavily influenced by drugs (sabog sa gamot). After the rape. Then Boyet gave Rey an icepick and ordered him to stab Marlyn whom he stabbed once in the stomach. Then Rey raped Marlyn. After Rey was through. 8 In their defense. Hoyle raped Marlyn. Then. Hoyle also recalled that on the way to Mt. Boyet arrived with two companions. Boyet then took off his T-shirt and pulled down his pants and raped Marlyn. The two tied Marlyn's hands and got her necklace and wristwatch. At between 3:00 and 4:00 that morning Marlyn arrived at the waiting shed where she and Rey were supposed to meet and Rey took Marlyn to Mt. during the course of the trial. Quezon City on August 29. When Rey ran after Hoyle. appellants. Rey tried to undress Marlyn who resisted. Then they had an altercation. Boyet berated Marlyn for choosing Rey as her boyfriend instead of Boyet despite the fact that he has already spent large sums for her. Marlyn was raped right where she was found dead. Then he handed the icepick to Hoyle and Hoyle stabbed Marlyn too. Hoyle Diaz confession essentially stated: He came to know of both Rey Deniega and Marlyn Canoy at Gathering House where Hoyle used to take drinks. 1989 at around 2:00 in the morning. Rey was holding no weapon. 16 Considering that no eyewitnesses to the actual commission of the crime were presented before the court. . that their confession were coerced and untrue. . which the trial court granted. on August 31. Over and beyond this it appears that the confessions were executed during daytime and the accused themselves brought to the Quezon City IBP office at noontime during office hours when several employees of that chapter were working. There is nothing in the record to show that the apprehending officers are clever and articulate enough to be able to fabricate in a short a time the kind of confessions submitted here . 11 In a demurrer submitted to the trial court on December 28.000. the accused. the issue of the voluntariness and due execution of the extrajudicial confessions of the appellants upon which their conviction was based. force. 2) the same (confessions) "were obtained through torture. and therefore. Sansano and Atty. inadmissible in evidence. 13Consequently. 12 In an Order dated January 30. the trial court held that: The court finds it hard to believe that (Atty. the prosecution presented no other evidence to warrant a conviction. 1990. . 15 In dismissing appellant's principal defense that their confessions were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. of the same day of their arrest on August 31. would act as the accused said they did. the accused-appellants moved for leave to file Demurrer to Evidence.14 They were likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Marlyn Canoy the amount of P50. After the prosecution rested its case on December 14. we find for appellants. Sansano and Atty. respectively. the Regional Trial Court denied the motion for Demurrer to Evidence. Rey Deniega was arrested at around 6:30 in the morning and Hoyle Diaz at around 9:30 in the morning. Analyzing the appropriate provisions of law in relation to the facts of the case at bench. 1991 rendered its Decision convicting the accused-appellants of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing each of them to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. stressing that: 1) the confessions obtained by police authorities were acquired without the assistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional rights and were hence. 1991. is pivotal in the resolution of the instant appeal. .m. if their confession were really prevaricated beforehand. 1990. Rous). the lower court. The two counsels testified that they precisely segregated the accused from their police escorts to cull out the truth and the accused volunteered to confess to the crime at bar. Rey was brought to the IBP at around 11:00 in the morning and Hoyle at around 2:00 p. Their confession were quite lengthily (4 page each) and filled with details. both of whom are officers of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP and are prominent practitioners of great integrity. 1990." and 3) except for the testimonies of the medico-legal officer and two IBP lawyers who alleged that they assisted the accused during their custodial investigation. Rous.warrants of arrest and that the confessions obtained from them immediately thereafter were made without the assistance of counsel. had ample atmosphere to tell Atty. there are usually other lawyers there. appellants moved for the dismissal of the information for Rape with Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.00 in solidum. threat and other means which vitiat[ed] (their) free will. after hearing the appellants' testimonies. the header of the disputed documents indicates that the investigations were conducted at the police headquarters. within the body of these documents. even assuming the possibility of error in recording the actual time of the investigation. 1989. there exists evidence indicating that the actual custodial investigation was conducted at the police headquarters in the absence of counsel. Atty. Atty. 19 However. However. For instance.M. In addition to these. QCPS (sa himpilan ng homicide ng SID. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant Deniega at the IBP Quezon City chapter office at "around 11:30 in the morning" of August 31. contradicting the prosecution witnesses' declarations that the confessions were obtained in the Quezon City IBP office. Deniega's extrajudicial confession taken by Pat. that they should not escape even the untrained eye. 1989 or earlier than the time they allegedly arrived at the IBP office. Sansano for instance. they were not present at all during the actual custodial investigation of the accused in the police headquarters. 17 it is one thing for appellants to be brought to the IBP office only for the purpose of signing the confessions in plain view of the other employees of the office. were in typewritten form. These were spaces obviously provided for the accused to fill in the blank with the word "yes" ("opo") followed by another blank space for their respective signatures. even from a cursory examination of the confessions. While we have no dispute with the trial court's observation that the appellants were brought to the Quezon City IBP office during daytime when other individuals were holding office in the IBP floor (who may have witnessed the presence of the appellants in the area). unless factual evidence has either been deliberately ignored or misapprehended. Sansano and Rous may have been present at the signing of the documents. Sansano. The statements evidencing the interrogation. while compliance with the constitutional mandate requiring the presence of counsel during the actual custodial investigation is quite another. The confessions which form part of the record of the case at bench are an eloquent example of facts deliberately ignored: the legal insufficiencies and inconsistencies in the documents in question are so glaring. 21 An examination of the document's heading however reveals that the confessions were given to the investigator (Maniquis) at the police headquarters of the SID. There is convincing proof 18 that. while Attys. Moreover. also on August 31. including those portions in which the appellants purportedly were informed of their constitutional rights. testified that Daniega's extrajudicial confession was taken at the QC-IBP office. as contended by appellants. QCPS) not in the IBP office of Atty. blank spaces were conspicuously left at strategic areas (spaces) where the accused were supposed to sign and acknowledge that they were appraised of their rights and that they gave their statements voluntarily. . Maniquis gives the time of its execution as 11:20 A. Apart from the defects evident on the face of the documents.It is a settled rule that this Court will not normally overturn factual conclusions of the trial court. 20 there is conflict as to the place where the custodial investigation was actually conducted. 27 The 1987 Constitution provided a stricter rule by mandating that waiver of the right to counsel must be made not only in the . by any person on his behalf. that the signatures present were their signatures and those of the accused. Atty. Galit. handcuffed. and that the accused agreed to having the lawyers assist them during the process of custodial investigation. Rous' declaration that "the custodial investigation was conducted by the policeman in the (IBP chapter) office. in whole or in part. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. Maniquis. 25 the Court defined the procedure which law enforcement officers must observe in custodial investigations as follows: At the time. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. to the IBP headquarters where the services of the lawyers were supposedly "engaged. Atty. the standards utilized by police authorities (and the lawyers) to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the case at bench fall short of the standards demanded by our case law and the Constitution itself. Rogelio Barcelona that he (Maniquis) had been dismissed from the service for unspecified reasons. a relative. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. it was the police authorities who brought the accused. Jr. a person is arrested. In Morales." 22 conflicts with the statement in the actual document (sinumpaang salaysay) that he (appellant) executed his confession at the police headquarters of the SID. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter of messenger. QCPS (himpilan nghomicide. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. shall be inadmissible in evidence. who testified in rebuttal was certainly not enhanced by the information given the trial court by prosecution witness P/Sgt." No details of the actual assistance rendered during the interrogation process were furnished or alleged during the entire testimony of the lawyers in open court. In the case before us. indicates that they appeared less as agents of the accused during the alleged investigation than they were agents of the police authorities. Enrile. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. 23 A thorough reading of the transcripts of the testimonies of the two lawyers. QCPS) and not the IBP office. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. Lastly. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Sansano and Atty. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. SID. v. if any. The bulk of the lawyers' oral testimonies merely gave the trial court assurance that they supposedly explained to the appellants their constitutional rights.With respect to the extrajudicial confession of appellant Diaz. the probity of Pat. Rous. 24 Clearly. 26 The rules laid down in Morales were reiterated in 1985 case of People vs. to be admissible. must beexpress. counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires." 29 Ideally therefore. by according the accused. Finally. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be provided with one. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice. the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine. There would be denial of the right to the assistance of competent and independent counsel if the investigation or.e. a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself)..e. the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end. or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court. Section 12 provides: 1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. 28 In all. In People vs. during the process of signing. at all stages of the interview.presence of counsel but also in writing. moreover. as in the case before us. Thus. as in many areas. this Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer. What may satisfy constitutional requirements of voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not be sufficient as the investigation goes on. under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence. Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial investigation. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. that a confession. it is important that he should be competent and independent. and stopping the interrogation once in a . i. that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence. upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Article III. Basay.. Section 33. a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation. peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. 3) the confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf." 30 Lawyers engaged by the police. i. Republic Act 7438 mandates that the entire confession must be in writing. the lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible. deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy. are generally suspect. It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. The failure to meet the constitutional requirement for competent and independent counsel and the glaring inconsistencies in documents purportedly executed under the trained and watchful eyes of the lawyers who allegedly were of assistance to the accused during the process of custodial investigation . Diaz likewise testified as follows: Q Who told you to sign this document? A That paper. choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The process of assisting appellants in the case at bench as described by the lawyers in their testimony therefore hardly meets the standard of effective and meaningful communication required by the 1987 Constitution. . maam. when its framers decided to add the modifiers competent and independent to the requirement for counsel during the process of custodial investigations. Section 12 (1) is not met. Maniquis investigate(d) you? A About one hour maam. I did not see that paper while he was investigating me. Maniquis. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless.taken together with the manner in which the signatures of the accused were affixed into the confessions — cast a serious doubt on their due execution. voluntariness is impaired. The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding "the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense" 31 and ensuring that the accused's waiver of his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an informed one in all aspects. Q And Pat. the other accused. the constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III. 32 In his cross-examination. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. it was later. Q Do you know who prepared this at the headquarters? A It was Pat. During the trial. he showed that to me. Maniquis was typing this while he was asking you this question? A. we made that at the headquarters. and support the contention that the sworn statements executed by the appellants were already prepared and signed at the police headquarters before the statements were brought to the QC-IBP office for signing.while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue. because this statement was signed by me at the police station and then we brought it to the IBP office. If the lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accused's constitutional rights. Q For how long a time more or less (did) Pat. Daniega testified to the following: Q Was Atty. Sansano present when this alleged sinumpaang salaysay was taken from you by questions and answers which consist of 31 questions and 32 answers? A No. It was already answered. 33 (Emphasis supplied.. Maniquis. and one or both of them would have withered.Q And after that one hour. it would not be difficult for us to give credence to appellants' testimonies to the effect that the investigation was actually conducted in the absence of counsel in one place (the QC SID headquarters) and signed in the presence of counsel in another (the QC IBP office). Appellants. when you signed that document? Q What time did you sign this? A About lunch time. I only remember Pat. A I signed it about ten to eleven in the morning ad we went to IBP about two or three in the afternoon. Assuming they were couched. your honor. he just asked me to sign it. A Two or three in the afternoon. who were the person(s) present aside from you and Pat. It was at the headquarters. how long a time elapse(d) before you were brought to the IBP Bldg.) Together with all the legal deficiencies pointed out so far. Maniquis. your Honor. Gojar: A I signed that document(s) at the police headquarters. Q After you signed this how long a time elapse(d) before you went to Quezon City IBP? He did not sign that in the IBP. Maniquis told you to sign this? A I don't know them. Q And when you were told to sign this document. in any case. Q But can you read tagalog? A Yes maam. Gojar: Q And you did not take any opportunity to read this before you sign(ed) it? A Everything went fast. Maniquis investigated you? A Yes maam. Q Was that after Pat. sir. on intense cross examination. would not have understood the constitutional nuances of the fact that the confessions and the signing of the documents evidencing the confessions were obtained in different places. Atty. Maniquis? Atty. Q What time more or less was that. . at the IBP Bldg. Pat. Q Did you have any occasion to read this before you sign(ed) this? A No maam. appellants were quite vehement as they were consistent in their separate oral testimonies. Q Who were present at the time Pat. who were not trained in the law. would have been readily sustained by this Court. in the process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. once again. Even if the confession speaks the truth. Allowing any profit gained through such methods furnishes an incentive for law enforcement officials to engage in constitutionally proscribed methods of law enforcement. Yet again. the likelihood for compulsion is forcefully apparent in every custodial investigation. Section 12[1]) . III.These facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the confessions of both defendants were obtained in the absence of independent and competent counsel as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and that the same may have been acquired under conditions negating voluntariness. the potential for suggestion is strong. thanking their luck. . Sec. we emphasized. not to vindicate the constitutional rights of lawbreakers but to protect the rights of all citizens. that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III. Judges face unimaginable pressures from all areas. ad nauseam. in a number of cases before this. and the contradictions and inconsistencies here noted. there remains the possibility that the real assailants lurk free somewhere.. especially the innocent. In People v.e. play a central role in bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. . 12 of the Constitution that: Any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision. if it was made without the assistance of counsel. hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence. by removing the incentive of law enforcement and other officials to obtain confessions by the easy route. that the exclusionary rules adopted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution were designed. courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole basis for convicting accused individuals. In the oftentimes highly intimidating setting of a police investigation.i. Our courts. or in part. They are on the forefront of the government's battle against crime. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and ruthlessness." 35 There is a distinct possibility that the confessions given by the appellants in the case at bench might speak the truth. 34 In fine. shall be inadmissible in evidence. Every so often. in relation to the unfortunate circumstances of the case at bench has already been said. the trial court's well-written opinion in the case at bench — an eloquent example of the earnest attempts judges make to battle crime. in the only conceivable way those rights could be effectively protected. Were it not for the defects inherent in the confessions. Javar. including the pressure of their heavy dockets. either by psychological and physical torture. or by methods which fall short of the standard provided by the fundamental law. If the standards are not met. A person compelled under the circumstances obtaining in every custodial investigation is surrounded by psychologically hostile forces and the threat of physical violence so that the information extracted is hardly voluntary. 36 for instance. What can only be said. as alleged by the accused. it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule. and renders nugatory the only effective constitutional protections available to citizens. We stress. the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. . conformably with Art. MADRID.600. SO ORDERED. DEMETRIO Z.: If the Constitution has any value. appellants Rey Daniega y Macoy and Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo are herebyACQUITTED of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Philippines. it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up for themselves. Thus. Pag-asa. in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place aforementioned. one gold necklace with cross pendant.WHEREFORE. rob and carry away his cash money amounting to P6. conspiring together. unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. PREMISES CONSIDERED. . take. J. 1988. Alejandro Lucero. PEOPLE v LUCERO PUNO. confederating with and mutually helping one another . it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to counsel. did then and there. Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of justice. in Quezon City. 7 karat. Their immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held on other legal grounds. the abovenamed accused. Balbino Echavez. pursuant to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue. For denial of his right to counsel. we acquit accused-appellant. the said accused. wilfully. one armed with handgun. Bienvenido Echavez. this City. by means of violence and intimidation against persons.00. Peter Doe. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. The Information against them reads: That on or about the 7th day of May. and did then and there. Philippine Currency. and taking advantage the(ir) superior strength. Bago-Bantay. Trial proceeded only as against the three. The evidence on record shows that on May 6..000. 5 He reported the incident to the Quezon City police. The worst came. the CIS efforts paid-off.600.000. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to his main residence in Project 6. On July 23. DEMETRIO Z. Quezon City.00. the malefactors stopped his car and alighted. While traversing Road 14. Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the car blocking them and barged into his Benz. shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA. the above-named accused. advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that It was around 7:00 a. DEMETRIO Z.000. When no action was taken on his case. Madrid survived. studded with diamonds. However. 4 Dr. a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80. a gray-reddish car overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way. that Dr. worth P155. The others remained at large. located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street. 3 Two months later.00. with intent to kill. one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155.000. to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code. the next day. Quezon City.00. domino style. the Special Operations Group headed by Capt.000. 1 After driving them around the area for a couple of hours. worth P27. his driver. he filed his complaint with the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS). surrounded with diamonds worth P27. a driver of the said offended party. thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the chest before fleeing. The third sat beside Dr. Quezon City. Raul Boac. Lorenzo Bernales. a necklace worth P27. with the use of handgun. one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80. private complainant DR.600. Madrid at the back sent and punched him. He wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch. his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he sustained. The second occupied the right side of his driver. after a .000. 1988.00.worth P45.m.00.00.00. Two hours later. 6 Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.00. that on the occasion of the robbery and pursuant to their conspiracy. a bracelet worth P50. 1988.00. another two (2) carat domino-style ring. 2 The man beside Dr. to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned. the group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his way home. Dr. belonging to said DR. one 2 karat gold ring. one (1) solid gold bracelet worth 363.000.00. the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and announced a hold-up.000.00. Contrary to law. Simultaneously.000. Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital. The first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his driver to the other side of the seat. MADRID spent the night at his boarding house. and his wallet containing P6. He heeded the advice. MADRID. The men turned out to be police officers. He woke up at 6:30 a. he was at his house in Caloocan City. Emilio Dacanay. that he is not obliged to give any statement to the investigators. 8 In any event. stayed at his house the whole day repairing the upholstery of a customer's chair. 1988. Peralta conferred with Lucero.. Lucero was apprehended on July 25. Lucero replied in the affirmative. He gave word that in case of need. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"). They turned them over to the Investigation Department of the CIS. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. Atty. more than two (2) months after the commission of the crime. Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. Atty. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. He worked until 5 p. Atty. He declared that even before the investigation started. Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Boak. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. Atty.m. He explained to Lucero that he has the right to remain silent.m. He was then directed to where Lucero was. at Fort Bonifacio. He informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Madrid. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. Atty. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions. He claimed that he was tortured. 7 Pfc. The next morning. interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in Camp Crame. he could be reached at his residence. Atty. Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer.m. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. 10 The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to Lucero its Legal implications. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". Thereafter. . Peralta. the driver of Dr. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He was He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. Pfc. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. 1988. He advised that he be treated. Peralta's house. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife Mylen Lucero. the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. was presented to Atty. 9 In due time. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame.surveillance of the suspects. They chased him. The next day. he may refuse to sign it. Nonetheless. He testified that on May 7. head of the CIS Special Operations Group. that day. He observed no reaction from Lucero. they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. The doctor saw the contusions on his body. he learned he was in Camp Crame. It was already signed by Lucero. The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic. Capt. Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was the one who shot Bernales. handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. Later. and that even if he has already given a statement. Two days later. he identified one of the men to be Capt. He identified himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the latter's whereabouts. convicted accused Lucero. Demetrio Z. The trial court. On the civil aspect. 14 Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C") 11 under duress. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time. 2. the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation. NOT CREDIBLE. Madrid the sum of P363.600. and b) to pay Dr. and money value of the jewelries and wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar. SO ORDERED. family. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr.000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by his Hence this appeal by Lucero. He denied engaging the services of Atty. 12 After trial. Madrid. Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION) WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE. He said he only met Dr. The dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads: ACCORDINGLY. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS CASE. the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND . He likewise confirmed that Atty.000. UNRELIABLE. 3. raising the following assignments of error: 1. Peralta. however.00 representing the cash money.00 as actual damages and P50. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC) OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT.Lucero denied knowing Dr. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide. and 2. judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness. Madrid. Dr. The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the complainant. There is no reason for the ambivalence. Initially. Madrid. Madrid during the trial. Dr. The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Madrid presented he could identify all three.THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND NOT ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME CHARGED. This is far from the intent of the Constitution. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE. The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors. is seriously open to doubt. We find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. Firstly. We have sustained the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology. it did not impose a rigorous respect for the right. there is no reason for Dr.m. Considering these circumstances. We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. 19 We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. 16 In his affidavit. and . More exactly. 4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE PROSECUTION. They drove them around for three (3) hours. Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. We find the appeal meritorious. It was satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. The records show that Atty. arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention. Indeed. Dr. Madrid's failure to immediately identify appellant. 5. 15 At another point. 6. Secondly. AND INSPITE OF THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Demetrio Madrid who identified appellant. he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p. 17 Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on this nebulous identification by Dr. and (b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime. Dr. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate at the police line-up four (4) timesbefore he was finally identified by Dr. Peralta's. convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. appellant gave his uncounselled extrajudicial a confession. it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. In this case. Atty. at the crucial point when the interrogation was just starting. It was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a friend . appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. SO ORDERED. Atty. Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense. there is no thread of evidence to criminally inculpate appellant.e. the right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts. We disagree. Atty. Surely. of course. IN VIEW WHEREOF. Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. the Decision in Criminal Case No.talked with appellant about his rights. In a trial by the court. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. In the presence of these agents.. In People v. Peralta. De Guzman. 20Worse. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City . We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel. i. Peralta's house. Given the uncertainty of appellant's identification and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession. such a confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict. J. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for the next day. Defendants' motions for new trial were denied. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the accused. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. Branch CIII. Atty. At that critical stage. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. 21 we held that in custodial investigation. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS PEOPLE V ROJAS SCHAUER. Rojas was granted probation . after proper waiver of jury. defendants Rojas and Hidalgo were found guilty of a charge of receiving stolen property. Appellant. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it voluntarily. Atty. Lovold further testified that at 7 p. 1959.. of an attempt to receive stolen property) because had an understanding with Mr. Are you ready for it?" Joe: "No. and that the appeal Lovold's testimony. Joe . Hall telephoned During the night of March 3. conversation took place: Hall: "Hello... asked Hall to to receive stolen goods. . according to complain do not require a new trial. saw William Hall sitting in an automobile on a orders denying the motions for new trial." property pursuant to prearrangement with defendants he took it as their agent. Hidalgo [one of the when they received the property it had been recovered defendants] that he would buy any and all electrical by the police and was no longer in a stolen condition. m. The appliances or electrical materials that he could get and attorney general argues that because the thief stole the that he had several transactions with him in the past..without imposition of sentence and Hidalgo was On the day of March 4 Officer Lovold of the Los Angeles sentenced to state prison. Officer Lovold listened to these conversations intercepted him and recovered the property. Hall was arrested and he and Defendants urge that they were guilty of no crime (or. This is Bill. and the offense. Hall said that "he most.. 1 We on a telephone in another office. Police Department. Hall did so at about 4:35 and.. Can you call me back around 7:00 o'clock? . How about . the conduit? they are guilty of attempting to receive stolen property. electrical conduit again. had the following conversation with a should be disposed of by modifying the finding that person who identified himself as "Joe" (which is Hidalgo's defendants are guilty as charged to a determination that first name): "Hall: "This is Bill.2d 255] opposite a truck which contained Taft's conduit. "had Hidalgo over the phone.500 was stolen from John Taft in Ventura. who was investigating the Ventura from the order granting probation. They appeal.. Los Angeles street [55 Cal. respectively. that other matters of which they call back. ." appropriate based upon the modified finding.. I don't have the money and by reversing with directions to the trial court to enter yet. at about 4:20 p. at the truck were taken to a police station. m. The person who have concluded that defendants are guilty of attempting answered the first call. fn. I have such judgments or probation orders as it deems to get some money ... and the crime of receiving stolen On the afternoon of March 4 Hall made three telephone property was complete when the thief began its calls from the police station to Hidalgo's place of asportation toward defendants and before the police business." and the following worth about $4.... the judgment. defendant Rojas arrived and drove it to a lot by Rojas' place of business (a shop On the night of March 4. 7 Ann.. Code.) Defendants. returned and told Hall and Saville to leave the keys in the truck. Hall's protection." and said that "I know you guys will let me make money"... where they parked.. ." of it now and the rest tomorrow." The offense with which defendants were charged and of which they were convicted was receiving "property which has been stolen . 497. drove the truck of conduit later on the night of March 4 saw the two defendants to about two blocks from Hidalgo's electrical shop.. . the balance of the money which was $500. Be here at 8:00 the truck from the police station. subd. following Hidalgo in his car. you can bring it over. 501 [78 N." Rojas replied.S." Hidalgo [55 Cal.. 348. On Mott Street.E.. I'm not kidding and it's no use trying to kid you. one of the arresting officers.. 263. to Mott Street. day at noon and he would tell him where to get the truck I don't have all the money now but I can give you a part and .park it a Officers Lovold and Bischonden. walked to the shop. Hall. doing business with Hall alone. to come alone.00.R." At Hidalgo's request Hall and Saville returned to the truck and drove it. relying particularly upon People v. 9 L. Hidalgo At 8 o'clock the following morning Rojas opened his shop said that he did not want the truck brought to his shop and began to unload the conduit from the truck. Hidalgo referred to the "last time I got stuff from you guys. said.. italics added. § 496. Rojas because "his place was 'hot' and was being watched by was then placed under arrest. The officers "staked out" the truck and Officer Saville in plain clothes. Who Hall split with was his business but for his protection. accompanied by Police and warehouse).. Jaffe (1906). 169.. .A. You know it's stolen and I know it's stolen.Cas. Hall introduced Officer Saville to Hidalgo as "Rudy" (the name of Hall's cousin). N. They examine its contents and then leave. meanwhile. had followed couple of blocks away.2d 256] paid Hall $200 and "instructed Hall to call him the following Lieutenant Lauritzen. "You know that this property was stolen. that he would pay $700 for the present load. . that "in the future he would prefer . and drove them to still another location in Hidalgo's car.how about the material?" Joe: "Yes. 185 N. the police. Bring the material but don't bring the truck to my place of business. "I know that it was stolen but I'm not making any money out of it myself." (Pen." Hall and Hidalgo left the truck. after o'clock. knowing the same to be so stolen. Come alone..Y. 1. There Hidalgo left for about 30 minutes.. Draft No.2d 496] (attempted extortion). 70 Harv. 115 Cal. If all which an accused person intends to do actually did and his intent is apparent. 11 Cal. 464. had been recovered by the police. Keedy." [55 Cal.Rev. defendants received it." the external realities did not alter his intention.2d 903] (attempted theft by false pretenses). Arnold.2d 543]. Each of those cases is request of the owner. Model Penal Code. anyone else in the world could know that the property General Principles of Criminal Law (1947).2d 830.L. 476. but simply made it impossible to effectuate it. Superior Court (1959). Camodeca (1959). A. which contains the The situation here is materially like those considered in following dictum concerning a state of facts like that in People v. 102 Pa. not as property in a stolen condition.. 78 Pa. . 115.. 990. Sayre.Rev. [338 P. 52 Cal.I." (See Smith. 41 Harv. Criminal Attempts at Common Law en route to the would-be receiver and. decoy.2d 257] decided on the hypothesis that the defendants had the specific intent to commit the substantive offense and that As pointed out by the District Court of Appeal in Faustina under the circumstances as the defendants reasonably v.L.Rev.App..266]. 300-301 [11] the defendant's house with the consent and at the [1 P. urge that they neither received stolen goods nor [345 P. 590]. Criminal Attempts (1928).. stolen property was recovered by the owner while it was 821. it is not the external realities to which intention attempt to do with the same purpose a part of the thing refers. and did not constitute an offense. Criminal Attempts (1930). by arrangement (1954). Lavine (1931). Strahorn.) [1] In our opinion the following criticism (Hall. was delivered to such receiver as a Impossibility on Criminal Attempts (1930). receive stolen goods "because neither [defendant] nor p. 30." Defendants also cited People v.L. York Court of Appeals held that there was no attempt to 53. Tent. 174 Cal.L. 77. when subject of much criticism and discussion.2d 142. was not in a stolen condition but Two Problems in Criminal Attempts (1957). p.App. Intent is in the would if done constitute no crime it cannot be a crime to mind. "The rule of the Jaffe case has been the criminally attempted to do so because the conduit. 853. In the Jaffe case the 422. 833 [1] saw them they did the acts necessary to consummate . The fact that defendant was mistaken regarding intended. 40 Yale L. 118 [104 P. Zimmerman (1909). The New 962.App. 439. 127) is was stolen property inasmuch as it was not in fact stolen sound: "The confusion between what the defendant property. 146-147 [6-9] the Jaffe case: "The circumstances of the transaction . 289.Rev. as the goods were taken to People v. 10 (1960). The Effect of with the police.L.J. 2d.2d 479. could recovered the goods and taken them from the place not have had actual knowledge of that condition.App. the goods did Cal. 566. It is held (p. 32 substantive crime were lacking. the "victim" was not those of defendants here should be more serious than deceived by defendants' false representations and pleased amazement that because of the timeliness of the therefore there was no lack of consent to the taking of police the projected criminality was not merely detected the property. 497. the [goods] were not 'stolen' nevertheless [3] In the case at bench the criminality of the attempt is the defendant did attempt to receive stolen property. constitute a crime is disapproved. 689]. 568 [163 P.2d opinion the consequences of intent and acts such as 927]." not destroyed by the fact that the goods. Jelke (1956).2d victim was not induced by fear to part with any money. overruled by Camodeca.S. was destroyed by not have the status of stolen property and therefore impossibility caused by the fact that the police had defendants. although believing them to be stolen.App. having been The dictum in the Zimmerman case (1909). the pretending but also wiped out. essential elements of the the attempt in the case of In re Magidson (1917). 16 Cal. "Even though we say that.2d 216. threatening and not upon the effect or result upon the supra.. In our People v. In the Lavine case. as a case "like selling asserted or proposed attempt and by prior arrangement oil stock and being surprised to discover that oil was between the district attorney and the "victim" the actually in the ground where the accused vendor had "extorted" money was paid to defendants who were represented but not believed it to be"--conduct which the immediately thereafter arrested by officers who were New York Court of Appeals apparently feels is not awaiting the event. but because of circumstances lost their "stolen" status. that upon a state of person to be coerced.2d 258] and intent of the person We approve the holding of the Faustina case (1959). p.the substantive offense. Werner (1940).Y. (Cf. . supra. explaining the rather. mind [55 Cal. 329 [152 N. technically. 213].App.E.) that "in attempted extortion the crime depends upon the acts. page 834 of 174 Cal. 135 N. had. People v.Y.Y. In where the would-be receiver went to get them.) criminal. 321.App. 300 [11] of 115 Cal. the "victim" told the district attorney of the Jaffe decision." facts such as that here. that such a state of facts does not of the Los Angeles police. supra. 118 recovered by the commendably alert and efficient action of 11 Cal. [2] Here. 185 N. supra. unknown to defendants. any more than the criminality of unknown to defendants. 225 [105 P. 1 N. 25 Cal. has the status of stolen goods but. the "undercover man. it does not discuss.) Upon this view of the situation. no longer crime of receiving stolen goods was completed by Hall. they were accomplices. cited by the People. It is true that. 802-803 The People's attempt to apply rules of the law of agency [5] [135 So. 526 [5] [282 P. [5] accomplice who cooperated with but was not a member The thief. were We believe that both the owner and the police would take liable to prosecution as principals either in the crime of unkindly to the suggestion that property which has been theft or in the crime of receiving stolen property. when they came into the Hidalgo that he [defendant Hidalgo] would buy any and hands of defendants. Lima (1944).2d 523." Therefore. (The truck in Ventura and started driving to Los Angeles. 578-579 [3. then sent on their way to the intended receiver as a [6] Hall might have become criminally liable as a receiver decoy. as members of the conspiracy. Marsalise (1931). 361]. Raven (1955). 796. precise [55 Cal. is held by the as "agent" for defendants. the that stolen property. stole pursuant to a prearranged "understanding with Mr. the problem of stolen goods which come into goods from himself.The People would have us go farther and hold that the The People's second theory that the evidence supports evidence here supports the finding that defendants are the finding that the crime of receiving stolen property guilty of the consummated offense of receiving stolen was consummated proceeds as follows: The thief. recaptured by the police. 25 Cal. 4]. [4] The first is that the goods.) State v. law enforcement officers remains "stolen" while it is People v. Hall and defendants." was [Hall] could get. 44 Cal. and upon its facts does with a prospective receiver. concerns a feigned to the law of crimes in this situation is inappropriate. or for the account of. both acting as "agent" of the city and not of the true owner. the People say. 578-579 [3. 4].2d 573. under the rule of the actual possession of their owner or the police and are Lima case (1944). even when he steals pursuant to a conspiracy of the police. In this regard the People advance two theories. Hall. rather. if the crime of receiving stolen goods had been completed by delivery of the goods to Hidalgo while they were still in a stolen condition. It seems obvious 866]. (People the subject of larceny and has then been recovered by v. the owner. property. but that crime was not .2d 573. cannot receive the stolen not raise.2d 259] nature of the bailment is not here material. supra. had not lost their stolen character all electrical appliances or electrical materials that he because Officer Saville. 172 La. supra.2d under the surveillance of the police. when he put the goods in his police in trust for. 2d was called as a witness by defendants. 605 [5. was that whether Hall did or did not know of or consent to Lovold's of Hidalgo. Therefore. 53 Cal. Hall was not a servant of Hidalgo whose 205 [1] [300 P.2d 1. a ground of their present contention.Ct. (subd. in contemplation of law.S. People v. 3 and therefore was unjust schemes designed to foster rather than prevent inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of People v.2d 199. 51 Cal. Benford (1959). under agency principles.3] [292 the offense with which he is charged.2d 59.2d 186. 355 U.A.2d 569]. "When the . fn.R. 473 [2] [334 P. Their reliance on this defense is misplaced. Defendants were firmly tied to the charged offense by the testimony [9] Defendants (as an alternative to their contention that of the police officers who heard defendants' own there was no crime) urge that the evidence establishes admissions and saw their conduct. the defense of entrapment. finding is contrary to law .L. United States (1957).) People. Cahan (1955). 161.) A.2d 837]. 2 and section evidence that the officers were carrying out "illegal or 640 of the California Penal Code fn. The police here simply detected and [8] Defendants contend that Officer Lovold's evidence of observed the criminal activities of defendants without the telephone calls of Hall to defendant Hidalgo was calling them to a halt until they had come near to obtained [55 Cal. 44 Cal. Graff (1956). and detect crime.2d 513].C. 187 [1] [316 P. (Hall v. Superior Court (1957).2d 505]. not by the 1]..2d 260] in violation of the Federal apparent completion. nor was there some moment during Hall's listening to the conversations.49 Cal.2d 471." (People v. 4 Section 1181 P.) The contention is without merit. 50 9 [345 P. 6] [311 P.2d 928].2d 600. Superior Court [7] Defendants urge that they were convicted upon the (1959). 107.consummated. 2 L.App. 110 [78 S.) There is no evidence as to possession or custody. Malotte (1956). the merits receiver. Robinson uncorroborated admissions of the accomplice Hall. There is no suggestion in the Communications Act (47 U.2d 905.2d 434. defendant may be found guilty of an attempt to commit People v.2d 134]. [10] Section 1159 of the Penal Code provides that a Dement (1957).Ed. People v. 6) provides. 63-64 [1.. 445 [7] [282 P. (See Coy v. and defendants at the trial asportation of the stolen property when he ceased to act did not object to the admission of the evidence on the as a thief and became. (See Rathbun v. of the contention were not before the trial court and are not before this court.S.2d 517]. 46 Cal. 48 Cal. 144 Cal. § 605) fn. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. lesser crime included therein. 235.. People v.. 521 [282 P. The trial court's finding that defendants are guilty as charged is modified to find them guilty of the offense of attempting to receive stolen property. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared.2d 1018]. to no avail. Maltreatment of prisoners. § 1260. But no it did not. His will had been broken. Later. but guilty of a .2d 898].) The orders denying defendants' motions for new trial are affirmed.or evidence. in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused. or to obtain some information from the . 2.2d 261] appellate court as well as the trial court] may modify the . 44 Cal. 414 [5] [303 P. He consistently maintained his innocence. and with directions to enter such lawful judgment or order against each defendant. A confession was absolutely necessary. the court [the [55 Cal.. purporting it to be a reenactment. WAIVER PEOPLE V GALIT CONCEPCION.. by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days. It happened in the Philippines. Jackson (1955). Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal. His will had to be broken. The judgment and probation order are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views hereinabove expressed. J: 1. In this case before Us.2d 406. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. based on the modified finding. If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession. but if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was convicted. Code.. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. against his will... — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period. he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators. There was no evidence to link him to the crime." (See also Pen.. Obviously. shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge. 3. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. something drastic had to be done. JR. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. The prisoner could not take any more. People v. finding or judgment accordingly .2d 511. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. as the court deems appropriate. A confession must be obtained. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows: ART. 2 More than two weeks thereafter. in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig. police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused.000. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years. Accordingly. to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110. with intent of gain and by means of force. Rizal. Cabrera. Case No. steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad Fernando. in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused. such instances constitute the exception rather than the general rule. The record shows that in the morning of August 23. in Crim. 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. and the total amount of the loss is P10. 5. 4 But the following day. Rizal.00 including valuables and cash. and on August 11. 6. Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. CCC-VII-2589 of said court. Philippines. immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence. intimidation and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling. cash money of an undetermined amount.000. the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court. Rizal. and to pay the costs. . But the practice persists. the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and three of them mutually helping and aiding one another. an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina. 4. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. Trial was held. then and there wilfully. then and there wilfully. unlawfully. 1977. Montalban. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1977. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos. and for purpose of enabling them (accused) to take. Hence. that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery. however. 1977. the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. Rizal. as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. did. province of Rizal. the offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period. 5 As a result. and feloniously take. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig. did. the latest being the case of People vs. he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. belonging to said Natividad Fernando. finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo. unlawfully. with intent to kill. which directly caused her death. the above-named accused. September 9. assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body. Mrs. Fortunately. a widow. September 8. on suspicion of the murder. Natividad Fernando. steal and carry away the said cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act. Francisco Galit. committed as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban. conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe.00. 1978.prisoner. and feloniously attack. thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the head and extremities. On the following day. thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount. the present recourse. using the same way by which they gained entrance. The incriminatory facts of the case. that at about 12:00 o'clock that night. they stopped and they waited at the side of the road until the hour of midnight. namely. accused Francisco Galit and his two companions. Rizal. followed by the accused Galit and next to him was "Pabling". It appears that on August 18. that it was Juling Dulay who first entered the house through the hole that they made. who was then sleeping. that once inside the premises. that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim. that Juling Dulay. Rizal. in the twilight of her life. and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim. they will search every room. widow. that the three accused walked towards the river bank where they divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim.00 for each of them. especially the aparador and filing cabinets. 1977. Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina.7. that it was already early dawn of August 23. it was gathered that in the early morning of August 23. before searching the room for valuables. are as follows: From the evidence adduced in this case. began hacking the victim. Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22. as per their previous agreement. 1977. where they found some money. the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando. and that after . Juling Dulay saw a bolo. as the three could not find anything valuable inside the first room that they entered. that upon entering the room of the victim. lying near the piggery compound. that after killing and robbing the victim. the three repaired to the premises of the victim. that while entering the premises of said house. that it was further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard by climbing over the fence. that when the three accused left the room of the victim. they brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw outside. at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. who was then holding the bolo. that their respective shares amount to P70. which he picked up and used it to destroy the back portion of the wall of the house. a 70-year old woman named Natividad Fernando. the three accused began searching the room for valuables. and in their conversation. Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the victim. 1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the victim. Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim. Juling Dulay and Pabling. Natividad Fernando. that they entered the said premises through the back wall of the house. Natividad Fernando. the three accused went out of the premises of the house. that after the victim was killed. with the sole aim of looking for cash money and other valuables. was robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at Montalban. as found by the trial court. which was through the back portion of the wall. Natividad Fernando. accused Galit and two others. that the three conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building. 1977. Rizal. the three accused decided to kill first the victim. met at the place where they formerly saw each other in Mariquina. Natividad Fernando. that when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. in the case of Morales vs. that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene. 'E-1' and 'E-2'). This Court. upon the other hand. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence immediately. When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room. Rizal. force and intimidation as described earlier. 9. Natividad Fernando. as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 1977. but the latter was insistent. the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. the three accused left and went home. He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. 8. 'C' and 'C-2'). and which We reiterate: 7. the accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo). 6 10. and that a week later. and the pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were living together in one house in Marikina. The principal prosecution witness. that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave. that he heard that the accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene". a relative. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. Rizal. 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance . which was adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit. and without the benefit of counsel. As a result of the killing. on August 23. because the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused. Montalban policemen went to their house and arrested the accused. that he further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando. if any. In fact. by any person on his behalf. Rizal. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage. when the crime was committed in Montalban. he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about what he had heard. The accused. After a review of the records. the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. denied participation in the commission of the crime. We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction.receiving their shares of the loot. the victim. 'E'. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Rizal. Ponce Enrile. suffered no less than seven stab wounds. At the time a person is arrested. Rizal. that upon learning of what the accused had done. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. 16. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating officers. 13. no state witnesses.of counsel. especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed reenactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. The statement begins as follows: I. There were no eyewitnesses. na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. as it is hereby. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito? SAGOT: Opo. SO ORDERED. SET ASIDE. na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay. 11. and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Moreover. or a friend. in whole or in part. na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas. Let him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. PEOPLE V OLVIS This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in Dipolog City. 1985 following the death sentences imposed on each of the three . the same must be rejected in toto. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness. WHEREFORE. again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession. With costs de oficio. the judgment appealed from should be. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng SaligangBatas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay. 15. These constitute gross violations of his rights. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. 12. 1 The case was certified to this Court on January 19. accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer. In fact. no property recovered from the accused. a relative. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. At the supposed reenactment. 14. his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. shall be inadmissible in evidence. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. 17. at the time of his arrest. (hack) and stab wounds which caused his instantaneous death. whether testimonial. the three accused-appellants. 6 This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11. on May 14. said accused has to be. nighttime and in consideration of a price or reward. filed a statement informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed case. 2 In compliance with our resolution. thereby inflicting upon him multiple inc. issued a death penalty abolition resolutionrequiring the three accused-appellants to file a statement. was acquitted). and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q. The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q. of the crime of murder. in title Municipality of Polanco. did. and Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named. assault. ROMULO VILLAROJO. stating whether or not they wished to continue with the case as an appealed case.. 1987. there being no evidence. 1976 charging all four accused with the murder of Discredit Bagon. Leonardo Cademas. On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO. OLVIS who mastermind the After trial. OLVIS. documentary or physical evidence. as principals by direct participation. 7 xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The four accused entered Identical "not guilty" pleas. personally signed by them with the assistance of counsel. with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation. committed as follows: That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975. the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal. 5 We have since observed this procedure with respect to all pending capital cases. 3 With the promulgation of the 1987 Charter. OLVIS. the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows: FOREGOING CONSIDERED. with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. ACQUITTED. LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the conspiracy and who. Anacleto Olvis. direct or indirect. then in force. armed with boloes and a hunting knife. The same reads as follows: bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO VILLAROJO. 1987. Zamboanga del Norte. on May 28. and for a consideration of a price or reward. the above-named accused. then and there willfully. that tend to establish his complicity in this case. . as principal by inducement. Romulo Villarojo. hack and stab one DISCREDIT BAGON. CONTRARY TO LAW. abolishing the death penalty and commuting death penalties already imposed to reclusion perpetua 4 we. under the Constitution we exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. over which. unlawfully and feloniously attack. consprising and confederating with one another and acting upon the direction and instruction of ANACLETO Q. LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA. as he hereby is. SR. LEONARDO CADEMAS.accused-appellants. and DOMINADOR SORELA. Captain Ruperto Encabo. Deosdedit Bagon. the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused ROMULO VILLAROJO. 1976 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. 8 We come to the facts. Sorela bore several scratches on his face. The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. in what would apparently crack the case for the police. But half way there. It does not appear from the records how the three were able to have the deceased join them. to report their brother. missing. in the evening of September 7. Encabo then instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela. as a consequence of which. Their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. received their report. but her efforts were in vain. But said offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and nighttime. was dead. He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon of September 7. The station commander. he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. LEONARDO CADEMAS. . The three (3) accused conspired and confederated with one another to successfully achieve their ghastly. brother and sister. Captain Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he sustained his injuries. Moments later. By then. Bagon. According to him. arrived at the local Integrated National Police station of Barrio Polanco. they were turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo. There. hacking him at several parts of the body until he. certainty establishing their authorship of the crime is irreversibly positive. evil ends. Captain Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer. Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this case of MURDER. Sorela fled. who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with Dominador Sorela. Sorela illegally broke down. 1975. As a matter of police procedure. on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. and. Sorela allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon. to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. Alfredo and Estrella Bagon. neck and arms when the police found him. No mitigating circumstance has been shown to offset the two (2) aggravating circumstances. admitted having participated in the killing of the missing Bagon. Together with Sorela. She did three probable places. Apparently unconvinced. the degree of moral. running into thick cogon grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches. Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise friends of the deceased. 1975. one of the accused herein. On September 9. who led them to a secluded place in the ricefields. in Zamboanga del Norte. SO ORDERED. Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. They were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas. the police of Polanco knew that they had a murder case in their hands. It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo. a friend of his. It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. and DOMINADOR SORELA. the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree.) But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from the sack that had concealed it. Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero. Exhibit "Y. (Exhibits "R". six of which were determined to be fatal. The first confessions were taken on September 9. in full public view. shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike another. where the body of the victim was transferred. In their confessions of September 18. Adaro daughter of Olvis. 1975. September 14. and her four children viewed it. the three executed five separate written confessions each. (Exhibits "I". they executed two confessions more. and upon complaint by her of harassment against her father by his supposed political enemies. 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters.000. 1975. and the sack itself. sworn before agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.00 each. "S". 1975. The exhumation. as well as the transfer of Bagon's cadaver. numbering about thirty. "M". while Solero and Cademas look on.) Thereupon. 1975. Again the proceedings were recorded by the camera of a photographer. While in custody. it was readied for autopsy. its "L". were captured by the lens of a photographer. September 10. "K". they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing. and September 25. demonstrated how the victim was boloed to death. the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement. the three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. however.000. the three accused herein. On September 18. morbidly. the suspects. 1975. 1975. again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco. another photograph. The second were made before the Polanco police. "J". The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco. In the re-enactment. (Exhibits "T". where the sack-covered. Catalina Bagon. Villarojo.The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. a nylon rope with which the dead body was tied. in front of the building where Mrs. The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the deceased suffered twelve stab and hack wounds. "VIP. . widow of the deceased. It was displayed. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed Sorela to lead them to the grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been buried.00 each. Exhibit "X". On September 21. 1975 by Mrs." a photograph. apparently after having done the victim in. September 21. 1975. 1975 and September 25. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields. the shovel used to inter the victim's remains. Diolinda O. then Polanco municipal mayor. The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen and Civilian Home Defense Forces volunteers. and Cademas executed Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis. portrays Villarojo in the act of The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twentyinch long bolo. The body was transported to the Polanco municipal hand the following day. for a reward of P3. In their confessions of September 9. decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave. who allegedly promised them a reward of P3. "U". We note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September 10. and "N"). 1975. It was laid on the altar. The defendant. the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform.11 In that decision. They insisted on their innocence. and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned. either retained or appointed. as any extrajudicial confession confronting us. As earlier stated Olvis was acquitted. that he had a "clean bill of health" 10 in connection with the murder case. we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-appellants. that he was not questioned by the police after the killing. specifically. notwithstanding efforts by the three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. 1987 that we promulgated People v.Based on these subsequent statements. can stand up in court. The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased having been a tenant of his). upon arriving in Dipolog City. It dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim. We hold that. this was inconsistent with a guilty mind. two days after the murder. "to which said accused (Olvis) meekly complied" 9 (that is. on the retraction of the accused themselves. The police of Polanco had but the three accusedappellants' statements to support its claiming. the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as the mastermind. to the remark). while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder. that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him. With the acquittal of Olvis. based on the recorded evidence. and Anacleto Olvis on the other. overall. finally. The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. ambiguously. and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. and who. we laid down the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions: xxx xxx xxx . that case having been dismissed. The acused Romulo Villarojo averred. It was satisfied. if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be . that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him.. It relied. According to the court. It rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in fact no money changed hands. It likewise noted that Olvis had. Decierdo. Prior to any questioning. The fundamental issue then is whether or not these statements. Likewise. he assented. the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent. the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three accused on the one hand. who had earlier brought a physical injuries suit against the former. It observed. was in fact informed by the Philippine Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man. absolving Olvis of any liability. for which he acted in self-defense. there can be no questioning. It was on May 7. been in Cebu City.. In acquitting Olvis. furthermore. may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs Counsel If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs. he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him . .. If the individual indicates in any manner. that he wishes to remain silent. . it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney. . if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation. the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney . For those unaware of the privilege. he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege. . the warning is needed simply to make them aware of — the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. the interrogation impose cease. . such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere Further. the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it . .interrogated. In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then. but also of the consequences of foregoing it . the subsequent procedure is clear. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one. but also that ff. An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. . More important. If the individual . No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given.. The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and WW be used against the individual in court. at any time prior to or during questioning. xxx xxx xxx In People v. the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned. . his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. we added: xxx xxx xxx At the outset. Duero. Once warnings have been given. ' even if it were otherwise voluntary. while it is stated therein that this Office had just requested the services of Atty. from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. Galit. parenthetically. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically. 21 Thus. NAVARRO to handle your case. but twice. for the same reason. a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incriminate tion and his right to retained or appointed counsel . 16 We cast aside. 1975. The 1973 Constitution. like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self. the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. In their supposed statements dated September 9. Essentially. 12 behalf. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. they must respect his decision to remain silent . by any person on his Forced re-enactments. in contemplation of law. 1975. technically. 14. whether testimonial or passive. 197 5. 17 This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion. On the contrary. in a criminal or any other case. xxx xxx xxx Like the Decierdo confessions. that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. the lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s]. are you wining to accept the legal assistance of Atty." 13 With reset to the confessions of September 18. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. 18 but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" 19 acquired under circumstances of duress. it is clear therefrom that Atty. the confessions of September 25.. Dipolog District Office." 20 This should be distinguished. the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. 22 or compelling him .incrimination. and 21. . 'involuntary. the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person. the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below. to This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body. But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once. There is nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI.cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to policy. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office.. As we said in Decierdo. 15 applies with like force here: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. an act. the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). says: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. What we said in People v. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken. Department of Justice. . 14 the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. for another. to the parish church. For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands. by and large. the accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel. he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. were truly his voluntary statementsChavez v. What is more. "M". It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application. By custodial interrogation. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. Court of Appeals 30 tells us: Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence. "N". What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody. and "R". depict the deceased's relatives in fixed poses. But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. It should be furthermore observed that the three accusedappellants were in police custody when they took part in the reenactment in question. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." In each case. under the circumstances. . we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 31 In such a case. As for the accused Dominador Sorela. Pressure which operates to overbear his will disable him from making a free and rational choice. Indeed. 33 Moreover. there are striking aspects in the case that we find distressing. we are puzzled why they. the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the information was filed. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty. it may be the product of unintentional statements. Accordingly. "L". the accused. again. more so his widow and children. for a photographing session — unusual procedure — when the perfunctory police procedure should have been to bring the corpse to the health officer for autopsy. upon witnessing his cadaver-wrapped in a sack and all — although it was supposedly the first time that they saw his remains after two days of frantic search. and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus. while the deceased's corpse lay in the foreground. we cannot accept the trial judge's finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity" 27 when he allegedly "spilled the beans 28 before the law enforcers on September 9.to expectorate morphine from his mouth 23 or making her submit to a pregnancy test 24 or a footprinting test. 25 or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. the accused does not speak his guilt. there was no trace of grief upon the faces of the deceased's bereaved relatives. 1975. incompetent evidence. had to be made to suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time. 29 We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions. we hold that all evidence based on such a reenactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence. For one. he should have been provided with counsel. Here. the victim was transferred to the municipal hand building and then subsequently. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. 32 Exhibits "K". to fourteen years. Villarojo should be liable for plain homicide. happily for Olvis. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from his body. This indicates a serious intent to kill. judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30. we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal upon all the three accused-appellants. and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty of homicide. quite disconcerting. To the mind of. rather than selfdefense. retracted their earlier statements indicting him as a coconspirator. suspicious enough. for it is not within our power to overturn acquittals. however. the severity and number of wounds sustained by the deceased are not. as if pursuant to a script or as part of some eerie ceremony. The accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. 36 marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense. As it happened. 1984. He stressed. that he did so in self. Still. the disposition of the case was characterized by unusual grandstanding. appreciate superior strength or nocturnity. the three accused-appellants while under NBI custody. While we do not challenge the verdict by acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis. by themselves. The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp instrument. 38 But it is still our business to see whether his defense can stand scrutiny. 39 In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim. To us. He pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in order also to defend my body. as fall guys in an evident network of political intrigue. this Court. 34 what is our concern is the apparent design to use three ill-lettered peasants. Olvis was never invited for the usual questioning. we cannot. is. In the absence of any other proof. there is more to Exhibit "20. the accused Romulo Villarojo admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. in the first place. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the court a quo on the basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused. It should be noted that the three appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. than meets the eye. Hence. at the parish church at that. I hack[ed] him. eight months. however. Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on him. at the expense of the present three accused. make a turn-about there leaves us even more disturbed. 35 the three herein accused. WHEREFORE. sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Yet. for reasons as yet unclear to us." 37 He completely absolved his coaccused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any liability. It leaves us with an uncomfortable impression that each scene was an act in some contrived tragedy. and one day . Why the NBI should intervene in the case when the Polanco police had apparently "solved" it. We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal.defense.It was in fact only on September 10." the request to transfer Olvis' case to the jurisdiction of the National Bureau of Investigation for reinvestigation. 1975 that Discredit Bagon's remains were unwrapped. In his counter-affidavit. but why the three appellants should. statements we reject for the reasons earlier discussed. in an instant. of reclusion temporal.:p . No special pronouncement as to costs.000. as maximum.00. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify the heirs of Discredit Bagon in the sum of P30. J. SECTION 13 COMMENDOR V DE VILLA CRUZ. the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds. In G. No. a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. if any. the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.R. AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).R.m.R.R. 96948. the petitioners. 93177. 408. No. they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them. 95020.R.These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30. On the same date. 14. No. 14. 93177 and 96948. to wit: You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on12 Feb 90 9:00 a. No. I Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 1990. certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. to investigate the petitioners in G. The petitioners in G. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9. besides challenging the legality of GCM No. sworn statements of witnesses. No. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny). In G. Nos. 1990. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G. In G.R. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G. then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses. Nos. 1989. 97454. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.R. Act No. 16 dated January 14. In G. At the first scheduled hearing.R. individually addressed to the petitioners. Camp Crame Quezon City. and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. at Kiangan Hall. 95020. Nos. seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. which is a petition for certiorari. prohibition and mandamus. in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. prompting the PTI Panel to . Failure to submit the aforementioned counteraffidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence. the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits. (Emphasis supplied. On March 7. the petitioners in G. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation.R. that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P. the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. 1990. but the application was denied by GCM No. and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law.R. On July 28. Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5. 1990. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No.1990. either in defense or mitigation.1990. This was done on March 14. the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses. At the hearing of May 15. however. to the best of his knowledge and belief. they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.14. 1990. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. which provides: Art. Charges Action upon. Judge Maximiano C. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No. 95020. and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of. No. The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71.D. the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. 408 for this purpose. 1990. 71.14. 14 ruled. 39. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf.grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21. form of charges. GCM No. No. or has investigated. and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. No charge will be referred to a general courtmartial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. 1990. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and .14. Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. In G.) They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. In a resolution dated February 27. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied. No. On August 22. After hearing. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at the pretrial investigation. As their motions appeared to be dilatory. The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows. this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson. where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. 14. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. the assailed orders of General Court. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest. 1990. and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21. On that date. The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. that Section 13. as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner. 1990. 1991.R. the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot. No. On February 18. to submit their counter-affidavits.Martial No. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence. Manuel Ison. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Nos. 1990. intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial. Lt/Col. Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No.R. Solano. first at the scheduled hearing of February 12. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros. It appears that the petitioners in G. Respondent General Court-Martial No. the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: II (a) Declaring. the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. when they were given until March 7. the private respondents in G. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent. This they did on March 13. and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. 1990. Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly. .Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court. they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. 14. the trial court ordered their release." They chose not to heed the warning. are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Its xxx xxx xxx Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation.. it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention.martial of jurisdiction. 1 thus: xxx xxx xxx But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general courtmartial of jurisdiction. the Court said: We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71. 336 U. and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a courtmartial." We so held in Arula v. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. Smith. Moreover. 695. If it is not availed of. reversing a courtmartial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level. There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. not mandatory. Espino. 93 L ed 986 (1949).S. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction. language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. In Humphrey v. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later . and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. 77. after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records. compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory. as amended by P. petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counteraffidavit. Baldonado. 77. 2 where we declared: The Court finds that. the "accuser. No. As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation. were signed by Maj. No. 911. Significantly. contrary to the contention of petitioners. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration.. does not invalidate said charge sheets.D. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Thereafter. for they never even asked Maj.e.D.D. that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit. 71 of the Articles of War. including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers. they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. 911.D. No. this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P. instead of doing so. is only of suppletory application. a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. i. not mandatory.holdings of the Judge Advocate General. No. ." in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. pursuant to P. 911. D. No. Considering that P. wherein. No. as amended by P. a person subject to military law.D. 77. charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer. as amended by P. and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record.D. The amended charge sheets. De Villa. that issue was resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. 77. 911. as amended by P. Antonio Ruiz. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing. No. However. the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees. No.D. Ruiz. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. 18. 8. as the principal respondent in G. which supposedly convened the body. we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Article of War No. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be .. the Chief of Constabulary and. to wit: Art. On the contrary. on June 12. De Villa. M-6.. Act No. the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general courtsmartial. 242. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act). except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army. De Villa.R. as amended by Rep. the commanding officer of a division. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order. As observed by the Solicitor General. there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law. the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff. the commanding officer of a military area. the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried. Act No. 1948.The petitioners also allege that GCM No. The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge. the superintendent of the Military Academy. . Challenges. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General. when empowered by the President. 3 thus: In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army. but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause. as Chief of Staff. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof. Alejandro. and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. General Courts-Martial. was not signed by Gen. While it is true that General Order No. after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. the commanding officer of a major command or task force. 408 (Articles of War). 93177. AFP. M-6 was not signed by Gen. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. 14 and appointed its president and members. No. there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. — The President of the Philippines. he sustained General Order No. actually constituted GCM No. 8 reads: Art. D. This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge. as worded on September 14. After December 17.1972. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945. and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. 39 ceased automatically. the reason for the existence of P. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12. 408). On January 17. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 1498. No. On June 11. 1938.D. would be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. 1978. P. President Marcos issued General Order No.martial or by the accused." The modified rule on challenges under P. On November 7. general orders. 39 was embodied in this decree. Procedure. empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them. No. security and stability of the State.1981.1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge. Jurisdiction. when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective. he promulgated P. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines.permitted and that only challenges for cause. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7.D. in any number. President Marcos promulgated P. the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law. with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause. or the National Security Code. . President Marcos issued Proc. The proclamation revoked General Order No. the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number.D. On September 27. Composition. which was a compilation and codification of decrees. thus: No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein. 8.D. LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence. 39 (Governing the Creation. No. made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. No. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged member.1972. No. 1941. the date of the approval of the Act. No. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder. and other matters relevant to military Tribunals).1958. we observed as follows: ." Rather irrelevantly. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge. orders. The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. No. in the words of the Freedom Constitution. 2045. the wisdom of Com. resolutions. the law itself ceases. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. 1981. To repeat for emphasis. The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. in the light of present circumstances. We do not agree with the respondents in G. boards or commissions. having been cast out under the new dispensation as. the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. As a result. In Martelino. Act No. instrumentalities. The petitioners in G. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War.It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases. it could still be considered no longer operative. It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts. The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment.R. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P. It is curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers. or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies. decisions. cessat ipsa lex. the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Applying these rules. 408. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. Indeed. even if not so withdrawn. 39.R. this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17. Cessante ratione legis.D. we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. At any rate. No. Act No. the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. is a matter addressed to the lawmakers and not to this Court. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve. No. courtsmartial may commit such an abuse of discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. the test. including this Honorable Court. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the ..R. is jurisdiction. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. 5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions. the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities. prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpusand quo warranto. orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. xxx xxx xxx National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Nos. Aside from structural peculiarity. Imagine a scenario of say 1. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. or if the assailed July 25. it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion. We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military.It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial.000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail. as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari.. and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice. . This much was suggested in Arula. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition . on "provisional" bail. where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction. But. and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry.1990 Order were sustained. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest. this was explained by the Solicitor General thus: . Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 1991. pursuant to Office Order No. On the contention of the private respondents in G. as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. On February 12. 1991. indefinite confinement is not sanctioned. In some cases. No. command units. have already been disbanded. On March 20. It was heard on February 26. However. 1991. 1991. The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18. the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12. finally. where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30.m. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. While accepting this explanation. must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting. hearing and decision. 1991. our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. 6 It should be noted. 1991. All of them. 1991. and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle.R. the private respondents received the copies of the charges. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26. had to be interviewed or investigated. and these inevitably took months to finish. 1991 at 2:00 p. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War. such as the Scout Rangers. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.treatment is substantially different from others. the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition: This Court as protector of the rights of the people.. After the charges were completed.. the government filed a . There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. by the respondent court. as well as other witnesses. 31-91. charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11. In G.hour period for appeal under Rule 41. of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12. No. Section 18.R. In G. in G. the latter was ultimately denied. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12. Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar. it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula: The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). As in that case. ACCORDINGLY. any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. as amended.R. and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction.R.R. the petition is GRANTED. where the private respondents should not have been ordered released. III SO ORDERED. however. must be based on jurisdictional grounds because. the decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G. on March 4. Contrary to the private respondents' contention. No.notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration. Branch 8. Such action is indicated. and in G. J. . Nos. No costs. we find that the respondents in G. in G. No.R. 1991. therefore. Nos. seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. in order to prosper. No. 95020 and 97454. and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1991. the petitions are also GRANTED. A petition for certiorari. No. after hearing. 96948. where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied. 93177. The 48. 95020 and 97454.R.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners.R. 96948. GOV’T OF HONGKONG V OLALIA DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. 1991. private respondent filed. Branch 19. raffled off to Branch 10. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20. to post bail. 1997. 99-95733. praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. the NBI agents arrested and detained him. prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. 1999. On October 14. Cap. 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20.) issued in Civil Case No.. 2000. On November 12." in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. No. Olalia. filed with the RTC of Manila. 1997. The Decision became final and executory on April 10. 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz. Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 1999. For his part. Jr. 1995. 140520. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which. the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. petitioner. The facts are: On January 30. docketed as G. the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Meanwhile. 1999. Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent. On September 23. Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. 2001. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. private respondent. warrants of arrest were issued against him. 99-95773. 201 of Hong Kong.R. the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. docketed as Civil Case No. 1999. On November 9. If convicted. he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On July 1.a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. That same day. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. On September 13. Jr. this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ). the RTC. presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo. penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23. 1999. 1999. in turn. as early as November 22. and (2) the Order dated April 10. . in the same case. On December 18. 1999. 1997 and October 25. private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari." It took effect on June 20. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding." On October 22. Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired. manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused. Hence.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court. shall. said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. be filed with this Court soonest. On December 21. thus: In conclusion. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office. that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail. If accused fails in this undertaking. All persons. the instant petition. but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10. In his comment on the petition. 99-95733. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20. 2. real and personal. thus: Sec. petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order. Jr. Judge Bernardo. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. and 4. Bail is set at Php750. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions: 1. 3. 2001. 2001.000. or on October 8. On October 30. 2001. private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee. will further appear for judgment. be bailable by sufficient sureties. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court. this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail. issued an Order denying the petition for bail. private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. Judge Bernardo. SO ORDERED. 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail. at any time and day of the week. with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking. Jr.After hearing. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. . 2001. and if they further desire. Section 13. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk. before conviction. 2002. the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government. 13. and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who. Art. and Mark B.1 this Court. At first glance. (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction. Hence. For one. 6. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. 1971. a. this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case.or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. J. applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec.a. Mario Batacan Crespo. Moreover. RTC of Manila. However. Purganan. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights." the constitutional provision on bail quoted above. VIII. has gradually attained global recognition. Slowly. later Chief Justice. on one hand. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Jimenez. the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations.. Excessive bail shall not be required. In Government of United States of America v. unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Branch 42. Nonetheless. Hon. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. and the law on extradition. and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition. in the 20th century. 18. per Fernando. It is "available only in criminal proceedings. held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Constitution). the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts . Enage. 41 SCRA 1. the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal. Panganiban. later CJ). on the other.k. Presiding Judge. where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. September 17. Guillermo G." thus: x x x. as well as Section 4. liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. In 1966.characterized as violations of the laws of war. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights. held that under the Constitution. In other words." The Philippines. in Mejoff v. we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings." and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. along with the other members of the family of nations. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. and crimes against humanity. bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings. Recently. the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law. has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process. This commitment is enshrined in Section II. such as deportation and quarantine. Thus. On a more positive note. Respondents in administrative proceedings. both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. on December 10. Second. particularly the right to life and liberty. In fact. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. therefore. taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. First.4 have likewise been detained. to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. in granting bail to a prospective deportee. and due process. Director of Prisons. 1948. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. Thus.2 this Court. to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. In this case. . The 1909 case of US v. ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court. under the Nuremberg principle. The Philippines. liberty. also after World War II. the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime. committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.3the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. crimes against peace. however. While not a treaty. a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life. we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.8 It is not a criminal proceeding. and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action. Clearly.D. both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. created by treaty. for it is not punishment for a crime. pending receipt of the request for extradition.D." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused. Under these treaties. considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases.some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P. Thus.) No. If bail can be granted in deportation cases. "Temporary . A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest. and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.14 But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding. Commission of Immigration. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. As previously stated. an extradition proceeding. the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. No. to a prolonged restraint of liberty. it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." Obviously.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal. for the purpose of trial or punishment. In Mejoff v. there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.10 It is sui generis. tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. while ostensibly administrative. the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P. but one that is merely administrative in character. to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction." and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently. the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power. Likewise." Thus. the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled. even though such punishment may follow extradition. the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. After all. bears all earmarks of a criminal process. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings. he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime.detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition. this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence. should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In fact. where these rights are guaranteed. In other words. As Purganancorrectly points out. However. In the latter. it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations. Consequently. when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. to which the Philippines is a party. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan. the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.15 Given the foregoing. however. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 2001. there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. therefore. however. and remained incarcerated until December 20. proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23. liberty. the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life. and due process. then Associate Justice. An extradition proceeding being sui generis. a right to due process under the Constitution. the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. but also by international conventions. We should not. but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable." . 1999. Puno. In this case. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. More so. not only by our Constitution. While administrative in character. The applicable standard of due process. this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail. it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail. By any standard. now Chief Justice Reynato S. According to him. it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. WHEREFORE." If not. . the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention. conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED. and thereafter. we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence.