Electoral politics In NWFP. 1988-1999

iELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP. 1988-1999 Submitted by MUHAMMAD SHAKEEL AHMAD Supervised by Dr. NAUREEN TALHA NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN STUDIES QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD 2010 ii ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP. 1988-1999 A dissertation submitted to the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University Islamabad (Pakistan) in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Pakistan Studies. By MUHAMMAD SHAKEEL AHMAD NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN STUDIES QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD 2010 iii DECLARATION I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research, and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree. Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad iv CONTENTS S. NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 TITLES LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS ACRONYMS GLOSSARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION Aims and Objective of the Study Research Question-Hypothesis and Models Significance of the Problem Review of Literature Research Methodology Summary of Chapters PART-1 THEORIES AND CONTEXTS 7 CHAPTER-1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ELECTORAL POLITICS 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Electoral Politics and the political organization 1.3 Electoral politics and political participation 1.4 Militaricracy to Electocracy 1.5 Impact of elections on legislature 1.6 Basic practices in Electoral Politics 1.7 Reforms in Electoral Politics 1.8 Conclusions 8 CHAPTER-2: NWFP’S ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Central NWFP 2.2.1 Geography and Population 2.2.2 Agriculture and canal system 2.2.3 Economy 2.2.4 Politics 2.3.1 Northern NWFP 2.3.2 Geography and Population 2.3.3 Economy 2.3.4 Politics 2.4.1 Southern NWFP 2.4.2 Geography and Population 2.4.3 Economy 2.4.4 Politics 2.5.1 North-Eastern NWFP 2.5.2 Economy 2.5.3 Politics 2.6 Conclusions 9 CHAPTER-3: ELECTORAL HISTORY OF NWFP 3. Introduction 3.1 British Period (1932-47) 3.2 Legislative Council Elections 3.3 Elections 1937 3.4 Elections 1946 3.5 Referendum in NWFP 1947 3.6 Post Partition (1947-1955) 3.7 Elections during Ayub Era (1959-65) 3.8 Conclusions PAGE NO vii xi xii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xxi xxxiii OF 1-32 1 7 14 19 23 26 28 30 33-61 33 37 38 38 41 43 46 46 48 49 51 52 52 53 55 56 57 60 62-89 62 62 64 65 71 76 81 85 86 v PART-II CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 10 CHAPTER-4: VOTING TRENDS IN NWFP 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Characteristics of Sample data 4.3 Interest in Politics and Information 4.4 Awareness and Access to Electoral Process 4.5 Trust in Institution 4.6 Perception of Electoral fraud, Coercion and Violence. 4.7 Perception of Democracy 4.8 Electoral and Democratic Participation. 4.9 Conclusions 11 CHAPTER-5: ELECTORAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF PESHAWAR. 5. Introduction 5.1 Electoral Results 5.2 Urban Rural Periphery Polling Stations 5.3 Industrial Polling Stations. 5.4 Lower Middle Class Polling Stations 5.5 Middle Class Polling Stations. 5.6 Upper Class Polling Stations 5.7 Old City Polling Stations 5.8 Peshawar Cantonment Polling Stations 5.9 Constituencies Results 5.10 National Assembly NA-1 5.11 National Assembly NA-2 5.12 National Assembly NA-3 5.13 Case Study NA-1 5.14 The Constituency 5.15 The Candidate 5.16 NA-1 results 5.17 Comparison of 1988-1997 Election Results. 5.18 Gender Differences in Voting behavior 5.19 Party/ Leader Identification in Peshawar 5.20 Conclusions 12 CHAPTER-6: PARTY POLITICS IN NWFP 1988-1999. 6. Introduction 6.1 Party politics at Macro Level in NWFP. 6.1.1 Political Legacy of PPP 6.1.2 PPP Organisational weaknesses 6.1.3 Legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq 6.1.4 Patronage of Nawaz Sharif 6.1.5 New Trade and Business activities in NWFP in 1980s 6.1.6 The Rise of Traders 6.1.7 Decline of Organised labour 6.1.8 Ethnic/Regional Legacy of ANP in NWFP 6.1.9 Politics of Pashto in NWFP 6.1.10 Religious Legacy in NWFP: Establishment of Conservatism in NWFP. 6.2.1 Party Politics at Micro level in NWFP. 6.2.1.1 Central NWFP 6.2.2 North-Eastern NWFP (Hazara) 6.2.3 Northern NWFP 6.2.4 Southern NWFP 90-189 90 97 104 113 127 142 160 165 178 190-215 190 191 192 192 193 193 194 194 194 194 195 199 201 202 203 204 206 209 209 211 213 216-274 216 21 218 219 223 225 227 228 230 232 233 235 243 243 249 254 261 vi 6.3 Conclusions 13 CHAPTER-7: THE URBAN-RURAL DIVISION ELECTORAL POLITICS. 7.1. Introduction 7.2 Urban-Rural division in Historical Perspective 7.3 The Jagirdars vs the Bureaucrats 1947-1958 7.4 The Ayub Era 1958-1969 7.5 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 1970-1977 7.6 General Zia-ul-Haq 1977-1988 7.7 The Urban Rural Divide in Electoral Politics 7.8 Analysis of Constituency Results in Urban Rural NWFP 7.9 Conclusions CHAPTER-8: SOCIOLGICAL DETERMINANTS ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP. 8. Introduction 8.1 Gender 8.2 Women in electoral politics of NWFP 8.3 Gender differences in voting behaviour 8.4 Rigging in Female Polling Stations 8.5 Conservatism of Female voters 8.6 PML (N) Election Campaigns 8.7 Other gender related findings 8.7.1 Impacts of Candidate’s Gender on Voting 8.7.2 Gender differences in support for religious parties 8.7.3 Female voter education 8.8 Class 8.9 Postal Ballots 8.10 Islamabad Results 8.11 Age 8.12 Literacy and levels of education 8.13 Minorities in electoral politics of NWFP 8.14: Religious Determinants. 8.15 Sectarianism 8.16 Maulvis, Pirs, and Sajjada Nashins 8.17 Factionalism 8.18 Biradari 8.19 Conclusions CHAPTER-9: POLITICAL DETERMINANTS ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP. 9. Introduction 9.1 Party leader identification in NWFP. 9.2 Voting for delivery 9.4 Democratization of patronage politics 9.5 Patronage and legislature 9.6 Commercialization of politics 9.7 Political instability 9.8 National/provincial issue orientation 9.9 Conclusions CONCLUSIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX-1: QUESTIONARE 268 OF 275-297 275 275 277 278 280 284 284 293 295 OF 298-332 14 15 298 298 300 303 304 305 305 305 306 307 308 310 311 313 315 316 318 319 320 321 323 328 OF 333-349 333 333 336 339 341 342 343 344 347 350-354 355-365 366-372 16 17 18 vii LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS CHAPTER-1 Figure 1: Diagram-I: Diagram-II: CHAPTER-2 Map 2.1: Table 2.1: Table 2.3: Table 2.5: Table 2.6: Table 2.7: Table 2.8: Table 2.11: Table 2.12: Table 2.14: Table 2.16: Table 2.17: Table 2.18: Table 2.21: Table 2.22. Table 2.24: Table 2.26: How an Election Result is Determined. Paradigm for the study of electoral Behaviour. Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour. Map of NWFP. Election Results by NWFP Regions. Voting Detail Socio economic comparison of four NWFP regions. Participation rate of economically active population (Central NWFP) Results Showing Close electoral competition less than 5000 votes and greater than1001 and more close contest i.e less than 1000 votes (Both NA and PA): Voting Detail Central NWFP Election Result Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (Northern NWFP). Northern NWFP Election Result Voting detail Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1998 (Southern NWFP) Southern NWFP Election Result Voting Detail Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (North-Eastern NWFP). North-eastern NWFP Election Result Voting Detail Results of the 1937 Elections in the NWFP. 1937 elections in the NWFP. Distribution of the Muslim Rural seats by districts: Results of the elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946 Distribution of Muslim Rural seats by districts in the Legislative Assembly elections in the NWFP 1946: Results of 1946 Elections The detailed picture of referendum is shown in following table: Table showing the turn out in seven Constituencies of Hazara. Comparison between 1946 elections and the 1947 Referendum. Table showing the turn out in the Muslim Rural constituencies of Peshawar and Mardan Districts. Comparison between 1946 elections and the 1947 Referendum Table showing the detail of Elections in NWFP, 1947-1997 Distribution of Urban and Rural Population. Urban and Rural localities: Age and Marriage Status, by Gender (Questions Q2, 3, 1) Employment Status, by Gender (Q10) Occupation Classification, by Gender and Urban/Rural Classification Average Household Size and Housing Tenure, by regions of NWFP: Owner of Respondents' Home (Q7) Percent Population per Household Income Category, in Rural and Urban Areas: Educational Attainment, by Gender and Urban-Rural Classification Language Distribution. Distribution of Mother Tongue Speakers Across four regions of NWFP: Percent Respondents Speaking Mother Tongue in regions. Single-Language Literacy, by regions and Urban-Rural Classification Urdu, English, and Mother Tongue Literacy; by Mother Tongue, Urban/Rural Classification, Gender, and Regions wise. Urdu Speakers, by Mother Tongue and Province Self-Reported Political Interest, by regions (figures in %) Political Interest Index by Age, regions, Income, and Educational Attainment CHAPTER-3 Table 3.1: Table 3.2: Table 3.3: Table 3.4: Table 3.5 Table 3.6: Table 3.7: Table 3.8: Table 3.9: CHAPTER-4 Table 4.1.1 a: Table 4.1.1 b: Table 4.2.1a: Table 4.2.1b: Table 4.2.1 c: Table 4.2.1d: Table 4.2.1e: Table: 4.2.2a Table 4.2.2 b: Table 4.2.2 c: Table 4.2.2d: Table 4.2.2e: Table 4.2.2f: Table 4.3.1 a: Table 4.3.1b: viii Table 4.3.2a: Table 4.3.2b: Table 4.3.2 c: Table 4.3.3a: Table 4.3.4a: Table 4.3.4b: Table 4.3.4 c: Table 4.3.4 d: Table 4.4.1a: Table 4.4.1b: Table 4.4.1c: Table 4.4.1d: Table 4.4.2 a: Table 4.4.2 b: Frequency of Media Use. Use of Television and Radio, by Occupational Classification Use of Television and Radio, by Language Groups Sources of Political Information Volunteered by Respondents, by Demographic Groups Preferred Modes of Election Information: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Regions and Milieu. Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Level of Political Interest (Index) Preference for Posters/Illustrations as a Preferred Mode of Receiving Election Information, by Class, Education, and Urban/Rural Milieu Awareness of Time Period for 2007/2008 Election Awareness of Registration Location. Perception of voters. Index of Election Awareness: Number of Policies of Which Respondent is Aware. Respondent Exposure to National Door-to-Door Registration Process by Demographic Category: Likelihood of Registering Outside of Home if Travel Required, by Respondent Distance to Election Registration Office / District Returning Officer Likelihood of Registering if Travel to EC Required Possession of Different Forms of Identification (Q48) Possession of NIC (Q48) Importance of Lack of Identification at Polling Station as Reason for Non-Voting, by Class and Education. Attribution of Election (Un)Fairness to National versus Local Government, by Age, Educational Attainment, and Province Perception about the Fairness of upcoming elections as Compared with Past Elections: Trust in Election Commission of Pakistan, by Milieu, Class, and Gender Confidence that Eligible Voters in Community Will Be Registered, by Regions and Gender: Confidence in the Accuracy of the Electoral List in Your Community. Trust in National and Provincial Assembly, by Milieu, Class, and Gender. Likelihood of Recommending MNA or MPA to Resolve Local Problems, by Gender and Educational Attainment. Perceived Power of the Provincial Assembly, by Province Trust on Police: Likelihood of Recommending Local Government to Solve a Problem, by Age, Regional Milieu, Class, and Educational Attainment Likelihood of Recommending Religious Leaders to Solve a Problem, Class and Educational Attainment. Likelihood of Recommending “Feudal Leaders” to Solve a Problem. Likelihood of Recommending Biradari Leaders to Solve a Problem. Corruption in Political Parties (Q53e) Importance of Perceived Election Fairness in Decision to Abstain in One or More Elections, by Educational Attainment. Statements that Best Describes Responsibility for Rigging Elections, by Province. Importance of Fear of Violence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting, by Province Importance of Fear of Religious Leaders' Influence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting, by Province. Importance of Being Convinced by Family Members in Decision to Vote: Importance of Fear of Danger in Motivation for Voting. Most Likely Targets / Victims of Electoral Intimidation and Violence Pakistan's Citizens have Power to Influence Government. Most Important Factors Essential for Democracy Essential Features of Democracy (Response Types) Past Electoral Participation (Number of Elections in Which Respondent has Voted) Voting out of a sense of duty, by demographic subgroup Table 4.4.2 c: Table 4.4.2 d: Table 4.4.3 a: Table 4.4.4a: Table 4.4.4 b: Table 4.4.4c: Table 4.4.4d: Table 4.4.4e: Table 4.5.1 a: Table 4.5.1b: Table 4.5.1c: Table 4.5.4: Table 5.6: Table 4.5.8a: Table 4.5.8b: Table 4.5.8C: Table 4.6.1: Table 4.6.2: Table 4.6.3a: Table 4.6.4a: Table 4.6.4b: Table 4.6.4c: Table 4.6.4d: Table 4.6.5: Table 4.7.2: Table 4.7.3a: Table 4.7.3b: Table 4.8.1a: Table 4.8.2a: ix Table 4.8.2b: Table 4.8.5: Difference respondent's vote will make in 2008, by demographic subgroup: Participation in 2002 and 2005 Elections, by Political Interest CHAPTER-5 Table 5.1: Table 5.2: Table 5.3: Table 5.4: Table 5.5: Table 5.6: Table 5.7: Table 5.8: Table 5.9: Table 5.10: Table 5.11: Table 5.12: Table 5.13: Table 5.14: Table 5.15: Gender Balance during 1988-1997 elections: Breakup of population in urban and rural areas of NWFP: Literacy Ratio (10 years and above) by Sex, Rural/Urban areas. Party Position in Peshawar Registered Votes and Votes Polled in NWFP Provincial Assembly Party’s position in National Assembly from Peshawar: Number of polling stations in Peshawar. Peshawar City1988-1997 NA Election Results by electoral/polling areas Categories. Peshawar Constituency Results: PPP electoral result in Peshawar. ANP vote position in NA-1. Votes cast infavour of each party: NA-1 Election Results by Gender and Class Results of ANP: Comparison of Provincial Assembly and National Assembly Election Results: Voting percentage of political parties in NWFP. ANP electoral situation during 1988-1997 Party politics in central NWFP (National Assembly) Party politics in central NWFP (Provincial Assembly) Party position in Peshawar (National Assembly) Party position in Mardan Party position in Charsada Party’s position during 1988-1997 in Nowshera Party’s position during 1988-1997 National Assembly results from Hazara during 1988-1997 Provincial assembly results from Hazara during 1988-1997 Party’s position in Abbottabad during 1988-1997 Party’s position in Mansehra during 1988-1997 Party’s position in Battagram during 1988-1997 Party’s position in Kohistan District Party’s Position in Haripur district during 1988-1997 National Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFP Provincial Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFP Party’s Position in Swat District Party’s Position in Upper Dir District Party’s Position in Lower Dir District Party’s Position in Chitral District Party position in Shangla District Party’s Position in Malakand: Party’s Position in Buner 1988-1997 Party position on National Assembly seats from Southern NWFP Party’s position on Provincial Assembly seats from Southern NWFP Position in Kohat: Party position in Bannu District during 1988-1999 Party’s Position in DI. Khan Party’s Position in Tank Party’s Position in Hangu Party’s Position in Karak Urban and rural population in NWFP. Showing the Name and party affiliation of winning candidates (National Assembly) in 1970 elections. Name and party affiliation of winning candidates (Provincial Assembly) in 1970 elections PPP/PDA Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results of National Assembly Seats IJI/PML-N Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats CHAPTER-6 Table 6.1: Table 6.2: Table 6.3: Table 6.4: Table 6.5: Table 6.6: Table 6.7: Table 6.8: Table 6.9: Table 6.10: Table 6.11: Table 6.12: Table 6.13: Table 6.14: Table 6.15: Table 6.16: Table 6.17: Table 6.18: Table 6.19: Table 6.20: Table 6.21: Table 6.22: Table 6.23: Table 6.24: Table 6.25: Table 6.26: Table 6.27: Table 6.28: Table 6.29: Table 6.30: Table 6.31: Table 6.32: Table 6.33: CHAPTER-7 Table 7.1: Table 7.2: Table 7.3: Table 7.4: Table 7.5: x Table 7.6: Table 7.7: ANP Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats Table Showing JUI-F/Religious Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats Summary of 1993 Urban and Rural Results by Gender Large City Election Results (NA) by Gender Detail of female candidates for NWFP Provincial Assembly Detail of female candidates for National Assembly in NWFP: Detail of rigging at Female Polling stations Increase in registered voters in NWFP 1990 and 1993. Status of religious parties from NWFP in National Assembly Lower and Middle/Upper Class Neighbourhood Voting Patterns (Provincial Assembly) in NWFP cities. Detail of NWFP 1997 Postal Ballot Results Exit Poll Survey Result-Effect of Age, Literacy, and Education on Voting Behaviour. Detailed results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP: seat reserved for Sikh, Budhist, Parsi and Non- Muslim communities (1 Seat) Detailed results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP seat reserved for persons belonging to the Quadianis group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis) (1 seat) Political parties contested provincial assembly elections in urban NWFP. Detail of National Assembly elections in urban NWFP. Status of independent candidates for Provincial Assembly (NWFP). Status of independent candidates for National Assembly (NWFP). Status of religious parties for NWFP Provincial Assembly elections. Status of religious parties for NWFP National Assembly elections. Voters perception about the candidate to whom they vote. CHAPTER-8 Table 8.1: Table 8.2: Table 8.3: Table 8.4: Table 8.5: Table 8.6: Table 8.7: Table 8.8: Table 8.9: Table 8.10: Table 8.11: Table 8.12: CHAPTER-9 Table 9.1: Table 9.2: Table 9.3: Table 9.4: Table 9.5: Table 9.6: Table 9.7: xi LIST OF ACRONYMS AICC AIML AINC ANP ARD COAS COP CSP FAFEN F.R. All India Congress Committee All India Muslim League All India National Congress Awami National Party Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy Chief of Army Staff Combine Opposition parties Civil Service of Pakistan Free and Fair Election Network (Chief Secretary’s) Fortnightly Reports. FR 1 Jan. means ‘Fortnightly Report for the first half of January”, FR II Jan. ‘for the second half”, etc. Frontier Province Congress Committee Home Political India office Library and records Islami Jamhoori Ittehad Islami Jamhoori Mahaz Inter Service Intelligence Agency Jmaat-i-Islami Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group) Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan Khan Bahadur (honorific title awarded the Muslims by the government) Khan sahib (honorific title awarded the Muslims by the government) Khaksar Tehrik Legislative Assembly debates Legal Framework order Member of the Legislative Assembly Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal National Awami Party National Democratic Institute National Archives of India National Awami Party North West Frontier Province Provincial Administered Tribal Area Pakistan Democratic Alliance Pakistan Democratic Part Pakistan Islamic Front Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency Pushtunkhwa Milli Awami Party Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo faction) Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) Pakistan People Party Quaid-i-Azam Papers Rais Sahib (honorific title awarded to the Sikhs or Hindus by the British government) Supreme Court Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan Tehriq Istiqlal Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqa Jafiriah Tehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi FPCC Hoe Poll. IOL IJI IJM ISI JI JUI JUI (F) JUP K.B K.S. KT LAD LFO MLA MMA NAP NDI NAI NAP NWFP PATA PDA PDP PIF PILDAT PKMAP PML (N) PML(J) PML(Q) PPP QAP R.S S.C SSP TI TNFJ TNSM xii GLOSSARY: This is a selected list of those important terms which appear more than once or twice in the text. Other Pashtu and urdu word are defined in parentheses within the text. Akhund, Hazrat, Sufi, Faqir Title denoting distinction with in the Sufi tradition Akhuwwat Strength Alim Muslim religious scholar (pl. “Ulema) Amir Ruler within the Muslim tradition Amir-Badshah Ruler with temporal and religious authority Anjuman Association, society Astanadar Individual with inherited spiritual status Azad Free, independent Baiat Vow of spiritual allegiance given by a murid to his pir Baradari Social groupings based on kinship Baraka Spiritual power of a holly man Buzurg, Buzurgan Eder; pl., elders Crore 10,000,000 (unit of measurement) Dak Mail Darasgahs Schools Dargah Sufi shrine Darul harb Place of war or persecution Dashatgardi Terrorism Dasturbandi Coronation (lit. turban tying) Durbari Derived from the word durbar, a ceremonial reception by senior officials to honour prominent Indians. A durbari was a person who was entitled to participate in a durbar. Fatwa Formal religious-judicial decree Firenghi Foreigner, Englishman Ghairat Honour Gundi Pakhtun faction Hamsaya lit.: one who share shade; client, dependent Hartal Strike Hijrat Religiously motivated emigration from a non-Muslim country to a Muslim one. Holy man. Pious Person Hujra An area for entertaining guests Hukumat Government Inam Cash grant bestowed by the government Inamdar Person enjoying an inam. Inqilab Revolution Islah Reform Ittihad Union Jagir Land or cash grant from the government Jagirdar One who holds a jagir Jahuri, jamhuriat Democratic, democracy Jamaat Gathering Jihad Struggle for the faith, war against non Muslims Jirga Pakhtun tribal council; party Kacha non-metallic Kafir Heretic, non-believer Kamin Landless menial laborer Kandi Village ward Khan Chief, landlord Khandaan Family, used also for ‘tribe’ or ‘clan’ Khel Iineage; clan or small subdivision of a tribe xiii Kilafat Adj., “-movement”, political movement among the Indian Muslims in the 1920s to protect the khalifah, the sultan of Turkey. Peasant Village revenue official Tribal war party Bamaoo cane used by the police Muslim seminary Gathering of notables Tribal leader Tribal council, tribal meeting Mosque Religious leader with formal training Religious leader with formal training Religious refugee Warrior for the faith Religious disciple, Follower of a ‘saint’, e.g., a pir Honor (Lit.: deputy, governor); honorific title bestowed by the British Government; may be held for life or hereditarily Son of a Nawab Metallic Shortened form of Pakhtunwali. Pakhtun’s system of values Factionalism Hereditary “saint” Seclusion of women Nation, used also for tribe The great leader, title given to Jinnah Volunteer one Hereditary religious leader; successor to leadership of a ziarat and order of sufi devotees General, commander Commander in Chief Gandhian non-violent civil disobedience movement Descendent of the prophet Islamic Law Administrative unit in a district Traditionally, the area inhabited by a major Pakhtun clan; under the British, an administrative division of a tehsil. (Lit.: first cousin); enemy among one’s close patrilineal cousins Rivalry between patrilineal cousins Largest administrative subdivision within a district Plural of alim Death anniversary of a holly man Periodic redistribution of land landowner, landlord Women’s quarters; used to refer to something associated with women Tomb of a holly man Kisan Lambardar Lashkar Lathi Madrasah Majlis –e- Shura Malik Marakka Masjid Maulana Maulvi Muhajarin Mujahid Murid Nang Nawab Nawabzada Paka Pakhto Pakhtunwali Parajamba Pir Purdah Qaum Quaid-e-Azam Razakar Sajjada nishin Salar Salar-i-azam Satyagraha Sayyid Shariat Tahsil Tappa Tarbur Tarburwali Tehsil Ulema Urs Wesh Zamindar Zanana Ziarat xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It was Prof. Pervez Iqbal Cheema from the Department of International Relations, Quaid-eAzam University Islamabad, who encouraged me towards the study of electoral politics in NWFP. Today, drawing breath and looking back in the years I have devoted to this study, I am grateful to him for that. In my own Institute, my supervisor Dr. Naureen Talha, I wish to thank her for all the trouble she has taken over my work, for the encouragement she has given me and for helping me to find means to complete my Ph.D research work. Dr. Lubna Saif and Dr. Badshah Sardar have read the thesis in manuscript and subjected it to their constructive criticism. Thanks to Dr. Waqar Ali Shah from Heidelberg University Germany, whose knowledge on NWFP politics and history has been of great value. I am grateful to Higher Education Commission of Pakistan for their funding at the University of Southampton UK to finalise this research work. I am thankful to Prof. Ian Talbot in the Department of History, University of Southampton. Thanks to Prof. Iftikhar H. Malik from Bath UK, Prof. Younas Samad, Ayesha Jalal, Katherine Adeney and Lawrence Seaz for their valuable comments and support during this research work. I regard my time in UK the most fulfilling. I thanks to all the friends in UK specially Umar Khitab, Sadaqat, Sohail, Rida, Claire Woolgar, Shaje, Waqar, Salman Bangash, Basharat and Pakistani community in UK. Only people who have been to the NWFP can understand how many people I became indebted to. Here I shall only mention Mohammad Jawad, Dr. Bakht Rawan, Prof.Qasim Khan Marwat, Prof. Riaz Hussain and Prof. Mustafa Khan who always gave me whatever help I needed and, even more important to a warmth of a family atmosphere. All the others, who showed hospitality and shared their time with me, I must thank collectively. I have in the course of my work incurred debts of gratitude to the staff of several archives and libraries. I must thank the staff of the India Office Library and Records and British Library London to whom I have always been happy to return. In Pakistan I am indebted to the staff of NIPS, PIDE, National Library of Pakistan, Allama Iqbal Open University, Press Information Department Islamabad and library Provincial Archives Peshawar. I must thank the microfilming staff of the National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad. My thanks are also due to my friends, Mr. Himayat Ullah Khan, Altafullah Khan, Dr. Nasim Ahmad, AR. Bodla, Hassan, Fazal-i-Rabbi and Fasiullah who strongly encourage me during this research work. I am particularly thankful to the staff of election commission of Pakistan in Islamabad and Peshawar, specially Secretary Election Commission, Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan and Section Officer Fiaz Ahmad. Thanks to my friends Marium Kiani (Daily Dawn) and Mr. Karim Ahmad (Radio Pakistan) who have gone through my manuscript and made linguistic improvements. Finally, I had in the course of my work made some friends. Rahimullah Yousaf Zai, correspondent BBC Peshawar. His knowledge of Frontier affairs is unrivalled and on, account of his fairness, he is respected in all camps. Shakerullah, Bilal, and Habib-un-Nabi Producers Radio Pakistan Peshawar, with whom I have shared many adventurous and innumerable thoughts since I first met him in Peshawar. Thanks to the high officials of Radio Pakistan including Mujtaba Aamer, Abdul Hafeez, Aftab Mehmood, Rais Saleem, Sajid Durrani and Sarfaraz Khan who gave me opportunity to visit the different places in NWFP for field survey. Many thanks to the respondents of the survey whose responses make this research work possible. Many thanks to my colleagues in Allama Iqbal Open University including Dr. Aman Memon, Dr. Ilyas and Dr. Rasheed A. Naeem, for their encouragement during this research work. Thanks to my family, relatives and friends whose love, confidence and support has given me the strength to finalize this thesis. I must express my deep love to my daughter, Manahil whose loving pranks helped me to finalize this research work in her own way. I must thank my wife Saiqa Jabeen Shouket (Chanda), who would be more pleased than anyone else on the successful completion of this work. xv Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad ABSTRACT The main objective of this study is therefore to provide one of the detailed analysis of electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. This study challenges the common perception in NWFP that voting decisions are largely determined by social factors such as traditional ‘feudal’ relationship, and ties of family, faction, clan, or tribe. It argues, that political determinant of voting behaviour, such as party and party leader’s loyalty in urban areas and patronage orientation in rural areas, are more important than social determinants of voting behaviour. The scope of study is limited to NWFP. It focuses on the results of National Assembly and Provincial Assembly from 19881997 (Elections 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997). This study is based on both published and unpublished sources as well as on information collected in interviews with politicians and political observers. Perhaps the most original contribution of this work is extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis of electoral data, particularly polling stations returns. The focus of this study is to enquire about the events and circumstances that lead to the determination of the voting behavior, practical participation and involvement of masses in the electoral process; and to analyse different factors which have affected electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. This thesis is the answer of main research question i.e to what extent electoral politics affect voting behaviour of people in NWFP? In other words who is voting for whom and why? What are the determinants of voting behaviour and electoral politics? The research works starts from two assumptions/hypothesis. First, it has been assumed that social factors were the dominant determinants that effect voting behavior and second is political determinants that predominantly effect voting behavior in NWFP. To answer the basic research questions and assumptions electoral models including sociological model often identified as School of Columbia, the psychosocial model also identified as School of Michigan, and rational choice theory, also referred to as a model of economic voting, or even as School of Rochester, were utilized in this research work. The period under study have unique significance, as the rules of electoral systems were same, restoration of democracy and repeated elections. During this period there were four national and provincial elections were held. They provide considerable scope for an analysis of electoral politics. xvi INTRODUCTION In this study an attempt has been made to determine electoral politics and voting trends in NWFP during the period 1998-99. The literature on electoral behaviour reviewed in thesis indicates that there is difference of opinions among scholarly community and have little consensus on what determines voting behaviour in NWFP. Some scholars have emphasised the importance of a groups, while others have maintained the role of the individuals. Some have argued that the decisive factor is kinship, while others have asserted that it is a class. Some have highlighted the role of socio economic changes while others have stressed the role of local power structure. These different interpretations underscore the complexity of the problem and compelled the researcher to select this topic for research. This study has a multidimensional approach towards analysing the determinants of electoral politics and voting behaviour in the NWFP. The main objective of this study is therefore to provide one of the few detailed analysis of electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. This study challenges the common perception in NWFP that voting decisions are largely determined by social factors such as traditional ‘feudal’ relationship, and ties of family, faction, clan, or tribe. It argues instead, that political determinant of voting behaviour, such as party (and party leader) loyalty in urban areas and patronage orientation in rural areas, are more important than social determinants of voting behaviour. The scope of study is limited to NWFP. It focuses on the results of National Assembly and Provincial Assembly from 1988-1997 (Elections 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997). This study is based on both published and unpublished sources as well as on information collected in interviews with politicians and political observers. Perhaps the most original contribution of this work is extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis of electoral data, particularly polling stations returns. It is important to understand electoral politics in the NWFP because of the region’s unique strategic importance, cultural characteristics and colonial political and economic heritage of the region1. Since the creation of NWFP as Governor’s Province in 1932, the people of NWFP were allowed to choose their representatives under 1935 Indian Act through election. First elections were held in 1937 in NWFP after the promulgation of 1935 Act. Before discussing Electoral Politics in detail first the researcher would like to elaborate the introduction of NWFP. NWFP is the North Western Province of Pakistan. It is located on both banks of the river Indus and stretches from the Himalayas in the north to the deserts in the south where its borders touch with Baluchistan and Punjab Provinces. On its west, is Afghanistan, which is accessible via the Khyber. On its north, the Northern areas and northeast lies Kashmir. The capital of the province is Peshawar. It covers an area of 74,521 Sq. xvii Km. according to 1998 census, the total population of NWFP was approximately 14 million out of whom 52% are male and 48 % are female. The density of population is 187 per sq. km. North West Frontier Province, runs for over 1100 Km (680 miles) along the border with Afghanistan. The valley of Peshawar, fertile and well watered by Kabul and Swat rivers, is its heart. The northern half of the province consist of five rivers valleys running roughly parallel, north to south: the Chitral, Dir, Swat, Indus and Kaghan. These valleys are on the northern edge of the monsoon belt, so are fairly green and partly wooded in their southern sections. Northern Chitral and the upper regions of the Indus valley are mountainous deserts, where cultivation depends entirely on irrigation. The NWFP south of Peshawar is below the monsoon belt and consists of low, Rocky Mountains and wide, gravely plains. Nearly one third of the population of NWFP is non-Pakhtun. In the border area of Hazara and DI. Khan, social norms are present which more closely resemble those in Punjab and Kashmir. Clan groups remain important, but mainly as social networks, particularly for marriages. Chitral has a separate language and culture of its own. This cultural difference also affected voting trends in NWFP. ANP is considered to be the Party of Pakhtun , so nonpukhtuns areas in this province voted in favour of national/religious parties or independent candidates. Around 68% of the households in NWFP are Pashto speaking, 18% are Hindko speaking while Saraiki is the mother tongue of 4%. Around 8% of households speak local languages, such as Kohwar in Chitral district, while Urdu and Punjabi speaking migrants accounts for only 2% of the households. With the exception of Sindh, Islam came to NWFP earlier than to any other part of South Asia. In NWFP, central districts, like Mardan, Swabi, Charsada, Peshawar and Nowshera were the stronghold of the ANP. In southern districts like Kohat, Hangu, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Karak and DI Khan, there were mixed religio-political situation during the period under study. Hazara region, comprising Haripur Hazara, Abbottabad, Mansehra, Battagram and Kohistan had their political affiliation with PML-N in 1990s. Northern NWFP including Dir, Malakand, Swat, Buner, Shangla, and Chitral had mixed political affiliation with PML-N and PPP. Ethnically not all of them come from a Pukhtun dominated or Pushto speaking area but have also a distinct different tinge and tone of culture, language or dialect of their own. Bannuwals call their lingua franca Bannussi (Bannusay) and not Pushto. Kohistani ‘Pushto’ is again not easily comprehensible by many. Apart from these variations Hindku is the second largest language of the province. On the basis of ethnic politics of ruling political party ANP in NWFP and its alliance with PPP at Federal level, the NWFP was renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under eighteenth constitutional amendment on 15 April 2010.2 The name of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was NWFP during the period under study, so NWFP will remain with same nomenclature in this study. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY xviii Electoral politics is based on electoral system and voting behaviour. Different governments in Pakistan have taken steps to establish and improve sound voting system and electoral process to improve the participation of the people in the decision making process. This study has the following hypothesis, aims and objectives. 1. To enquire about the events and circumstances that lead to the determination of the voting behaviour. 2. To find out the degree of practical participation and involvement of masses in the electoral process; 3. Different factors which have affected electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. MAIN/SUPPORTING RESEARCH QUESTION Main research question is to what extent electoral politics effect voting behaviour of people in NWFP? In other words who is voting for whom and why? ASSUMPTIONS/HYPOTHESIS: Two assumptions has been conceived for this study, one is about political determinants i.e political determinants were the dominant and key factor that affected electoral politics and voting behavior in NWFP during 1988-1999-(People voted on the bases of Political Determinants during 1990s) and second is about social determinants, i.e. social determinants were the dominant and key factor that affected electoral politics and voting behavior during the period under study - (People voted on the bases of Social Determinants during the period under study) MODELS AND THEORIES USED: The following models and theories are used: Different well known models and theories are used to prove this thesis. These models include sociological model often identified as School of Columbia, with the main reference in Applied Bureau of Social Research of Columbia University, whose work begins with the publication of the book The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944) and focuses on the influences of social factors. In Columbia School voters are understood to be like consumers and ads make a difference in their decisions. Its consumer hypothesis was proven false in NWFP electoral politics. People still voted for the candidate they supported early on. What was found instead was that voters would vote for a candidate that looked like them and shared things like religion, social-economic status, and ethnicity. The psychosocial model also identified as School of Michigan, which has its major reference in the work of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) —The American Voter — and assumes that party identification is the main factor behind the behavior of voters. The Michigan Model is a party identification model. People vote because they feel a belonging to a certain party. xix Rational choice theory, also referred to as a model of economic voting, or even as School of Rochester, whose landmark work is the work of Anthony Downs (1957) — An Economic Theory of Democracy — and that puts emphasis on variables such as rationality, choice, uncertainty and information. The Downs and Economic Model says that voters are rational utility maximizes who vote to gain the most happiness. The major problem with this model is that voters need much information for it to work. In Retrospective Model voters, vote on past and present aspects of the election. The popularity of the incumbent government is obviously important here. The question is the performance of the current government. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM The period 1988-1999 saw the restoration of democracy following the Zia Martial Law era. During this period there were four national/provincial elections were held. They provide considerable scope for an analysis of electoral politics. The focus is the province not on FATA or neighbouring PATA Tribal areas, also the focus is given on electoral determinant and voting behaviour. Given the legal, institutional and behavioural pattern operative in the country, what was the meaning of the Electoral Politics in Pakistan especially in NWFP? This study explores the meaning of elections and electoral politics for people, including voters as well as non voters, who experienced the electoral dynamics in various ways. The present research also explores the meaning of elections for various political parties in and outside the government. This research work will be helpful for the Election Commission officials, politicians, electoral personal, and NGO’s promoting political awareness in this area. Moreover this will be helpful in strengthening democracy in NWFP and will be a valuable literature. Other significant points are:       The thesis is able to make original findings because of its sources. The thesis utilizes a large number of interviews with politicians and activists. It also contains highly original analysis of polling station results in Peshawar. The thesis is able to provide a detailed and authoritative account of electoral politics which fills an important gape in the literature on party politics in Pakistan. Most published work focuses on the national level, or on Punjab. The thesis thus represents an important contribution to Pakistan’s political Science literature. Researcher always relied on such studies as Erland Janson’s (1981), India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: A Nationalist Movements in North West Frontier Province, 1937-1947, S.A Rittenberg’s Ethnicity, Nationalism and Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement on India’s North West Frontier Province (Durham: NC: Carolina Academy Press, 1988) and Waqar Ali Shah’s Muslim League in NWFP and Ethnicity, Islam and Muslim Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North West Frontier Province, 1937-1947 for the xx discussion of the dynamics of electoral politics in NWFP. This is new study because it covers more recent period. WHAT HAVE I DONE?  Analysis of Polling Station’s/constituencies results.  Analysis of Survey of respondents on electoral politics.  Theoretical analysis of electoral politics.  Zonal wise analysis of electoral politics in NWFP.  Urban Rural Trends of Electoral politics.  Party Politics and electoral trends in NWFP.  Analysis of Social and Political trends in electoral politics.  Case Study of Peshawar  The thesis is well grounded study of voting behavior and its determinants in NWFP.    The reader is made aware of urban-rural and gender dimensions and there is highly impressive use of case study material. The thesis utilizes both quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to analyse voting trends and electoral politics. It provides new data and argument for a relatively unstudied subject.  The different regional characteristics of voting behavior in NWFP come across very well.  This thesis offer a useful list of acronyms, a glossary, a description of study, a good review of literature and a description of research methodology. WHY HAVE I DONE?  Study of Electoral politics is a new approach to fill the scholarly gap in party politics and other political science literature in Pakistan. To fill this gape I have done it.  I have done it for the promotion of further research in this field. HOW DID I DO IT?      Both Qualitative and Quantitative approaches are used. I have used both primary and secondary sources for this research. I have visited various libraries to consult primary and secondary sources. I have visited various parts of NWFP now KPK for field survey and interviews. During the course of field research eighty formal interviews out of 640 were conducted from politicians and political activists through Random Sampling. xxi  2270 responses were recorded from registered voters (approximately 6651974 at the time of 1997 elections) for survey to find the voting trends in NWFP through purposive and judgmental sampling.   The work is well referenced and contains a wealth of source material drawn from field work interviews and data analysis. There is also evidence of good engagement with the existing literature on electoral history in Pakistan and theories of voting behavior. WHAT HAVE I FOUND? The major finding is that Political determinants of voting behavior are more important than social determinants with party affiliation and access to patronage and development being key factors. X. IMPLICATIONS OF THESIS  This study will be helpful for further research on elections and electoral politics in Pakistan.  It will be helpful for ECP and other organization working for strengthening democracy PLAN TO DISSEMINATE THIS RESEARCH WORK:      I will publish this research work for wide audience to disseminate this research work. Publishing of research papers on the topic. Encourage other researchers to undertake research on the topic. Introduction of electoral studies at university level Electoral awareness programmes MAJOR CONTRIBUTION(S)  The major contribution of this study is the statistical analysis as statistic without analysis is nothing. Throughout the study I have listed important people involved in politics. This is very useful information and will be a gate way for further research.  This is the first ever research based study on electoral politics of NWFP and it will be base line study for future researcher. REVIEW OF LITERATURE Many scholars from Pakistan have taken up research on elections and electoral politics. Most of these studies were published in academic journals. The NWFP does not feature heavily in these studies. There are few official or non official institutions specifically reserved for the study of election trends, analysis of constituencies and collection of data in general. The xxii available academic research on elections is generally related to the performance of political parties and alliances, the nature of the campaign and other macro-level electoral currents. Few systematic studies of voting trends at the micro-level are available. Lack of institutional funding, absence of academic interest in field research in terms of house-to-house investigation and the lack of a tradition of teamwork are some of the factors responsible for the dearth of scholarly research on elections at NWFP. Kamran Bashir3 focused on purely 1970 elections and electoral data related to NWFP. This work is related to socio-economic a feature of different constituencies in NWFP during 1970 elections and it is little bit associated with the historical analysis of the main argument, “at what extent electoral politics effect electoral behavior in NWFP during 1990s”. Sociological or political determinants are not focused which is the core assumptions of this study. Imdad Ali Khan4, has analysed the non-party system of elections of 1985. The study has tried to find out viewpoints of the then NWFP; Assembly members regarding local councils and aspirations of voters towards participation in decision making and implementation of development schemes. Imdad’s work is based on the interviews of the Assembly members and not the voters. Imdad’s work reflects little bit reflections on sociological and political determinants in the interviews of assembly members. Mohammad Waseem5 focused on theoretical aspects of elections in Pakistan during 1993 and 2002. This is the only scholarly work on the elections in Pakistan in which theoretical framework is established for the study of elections. However this work is focused on national level and not related to NWFP which is the main area of research of this thesis. David Washbrook6, Ayesha Jalal,7, and Mohammad Waseem8, have also focused on historical background of electoral politics and its relations with colonialism. Waseem shows how the colonial legacy of bureaucratic rule has enabled powerful civil-military bureaucracy to maintain its hold on power in post independence Pakistan. Andrew R-Wilder9 has the opinion that the first electoral studies in South Asia focused on the social determinants of voting behaviour. Later studies began to include political determination such as party identification and issue orientation. The limited amount of electoral research conducted in Pakistan has meant that neither social nor political determinates of voting behaviour have been systematically analysed. Andrew R. Wilder work focused on Punjab andhe also highlighted electoral history before partition which is to some extent related to historical analysis of the researcher’s core arguments. Inayatullah in his article “Perspective in Rural power structure in West Pakistan” argues that traditional social structures and group identities of family and biradari determine voting behavior. This arguments also supports the biradari politics in NWFP which is also an important social factor in the electoral politics of NWFP Hamza Alvi10, supports the views of Saghir Ahmed11. Both believe that the voting behaviour is determined more by class than traditional kinship. They argue that voters who are xxiii economically dependent on others will vote according to the dictates of those upon whom they are dependant, and only those who are economically independent are likely to vote along the lines of kinship or caste. Craig Baxter12 and Sharif-al-Mujahid13, and Mushtaq Ahmed14 provided useful overview of the background of elections, the contestants, the campaigns and the results. Iftikhar Ahmad’s15 focused on electoral contest, campaign issues and historical background. Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter’s, Pakistan in transition, is related to voting behaviour of the people with their socio economic conditions. Maleeha Lodhi16 has analysed the 1993 elections in terms of turnout, candidates, and importance of vote and voting. Ijaz Shafi Gillani’s17, work is based upon a scientific exit poll survey of voters during the 1985 elections. This survey was conducted nationwide and not focused on NWFP. Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad18, has examined in his unpublished M. Phil thesis, the functions of electoral models and state of electoral politics in Hazara region of NWFP. He argues, “electoral politics in Hazara region of NWFP is determined more by social factors. In addition to official, non official and scholarly publications on electoral politics in Pakistan, the press is a very important source of information about individual and organizational activities surrounding elections, such as alliance-building, tribal and factional feuds, sectarian conflict, patterns of seats adjustment and negative campaigning. English language Newspapers such as Daily Dawn, Daily The News, the Nation, the Frontier Post and the Daily Times published extensive reports on local patterns of leadership as well as the demographic composition of electoral constituencies in ethnic, tribal, sectarian and caste terms. While some articles presented a good analysis of trends in various localities, a majority of them simply contained descriptive accounts electoral politics. Also, the media showed a visible bias in favour of the high and mighty. While it focused on the noise and the multitude, as reflected through rallies and public meetings, these did not necessarily represent the real voting patterns. Some party leaders such as Qazi Hussain Ahmad of JI were able to project their message forcefully through the media, for example in 1993. It turned out to be totally disproportionate to their following in terms of voting. The Urdu press generally reflected a more detailed but, by the same account, more partisan and position-related analysis. While the Sindhi press is more developed in the vernacular press than Urdu, it has generally provided an ethno-nationalists perspective on electoral politics. Weeklies such as Takbir, Zindgi, and Friday Times and Monthlies such as Herald and Newsline provide an interesting background to political events ranging from in-depth study of specific groups and parties to sensational news about politicians and their alleged underhand deals. The foreign press, both English language and non-English, generally touches on widely predictable and macro-level activity, usually focusing on the leading personalities and their chances of going up or going down, or only going down but not out. One can perhaps argue that most of the print media’s coverage of elections lacks analytical content in order to merit xxiv the status of a serious election study. The dearth of writings on elections reflects not only a low level of response from the academic community but also the problematic nature of the political contest itself in terms of controversies surrounding the constitutional framework, party profiles, means of communication and the government’s commitment to hold free and fair elections. Electoral studies may be divided into three categories corresponding to the three ‘democratic’ periods in the history of Pakistan, viz. from 1947 to 1968 (minus the martial law years 1958-62), 1970 to 77 and 1985 to 1999. There is persistent scepticism in the existing academic literature about electoral politics during the pre-1970 election period relating to the legitimacy of polls. The period (1947-68) can be divided into two phases: the parliamentary phase (1947-58) when four provincial elections were held: in Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1951, in Sindh in 1953 and in East Bengal in 1954. No election was held at the National level during this period. The major issue in this phase was poll rigging, both at the local and provincial levels, even as constitutional debates continued about such issues as separate electorates for minorities, the role of Islam in the new state and a suitable form of government for Pakistan. The situation on the ground constantly deteriorated as electoral malpractices were rampant, and the public was wary of electoral democracy as it came into operation in Pakistan. The approach of the government in British India to the holding of fair elections has been essentially legalistic inasmuch as the mass exercise in polling was backed by a bureaucratic apparatus. The franchise was limited to a 15 percent of the population, which meant that the local bureaucracy could manage the electorate in well mannered way. After independence, the bureaucracy was formally bound to serve the new political bosses, who had high stakes in elections at the provincial and national levels. Similarly, the introduction of adult franchise suddenly opened up opportunities for political participation to a large number of people., who became pawns in the hands of local elites everywhere in the absence of issue-oriented political mobilization. All this led to an unabashed exercise in election rigging. The Leghari Report listed various malpractices: gerrymandering of constituencies, arresting of rival candidates, disallowing the filling of nomination papers by the rival candidates, using he revenue administration to put pressure on the latter, and even coming down to cattle stealing and disrupting the supply of water through the irrigation canals.19 K.B. Sayeed20 in his study focused on constitutional debates, especially the centre-province relations which has indirect connection with electoral politics at national level. Keith Callard21 concentrated on the analysis of relations between politicians and bureaucracy and it has also considerable historical relations with electoral politics. Binder22 studied Islam in terms of Muslim League heritage, ulema’s lobby, public demand and the ideological predispositions of the ruling elite. Binder study is also helpful for analyzing religio-political xxv trends in electoral politics. Mushtaq Ahmad traced the parallel growth of legislature, executive and other wings of the state in a somewhat formalistic approach to the institutional apparatuses of the new order.23 Richard L. Park looked at the 1954 elections and raised the alarm over what he considered a victory for communists and pro-communist elements.24 While elections in the parliamentary phase lacked legitimacy in an operational sense because of procedural malpractices, elections in the presidential phase from 1962 to 1969 suffered from a gap of legitimacy in a structural sense. Here, the focus was on the issue of disenfranchisement of the public. Indirect elections for president and the National Assembly in 1962 to 1965 missed out on general acceptance by the people. The issue of separate electorates to religious communities, which continued to be at the centre of constitutional debates, had been virtually shelved in the 1956 constitution. The 1962 elections were held on the basis of joint electorates. Mahfooz-ul-Haq’s book Electoral problems in Pakistan traced the debate over constitutional issues, especially separate electorates, from 1952 to 1962. Haq’s book reflects the prevalent approach to electoral democracy, which was essentially focused on legal and constitutional provisions for various aspects of elections rather than on a sociological analysis of the people’s political, social and cultural attitudes relating to their electoral choices.25 The second period of electoral politics in Pakistan’s history started with the 1970 elections. These elections came close to the model of ‘realignment elections’ in the US, inasmuch as a radical shift took place in the pattern of alignment between social forces.26 A consciousness emerged about public activity surrounding industrial and agricultural development, urbanization, horizontal and vertical mobility as well as the emergence of a vast number of the educated unemployed. The contributions of these developments to political change was visible through the works of Sharif-al Mujhaid, Iftikhar Ahmad, Craig Baxter, Maleeh Lodhi, Philip Jones and several other writers and researchers The long absence of general elections on the basis of adult franchise had kept the military-bureaucratic establishment, as well as politicians, in complete darkness about the respective following of various political parties. While they continued to dwell on the ideological basis of the state and concerned for national security in the context of the perceived Indian threat, large sections of the society had moved onto understanding the economic and political issues as the real basis for making electoral choices. The most popular mood of analysis for 1970 elections in Pakistan was couched in the modernization thesis. This model was based on an understanding of political change where electoral mobilization, itself drew upon a model of social change linked with economic development. The argument was that in the relatively developed districts of the Punjab, in both industrial and agricultural areas, the established social structure had been destabilised. Combined with high population density, improved contacts between towns and country side, and rapid process of urbanisation, this situation had led to political mobilization along radical xxvi lines.27 Burki and Baxter dwelt on this theme and added the dimensions of rate of growth as well as the level of development. They found the relatively fast developing ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ tehsils of Punjab to be voting predominantly for the PPP.28 Philip Jones’s research covered a wide scope incorporating social change and its political articulation in various districts of central and northern Punjab.29 The focus on social change in the context of modernisation was generally at the expense of analysing the organizational input in terms of elections strategies of the PPP and other political parties for mass mobilisation. One reason given was that the institutional level of these parties was very low.30 Similarly, the PPP leadership was divided between ‘ideological’ and ‘political’.31 At the top, Z.A. Bhutto exhibited the characteristic of ‘patrimonial authority’.32 In the overall atmosphere of the breakdown of traditional hierarchy and expanded social mobilisation, a whole new generation came-up and were elected into the assemblies. As Baxter noted, only ten out of seventy five former elected members of the National Assemblies (MNAs) in (W) Pakistan survived in the new house.33 The general concentration on social change and mobility along class lines not only ignored the role of party cadres in terms of organisational and ideological work but also took for granted the underlying legal and institutional framework of elections. There was no general debate on the prevalent election system based on the first- past-the post-system, especially as the country had only recently moved back from the indirect system of elections with restricted franchise to direct elections on the basis of one man one vote. Nor indeed was the pattern of delimitation of electoral constituencies generally taken up as determinates of the decline of the traditional elite over the electorate. For example those tehsils and districts, which served as electoral constituencies in their entirety, returns the members of the dominant families and thus insured continuation of their power. The situation prevailed largely in Sindh and Balochistan where 16 out of 27 and all four National Assembly seats respectively were based on the existing administrative boundaries. No big shake-up was experienced in these areas. On the other hand, only 13 out of 82 in Punjab and 4 out of 18 constituencies in NWFP were based on the regular administrative units. Here, electoral units cut across the traditional strongholds of tribal and laded elites, and indirectly facilitated the task of party cadres to infiltrate the area and mobilise people along radical lines.34 Research on the role of apportionment as indeed, on various related issues ranging from the nature of the election system to the roles of leadership, biradari, party organisation and multiple candidature remained relatively under developed. It focused on Islamic ideological mobilisation on the side of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), to the exclusion of such issues as redistribution of wealth, generation of employment opportunities and expansion of social infrastructure. Z.A. Bhutto focused on the defense of PPP government’s achievements during their tenure in government. As for as Bhutto’s decisions to go ahead with elections were concerned, Ziring’s study stressed his need to seek a fresh mandate to get rid of what Bhutto considered xxvii obstructionist elements in the party in the context of ‘centralization of powers’ in his own hands.35 Mujhaid’s article noted the way the landed elite managed to get the PPP tickets for election, the negative campaigning that marred the quality of election and finally electoral malpractices that robbed the elections of legitimacy.36 Weinbaum focused on the revival of ‘feudal’ influence and the emergence of a united alliance of opposition parties, as well as the distortion effects of the electoral system whereby the PPP got 108 out of 116 NA seats from Punjab (including Islamabad) i.e. 94.5% seats by winning only 61% of the vote.37 Palmer compared the two elections held in India and Pakistan in 1977. He broadly covered two themes: that these elections were expected to be routine and unexcited efforts to re-legitimize controlled regimes, and that these expectations were-because of the anti authoritarian ‘waves’ in the two countries against powerful leaders.38 While he was concerned about rigging in the elections, he stressed the need to go beyond this to explain the continuing popularity of PPP in Pakistan.39 One can argue that the perceived participatory function of 1970 elections, which had impressed many scholars and influenced their findings, was largely replaced by the legitimacy functions of elections in 1977 as the central theme of studies. There was long interregnum of Zia’s martial law years (1977-85). Political parties in general and the PPP in particular, were out of action for all this period. The latter’s cadres and workers were subject to severe repression at the hands of the Zia government. Some PPP stalwarts defected from the party after the execution of Z.A. Bhutto and chose to become members of Zia’s nominated Majlis-e-Shoora along with others from various factions of the PML and Islamic parties. A persistent focus on Islamisation over long years against the backdrop of the Afghan resistance movement against the communist regime in Kabul, in which Pakistan played an active role, provided a political context for the pervasive ideological idiom during the 1980s. As pointed out by Richter, the Zia government wanted to test the efficacy of the new political order which it had created, and now wanted to preserve, under the new democratic dispensation.40 It is interesting to see that, somewhat un-typically, the voter turnout in the rural areas was larger than in the urban areas during the 1985 elections. This was due to the reassertion of ‘feudal’ power, which was reflected in the tied vote blocs activated with the help of lower revenue officers.41 Secondly, the non party character of these elections brought in multiple candidates in each constituency, who divided votes amongst themselves, and thus brought down the winning majority of the victorious candidates. Some of the new MNAs and MPAs poll was low as 8.7 %, 6.8% and even 5.9% of the registered votes.42 Zia’s deviations from the constitution in terms of non party polls raised the issue of the relatively inconsequential victory of the election candidates whose representative character on the strength of a mere fraction of the electorate was questionable. This process of de‘institutionalising politics’ separated election promises from accountability.43 While several elections have followed the 1985 elections, such as in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997 and 2002, the xxviii political agenda is still not back in real sense, except of course as part of the polemical debates carried on during various election campaigns. The Junejo period (1985-1988) contributed two factors as emerging shape of the democratic dispensation: first, it created an almost new party out of the sitting members of the parliament under the old name of Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which comprised the winners of 1985 elections. Belonging to different ideological or policy positions, they only shared the fact that they carried local influence and willingness to go along with the ruling dispensation for whatever patronage it could bring irrespective of its lack of moral or constitutional legitimacy. Secondly, it set in motion a process of transformation of the anti Bhutto vote in a pro-ML vote, which came to fruition during the 1993 and 1997 elections. The SC gave its verdict in 1988 in favour of party based elections. That mobilised the establishment to recreate a PNA style anti PPP groupings of parties. The Muslim League formed a United Front Islamic Jamoori Itehad (IJI) with other parties against the PPP for election purpose. The ascendancy of Zia’s protégé Ghulam Ishaq to the post of President gave confidence to the establishment to face the PPP in the elections. It was here that Benazir Bhutto’s credentials were obviously strong. The PML tried to make a virtue out of what was otherwise an embarrassing legacy of Zia. The PML choose to stress the Islamic aspect of this legacy, especially against the back drop of Afghanistan’s resistant movement. The 1988 election was essentially about the past, in terms of regard of the two previous rulers, Bhutto and Zia. The PPP enjoyed a high moral position in the form of its vehement struggle for democracy, which had now borne fruit. Within Sindh the resurgence of the PPP was countered by a new development, which was yet to be understood in-terms of its impact on the future shape of events. This was the complete political division along ethnic lines between the generally urban based Muhajirs and the rural based Sindhis. Benazir Bhutto’s ascendancy to power came too soon for the Zia establishment, which was still in place. A series of misunderstandings and conflicts between the PM on the one hand and the President, who largely represented the old guard, on the other led to a show down on 6 august 1990 when the Bhutto government was sacked. Not surprisingly, the October elections of 1990 were marred by controversy surrounding Bhutto’s dismissal. Again, the political debate centered not on society but on the state, not on issues and polices but on the legitimacy of the President’s action against the PM, not on the future plans but on past elections. William Richter discussed the questionable nature of Ishaq’s action, the absence of neutrality of the caretaker setup, in the controversial nature of the NDI report of the international delegation of election observers, which had certified these elections as genuinely representative of the public opinion. Richter, endorsed the NDIs findings.44 He noted that the transfer of power had taken place without overt military intervention, but that the country had to go along way yet to graduate as a democracy free of electoral malpractices.45 Anwar H. Sayed discussed the 1988 and 1990 elections along similar lines. He xxix observed the absence of policy issues, the localization of politics, and the 1990 elections as being a referendum on the legitimacy of the Presidential action of removing Benazir Bhutto from office.46 He attributed this phenomenon to the IJIs election strategy of confronting. The PPP candidates with the consensus candidates of it own.47 Curiously, Richter noted a shift in the social base of politics away from the ‘feudal’ class.48 On the other hand, the general mood among articulate sections of the public continued to be against what was still perceived to be the complete domination of elections by ‘feudals’. The ascendancy of Nawaz Sharif, who was an industrialist, to the position of prime minister in 1990 and again in 1997, though symptomatic of the gradual opening up of the system to other elites, could not be considered representative of a definite trend in electoral politics. The 1990 election was marred by controversy about rigging. The PDA opposition published a comprehensive White Paper on the way the caretaker government and the President allegedly perpetrated an electoral fraud on the nation. Its focus lay on various forms of pre-poll rigging such as the appointment of partisan judges and members of the Election Commission, maligning the PPP through television, provision of ‘development funds’ to the Islami Jamuri Itehad (IJI) candidates and general harassment of the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) candidates.49 The National Democratic Institute (NDI) report of election observers also indicated serious malpractices committed by the caretaker government.50 Only it differed from the PDA White Paper inasmuch as it did not consider such practices to have made a qualitative difference to the results. Previously, the NDI observers’ report on the 1988 elections had suggested that Pakistan should develop an accountable government and an independent judiciary as well as a non-partisan military establishment, in order to allow society a free exercise of choice of its rulers.51 It was also noted that the task of the election observers was tedious and unenviable. Henry Carey, who studied the role of election observers including those in Pakistan for the 1988 and 1990 elections, noted foreign observers’ poor knowledge about legal and cultural realities of the society and an understanding of the potential or actual voters.52 The 1993 election was relatively free of controversy. In Ziring’s view, electoral politics in Pakistan had reached the ‘second stage’ and now opposition was too rooted and too popular to be neutralised by a government.53 Andrew Wilder’s study of the Punjab’s electoral scene in 1988 and 1993 brought out interesting observations. His analysis revealed that unlike the common perception, women voted more for PML than PPP, 18% more in five large cities, 4.1% more in small towns and 1.4% more in villages.54 He also claimed that the PPP had lost 8.5% of the lower class vote between 1988 and 1990.55 Wilder tried to look at the two election results to give a profile of electoral trends in terms of group, gender and class, in an ambitious attempt to provide a sociological perspective on electoral politics in Pakistan. Mohammad Waseem analysed the democratic potential of the state and the electoral trends at the macro and micro levels in a study of the 1993 elections.56 It attempted a typology of electoral candidates xxx comprising five categories: tribal and feudal elites; biradari or community leaders; industrial elite; middle and lower middle class; and ulema.57 His work offered a detailed statistical analysis of voting patterns in various constituencies at the national and provincial levels such as: the urban-rural and north-south divides in the Punjab, the decline of votes for Islamic parties, the emergence of fiscal culture in cities which proved to be the undoing of the PPP in urban Punjab only to be compared with the developmental euphoria created by the PML; the complete ethnic divide in Sindh along Mohajir-Sindhi lines; the triangular voting patterns in the NWFP between the PPP, PML and Awami National Party (ANP); and the divide in Balochistan between Pathans and Baloch on the one hand and the tribal Sardars and Ulema on the other, from the perspective of the inter-generational transition of political leadership.58 The study also attempted a voter profile of Pakistan in terms of a four-fold typology: civic voter, client voter, maverick voter and primary voter.59 Various political parties, independent groups, NGOs and individual writers deliberated on the subject.60 On the eve of the 1993 elections, the PPP’s manifesto promised to restore the joint electorates system, enact a law to end floor crossing and to restore parliamentary sovereignty.61 The NDI’s report on the 1993 elections pointed to the need for improving electoral rolls and the means to correct identification of voters, as did the Commonwealth, EU and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) observers’ teams, which also recommended a change in the cumbersome and discriminatory election system for minorities.62 Faqir Hussain put together recommendations for electoral reforms as discussed and elaborated on them in a workshop held in Islamabad. Some of these recommendations related to: making the Election Commission financially and institutionally independent; asking political parties to hold internal elections, nominate candidates collectively and issue at least 10 % of the tickets to women; disqualifying party members from the membership of assemblies for floor-crossing; abolishing the separate electorates system; and extending adult franchise to tribal areas.63 Dieter Nohlen in his recommendations for electoral reforms in Pakistan proposed a Mixed Member List System (MML), incorporating direct elections for two-thirds of the house and a proportional list based on parties for one third of the house. In this way, 100 ‘list’ seats would be added to the existing 217 single member constituencies and thus the basic character of the existing system as a majority –based system would be retained.64 Nohlen’s scheme provided 60 additional multi-members deputies for Punjab, twenty for Sindh, 12 for NWFP, 5 for Balochistan and 3 for Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).65 Such views reflected the fact that the lobby for proportional representation had expanded in Pakistan against the back drop of criticism of disproportional between votes and seats.66 The issue of electoral reforms continued to be a part of the political discourse in Pakistan. The Benazir Bhutto government (1993-96) announced a reform package in February 1996, which led to fierce public debate. These reforms included: the right of double voting for minorities, simultaneous xxxi elections for the national and provincial assemblies and the elimination of ID cards as a mark of voter’s identity.67 Prime Minister Bhutto claimed that these reforms would decrease election expenditure by 50% and ensure transparency.68 The PML opposed the measure of waiving the condition of producing the ID cards at the time of polling while the JI Chief considered these reforms as an attack on the ideology of the country.69 The PML challenged the electoral reforms in the Supreme Court, terming it a part of the government’s pre-election rigging scheme.70 The religious parties in general threatened to go on strike if the proposed reforms were carried out. The PPP government’s plan to put the electoral reforms before the National Assembly were shelved and no compromise was reached with the opposition on such crucial questions as the abolition of separate electorates and holding of elections for national and provincial assemblies on the same day. The PPP government did not make any move towards adding 100 seats to the existing number of the National Assembly seats to be elected under the PR list system as stated in its election manifesto. As for free and fair election, the PML opposition made it clear that it would not settle for anything less than a neutral caretaker government until the next elections. Under the existing situation of extreme polarization between the government and the opposition, the case for electoral reforms was lost. The scope of academic enquiry into Pakistani elections particularly on NWFP has been limited to macro-level analysis of electoral trends which are defined according to party loyalties for specific elections. Studies are generally not accompanied by analysis of political attitudes in the long term perspective, nor is there examination of support bases of political parties in terms of class, sectarian loyalties, sectoral divide or ethnic commitment, nor indeed of such social, economic and cultural processes as migration, urbanisation, industrialization, Islamisation or globalization. Most of the available research is limited to overt political activity inside or outside the parliament, often accompanied by a discussion of court cases relating to this phenomenon. Secondly, micro-level analysis of voting patterns is largely absent. Universities and research institutes do not have the funding for undertaking in depth enquiry of this nature, which would typically require network through various stages of interviews, tabulation of results, development of a conceptual framework and publication of findings. Even apart from financial resources, the academic institutions are ill-equipped to take up research of this kind because of the lack of scholarly talent and professional training. There are various kinds of writings that dealt with elections in Pakistan both as commentary on electoral behaviour and as a source of information for political analysis. These literatures include official publications, enquiry reports, white papers and institutional reports. There are three kinds of government publications relating to the conduct and outcomes of elections. At the end of each election, the government has published a report covering the nature of the legal and institutional framework, historical growth of constituencies and electoral rolls, the xxxii judicial and, where applicable, military involvement in the conduct of elections as well as party lists, electoral laws, provision for secret ballot and other forms of moral and material input into the exercise in mass voting. These reports also include the detailed results of elections for the national and provincial assemblies and sometimes a comparison with previous election results to bring out long term electoral trends. This exercise also followed the elections for the Senate as well as for President. In enquiry reports, Governments have responded to public demands for holding enquiries into electoral malpractices and sometimes-if not always-by publishing these reports. The Leghari Report on rigging during the local bodies elections in Sargodha district in 1952-3 remains a classic study of the ways and means of influencing the election outcomes in Pakistan.71 In white papers, government publishes its findings on some previous elections conducted by its predecessor with the specific purpose of undermining its existing support base and maligning it in order to legitimize itself in the public eye. The White Paper on the 1997 electoral malpractices is a key example of this kind of literature.72 No report was published by the PPP government on the 1977 election, which was marred by controversy about rigging. It was the Zia government that published a White Paper on these elections. Later, the report of the 1990 elections including an additional volume as a rejoinder to the grave allegations of malpractices from the Peoples Democratic Alliance (PDA) opposition about the caretaker government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and the Election Commission (EC). Similarly, the latter’s publications include such periodical reports as compilations of the Supreme Court judgments on appeals relating to elections at the National and Provincial levels.73 In non-official, institutional and group reports, the opposition party or alliance of parties put together information about electoral malpractices and publish it to put pressure on the government and challenge the legitimacy of its election victory. The PDA’s 1990 White Paper was the most elaborate exercise in this category.74 Other non-official publications include various reports of election observers groups, especially those published by the NDI for International Affairs, Washington D.C.’ and International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka as well as reports of the Commonwealth Observers group, EU observers group and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) observer group.75 Certain NGOs focus on specific aspects of election studies of the electoral behaviour of trade unions, professional associations, sectarian groups, women or minorities. The tradition of conducting public opinion polls has not taken root in the country. The only poll regularly published in Pakistan, the Gallup Poll, ran into controversy a few times, allegedly because of its apparent position on the far right, in favour of a small but active Islamic party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). From the above review of literature it has been found that there is scarcity of the study of electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. Voting behaviour and electoral politics in NWFP has not been taken up for scholarly and comprehensive study by political scientists and xxxiii social analysts. No attempt has been made to reach the masses, to find out their perception about the existing polity, political parties, electoral candidate’s turnout, women suffrage and election campaigns in detail. This research work is an effort in this direction. An attempt has been made to determine electoral politics and voting trends in NWFP during the period 199899. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: The findings are based on an analysis of qualitative data collected in personal interviews and from Election Commission's sources, and on extensive quantitative data collected from primary sources. During the course of field research eighty formal interviews out of 640 were conducted through Random Sampling and 2270 responses were recorded out of total voting age population, i.e registered voters (approximately 6651974 at the time of 1997 elections) for survey to find the voting trends in NWFP through purposive and judgmental sampling. One-third of these were with senators, candidates and members of the National and Provincial Assembly, and the remainder with academics, businessmen, election campaign managers, human rights activists, industrialists, journalists, labour leaders, political party workers and women’s right activists. In this study both qualitative and quantitative instruments are used to ascertain different dimensions and depths of electoral politics and voting behaviour in NWFP. Both historical and descriptive method is used. In order to execute the study and collect the relevant information both primary and secondary sources are included in this study. These include Electoral forms, polling stations results, Official reports, government publications, booklets and pamphlets, election commission report, Enquiry Reports, White Papers, Non-official, Institutional and Group Reports, Academic Research. SPSS software is used for data analysis and statistical purposes. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS: The purpose of this study is to provide an empirically based analysis of electoral politics in NWFP. This study is organised in two major parts. The first is focused on theories and context of the study and second part is based on case studies and analysis. Introductory chapter focused on introduction to the problem, its objectives and methodology. One of the strength of this study is use full “Review of Literature” where the researcher looks at electoral studies and electoral issues. This is good starting point for those looking at elections in NWFP. In first part there are three chapters, the first chapter focused on theoretical framework of electoral politics in NWFP. In this chapter three major theoretical approaches to the study of elections, the Michigan approach, the Columbia school and the Downs theory (rational choice) have been outlined. Electoral politics, political participation, basic practices in electoral politics, reforms and shifting patterns of public opinion have been analysed. Michigan Model is closely associated for the study of elections in NWFP. This is so because it attracted both partisan and political motives of a voter and candidate. xxxiv Electoral Geography is a second chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to map out the electoral geography of the NWFP by referring to the distinctive historical, socio-economic, and political characteristics of each region, and to show how these have contributed to regional differences in voting behaviour. The Chapter on “NWFP’s Electoral Geography” is a sound study of how the NWFP’s voting patterns are based on historical, socio-economic, and political characteristics of the province. It divides the study into northern, central, southern and north eastern parts (Hazara). In north-eastern (Hazara) region, the voting behaviour was largely tilted towards Muslim League during 1990s due to historical, linguistic and political reasons. In central NWFP electoral politics affected the voting behaviour in favour of ANP due to Pakhtun ethnic cleavages, while in southern and northern parts of NWFP electoral politics attracted religious and ethnic sentiments along with mainstream political parties’ i.e Muslim League and PPP. It was shown that the key to electoral success is in central NWFP, which had one third of the Provincial Assembly seats. It was the most densely populated, urbanized and industrialized of the NWFP’s four regions, and hence politically the most volatile. The PPP’s strongest regional support in 1988-1997 came from northern and central NWFP, the region most dependent on agriculture, whose political elites resented the decline in their influence relative to the politicians of north-eastern NWFP (Hazara) and southern NWFP. Chapter-3 of part-1 is related to Electoral History of NWFP. The focus of this chapter is on historical background of electoral politics in NWFP. Electoral politics in NWFP which was started during controlled suffrage period (1932-1970) were rooted in four historical developments, i.e. British System of indirect rule, the impact of Khilafat Movement, the reform issues and the legacy of period of civil disobedience in 1930-32. During pre independence period, the electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the colonial interest and post independence period (1947-1970) it revolved around the authoritarian political culture of Pakistan. During 1937 and 1945-46 elections politicians used the voters for their personal interest and voters became patronage seekers under the garb of these politicians (rational choice-Downs theory). Part two of this study consists of case studies and analysis. surveys about electoral Chapter-IV regarding voting trends in NWFP is based on trends in NWFP. Structured and unstructured questions regarding voting trends were asked from the purposely taken sample from different regions of NWFP. Data were analysed carefully and tabulated in this chapter. This chapter presents the key findings of the voting trends in NWFP including electoral knowledge, attitudes, and political participation of the electorate with respect to the Electoral Politics and electoral behaviour. This survey also reflect the main argument, that how electoral politics effect voting behaviour in NWFP. The study found significant disparities based on gender, rural/urban location, income, education, xxxv age, regions in province, and other demographic characteristics regarding knowledge, access, and attitudes toward electoral procedures and issues. Since there were repeated elections during 1990s, the survey measured voters’ experience with electoral processes, including their exposure to and perceptions of electoral politics, in order to identify populations vulnerable to disenfranchisement or misrepresentation as a result of these problems. These findings highlight the prevalence of different types of irregularities that have been common in elections for different population subgroups, which might help to inform those involved in the interpretation of electoral conduct before, during, and after Election Day. Chapter V examined in detail voting behaviour in the NWFP’s largest city, Peshawar. An analysis of polling stations results from the 1988-1997 elections revealed that while levels of support for the PPP and the IJI/PML and ANP have changed over time, patterns of class support have remained consistent. The PPP continued to do better in the poorer urban-rural periphery polling stations and in the polling areas with large concentrations of industrial labour. The IJI/PML and ANP consistently received its strongest support from the middle and upper class wards. Therefore class remained an important determinant of voting behaviour, and the PPP’s reputation as ‘the party of the poor’ continues to be warranted. Class, however, seems to be losing ground to party and/or party leader loyalty. Through an analysis of polling areas results from the 1988-1997 elections, this chapter has shown that while levels of support for the PPP and the ANP have changed over time, patterns of support have remained consistent. In all four elections the PPP did best in the urban-rural periphery areas and in the polling areas with large concentrations of industrial labour, which confirmed its reputation as the party of the poor. The ANP always received its strongest support from the middle and upper class polling areas. These findings were supported in the more detailed analyses of various constituency results which showed that class still played an important role in determining voting behaviour. The case study on NA-1 also revealed that there were gender differences as well, and that female voters preferred the ANP to the PPP. Biradari did not seem to be a major determinant of voting behaviour except perhaps in some of the polling areas in the urban-rural periphery of the city. Candidate loyalty also did not seem to be a major determinant as relatively unknown candidates like Zafar Ali Shah got victory in 1993 and Qammar Abbas were able to go considerable votes on PPP ticket in 1997 elections. The major conclusion of this chapter is that the most important determinant of voting behaviour in Peshawar was party or party leader identification. Almost all those who held PPP and ANP ticket holders won elections alternatively due to party identification. Chapter-VI is based on Party Politics in NWFP 1988-1999. The purpose of this chapter is to focus on party politics of leading political parties in NWFP i.e. ANP, JUI-F, PPP and PML-N and their alliances. Moreover the electoral process including preparation of elections, Selection of candidates, Election manifestos and slogans, electoral campaigns, electoral xxxvi arrangements is to be discussed in this chapter. There were analyses of different factors affecting party politics electoral strategies in NWFP. These factors go a long way towards explaining the important reversal whereby the PML-N coalition party ANP replaced the PPP in its former stronghold in urban NWFP. No list, however, will comprehensively explain this complex issue. Furthermore, as this role reversal proves, the political situation in urban NWFP is not static. Political preferences and voting behaviour changes over time, and change more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. The urban voters, who voted for the PPP in 1988 and for the ANP in 1993 and 1997, may well change their voting behaviour once again. There is also an analysis of how the legacies of ANP, PPP and General Zia-ul- Haq had helped, create and consolidate a strong ‘anti-PPP’ party based in urban NWFP. It examined how organizational weakness and factional politics within the PPP contributed to its decline, while the patronage at the disposal of Nawaz Sharif contributed to the PML(N)’s rise. Another important factor contributed to the reversal in urban NWFP was the effect that the prosperity of 1990s had on the ‘party of the poor’. Related to this prosperity was the economic and political rise of middle class traders and businessmen who formed the core of the ‘anti-PPP’ party and the decline of groups, such as organized labour, who were the strongest urban supporters of PPP. Chapter-VII on Urban-Rural Division of Electoral Politics shifts attention from the regional differences in voting behaviour to an analysis of urban and rural differences. It shows how the rural landed elites have been dominating NWFP politics ever since the colonial period. The chapter analyzes constituency returns for the 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 elections, and polling station returns for the 1988-1997 elections, and highlights the changes that have taken place between the voting behaviour of urban and rural NWFP. This chapter offers a very good discussion of the urban rural division of electoral politics. Discussion on “covering candidates” and the significance of female voters is again, a very useful one . Role of religion and party identification has become more important. In electoral politics of NWFP there are considerable regional differences in the rural results. The region where an urban-rural divide is clear is in Hazara, Northern and southern NWFP where the PML-N had lead over the PPP in the rural areas in 1988-97. Electoral democracy in NWFP largely depends on rural areas and rural stakeholders dominated political structure. The urban middle classes have generally prospered under electocratic governments for whom maintaining stability in urban areas is of prime importance. electocratic governments, seeking to win elections from NWFP, must turn for support to rural elites who can influence the voting behaviour of the majority of voters living in rural areas. But socio-economic and demographic trends ensure that the importance of urban areas will continue to grow relative to rural areas. This chapter also showed how the countryside has traditionally dominated the cities. It then highlighted the important change that took place in the 1990s elections when the PML(N) electoral alliance with ANP replaced xxxvii the PPP as the strongest party in urban NWFP. From small towns to large cities in all four regions of the province, the PML(N) and ANP consistently out performed the PPP. This indicates that party and party leader identification played a major role in determining the voting behaviour of urban voters. The PPP, however, did better than PML(N) in the far more numerous rural constituencies and therefore ended up winning more seats. As the majority of the province’s population live in rural areas, elections have reinforced the political dominance of rural NWFP and rural politicians. However, in a country that has one of the highest urbanization rates in the world, and with the communications revolution rapidly narrowing the distance between cities and countryside, it is clear that the cities are gaining political ground at the expense of the countryside. If economic interests increasingly become articulated along urban versus rural lines, which seems likely, the urban-rural cleavage will become even more important in determining party alignments and voter behaviour. Chapter-VIII on Sociological Determinants of Electoral Politics in NWFP reflects a popular perception that voting behaviour in the NWFP, especially in rural areas, is determined more by social then political factors. Traditional group loyalties of family, factions or biradri (clan) are thought to influence voting decisions to a much greater extent then more modern or political factors, such as party loyalty, patronage, or issue orientation. This chapter focuses its attention on the social factors that influence the voting decisions beginning with detailed analysis of polling stations to compare gender and class differences in voting behaviour. There is ample evidence to suggest that candidates are increasingly being judged on the basis of their performance as deliverers of patronage and development. Increasingly, in order to win elections candidate will have to add ‘development votes’ to their ‘biradari votes’.. In the 1990s , biradari seemed to be a more significant determinant of voting behavior. In general, the importance of biradari is greater in central and northern NWFP than in southern and north eastern NWFP, in rural than in urban constituencies, and in local than in national elections. Its importance is reduced by biradari and factional rivalries within constituencies, by class tensions between the haves and have-nots, and by the fact that both parties take biradari factor into consideration when awarding tickets. The evidence indicates that party loyalty in urban areas and the performance of candidates in providing patronage and development to their constituents in rural areas play an important role in determining voting behaviour. This supports the overall conclusion of this study that political factors are growing in importance relative to social factors in determining the behaviour of the voters in the NWFP. This chapter examined the role of gender in influencing voting decisions and showed that women in urban NWFP favoured PML(N) and ANP over PPP. Exit poll survey data revealed that a significant percentage of younger voters, who traditionally had supported the PPP, shifted their support to the ANP/PML(N) in 1990s. The effects that literacy and education had on voting behaviour closely approximated to those of class, with illiterate voters preferring the xxxviii PPP and literate voters the ANP/PML(N) . The Chapter then looked at the role of religion in determining voting behaviour. The poor performance of religious parties in elections illustrated that it was not a major factor, although sectarianism and the influence of traditional religious leaders do effect the voting decisions of some voters. Overall, voters decided not to ‘waste’ their votes on religious parties which were not expected to win, and which would therefore not be in a position to provide patronage. The chapter ended by looking at the influence of faction and biradari, which are viewed by many to be the most important determinants of voting behaviour in the NWFP. Chapter-IX on Political Determinants of Electoral Politics in NWFP presents the detailed analysis of political determinants. During the analysis of political determinants of voting behavior, it has been found that political determinants are more powerful than social determinants. It has been also found that local bodies have localized electoral politics and local issues seems much important than national issues. This has been the affect of local government elections and impact of non-party campaigns on local issues. During the period under study it has been found that unemployment and inflation are becoming increasingly important and throughout the electoral race during 1990s it has an important factor in determining peoples voting behavior. Finally chapter nine discussed the growing importance of political determinants such as party and party leader identification, patronage orientation, and national issue orientation. Party identification (Michigan approach) was the most important determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP, but even in rural areas it was much more important than was assumed. While parties still needed strong candidates in rural constituencies, strong candidates increasingly need strong parties to win. The chapter than emphasized the growing importance of patronage and development in determining voting behaviour. Voters, especially in rural areas, are therefore casting their ballots for the candidates and parties they perceive will be the most effective conduits for delivering patronage. The chapter concluded by arguing that national issues, while not major determinant of voter behaviour in 1990s were likely to become more important in coming years. Concerns over the economic issues of inflation and unemployment could divert attention away from local issues to national issues. In conclusion it has been concluded that electoral politics in NWFP during the period under study was representation oriented not movement oriented. Political Parties are less cadres oriented and more leaders oriented.More candidate oriented than issue oriented. Electoral Politics is an exercise to access patronage that’s why voters failed to influence policies.During the study of electoral politics in NWFP (1988-1999) four major categories of voters also exist as indicated in Muhammad Waseem study of 1993 elections. First, there was a civic voter. This voter tended to be a party voter, even an ideologue but more generally the holder of a partisan opinion on public issues. Secondly, there was the client voter. Typically, xxxix he belonged to feudal areas where his economic dependence on the local landlord-politician was complete. Thirdly, there was a maverick voter. He was a typical patronage seeker, who was not prepared to wait till after the elections. His demand could be either individualistic or even community oriented. Finally there is a primary voter. He voted for either ethnic identity or sectarian identity. Electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the characteristics represented in these categories of voters in a varying degree. However further research is needed for accurate measurement of these voters. It is important to remember that voting behaviour is not static, and with time new divisions may emerge or old ones becomes less salient. Generational change may lead to political re-alignments. Rapid urbanization and industrialization may increase the political relevance of the urban-rural divide and industry versus agriculture cleavages, and decrease those based on kinship or faction. Furthermore, new cross-cutting issues such as inflation or environmental concerns may emerge that do not immediately lend themselves to existing categories but could lead instead to ‘issue-oriented’ voting. Finally, new charismatic political leaders could emerge, create new political alignment, and transform the political landscape. For detail see Naureen Talha, Economic Factors in the Making of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) 2 Daily Dawn (Internet edition), 15 April 2010. 3 Javed Kamran Bashir, N.W.F.P. Elections of 1970: An Analysis (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973) 4 See Imdad Ali Khan, Voting Behaviour in Rural NWFP: A Study of People Participation in Election (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1986). 5 See Muhammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of 2002 elections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006) 6 See David Washbrook, ‘The Rhetoric of Democracy and Development in Late Colonial India’, In Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds. Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India (Dehli: Oxford University Press, n.d) 7 See Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 8 See Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1994) 9 Andrew R. Wilder, See Andrew R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 10 See Hamza Alavi, ‘Kinship in West Pakistan Villages’, In T.N. Madan, ed., Muslim Communities in South Asia (New Delhi: Vikas, 1996). 11 Saghir Ahmad See Saghir Ahmad, Class and Power in Punjabi Village (Lahore: Punjab Adbi Markaz, 1977). 12 See Craig Baxter, ‘Pakistan Votes, 1971’, Asian Survey 11 (March 1973). See Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, (ed.) Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975). 13 See Sharif-al-Mujahid, ‘Pakistan: First General Elections’, Asian Survey 11 (February 1971). 14 Mushtaq Ahmad Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi, 1970) 15 See Iftikhar Ahmad, Pakistan General Elections, 1970 (Lahore: South Asian institute, Punjab University, 1976) 16 See Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan Encounter With Democracy (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1994). 17 See Ijaz Shafi Gillani, Pakistan at the Polls (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan1985). 18 Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, Muhammad Shakeel Ahmad, Electoral Politics in Pakistan with Special reference to Hazara region of NWFP. (1988-2002), (M. Phil thesis: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-E-Azam University Islamabad, 2003). 19 A.M. Khan Leghari, Report on the Sargodha District Board Elections 1952-53 (Lahore: Punjab Printing Press, 1954), pp.13-28. 20 K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Boston: Houghton Miffin,1968). 21 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (London: G. Allen, 1957). 22 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, (Barke;ey: , University of California Press, 1961). 23 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1970). 24 Richard L. Park, ‘East Bengal: Pakistan’s Troubled Province’, (Far Eastern Survey, 1954), p.72. 1 xl Mahfuzul Haq, Electoral Problems in Pakistan, (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1966), p.66-69, 80-82, 115. Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling, eds., Realignment in American Politics, Austin, 1980. 27 Pakistan economist Research Unit (PERU), The General Elections 1970: An analysis of Socio-Economic Trends in West Pakistan (Karachi, 1973), p. 15-23. 28 S.J Burki and C. Baxter, Socio Economic Indicators of the Peoples Party Vote in Punjab: A Study at the Tehsil Level, in W.H. Wriggins ed, Pakistan in Transition, (Islamabad University Press, Islamabad 1975), pp. 169-67. 29 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power. 2003, pp. 15-25. 30 Iftikhar Ahmad, Pakistan General Elections, 1970, p.69. 31 Philip Jones, The hanging Party Structures in Pakistan: From Muslim League to Peoples Party’, in Manzooruddin Ahmad (ed.) Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society, (Durham, 1980), pp. 128129. 32 Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Bhutto, The Pakistan Peoples Party and Political Development in Pakistan 1967-1977’, Ph. D Thesis, University of London, 1980, p. 379-380. 33 Crag Baxter, ‘Pakistan Votes, 1971’, Asian Survey 11 (March 1973), p. 216-217. 34 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, (National Institute of History and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1994a), p. 253. 35 Lawrence Ziring, ‘The Campaign before Storm’, (Asian Survey, July 1977), pp. 584, 594. 36 Shariful Mujahid, ‘The 1997 Pakistani Election: An Analysis’, in Manzooruddin Ahmad, (ed.), p. 79. 37 MG. Weinbaum, ‘The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost’, (Asian Survey, July 1997), pp.605-613. 38 Norman D. Palmer, ‘The Two Elections: A Comparative Study’, (Asian Survey, July 1977), pp. 648-649. 39 Ibid, p. 661. 40 William Richter, ‘Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order’, (Asian Survey, February 1986) 41 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State, p. 398. 42 Ibid, p. 661. 43 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law 1979-1985, (Lahore, 1987), p.42. 44 William Richter, ‘The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan’, in Pakistan: 1992, Charles H. Kennedy ed, (Westview Press, Boulder, 1993), pp. 27-35. 45 Ibid, p.36. 46 Anwar H. Syed, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab: National Assembly Elections, 1988 and 1990’, Asian Survey, July 1991, p. 584. 47 Ibid. 48 William Richter, The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan’, in Pakistan: 1992, Charles H. Kennedy ed, p. 38. 49 PDA White paper, How election was stolen 1991, pp. xvii-xxiv. 50 NDI for International Affairs, The October 1990 elections in Pakistan, (Washington D.C., 1991), pp. v-vi. 51 Ibid, Appendix IV, p. 127. 52 Henry Cray, ‘International Election Observers: Panacea or Problematic participation ,’ (Seminar Paper, Columbia- New York Universities Conference on Crossing National Borders: Invasion or involvement,’ December 6 1991), pp. 1- 4. 53 Lawrence Ziring, ‘The Second Stage in Pakistani Politics in Pakistan: The 1993 Elections’, (Asian Survey, December 1993), pp. 1179-1183. 54 Andrew R. Wilder, ‘Changing Patterns of Punjab Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Elections Result, 1988 and 193’, (Asian Survey, April 1995), p.379. 55 Ibid. 56 Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1994) 57 Ibid, pp. 75-96. 58 Ibid, Chapters 4 and 6. 59 Ibid, 240. 60 Ibid, 259. 61 Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections, pp. 48-149. 62 Ibid. 63 Faqir Hussain, ‘The Electoral System in Pakistan’, in ed. Faqir Hussain, Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1995). 64 Dietor Nohlen, Electoral System in Pakistan: Options for Pakistan, (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1995), pp. 80-84. 65 Ibid. 66 Tariq Jazzi, ‘Proportional Representation System’, in Faqir Hussain Electoral reforms, 1995, pp. 80-91. 67 The News, February 27, 1996. 68 The Pakistan Times, February 28,1996. 69 Daily Pakistan Observer, February 28, 1996. 70 Ibid, March 04,1996. 71 A.M. Khan Leghari, Report on the Sargodha District Board Elections 1952-53, pp. 23-30. 72 Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the conduct of General Elections in March 1997, (Islamabad, 1978). 73 See Election Commission of Pakistan, Compilation of Judgements of The Supreme Court of Pakistan In Cases Relating to the National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies an the Senate (1957-1987), Islamabad, 1988. 26 25 xli 74 How an election was Stolen: The PDA White Paper on the Pakistan Elections 1990, (Islamabad: Madasia Publications, 1991). 75 Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, pp. 147-151. 1 CHAPTER-I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTORAL POLITICS 1.1 INTRODUCTION: In this chapter theoretical framework of electoral politics is drawn to analyse the voting behaviour of the voters in NWFP. Electoral theories and electoral models are discussed in this chapter for focused analysis of electoral politics and voting behaviour. Electoral politics are the most visible and symbolic form of political participation. Periodic, genuinely, free and fair elections are essential for the achievement of effective democracy. The free, fair and transparent elections reflect the will of the people, which provide the basis of the authority of the government. Henry J. Steiner in his work, states, “Countries with markedly different political systems have termed political participation the vital human right. In its absence, it is said; all others fall to a perilous existence”1 Elections are, therefore, the means by which the great mass of citizens can participate directly in the political process and in NWFP citizens do participate in this way and elect their representatives for public offices. Electoral politics is a participatory play in governing process through elections in which both voters and politicians want to achieve power, ‘to control the behaviour of others through force, threats, or withholding of resources’.2 Study of electoral politics renders an understanding of how government’s policies, political parties’ strategies about elections operates and how people behave. This study involves the investigation of citizens interacting with each other. Electoral politics in NWFP have different dimensions of socio-political nature, tenants-landlords relations and parties’ electoral play. Political parties used influential people amongst the Frontier society to win elections and these influential people used political parties to get power within their constituencies over the district administration for the fulfillment of their own interests. In this way the study of electoral politics is an interesting topic due to its practical applications. Electoral politics is concerned with the distribution of advantages and disadvantages among people based on their interests. In urban and rural areas of NWFP citizens have different wants and needs which are acquired by “arguments, persuasion, threats, flattery and other forces”.3 Citizens are constantly interacting with each other, and since the satisfaction of many of a person’s needs depends upon the relationships he establishes with others, the preferences and interests of some individuals will inevitably come into opposition with the preferences and interests of 2 others. This opposition of preferences and interests may result in competition or conflict and in attempts by those concerned to reach some sort of accommodation, varying from elimination of the competitor to a reconciliation of differences. “Payoffs” are distributed among the parties in conflict. It depends upon two factors. (1) The type of decision making process, and (2) the people and the resources involved. The distribution of advantages and disadvantages are dependent upon both the types of decision making process and the people involved.4 On the basis of electoral politics, elected politicians gain office from the votes of a certain number of people, geographically defined i.e. from their constituencies. They owe their election to the votes, campaign funds, party work, and efforts of those who elected them as their elected representatives. They enjoy their work and desire to remain in office. Hence they pay attention to those who played a role in putting them there. The stronger the support, the greater will be the obligation by the politician to the supporters5 and all this has happened in the electoral politics of NWFP since their inception. Factors such as socio-economic status, religion, family influence, and the state of the national, local and provincial affairs affect political attitudes; but the people’s conscious feelings about the parties, issues and candidates are the most immediate determinants of voting behaviour.6 Throughout one’s life a variety of agents exert influence on a person’s political outlook. A considerable portion of this learning occurs before the individual is old enough to enter the voting booth i.e. in the early days of life. Family background can determine voting and party preferences.7 Many if not most, individuals adopt the same party identification as their parents. It was assumed that parents transmitted their partisanship to their off springs through a process called political socialization.8 In NWFP paternal political influence on electoral politics is deeply rooted in Pakhto (Pakhtuns codes of life) and this paternal influence reflects in the younger generations in Pakhtun society9. Participation of the people in the electoral process is the substance of procedural democracy and during every election large number of people participated in procedural democracy from NWFP within social chains. A free election which is the highest degree of a consolidated democracy is still waiting in NWFP. Elections are the hallmark of democracy. Robert Dahl, in an introduction to democratic theory suggests that political parties and elections are two requisite institutions of any democracy.10 Electoral politics and political process both have direct relation with each other. 3 Electoral process establishes political institutions whose success and failure depends upon the rate of political awareness. Democratic elections are a fair competitive examination for recruitment of leaders by the electorates.11 Electoral systems determine the rules according to which the voters may express their political preferences and according to which it is possible to convert votes into parliamentary seats.12 In electoral politics people are mostly concerned with style issues about war and peace, prosperity and depression, corruption and “good” governance. In election campaigns politicians are interested in getting re-elected.13 During election process and campaigns politicians used the language of voter, they liberally use “should” and “ought to”, they deal in generalities and half truths, they say things which they probably don’t mean and don’t understand themselves. In electoral politics, politicians have different strategies and techniques. The strategy of the politicians is clear. They make broad, vague, ambiguous, and emotional appeals in the hopes of winning as many votes as possible. This strategy serves a function for both politicians and people: for politicians it is generally the only strategy that will result in success (given the nature of the electorate), to people it gives the kinds of things they want to hear. Campaigns help to assure voters that they are making the right choice.14 Issues are always highlighted at party platforms and political parties used issue style politics in NWFP but the MNAs or MPAs who represented constituencies used traditional ways such as biradari supports, friends influence and past developmental works. Voters often did not bother to ask any candidate his motivation for seeking election and reasoning at the grassroots level is sometime out of the question15. The major component of electoral politics is voting. The act of voting gives a concrete example of the individual citizen responding to stimuli, making decisions, and finally either acting or choosing not to. It provides a useful and illuminating case study of political behaviour. In electoral politics, a high voting turnout among the citizens is considered to be a significant indicator of the health of the political system, because political participation is assumed to be essential to the proper functioning of the democracy. Most political studies also assume that the act of voting is an indication that the individual citizen views himself as an active participant in the political system. If the individual feels, on the basis of past experience, that the results of elections do influence the decision of the government and that the efforts of individuals like himself can affect the results of elections then he will be motivated to participate in 4 the electoral process. If the citizen is motivated, he may put more of his time, energy, and resources into the process by studying the issues involved in the election, making contributions to campaigns, or actively working to help create support for a candidate, party, or position on some issue. If his effort is not rewarded by some sense of accomplishment, he is likely to make less of an investment in future elections.16 The voter is a prospective in an exchange relationship. Through party platform, speeches, statements of position, and personal contacts, the various candidates promise various benefits that will accrue to him if he invests his vote in their cause. Additional benefits (such as positions in the governmental structure) may be offered to induce the citizen to give active personal or financial support to the campaign. Completing the bargaining cycle, the prospective voter makes his various needs and demands known to the candidates, usually through organised pressure groups and the machinery of political parties. During the course of a pre-election campaign, this bargaining process may lead to shifts of position by both the candidates and the prospective voters.17 The basic logic of voting as mentioned in Down’s work is ‘rational choice’, i.e. voters, vote as per their self interests and parties or candidates who receive votes are also rational because they have their own interests. These interests are not clear but always uncertain. This uncertainty situation always becomes the backbone of electoral politics. Politicians act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office. According to rational choice theory, politicians never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office. They treat policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends, which they can reach only by being elected. Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies. 18 The election is a multivariate phenomenon. To understand how elections are won and lost, one must consider not only the influence social characteristics have on the individual voter, but also the roles played by such institutional arrangements as election laws-these also affect how many seats each party wins in its national parliament. The relationship between the multitudes of influences is represented schematically in figure 1. The entries above the line indicate influence upon individual voters: eligibility to vote rules, turnout considerations, party actions and political events, social characteristics, standing party identification, and issue predispositions. Many studies of voting terminate with statements about the preferences of individual voters. The most important political phenomena are not 5 individual choices but the aggregate distribution of seats in the national parliament, effecting control of executive government. In a country with simple two-party system the result is conceived as total victory or defeat; in multiparty system in which coalition government is the norm there are complications in converting parliamentary seats into coalition shares.19 Party System Turn Out Rules Turn Out Factors Party Actions Political Events Social Characteristics Standing Party Identification Issue PreDispositions Eligibility to Vote Rules Individual Electors Individual Votes Population National Aggregate Vote Conversion Rules: Votes to Seats per Constituency National Election Result Figure 1: How an Election Result is Determined. The electoral process is a means of decision that lies within a broader political order, and in research on voting it is valuable to have the wider political system in which the electoral process is found. Timely elections would seem to be obviously related to political developments. They have to be considered in the context of the political culture and sentiments about legitimacy and commitment to the system; they have a direct and often decisive bearing on the capacity of a political system and on the performance of the authoritative structures of government in many political systems. They have a central role in the non-authoritative structures and the general political process. Elections induce the important element of accountability into a political system, and provide a means by which such accountability is achieved in greater or lesser degree. Accountability also seems to be related to political development. As John Badgley has reasoned, “A civil polity is one in which the public interest is 6 served by the process of accountability”.20 While on the other hand Samuel Huntington believes that in many countries, elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces, except on short run basis.21 Elections and political parties have a direct relationship with each other. During elections, parties are most prominently on display, or, to put it in another way, on trial. An election provides an unrivalled opportunity to examine the organisation, the personnel, and the policies of the parties. Parties are the main agencies for organising and for providing political direction to the electorate, and for political choice. The electoral system affects the political life of a country mainly through the parties.22 Elections are a mechanism which parties use to maintain their support base. Elections help to establish links between the society, mainly non-political, and the political system, in which parties function and of which they are apart. In heterogeneous society, people who are psychologically and emotionally attached to their political groups, have two perspectives i.e. traditionalist perspective and revisionist perspective.23 According to the traditionalist perspective, party identification is primarily an emotional attachment and not the result of the individual’s consideration of which party might be more likely to better serve his or her interests.24 It is thus a sort of psychological identification and is therefore not based on policy concerns. This perspective could be rational in the sense that with the passage of time partisan ties strengthen due to frequent use of their vote and exposure to agreeable information. Thus a citizen refrains from changing his party loyalty he has acquired so early in life without paying any heed to the multiple issues and policies surrounding him.25 According to the revisionist perspective, model partisanship is not merely a psychological attachment without political meaning; rather it reflects the citizen’s judgement of the parties’ performance on issues important to the citizen.26 This perspective comes closer to the rational activist model, according to which the public supposedly controls the behaviour of its public officials by exercising influence at the ballot box in a rational fashion. It implies that a voter takes into account all the factors i.e. issues, candidates, parties, manifestos, etc. before casting his vote. With all the information regarding political parties, campaign, candidates and contemporary issues at his disposal, it seems quite reasonable to state that issues and policy matters play an important role in determining an individual’s partisanship.27 Electoral politics is concerned with all these issues and is based on wide range of factors such as political system, political parties, interest groups, military and 7 bureaucracy. In electoral politics historical, social, psychological and other ecological factors directly effect on electoral process. Electoral politics is also conditioned by deep-seated historical and societal factors.28 Gopal Krishna observed that the decision to vote for one candidate rather than another may be governed entirely by non political considerations and the voter may often be unaware of the political choice he/she is making through the act of voting.’29 The importance of considering the electoral process within the societal as well as the political framework, and the role of elections as providing a crucial link between the society and the polity calls attention to the relationship between the political and the social system.30 The most generally discussed electoral propositions, namely that ‘social characteristics determine political preferences’.31 It holds true globally. Every society has some kind of political system. Political systems vary from society to society. Max Weber was of the opinion that the type of the political system depends upon the nature of its legitimacy. Legitimacy rests on three factors, i.e. traditions, charismatic personality, legality.32 Today Democracy i.e. the government where the power is vested in the people is considered to be the popular system. Democracy has different principles and necessary conditions. Among these the most important principle is the strong desire and full commitment of the masses toward democracy.33 1.2 ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS Political organisation refers to the means by which a society maintains order internally and manages its affairs with other societies externally.34 Such organisation may be relatively decentralised and informal as in bands and tribes, or centralised and formal, as in chiefdoms and states. In other words, political organisation is the system of social relationships that provides for the co-ordination and regulation of behaviour, insofar as that behaviour is related to the maintenance of public order. Political organisation is the means through which a society maintains social order.35 Elections are complex events involving individual and collective decisions, which directly effect, and are effected by, the total political and social process. They open up channels between the polity and the society, between the elite and the masses, between the individuals and his government. They are major agencies of political socialisation and political participation.36 Elections broadly considered, are complicated political processes, which are to be analysed within the context of the total political and social system. An election itself, wrote V.O. Key, ‘is a formal act of 8 collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behaviour.’37 Robert Lane has developed a useful “paradigm for the study of electoral behaviour”38 which calls attention to the broader dimensions of the electoral process and to a variety of types, attributes, and factors which may be considered as either dependent or independent variables. The types of political behaviour listed under ‘responses’ represent, ‘collectively and individually, the dependent variable,39 the psychological attributes of individual, listed under ‘organisation’ and ‘the social or environmental factors listed under stimuli’ represent the independent variable. Diagram-I: Paradigm for the Study of Electoral Behaviour. Diagram-I: Paradigm for the study of electoral Behaviour. Stimuli Economic status and institutions Organisation Group membership (Family, Ethnic, Class) etc. Community situation Political Institutions The Media Discussing politics Joining political groups and movement Social and Political attitudes Responses Core Personality (Needs) Voting and electioneeri ng Containing Politicians Reading and listening to politics Contributing to parties and interpret groups. Source: Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in Politics (Glencose, III, the Free Press, 1959), p. 6. On the other hand the Michigan Model of voter behaviour has a core theme on social psychological pattern.40 It depends on many factors. Events follow one another, converging in a series of causal chains and moving from the mouth to the stem of the funnel. Thus a multitude of causes narrow in to the voting act. At the mouth of the funnel are sociological background characteristic such as (ethnicity, race, region, religion, and the like), social status characteristic (education, occupation, class), and parental characteristics (class, partisanship). All these factors affect the person’s choice of party identification. Party identification in turn influences the person’s evaluation of the candidates and the issues, which takes us further into the funnel. Then comes the campaign. Closer to the tip are the conversations which the voter has with family and friends about the election. Then comes the vote itself.41 Michigan researchers concentrated, then and now, on those variables that are closest to the 9 voting decision. This approach can be attributed to the influence of social psychology on modern political science. Diagram-II: Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour.  Sociological SSScharacteristics  Parental characteristics  Social status characteristics Party identification Campaign issue Candidate and issue evaluation Time The voting Family and friends Source: Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, Controversies in American Voting Behaviour (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1996), p.12. Political scientists also have the opinion that “the immediate determinants of an individual’s behaviour lie more clearly in his attitudes and his perceptual organisation of his environment than in either his/her social position or other ‘objective’ situational factors”.42 The Michigan Model suggests that long term factors are most important in determining party choice. But there is not a simple step from social locations to voting behaviour. Rather, the social position that an individual occupies affects the kinds of influence that he or she will encounter in interacting with family, friends, neighbours, workmates and so on. As a consequence of the interactions-especially within the family-the individual acquires a party identification. This means sense of attachment to party, feeling of commitment to it, being the supporter of the party-and not just someone who happens to vote for the party from time to time.43 When there is an election, there is an interaction between a voter’s long term party identification and various short term influences, such as current political issues, campaign events, the personalities of party leaders or candidates and, the tactical situation in the local constituency, to produce a vote decision. The Michigan Model emphasises that it is the long term factors that are usually decisive. Indeed a person’s party identification will influence how the voter interprets and evaluates issues, party leaders and so on. The concept of Party identification is central to the Michigan model and there are three clear differences between party identification and voting. Firstly, party 10 identification is psychological while voting is behavioural. That is, identification exists in a person’s mind; one cannot observe it directly. Voting however a definite action-putting a stamp on a piece of paper-and it is in principle, observable (normally done in secret). Secondly, voting is time specific while party identification is not. Voting can take place only at an election-and elections occur frequently in NWFPwhereas identification is ongoing and continuous. There does not need to be an election in the offing for people to consider themselves supporters of a party. Thirdly, party identification varies in intensity and voting does not. Some people will be very strong party supporters, others not very strong or just weak supporters. All votes count equally, however, whether the voter marks the ballot with a great thick black cross or a tiny faint one44. Party identification is, then, distinct from voting. This means that it can be used to help explain party choice in election, as in the Michigan Model. According to the theory, party identification serves important functions for the individual. It simplifies the task of understanding the complex world of politics. Identification also acts as a sort of psychological filter or prism through which political messages pass to the individual; it provides a framework within which political events are understood and evaluated. If people identify with a party they are not likely to shoot off in all directions at successive elections. Rather, they will have a ‘normal’ vote which in most cases will remain stable from election to election. The Michigan approach was based on a sample survey of voters, aimed at bringing out a correlation between party identification and volatility.45 It drew upon the social psychology of individual voters. Its focal point was to the voting behaviour as the end product of election activities, ranging from the announcement of candidature, media input and party propaganda to the act of casting the ballot at the polling station. The voter is the king-pin of the electoral process according to the Michigan approach, with scant attention given to the social context of voting. Some times a survey is conducted to cover the changes in the voter preferences during different phases of election phases of the election campaign, modeled after a ‘rolling thunder design’.46 The concept is that the voter is sovereign in terms of taking decisions about which of the alternative political parties and patterns of leadership should be delegated his or her trust in the matter of policy making. On the other hand, the Columbia school of thought focused on a sociological perspective to understand the partisan dynamics of elections. This perspective deals essentially with attitudinal determinants of voter 11 along the continuum of policy preferences on the left-right ideological orientations. Here, the contexts of class, race, caste, ethnicity, religion, rural or urban sectors gender and generation influence the voter in varying degrees and styles. In this regard, the political communications approach revolves around the issue of the construction of electoral choice for the voter.47 Alternatively the Downsian theory of voting behaviour is based on the voter calculation of cost and benefit leading to the act of voting. This so called economic theory of voting behaviour is coached in the rationality thesis, whereby each voter is supposed to seek maximization of his or her interest by carefully analyzing the gains emanating out of preferring one party or candidate over the other.48 This approach depends heavily on the profile of the citizen who demonstrates stable issue preferences, credible information about policy alternative and knowledge of both short term and long term consequences of the ballot. These approaches have led to the corresponding research models applicable to filled surveys covering conceptual frameworks and methodological issues relations to the elections. Researcher can look at the three models in traverse order: spatial studies, alignment studies and party organizational studies. The spatial model corresponds to the Downsian Theory based on voter maximizing strategy. According to this approach, the issues positions of various parties converge with the issue dimensional of voter outlook.49 This ‘proximity Theory’ reflects the meeting point of the electorate and political parties.50 In order to establish contract with voter parties try to control the dimensionality of a campaigns issue space in NWFP, the approach could be applied to the study of the specific election, which must demonstrate a high level of issue salience. For example, only 1970 and to some extent 1977 elections are candidates for analyses and under the spatial model. Otherwise, given the increasingly non-issue character of general elections in Pakistan and in NWFP, an interest maximizing role of mass voting needs to be defined in terms of short term patronageindividual or collective rather than long term policy, along with its envisaged impact on the larger political community. The alignment model of electoral politics, envisaged typically based on party identification at the national or provincial level, has been a role rather than an exception throughout country’s history. The party alignment model has a great explanatory value, given the voters’ entrenched partisanship based on shorter term factors.51 Indeed, party alignment, de-alignment and re-alignment are persistent features of electoral politics in NWFP as elsewhere in the other provinces of Pakistan. A stable pattern of party voter alignment is the norm 12 in the medium to long term perspective in Pakistan. PPP, MQM, ANP, Jiya Sindh Mohaz, JI, Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP), JUI as well as the oldest mainstream party PML have all enjoyed stable constituencies over decades. The party organizational model revolves around the growing organizational fluidity of political parties. Generally, parties in NWFP and other provinces kept their support bases more or less intact. This was despite the fact that they were discredited by military governments and rendered non-functional for many years. Non- party elections were held at the national or provincial levels in 1962 and 1985 and the local level throughout Pakistan’s history. The two mainstream parties PPP and PML continued to dominate the scene for three decades, from the 1970s to the 1990s at the national level and with the coalition of ANP and others independents in NWFP. The PML underwent a transition that was essentially in terms of leadership and a new factional identity, and not by way of change in the support base. Political parties did not frame any new policy –based identities during the period under study. Instead, they struggled for survival in the face of the government’s accountability drive throughout the 1990s due to the power tussle between PPP and PML-N backed by ISI. In this situation, the experienced voters stayed in line but the undecided voters, who actually made the difference between the two rival contenders for powering terms of victory in elections, remained immobilized. The two mainstream parties PPP and PMLs, the so-called cartel parties, in so far as these bagged nearly 70 per cent of polled votes in 1997 and nearly as many in the preceding elections, had displayed an overly office seeking behaviour for more than a decade.52 Once they lost their mobilizing potential, they became susceptible to allegations of collaborating with each other in order to keep the levers of power in their own hands by means of shutting of lesser parties from aspiring to form the government in Islamabad. The military cadres, civil bureaucracy, the professional middle classes, the business community as well Islamic parties grew increasingly cynical about the two prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief, who were allegedly playing musical chairs between themselves during the 1990s, in Pakistan, political parties are considered the villain of the piece. It is remembered for misrule, corruption, selfishness, nepotism, electoral malpractices, a non-responsive attitude towards the public at large and absolutism of the party hierarchy. To understand the political context of elections in the years under study, we need to delineate the role of parties as understood and accommodated in their scheme of things by the state managers. 13 While much changed during the last three quarters of a century, one thing remained intact: parties were imagined as intruders on the district scene in their capacity as non local political resources carrying a great destabilizing potential for a local power structure. In the absence of party based national elections on the basis of adult franchise for a quarter of a century after independence, the district administration continued to represent the ultimate source of the authority at the local level. Parties were reduced to a collection of bigwigs, with a following based not on aggregation of interests but on alliances between factional groupings. In India, local patterns of leadership were interviewed with the party high command straight after independence. Instead, Pakistan experienced not only an incomplete transition from the dynamics of micro to macro-politics as the foundation of electoral democracy, but also a process of rendering local government into an instrument to constrain the influence of politicians in the locality operating at higher levels. The mainstream parties in Pakistan, PPP and PML, like the archetypal mainstream party in IndiaCongress-are ‘inclusive’ and heterogeneous rather than ‘cohesive’ in nature. These are ‘catch-all’ parties, representing multiple support bases across ethnic, religious, sectarian and sectional boundaries. By the same account, these parties are somewhat autonomous with social cleavages of different kinds in different contexts. Their lack of cohesion is not necessarily counter productive in terms of their ability to aggregate local influence structures in order to form a government. However, their organizational weakness means that there is no managerial class of politicians who would operate as ‘link men’ and bring ‘faction chains’ together in a larger and more meaningful entity.53 In Rajni Kothari’s view, the success of the ongoing democratic framework of politics in India draws, among other things, on the overall democratic intellectual climate which provided meaning to political activity of politicians.54 As opposed to the (Hindu) majority-based public ethos in pursuit of collective causes, the emergent Muslim middle class everywhere in British India sought accommodation in the system from a (Muslim) majority perspective. The state rather than society was the focus of its activity by way of seeking employment in the public sector, and thus representing a status quo orientation in terms of issues and policies.55 The overall potential of the much-cultivated sense of national insecurity in the country, often couched in the defecation of state, can be gauged from the continuously hostile attitude of the ruling elite towards politicians. Politics in Pakistan operates in an intellectual climate that is not very conducive to democratic ideals and norms. 14 1.3 ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Electoral politics is a key factor for political participation and political behaviour in a society. People inform themselves through interaction with each other, political groups and mass media. By interacting with different information agencies, a common man acquires the capability to form a clear judgment and other issues confronting a country.56 Civic culture includes a sense of obligation to participate in political input activities, as well as a sense of competence to participate.57 Citizen’s active participation in the political process may be in the shape of becoming member of a political party, taking part in election campaigns, voting during elections and pressing for demands to the government through a democratic manner.58 Electoral politics strengthen democracy in which power over significant authoritative decisions in a society is distributed among the population. The ordinary man is expected to take an active part in the governmental affairs, to be aware of how decisions are made, and to make his views known.59 According to the democratic theory the health of a democracy depends on the existence of a potentially informed and active citizenry. By working for, and voting for candidates who represent their views, and by making their views known to elected leaders, citizens could collectively translate their various policy preferences into government action.60 This is in fact what may be called the democratic ideal in which both the government and masses act in a reciprocal manner. The citizens put forth their demands, and those in power try to placate them by responding in a positive manner. With both sides playing their due roles, democracy gets the conducive atmosphere to flourish. In short the more the masses keep a vigil on what their elected representatives do while in office, the more the latter will be responsive to the demands and grievances of the former. The act of casting one’s vote in a rational manner doesn’t only and necessarily mean electing members of legislature and hence the entire government. It goes even beyond. J.S. Mill considered electoral politics and political participation as moral imperative.61 Democracy has been used ever since the times of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a state is largely vested, not in any particular class or classes but in the members of the community as a whole.62 With the entire emphasis on people’s participation in a democracy, it thus become incumbent upon the members of a community to take an active part in the decision making process. A government, which does not reflect the collective will of people, cannot be called a 15 democratic government. Indeed, it is representation of masses in the affairs of their state, which distinguishes a democratic government from that of a military, authoritarian and despotic regime. An ordinary citizen, expressing himself freely in rational manner, at elections or without it, performs the key function to keep democracy alive. Democracy, says Prof. Lindsay, is participation, it means doing things in common with others, and taking share of responsibilities involved.63 It has been justly said that, like liberty, the price of democracy is eternal vigilance. The transfer of power from British India to its successor states also contributed to the emergence of two separate traditions in these countries. Pakistan experienced an anomalous situation from the beginning. Political leaders from those provinces and areas, which became part of India instead of Pakistan, dominated its ruling party Muslim League. The migrant leadership of the Muslim League had left its electoral constituencies in India and could not hope to win any election in Pakistan. Nor could it rely on the current members of the assembly as a support base for their routine exercise of power. In this situation, the government choose to operate from outside the parliament rather than from inside it. Migrants from other areas of India also dominated the bureaucracy. In Pakistan, recourse to elections was considered suicidal by the migrant led government at federal capital Karachi because there was no way it could win elections and return to power in the centre. Elections were considered dysfunctional for the political system of Pakistan in the immediate post independence period.64 Electoral politics in Pakistan and particularly in NWFP can be analyzed as politics of holding elections in such a way that the ruling elite keep its privileged position. If that was not possible, it preferred not to hold elections at all. This rational choice model is also applicable in NWFP where Khudai khidmatgars seems to be powerful after partition. 1951 elections in NWFP were rigged; otherwise there was no chance for Muslim League to win the elections. The focal point of every electoral system is the formula of decision, which is fundamental in nature. There are two types of electoral systems; i.e. majoritarian and proportional. Decision in the majority system is according to a majority of votes polled and in the proportional system it is according to proportion of votes polled. The majority system has two main types; the relative majority and absolute majority system. Proportional system has also two main types; party list voting and non party list voting or single transferable voting system.65 Both systems were in practice in Pakistan’s electoral setup. From 1988-1997, as elections were held on separate electorate basis and for minorities, seats were reserved 16 according to the proportion of their population. The functioning of an electoral system is greatly affected by the social structure political system and political party system of a country. In view of this position, transplantation of electoral system from one country to another can be problematic. It has been stated by Mackenzie that, only one thing is certain, that each country has its own political life and that old institutions will work differently in a new setting.66 NWFP like other parts of Pakistan is a heterogeneous society so one single electoral system is impractical for the whole province. In Frontier society the basic electoral unit is not the individual as seen in the West but the leader or spokesman of the local community, be it tribe, caste, sub-caste, sect, faction, trade union, migrant or settler group or women’s activist group. The electoral candidates operating from the platform of political parties contacted not men and women in their homes but the local ‘big men’ who would deliver votes in hundreds or even thousands. Elections in Pakistan and particularly in NWFP were held in a social context which was characterized by the continuing domination of the tribal and landed elites over their respective areas of influence. Three distinct features of the political system of Pakistan can be ascribed as playing a determining role in this respect: first there is the primacy of administrative authority for allocating resources, operating the structures of public services and regulating the process of accountability. This authority firmly rests with the civil bureaucracy. Under these circumstances, the function of elected representatives would typically be reduced to one of projecting local demands and securing access to the state’s legal and institutional resources. In other words, politics would be a way to the administration and therefore a channel brokerage. Instead of being understood in terms of its designated function of law making, parliament would be considered a pumping station for local interests. Over time, it assumed an ‘ombudsmanic’ rule.67 Secondly, an essential framework for understanding electoral politics is provided by the district. The British bureaucracy established its patronage structure in and around the district administration. When it introduced electoral politics in British India, it ensured that the existing power structures based on tribal and ‘feudal’ linkages were preserved and integrated with the district administration. Thus, democracy was grafted upon a wellestablished bureaucratic system. The bureaucracy presided over the process of demarcation of electoral constituencies and making of electoral laws relating to various stages in the process of holding elections, ranging from preparation of electoral rolls and laying out of the election schedule to the announcement of results 17 and hearing of legal cases. The idea was to preserve the status quo under the new system, which was potentially unpredictable inasmuch as it was based on the emerging source of legitimacy in the form of mass mandate. This leads to the third feature of the electoral system, viz. the political party. As a typical supra-district variable operating at the national or provincial level, political parties represented the potential for destabilizing the district politics. While the All India Congress was able to establish itself at the grassroots level by generally coopting the rural elite into its organizational matrix, the Muslim League failed to replace bureaucracy as patron of the local elite due to its lack of organizational resources. The Congress had already formed governments in several provinces in 1937 and assumed a credible role as patron of the local leadership, while the Muslim League’s (ML) ascendancy to political office saw the light of the day, in a real sense, only after partition. Thus, Pakistan inherited a model of district politics where extralocal input through the party was minimal. The super-ordinate position of the bureaucracy in the new government only ensured that there was no mobilization and projection of alternative policy structures by political parties. Moreover the ongoing political system on Congress patterns was largely suffered when Muslim League came into power in NWFP in 1947. Both the military and the bureaucracy favored a model of district politics, which approximated to the colonial pattern, characterized by provision for local bodies as the principle of political participation by public representative, restricted franchise, non party elections and diarchy. Both Ayub and Zia showed preference for local bodies and held regular elections for district and local councils on a non party basis. The Ayub system was based on disenfranchisement of the public via indirect elections. On the other hand, Zia institutionalized diarchy through the 8th Constitutional Amendment, which increased presidential powers by including the powers to dissolved the parliament and appoint judges of the higher courts and the chiefs of the armed services.68 From 1958 onwards military governments influenced the shape of electoral politics in Pakistan. Foremost among these changes was the shift of power from parliament to the president, which involved the loss of sovereignty for the former. The passing of 8th amendment by the National assembly of Pakistan in 1985 represented an attempt at constitutional engineering, which robbed parliament of its efficacy as a symbol of ultimate power. This reduced the legislature to the function of brokerage, to a mere institutional link between politics and administration. A second and even more 18 significant contribution of the military governments was localization of electoral politics. These has been a consistent pattern of thinking among the top brass to hold local bodies elections regularly as a way of taking the steam out of the alienated public and provide it with a semblance of political participation without involving the question of transfer of power to public representatives. Localization of electoral politics was further institutionalized through non-party elections at the higher levels in 1985. These elections depended wholly on individual candidates’ influence in the locality and their efforts to mobilize financial resources, tribal and community or biradri ties as well as contacts with the district administration. While the subsequent elections were held on a party basis in a formal sense the fundamental candidateorientation of elections has not changed ever since 1985. Parties have functioned as umbrella organizations, seeking the support of local people of influence even more than the latter looking for organizational backing.69 Localization of elections reflected a wide spread malaise of the body politics of Pakistan in the form of a virtual absence of issues and an issue base policy structure. While there were all kinds of promises made during the elections, policy was conspicuous by its absence. Both contestants and voters were increasingly conscious that it was not policy but patronage that was at stake. Change through policy via legislation has always been considered remote and indirect. Patronage through clientele structures operating in the locality was more real and direct. Policy for large sections of the population was not considered viable in the absence of interest groups, trade union-based activity or other forms of collective behaviour. Personal gains in the short term have moved to the center of the voter’s choice structure. It can be argued that successive elections have not necessarily increased the level of political participation among the general public, or even the commitment to democracy among the political leadership. The 1985 elections were meant to provide legitimacy to Zia government. Similarly, the subsequent elections essentially provided legitimacy to the power structure ruling Pakistan, with the army occupying a central position. Electoral politics was effectively de-ideologiesed, and debate over policy virtually disappeared from the political discourse in the 1990s. The ruling elite felt comfortable with election as a source of legitimacy, especially as the global political culture was increasingly defined by the concept of ‘democracy’s third wave’.70 This phenomenon was also reflected through the absence of participatory activity at the mass level once elections were over. Indeed, politics in provincial and national level in Pakistan in the period between elections has been typically non- 19 existent. The holding of local bodies’ elections became increasingly more erratic. On the other hand, the issue of holding elections for various non-governmental organizations never took root in the public imagination in frontier society as well as in Pakistan. Therefore, in the absence of participatory culture and tradition in the country, the legitimacy function of general elections remained the most visible indicator of electoral democracy in Pakistan. Two factors stand out for contributing to the lack of scholarly attention to elections in NWFP and other provinces, one substantive and the other procedural. Substantively speaking, the ultimate power to make policy generally eludes public representatives in Pakistan. Procedurally speaking, the representative character of elected assemblies has been rendered suspect in the public eye due to a long history of rigging. Both factors represent interesting challenges to an academic enquiry into the meaning of elections for voters, candidates, political parties as well as the two state apparatuses, army and bureaucracy in Pakistan. The most obvious fact about the elections held in 1988-1997 was the political context for an exercise of the powers of ISI behind the mass voting and indirect of penetration of military in electoral politics. The most significant event is the formation of IJI by ISI in 1988 which was established to counter PPP massive campaigns in the election71. Latter on such type activities of ISI was continued for breaking the affiliation of PPP, MPAs and MNAs from the party72 and hence introduced a new term of lotacracy in Pakistani politics. Dr. Mohammad Waseem had the opinion that 1962, 1970 and 1985 and later on 2002 elections were the transition from military to civilian rule. Three military rulers Ayub, Zia and Musharaf had themselves ‘elected’ through referendum prior to holding general elections, thus securing the continuity of political initiative in their own hands after the installation of a civilian parliaments. 1.4 MILITARICRACY TO ELECTOCRACY: The elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 were preceded by three general elections held in 1970, 1977 and 1985. The period under study covered four governments of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto again and Nawaz Sharif again at National level and their coalition governments in NWFP. The February 1997 election brought Nawaz Sharif back as prime minister with a heavy mandate, only to be dismissed by an army coup in October 1999. The 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections were held in an ongoing democratic context, organized and supervised by ‘civilian’ caretaker governments. 20 Except in 1988, these governments were led by civilian caretaker prime ministers and chief ministers. While the army was never too far from the election scene in the 1990s, the electoral dynamics increasingly bore the clear stamp of the strategic planning and operational thinking of politicians and political parties. The fact that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were able to operate as opposition leaders and become prime minister successively pointed towards the prospects of a self sustaining political process finally taking root in at national and provincial level. The phenomenon of transition carries a great explanatory potential for understanding the conduct of elections held under the army. Each transition put new rules of the game to install new democratic setup in Pakistan. Democracy itself has not always been clearly defined. The term has been used loosely, but there is a world of difference between what may be called ‘procedural’ and ‘social’ democracy. The former means little more than the holding of regular ballots, while the latter implies a participatory element in the exercise of power and the removal of social inequalities. In its absence, only lip-service to democracy can be paid. Pakistan may be seen as having made the transition from authoritarianism to procedural democracy, but as lacking any of the characteristics of a consolidated democracy.73 The Democratic transition can be best conceptualized as a ‘transformation’. Despite the formation of the multi-party MRD in 1981, democracy ‘emerged’ following the voluntary withdrawal of the military after Zia’s sudden death in August 1988. The post Zia Military elite was thus able to exert power behind the scenes by brokering a deal which ensured the unity of anti-PPP political forces under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. Thus, the PPP could not sweep the polls. These ‘understandings’ rested on the assurance that the defense budget was sacrosanct and Army retained a veto in vital foreign policy and security matters. The armed forces were able to enforce this veto through their allies in the bureaucracy led by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Zia’s successor in the office of President, whose powers had been appreciably augmented by the Eighth Amendment to the constitution. The PPP’s enforced enfeeblement was compounded by economic crises and the ethnic conflict in Sindh and Afghan refugees’ problems in NWFP, a legacy of Zia era. The weakness of the Government was laid bare by its inability to bring forward any meaningful legislation during a two- year period. Indeed Pakistan’s experience in 1988-90 lends weight to those understandings which maintain that transitions unilateral imposed by armed forces are at best likely to result in fragile democracies which eschew the improvement in 21 economic equity while maintaining guarantees of political freedom, but which are more likely to produce a hybrid mix of electoral forms and authoritarianism. The latter a has been dubbed ‘electocratic rule’74 Given his questionable democratic credentials, PML-N was in a stronger position than his PPP predecessor to tilt the balance of power in favour of the elected institutions over the state structure. This resulted from both his power-base in the politically crucial Punjab region and his greater acceptability to the Islamic parties. Neverthless, although the civil-military bureaucracy had engineered (IJI) Nawaz Sharif’s rise to power in 1990, relation between the new Premier and the establishment became increasingly uneasy as he sought to carve out an independent political agenda. This formed the background to Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s second dismissal of an elected leader. The President’s subsequent resignation in a deal brokered by the Army to end the constitutional crises was sparked off by the Supreme Court’s restoration of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but it did not mark the breakthrough many hoped for. Democratic transformation was too easily elided into consolidation in this analysis. Pakistani democracy has in reality remained extremely fragile and is still in the early stages of the unfolding sequence from transition to consolidation. Two critical tasks await Pakistani democracy: first to further loyal opposition and responsible government through process of institutionalization and consociation; second to encourage wider political participation and re-establish civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Pakistan in 1988-1999 represented the civilian rule indirectly backed by military establishment. The most important question relating to this process deals with the location of authority to take decisions and make policies. More specifically, one needs to ask whether this authority has in reality shifted from the military to the hands of elected members of parliament. This question is relevant because in various countries transition has taken place in name only. For example, parliament in Thailand generally rules on sufferance of the army, bureaucracy and royal dynasty. In Indonesia, the Suharto years represented the predominant role of the army for three decades under a façade of democracy. Under the New Order, Suharto had the power to appoint 100 members of parliament, three quarters from the army and one quarter from civilians, in addition to 360 directly elected deputies. In Pakistan, the process of civilianization of the Zia government in 1985 had ensured that the president continued to have powers to dissolve the National Assembly and thus dismiss the elected 22 government under the controversial 8th Amendment. In defining the context for the elections from 1988-1999, one needs to point to the attitudinal changes in the way the electorate viewed elections, parties and contestants. Through its intensive campaign of discrediting politicians, Presidency plus military produced widespread cynicism in the general public about the authenticity of partisan positions identified with the political leadership at the national, provincial and local levels. In addition, the military establishment managed to create factions out of the main political parties, led by secondary leaders, and thus de-institutionalized politics still further.75 The combined effect of official propaganda against the political class as a whole and the official strategy of undermining the credibility of individual leaders through a vehement accountability drive was the phenomenon of wide spread political de-alignment.76 In view of the fact that the lines dividing political parties in terms of their policy and ideological framework became increasingly blurred, this process acquired the character of partisan de-alignment in as much as ties with parties were loosened. All this led to de-politicization of public attitudes towards the national agenda, and created voter apathy in general. Only slightly more than one-third of registered voters polled their votes in the four elections from 1988-1997. The partisan de-alignment was buttressed by class de-alignment on the one hand and partial ethnic de-alignment on the other.77 Class-based issues such as poverty, unemployment, economic insecurity, health and educational facilities for the general population, as well as land tenure and industrial relations were conspicuous by their absence from the election campaign. Correspondingly, those parties which were identified with one or more of these issues suffered de-alignment. Additionally, ethnic de-alignment took place in terms of the loss of credibility of the top and middle rank leaders of traditional ethnic parties such as ANP, Baluchistan National Party (BNP), PNP, Muttahida (previously Mahajir) Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Sindh National Alliance (SNA), especially as they had been part of various coalition governments in the 1990s at one time or another. Leaders of the two major ethnic parties, MQM of Sindh and ANP of NWFP, were prosecuted for corruption by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Ethnic de-alignment contributed to partisan de-alignment in general in the sense that people’s unquestioning loyalty to certain political parties could not be taken for granted any more. However, primordial loyalties to ethnic, linguistic and territorial identities were not overtaken by the mainstream political parties, PPP and PML-N. These parties 23 were themselves positioned on the wrong side of the military regime, which cost them heavily in terms of credibility and public support. 1.5 IMPACTS OF ELECTIONS ON LEGISLATURE Elections-the product of electoral politics have deep impacts and direct relations with legislature. Legislatures at provincial and national level of Pakistan established on the basis of elections. The literature on democracy deals with the function of the legislature as the goal setting agencies from the larger public in terms of policy making, while the executive as supposed to implement policy on the ground. In reality, the influence of the legislature in this regard has been circumscribed by the over arching role of the executive.78 This happened in several ways. The party or parties in power and in opposition tended to control the way their legislators voted or did not vote and spoke or did not speak on the floor of the parliament. In this since, the party leadership operated essentially from outside the legislatures to steal legislation, including constitutional amendments. One can argue that, in as much as speaker and the floor take positions on issues of relevance from the treasury or opposition benches, a legislature’s structures, a political conflict and provides public forum for debate on contentious issues. In Pakistan, and else where, where issue formation does not generally take place out in the civil society, legislatures at both the national and provincial levels have provided both security and legitimacy for politicians speaking in public about problems ranging from constitutional amendments to the quota for Hajis (pilgrims to makka) in any specific year. During the 1990s the National Assembly of Pakistan produced several debates relating to such contentious issues as military operation in Sindh 1992-94, the Shariat Bill 1998 as well as the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore (1999), which symbolize a change of policy towards India end therefore became controversial. An important function of election for the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies in Pakistan has been the recruitment of legislatures. In the Parliamentary framework of politics in the country, this has been the standard point of entry into the political system dating from Jinnah in pre Partition days today. This applied to; the independence generation of politicians including Liaqat, Suhrwardy, Khaleequzaman, Noorul Amin, Daultana, Shouket Hayat, Madudi and Ayub Khoro, khan Abdul Qayum Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib; the second generation including ZA. Bhautto, Wali Khan, Mujeebur Rehamn, Shah Ahmad Noranni and the Baloch triumvirate of 24 Mangal- Bugti- Marri; and the third generation including Nawaz Sharif and Late Benazir Bhutto of course, some of them started their career outside the legislatures and were only later elected into the assemblies. This include Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Imran Khan, Asghar Khan, late Azam Tariq and Ajmal Khattak in their case, their struggle to get into the political system did not succeed until they were finally elected into parliament. Therefore, it can be safely argued that elected assembles in Pakistan generally attract a lot of attention from ambitious politicians as the most secure and legitimate method of entry into the system. The aspect of politics in Pakistan is crucial for the understanding of the hold of parliamentary norm and procedures on the public mind as the ultimate source of state authority. What kind of legislatures emerge out of general elections in Pakistan? This is important to understand in order to place the parliament and provincial assemblies within the power structure of the country. The perceived or actual role of the legislature and legislation provided a clue to the authenticity of the whole process of elections. The British House of Commons is a co-ordinate legislature, inasmuch as it has the ability to legislate freely within the context of a stable executive-legislative relationship led by a disciplined majority. This remains the ideal of the present and would-be parliamentarians in the Commonwealth countries, including Pakistan. However, the reality is that parliament in Pakistan is a subordinate legislature. Here, the executive is, without exception, a pre-eminent player on the national scene. It initiates decisions in party forums, which are translated into law through the legislative procedure, and are than rigidly defined, implemented and controlled by the bureaucracy. Given the domination of extra-parliamentary forces over the power structure of Pakistan, parliamentary institutions are often considered by political players as necessary accoutrements of a modern ruling structure. In other words, these institutions legitimize the existing political order. Even if real power resides outside the legislature, the power holder needs to win legal and moral authority. Not surprisingly, each of the four military governments tried to fill the gap of legitimacy by holding elections, in 1962, 1970, 1985 and 2002. Parliamentary institutions in Pakistan have often performed what is called the ‘exit function’ of legislatures. Whenever the pressure or legitimacy raised high and restive elements of the public threatened to destabilize the system, elections for legislatures opened up an opportunity for them to stand up and be counted for the purposes of either government formation or oppositionist politics. Elections take them from 25 ‘voice’ to ‘exit’ from the street and thus to ‘disengagement’ from a potentially extrasystemic activity. For example, the 1970 election was a direct result of the 1968-69 anti Ayub movement that had mobilized millions of industrial workers, students, peasants, tribal and ethnic nationalists and ‘socialist’ element throughout the country. Every shade of political opinion and ideology won a share of votes and seats in the 1970 elections, including ethnic nationalists from East Pakistan, Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP, trade unions, Islamic parties, the left and, to a lesser extent, professional middle classes.79 The Yahya regime adopted a strategy of brutal suppression of the Bengali movement, which led to the loss of East Pakistan. While the 1970 elections represented popular forces of all shades, the 1985 elections bypassed popular forces, represented by the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which had boycotted the whole exercise of mass mandate as unconstitutional and illegal. In clear swing of the pendulum to the other side, the 1988-1997 elections gave representation to all the major and minor political parties, groups, factions and individuals. It can be argued that this was again a case of the exit function of elections, where all the relatively enterprising sections of the political community opted out of potentially agitation politics and chose to play according to the prescribed, though controversial, rules of the game. While legislatures in Pakistan structured the political conflict, served as an entry point to the political system, provided legitimacy to the ruling elite and performed an exit function for radical opposition, these also served as channels for ‘constituency service work’ inasmuch as public representatives often mediated between the government and the public. The process of elections linked the potential legislatures with the electorate, whereby the latter defined a role for the former pumping station for the interest of their respective constituents through various informal channels. This brokerage function of members of elected assemblies has generally overtaken their function as law-makers. Mohapatra outlined the demands constituents in terms of a) beating the system, such as for out-of-turn favours; b) expediting the administrative process for businessmen, students and petitioners of all other kinds; c) pork barrel requests, such as funds for development projects; and d) helping the helpless individuals who are stuck in the morass of things.80 This model applies to Pakistan in a comprehensive way. In a typical electoral constituency for the National Assembly or a provincial assembly, the potential and actual voters want their representatives to act on their behalf to get things done, and practically do the errandrunning if need be. The voter turnout, finally, is the measure of people’s trust in this 26 struggle in pursuit of a step up the ladder, which would provide them access to the coveted window of a department in the state’s machinery. Conversely, it indicates the level of the public’s faith in the capacity of the system to deliver. 1.6 BASIC PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL POLITICS Electoral politics based on some basic practices which attract a genuine commitment of contestants and voters to the competition for office only if the results of elections are not a foregone conclusion. That was the case in certain communist systems or one-party states. In other words, only competitive elections can be taken seriously for the purpose of establishing the rule of public representatives. In Fred Hayward’s words: The basic principles and expectations of competitive elections can be summarized as follows: all the law abiding adult citizens are entitled to vote; political organizations are free to put up candidates, debate their merits freely, and criticize opponents; political organizations campaign with the objective of winning; each voter caste one vote and is not hindered in expressing a choice (preferably in secret); votes are honestly counted and the results faithfully reported; the candidate, party, or coalition with the most votes wins; the losing individual or party does not try to use force to alter the outcome or prevent the winner from taking office; and the party in power does not restrict political participation and competition which are within the parameters of existing rules.81 Myron Weiner similarly outlined four characteristics of electoral democracy; competitive elections; ability of political parties and contestants to canvas in a free atmosphere; acceptance of results in order to move on to the task of the formation of government as well as opposition; and location of supreme authority in the hands of the elected government accountable to the electorate.82 The last factor entails a requirement for parliamentary sovereignty, which has been problematic in Pakistan over since independence. Given the context of elections for a non-sovereign parliament, and similarly vulnerable provincial assemblies lower down, we need to outline the relevance of the election campaign, party mobilization, media input and the actual polling of votes for the process of democratization in the country. While elections in Pakistan are competitive according to other criteria, the lack of parliamentary control over the levers of power in a final sense makes the whole process suspect in the eyes of political activists and analysts. Why Study Elections in Pakistan and especially in NWFP? How far can the exercise of seeking to explain individual decisions of casting votes and collective results of voting be useful for a study of politics in Pakistan? How can the analysis of one specific election explain the general electoral behaviors of the public? In the presence of widespread allegations of rigging, does it make sense to try to understand the public mood with the help of expression through the ballot? Since the elections were 27 held as a part of the process of transition from authoritarian to civilian rule, and were by the same account atypical of elections as normally held in an ongoing democratic process, how can the present study bring out the pattern of predictability of election cycle? To answer these questions, one needs to point out the latent concern of the establishment to win over legitimacy from the constitutionally provided source of mass mandate. There is widespread understanding among various sections of the population, ranging from the tribal and landed elite and professional middle classes down to students, trade unionists and peasants, that election mean power. The electorate interprets the meaning of elections in terms of accessibility to the powerwelding administrative regime in the federal and provincial capitals. Electoral candidates look at the whole exercise in terms of opportunity for providing patronage in the locality along with a social status commensurate with the ability to perform the brokerage function. The military establishment and its cohort civilian bureaucracy find elections the legal cushion for exercising power. All this makes democracy the overarching normative ideal, which inspires the rulers and the ruled alike. It is with reference to this ideal, and behavioural standards accruing from it, that allegations of electoral malpractices emerge and proliferate. The ideal that democracy is the all encompassing normative ideal of the general public underlines the current research into the electoral behaviour in Pakistan.83 The nature of this consensus is mainly procedural, not substantive.84 Most of the complaints about foul play relate to failing standards of democratic behaviour at various stages of the cumbersome process of election. These include: filling nomination, withdrawing names of candidature, scrutiny of papers, equal access to media, apportionment of electoral constituencies, grossly biased nature of appellate tribunals dealing with wrongdoing at various stages of the election process, location of polling stations, coverage by the electronic media, impersonation of voters as well as violence at the polls. These procedures are defined and safeguarded by the legal and institutional framework of the state. Thus, these are elevated to high principles of public morality by various incumbent governments, caretaker or otherwise, which try to adhere to the formal requirements enshrined in election laws. Government often relay on the cumbersome process of litigation, including dilatory tactics and legal loopholes, to save off the crisis of legitimacy in the short run. Most of the rigging practices are rooted in attempts to dodge the rules and regulations which otherwise follow the pattern of he legal and institutional practices of mature democracies, 28 especially the UK. Given the legal, institutional and behavioural pattern operative in the country, what was the meaning of the elections in Pakistan? This study explores the meaning of elections for people, including voters as well as non voters, who experienced the electoral dynamics in various ways. This study also endeavours to analyze the evolving civil-military relations in the wake of political mobilization of the wider public during the campaign, in the context of the legitimacy function of the exercise in mass voting. The present research also explores the meaning of elections for various political parties in and outside the government. Similarly the meaning of elections for various civil society organizations is an interesting field of enquiry. The question whether these elections have provided access to the ultimate power of allocation of resources to the non establishment elements of society in general, and political forces in particular, forms a significant part of the present inquiry. Elaborating on this theme further, a question arises whether elections in Pakistan have the potential to translate mass mandate into public policy once the government formally assumes the responsibility for decision making. This question acquires its relevance from the fact that bureaucracy is typically inclined to prevent elections from influencing policy. Often, public office holders, who are hierarchically superior to the government officials in various departments, find themselves handicapped in the face of administrative routine and the establishment’s thinking.85 In this model of ‘overall democracy’, the higher the level of professionalism in bureaucracy the lower would be the level of acceptance of the election agenda and party positions as material for sound policy.86 The fact that bureaucracy enjoys a higher institutional level than political parties in terms of merit-based recruitment, strict post-recruitment socialization and a hierarchical structure operates decisively against any possible impact of election on policy.87 1.7 REFORMS IN ELECTORAL POLITICS: The issue of electoral reforms is the heart and core of electoral politics. The demand for electoral reforms and change in the prevalent electoral system dated as for back as the first elections in 1951 held in Punjab and NWFP. The idea was that the first-past-the-post system, as inherited from the British India, led to the formation of governments which had not won the majority vote. After all, an election system is the most specific manipulative instrument of politics.88 It translates votes into seats in a certain predetermined way and thus shapes a predictable kind of party system. It is part of the traditional wisdom 29 that the plurality system tends to create a two party system, even as it allows smaller parties to operate on the margins. This is so because the plurality system tends to create two party systems, even as it allows smaller parties to operate on the margins. This is so because the plurality system produces a stable majority in parliament. The Proportional Representation system (PR), alternatively, promotes maximum representation of all shades of public opinion. One is like projector, bringing out an imperative mandate of the electorate with a view to forming a government and possibly pursuing a prescribed set of policies. The other is like a camera, reflecting the representative mandate of the public but leaving the task government formation and implementation of the political agenda to the new legislators.89 Citizens end up contributing to formation of stable party governments in the former case but delegating authority to form what is often an unstable coalition government to their representatives in the latter case.90 In Pakistan the protagonists of the plurality and PR Systems tended to be polarized. Under the one party dominance model of politics in Pakistan during the 1970s, the smaller parties of the opposition demanded the PR system. Under the two party systems of the 1990s again PR was the preferred system of smaller parties. Even more significantly, the urban middle classes, military officers and bureaucracy in general disliked strong majorities on the floor of elected assemblies, led by what they called the feudal leadership. They argued against the plurality system, because: i). the local influential, especially tribal lords and the landed elite, would enjoy a level of representation on the floor of parliament which was disproportionate to their vote. ii). this would lead to the emergence of strong prime ministers who would seek to change policy and mobilize the public in pursuit of their agenda; and iii). it would leave the educated middle class high and dry out in the field due to its lack of support in the locality. It is not uncommon to see government officials, who generally hail from the middle class, argue against the plurality system. They strongly uphold the standard criticism of the system, e.g. that the vote of defeated candidates is wasted and that the victorious parties and contestants are elected with only a minority of polled votes. The 1990 election fully exposed the anomalous link between votes and seats. Each of the two mainstream political parties PML-N and PPP polled nearly 37 per cent of vote, with a difference of less than one per cent. But the former took more than double the seats of its rival. In 1997 the PML-N polled twice the votes of PPP in the National Assembly. Over-amplification of small vote margins into huge seats margins 30 characterized the electoral system of Pakistan throughout the 1990s. It also ensured that a kind of two party systems continued to dominate the electoral scene. To that extent, Duverger’s law was in operation in Pakistan. In addition to social factors affecting the outcome of elections in Pakistan, including the tribal system, caste system, Islamic and ethnic orientations and the role of the ‘invisible’ government, exogenous factors, such as the election system, played a significant role in mapping the electoral space. This role has been defined in terms of the ‘mechanical effect’ of the election system, because no human agency is supposed to interfere in the implementations of laws.91 This is closely related to the ‘psychological effect’ in as much as the system accommodates a large number of parties and candidates to contest elections, and lays out ideological, issue-based and policy-based public profiles. 1.8 CONCLUSIONS In this chapter three major theoretical approaches to the study of elections, the Michigan approach, the Columbia school and the Downsian theory i.e rational choice theory have been outlined. Electoral politics, political participation, basic practices in electoral politics, reforms and shifting patterns of public opinion have been analysed. Michigan Model is closely associated for the study of elections in NWFP. This is so because it attracted both partisan and political motives of a voter and candidate. Henry J. Steiner, Political participation as Human rights (New York: McMillan and Company Ltd., 1960), p.60. 2 David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics (England: Penguin Books, 1987), p.88. 3 Leon Mayhew, Society, Institutions and Activity (Davis: University of California, 1971), p.123. 4 Ibid. pp.2-4. 5 Ibid. pp. 6-8. 6 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p.301. 7 Ibid, p.113. 8 Ibid, p.51. 9 Ajmal Khattak, Interview by author, Nowshera, 23 March 2005. 10 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.158. 11 Muhammad Tariq Jazy, The Mixed Proportional Electoral System for Pakistan (Islamabad: Friedrich Ebert Stifting, 200), p.1. 12 Dietor Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (Bonn; Friedrich Ebert-Stifting, 1966), p.84. 13 J. Blondel, Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics (Australia: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 27-28. 14 J. Blondel, Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics (Australia: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 27-28. 15 Ajmal Khattak, Interview by author, Nowshera, 23 March 2005 16 J.F.S. Ross, Elections and Electors (London: Eyere and spottis woode, 1955), p.33. 17 Thomas A. Reilly. Political Bargaining, (Manchester: Manchester School Press, 1968), p.37. 18 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1957), p. 28 1 31 19 Richard Rose, Comparability in Electoral Studies, Ed. Richard Rose, Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1974), pp. 8-9 20 John Badgley, Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p.139. 21 Samual Huntington, “Made about Mega”, Newsweek (New York: June 21, 1988), p.12. 22 Ibid, p.33. 23 Ibid, p.45. 24 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion, p.30. 25 Ibid, p.30. 26 Ibid, p.55. 27 Ibid, p.31. 28 Ibid, p.28. 29 Ibid, p.29. 30 Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmad, Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.89. 31 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.155-56. 32 Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p.33. 33 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p.345. 34 Academic American Encyclopaedia, Vol. 19 (Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1987), p.104. 35 William A. Haviland, Cultural Anthropology (New York: MC Grand Hill Publishing Company. 1990), pp.321-22. 36 Rebert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in politics (Glencoe, III , the free press, 1959), p. 6. 37 V.O. Key, ‘A theory of critical elections’, Journal of Politics, XVII (February 1955), p.3. 38 Rebert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in politics (Glencoe, III , The Free press, 1959), p. 6. 39 Ibid, p.8. 40 Richards G.Niemi and Herbert F.Weisberg, Controversies in American Voting Behaviour (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and company, 1976), P.12. 41 Ibid, p.14. 42 Ibid, p.18. 43 David Denver, Elections and Voting Behaviour in Britain (London: Phillip Allan, 1989), p. 27 44 Ibid. 45 Jack Denis, ‘The Study of Electoral Behaviour,’ in Political Behaviour Ed, William Crotty, (Evganston, Illinois: North Western University Press, , 1991), p.55 46 Ibid., pp.59-61. 47 John Curtice, ‘The State of Election Studies: A Mid-Life Crisis or New Youth?, Electoral Studies, vol.21, no.2 (June 2002), p.162. 48 K. Kight and M. March, ‘Varieties of Election Studies’, Electoral Studies, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 2002), pp.74-75. 49 Ibid, pp.175-76. 50 K. Shepsle and R. Cohen, ‘Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Deterrence in Spatial Models of elections’, in eds. J.m. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, Advances in the Spatial Theory and Voting (Vambridge University Press, New York 1990), pp.12-16. 51 A. Westholm, ‘Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of Electoral Choice’, American Political Science Review, no. 91, (1997), pp.869-70. 52 R.J Dalton, S.C. Flanegan and PA. Beck (eds.), Realignment or De-alignment (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984) 53 R.S Katz and P. Mair, ‘Changing Model of Party organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of a Catch –all Party’, Party Politic, no. 1, (1995), pp.5-28. 54 Rajni Kothari et al,, Party system and election Studies, (New Dehli: 1967), pp. 4-5. 55 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan. 56 Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books ltd, 1994), p.30. 57 Ibid, p.255. 58 Peter G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and election in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1976), p. 93. 32 59 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p.88. 60 Ibid, p.61. 61 Ibid, p. 162. 62 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion, p. 301. 63 J.S. Mill quoted in Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.8. 64 Mazhar-ul-Haq, Political Science (Lahore: Book Land Publishers, 1994), p.29. 65 W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1947), p.363. 66 Dietor Nohlen, Election and Electoral Systems, (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 1996), p.84. 67 M.K Mohapatra, ‘The Ombudsmanic Role of Legislature in an Indian State’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 1976. 68 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Pakistan’s Lingering Crises of Dyarchy’, (Asian Survey, July 1992) 69 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Democratisation in Pakistan: The Current Phase’, in Contemporary Political Studies 1996, (Belfast, 1996), p.261. 70 Samuel Huntington, ‘Demoracy’s Third Wave’, (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, no 2 Spring 1991) 71 General ® Hameed Gul, Interview with author, Islamabad 23 April 2006 72 Benazir Bhutto, Interview with author, Dubai 26 August 2005 73 IanTalbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), p. 291 74 Ibid., p.279. 75 Interviews with politicians, among others-Mohammad Iqbal Jhagra PML-N, Peshawar, 13 April 2008. 76 I. Crew, ‘The Electorate: Partisan De-alignment Ten Years On’, in H. Barrington ed. Change in British Politics, (Frank Cass, London 1984), pp.193-200. 77 G. Evans, The End of Class Politics? (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). pp.25-30 78 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics; also, K.B. Sayeed, The political system. 79 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State, pp.243-54. 80 M.K Mohapatra, The Ombudsmanic Role, pp. 301-2 81 Fred Hayward, Introduction in Fred Hayward, Elections in Independent Africa ed. (Boulder, 1987), p.3. 82 Myron Weiner, ‘Empirical Democratic Theory’ in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun eds, Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (London: Duke University Press, 1987), p.3. 83 Interviews with cross-section of the elite, including generals, bureaucrats, and diplomats and party leaders and workers, as well as the members of general public. 84 Myron Weiner, Empirical Democratic Theory, p. 20 85 Hamza Alavi, ‘The Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan Politics’, Paper later published in Armee et Nations dans les Trois Continents ed. A. Abdel Malik, (Alger, 1975), pp. 25-30 86 Ibid, pp. 38-43 87 Charles Canady, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1987) 88 Arend Ligphart, ‘the Field of Electoral system research: A Critical survey’, Electoral Studies, (1985), 4:1, p.3. 89 Maurice Duverger, ‘Which is the Best electoral system’, in eds. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral system (Praegar, 1984), pp. 31-35. 90 Ibid 91 Kenneth Benoit, ‘The Endogeneity Problem in Electoral Studies: A Critical Re-Examination of Duverger’s Mechanical Effect’, Electoral Studies, vol. 21, no.1 (March 2002) 33 CHAPTER-2 NWFP’s ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY 2.1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to map out the electoral geography of the NWFP by his referring to the distinctive historical, socio economic, and political characteristics of socio-economic, each region, and to show how these have contributed to regional differences in voting behaviour and electoral politics in NWFP. This study has divided NWFP into northern, central, southern and north eastern (Hazara) parts as illustrated in Map 2.11. These divisions have taken into consideration several factors including geographical boundaries, official district and nsideration division borders, voting behaviour, regional economic differences, and variations in irrigation, agriculture, and cropping patterns, and distinct historical, cultural, and linguistic influences in each region. Map 2.1: Map of NWFP. Northern NWFP consists of seven districts including Swat, Chitral, Shangla, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Malakand and Buner. Central NWFP has five districts which include Peshawar, Charsada, Nowsh Nowshera, Mardan and Swabi. North-Eastern NWFP (Hazara) Eastern 34 has five districts, including Abbottabad, Mansehra, Haripur, Battagram and Kohistan. Similarly southern region of NWFP consists of seven districts, including D.I. Khan, Tank, Hangu, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Karak.2 In all these regions the economically active populations are potential political participants in elections. Total economically active population in NWFP is 19.4 % which includes 19% in rural areas and 21.3% in urban areas. Economically Female are more dependent on Male both in rural and urban areas. In economically active population male ratio is 36.8% while female ratio is 1.1%.3 Table 2.1: National Assembly Election Results by NWFP Regions. Political Parties Central seats %age 50 0 25 12.5 12.5 0 0 12.5 75 12.5 0 0 62.5 0 25 12.5 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 8 Seats 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 6 1 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 South 5 seats %age 0 40 0 60 0 0 40 20 0 20 20 0 0 60 0 40 0 0 0 80 20 0 0 0 Seats 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 North-East 7 seats %age Seats 0 57.14 0 0 42.8 0 0 57.14 0 28.57 14.28 0 0 85.71 0 0 14.29 0 0 85.71 0 0 14.29 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 North 6 seats %age 66.6 33.33 0 0 0 0 50 33.3 0 0 16.6 0 16.67 16.67 16.67 33.33 16.67 0 0 83.33 16.67 0 0 0 Seats 4 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 Total 26 seats %age 30.76 30.76 7.69 15.38 15.38 0 19.23 30.76 23.07 15.38 11.5 0 23.07 38.46 11.53 19.23 7.69 0 0 57.69 38.46 0 3.84 0 Seats 8 8 2 4 4 0 5 8 6 4 3 0 6 10 3 5 2 0 0 15 10 0 1 0 1988 PPP IJI ANP Religious Independent Other 1990 PDA IJI ANP Religious Independent Other 1993 PPP PML-N ANP Religious Independent Other 1997 PPP PML-N ANP Religious Independent Other Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) There were eighty provincial seats and twenty six National Assembly seats for NWFP during 1988-1999. In National Assembly, Central NWFP had eight seats, Southern NWFP had five seats, North-East region had seven seats and North region had six seats. Percentage of seats and seats won by each party on National Assembly from NWFP is indicated in table 2.1. The electoral results for provincial assembly show that the party which was in wining position at center obtained considerable vote strength in NWFP. Table 2.2 illustrates the detailed picture of electoral situations in NWFP. 35 Table 2.2: Table showing the Provincial Assembly Election Results by NWFP Regions. Central 27 Seats %age Seats 1988 PPP IJI ANP Religious Independent Other 1990 PDA IJI ANP Religious Independent Other 1993 PPP PML-N ANP Religious Independent Other 1997 PPP PML-N ANP Religious Independent Other 51.85 7.41 37.04 0 3.70 0 7.41 22.22 66.67 0 3.70 0 37.04 0 59.26 0 3.70 0 3.7 14.81 77.78 0 3.7 0 14 2 10 0 1 0 2 6 18 0 1 0 10 0 16 0 1 0 1 4 21 0 1 0 South 16 seats %age Seats 6.25 37.5 6.25 12.5 37.5 0 12.50 43.75 12.50 6.25 25 0 6.25 25 6.25 6.25 37.5 18.75 0 37.50 18.75 6.25 25 12.5 1 6 1 2 6 0 2 7 2 1 4 0 1 4 1 1 6 3 0 6 3 1 4 2 North-East 19 seats %age Seats 0 52.63 0 0 47.37 0 0 42.11 5.26 5.26 47.37 0 5.26 52.63 5.26 5.26 26.32 0 0 73.68 5.26 0 21.05 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 8 1 1 9 0 1 10 1 1 5 0 0 14 1 0 4 0 North 18 seats %age Seats 38.89 50 5.56 0 5.56 0 11.11 66.67 11.11 0 11.11 0 55.56 5.56 11.11 22.22 5.56 0 16.67 44.44 27.78 0 11.11 0 7 9 1 0 1 0 2 12 2 0 2 0 10 1 2 4 1 0 3 8 5 0 2 0 Total 80 seats %age Seats 27.5 33.75 15 0 21.25 0 7.5 33 28.75 2.5 20 0 27.5 18.75 25 7.5 16.25 3.75 22.5 22.5 37.5 1.25 13.75 2.5 22 27 12 0 17 0 6 33 23 2 16 0 22 15 20 6 13 3 4 18 30 1 11 2 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). The electoral geography of NWFP is unique due to its physical features and topography. NWFP comprising 74521 Square Kilometres area possesses a population of 17,735,912,4 which is spread on hilly areas of north and north-eastern parts of NWFP, Plain areas of central districts and deserts areas of southern parts of NWFP. Electoral politics in these areas revolves around political elites of rural areas including Khans (Elders), landholders, religious seminaries, and titled gentry of the British period. In NWFP the nucleus of electoral politics lies in rural areas.5 The detail of party positions in National and Provincial assemblies from 1988-1997 are shown in table 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The detail of valid, rejected, registered and percentage of vote polled is shown in table 2.3. Table 2.3 and 2.4 shows that the registered voters for provincial assembly is not matched with the registered voters of national Assembly. Percentage of vote polled for provincial assembly is more as compared to the vote polled for national assembly. Similarly number of contesters for provincial 36 assembly is also seemed more as compared to the number of contesters for national assembly. Table 2.3: Voting detail (Provincial Assembly for 80 seats) Elections 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 Party Position 2376193 2995129 Valid 2174550 Rejected 37331 Total 2211881 Registered 5940182 %age 37.24 Contesters 594 IJI: 27, PPP:22 ANP:12,IND:17, JUI-F:2 30606 2325735 5974565 38.93 538 IJI:33, PDA:6, ANP:23,IND:16, JUI-F:2 32896 2409089 6268525 37.83 510 PPP:22,ANP:20, IND:13, PML-N:15, PML-J:4, IJM:1, MDM:1, PIF:4 1933623 49384 1983007 6651930 29.81 622 PML-N:32, PPP:04, ANP:30, IND:11, JUI-F:1, PML(J):2. Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). PPP formed the government in 1988 (as later in 1993) with the coalition of independents, ANP and some religious elements. Similarly in 1990 and 1997, IJI and PML-N formed their governments with the coalition of ANP, independents and religious elements. This shows that the party which formed a Government at the Centre would also establish a provincial administration in NWFP. Table 2.4: Table showing voting detail (National Assembly for 26 seats) Elections 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 Party Position 2148897 2098123 Valid 1974315 Rejected 45014 Total 2019349 Registered 5939165 %age 34.29 Contesters 56 PPP:8, ANP:2, JUI-F:1, IND:4, IJI:8, JUI-F:2, JUI-D:1 31343 2129446 5983415 32.9 147 ANP:6, IJI:8, JUI-F:4, PDA:5, IND:3 39430 2188327 6367968 34.55 PPP:6, ANP:3, IJM:2, PM-N:10, MDM:1, IND:1, PIF:2, PKQP:1 1868838 54194 1923032 6651974 29.01 128 PML-N:15, ANP:10, IND:1 175 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Table 2.4 shows the detail of National Assembly voting from NWFP. The maximum turnout rate was during 1988-1997 elections with 34.55 per cent and the minimum was 29.01 per cent in 1997. Similarly for 26 National Assembly seats the maximum contesters were 175 and minimum were 56. Table 2.5 provides a comparison of key socio economic statistics for each region. 37 Table 2.5: Socio economic comparison of four NWFP regions. Population Central 1998 Population (1000) 6402 1998 Population (%) 36.10 1998 Urban Population (%) 26.20 1998 Rural Population (%) 73.74 Area (Square Kms) 7176 1998 Population Density (Per square Km) 892.25 Literacy and Languages Total Literacy (%) 37.58 Male Literacy (%) 54.16 Female Literacy (%) 19.86 Urban Literacy (%) 48.24 Rural Literacy (%) 32.68 Household Speaking Pushto 93.48 Household Speaking Punjabi 1.38 Household Speaking Urdu 0.94 Household Speaking Saraiki 0.16 Household Speaking Other Languages 3.96 Economy and Employment Total Labour Force 5.9 Agriculture Labour Force-%age in NWFP 6.0 Agriculture Labour Force-%age in Regions 30.4 Labour, Production, Transport-% of NWFP 7.1 Labour, Production, Transport-% in regions 28.2 Service, Sales, Prof/tech., Admin/Mgmt.-% in NWFP 08.4 Service, Sales, Prof/tech., Admin/Mgmt % in Regions 8.1 Government Employees-% of NWFP 16.2 Government Employees-% in Regions 26.4 1998 Manufacturing employment-% of NWFP 5.7 1998 Manufacturing employment-% in regions 6.2 1998 Manufacturing -# of units-% of NWFP 5.2 1998 Manufacturing -# of units-% in regions 17.2 1998 number of registered factories 2.4 Agriculture (average figure from 1990-99) Irrigated Land (1000 Hectares) in %ages 46 Wheet (1000 Tons) in %ages 32.2 Cleaned Rice (1000 Tons) in %ages 4.23 Sugarcane (1000 Tons) in %ages 85.55 Cotton (1000 Bales) in %ages 6.2 Tobacco (1000 Tons) in %ages 79.16 Sources: Government of Pakistan (GOP), Handbook of Population Census Organisation Press, 1987) North 4262 24.03 6.16 93.84 29871 142.40 28.14 43.59 12.57 32.64 27.14 72.86 0.07 0.17 0.06 26.84 52.6 45.6 18.5 59.4 30.3 59.5 59.6 57.8 30.2 68.9 68.8 68.3 33.8 70.1 North-East 3505 19.37 7.04 92.96 17064 205.44 35.2 48.52 21.74 42.98 33.42 24.66 0.84 0.44 0.6 71 21.8 23.3 26.4 16.2 22.8 16.8 15.9 14.2 20.8 12.5 12.8 11.8 25.6 17.3 South 3564 20.10 14.33 85.67 20410 174.66 33.70 53.34 14.10 55.01 29.56 82.27 0.89 0.83 13.19 2.71 14.8 18.2 23.2 10.5 20.4 8.2 8.7 8.9 24.2 7.6 6.8 7.5 24.8 5.2 Total 17735 100 16.9 83.1 74521 238 35.4 51.5 18.8 54.3 31.3 68.31 0.79 0.59 3.50 26.12 23.77 23.27 24.62 23.3 25.42 23.22 23.07 24.27 25.4 23.67 23.65 23.2 25.35 23.75 15 25 14 25 24.9 12.1 31 25.05 65.84 10.69 19.25 25 5.52 0.12 7.0 24.54 0 0 93.79 24.99 13.85 6.99 0 25 Data 1988, NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census The researcher will turn in the next sections to look in more detail at these varied socio-economic contexts between the regions of NWFP and how they contribute to a distinctive electoral geography. 2.2 CENTRAL NWFP: Central NWFP is not only the province’s geographic centre, but also its political, economic, and cultural centre. Total area of central NWFP is 7176 sq.km having population 6402000.6 It is the most urbanized, industrialized, agriculturally productive, and densely populated of the four regions of the NWFP. Eight National Assembly seats out of twenty Six of NWFP and twenty seven provincial assembly seats out of eighty of NWFP lies here. This area is thus of crucial importance for election outcomes. During elections 1988-1997 voters’ average percentage participation in central NWFP was 32%.7 38 2.2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION: Central NWFP comprises districts Peshawar, Nowshera, Charsada, Mardan and Swabi.8 It is situated near the bank of river Indus and Kabul. The canal system of these rivers helped to irrigate the lands of these districts which have made central NWFP the agriculturally richest region in the Province. Agriculture is the principal occupation of the population living in these areas. Apart from agriculture, a number of manufacturing industries have absorbed a large number of skilled and unskilled labours. Gadoon Amazai is one of the biggest Industrial estates of the North-West Frontier Province having 580 industries and mills it lies in central NWFP (Swabi District). To the east of central NWFP lies Afghanistan border and the west is Punjab. The fertile agricultural land has made central NWFP the most densely populated region of Pakistan. Its population in 1998 was 64.02 million9, approximately 36 percent of the NWFP’s total population. The other most notable geographical feature of central NWFP is that it is plain and fertile area of river Indus and Kabul. The river Indus serves as the boundary between central and southern, and north-eastern NWFP. Another feature that distinguishes central NWFP is that it has the most urbanized population in NWFP. The largest cities like Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, Swabi and Charsada are located in central NWFP. In 1998, 26.26 percent of the population was living in urban areas. The average growth rates of urban areas are 3%.10 This shows that within the next 1020 years central NWFP’s urban population will outnumber its rural population. 2.2.2 THE AGRICULTURAL AND CANAL SYSTEM: The rivers of the NWFP i.e Kabul and Indus provide water to the canal irrigation system of the central region of NWFP. The construction of proper canal irrigation system was for the first time adapted by the British government in 1885 AD11., when the lower Swat canal was opened at Manda Qila of Swat river. This first ever canal in the province irrigated whole southern area of Charsada and middle tracts of Mardan. Upper Swat canal which takes off from the Swat River at Amandarra in Malakand Agency was first opened in 1914 to irrigate the areas in the north of Mardan and Swabi in the extreme north eastern corner of Charsada. Kabul River canal was opened in 189312 from the right bank of Kabul River near Warsak and irrigate considerable areas in Peshawar and Nowshera. One advantage of the construction of this canal was that the Warsak canal which was primarily a flood channel was converted into a regular canal, and the base for canal system of irrigation was also laid in other parts of the province. 39 Pehur Canal takes water by way of a cut from the Indus a few miles from Topi in Swabi district. Due to heavy silt it is not regularly used for irrigation Warsak High level canal, Right and Left Bank Canals are also the major source of irrigation in central NWFP. Before the introduction of the major canal networks in central NWFP, barani (rain-fed) agriculture was possible in the sub-mountainous regions of Swabi, Charsada, Peshawar, Mardan and Nowshera districts, and in the eastern settled districts of central NWFP through well irrigation and occasionally seasonal inundation canals. In the western regions of central NWFP cultivation took place in the riverian regions, but the un-irrigated higher lands in the alluvial terraces (bars) of the doabs13 were wastelands, virtually uninhabited except for some pastoral tribes. It was in these barren and sparsely populated western bar lands that the canal colonies were established and settlers brought into cultivate the lands they were allotted. The addition of millions of acres of irrigated land brought prosperity to central NWFP. The irrigation process of the land in the province was started centuries ago. Due to the limited sources, and technical know how people had started construction water channels on the river sides and water courses according to their requirements. In these channels the flow of water always to be blocked due to the low water level in rivers. As the time passed on and the requirements of the people increased the construction of these water channels were also changed, and these channels were constructed collectively.14 Agriculture in Central NWFP is associated largely with these canal systems and it is the most important agricultural region in Pakistan. Land is divided into three main categories, i.e. Barani Land, Partly irrigated land and cash crop land.15 In this agricultural based environment, landlords, nevertheless, have considerably more influence than statistics would seem to indicate. For one thing, though individual holdings are numerous they are often small or extremely fragmented, whereas the areas commanded by landlords though proportionality smaller in number, run into thousands of acres. Before Martial in 1964 came into effect a Nawab of Hoti owns as much as 50,000 acres of top quality land in Peshawar Basin. The Ayub’s land reforms laws prohibits persons from holding more than 500 acres of irrigated lands, 150 acres of orchards and 1000 acres of barrani (rainy) land, most of the large landholdings still remain intact. By skillfully dividing the shares of land among all of their family members, the landlords have managed to circumvent all land reforms almost entirely. 40 In a society where social status and political power are traditionally directly related to the amount of land owned, it is important to note the policies adopted by the British to distribute these vast expanses of newly irrigated canal colony land. In general, four categories of land grants were given. The first was to ‘peasant proprietors’ who receive one-two squares of land. The second category was to ‘yeoman farmers’ who received four or five squares of land in the hope that their abilities and resources would help in the development of the colony. The third was to the landed elite, or the ‘hereditary landed gentry’ as they were referred to by the British, and was motivated primarily by political concerns16. In the words of Malcom Darling: …Society was still semi-feudal in character, and there were obvious advantages in propitiating the landed gentry with valuable grants of land; and the hope was cherished that this would help to restore the influence of a class, which had been seriously impaired by recurring partition of family estates and by the rise to power of a prosperous and educated middle class in the towns.17 The fourth category was conditional land grants given to those who undertook the breeding of horses and camels for the military.18 Kabul river canal and Lower Swat canal system was one of the great canal system and was established at a time when the British were motivated by the desire to ‘preserve the tradition of the NWFP as peasant farmers like Punjab’.19 By the time the other two colonies of Charsada and Swabi were settled in the years following World War I, the Indian Nationalist movement, led primarily by urban professionals, was gaining momentum. The Government’s priority, therefore, shifted from preserving the peasant to preserving the rural landed elite. This British priority created a distance between big and small khans and finally this policy paved a way towards the emergence of new political group in Frontier politics, i.e. Khudai Khidmatgars as pointed out in previous chapter on ‘historical background’. In these colonies, much more land was auctioned to ‘capitalists’ or allocated to the ‘hereditary landed gentry’. This was especially true in Charsada, and Mardan where all the major asharafi families Hoti, Khans, Afridis, Pir and Syedsreceived large colony grants.20 The political impact of this policy is felt to this day, as the larger landholdings have enabled the landed elite in Mardan to wield considerable influence in the District’s politics. In Charsada district, the policy of preserving the ‘peasant farmer’ left few large landholders, with the result that control of land plays a less important role in the politics of Charsada than in most other rural areas of the NWFP. British also introduced canal colony setup in west Punjab, where large numbers of lands were awarded to new landlords who were in the interest of British government. In this way a new class structures was emerged and old hereditary jagirdars were also persuaded to support British government in sub-continent. In 41 Punjab some new canal colonies were established with the help of outside settlers taken from overpopulated districts. These settlers were generally chosen from the ‘agricultural tribes’, namely the Jat Sikh, who were considered as the best settlers as they further recruited for military purposes, and the Arain, ‘the prince of marketgardeners’.21 The soldiers who were recruited from Punjab were also awarded land after retirement. For this purpose a considerable land in Lower Bari Doab Colony was also set aside for military pensioners.22 2.2.3 ECONOMY: In 1947, NWFP had no industrial infrastructure. Eleven small scale units and a sugar mill were the first developments. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) established some major industries in the 1950s. Sugar Mill at Charsada, paper and woolen Mills at Nowshera were established in early 1950s. During 1960s, 132 large and small scale industrial units with a total investment of Rs. 1467 millions were established. In 1991 exemption of custom duty on raw material for Gadoon Industrial Estate was withdrawn. Later on, other incentives were withdrawn in 1995.23 Central NWFP is the major trade centre of the whole of the NWFP. All kinds of trading via railway is handled at Peshawar dry port. Several factors combined to make the region the centre of the province’s economic activities. These included an extensive river and canal system, few large feudal estates, more small and mid sized owner-operated farms, and relatively progressive farmers willing to use high yield varieties of seed. With 46.5% of the NWFP’s irrigated land and 47.1 percent of its agricultural labour force, central NWFP produces 82 percent of the province’s rice, 68 percent of its sugar cane, and 46 percent of its wheat. Economically active population is shown in table 2.6. Table 2.6: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (Central NWFP) (In %age). All Areas Rural Urban Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Peshawar 28.6 50.1 4.5 21 44.4 0.6 27.2 49.3 1 Nowshera 32.2 60.2 1.5 22.2 46.9 0.5 33.3 56.9 2.9 Charsada 30.8 57.9 1.5 34.6 66.9 1 0 0 0 Swabi 28.9 57.1 1 29.3 56.1 1.2 32.8 55.7 2.8 Mardan 31.1 59.3 1.3 31.2 60.1 1.3 35 60.5 2.2 Total 30.32 56.92 1.96 27.66 54.78 0.92 25.66 44.48 1.78 Source: Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics (Peshawar: Bureau of Statistics, 2000) District In addition to being the agriculturally richest region of the NWFP, in 1998, 71.9 percent of all the NWFP’s registered factories were located in central NWFP, and 68.7 percent of its manufacturing units in 1988.24 Most of the industries are located in Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera and along the main transportation routes linking 42 these cities. In the 1980s and early 1990s a large number of industrial units were put up in the newly established Gadoon Industrial Estate located near Swabi. Central NWFP is also the centre of import and export. Export from dry port Peshawar which was established in 1996,25 is mainly consisted upon the precious stones, carpets, especially hand made dry fruits, honey and antique furniture. The import mainly consists upon the plastic material for the small industrial estate at Gadoon Amazai and spare parts for locomotive factory Risalpur. Peshawar is also the main fruit Market. All the Provincial head offices of the commercial banks and Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry are situated at Peshawar. Another trade centre of central NWFP is Charsada which is famous for goods industry in Chappal (footwear) making and local made cloths known as Khamata (Khaddar). Charsada is also famous for agriculture products like Gur (Sugar) and tobacco. Mardan and Swabi are also trade centres known for their agriculture products like tobacco and sugarcane. The largest sugar Mill of Asia known as Premier Sugar Mills Mardan26 is producing sugar for export and for internal supply with in country. The small scale manufacturing and services sectors of the economy, rather than large scale manufacturing, have experienced the highest growth rates during the 1980s and 1990s. There has been a long tradition of ceramic industries in some of the cities and towns of the central NWFP. Peshawar, for example, has traditionally been famous for its artisans who produce high quality utensils, supporting goods, cutlery, and surgical instruments. During the last two decades, in and around the cities of central NWFP, a growing class of traders and entrepreneurs emerged and prospered by establishing small and medium scale industries engaged in rice-husking, flour milling, food processing and in manufacturing items such as fans, washing machines, leather goods, electrical appliances, plastic ware, shoes, ceramics, carpets, soaps and cosmetics. This growing class of traders and manufactures is making its presence felt in the politics of the NWFP. While they may be relatively few in number, they have access to ready cash which is increasingly becoming the life blood of politics in the NWFP. They also have ‘shutter power’ which they can use to close down entire business districts to protest government policies. The trader community’s unequivocal support for ANP was an important contributing factor to the strong performance of the ANP in urban NWFP in the 1988-1997 elections. 43 2.2.4 POLITICS: Central NWFP as already noted is the politically dominant region of NWFP. Table-2.1 provides a breakdown of the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 National Assembly election and Provincial Assembly’s results by region, and highlights the critical importance of central NWFP in the electoral politics of the NWFP. Central NWFP’s 8 National Assembly seats out of 26 and 27 provincial assembly seats out of 80 shows significant number of seats in Provincial and National assembly. Similarly, its 27 Provincial Assembly seats out of eighty are more than one quarter of the NWFP Assembly. Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan, Mr. Muhammad Bashir Khan, Maj General (Retd.) Nasirullah Baber, Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Muhammad Ajmal Khan Khattak were the prominent political figures during 1988-1997 electoral politics from central NWFP. During elections from 1988-97, PPP and ANP were the major parties in central NWFP while IJI and PML-N had little role in electoral politics of this area. The results of many individual seats showed the close competition. Following table shows the close competition in different seats in central NWFP. Table 2.7: Results Showing Close electoral competition less than 5000 votes and greater than1001 and more close contest i.e less than 1000 votes (Both NA and PA) Provincial Assembly Less than 1000 votes Less than 5000 and More than 1000 votes National Assembly Less than 1000 votes Less than 5000 and More than 1000 votes 3 0 2 0 1988 7 14 2 1990 5 14 0 1993 5 14 2 1997 5 12 1 08 Total 27 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Table 2.7 shows that there was close competition in seven provincial seats in 1988 provincial assembly elections and close competition in five seats in 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections. Similarly the situation in National Assembly seats shows huge voting gap among the candidates. Table 2.9 shows that only one seat in 1997 election had less than one thousand vote gap and two seats in 1993 and 1988 elections had less than one thousand vote gap. During the electoral contest for National Assembly seats from 1988-1999, the whole electoral game seemed to revolve around ANP and PPP contesters. In 1998 National Assembly elections PPP won 4 and in 1993 5seats out of eight from central NWFP while ANP won 2 seats in 1988, 6 in 1990, 2 in 1993 and 8 in 1997 out of eight National Assembly seats. During1988 and 1990 elections, IJI have won only one national assembly seat in 1990 elections, while in 1993 and 1997 44 PML(N), a major coalition partner of IJI during 1998 and 1990 elections have shown poor results in central NWFP without winning any seat. One of the most noted facts is that with the decrease of the PPP vote bank, ANP vote bank seemed to be high. ANP and PPP, results are both inversely proportion to each other. Voting detail both for national and provincial assembly is shown in table 2.8. Table 2.8: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly Elections 1988 1990 1993 1997 National Assembly 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 565095 15932 711210 12056 724443 669850 15093 684943 1908242 36.16 44 777108 615650 Valid 726762 756936 Rejected Total Registered %age 38.95 40 39.51 30.44 172 179 166 178 10831 737593 190452 IJI (2), PPP (14), ANP (10), IND (1) 8177 765113 1929592 IJI (6), PDA (2), ANP (18), IND (1) 9500 14794 786608 2009288 PPP (10), ANP (16), IND (1) 630444 2083303 PML-N (4), PPPP (1), ANP (21), IND (1) PPP (4), ANP (2), JUI-F (1), IND (1) 9795 734238 1929741 37.44 36.13 39 35 ANP (6), IJI (1), JUI-F (1) 723266 2009288 PPP (5), ANP (2), IJM (1) 581027 2083303 27.62 55 Party Position ANP (8) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) The electoral contest between Mian Muzaffar Shah (PPP) and Mr. Abrar Khattak (ANP) from NA-4 Peshawar-IV in 1988 was decided by just 85 votes. Similarly results shows that in 1993 elections the contest between Haji Muhammad Yaqoob Khan (PPP) and Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan (ANP) from NA-7 Mardan-II, had a difference of 410 votes. In Provincial Assembly elections, the results also show that in some seats the electoral contest among the candidates were very close. The result from PF-5 Peshawar-V in 1997 elections, between Haji Abdur Rehman Khan (ANP) and Mr. Kiramatullah Khan (PPP) shows a difference of 44 votes. The electoral contest in provincial assembly seats during 1988-1997 elections, shows that PPP won 13 seats in 1988, PPP in coalition with PDA won 2 seats in 1990, 10 seats in 1993 and one seat in 1997 with the coalition of PML-J out of 27 seats from central NWFP. ANP have 11 seats in 1988, 18 seats in 1990, 16 seats in 1993 and 21 seats in 1997 out of 27 seats. IJI have won 2 seats in 1988, 06 in 1990 elections. 45 PML-N, previously had a alliance with IJI during 1988 and 1990 elections have won 4 seats in 1997 elections and could not win any seat in 1993 elections. The PPPPML(J)’s 1993 National Assembly results was stronger than the 46.22 percent of the votes it won in the 1993 elections. One of the reasons can be attributed to the strong performances of PPP in Mardan, Nowshera and Peshawar. More significant is the increase in the ANP’s vote from 37.79 percent in 1988 to 51.54 percent in 1997. Bearing in mind the closeness of many of the contests, a further vote increase of a few percentage points could have dramatically altered the number of seats won by either party. This is essentially what happened in the 1990’s elections when the ANP won 6 out of 8 National Assembly seats and 18 out of 27 Provincial Assembly seats. Similarly, in 1997 election PML-N and PPP lost their national assembly seats and ANP won 100 percent seats from central NWFP. Table 2.9: Central NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly 1988 Districts Peshawar Charsada Nowshera Mardan Swabi Total Seat won PPP 37.4 30.7 27.2 32.9 10.3 27.7 14/27 IJI 12 7.2 18.4 25.2 27.7 18.1 2 10.9 33.0 21.9 8.3 31.1 21 0/8 1990 ANP 23.6 34.6 36.1 18.4 37.8 30.1 10/27 35.6 60.7 37.0 27.8 33.9 39 2/8 PDA 27.5 13.1 30.8 28.2 13.9 22.7 2/27 31.9 0 31.0 31.0 0 18.7 0/8 IJI 12.3 0 6.2 32.3 9.5 12 6/27 0 0 0 21.7 49.8 14.3 1/8 ANP 31.2 42.5 49.4 17.9 42.4 36.6 11/27 49.5 42.4 36.3 20.8 44.6 38.7 6/8 PPP 31.4 23.6 36.4 28.6 14.9 26.9 10/27 41.5 44.5 42.9 42.5 0 34.2 5/8 1993 PMLN 8.7 0 0 17.3 5.7 6.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/8 ANP 29.4 33.5 31.3 18.7 36.6 29.9 16/27 39.1 45.4 35.6 34.2 44.6 39.7 2/8 PPP 18.5 24.4 15.9 22.7 9.6 18.2 1/27 19.9 0 30.9 22.9 11.2 16.9 0/8 1997 PMLN 10.3 0 15 28.3 15 13.7 4/27 0 0 0 0 33.4 6.6 0/8 ANP 46.6 45.3 50.7 25.6 35.6 40.7 21/27 62.1 50.5 60.5 48.0 36.4 51.5 8/8 National Assembly Peshawar 43.4 Charsada 0 Nowshera 37.1 Mardan 42.2 Swabi 28.3 Total 30.2 Seat won 4/8 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Another important consideration was that the religious parties from central NWFP during 1988-1997 elections won only one seat of National Assembly from NA-8 Swabi on IJM ticket. Their vote bank was less than 10 percent in provincial assembly elections. Table 2.9 provides a breakdown of central NWFP election results by district. The table indicates that the PPP has consistently done slightly better and ANP much better in Central NWFP. The large fluctuations from election to election and the presence of few discernible patterns in voting behaviour are striking. Voting behaviour in central NWFP remained relatively fluid, making it difficult to comment on party strongholds. It is not surprising that the region undergoing the most rapid 46 socioeconomic changes, and which has the highest industrialization, urbanization, and population density rates, was also undergoing the most rapid political changes. 2.3.1 NORTHERN NWFP: Area wise it is the largest of the province’s four regions having area comprising 29871 Sq. Km and population is 4262700 million. 93.84 populations lived in rural areas and 6.16 per cent in urban areas. Northern NWFP’s 1998 literacy rate of 28.14 per cent is the lowest of the NWFP’s four regions. Agriculturally, it is the poorest as its hilly terrain makes canal irrigation impossible. As a result, it has the lowest percentage of its labour force employed in the agricultural sector and the highest percentage employed in the semi skilled business, cattle grazing. 2.3.2 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION: Northern NWFP consists of Swat, Shangla, Malakand, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Buner and Chitral districts. Its boundaries touch to Afghanistan from its north-western sides, on the southern part its boundaries touches with central parts of NWFP. i.e. Mardan and Swabi. Hazara lies on its eastern side. The area is dominated by very high mountains and rugged topography. The hills are loftier, soaring to great heights with inaccessible narrow valleys. Chitral is the most northern district with deep valleys and lofty ranges mostly treeless. Thickly wooded hills lie in Dir and Swat. These areas have fertile valleys of Panjkora and Swat rivers. The Hindu Kush runs east and west along the northerneastern and northern frontiers of the province, and at its north eastern side touches a continuation of the outer Himalayan chain which crosses the Indus above the Kaghan Valley. From this chain minor ranges descend in a north-western direction, transversing Bajaur and Swat, until they meet the curved range of hills which connects the mid Himalaya with the Sufaid Koh and encircles the Peshawar valley on the north. From the Hindu Kush a long broken line of mountains runs almost due south, dividing the province from Kafiristan, and farther south from other parts of the Afghanistan. It is pierced at Arnawai by the Chitral river, which runs then, under the name of the Kunar, parallel with it in Afghan territory. Thus the Hindu Kush and the two ranges which run south-ward from it enclose the entire area of Chitral, Dir and Swat. The whole intervening space is filled by the minor ranges which run south-ward from it encloses the entire area of Chitral, Dir and Swat. The whole intervening space is filled by the minor ranges which descend from them. The western line is again pierced after its junction with the Kunar by the Kabul river, south of which it merges 47 in the Khyber hills, which form the eastern extremity of the Sufaid Koh. Sufaid Koh also runs almost in east and west direction forming the watershed between the Kabul and Kurram rivers. East-ward minor ranges descend from its southern slopes to the Indus. The Sulaiman range runs up the western border of the province to meet the Sufaid Koh, and also throws out a series of parallel spurs to the east traversing while the Kohat district. In northern NWFP, Daggar in Buner district is famous for fine quality marble products prepared from the local material and exported to other countries and also supplied within country. Dir district which is situated in northern side of Swat district is famous for timber, potato, food grain walnut etc. Dargai and Batkhela are the main trade centres of Malakand district famous for timber marketing. Swat is also famous for tourism and fruit markets, althouth the increased militancy in the region was eventually to end this industry in the post 2001 era. The most important river of Northern NWFP is Swat river. This river formed by the junction at kalam in Swat Kohistan of the Gabral and Ushu. The former rises on the east of the Budugai Pass and the latter comes down from the higher hills of Bashkor to the north. From Kalam the swat river flows almost due south for about 109 Kilometre, but at Manglaur turns abruptly to the south-west and west for 38 Kilometres until it is joined by the Panjkora. In northern NWFP People used Shalwar, Kameez, Kohati chappal and white cape as their dress. Women used Dopatta on Shalwar, Kameez in their homes while out of home they used Burqa (veil) or Chaddar in both rural and urban areas. The golden and silver ornaments are used in routine life as well as in functions and festive occasions. In northern NWFP rice is used as food more than wheat and maize. Meat is an important part of the meal in lunch and dinner. Maize bread with curry (type of dish), dessi Ghee (butter), honey, walnuts are also used as food item. The use of tobacco and snuff is universal and no hujra is considered complete without Hooka or Chillam (locally made smoking items). Political and other societal issues are discussed in these hujras (common guest house in a village). With the arrival of Afghan refugees their restaurants are preparing varieties of food especially rice known as kabuli pullao(dish of rice). An important factor that helps explain the relative poverty of the Northern NWFP, and which continues to shape their politics, is the persistence of feudal landholding patterns and more traditional and conservative social structures. The presence of large landholding tribal maliks, in particular those of the Akhundzada and Yousafzai’s tribes, has impeded social and economic development and slowed political change in 48 the region. From the beginning of 2001 the power of these traditional landholders becanme threatened by militants who were to eventually coalesce around the TNSM in the Malakand Division under the umbrella of the Taliban organization. 2.3.3 ECONOMY: The geography of Northern NWFP has shaped its economy. The barren hilly terrain in the south and west, and the mountainous terrain in the north-east, have made it impossible to introduce irrigation schemes that revolutionized agriculture in the rest of the province. Northern NWFP has less than one per cent of the NWFP’s irrigated land and what little agriculture it has is dependent on rain. Consequently, the region accounts for only six per cent of the province’s total wheat production, and virtually none of the other major crops such as sugar, cotton, and rice. At the time of the 1981 census only 38.4 per cent of the region’s total labour force was employed in the agriculture sector, the lowest in NWFP. In addition to being agriculturally poor, northern NWFP has also been relatively slow to industrialize.27 In this agriculturally poor and industrially underdeveloped region, the only employment opportunity left for many is in the services and livestock sector of the economy. Government service, in particular, is the career of choice for the literate. Of northern NWFP’s total labour force in 1981, 17.8 per cent were government employees. In the urban areas of Swat, one-third of the entire labour force was employed by the government.28 Table 2.10: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (Northern NWFP). (Figures in %age) District Buner Chitral Lower Dir Both 30.1 30.7 25.6 All Areas Male 60.1 58 Female 1.1 2.7 Both 28.9 30.3 Rural Male 55.3 57.8 Female 1.2 2.7 Both 33.2 34.2 Urban Male 61 594 Female 1.6 3 1.4 28.9 57.3 1.1 29.1 56.9 0.9 51.5 Malakand 26 48.2 2.3 30.4 57.4 1.5 28.3 60.1 1.6 Shangla 34.6 66.4 1 22.1 45.7 0.9 25.5 47.8 2.8 Swat 29.6 56.1 1.3 25.4 49.5 1 29.4 54.3 2.1 Upper Dir 25.6 51.5 1.4 28.9 57.3 1.1 29.1 56.9 0.9 Total 28.89 55.97 1.60 27.84 54.33 1.36 29.83 56.63 1.84 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987) Working abroad as migrant labourers was another important source of employment for northern NWFP’s surplus labour force.29 Since the mid-1970s, the Gulf States have provided the greatest opportunities for Pakistan’s migrant workers. Since the late 1970s, remittances from these workers helped fuel the economic boom of the 1980s that enabled many to buy land, build houses, and join the ranks of the middle classes. 49 2.3.4 POLITICS: The IJI showed its strongest performance in the 1988, and 1990 election in northern NWFP. The detailed electoral results both for national and provincial assembly are shown in table 2.11. Table 2.11: Northern NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly 1988 Districts PPP IJI Swat 21.8 23.8 Buner 12.3 25.9 Shangla 30.0 35.1 Chitral 37.7 20.9 Lower 21.8 48.1 Dir Upper 21.36 39.08 Dir MKD 34.5 14.6 Total 19.8 25.2 Seat won 7/18 9/18 National Assembly Swat 20.5 25.4 Buner 29.7 26.8 Chitral 54.4 38.8 Dir 37.9 46.1 MKD 43.5 25.8 Total 23.1 26.8 Seat won 4/6 2/6 1990 ANP 21.5 22.5 9.7 5.96 0.16 13.01 17.7 15.0 1/18 11.5 28.5 0 13.5 16 17.2 0/6 PDA 27.6 10.5 22.6 33.7 30.5 9.4 28.2 15.5 2/18 18.6 36.3 31.5 41.4 34.0 20.6 3/6 IJI 26.5 18.2 45.6 52.0 39.9 35.6 23.1 26.3 12/18 30.5 31.4 53.8 39.4 32.5 27.1 6/6 ANP 11.5 16.1 0 0 3.81 0 14.5 14.5 2/18 0 8.6 0 0 0 14.3 0/6 PPP 33.1 25.1 28.3 0 29.4 34.5 38.8 18.2 10/18 0 0 26.7 34.7 49.3 16.6 1/6 1993 PMLN 24.5 16.1 26.6 17.1 13.8 24.2 7.6 21.9 1/18 39.4 0 24.6 15.7 0 25.8 1/6 1997 PMLN 38.2 27.3 26.8 40.4 37.6 28.1 0 29.4 8/18 34.3 0 47.0 48.6 47.9 33.7 5/6 ANP 18.3 24.5 23.7 8.61 8.07 0 25.6 14.8 2/18 0 29.4 0 0 0 14 1/6 PPP 6.23 14.1 7.5 24.7 30.2 42.3 28.9 10.2 3/18 12.1 20.3 23.6 34.1 32 9.8 0/6 ANP 16.6 38.4 13.4 0 0 2.8 53 20 5/18 15.4 34 0 0 0 19.3 1/6 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In 1997 elections, the PML(N) did especially well in the more urbanized, literate, and economically developed areas of Northern NWFP. Northern NWFP has also been a PPP strong hold. PPP did well in 1993 elections. In 1993 elections PPP won the most votes from the poorer and more rural constituencies of Northern NWFP. There are several explanations for the IJI and latter PML(N) strong performance in northern NWFP. The best explanation seems to lie in its candidates social orientations in these areas. For example Mian Gul Aurangzeb, Shujahat Ali Khan, Shahzada Mohi-ud-din and Alhaj30 Muhammad Khan have high social prestige in Northern NWFP. See table 4. Religious parties have very negligible role in Northern NWFP. Only in 1993 election they have won 4 seats in provincial Assembly out of 18 and 2 seats in National Assembly out of 06. A related explanation is that northern NWFP’s economy is the least dependent on agriculture, and therefore its rural voters were not affected by the perception that Nawaz Sharif favoured commercial and industrial interest at the expense of agriculture interests. In interviews, the most common explanation given for the strong performance of Muslim League in northern NWFP is 50 the strength of the Biradari and social values of the region makes voter ideologically closer to the PML than to the PPP. Furthermore, the Zia legacy of strong antipathy towards the PPP and open support of the PML was carried on by his successor, General Mirza Aslam Beg, who was chief of army staff until 1991. In the 1988 elections, the military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency actively participated in forming the Islami Jamoori Ittehad (IJI) (Islamic Democratic Alliance)- a coalition of right-wing parties led by the PML to confront the PPP. By his own admission, General Beg was instrumental in the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990. He also acknowledged receiving large amounts of money from Mehran Bank to finance the ISI’s Election Cell that was set up to rig the 1990 elections in favour of the IJI.31 In 1993, however, the popular perception was that after facilitating the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif’s government, the generals would not want him to return to power. Voting detail both for national and provincial assembly is indicated in table 2.12. Table 2.12: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly Elections 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 Party Position National Assembly 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 Party Position 360475 457686 10225 449898 8818 Valid 468585 Rejected 10599 Total 479184 Registered 1383977 %age 34.04 Contesters 122 IJI (9), PPP (7), ANP (1), IND (1) 477868 6805 IJI (12), PDA (2), ANP (2), IND (2) 508248 8020 484673 1391676 34.11 119 516268 1486989 34.46 105 PML-N (1), PPP (10), ANP 365567 11044 376611 1555885 23.69 129 PML-N (8), PPP (3), ANP (5), IND (2) 435409 10652 446061 1383969 34.12 29 PPP (4), IJI (2) 458716 1391677 IJI (2), PDA (3), IND (1) 467911 1483556 35.25 33 33.21 28 PML-N (1), ANP (1), PPP (1), PIF (2), PKQP (1) 12907 373382 1555929 25.97 PML-N (5), ANP (1) 39 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In Northern NWFP electoral contestants have mostly belonged to big biradaris and have socially high prestige. Major Political parties such as PML(N), ANP and PPP used these political figures for their own political interest. It is also noted that Military, police and revenue department also affected voting behavior. There is no empirical evidence, however, to show that the political preferences of the military’s, 51 police and revenue leaders determine the voting behaviour of the rank and file. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary for the 1970 elections. In his study of the PPP, Jones compared the postal ballot results from military recruiting areas, and the polling station’s results from the military cantonments, as a sample of the voting behaviour of military officers and the ordinary rank and file. He concluded that ‘the older and more senior officers tended to support the established parties (the Leagues), while the PPP-JI ideological polarization, evident elsewhere, affected the junior officers ranks’. The PPP, however, seemed to be the strong favourite.32 In recent years, both the mainstream parties have tried to win the military, police and revenue officials vote in northern NWFP through the selection of their candidates. In northern NWFP there is close relations between local influential political candidates and police department. Moreover members of the district administration often visit the homes (Hujras) of local Khan. As the local people have no access to these officials directly due to bureaucratic hurdles. At district level local khan is the key central figure between the district administration and local people. In this way district administration mould the voting behaviour in the favour of any candidate. 2.4.1 SOUTHERN NWFP: Kohat , Hangu, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Tank and DI Khan districts are included in southern NWFP. In Kohat, Hangu, Bannu, Karak and Lakki Marwat majority of the people speak Pashto while Saraiki is the major language of DI Khan District. Southern NWFP is less urbanized, industrialized, and literate than central NWFP, and has an agriculturally-based economy. See table of literacy rate. Kurram, Tochi and Gomal rivers also lie in this region. Dress and appearance is clearly marked in this area and displays a regional variation which culturally marks it out from other parts of the NWFP. In southern NWFP people like to wear turbans on their heads or Qrakulli (cap made of hide of sheep, goat etc) and rarely used white cape which is worn by the people of upper NWFP. The people of southern areas wear special Chappal (shoes) which differs in design from district to district. In southern part, the dress of women consists of Choli, Frock, shalwar and Dopatta. The Pathan women of the middle and upper classes in towns wear loose wrinkled trousers but the Jat women of the rural area wear Tehband or Manjla. The dress of the peasants consists of a turban, a loose shirt or baggy trousers tied around the waist by running string and two or three shawls or a Swati blanket 52 wrapped round the waist or placed on the head as a protection against the Sun. Waistcoat are worn uncommonly. A leather belt called (qamarband) is always worn on a journey by those who have arms to put in it. In parts of southern districts among the Jats the trousers are replaced by loin cloth and a shet is thrown over the shoulders. Women wear upper garments, forming a bodice and skirt in one piece dark blue in colour and a red border and a yoke. Underneath are worn a baggy trouser and above is Shawl. Sandals of grass or leather or shoes are worn by both sexes. In winter Pathan wear sheep skin coat with wool inside. In the south hair is generally allowed to grow and sometimes to curl into ringlets. 2.4.2 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION: Southern NWFP containing Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Hangu, Tank and DI. Khan touches its boundaries to Punjab from its Eastern and southern side, North and South Waziristan (Tribal belt of FATA) lie in its western side, Baluchistan Province lies in its southwestern side. In 1998, southern NWFP had a population of 3,564,872 i.e 20.10 per cent of the NWFP’s population. Only 14.33 per cent of its 1998 population was living in urban areas, and 85.6 per cent in rural areas. Its 1998 population density rate of 174.66 per square kilometer is also much lower than central and North-Eastern NWFP. Southern NWFP’s literacy rate of 33.70 per cent is also lower than those of central and north-eastern NWFP. In 1998, the mother tongue of 84.57 per cent of the population of the central NWFP was Pashto while in Dera Ismail Khan 72.5 percent population speaks Saraiki. 2.4.3 ECONOMY: Southern NWFP’s is heavily dependent on agriculture and Dairy products. NWFP produces 93.7 per cent of NWFP’s cotton. In addition to cotton, with 14 per cent of the NWFP’s irrigated land, southern NWFP produces 31 per cent of the NWFP’s wheat, 7 per cent of its sugar cane. In 1998, 26.4 per cent of its total labour force was involved economic activities. Table 2.13: Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1998 (Southern NWFP) District Bannu Lakki DI. Khan Tank Hangu Karak Total Both 29.1 25.8 32 27.7 22.4 22.4 26.40 All Areas Male 56.1 39.8 59.2 52.1 46.3 45.9 49.94 Female 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.97 0.9 1 1.12 Both 25.3 29.8 26.2 31.9 37.5 27.6 29.27 Rural Male 52 57.4 48.7 59.4 65.4 56.1 56.30 Female 1.3 1.1 2.4 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.24 Both 31 36 24 32.9 0 30.6 26.84 Urban Male 55.7 66.5 43.5 58.7 0 56 48.03 Female 2.9 1.7 1.7 2.9 0 3 2.23 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987) 53 While southern NWFP does not yet compare with central NWFP, industrialization is increasing and by 1998, 18.3 per cent of registered factories in the NWFP, and 14.6 per cent of all units engaged in manufacturing, were located in the south. Not surprisingly, most industries, including cottage industries, are linked to cotton crop. These include cotton ginning and pressing, the manufacturing of textile and carpets, the production of dyes and chemicals for the textile industry, and the dying, bleaching, and finishing of textiles. The fact that the major north-south road and transport networks pass through southern NWFP has been a catalyst for industrial development in the region. 2.4.4 POLITICS: Table 2.14 provides a breakdown of southern NWFP’s election results by district and sub-region. The most significant feature of the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 Provincial and National Assembly elections in southern NWFP was the sharp increase in support for the PML (N). The increase of nearly 4 per cent over the 1988 and 1990 vote percentages resulted in the IJI led by PML(N) getting its best regional result in southern NWFP. Table 2.14: Southern NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly 1988 Districts Kohat Hangu Karak DI. Khan Tank Bannu Lakki Total Seat won PPP 10.3 0 0 16.1 0 0 22.8 19.8 1/16 IJI 26.5 20 31.7 27.6 13.2 30.1 48.9 25.2 6/16 ANP 5.8 11.4 17 0.72 20.4 15.8 2.09 15 1/16 PDA 13 3.9 0 9.7 0 2.3 0 15.5 2/16 1990 IJI 21.6 30.1 27.7 5.01 44 24.2 62.9 26.3 7/16 ANP 0 0 17.9 0.29 9.2 9.38 0 14.5 2/16 PPP 16.1 0 9.4 7.9 0 0 8.5 18.2 1/16 1993 PMLN 19.6 45.8 7.6 33.8 34.7 19.4 29.9 21.9 4/16 1997 ANP 19.6 0 12 0 0 12.3 0 14.8 1/16 PPP 2.3 0 0 2.05 0 8.18 0 10.2 0/16 PML-N 24.4 26.8 15.6 48.8 9.24 10.2 34.1 29.4 6/16 ANP 11.4 28.1 30 0.04 0 13.9 8.4 20 3/16 National Assembly Kohat 22.4 Karak 0 DI. 0 Khan Bannu 0 Lakki 0 Total 4.48 Seat 0/5 won 36 37.5 23.1 22 49 33.5 2/5 12.9 8.16 0 11.2 4 7.25 0/5 31.2 0 40.6 21.5 0 18.6 2/5 29.7 26 8.5 19.4 50.5 26.8 1/5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/5 17.1 0 0 0 0 3.42 0/5 33.6 32 33.5 38.2 38 28.4 3/5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0/5 63.7 10.4 42.6 29.4 40.8 37.3 4/5 0 40.1 0 0 0 8.02 1/5 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) The most important explanation for the PML (N)’s strength is its ability to make use of factional and biradari ties in this region. Mr. Javed Ibrahim Piracha, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Haji Muhammad Kabir Khan Marwat, and Mr. Anwar Saifullah were the strong electoral candidates on PML(N) ticket during 1988-1997 Elections due to their factional and strong biradari relations. 54 Another factor contributing to the PML(N) strong performance was the defection from the PPP to the PML(N) of prominent members of southern NWFP’s landed elite, such as Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani and Mr. Javed Ibrahim Pracha. This led to the unusual situation of the two traditional rival ashrafi families of Kohat, the Gillani and Pirachas, living on the same side of the electoral divide. A central versus southern NWFP political rivalry partially explains why an increasing number of politicians from southern NWFP’s landed elite are found in the ranks of the PPP. Traditionally, these ashrafi notable families were the ones who dominated NWFP’s politics. Although Saraiki nationalist parties,33 have never fared well in electoral politics, primarily due to the absence of a significant Saraiki middle class, the matter of Saraiki locals versus the NWFP settlers is still a factor in the politics of the DI. Khan. This is particularly true in DI. Khan region where the Saraiki issue is linked to the remnants of the Saraiki (Province) Movement.34 In the 1970 elections the PPP backed the NWFP settlers as Bhutto did not want to upset his support base in the NWFP. As a result, the PPP received its lowest result in the old settled tracts of Southern NWFP. In the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections the situation was even more confusing as the southern region have mixed electoral position of parties. IJI and PML-N have simple majority in this region. Prominent local and settler politicians were found in both parties. Nevertheless, it was believed that the PPP, led by a Sindhi, would be more sympathetic to Saraiki interests than the PML(N), led by a Punjabi. In the constituencies of Saraiki speaking district of DI. Khan a comparison of polling station results (mostly populated by local Saraiki speakers)35 support the perception that the settlers tended to back the PML(N) and the latter the PPP.36 This is particularly true in the constituencies of DI. Khan district where the local versus settler rivalry is especially intense. The traditional rivalry between the two was further exacerbated during the 1980s by the patronage provided by General Zia to follow NWFP’s kundi who had settled in the district, which included gerrymandering constituencies to the advantage of settlers. This point was noted by Fazal-ur-Rehmn, a former MNA from southern NWFP: Basically it’s the local versus non-local conflict. There is an inherent conflict. I heard it much more in DI. Khan…. They constantly talked about the Kundis coming in, and Zia-ul-Haq creating a constituency for the Kundis in DI. Khan in 1988 which the Kundis keep on winning because of the way the constituency is delimited…. There’s a feeling of great resentment amongst the locals and because they are Siraiki speaking it is reflected as that.37 This political cleavage between the local and settlers is clearly revealed in table 3-6, which compares the results of polling stations located in urban, local villages, and 55 canal colony villages in constituencies. In Dera Ismail Khan the old settled tracts generally lie to the east of the Indus, DG. Khan lies in north-south. In the 1993 elections, the PML(N) won more than 60 per cent of the vote in the urban areas and in the canal colony villages dominated by settlers, but only 36.9 per cent in the noncolony villages dominated by Siraiki speakers. The PPP, on the other hand, won nearly 60 per cent of the vote in the non-colony villages but only 35.1 per cent in the colony villages38. Voting detail both for national and provincial assembly is shown in table 2.15. Table 2.15: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly Elections 1988 Party position 1990 Party position 1993 Party position 1997 Party position 475509 539362 519637 Valid 474095 Rejected 6781 Total 480876 Registered 1265296 %age of votes 38.32 Contesters 158 119 IJI (6), PPP (1), ANP (1), JUI-F (2), IND (6) 5885 525522 1272193 IJI (7), PDA (2), ANP (2), JUI-F (1), IND (4) 7464 546826 1378009 41.57 39.77 125 PML-N (4), PPP (1), ANP (1), PML-J (3), IJM (1), IND (6) 11542 487051 1445364 33.86 ANP (3), JUI-F (1), PML-J (2), IND (4) 166 National Assembly 1988 Party position 1990 Party position 1993 Party position 1997 Party position 462817 434652 4665 417316 6970 424286 1264497 32.97 43 IJI (2), JUI-F (2), JUI-D (1) 439317 1272193 33.95 32 PDA (2), IJI (1), JUI-F (1), IND (1) 7386 470203 1380885 PML-N (3), IJM (1), MDM (1) 482241 1445364 PML-N (4), ANP (1) 33.93 37 469703 12538 32.87 46 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 2.5.1 NORTH-EASTERN NWFP: North-Eastern NWFP comprises Hazara region of NWFP including Abbottabad, Mansehra, Haripur, Battagram and Kohistan. It is the least urbanized, literate, and economically developed region of the NWFP. Much of this can be attributed to the retrogressive effects of the still prevalent conservative tribal and semi-feudal social structures. For the same reason, this region has witnessed the least political change over time as prominent tribal leaders and landed elite maintain their political and economic hold over their tribesmen and tenants. The land between the Indus, and Kunhar known as the Pakhli maidan, rush and Haripur and the In-Indus Batagram and Kohistan together comprise the region of north-eastern NWFP. It encompasses Haripur, Abbottabad, Mansehra, Bettagram and Kohistan. In north the Indus separates North NWFP from north-eastern side. In the 56 south, the Indus river serves as the border between central NWFP and the Northeastern NWFP. In the south lies the border with Rawalpindi. In the east, the Kashmir and Gilgit on its northern side. In 1998, the population of North-eastern NWFP was 3,505,000, approximately 19.3 per cent of the NWFP’s population. Population wise north-eastern NWFP is the smallest of the NWFP’s four regions, its population density rate of 205.44 per square kilometer in the NWFP. It is the least urbanized region with only 7.04 per cent of its 1988 population living in urban areas. This reflects the semi-developed nature of the region as compared to other regions of NWFP. North-Eastern NWFP can be further subdivided along linguistic and cultural lines into northern and southern regions. In the northern region, encompassing the districts of Battagram, Kohistan and Pashto speaking areas of Mansehra, and southern parts i.e Hindko speaking areas of Mansehra, Abbottabad and Haripur, the mother tongue of 74.72 per cent of the population, according to the 1998 census, is Hindko. In the southern region, encompassing Mansehra, Abbottabad and Haripur 95 per cent of the population speak Hindko. Another distinguishing feature of some areas of North-eastern NWFP is the presence of an operative tribal system not found elsewhere in the NWFP. In Mansehra district, tribal leaders in the provincial administered tribal area (Kala Dhaka) still exert influence over their tribes. In Mansehra the Syeds, Swatis, Sardars, and Tanolis are the main tribes. These tribes are still in conflict with one another, but today the ballot usually replaces the bullet. In Mansehra constituency of NA-14, the Sardar and the Syeds usually oppose each other, with the Swatis. Sardar biradari won elections 1990, 1993 and 1997 and have politically most strong biradari in this constituency. In the Abbottabad constituency of NA-11 in 1990-97, the Sardars have defeated the Jadoons. in National Assembly elections. In other areas, the biradari system has broken down over time, but prominent families of Jadoon, Tareen, Awans and the Queshis still exert influence.39 In Kohistan, Pakhtoon tribes such as the yousafzai exist, but again the tribal system has mostly disappeared and control over land rather than control over a tribe is the basis for political power. 2.5.2 ECONOMY: According to one study that ranked the districts of Pakistan by levels of development, North-eastern NWFP’s districts fall into the bottom third of NWFP’s districts.40 Like other regions of NWFP, North-eastern NWFP’s economy is heavily dependent on agriculture. In 1998, 21.8 per cent of its total labour force was 57 engaged in agriculture. With 25 per cent of the irrigated land, North-eastern NWFP produces 12.1 per cent of the wheat, 0.12 per cent of sugar cane, 6.99 per cent of tobacco, and 10.69 per cent of rice. An important factor contributing to North-eastern NWFP’s poverty is the survival of the large landlord. Although both Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did institute land reforms, they were halfhearted measures that were easily circumvented. Table 2.16. Participation rate of economically active population (10 years and above) by sex, rural/urban and districts, 1988 (North-Eastern NWFP). All Areas Rural Urban Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Abbottabad 27.9 55.2 1.3 27.5 54.1 0.55 25.4 48.1 1.5 Batagam 33.9 64.5 1.4 30.1 60.1 1.1 0 0 0 Haripur 25.8 51.1 1.2 33.9 64.5 1.4 0 0 0 Kohistan 37.5 64.4 0.8 25.4 50.8 1.02 28.6 53.3 2.4 Mansehra 27.7 56.1 1.3 31.6 60.1 0.7 25.7 40.6 8.4 Total 30.56 58.26 1.2 29.7 57.92 0.954 15.94 28.4 2.46 Source: Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987) District In 1980, 40 per cent of all the farms in central NWFP over 150 acres were in Northeastern NWFP.41 North-eastern NWFP is the least industrialized of the NWFP’s four regions on a per capita basis. In 1989, only 5.2 per cent of registered factories were located in North-eastern NWFP. An important contributing factor to the slow pace of industrialization is that the major north-south transportation arteries bypass northeastern NWFP and instead pass through southern NWFP into central NWFP. 2.5.3 POLITICS: That the least developed, industrialized, urbanized, and literate region of the NWFP, should exhibited the least political change should come as no surprise. The following description of Oghi Tehsil of Mansehra District reflects the situation in much north-eastern NWFP. Every five miles or so is the house of a tribal or religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers to enforce his influence on his poor neighbours, and to conduct his feuds with his equals. The poor man pays blackmail for his cattle to these local chieftains and for his soul to his pir, who may or may not live in the neighbourhood, but visits his followers yearly to receive his dues. As would be expected, the bulk of the land is held by the rich men, who are increasing their possessions. Peasant proprietors exist on the outskirts of the small towns: elsewhere the small lordless man cannot hold his own. If he attempted to do so, his cattle would be driven, his women folk carried off, himself prosecuted before an honorary magistrate on a charge of cattle theft, and in a short time he would be glade to hand over his land and secure protection on any terms. Society then in the main consists of the land-holding squires, when local authority is only limited by their 58 mutual jealousies, and of their retainers and tenants, who, holding non share in the land which they till, and knowing that an appearance of wealth will lead to exaction from their feudal or spiritual masters, or content to lead a hand-to-mouth existence.42 There are many similarities between the socio-economic conditions in north-eastern NWFP today, and this description written by Malcolm Darling in 1931. The slow pace of change, and the social and political conservatism of north-eastern NWFP, is no accident-it was the intended outcome of British colonial land settlement policies in the region. Prior to the Mutiny of 1857, the primary objective of land settlement policies was to create a class of peasant proprietors. After the Mutiny, political imperatives took precedence and the priority changed to creating a class of ‘hereditary landed gentry’ who could maintain peace and stability in the country side. In the postMutiny settlement districts (mostly in north-eastern NWFP), the British distributed titles, pensions, and large land grants to create and strengthen the political hold of the conservative landed elite. Jones noted that ‘in political geography of the province, the line separating the pre-Mutiny settlement districts from the post-Mutiny ones represents a major political cleavage that is distinctively visible on the map of the 1970 elections. Table 2.17: North-Eastern NWFP Election Result Provincial Assembly 1988 Districts PPP IJI 27.4 21.9 36 37.1 20 27.9 10 IJI ANP 0 2.2 2.3 3.5 7.1 1.7 0/19 ANP PDA 5.7 1.7 13.9 0 0 5.6 0/19 PDA 1990 IJI 40 27.7 65.5 0 12.7 37.8 8/19 IJI ANP 0 1.6 0 27.6 0 2.07 1/19 ANP PPP 19.2 0 0 0 0 5.4 1/19 PPP 1993 PMLN 41.6 45.2 50.5 42.8 17.5 41 10/19 PMLN ANP 0 0 0 0 0 2.5 1/19 ANP PPP 2.9 0 0 0 2.8 1.09 0/19 PPP 1997 PMLN 62 40.2 57 18.5 11.1 48.7 14/19 PMLN ANP 0 5.2 0 27.3 6.7 3.6 1/19 ANP Abbottabad 14.9 cum Haripur Mansehra 6.8 Haripur 15.4 Battagram 0 Kohistan 9.9 Total 11.6 Seat won 0/19 National Assembly Districts PPP Abbottabad 18.1 41.2 0 12.8 56.7 0 0 65.8 0 3.6 6.5 0 cum Haripur Mansehra 5.8 7.8 0 0.48 33.5 0 0 52.2 0 0 46.5 0 Battagram 28.3 34.8 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 48.4 0 Kohistan 0 30.7 21.2 0 16.1 0 0 25.8 0 3.3 33.8 0 Total 14.4 30.2 0.82 7.5 43.3 0 0 58.3 0 2.34 58.2 0 Seat won 0/7 4/7 0/7 0/7 4/7 0/7 0/7 6/7 0/7 0/7 6/7 0/7 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In these elections, as in those of 1946, the post-Mutiny settlement districts were a bastion of a conservative chiefly control, quite impervious to the JUI/ANP flood (Muslim League in 1946) which swept virtually every other part of NWFP.43 At no 59 time is the political conservatism of north-eastern NWFP more visible then at election time, when the same names of influential tribal leaders and landed elites appear on the ballots, although often with the different party labels. The most distinctive feature of election results in north-eastern NWFP, and a further example of the powerful hold of its ruling class, is the high percentage of votes won by candidates running without party tickets. In contrast with the strong move towards a two party system in the other regions of the NWFP, tribal leaders and the large landlords in north-eastern NWFP can still get elected contesting as an independent candidate. The strong presence of independent members in north-eastern NWFP is one aspect of NWFP politics where there has been remarkably little change since 1970. Independent candidates in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 obtained a significant number of seats as mentioned in table 2.28. This compares favourably with 42.86% won by independents in 1988, 14.29% in 1990, 1993 and 1997. Table 2.18: Voting Detail Provincial Assembly Elections 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 Party Position 551475 Valid 505108 540688 Rejected 9120 9739 Total Registered 514228 1382457 IJI (10), IND (9) 550427 1390104 %age 36.01 39.38 Contesters 142 121 114 IJI (8), ANP (1), JUI-F (1), IND (9) 7912 559387 1494239 36.13 PML-N (10), PPP (1), ANP (1), PML-J (1), MDM (1), IND (5) 476897 12004 488901 1567378 30.18 149 PML-N (14), ANP (1), IND (4) 451760 12299 464059 1382457 33.26 40 National Assembly 1988 Party Position 1990 Party Position 1993 Party Position 1997 Party Position 473565 12817 517184 9763 IJI (4), IND (3) 497195 1389804 IJI (4), JUI-F (2), IND (1) 526947 1494239 489130 8065 35.63 43 34.35 28 PML-N (6), IND (1) 486382 1567378 PML-N (6), IND (1) 30.44 35 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) This trend was even more visible in the provincial assembly elections, where in 1988 independent candidates won 47.37% of the vote and 09 out of 19 seats. Furthermore, to a much greater extent then in the NWFP’s other regions, the majority of votes that are won by the major parties are not votes for the party itself but vote for the influential elites who are given tickets by the party. In addition to independents, the 60 religious parties also garnered more support in the culturally conservative northeastern NWFP than in any other region of the NWFP except the south. In the 1970 election, the Islamic parties won 38.6% of the vote in the north-eastern NWFP-there strongest performance ever in Pakistani elections. In the 1990 elections, their strongest performance was still in north-eastern NWFP. A high percentage of the Islamic party votes in northeastern NWFP are won in Battagram and Kohistan, due to the volatile sunni-deobandi sectarian politics of these districts. The above table illustrates the fact that IJI/PML has always received a large number of seats from north-eastern regions but PPP had worse results from north-eastern NWFP. In 1970, for example while the PPP swept the polls in the rest of the NWFP, it did not win a single seat from this part of NWFP. The PPP has consistently done better in the southern saraiki speaking districts of western NWFP then in the northern NWFP districts, whereas the PML(N) has tended to do better in the latter then the former. 2.6 CONCLUSIONS In northern, central, southern and north eastern (Hazara) zones of NWFP, electoral politics effected voting behaviour in different ways. In north-eastern (Hazara) region, the voting behaviour was largely tilted towards Muslim League during 1990s due to historical, linguistic and political reasons. In central NWFP electoral politics affected the voting behaviour in favour of ANP due to Pakhtun ethnic cleavages, while in southern and northern parts of NWFP electoral politics attracted religious and ethnic sentiments along with mainstream political parties’ i.e Muslim League and PPP. In next chapter historical roots of electoral politics in NWFP is analysed to find out the intensity of electoral politics on the voting behaviour in NWFP. 1 The idea for classification taken from Malcom Darling and Philip E. Jones, See Malcom L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London: Oxford University Press, 1925) and also see Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 514. 2 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 2000). 3 4 Ibid. Ibid. 5 Daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, 13 January 1997. 6 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP, pp.2-3 7 Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. 8 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP 9 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP 10 Ibid. 11 David Dichter, The North West Frontier of west Pakistan: A Study in Regional Geography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.201. 12 Ibid. p.202 13 The doabs are named by compounding the name of the two rivers they lie between. 61 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP, p. 62 David Dichter, The North West Frontier of west Pakistan: A Study in Regional Geography, pp. 107108. 16 Malcom L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, p.117 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid, p. 116 19 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, p. 586 20 Ibid, p.587 21 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.39. 22 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, p. 587. 23 Daily The News, Rawalpindi, 20 March 1993. 24 Ibid 25 Daily The News, Rawalpindi, 15 March 1996. 26 Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics. 27 Iqbal Saigol [Industrialist], Interview with author, Tape recording, Muree, 9 May 2005 28 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP (Islamabad: Statistic Division, Population Census Organization Press, 1987), pp.117-22 29 Ibid. 30 The word Alhaj means who perform more than one pilgrimage (plural of Haji). This word is widely used by the electoral contesters in NWFP to show their pious nature to get vote. 31 Idrees Bukhtiar, ‘Scandal’, Herald, April 1994, pp. 24-32. 32 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, pp.510-12. 33 Daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, 21 April 1996. 34 Ibid. 35 Daily The News, Rawalpindi, 25 February 1993. 36 Ibid. 37 Maulan Fazal-ur-Rehman, interview with author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 24 March 2007. 15 38 39 14 Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results) Government of Punjab, Gazetteer of the Hazara district 1883-4 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000) 40 Hafiz A. Pasha, Salman Malik and Haroon Jamal, ‘The Changing Profile of Regional Development in Pakistan’, Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics 9 (1990), p.21 41 Agriculture Census Organisation, Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 1980: Province Report NWFP, Vol. II Part II (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, nd.) pp.1-8. 42 Malcom L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, p. 99 43 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power, pp. 75-76 62 CHAPTER-3 ELECTORAL HISTORY OF NWFP 3. INTRODUCTION: The history of electoral politics in NWFP started in 1932 when it became a governor’s province under Sir Ralph Griffith on April 18, 1932. So, in this chapter electoral history of NWFP is analysed in two major sections, one is 1932-1947 and second section is 1947-1970 i.e up to the introduction of universal suffrage. 3.1 BRITISH PERIOD (1932-47): The area under NWFP had been taken by the British from the Sikh Darbar as a consequence of their victory in the second Anglo-Sikh war of 1849 and had been brought under the administration of Punjab province,1 but first time British came into direct contact with these areas of NWFP was in 1808 due to the fear of French invasion through Persia and Afghanistan, and they sent a mission to Afghan Amir.2 On 9 November 1901, Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India separated the Frontier Region from Punjab and created a new province of NWFP. The newly created Frontier province, consisting of the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan and the political agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kuram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, was placed under the charge of Chief Commissioner and agent to the Governor General, appointed and directly responsible to Government of India.3 On the formation of NWFP and by separating the five districts from the Punjab, these areas did not experience the electoral and other constitutional benefits of British representative institutions due to internal instability and strategic location of the province4, but awareness of representative institutions had already been started in Frontier after the uprising of 1857 when British introduced representative institutions in India to strengthen the administration. Prominent notables were asked to join Governor’s Councils which served as advisory bodies.5 In 1884, the first restricted franchise elections were held for local government institutions. In 1892, members of these institutions were given the right to elect some members of the provincial legislatures, who in turn elected a limited number of central legislature members. The Government of India Acts of 1909 and 1919 continued to expand the franchise and the number of elected representatives. Following the civil disobedience campaigns of the Khudai Khidmatgars, in 1930-32, the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced the elevation of its status to a governor’s province like other provinces of India at the concluding session of Second 63 Round table Conference.6 The Khudia Khidmatgars had extended their influence in the NWFP both by creating new organizations and as in Bannu taking over the old Congress district organization. Earlier the loyalist Khans had petitioned for reforms which had become a long standing Muslim demand. The Muslim League which drew its main support from this social grouping had also supported the idea of reform from its platform. Under the new scheme, Sir Ralph Griffith, the then Chief Commissioner of NWFP, was made the first Governor of NWFP on April 18, 1932. On the same day, Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy of India inaugurated the NWFP legislative council. The council consisted of a total of 40 members (28 elected and 12 nominated). Among them 22 were to be Muslims, 5 Hindus, and one Sikh. The nominated members comprised of 5 Europeans, 1 Muslim, 1 Sikh official, 4 non-official Muslims and 1 Sikh non official. Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum was appointed the Minister in charge of the transferred Department, KB Ghafoor Khan of Zaida, a nominated member, was made the first President, and Sheikh Abdul Hamid, a member of the provincial civil service, was appointed as the secretary of the council. It was made clear the council or the ministers had no say in the administration of the tribal areas as tribal policy remained a central subject under the direct control of the governor who served as the Agent to the Governor-General7. After the establishment of Governor’s Province in 1932 electoral politics started in NWFP but they were rooted in four earlier historical developments8, i.e. i). the British system of indirect rule, ii). the impact of Khilafat Movement, iii). the reform issue, iv). legacy of the period of Civil Disobedience in 1930-32. The electoral politics revolved around the colonial interest in NWFP like other parts of India. In order to have an efficient bureaucracy based on favourable public opinion, the British rule emphasised the need for making some provisions for associating local influential elements with the law making process, but through indirect channels.9 It may be recalled that nomination system was confined to chiefs, nobles and members of the landed aristocracy and it had nothing to do with the idea of popular representation. The British in NWFP turned towards the leading khans (chiefs) to maintain their rule and patronage was provided to them in return for maintaining peace and revenue collections. This system worked smoothly until the 1920s when tenants vs. khanate discontentment started. Small khans and tenants joined the Khudai Khidmatgar’s Movement and government patronage seekers big khans removed out from political scene for a time being and later on these big khans joined the Muslim League to safeguard their interest10. 64 The Khilafat Movement in 1919 had a deep impact on Frontier politics. The Congress’s support in favour of Khilafat Movement created a tradition of cooperation between it and the Frontier Muslims who supported khilafat campaigns and became prominent during this period. Among these, the most notable persons were Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib. The link between Khudai Khidmatgar movement and Khilafat Movement was sustained through such organisations as the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afghania (Society for the Reform of the Afghans) which was formed in the wake of the collapse of the ‘Hijrat’ movement.11 The demand for political reforms in NWFP led to the strengthening of the anti-British and pro-Congress attitudes which had emerged during the Khilafat Movement among the younger sections of Khanate elite. 3.2 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS (NWFP): These developments formed the background to the legislative elections in the second week of 1932, in which the percentage of voting was very considerable as compared to other parts of India.12In the absence of Congress, there was no organized party in the elections, which fragmented into twenty-eight separate races with little or no bearing on one another. Restrictive property qualification limited the electorate to four percent of the population and ensured a legislature dominated by conservative, wealthy men13. The non-Muslims who were elected espoused a sectarian philosophy characterized by a distrust of Muslims and presentiments that the legislative council would prove disastrous for their communities. The preference of the minority voters was best illustrated by the race in Peshawar where Rai Sahib Mahr Chan Khanna, the Provincial Hindu Sabha leader, received a three to one majority over C.C Gosh, the former PCC President.14 Mahr Chand Khanna, a banker and urban landowner, had run as a defender of Hindu interests, while Gosh had downgraded communal questions and campaigned as a representative of Congress opinion in a province where the Congress was identified with the Pakhtun community. Similarly, Rai Sahib Rochi Ram, a wealthy government contractor and the President of the Dera Ismail Khan Hindu Saba, scored an easy victory over Bhanju Ram Ghandi, another former Congressman, in Dera Ismail Khan. Nationalist alternatives were absent in the other minority constituencies and the leading candidates fought the elections over who could best protect their communities from the province’s Muslim Majority.15 In the two urban Muslim Constituencies, Pir Baksh, the former PCC General Secretary, and Malik Khuda Baksh were elected on the basis of their nationalist reputations. In the rural Muslim constituencies, in contrast, national credentials mattered less than the status 65 of one’s family and the strength of one’s gundi. All the successful candidates were members or agents of the dominant elite in their constituencies, as were most of their opponents. The victors included two hereditary Nawab and one appointed for life, two Arbabs, three other individuals from families of tribal chieftains, one religious leader, and seven men of high tribal status. In selecting the council’s nominated non-officials, the governor reinforced its conservatism by appointing five Muslims with strong traditional standing. Local considerations dominated the campaign in all constituencies. Tribal divisions or factional alignments determined the outcomes in some, while religious issues materially influenced the results in others. Three men associated with the nationalist movement were elected, but in each case, family and faction had a more important bearing on the outcome than voters’ patriotism. For example, Habibullah Khan’s record as a former Vice President of the Bannu Congress was of secondary importance in his election. He was victorious principally because he had the backing of one of the two gundis into which the Marwat tribe was divided. Similarly Abdul Qayyum Khan of Safaida captured a seat in Hazara due to personal feuds and religious controversies which split the strength of the leading Swati Khans in his constituency.16 After the council convened, its members polarized into four groups17, Nationalist opinion was represented by Azad Party headed by Malik Khuda Baksh, nine other Khans formed the liberal Party and combination of nine professional and Khans formed the Progressive party. The seven Hindus and Sikhs grouped together and formed minority party. These parties had no organization and ideology. 3.3 ELECTIONS 1937 (NWFP): The constitution Act of 1935 was the first act which was introduced in NWFP after its provincial status. The government of India Act, 1935 did not introduce the system of universal suffrage, and the right to vote was limited. The property qualifications continued to be the main basis of franchise for both the houses. A much higher standard was adopted for the Upper House with the result that only the wealthiest and privileged persons of very high status enjoyed the right to vote. The franchise for the Lower House was fixed at a level of much lower than under the act of 1919. This resulted in the increase in the number of voters i.e. not more than 14% of the total population of British India had the right to vote for provincial assemblies. Previously only 3% of the population had enjoyed the right to vote.18 The bicameral legislature under 1935 Act was a mixture of many principles and interests-both democratic and autocratic elements. Provinces were to send directly elected 66 representative on their behalf, the states were given the freedom of sending the nominees of the rulers as their representatives to the central legislature. The provincial legislature did represent the people through general constituencies. Instead, they were composed of members elected on the basis of constituencies organised according to religion or race, interest or sex. The members of provincial legislatures were elected directly, but the extent of the franchise varied from province to province and it was determined on the basis of minimum land revenue, a person paid or on the basis of the house rent. A certain minimum educational qualification or military services also were considered adequate for franchise. It can be said that the electors were chiefly governed by communal or provincial considerations in their choice while exercising to vote.19 Under the 1935 Act, diarchy was replaced by provincial autonomy, while the Governors remained the provincial chiefs; all provincial subjects were transferred to ministers who served at the will of popular elected assemblies. The NWFP was conceded the same reforms as other provinces under the Act, although the governor, in his capacity as the Agent to the Governor General, retained sole control over tribal policy. In December 1936 the nominations of 135 candidates for the Frontier Legislative Assembly took place which later reduced to five parties and groupings. The largest and most organized party was Congress which contested elections under the banner of Provincial Parliamentary board as Congress was banned in Frontier due its civil disobedience movement. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was also banned to enter in the province and his absence Dr. Khan Sahib led the party. The Congress candidates were nominated on the basis of loyalty to the nationalist cause and their prestige in society. In the Muslim rural constituencies the Congress candidates were largely small Khans. Most of the Congress candidates in the Muslim Urban and General constituencies were lawyers. A large number of Khans stood as independent candidates. The leading one among them was Major Nawab Sir Akbar Khan (Nawab of Hoti). Other prominent Khans standing for election were Nawab of Teri, K.B Arbab Sher Ali Khan, Nawab Zada Nasrullah Khan, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan and Nawabzada Mohammad Said Khan. Most Khans outside the Congress represented the same landed interest and mindset of loyalty to the British but they were unable to form any party of their own or to find some other form of cooperation during the election campaign. In several constituencies the Congress was able to benefit from the fact that the anti-Congress vote was split by rival Khans.20 Electoral Politics in the towns of NWFP was dominated by lawyers including Malik Khuda Baksh 67 and Pir Baksh. They represented the Independent Party, which had been the only real opposition party in the old legislative council. Two other lawyers were Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. In the 1937 Elections the former represented the Congress and the latter contested as an independent. The urban Congress candidates in the general constituencies were mostly lawyers or doctors. Their main opponents belonged to the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party. This party was created during the election campaign by members of the provincial Hindu Sabha and the Sing Sabha. The leaders of the party were mostly prosperous businessmen, who were loyal to the British.21 The major point of their electoral campaign was the demand of cancellation of the so called Hindu-Gurmukhi circular which had been issued by Sir Abdul Qayyum in October 1935, making Urdu and English the mandatory language of instruction from the third standard in government-aided schools for girls.22 The Muslim League did not put up any candidate in NWFP during 1937 elections. It had attempted without success since 1934 to found a NWFP branch. Jinnah had unsuccessfully attempted to establish an eighteen member Parliamentary Board with Pir Bakhsh as its convener, during his visit to the province in October 1936. Another group which emerged during 1937 elections was the group of retired senior government servants. Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum was the notable figure of this group. Others were K.B Kuli Khan, a retired publicity officer of the Frontier government, and K.B Saadullah Khan, a retired deputy commissioner who was also a leading landlord in the Charsada Tehsil in Peshawar district. Sir Abdul Qayyum also had strong support from a number of Khans in Hazara district.23 In Peshawar and Mardan, party identity seemed more important than elsewhere due to political activities and influence of Khudai Khidmatgars in these areas. According to the Governor, Cunningham., the elections in these districts were a straight fight between the Congress and its opponents, irrespective of candidates. Programmes and policies were of little or no importance and instead traditional following and factional considerations were usually decisive.24 In electoral campaigns, many candidates exploited religious factors. Anti-Congress candidates accused the Congress members, particularly the Khan Brothers and their families, of being under Hindu influence.25 The role of religious factors along with the more traditional factional politics was noted by the Secretary of State Lord Zetland: Only in Sindh and the North West Frontier Province were religious issues raised. in these provinces results turned largely on individual personalities, rivalries and tribal loyalties, although 68 in Peshawar and Mardan constituencies the issue upon which the election was fought was clear cut, Red shirts against the rest. In most of the constituencies the Red shirts won with clear majorities. In the Muslim constituencies in the Punjab general questions of polling counted little, and electors choose their loyal leaders. In Sikh and Hindu constituencies election propaganda was, however, diverted against government.26 There is also evidence of candidates standing for election in the hope that they would be paid to withdraw their nomination papers. In many instances a multiplicity of candidates have contested one seat, and there was reason to believe that a number of candidates stood merely in order to secure a bargaining counter for their subsequent withdrawal.27 In India as a whole and particularly in NWFP there cannot be the least doubt that many of the electorate who voted for the first time were unfitted to exercise the franchise intelligently. Many had little notion of what the election was about. In the backward rural areas the Congress propaganda in the main took these forms, the first a declaration that a vote for Congress meant a vote for Mr. Gandhi, and the second the making of the wildest and most irresponsible promises, coupled with violent attacks upon government and upon landlords.28 Khudai Khidmatgars widely used this technique in NWFP during election campaigns. They extensively attacked in their speeches, the big Khans and government. As the 1937 elections were the first large scale electoral experience in the Indian provinces, so common people were ignorant about the value of their vote. The British reported that in many provinces villagers were told that the Congress voting Box was the Gandhi box or even the "Sarkari", or "Govt." box. Villagers in some constituencies were informed that all ballot papers dropped in to Congress box would go straight to Mahtama Gandhi, and that person who voted in this way would secure large reduction in rent, while persons who voted against the Congress box would lose their lands altogether. They were also told that the victory of the Congress box would be followed by the repeal of unpopular laws. These stories were so implicitly believed that many voters came to look upon the Congress box as invested with supernatural qualities. In some instances prayers were made to the box, and letters and petitions to Mr. Gandhi, and even sums of money were found in the boxes29. Elections for a 50-member provincial assembly were scheduled on February 1937. The secrecy and freedom of the ballot were however, very badly protected by the procedural arrangements. There was a rule which allowed the marking of a ballot paper of an illiterate voter to be witnessed by the polling agent of the candidate for whom the illiterate voter declared he wished to vote. Naturally this made a mockery of the secrecy of the ballot in very many cases and allowed the candidates to influence the voters by fair 69 means or foul.30 Polling took place between 1 February and 10 February, with 179,529 voters. This was around 14 per cent of the total population. Turnout rate was 72.8 per cent. Turnout was highest in the rural Muslim constituencies and lowest among the Sikhs. Result of 1937 elections in NWFP is illustrated in table 3.1 and distribution of Muslim rural seats is shown in table 3.2. Table 3.1: Results of the 1937 Elections in the NWFP. Type of Constituency General General Muslim Muslim Total Urban Rural Urban Rural Congress 19 1 3 15 Independent Muslims 21 1 18 Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party 7 1 3 Independent Party 2 2 Independent Hindu 1 1 Total 50 3 6 3 33 Source: Return showing the results of Elections in India 1937. Party Sikh 3 3 Landholders 2 2 The Congress won 19 seats, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist captured seven and the Azad Party won two seats. The remaining twenty two successful candidates were independents. It was mainly in the Pakhtun rural areas that the Congress did well, especially in Peshawar and Mardan districts. In Peshawar district all Muslim rural seats were won by the Congress, and in Mardan the Congress won three out of five. In the remaining two Mardan constituencies the Congress candidates had been disqualified, the Congress soon captured these seats, too, by filing successful election petitions and then winning the byelections. Table 3.2: 1937 elections in the NWFP. Distribution of the Muslim Rural seats. Districts Peshawar Kohat Congress 2 3 7 1 Independents 7 2 3 Source: Returns showing the Results of Elections in India 1937 Party Hazara Mardan Bannu 1 3 D.I. Khan 1 3 The Congress won 19 seats, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist captured seven and the Azad Party won two seats. The remaining twenty two successful candidates were independents. It was mainly in the Pakhtun rural areas that the Congress did well, especially in Peshawar and Mardan districts. In Peshawar district all Muslim rural seats were won by the Congress, and in Mardan the Congress won three out of five. In the remaining two Mardan constituencies the Congress candidates had been disqualified, the Congress soon captured these seats, too, by filing successful election petitions and then winning the byelections. In the heavily non-Pakhtun district of Hazara the Congress did very badly, winning only two out of nine Muslim Urban seats. The Congress position among the 70 urban Muslims was very weak and no Congressite was returned from the Muslim urban constituencies. The general seats were evenly divided by the Congress and the HinduSikh Nationalist party. All Sikh seats went to the Hindu-Sikh nationalists. The majority of the successful Muslim independents were Khans closely associated with the British. Shortly after the elections, Sir Abdul Qayyum formed his own party “United Nationalist Party”31 in the Assembly with the help of independent members. Sir Abdul Qayyum formed the ministry with the coalition of Hindu-Sikh Nationalist party leaders on 1 April 1937. On 22 June 1937, the Viceroy made a conciliatory statement which induced the Congress to form ministries in the province. In July 1937 Congress Party took office in seven out of eleven provinces including the NWFP. In NWFP, all the “progressive forces” united round the Congress. Dr. Khan Sahib, the opposition leader, with the help of Hindu Sikh Nationalist party and of Hazara Democratic Party, got strength to put a NoConfidence Motion on 3 September 1937; it was passed by 27 votes to 21. Dr. Khan Sahib formed a coalition government with Lala Banju Ram Gandhi, Qazi Atta Ullah Khan and Muhammad Abbas Khan, who was a member of Democratic Party, the rest were Congress nominees.32 The Congress Ministry in the Frontier remained in office for two years and six weeks. The leading League candidates were Mian Ziauddin, Shah Pasand Khan (an old Khudai Khidmatgar who had obtained league’s ticket), Rashid Tahir Kheli, and Sardar Bhadur Khan. In the general elections of 1937, two Congress candidates had been disqualified in two Muslim-Rural constituencies of Mardan, i.e. Razar and Amazai. Their election petitions having been accepted, the two seats were declared vacant. In Razar- Muslim Rural constituency, the contest was between Mian Zia-ud-Din and Kamdar Khan, while in the Amazai Muslim rural constituency, the contest was between Allah dad Khan, a nominee of Congress, and Shah Pasand Khan, a nominee of Muslim League. After tough contest the Khudai Khidmatgars won elections from these two constituencies. Byelections in the Hazara district were of immense importance from League’s point of view. In Haripur North Muslim Rural constituency by-elections, Abdur Rashid Tahirkheli, the League’s candidate defeated his rivals by a margin of 13 votes only. The total number of votes were 3565. The Second World War broke out in September 1939. In common with the rest of the Congress provinces the Frontier Ministry, after passing the anti-war resolution on 6 November, 1939, tendered its resignation and governor rule was imposed on 11 November 1939 under Sir George Cunningham. 71 3.4 ELECTIONS 1946: After the end of World War II in 1945, following the Simla Conference, the Viceroy Lord Wavell announced that the Central and Provincial Legislature elections would be held in the winter of 1945-6, after which a constitutionmaking body would be set up. He announced that after the elections, the Viceroy would set up an Executive Council that would have the support of the main Indian political parties. After 1945, the demand for Pakistan had acquired considerable importance in NWFP but Muslim League in NWFP was unable to get benefit from this due to its factionalism. The Muslim League candidates were selected by the provincial Selection Board. The President of the board was the Nawab of Mamdot from the League High Command but the selection of candidates was in the hand of board convener.33 The senior leaders, Aurangzeb Khan, K.B Saadullah Khan and Mian Ziauddin were all denied nomination. All appealed to the Central Selection Board to review the decision but only Mian Ziauddin’s appeal succeeded. Abdur Rab Nishtar was able to get re-nominated for his old seat with great difficulty. Twenty-three persons applied for the nine constituencies from Hazara district upon which fourteen persons failed to get nominated, six nevertheless decided to contest against the official Muslim League candidates. In Hazara district Ghulam Jan Tahirkheli, (the editor of newspaper and secretary of Haripur Muslim League), Qazi Asadul Haq (a member of provincial election board who for many years had been battling against Aurangzeb Khan and the League’s strongman in Hazara) K.B. Jalaluddin, Khan Abdul Jaffar Khan and Abdullah Jan (two League leaders in Mansehra) and K.S. Atai Khan of Battal (MLA from upper Pakhli) were all expelled from the party for their anti-League activities during the campaign34. Elections were held between 26 January and 14 February on the same franchise qualifications as were laid down for 1937 election. The results of all constituencies were announced by 18 February 1946. The Congress won an absolute majority, or in all 30 out of 50 seats. The Muslim League in this Muslim majority province disappointingly captured only seventeen seats. In the Pakhtun dominated areas the Congress won almost all seats, whereas it could not show its popularity in non Pakhtun areas. In D.I. Khan the Congress’s ally, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema succeeded. Following table shows the distribution of the Muslim rural seats by districts. All General and Sikhs seats except one went to the Congress. Seven out of nine general seats were uncontested. Detail of results of the elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946 are shown in table 3.3. 72 Table 3.3: Results of the elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946 LandMuslim Muslim General General Sikh Holders Rural Urban Rural Urban Congress 30 18 1 6 3 2 Muslim League 17 13 2 2 Jamiat-ul- Ulema 2 2 Akali Dal 1 1 Total 50 33 3 6 3 3 2 Source: Government of India, Returns showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Dehli: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948) Party Total Two parties, which had previously played a prominent role in Provincial politics, had now dissolved. The groups which had supported Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party supported either the Congress or the Muslim League, mostly the latter. In addition to the Congress and the Muslim League, several other parties, the Ahrars, the Khaksars, the Jamiat-ulUlema and the Sikh Party the Akali Dal, took part in the elections, but almost all leading candidates belonged either to the Congress or the Muslim League. Thus the NWFP had been drawn more closely into the orbit of all-India affairs and all-India issues would seem to have set their imprint decisively on provincial politics. However, this development must not be exaggerated.35 Table 3.4 showed the voting trends in different regions of NWFP during 1946 elections. The table also reflected the traditional rivalries between Pakhtun and non-Pakhtuns and other horizontal and longitudinal stratification which determine the voting behaviour in NWFP. Table 3.4: Muslim Rural seats by districts in the Legislative Assembly elections in the NWFP 1946. District Hazara Mardan Peshawar Kohat Bannu D.I. Khan Congress 1 4 6 4 2 1 Muslim League 8 1 1 2 1 Jamiat-ul-Ulema 2 Source: Government of India, Returns showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Dehli: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948) As Cunningham reported the main feature of the elections was that they were fought not on any kind of party programme (neither party has any programme intelligible to the electorate), but on grounds of personal faction-feeling.36 In Bannu District, where he spent a few days soon before the elections, Cunningham declared that, “the results in the voting for the Muslim seats seem likely to be decided by the number of sheep each candidate can kill to feast his supporters”, the general estimate being ten votes per sheep.37 Table 3.3 shows that Congress won absolute majority, i.e. 30 out of 50 provincial seats. The Muslim League won only 17 seats. Two seats went to Jamiat-ul-Ulema while Akali Dal got one seat. In the province’s regions (Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu and 73 Tank Tehsil of Dera Ismail Khan) the Congress won sixteen of the nineteen territorial constituencies it contested, losing the other by slender margins.38 The League emerged in the elections as the representative of the Province’s non-Pakhtun Muslims, winning eight of nine seats in Hazara, two of the three urban seats and both landlord constituencies.39 Other voting detail is given in table 3.5. Muslim League received more Muslim votes than the Congress. League received 146,235 votes in the Muslim constituencies while Congress scored 142,508 votes.40 Above table shows that in DI. Khan’s constituencies were won by JUH candidates by securing 17741 votes, the ally of Congress. Cunningham reported to the Wavell about the cause of failure of Muslim League in the NWFP. “It has been said that if Congress had not been in office, very difficult for Congress to get a dozen Muslim seats, because of favour the people by giving them cloth, sugar etc.41” It was simply an excuse because most of the Muslim officials in superior appointments favoured the Muslim League. The two reasons of the failure of the League were their bad organisation and the internal rift within Muslim League in NWFP. Congress members had made many promises in economic fields. “Muslim League presented a one-point manifesto "if you want Pakistan, vote for the Muslim League".42 The election posters in Hazara district reflected this sentiment: The election is only for Pakistan. The arrogant Jawaharlal Nehru’s announcement that they [the Congress] will crush the Muslim League is a challenge to the faith and honour of every Muslim. Give him an effective reply for the success of the Muslim League and for the achievement of Pakistan.43 Table 3.5 Results of 1946 Elections. Constituency Muslim Urban Rural Hazara Peshawar Mardan Kohat Bannu D.I. Khan Total Total territorial seats Landlords Total Muslims Hindu Urban Rural Total Sikh Total Minority Total Pakhtun* Electorate Total vote caste 50567 61508 70726 63601 34176 38289 31896 300196 350763 1359 352117 9748 9748 14124 23872 375989 218023 Percent Voting 62.77 54.03 72.85 73.33 65.70 75.00 69.88 67.86 67.07 73.75 67.10 46.16 17.21 60.97 29.91 62.19 72.31 Muslim League votes 23055 29378 2853 23162 13922 17592 12466 122373 145428 807 146235 146235 86003 Percent of electorate 28.62 26.77 26.63 26.69 26.76 34.44 27.31 27.66 27.81 43.95 27.87 24.19 28.52 Congress & JUH votes 11241 7686 43316 35443 19860 9405 17741 133451 144692 447 145139 7512 7512 7598 15110 160249 112982 Percent of electorate 13.95 7.00 44.62 40.84 38.18 18.41 38.87 30.17 27.67 24.34 27.66 35.57 13.26 32.80 18.93 26.51 37.47 80556 109762 97088 86777 52020 51080 45642 442369 522925 1836 524761 21117 35521 56638 23164 79802 604563 301527 Source: Government of India, Returns showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Dehli: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948) 74 This approach had little appeal in the Paktun areas where the suggestion that there could be such a thing as Hindu domination was only laughable44. The exact meaning of Pakistan was left undefined in electoral politics of NWFP. In Governor Cunningham’s opinion few people were thinking in terms of complete separation from India. What the supporters of Pakistan were interested in was getting some safeguards of Muslim interests in the central government. In November Jinnah visited the NWFP to boost up the Muslim League electoral campaign. The Governor had asked several educated and intelligent people what Jinnah had said about Pakistan, but no one could give a clear answer.45 On the other hand, Congress used Khudai Khidmatgars for its electoral struggle. The Pakhtuns must be united but elections only led to a lot of factional feuds.46 He criticized the Congress for having done nothing to eradicate corruption but letting it go on as before. The ministry had no policy at all and discussed their programme neither with each other nor with the party. The struggle was between the Nation and Firanghis (Britishers). There was no third force. Those who were opposed to the Khudai Khidmatgars were those who had always supported the British.47 Ghaffar Khan was very successful in articulating the Congress political philosophy in Pakhtun society using the sentiments of Pakhto. As pakhto is the code of life of Pakhtun society in which honour, dignity, spirituality, nationalism (here nationalism means Pakhtuns group feelings) are the main ingredients. Pakhtuns possess hatred for all those who threaten their Pakhto. So in all statements Ghaffar Khan projected Pakhto feelings in order to popularize the Khudai Khidmatgar appeal.48 The other most important factor in the Congress victory was the Pakhtun predominance in the NWFP. Although Pakhtuns in settled districts were less than two-fifth of the population, they were socially and politically dominant. Traditional Pakhtun tarburwali-political alignment structured the operation of modern parties in the rural areas. The penalty of intermingling taburwali with party politics was that if one local faction joined the Muslim League its traditional rival would join the Congress and vice versa. The British patronage of big Khans and the growing aspirations of smaller Khans also structured political developments. The latter provided the leadership of the Congress Khudai Khidmatgar movement, while many of big Khans turned to the Muslim League in the 1940s to safeguard their interests. The Khan brothers based their power around the factions of the smaller Khan.49 Important political repercussions flowed from virtual invisibility of the few Hindus and Sikhs in the rural centers of the Pakhtun culture, while other Muslims might view them as a threat 75 to their religious and material interests, as for as Pakhtuns are concerned it was conceivable that they might be ruled by non-Muslims.50 In electoral politics of NWFP during these elections, the Congress avoided the name of ‘Akhand Hindustan’ or ‘Pakistan’ due to electoral strategy. The Congress members did not even publish their election manifesto in NWFP. “If they had done so, they would have had to explain their attitude on the question of Pakistan and then even the ignorant majority of the Muslim Electorate would have probably become cautious. In fact they asked for votes in the name of Khudai Khidmatgar movement, and not in the name of Congress as such.”51 The major focus of Congress electoral campaign was on social and economic issues and the corruption of Muslim Leaguers and officials. The Muslim Leaguers were accused of being British agents and the elections were portrayed as being a battle between rich and poor and the choice was also between freedom and foreign rule. The Congress in NWFP contested all General and Sikh seats, twenty four out of thirty three Muslim rural seats, one Muslim Urban and one landlord’s seat. In some constituencies the Congress had come to an agreement with either the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulema that only the party with the best chances of winning the seat should field a candidate and that the other party should support that candidate.52 Other factors of Congress victory and Muslim League defeat in NWFP were personal influence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the fact that the Muslim league was a political latecomer in the Frontier. The Muslim League failed in all the districts of NWFP except Hazara, where it won all the Muslim rural seats except one. The party also won two of three Muslim urban seats. Thus the division between the Congress and the Muslim League by and large coincided with the geographical distributions of Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns. Both the landholders’ seats went to the Muslim League. The 1946 elections gave considerable strength to the provincial Congress as compared to 1937 elections when it had won 19 seats and had no absolute majority. In 1946, the good Congress performance was due to its organizational setup and appeal to the sentiments of poor classes. After the elections the Congress claimed that the people of NWFP rejected the idea of Pakistan but in reality they were fought on other issues and the appeal of Pakistan among the masses was not really put to the test.53 By the end of February 1946, Dr. Khan Sahib formed the Ministry and soon afterward Cunningham was replaced by Sir Olaf Caroe. The third Khan Sahib Ministry consisted of four members, with Dr. Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister having the charge of Home, Political, Public Health and Public works; Qazi Ata Ullah was the 76 Minister for Revenue, Industries and Jails, Mohammad Yahya Jan was Education Minister and Mahr Chand Khanna was the Finance Minister. Allah Nawaz Khan was unanimously elected the Speaker when the new House met on 12 March 1946 and Lala Girdharilal became his Deputy. This ministry was in some respects a family affair as Ghaffar Khan’s brother was Chief Minister, the Education Minister was his son in law, and the Revenue Minister’s daughter had been married to one of his sons.54 On 10th March the Muslim League held a meeting under the Presidentship of the Nawab of Hoti. Abdu Qayyum Khan was elected leader of the Opposition and the Nawab of Tank was elected as Deputy Leader.55 The Congress held only one legislative session in 1946 which primarily served as a forum in which each side kept up the propaganda of the election campaign. Khan Sahib ministry passed some significant economic and social legislation, such as Punjab Tenancy (North-West Frontier Province) Amendment Act, introduced administrative reforms, and began long term planning for the province. All these initiatives tended to favour the Congress supporters, the lower class non Pakhtuns and the smaller khans, at the expense of senior Khans in the Muslim League.56 By 1947, the election results of the previous year were no longer an accurate gauge of political sympathies in the NWFP. In 1947 public opinion had shifted in favour of the Muslim League, due to the clear signs of the emergence of Pakistan, but there was no institutional way for the change because Congress had majority in the assembly. With no legal resources, the League decided to resort to civil disobedience in order to displace the Frontier Congress and ensure the further test of public opinion in NWFP. 57 By elections were scheduled for mid February in 1947 in the area of Mardan district-a stronghold of Muslim League. Ishaq Khan, the League nominee won the election by securing 8,941 votes and Congress received 8,353. In the by-elections the women workers of Muslim League also supported the cause of Ishaq Khan against Mian Shakerullah, the Congress nominee. They went to Mardan from Peshawar. During elections the Congress members showed their resentment on the participation of women League workers from Peshawar. 3.5 REFERENDUM IN NWFP 1947 Mountbatten was given the charge of transferring power. The Viceroy told Liaqat Ali Khan that one of the proposals under consideration was that provinces should be left to choose their own future. But he said that as far as the case in NWFP the number of elected members of the Constituent Assembly for this province was too small to leave the decision in their hands. Mountbatten during his visit to the NWFP on 28-29 April 1947 77 had indicated the idea of referendum but he had not said what its form would be. The draft plan of the partition which Mountbatten put before the Governors conference on 15 and 16 April 1947, envisaged the holding of fresh election. But neither the Provincial Congress nor the Congress High Command was ready to accept the solution. On 6 May Mountbatten wired to the Secretary of State for India that Nehru was prepared to accept referendum provided it was not held under Governor’s rule and if the Ministry was allowed to function in the normal way. When Jinnah was informed about holding of a referendum instead of new elections, at first he was upset, but when he was told by the Viceroy about the abolishment of weightage (12 seats in 50) which the Hindu-Sikh minority had in the NWFP, he also preferred referendum to an election. On 2 June, 1947 Mountbatten presented his famous plan later known as 3rd June Plan before the principal Indian leaders. In this plan there was a provision for referendum in NWFP. Commenting on 3rd June Plan, Jinnah appealed to all the communities with a special reference to the Muslims for the peaceful transfer of power in India. Referring to the question of Referendum in NWFP, the Quaid said: Hence it is clear that the verdict and the mandate of the people of the Frontier Province will be obtained as to whether they want to join Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances I request the Provincial Muslim League of the Frontier Province to withdraw the movement of civil disobedience which they had perforce to resort to; and I call upon all the leaders of the Muslim League and the Musalmans generally to organise our people to face this referendum with hope and courage., and I feel confident that the people of Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.58 This statement further affected the electoral politics and voting behaviour in this referendum. Congress and Muslim League both accepted this plan, but Gandi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan opposed it. It was agreed upon that the usual Provincial Election Staff should be allowed to perform the ordinary duties at the polling stations in the province. But they had to comply with the orders of the Members of Election Commission which consisted of the Army Officers. According to the official letter issued by Army General Headquarter, India on 18 June 1947, following team of officers were selected to assist referendum in NWFP.59 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Lt. Col. OH. Mitchell, Comd. 1FF Rif T/Lt. Col. V.W Tregear, FFR, AQMG, HQ (Northern Command) T/Lt. Col R.W. Niva, Comd. 4FFRif T/Lt. Col. MWH White, Comd. 2/9/GR T/Lt. Col. GM Strover, Guides Cavalry. AA & QMG HQ.1 Armed Div. T/Lt. Col. WI Moberley, OBE, Comd1 FFR Lt. Col. R.O.L.D Byrene 1AC Maj. E. De G.H. Bromhead, FFR 78 At the top was a Referendum Commissioner.60 Civilians were included in the lower echelons of the referendum machinery and only under the close supervision of Army personnel. The Viceroy met the Indian leaders and all agreed on following electoral charter. 1. It is desirable that in this referendum: a). Electioneering speeches, which can only lead to bloodshed should as far as possible be avoided; and b) issue should be clearly put before the voters. 2. To achieve these objects, it has been suggested: a). That electioneering speeches should by agreement between the parties, be banned; and b). That election posters should be prepared containing side by side and in very simple and agreed language, the issue what the two future Dominions will be and the respective advantages they have to offer to the NWFP. A map should be printed showing the areas of the two dominions. The Viceroy instructed the Governor NWFP that “each side should have equal facilities in the matter of the supply of petrol” and that an amnesty should be announced for the political prisoners, excluding those charged with serious criminal offences. In proposed poster for the referendum, first of all in a short paragraph they had discussed about the partition plan of India into two separate States of India and Pakistan and also some sort of explanation of the third June Plan of His Majesty’s government, which had already been accepted by the All India Muslim League Council and the All India Congress Committee. The Pir of Manki Sharif was the only member from the Frontier. The other members, I.I. Chundrigar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Syed Wajid Ali, came from the central organization.61 Muslim League campaign was on Pakistan issue while Congress continued to campaign for Pakhtunistan and against Pakistan and referendum. From 1945 onward Pir of Manki Sharif supported the cause of Pakistan and was deeply involved in Muslim League organizations from his base in Nowshera. He brought many of his murids into the League as political activists and supporters and encouraged Mian Gul Abdul Wadud (Wali-e-Swat) to support Jinnah’s campaign. The Pir’s most significant organization of Tribal Areas political activity in support of the League was to rally Shinwari and Milagros tribesmen to stage a demonstration against Nehru when the latter toured the Tribal Areas in 1946. 62 By 1947 Pir of Zakori Sharif in Bannu had also demonstrated his sympathy for League demands and popularized them in Waziristan. Faqir of Ipi assured the League of his support for Pakistan.63 The polling began on 6 July 1947. The referendum results were made public on July 20. According to the official results there were 572,798 registered voters.64 79 Table 3.6: The detailed picture of referendum Constituency Electorate vote caste % Voting Votes Pakistan % % of votes in Electorates 1946 % of Muslim League votes in 1946 % of Congress Votes for & JUH votesIndia in 1946 Muslim Urban 50627 35942 7099 35680 70.48 112.28 246.26 505.23 262 Rural Hazara 109762 83656 76.22 83269 75.86 135.38 283.44 1083.39 387 Peshawar 97088 40470 41.68 39902 41.10 56.42 154.34 92.12 568 Mardan 86777 36062 41.56 34852 40.16 54.80 150.48 98.33 1210 Kohat 52020 32323 62.14 32207 61.91 94.24 231.34 162.17 116 Bannu 51080 33282 65.16 33137 64.87 86.54 188.36 352.33 145 D.I. Khan 45642 29461 64.55 29303 64.20 91.87 235.06 165.17 158 Total 442369 255254 57.70 252670 57.12 84.17 206.48 189.34 2584 Total 492996 291196 59.07 288350 58.49 87.17 209.87 211.46 2846 Muslim Total Minority 79802 922 1.16 894 1.12 3.75 5.92 28 Total 572798 292118 50.99 289244 50.50 81.20 208.76 190.49 2874 Pakhtun* 301527 150731 50.00 148649 49.30 68.18 172.84 131.57 2082 Source: Data calculated from Referendum Results 1947 (NWFP) *The difference between the 1946 and Referendum elections arose due to two changes in the voting. 1). in 1946, each voter in Peshawar city could cast two votes; in 1947, they cast only one. 2). in 1946, a small number of rural Muslims voted twice: in their regular constituency and in special landlord’s constituencies. In 1947, there was no voting in the latter. 21 rural constituencies, including all those in Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, and Bannu plus Tank Tehsil in D.I. Khan. Out of them 50.99% exercised their vote. 289,244 (99.02%) votes were cast in favour of Pakistan, and 2874 (0.98%) in favour of India. Due to the differences in the electorates, the votes in 1946 and referendum are not directly comparable. These percentages, therefore, had been computed by comparing the percentage of the electorate voting for Congress and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind. One argument against that there was a low turn out, only 51 percent. This indicated that Congress boycott met with wide response and thus a significant share of the population was opposed to Pakistan. In fact, the votes cast for Pakistan represented only 50.50 percent of the total electorate. In Rittensberg’s opinion this boycott was “rather ineffectual”. He has come to this conclusion by comparing the figures for the referendum to those of the 1946 elections. The electoral rolls prepared for 1946 elections were adopted for the referendum without amendment in spite of the fact that many of those on the rolls had since died and many others, including perhaps the majority of all Hindus and Sikhs, had left their homes and were unable to exercise their franchise. In 1946 turnout had been 62 percent and in 1947 it was 51 percent. Thus in spite of fact that the figure for the total electorate in 1947 was much higher than the number of people who could actually take part in the voting., the turnout in 1947 was only 11 percentage point lower than in 1946.65 On the other side one analysis is that in 1946 seven out of nine Hindu candidates had been returned unopposed. Thus no votes were polled in these constituencies, which make the figure for the total turn-out a bit misleading. There 80 were so many factors which contributed to the overwhelming victory of Pakistan in referendum 1947 including patronage and different connotations and meaning of Pakistan for different people. The voting trends in NWFP shifted towards Pakistan due to Pathans killings in various parts of India in 1946.66 Religious group representing Pir of Manki Sharif and others considered the meaning of Pakistan, that it will be suitable place where they can implement their own type of Islam. Provincial bureaucracy considered that Pakistan meant the possibility of getting quick promotions. For Muslims, businessmen it was understood as a place where they could run their business without the competition of Hindus and Sikhs.67 So every group had their own ideology about Pakistan under the cover of Islam. In referendum Pakhtun tarburwali and parajama could not play their role due to the boycott of Congress. In 1937 and 1946 elections these two were the most effective electoral tools in the hands of Congress. Another factor of the victory of Pakistan was the one sided nature of the referendum. In the referendum Muslim Leaguers brought the voters to the poll, feasting them or influencing them and then getting votes in return.68 Naturally this increase was not totally due to bogus voting. Muslim League was better organized in Hazara than elsewhere and it had a dedicated and efficient leader (Mohammad Jalaluddin known as Jalal Baba). Table 3.7 shows the electoral comparison between 1946 elections and 1947 referendum. Table 3.7: Table showing the turn out in seven Constituencies of Hazara. Constituency 1946 Tanawal 51.9 Abbottabad West 58.3 Abbottabad East 46.2 Haripur North 48.8 Haripur Central 60.8 Haripur South 66.00 Upper Pakhli 59.2 1947 86.18 85.8 73.27 75.00 78.8 84.3 80.1 (Source: Appendix III and Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 Folio 240. The Congress ally Khudai khidmatgars had its strong hold in Peshawar and Mardan where boycott was effective. The figures of Mardan and Peshawar rural constituencies are shown in Table 3.8. In the referendum Pakistan and Muslim League had the support of the most articulate, vociferous and influential groups. Contest over political legitimacy in the provincial legislature ultimately determined the fate of the province. The administered and non-administered districts and agencies of NWFP were transferred to the state of Pakistan through the referendum of 1947.69 81 Table 3.8: Turn out in the Muslim Rural constituencies of Peshawar and Mardan Districts. Constituency Bara Mohmands Khalil Hashtnagar North Hashtnagar South Doaba Daudzai Nowshera South Nowshera North Baizai Kamalzai Utmannama Razzar Amazai 1946 70.4 78.7 82.3 72 82 66 67.6 76.18 65.9 73.8 76.6 78 1947 55.7 46.6 37.5 20.6 24.8 51.1 48.9 50.2 48.2 37.5 27.3 36.27 (Source: Appendix III and Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 Folio 240. After referendum was over, the Muslim League in NWFP reviewed their demand of the resignation of Dr. Khan sahib ministry. Dr. Khan Sahib had no intention of resignation but in a private conversation he had said that if he is assured that a general election would be held in the reasonable new future he would resign. The Viceroy discussed the question of dismissing the ministry of the NWFP with Sardar Patel, who had expressed the hope that nothing unconstitutional would be done, and that in any case any step of this nature should be postponed until the 15th August. Sir George Cunningham the new Governor of NWFP, who had taken over from Lockhart on the 13 July persuaded Mr. Jinnah, “to let him try his hand with Khan Sahib to obtain a satisfactory, settlement without having recourse to such drastic means. On 15 August 1947, Pakistan came into being and within a week i.e. 22 August 1947 the Congress ministry in the NWFP was dismissed. Abdul Qayyum Khan was installed as the new Chief Minister of the province. 3.6 POST-PARTITION (1947-1955) After partition, the political situation in NWFP entered a new scenario. NWFP have only eleven years of electoral experience starting from 1937 but in other parts of a new country like, in Punjab representative institutions were practiced for more than sixty years.70 In NWFP Muslim League Ministry which was installed on 23rd August did not for the time being have a majority in the Assembly. The Assembly was convened for budget session in spring 1948, seven Congress MLAs had decided to join the Muslim League and thus there was a majority for the ministry.71 In March the Frontier Assembly met for the first time since partition. Dr. Khan Sahib became leader of the Opposition. He and his followers took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan along with the Muslim League MLAs.72 The Muslim League Ministry headed by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was made to continue as a caretaker Government until the 82 elections, scheduled from December 8, 1951. Five political parties’ entered the electoral race. The Muslim League put up 78 members, The Azad Yousafzai Muslim League 44, The Islam League 6 and the Jamaat-i-Islami 3 candidates.73 The nomination papers of Qayyum Khan’s two opponents were turned down allegedly on grounds of technical discrepancy.74 Many Jinnah Awami Muslim Leaguers including Suhrawardy, the Pir of Manki Sharif, and Ghulam Muhammad Khan of Lundkhur could not freely campaign because many places in the province were declared off limits for them. e.g., the Pir of Manki Sharif was not allowed to enter the southern Districts. Restrictions on him and on Suhrawardy were removed only a fortnight before the polling day. Those on 27 other leaders were lifted after the election. Other Jinnah Awami Muslim League leaders and candidates were under detention. When the elections were over Khan Qayyum admitted that there were 60 political prisoners, but that they were all Red Shirts, he also admitted that only 170 persons were prohibited from moving out of their thana limits. There was no issue in these elections. The Muslim League rested its case on these slogans, “Stand united under the League”, “Vote for League is Vote for Progress”, “League victory is the defeat of Pakhtunistan”. The opposition neither had a manifesto nor a programme to sell to the electorate. The election was held according to schedule, but the polling was far from free and fair. Muhammad Yousaf Khattak with two other colleagues withdrew from the election, allegedly, on account of official involvement and tempering of ballot boxes by officials. The opposition parties felt so indignant at the way in which the elections were conducted that they not only planned to launch a civil disobedience movement in the province, but also sent an eleven member deputation to Karachi to appraise the Central government and the President on the matter. As result of these elections Muslim League got 67 seats, Jinnah Awami Muslim League obtained four seats, independent won 13 seats and non-Muslim got 1 seat out of total 85 seats. The elections in NWFP were meaningless. On 19 July 1955 Sardar Abdur Rashid was replaced with Sardar Bahadur Khan (Brother of Ayub Khan) as new Chief Minister of NWFP. He remained Chief Minister for three months, and on 14 October 1955, the post of Chief Minister was abolished and whole West Pakistan was amalgamated in One Unit up to 1970 elections. Elections were also held in the areas that were previously part of NWFP after becoming the part of One Unit with West Pakistan in 83 1955. Many politicians emerged on the National level from the Frontier side. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military dictator was himself was from Haripur district of Frontier. Table 3.9 shows the detail of elections in NWFP since 1947-1997. After independence electoral politics in NWFP got new trends due to central government involvement in Provincial politics and provincial politicians’ involvement in Central Government. For Electoral analysis the researcher will focus both dimensions of electoral politics i.e. central (national) and provincial together. At the national level, the strategy of postponing elections was followed for the first decade after independence. Muslim League politicians in alliance with the bureaucracy succeeded in maintaining the façade of parliamentary democracy without holding national elections from 1947-1958. Many of the Muslim League politicians had left their constituencies behind in India when they migrated to Pakistan in 1947, and were aware that holding elections at national level would be political suicide. Soon after independence, real power passed from the politicians to the bureaucracy. The civilmilitary bureaucracy also avoided holding elections which would have helped restore the legitimacy and power of politicians at their expense. Another reason for delaying elections at national level was the electoral dilemma confronting West Pakistan’s political and civil-military bureaucratic elite. Elections.75 The One Unit scheme was an electoral strategy adopted in 1955 to deny East Pakistan the advantage of its numerical majority. Table 3.9: Detail of Elections in NWFP, 1947-1997 Year 1951 1970 Election for Franchise Nature NWFP Legislative Assembly Direct Party based National and Provincial Direct Party based Assemblies 1977 National and Provincial Direct Party based Assemblies 1979 Local Government (Local Bodies) Direct Non-Party 1983 Local Government (Local Bodies Direct Non-Party 1984 Presidential Referendum Direct Non-Party 1985 National and Provincial Direct Non-Party Assemblies 1988 National and Provincial Direct Party based Assemblies 1990 National and Provincial Direct Party based Assemblies 1993 National and Provincial Direct Party based Assemblies 1997 National and Provincial Direct Party based Assemblies Source: Compiled by the author from Daily Dawn (Karachi) since 1951-1997. Winner PML N/A PPP N/A N/A Zia-ul-Haq N/A N/A IJI PPP PML-N 84 Another reason for delaying elections at national level was the electoral dilemma confronting West Pakistan’s political and civil-military bureaucratic elite. Elections would have inevitably resulted in a transfer of power from the western to the eastern wing of the country, since the bureaucracy would not have been able to preserve their political dominance in the face of East Pakistan’s numerical majority.76 Strategy that was considered, but not adopted until much latter by General Zia, was to have ‘separate electorate’ for minority voters. This would have moved 20 per cent of East Pakistan’s Hindu voters fro the political mainstream, which would have given West Pakistan a majority of Muslim seats in the National Assembly.77 In 1954 East Pakistan Legislative Assembly elections, the hitherto dominant Muslim League, with its base in West Pakistan, suffered a humiliating defeat from which it never full recovered. It won only 10 of 247 seats in contrast to the 233 seats won by the United Front, a coalition of the major East Pakistan opposition parties contesting on a platform of greater provincial autonomy. This proved to e a harbinger of what was to come when the national elections were held in 1970.78 Following the adoption of Pakistan’s first Constitution in 1956, it became increasingly difficult for Pakistan’s ruling elite to continue postponing elections while maintaining the façade of a parliamentary democracy. In October 1958, shortly before elections were finally scheduled to be held, the façade was removed-President Iskandar Mirza declared Martial Law, abrogated the Constitution, and cancelled the elections. Less than three weeks later Mirza was removed by the Army commander, General Ayub Khan, who was to govern Pakistan under a system of ‘guided democracy’ for more than ten years.79 Despite the imbalance of pre-partition’s electoral experience amongst the provinces, electoral history has been a decidedly chequered one.80 As Ayseha Jalal notes, the ‘overt authoritarianism’ that Pakistan has experienced for much of its history has been shaped ‘by institutional imbalances between the elected and nonelected institutions of the state’81 Mohammad Waseem argues that most of Pakistan’s electoral problems can be attributed to the imbalance between the two colonial legacies, which Myron Weiner has termed ‘tutelary democracy’82. The first legacy was the tradition of bureaucratic rule. Under John Lawrence’s school of paternalistic administration, this tradition became much stronger in NWFP. The principle of elections to the legislative councils and assemblies was therefore introduced at a much slower pace in the former provinces than the latter. Consequently, at the time of 85 partition, the regions that became part of Pakistan had much less experience with elections than those that became part of India.83 Since independence, the main impediment in the path of electoral democracy has been the unwillingness of the powerful civil and military bureaucracy, often supported by civilian politicians, to hold elections that would transfer power out of their hands. Indeed, the fundamental electoral dilemma confronting Pakistan’s ruling elites since independence has been how to accommodate the legacy of bureaucratic rule. The objectives have always been to hold elections that would legitimize but not change the status quo. To a considerable extent electoral history has been shaped by the various strategies that had been devised to achieve this objective. These include the following six elements. i). rigging elections; ii). promising but postponing holding elections; iii). holding local rather than provincial and national elections, iv). holding indirect rather than direct elections; and v). holding non-party rather than party based elections; vi). Writing new constitutions or amending old ones in order to strengthen presidential powers reduce those of electoral representatives. 3.7 ELECTIONS DURING AYUB ERA 1959-65 The first electoral strategy Ayub chose to preserve the status quo was to hold nonparty local government elections rather than party-based provincial or national elections. In 1959, the first round of ‘Basic Democracy’ elections was held on the basis of universal adult franchise. Eighty thousand (later increased to 120,000) ‘Basic Democrats’ were elected to serve in multi-tiered local government institutions. Local administration officials were also members of these institutions and had decisive say in the allocation and administration of local development schemes. This placed them in a strong position to influence and manipulate the decisions of the Basic Democrats. As Philip Jones noted, ‘the BD System was destined to become less a means of local representation than an arm of the bureaucracy’.84 Ayub’s second strategy for holding ‘no change election’ was to use the Basic Democrats as an electoral college to indirectly elect the President, the members of the National Assembly, and the members of the East and West Pakistan Assemblies. This system achieved the desired result in a referendum in February 1960, when 95.6 per cent of Basic Democrats elected Ayub Khan to be the President of Pakistan. 86 Following the promulgation of Ayub’s 1962 Constitution, the Basic Democrats elected members of the National and Provincial Assemblies on a non-party basis. The second round of Basic Democracy elections was held in November 1964. These were followed by indirect Presidential elections in January 1965, in which President Ayub won 63.3 per cent of the Electoral College votes compared to 36.4 per cent for his rival Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Fatima Jinnah’s results were surprisingly high, considering that it was Basic Democrats who were beholden to Ayub that formed the “Electoral College”. The opposition parties were known to oppose Ayub’s system of Basic democracy, so in voting for Ayub “the electors were voting for themselves”.85 These elections were followed shortly by indirect partybased elections to the National Assembly, and East and West Pakistan Assemblies, in which the factions of the Pakistan Muslim League led by Ayub Khan emerged victorious. In the National Assembly elections, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Ayub Khan won 54.8 per cent of the vote and 120 of 150 seats. In the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly elections, the PML won 48.8 per cent of the vote and 96 of 147 seats.86 Ayub’s third strategy for keeping power out of the hands of politicians was to write a new constitution. The 1962 Constitution replaced Pakistan’s traditional parliamentary system of government with a strong presidential one. It greatly enhanced the powers of President and severely curtailed those of the elected Assembly members. It was Ayub’s success at ensuring that elections did not lead to political change which resulted in political changes being brought about by voters in the streets rather than voters in ballot booths. In March 1969, following a four months anti-Ayub agitation movement, the President was forced to resign and hand power over to Pakistan second military ruler, General Mohammad Yahya Khan.87 CONCLUSIONS Electoral politics in NWFP which was started during controlled suffrage period (1932-1970) were rooted in in four historical developments, i.e. British System of indirect rule, the impact of Khilafat Movement, the reform issues and the legacy of period of civil disobedience in 1930-32. During pre independence period, the electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the colonial interest and post independence period (1947-1970) it revolved around the authoritarian political culture of Pakistan. During 1937 and 1945-46 elections politicians used the voters for their personal interest and voters became patronage seekers under the garb of these politicians. Nature and 87 dynamics of electoral politics in NWFP after 1970 is discussed in coming chapters of section two in this study. Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP (Karachi: Royal Book Co. 1989), p.3 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wikell International, 1981), p.24 3 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, North West Frontier Province: History and Politics (Islamabad: National Institute of History and Culture research, 2007), p.12 4 William Barton, Journal of Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XIX, January 1932, part I, p.17. 5 David Washbrook, ‘The Rhetoric of Democracy’, In Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds., Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 6 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, North West Frontier Province: History and Politics, p. 32. 7 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), P.126 8 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of The Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.5 9 Bannerjee, A.C., Indian Constitutional documents, Vol. 2, (Calcutta, 1948), pp. 135-54. 10 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of The Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47, p. 6 11 Ibid., p.7 12 Report of the Legislative council elections in the North-West Frontier Province for the Year 1932 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Stationary and Printing, 1932), pp. 2-4. 13 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.126. 14 Lahore Tribune 20 March 1932. 15 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p. 126. 16 Ibid., p.127 17 Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1932-33, p.19 18 N.S. Gehlot, Elections and Electoral Administration in India (New Dehli: Deep & Deep Publication, 1992), p.10 19 Ibid., p.13 20 Governor’s Report 12/1/37, 22/2/37 21 Governor’s Report 9/11/36 22 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, pp130-31 23 Governor’s Report 9/11/36 24 Governor’s Report 22/2/37 25 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p. 71. 26 Zetland papers, Mss. EUR. D. 609/25B 27 Ibid 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid 30 Ibid. 31 Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP, pp.28-29 32 Erland Janson India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p.71. 33 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p.148 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. p. 150-51 36 Governors Report 24/1/46 37 Ibid 2 1 88 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.331. 39 Ibid., p. 332. 40 Abdul Waheed Qureshi, Tarikhi Faisala (Urdu) (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976), p.126. 41 Cunnigham Papers,IOL, File Mss. Eur D 714/19. 42 http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articlete... {Retrieved on 31 October 2009} 43 Copies of the posters available in Jalauddin Papers, Abbottabad. 44 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP, p. 103. 45 Governor’s Report 8/12/45 46 Pakhtuns 8/11/45 47 Pakhtuns 1/1/46 48 Niaz Pasha Jadoon, Interview by author, Abbottabad, 25 August 2005. 49 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: a modern History (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), p. 82. 50 Ibid. 51 The Khber Mail, Peshawar, 5 April 1946. 52 Tribune 11/12/1945 53 Erland Janson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p. 152 54 Governors Report 9/3/46 55 Civil and Military Gazette 12/3/1946 56 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.202 57 Amit Kumar Gupta, North West frontier province, Legislature and Freedom Struggle: 1932-47 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical research, 1976), p.180. 58 Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Broadcast, 2 June, 1947, NAI. F. No. 10, p. 38. 59 Mountbatten Papers, File MB1/D233 60 Gazette of extraordinary, 7/2/47 61 Tribune 1/6/47 62 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo Afghan Borderland (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 174-75 63 Ibid. p.177 64 Mountbatten Papers, file MB1/ D233 Telegram C to secretary of state for India No. 288/CB dated 19 July 1947 65 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province, p.393 66 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 174-175. 67 Ishtiaq Ahmad, Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (London: Pinter Publishers, 1987), p. 86 68 Noor Ahmad, Interview by author, Mansehra, 13 Jan 2006. 69 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo Afghan Borderland, p.178. 70 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 71 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 273 72 Erland Janson India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The National Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47, p.232 73 Daily Dawn (Karachi), November 16, 1951. 74 Ibid, November 10, 1951 75 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.19. 76 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.19. 77 Ibid., p. 257 78 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (Darham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), pp.181-2. 79 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1962-1969 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971). 38 89 David Washbrook, ‘The Rhetoric of Democracy and Development in late Colonial India’, In Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, Sugata Bose and Aysha Jalal, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press,1998). 81 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 82 Myron Weiner, ‘India’, in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive elections in Developing Countries (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987), pp.19-20. 83 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1994), p.30 84 Phillip E. Jones, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party: Social Group Response and Party Development in an Era of Mass Participation’, Ph. D Dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1979, p. 188 85 Sharif-al-Mujahid, Pakistan’s First Presidential Elections, Asian Survey 5 (1965), pp.280-94. 86 Sharif-al-Mujahid, The Assembly Elections in Pakistan, Asian Survey 5 (1965), pp.538-51 87 Wayne Wilcox, ‘Pakistan in 1969: Once Again at the Starting Point’, Asian Survey 10 (1970), pp.7381 80 90 CHAPTER-4: VOTING TRENDS IN NWFP INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is the analysis of voting trends in NWFP. The survey is based on electoral trends in NWFP including knowledge of voters about elections and electoral politics and to assess eligible voters’ access to information about the electoral process, exposure to media, level of political awareness, participation in public affairs, knowledge of specific voter registration and electoral procedures, general attitudes about democracy, and expectations about the future. The survey aimed to understand how ordinary men and women in NWFP have experienced electoral processes and how they perceived contemporary developments in electoral administration. Electoral strategies of politicians and political parties depend upon electorate, which are convinced to vote and polarised on the basis of their voting trends. During election campaigns politicians and voters interact with each other for a limited time and for specific purposes. Citizens grew out of their local universe in the wake of the expanding role of political parties, their workers and leaders, as well as political issues and ideologies. The local universe came to be firmly underscored by the extra-local organizational and ideological resources. The logic of the local power structure was in due course hooked on to the meaning of the political conflict at higher levels. No detailed study of the NWFP electorate and voting trend is available. For analyzing voting trends in NWFP a comprehensive survey is conducted in different parts of NWFP. However, two indicators were also considered for this study, first voter turnout is a broad indicator of political participation and mobilization, subject to the manipulative efforts on the part of government officials or local influential’s to bring into play the tied vote phenomenon. This explains why sometimes rural voters have turned out in greater numbers than urban voters, without necessarily meaning a higher level of political awareness or motivation in villages to participate in the business of the state. Secondly low level party dynamics, but high level factional activity in an electoral constituency can result in partisan voting along pre-existing social affiliations. These two factors are discussed in the chapter ‘UrbanRural Division of Electoral Politics in NWFP. In other words, non electoral dynamics partially shape electoral behaviour and voting trends. The question is whether the electorate in NWFP has followed the Indian pattern of moving from vertical mobilization to differential and horizontal mobilization, 91 reflecting the transition from the hierarchical society to ‘empowerment of low social orders’. It can be argued that this transition is not a linear process in progression. For example, in 1970 NWFP showed a high level of political mobilization along the lines of issues, policies and ideologies. The subsequent elections during 1990s showed a gradually decreasing level of political mobilization. Beyond voter turnout, the prevalence of pre-election bonds and political mobilization in general, the issue of political communication enjoys a crucial place in the analysis of voting trends. NWFP operates at two different levels of political discourse. The elite are engaged in dealing with power and constitutional game with at provincial and federal level, CentreProvince relations and centralization or devolution of powers. On the other hand for the masses, the issues such as corruption, unemployment and law and order, as well as ethno-linguistic and Islamic-sectarian identities have a greater significance. While the two levels are grossly overlapping, still their analysis as two separate entities can have a heuristic value contributing to an understanding of the epicentres of the two disparate approaches to politics in the society. In this context, a profile of the electorate and their voting trends in NWFP, is drawn in this chapter in terms of other factors including low level of interest in politics, scant information about public policy and a varying pattern of stable issue preferences. The political leadership in NWFP operates at local, provincial and national levels; the electorate is essentially constituency-bound. People do take into account the larger ideological and organizational links of candidates. However, it is the capacity of electoral contestants to localize the larger idiom for the constituency that shapes the vote. F. G. Bailey’s research in India is couched in a functional paradigm rooted in the ‘interlocking’ and ‘nested’ arenas at various levels.1 In NWFP, electoral trends seem to be encircled at links between the local politicians and the provincial and national leadership, but also have links between the local elite and the state machinery. The latter includes district administration and other non-electoral actors. This intervention has played a deterministic role in various cases relating to candidature in elections, patterns of party or factional alliances at the local and higher levels, and campaign issues. All these issues in voting trends are tested in this chapter. The survey about voting trends was carried out during field research work for doctoral study on voting trends in NWFP in January-December 2007. The major focus of this survey is the voting trends during 1990s but questions about some recent voting trends are also included in survey questionnaire for in-depth analysis of voting trends. 92 A sample of the population over the age of twenty one at the time of any four elections during 1988-1997 was selected using a purposive and judgement sampling, which produced a sample of 2270 respondents out of total voting age population 7510110.2 A total of 2270 responses were recorded during face to face survey in four regions of NWFP, i.e. Northern NWFP, Southern NWFP, Central NWFP and Hazara. In all four regions of NWFP, each constituency and sample unit is purposively selected by considering urban rural divisions in 212 rural out of total 7335 rural localities and 25 urban out of total 55 urban localities. In every urban and rural locality, selected for this study, ten questionnaires were recorded, including five from males and five from females. All in-person interviews were conducted by men and women in collaboration with local interpreters where necessary. Informal interviews were taken and questionnaires were filled by 2270 respondents from urban rural localities of total ten districts out of twenty four districts including three districts from northern NWFP. i.e. Swat, Chitral and Upper Dir, two districts i.e D.I Khan and Kohat were taken from southern NWFP. Peshawar and Mardan were taken from central NWFP and three districts, Abbottabad, Mansehra and Kohistan were taken from Hazara region of NWFP. The samples of 2270 respondents, 50 percent were men and 50 percent were women and 54 percent of respondents were between 21 and 35 years of age during 1997 elections. The survey’s responses were refined subsequently through statistical weighting techniques by using SPSS. For detailed analysis of data about voting trends in NWFP, this chapter is divided in to following sections. Section-1, Introduction, Section-2, Sample Characteristics, Section-3, Political Interest and Information, Section 4, Awareness of and Access to Electoral Processes, Section-5, Trust in Governmental and Nongovernmental institutions, Section-6, Experience & Perceptions of Electoral Fraud, Coercion & Violence, Section-7, Perceptions of Democracy and Section 8, Conclusions about Electoral and Democratic Participation. SECTION 4.1.1 SURVEY EXPLAINATION The survey sought to assess the sentiments about the voting trends of the eligible electorate with respect to: 1 The types of traditional, governmental, and nongovernmental authorities that citizens trust and hold accountable; 2 The types and forms of media and other sources of political information citizens use most often, and whether citizens with different religious, ethnic, and age profiles have different media preferences; 93 3 Access to information about politics and participation in electoral processes; including voter identity cards, voter registration, and awareness of when, where, and how voting would take place; 4 Concerns about security in general and anticipated unrest, violence, or intimidation. 5 Perceptions and actual experiences of general and electoral corruption; and 6 The electoral experience of women and other typically disenfranchised groups. Data collected from a sample of units both from urban and rural and all four regions of NWFP with the intention that they should be representative of that universe (NWFP). A sample of this kind is referred to as a purposive (or sometimes judgmental) sample. The researcher selected a sample of the population over age of 213 using purposive sampling technique. Villages in rural areas and census circles in urban areas, taken from the 1998 census by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, constituted the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), in each region of NWFP. Purposively 28 locations were taken from Northern NWFP, 33 from Southern NWFP, 31 from Central NWFP and 35 from Hazara region of NWFP. Purposive and judgement sampling technique was used while interviewing or filling the questionnaires. The overall survey response rate for completed interviews was high by conventional standards, item non-response, in which data is missing completely for a given question, and ambiguous responses (Don’t Know/Don’t Remember) are common for most questions. The analysis does not seek to make statistical corrections for missing data but presents frequencies and percentages for those people who said they did not know or did not remember in response to a question. People respond in this manner for many reasons. Researcher recorded whether respondents refused to answer the question, had no opinion, suggested another response, did not remember, or did not know. Only the “Don’t Know” category is included in the analysis unless otherwise noted. The Questionnaire can be found in the appendix. Social desirability bias, in which respondents tend to tell researchers what is socially acceptable or desirable, is a problem in any survey. This bias was likely a factor in questions about literacy, income, and social status, as well as sensitive issues such as victimization or perpetration of corrupt or illegal activities. Respondents may misrepresent their true feelings by choosing the socially desirable response or may simply say they do not know how to answer. Respondent perceptions of interviewer, the organization conducting the survey, and fears about how the survey data might be used, even when they are assured of confidentiality, can 94 also lead them to respond in ways that they hope will please the interviewer or to avoid choosing responses that might upset or offend the interviewer. In any of these situations, had more respondents’ answered the question, the overall findings might have been different. Nevertheless, given the large size of the sample, it is possible to draw some useful conclusions about the nature of electoral trends in NWFP, particularly how ordinary men and women seek information about elections, how they participate in the process, and their views of the electoral process. The questionnaire was designed to cover several areas of interest to organizations working in the field of electoral administration, attitudes and perceptions toward state and non-state institutions, preferred actual and potential sources of political information, access to election-specific procedures and processes designed to ensure citizen participation, and ordinary citizens’ views about the state of democracy as well as the broader meaning of Democracy as a concept. Particular emphasis was placed on the development of questions designed to measure both perceptions and experience of electoral malpractices, corruption, and electoral violence. Careful attention was paid to question order, particularly with respect to questions regarding awareness about electoral procedures and voting behaviour, to reduce the probability of bias. In addition to collecting substantive data about political institutions, democracy, and elections, the questionnaire included questions on other topics to provide context about the nature of the electorate. Each respondent was asked questions about their household, education, previous employment, housing tenure, mother tongue/ethnicity, and religion. Tables in this chapter are based on the responses calculated from survey instrument (questionnaire). 4.1.2 WEIGHTING THE DATA: Data are weighted for respective proportion of the population age 21 years and above in each region of the province at the time of 1997 elections, the percentage of urban and rural residents in each region of the province, and the proportion of men and women in the population. The distribution of urban and rural population is shown in Table 4.1.1a. Table 4.1.1 a: Distribution of Urban and Rural Population. Regions North South Central Hazara Total Rural Respondents 730 350 270 770 2120 Rural % sample 34.43 16.50 12.43 36.32 24.92 Rural % Census 93.84 85.67 91.94 92.96 91.1 Urban Respondents 30 40 40 40 150 Urban % Sample 20 26.66 26.66 26.66 25 Urban % Census 6.16 14.33 8.06 7.04 8.9 Total PSUs 76 39 31 81 227 Total Respondents 760 390 310 810 2270 95 In equal number (50% male and 50% female) responded to the survey than in the total sample. The data are weighted accordingly. Table 4.1.1b presents the number of total urban and total rural localities and number of samples taken from both urban and rural localities. Table 4.1.1 b: Urban and Rural localities. Region North South Central Hazara Total District Swat Chitral Lower Dir DI. Khan Kohat Peshawar Mardan Abbottabad Mansehra Kohistan Total localities Urban 1 1 1 4 4 3 3 6 2 0 25 Rural 215 463 922 384 141 146 168 346 492 1342 4383 Sample Urban 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 0 15 Sample Rural 20 25 28 22 13 13 14 22 25 30 212 There are total 227 localities including 15 from urban areas and 212 from rural areas where questionnaire were filled and interviews were recorded. From each locality, ten questionnaires were filled, five from Male and five from Female. Total numbers of filled questionnaires are 2270. Detail of urban and rural localities selected for this study is as: 4.1.7 NORTHERN NWFP SWAT: The rural localities selected for this study from Swat are mentioned here where 200 respondents were recorded. These rural areas are Mankyal locality with population12448 4 with small villages of Mankyal, Ramat, Gornai, Darwali, Ayin. Khawaza Khela locality with population 24517 having small villages, Gashkor, Bandai, Khawaza Khela, Tikdarai. Baidara locality with population 21994 including small villages Baidara, Sambat, Cham. Koz Abakhel Kabal locality with population 20476 having villages, Kotlai, Dagai, Akhon Kalai. Aka Maruf Bami Khel locality with population 16689 includes villages, Bishbanr, Kass, Kuz Qila. One urban locality, Mingora M.C. with population173868 was selected from Swat, where 10 respondents (5 male and 5 female) respondents were recorded. CHITRAL: 250 respondents were recorded from rural areas of Chitral including Karimabad locality with population12292, having villages Pachili, Rondoor, Gaset, Deh Bokhtuli, Kilishpi, Bokhtuligole, Bilbil, Telegram, Parsan, Tashqar, Madashil, Shah, Loligram, Gree, Orolagh, Ajarandeh, Kiyar, Lasht, Susum, Petagram, Dardrai, Shahniroon,Orghoch, Shoot, gram, Kulum, Dalmir,Hinjil, Sunich, Shershal, Kherochum. 10 respondents were recorded from the urban locality, Chitral M.C. with population 30622 selected for this study. 96 LOWER DIR: 280 respondents were recorded from the rural localities of Lower Dir selected for this including Balambat having population 22581 with small villages are, Kurrai, Safarai, Dulai, Ghalo, Tangi, Sarazgho, Wali Korona, Sangar, Tangi, Banda Bala,Banda Payeen, Gadla Bala, Gadla Pyn: Botano Kalai, Malakand Bala, Shah Korona. Shera Malakand Payeen. Khema, Kandaro Bala, Kandaro, Pyn: Jabagai, Bala, Jabagai, Pyn: Dandoona, Dherai, Yusuf Manai, Landai Shah, Sathandar Pyn: Sthandar Bala, Shatai, Matta, Mirzaabad, Redawan. Ten respondents were recorded from urban locality-Timargara M.C with population 44335. 4.1.8 SOUTHERN NWFP DI KHAN: 220 respondents were recorded from rural localities selected for this study from DI. Khan including Dhap Shumali with population 22529 having villages, Long Khair Shah, Lodhra, Bochra, Beli Wala, Awan, Qazi, Naurang Luck, Saggu Shumali, Shah Nawaz, Dhap Khand, Thathal, Machora Najaf Ali Shah, Ghauns Shah Shumali, Najaf Ali Shah Dahotar, Shah Kot, Rakh, Shah Kot, Mubarak Shah, Rakh Band Kurai, Civil Rakh Band Kurai Thatha, Sukha, Shah, Rakh Mangan. 20 respondents were recorded from the urban localities including D.I. Khan MC with population 86969, D.I Khan Cantt with population 5145. KOHAT: 130 respondents were recorded from the rural areas of Kohat including Marai Bala with population 22,267 having villages, Marai bala & Marai Payan, PC Sherkot, Chili Badaber, Jab Gabroo, Khadi Zai & Sher Kot. PC Alizai, Alizai, Arazi Nusrat Khel. Usterzai area with population18,614 including Usterzai Bala, Usterzai, Payan, Landi Kachai, Musa Khel & Tora Warai. 20 respondents were recorded from urban localities of Kohat M.C with population 95863, Kohat Cantt with population 30764. 4.1.9 CENTRAL NWFP PESHAWAR: 130 respondents were reorded from rural areas of Peshawar including Mera Kichori with population 25512 with Mera Kichori, Banda, Jat, Jagra, Rashida, Mulago, Kani Hayat, Jogian and Nasirpur. Chaghar Matti locality with population 18425 having villages, Chaghar Matti, Garhi Ali, Muhammad, Heryan garh, Khat, Barbar, Caranga Bala, Charanga Payan, Hajizai, Yekh Dhand. 20 respondents were recorded urban areas of Peshawar Cantt. (68740) 5 and Peshawar M. Corporation (910807). 97 MARDAN: 140 respondents were recorded from the rural localities of Mardan including Bazar (22286) with villages Garo, Amankot, Landai, Surkhabi. Palo Dheri (21137) is another locality include villages, Palo Dheri, Hamzakot, Cheena & Ali. Qasmi (17555) include Tazagram, Ghazai Baba and Sarobi. Mohabatabad (24471) with villages Mohabatabad and Sheikh Maltoon, Behram Khan Killi, Khora, Banda, Plato, Surkh Dheri and Aminabad. 20 respondents were recorded from urban localities of Mardan Cantt. (7297), Mardan M.C. (31115). 4.1.10 NORTH EASTERN NWFP (HAZARA) ABBOTTABAD: 220 respondents were recorded from the rural areas of Abbottabad including Baldheri (14796) area with villages Baldheri, Gojri, Hal, Maira Tarla, Hal Maira Utla, Jalalpura, More Kalan, Sajikot, Tannan. Pawa locality with population 18326 having villages Kakot, Bandi Matrach, Bazurgal, Chatrhi, Garamri, Gogarhi, Pando Thana, Pasial, Patheri, Seydan, Peshail, Sargal, Sherbai, Sial, Talehar,Thathi. 30 repondents were recorded from the urban localities of Abbottabad M.C. (47609), Abbottabad Cantt.(58492), and Nawan Sher T.C. (19871). MANSEHRA: 250 respondents were recorded from the rural localities of Mansehra including Ghanool (7869), Hangrai (3506), Garlat (11956), Hassa (578), Kanshian (5094), Attar Shiha (2265), Phagla (2946), Jaba (5615), Hado Bani (2109), Datta (4610), Khushala (1028), Harrayala (1699), Behali (3544), Garala (934), Matyal (1069), Jalo (2645), Shehlia (1703), Hamsherian (2411),Pano Dheri (3104), Pairan (4261), Jabbori (6203), Sacah Kalan (8398), Hikot (6404), Battal (8720), Jalgali 3300. 10 respondent were recorded from urban locality of Mansehra M.C with population 49534. KOHISTAN: There is no urban area in Kohistan, the whole of Kohistan comprises a rural area. 300 respondents were recorded from Kohistan including Bar Sharyal (12,186) in Pallas velley with villages, Andrak Banda, Bin Banda, Bar Gaidar, Bar Nairri, Dadair, Dheri, Gaidar,Gakoi, Kachar Banda, Kat Banda, Khana Banda, Bakri Banda, Maidan, Murid Baik, Sheri Banda, Shoom Jamat, Ganja Banda. Dassu (10,996) with small villages, Lootar, Doch Bah, Sukrat Jeshal, Uchar, Jal kot, Jandar, Char, Dadair, Kass, Tall, Zarif, Dadir, Kaiga, Bar Seen, Dassu. SECTION 4.2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE DATTA Political institutions shape the quality of governance, nature of electoral politics, voting trends, degree of democracy, and attitudes of citizens, population 98 characteristics such as ethno-linguistic differences, socio-economic stratifications, and literacy also influence voting trends and political behaviour. Some studies suggest that a large middle class and mass literacy are necessary conditions for democracy6. While it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze relationships systematically between socio-demographic background characteristics and political outcomes, which would require more complex multivariate statistical analysis, the socio-economic-linguistic context of NWFP is important to understanding the survey data, voting trends, and observing electoral processes. In societies that maintain largely oral traditions and in which education is limited, the level of literacy, class and religious differences, and other social factors can influence the interaction between interviewer and respondent and interpretation of questions. Demographic information is also important for the identification of populations most vulnerable to disenfranchisement as a result of lack of access to information, deliberate omission from electoral registration processes, or undue influence in order to measure voting trends. Analysts of past elections have pointed out the importance of provincial, rural-urban, sectarian, age, occupational status—particularly between employees and employers, and class divisions in political party support as well as campaign strategy. 7 Political parties and nongovernmental organizations have chosen local-language press to reach rural populations, while state-run Television and Radio were under the control of government during 1990s. This section presents data describing the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the sample population, which are used in the following sections to better understand variation in this diverse population’s experience of elections and voting trends in 1990s elections. 4.2.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE Like many developing societies, NWFP population is young. Seventy-six percent were married (Table 4.2.1a). Table 4.2.1a: Age and Marriage Status, by Gender Age 21-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50 years Marriage Status Married Unmarried Divorced Widowed 79 25 0 2 73 16 1 5 76 20 0 3 Men (%) 27 25 26 28 Women (%) 32 29 23 16 Total (%) 29 27 24 22 99 Whereas in some societies unemployment and housing shortages have reduced marriage rates and increased the age of marriage among younger populations, income and unemployment do not appear to be barriers to marriage in NWFP. The majority of respondents were either employed full time-48% and 26% of men and women, respectively—or working in the home (32% of men and 53% of women). Students represent five percent of respondents, and retirees 3% percent. 5% percent reported that they were seeking work (Table 2.1b). Only 37% of the survey respondents were employed full time. Table 4.2.1b: Employment Status, by Gender Status Full Time Part Time Seeking work Retired Homemaker Student Others Men % 48 6 8 5 32 6 5 Women% 26 2 2 1 53 4 3 Total% 37 4 5 3 42 5 4 Occupational status has been salient in past NWFP electoral politics and voting trends. Although land tenants seem to vote with landowners, employers and employees often have been on different sides of local political divisions. In areas where a high percentage of the labour force is employed in the civil and military branches of government, such as Central NWFP, voter preferences have been distinct.8 Among both male and female respondents, the most common reported occupation was homemaker, but it is unclear whether men reported falling into this category because they were unemployed, independently-wealthy, engaged in a stigmatized economic activity or for other reasons. The unemployment rate in 2004 was 7.7 percent,9 while the 1998 Census reported an unemployment rate of almost 20 percent.10 Agricultural labourers and small and medium farmers made up 10% and 8% of the sample, respectively. Nine percent of respondents are self employed, while 7% each work in government and the private sector (Table 4.2.1c). Table 4.2.1 c: Occupation Classification, by Gender and Urban/Rural Classification. Classification Self employed Government Industry/private sector employee Agricultural Labour Small and Medium Farmer Landowner Professional/Managerial Education/Teacher Including Madrasa Homemaker Other Total column % Men% 11 9 9 13 10 1 1 3 33 10 100 Women% 8 5 5 7 5 1 1 3 59 7 100 Rural% 8 5 7 12 9 1 1 3 46 7 100 Urban% 11 9 7 6 5 2 1 3 45 11 100 Total% 9 7 7 10 8 1 1 3 46 8 100 100 Reported housing tenure rates are high, with 80% of respondents reporting that they or a relative own their current residence, a figure roughly consistent with figures from 2004 Living Standards Survey. 11 More respondents in NWFP said they live in residences owned by landlords (Table 4.2.1d), a much higher number than that of government statistics, a discrepancy that could be attributable to sampling bias. The average household size, including adults and children, was ten. Table 4.2.1d: Average Household Size and Housing Tenure Regions Average Household size (Adults/Children) (Q-6) Respondent owns Relatives owns Landlord owns Others North South Centre Hazara Total 10 12 10 9 10 40 56 68 27 55 33 18 22 23 25 25 24 6 45 17 2 2 4 4 3 Income distribution for the sample differed in rural and urban areas—but not region wise, with lower income people living disproportionately in rural areas. Economic studies consistently find higher rates of poverty in NWFP, which again points to the possibility of sampling bias in this province. Table 4.2.1e: Percent Population per Household Income Category (Rural and Urban) Monthly Income in Rupees (Q13) <Rs.1000 Rs.1001- 2000 Rs. 2001-3000 Rs.3001-4000 Rs.4001-5000 Rs.5001-10000 Rs.1001-15000 >15001 Don’t Know Total column % Class Designation Lowest Income Rural (%) 5.2 11.7 16.4 12.5 17.5 18.4 6.9 9.5 1.9 100 Urban(%) 2.4 6.5 12.7 10.2 19.5 24.4 10.4 11.8 2 100 Population (%) 4.2 9.8 15.1 11.7 18.2 20.6 8.2 10.3 1.9 100 Lower middle Middle Upper middle High Income/wealthy In 2001, the Government of Pakistan announced a poverty line of 749 Pakistani rupees (Rs) per capita per month, which was about Rs. 900 in 2005 prices.12 Table 4.2.1e presents the household income distribution of the sample population in urban and rural areas and defines five summary class categories that are used to ease subsequent analysis. Below Rs. 4,000/month is considered below the poverty line for a family of four. 4.2.2 EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE LITERACY: Limited educational opportunities, linguistic complexity and high rates of illiteracy present challenges to both political parties and electoral administration in NWFP. The national print and electronic media in Pakistan is composed of primarily English and Urdu sources, with some local language radio, television, and print media available regionally and locally. The business of government is conducted in both Urdu and English. Forty-two percent of respondents (38% of men and 45% of women) reported 101 having no education. An additional 10% have a madrasa education or some primary school. Fifteen percent passed the matriculation exam and 9% have an F.A./F.Sc (Intermediate) degree (Table 4.2.2a). Reported educational attainment rates are somewhat lower in rural areas. Because the number of respondents with bachelor’s degrees or above is small, to those with the F.A./F.Sc degree and other higher degrees are combined in further analysis.13 Table: 4.2.2a Educational Attainment Education Level completed (Q 12) None Madrasa Some Primary School Primary School Middle Matric Intermediate BA/B.Sc MA or Professional Degree Doctorate/Post Doctorate Total Column % Men % 38 3 6 9 9 15 9 7 4 0 100 Women % 45 5 5 8 7 15 8 5 2 0 100 Rural% 45 4 6 9 8 14 8 5 2 0 100 Urban% 35 4 5 8 8 16 10 8 5 0 100 Total% 42 4 6 9 8 15 9 6 3 0 100 The level of educational attainment is virtually the same across age groupings. Youth do not possess more education, even at the primary, middle school, and matric levels, than older people (data not presented; results very close to the national averages, with no statistically significant deviations). The number of respondents speaking each mother tongue in the four regions of NWFP is presented in Table 2.2b. In Central NWFP, 75.6% of respondents speak Pashto, followed by 20.3% who speak Hindko and 2.1% who speak Urdu. In Hazara, 75.9% of respondents speak Hindko, 18.1% speak Pashto, and 2.9% speak others languages including Kohistani. In Southern region, 70.2% of respondents speak Saraiki, 20.3 speak Saraiki, and 3.9% speak Urdu. 14 In northern NWFP, 1.2% respondents were speaking others language including Kohwar language of Chitral. Table 4.2.2 b: Language Distribution. Areas North South Centre Hazara Total Pashto 78.1 20.8 75.5 18.1 48.23 Hindko 15.2 2.5 20.3 75.9 28.48 Saraiki 2.2 70.2 2.1 0 19.33 Punjabi 2.1 5 1.5 3.2 2.95 Sindhi 0 0 0 0 0 Balochi 0 0 0 0 0 Urdu 1.2 3.9 1.1 1.5 2.73 Others 1.2 0 0 2.9 1.48 Table 4.2.2c presents data showing where mother tongue speakers are located. Almost 15% of native Urdu speakers live in Northern NWFP, while 35 % live in Southern NWFP. The vast majority (50%) of Pashto speakers live in Central NWFP. Most Seraiki speakers live in Southern NWFP (65%). Most Hindko speakers live in Hazara region of NWFP (75%). In addition to identifying their mother tongue, respondents 102 were asked whether they read and/or write each of the major languages of Pakistan (Q9). Table 4.2.2d presents data for minimum literacy in each region, by urban and rural areas. Those who said they could read, speak, and write at least one language are defined as literate for the purpose of the analysis.15 47% of the sample is able to read and write at least one language. Using this definition of literacy, the Northern NWFP sample has the lowest literacy rate (30%), followed by Hazara (44%). Table 4.2.2 c: Distribution of Mother Tongue Speakers Across four regions of NWFP: Percent Respondents Speaking Mother Tongue in regions. Areas North South Centre Hazara Total Pashto 35 15 50 10 100 Hindko 5 10 10 75 100 Saraiki 5 65 25 5 100 Punjabi 15 35 20 30 100 Kohistani 50 0 0 50 100 Kohwar 100 0 0 0 100 Urdu 15 35 10 40 100 Others 33 35 14 18 100 According to 1998 census, the literacy rate in Hazara is 35.2%, Northern NWFP is 28.14, southern NWFP is 33.71 and Central NWFP is 37.58 %.16 It is important to note that the survey findings indicate that minimum language literacy is Urdu literacy. That is, if a person is literate in at least one language, that language includes Urdu, even if the speaker may speak their maternal and other languages. 53% of respondents cannot read or write any of the languages they speak. Of the 47% who can, 42% are literate in Urdu and only 5% are literate in some other language but not Urdu. Although the survey findings suggest that most people who can read and write at all can read Urdu. Table 4.2.2d: Single-Language Literacy, by regions and Urban-Rural Classification. Areas Areas North South Centre Hazara Total Can not read or write any Language (Q9) Total% 46 70 53 56 53 Urban% 33 56 40 50 40 Rural% 60 74 58 58 60 Total% 54 30 47 44 47 Reads and Writes at least one Language Urban% 67 44 60 50 60 Rural% 40 26 42 42 40 The data presented in Table 4.2.2e support the assumption that citizens of all four regions of NWFP can understand Urdu and are more likely to read Urdu than their mother tongue. 40% percent of Northern NWFP speakers are literate in Urdu, compared with 60% who are literate in native language Pashto. In all languages, more women than men are illiterate. In Urdu, 32% of women and 53% of men are literate. Twenty-three percent of women and 44% of men are literate in their mother tongue. Young respondents have higher rates of Urdu, English, and mother-tongue literacy than do older people. For Urdu, 44% of 21-24 year-olds and 49% of 25-34 year-olds are literate in Urdu, compared with 41% of 35-49 year olds and 36% of those over 50. 103 International and National news channels and radio programs dealing with elections and politics tend to be broadcast in Urdu, Pashto. National Radio and Television also broadcast electoral awareness in major local languages also. Table 4.2.2f shows the number of people in each language group who speak Urdu, as well as the percentage of people who can speak Urdu in each region. Urdu is spoken by 82% of Hindko speakers, 62% of Punjabi speakers, 47% of Pushto speakers, 45% of Seraiki speakers. Table 4.2.2e: Urdu, English, and Mother Tongue Literacy. Urdu Mother Tongue Pashto Hindko Saraiki Punjabi Chitrali Kohistani Urdu Others Urban Rural Male Female 21-24 25-34 35-49 50 and above North South Centre Hazara Pop. Total No Urdu Skills % 32 49 71 45 65 74 80 64 44 65 47 68 56 51 59 64 60 64 54 72 57 Urdu Literacy% 68 51 29 55 35 26 20 36 56 35 53 32 44 99 41 36 40 36 46 28 43 No English Skill % 72 82 92 79 92 93 96 89 Milieu 77 91 Gender 82 89 Age Category 84 86 87 87 Areas 86 89 84 94 85 English English Literacy% 28 18 8 21 8 7 4 11 23 9 18 11 16 14 13 13 14 11 16 6 15 Literate in Mother Tongue Illiterate in Mother Tongue Mother Literacy% Tongue% 32 68 70 30 80 20 63 37 74 27 58 42 88 12 83 17 56 73 56 77 57 69 69 71 51 72 70 85 66 44 27 44 23 43 31 31 21 49 28 30 15 34 These findings indicate that written materials in languages other than Urdu seems less effective than regional-language audio-visual or face-to-face electoral choices. Politicians used some Urdu idioms for personal political benefits while telling the voters about different meanings. Table 4.2.2f: Urdu Speakers, by Mother Tongue and Regions. Mother Tongue Pashto Hindko Saraiki Punjabi Chitrali (Kohwar) Kohistani Urdu Others Provincial areas North South Centre Hazara Urdu Speakers No 53 18 55 38 53 59 3 34 40 52 38 56 Yes 47 82 45 62 47 41 97 66 60 48 62 44 104 For example from the National broadcast media (Radio and TV), before elections, electoral awareness programmes were on aired in which voters were asked that, ‘vote Qoum ki Imanat hay-Faisalay soch samaj ke kijiye (vote is the trust of nation-decide thoughtfully)’17. These findings indicate that written materials in languages other than Urdu seems less effective than regional-language audio-visual or face-to-face electoral choices. Politicians used some Urdu idioms for personal political benefits while telling the voters about different meanings. For example from the National broadcast media (Radio and TV), before elections, electoral awareness programmes were on aired in which voters were asked that, ‘vote Qoum ki Imanat hay-Faisalay soch samaj ke kijiye (vote is the trust of nation-decide thoughtfully)’18. While interviewing a local political activist from Mansehra-politically Gujjar tribe dominated area (Balakot), he explained how tactfully the local Gujjar candidate highlighted this slogan in their own favour. The Gujjar candidate in their electoral campaign said their voters that Gujjars are one qoum (nation), so vote for your Gujjar qoum (Gujjar nation) and he won the elections.19 In this way due to illiteracy and some unknown wordings of Urdu changed entirely the voting trends in favour of those politicians who used such type of idiom/slogans for their political purposes. SECTION 4.3: INTEREST IN POLITICS AND INFORMATION Electoral participation declined significantly between the 1970 and 1990s general elections. 20 When asked directly about their interest in politics (Q20), 67% of respondents said they were either not at all or not very interested, while only 32% were somewhat or very interested. However, self-reported political interest, belief in democracy, and other general questions are often influenced by social desirability bias, particularly among social groups where political interest is desirable (e.g., higher income and educated groups).21 Indeed, higher income and educated respondents were much more likely to report general interest in politics. On the other hand, self reported disinterest in politics among some populations might be attributable to associating politics and elections with violence, intimidation, or corruption, and wanting to stay out of the fray. There was no evidence for a real difference in self-reported interest between male and female respondents, contradicting common wisdom that women perceive politics as “men’s work” and do not want to be involved. The data also suggest that there is no real difference between urban and rural respondents with 105 respect to political interest. It is often said that people in rural areas of NWFP participate in elections more than urban populations. Reasons offered include urban elite cynicism about elections and feudal or tribal “capture” (control) over rural populations, essentially forcing them to vote for particular candidates or acquiring biradaris factional support. The self-reported equality of interest in politics between urban and rural populations may contradict this analysis. More than one in five respondents in Northern NWFP, compared with one in 10 or less in the other regions, reported that they were “very interested.” However, in all the regions, about one in three respondents said they were somewhat or very interested in politics. Table 4.3.1a presents provincial differences in political interest. Table 4.3.1 a: Self-Reported Political Interest, by regions (figures in %) Areas North South Centre Hazara Not at all Interested 41 53 47 52 Not very interested 42 17 21 16 Somewhat interested 16 20 23 21 Very interested 20 8 7 10 Don’t Know 2 2 2 0 Lower income people self-reported less interested in politics, with 56% of the lowest income expressing no interest at all in politics compared with 36.5% of those who have high incomes. Fifty-four percent of those in the lower middle class have no interest, but of those in the middle class, the number expressing no interest at all falls to 40%. Respondents who have some or a great deal of interest in politics tend to have higher incomes; 28% in the lowest income group are somewhat or very interested in politics compared with 24% in the middle class and 29% in the upper middle class. The survey included additional questions to measure self-reported behaviour during elections. To provide a more reliable measure of political involvement, these additional questions are used to create an index of political interest. Questions 21a, e, and f, asked respondents to indicate whether, for a number of different political activities, they have, would be likely to, might, or would never engage in that activity. Those questions dealing with low-effort or spontaneous engagement, such as discussing elections with friends and family, telling people to vote for a particular candidate, or getting into an argument provide a richer picture of the sample’s degree of political engagement during an election. The survey results do not provide evidence that women differ significantly from men in their likelihood of engaging in any of these activities, nor in their general political interest, with the exception of women in Central NWFP, where male respondents reported having some interest in 106 politics twice as often as women. With respect to their participation in these activities, the responses for rural and urban and young and old respondents also do not differ significantly. While higher income and more educated individuals are more likely to engage in these activities, income group differences are less marked than for responses to the general question about political interest. The behaviour questions are correlated with political interest and can be combined into a “political interest” index. Those engaging in two or more activities and/or reporting high interest are characterized as “high interest,” for example, and those with little or no interest and/or only one reported activity are “low interest.” Some observers of Electoral politics in NWFP have expressed concern about a lack of interest among younger people of voting age. While the findings suggest that older respondents are more likely to score high on the political interest index, 42% of the 21-24 year-olds fall in the middle of the scale. Respondents between the ages of 35 and 49 are the most engaged, followed by older people. (See Table 4.3.1b.) It is important to note that lower rates of engagement among younger voters may be a function of lack of experience and opportunities to become engaged, as opposed to fundamental generational differences. 22 Respondents in central NWFP score highest on the index, with 39% showing high interest in politics, followed by respondents in Hazara (37%) and Northern NWFP (36%). Southern has the lowest number of respondents in the high interest category (28%). Table 4.3.1b: Political Interest by Age, regions, Income, and Educational Attainment Low% Age Group 21-24 Years 25-34 Years 35-49 Years 50 and above North South Centre Hazara Lowest Income Lower Middle Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class High Income None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above 24 28 23 33 Regions 21 31 29 26 Class 32 25 22 19 22 Educational Attainment 35 27 28 25 24 23 16 39 35 41 31 28 35 33 26 38 31 44 48 42 38 39 39 32 33 27 29 36 46 47 51 42 41 32 37 36 28 39 37 42 35 34 30 34 36 43 37 Medium% High% 107 Overall, women and men have similar degrees of political interest when the various forms of engagement are combined, as do respondents from both rural and urban areas. Consistent with the findings of many surveys, the political index score is greater the higher a respondent’s income and education23. Around one in three low income respondents have a high interest score compared with one in two high income respondents—a difference of 20%. To the extent that this predictable trend is repeated for voting behaviour, belief in democracy, and other attitudes associated with income, further results are not presented unless the pattern is inconsistent with this general trend. For example, selfreported political interest (Q20) alone increases with levels of education, but when the index including actual behaviour is used (Table 4.3.1b), interest is much higher for respondents who have finished primary school (44%) compared with those who have only some primary school (31%), but is only 4% higher for those with a middle school education. Those in the high interest category with F.A./F.Sc degrees or more education are fewer (38%) than those who have only finished middle school (48%), the same percentage as high interest respondents with a madrasa education (38%). These findings suggest that self-reported interest may be subject to social desirability bias, particularly among those with more education, or people with different levels of education may have different interpretations of how interest in politics is or should be expressed. When discussing, arguing, or persuading others during elections are included as measures of interest; less educated individuals appear as engaged as those with more education. 4.3.2 PATTERNS OF MEDIA USE: Encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral process and to do so in an informed, independent manner is challenging in a society with high levels of illiteracy and linguistic diversity. The task is particularly challenging in NWFP, because penetration of both the broadcast and print media are limited. People tend to rely on personal networks and word-of-mouth rather than the media. Government controlled national media in 1990s presented only those programmes which were in the favour of incumbent government and it was observed during field visit that people had little trust of official media. According to 2002 statistics, newspaper readership is 60% in urban areas but only 35% in rural areas24, figures that tend to correspond with national literacy rates. Radio audiences are much 108 smaller in NWFP-only 21% of the urban population and 27% of the rural population listen to radio on a regular basis. Television access is low, with only about 3 million homes owning televisions—1.5 million each in urban and rural homes. 25 Pakistan Television (PTV), the state-run network, is broadcast over the airways, but cable and satellite channels are still lacking in rural areas of NWFP. Table 4.3.2a shows respondents’ use of media sources within the four regions of NWFP. In Central NWFP 72% of respondents never listen to radio, but report greater television use than those in other regions (e.g., 43% report daily use compared with 32% in Southern NWFP). The percentage of Southern NWFP’s respondents who listen to radio daily (15%) is more than twice that in Central and Northern NWFP (7% each), while 11% of Hazara’s respondents listen daily. Voting age populations in Hazara and Southern NWFP, where penetration of television may be lower, rely more heavily on radio for information. In Central and Northern NWFP, 50% of respondents watch television frequently or daily compared with 40% in Hazara and 39% in Southern NWFP. However, the percentage of respondents who report frequent or daily radio use does not exceed a high of 24% (Southern region) in the province. Newspaper readership never exceeds 28%.26 Table 4.3.2a: Frequency of Media Use. Never North South Centre Hazara North South Centre Hazara North South Centre Hazara 32 46 32 41 55 56 72 63 56 65 65 57 Once in a while Television 21 16 15 18 Radio 28 21 15 18 News Papers 19 14 13 15 Frequently 21 7 9 13 10 9 5 9 15 10 8 11 Daily 26 32 43 27 1 15 7 11 11 12 14 17 Television is the media most watched by the electorate; 36% of respondents claimed to watch television daily, while another 12% watch television frequently. Only 14% read newspapers daily while another 10% read frequently. When asked about internet use, 92% of respondents had never used the internet, and only 3% used this source frequently or daily, despite the fact that the political parties have increased the quality of the content and amount of material about their platforms in recent years.27 These efforts appear to reach foreign audiences and a small elite within Pakistan and should not be viewed as an influential source of political information. ‘These findings 109 indicates that television is still the most common source of media used by citizens in NWFP, and the voting trends specially the methods to cast the votes is largely influenced by this medium. Not surprisingly, television use increases with age, education, and income. Radio use, on the other hand, does not differ across income categories, but more educated groups do listen to radio more frequently. The data suggest that in NWFP, however, younger people of voting age are no more likely than older voters to listen to radio. Media usage differs somewhat across occupational classification and language group, although television is used more frequently by all of them. Table 4.3.2b presents TV and radio use by occupational category. Table 4.3.2b: Use of Television and Radio, by Occupational Classification. Classification Self-Employed Government Industry/Private sector Employee Agricultural Labourer Small or Medium Farmer Landowner Professional/Managerial Education/Teacher Including Madaras Homemaker Others Never or once in a while TV Radio 48 84 34 65 40 80 71 82 68 77 40 68 12 91 32 84 52 93 58 81 TV 52 66 60 29 32 60 88 68 48 42 Frequently or daily Radio 16 35 20 18 23 32 9 16 7 19 Rates of both forms of media are particularly low among agricultural labourers and small and medium farmers. Only 29% of the former group report watching TV frequently or daily, compared with 88% of those in the professional/managerial category and 65% of government employees, for example. Eighteen percent of agricultural workers and 23% of farmers listen to the radio frequently or daily compared with 9% of the professional/managerial class, 20% of private sector employees, 16% of educators, 7% of homemakers, and 16% of those who are selfemployed. Respondents in all of the categories listen to radio much less than government employees, 35% of whom report listening frequently or daily, and landowners (32%). The first set of occupational groups—agricultural workers, employees, homemakers, etc.—are also less interested in politics. These groups watch television more often than they listen to radio, but at rates much lower than the other occupational categories. This data illustrates how difficult it is to reach marginal populations of potential voters through traditional media. Similarly, language groups also have different patterns of media use, with Hindko, Seraiki, and Pushto speakers reporting the lowest rates of both television and radio use (See Table 4.3.2c). Pushto speakers report low usage of both television and radio overall, but a relatively higher percentage of Pushto speakers listen to radio frequently or daily compared with the 110 other language groups. Seraiki speakers report the lowest total rate of radio and television usage. Table 4.3.2 c: Use of Television and Radio, by Language Groups. Mother Tongue Pashto Hindko Saraiki Punjabi Urdu Others Never or once in a while TV Radio 62 77 40 85 59 88 46 88 46 80 58 75 Frequently or Daily TV 38 60 41 45 54 42 Radio 23 15 12 12 20 26 4.3.3 PREFERRED MEDIA SOURCES OF ELECTION INFORMATION As a follow-up to questions about general media use, interviewers asked respondents to specify sources they use for political and government information (Q16) in particular. These open-ended responses varied widely, with 28% reporting different sources, but 41% could not list any source. Many mentioned national, state-run media including ( PTV, PBC28), and international media including (BBC29 and VOA30 ) one of them. Table 4.3.3a: Sources of Political Information by Demographic Groups. Areas North South Centre Hazara Rural Urban Pashto Hindko Saraiki Punjabi Urdu Others Illiterate Literate in one Language None 24 2 9 1 44 36 49 25 45 38 35 36 51 30 Various 7 1 73 1 26 33 Mother Tongue 28 47 31 20 38 38 22 35 State run media (PTV and PBC) 3 4 16 4 24 18 20 17 19 30 15 23 21 23 Mention international Media (BBC, VOA) 1 0 0 16 6 14 3 11 5 12 13 3 6 12 4.3.4 PREFERRED MODES OF ELECTION INFORMATION Even among those people who report low rates of media use and decline to report sources of political information under ordinary circumstances, many people may seek out media use during elections or other periods in which political events are particularly salient. When respondents were asked from which two sources they would choose to learn more about elections (Q18), 38% indicated a preference for television programs, followed by 27% who preferred posters and illustrations. The third most common response was to suggest other ideas (Table 4.3.4a). “Reading newspapers or internet”, “watching candidates or parties debates on TV”, and “radio drama or comedy” were cited by 15%, 11%, and 6% of the respondents respectively. 111 Table 4.3.4a: Preferred Modes of Election Information Mode Radio Drama TV Programme Posters/Illustrations TV Debate Other Ideas No Opinion/ DK Mentioned% 6 38 27 11 20 16 Not Mentioned% 94 62 73 89 80 84 Table 4.3.4b presents statistics for the combined responses to help understand the degree to which voters prefer television to radio overall or a combination of both in finding out about elections. Fourteen percent declined to mention any source, while an additional 15% said they did not know which sources they would prefer. Television (either debate or a program) was mentioned as both the first and second preference for 33% of respondents, followed by 19% who suggested one or more of their own ideas exclusively. Only 10% indicated a preference for the combination of television and newspapers and 2% both radio and television. Radio and newspapers were mentioned as the sole preferred source of election information by only 3% and 4% of respondents, respectively. Both urban and rural respondents mention only television as a means for obtaining election news, but rural 13% of rural respondents compared with 6% of urban respondents suggest their own ideas for obtaining election information. Respondents in all four regions of NWFP mention television most frequently, followed by a lack of preferences. Respondents suggest their own ideas more often than selecting combinations of sources other than television, followed by a preference for television and newspapers (about 10 or 11% for all regions). Table 4.3.4b: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Regions and Milieu. Combined Responses Decline to mention Don’t Know Presents Own Ideas Only Newspaper Only Radio Only TV Only Both News papers and TV Broadcast Only (Radio + TV) Total 14 15 19 4 3 33 10 2 Combination of Two Type of Media preferred by respondent Milieu Rural Urban North South 10 5 15 15 10 5 18 18 13 3 2 18 5 1 6 2 1 14 5 1 14 5 4 32 10 3 17 5 7 24 11 3 Areas Centre 13 12 22 3 3 35 10 2 Hazara 17 22 14 8 3 24 10 1 Respondents in southern NWFP were relatively more likely to mention radio as a sole source of information (7% compared with 4% or less in the other three regions). Higher income and more educated respondents were more likely to mention all sources of media, including newspapers or the internet, radio, and television. Lower income and less educated respondents were more likely to say they have no preferences. Younger respondents expressed a preference less often, and were less 112 likely to mention all forms of media. The number of respondents suggesting their own ideas increased with age. These results reinforce the findings that reaching younger eligible voters is a challenging task. Young people have low interest in politics. Respondents with low or medium political interest mention TV more frequently than any other combination of sources for election information, but 31% of those with low interest present their own ideas, compared with only 20% and 19% of those with medium to high interest. (See Table 4.3.4c.) Table 4.3.4 c: Distribution of Newspaper and Broadcast Media Preferences for Election Information, by Level of Political Interest. Combinations of Two Types of Media Preferred by Respondent: Combined Responses (Q18) Declines to Mention Don't Know Presents Own Ideas Only Newspaper Only Radio Only TV Only Both Newspaper and TV Broadcast Only (Radio and TV) Low 10 19 31 3 1 30 31 6 Medium 12 8 20 5 6 35 11 3 High 8 5 19 7 3 39 17 2 Men and women have similar preferences for election information. Women declined to express a media preference or said they did not know 1-2% more frequently than men. Men were three times more likely to mention newspapers as their preferred source than women (6% compared with 2%), but there is no evidence that there are real differences in preferences for television, radio, and broadcast preferences by gender. Table 4.3.4 d: Preference for Posters/Illustrations as a Preferred Mode of Receiving Election Information, by Class, Education, and Urban/Rural Milieu. Regions North South Centre Hazara Lower Lower Middle Middle Upper Middle High Income/wealthy None Madrasa Some Primary Primary School Middle School Matric Intermediate and Above Rural Urban Low Medium High Mentioned % 28 35 20 30 33 33 28 19 19 28 43 27 27 36 28 20 30 23 22 33 36 Not Mentioned % 72 65 80 70 67 67 72 81 81 72 57 73 73 64 72 80 70 77 78 67 64 Class Education Milieu Political Interest While more educated, higher income, urban, and interested respondents were more likely to learn about election through watching a TV program, lower income groups 113 and less educated voters were more likely to learn about elections through illustrations and posters in their communities. Table 4.3.4d presents preference for posters and other illustrations. Forms of illustrations common in Hazara and implicitly included in this category are picture booklets (brochures/pamphlets) and “panaflex” banners—large, portable, and waterproof “flip-chart”-style canvas posters all used for voting trends and campaigns purposes. It is important to note that illustrations were mentioned less frequently than television among all groups, but relatively more (35%) of respondents in Hazara mentioned posters compared with 28%, 20%, and 30% in Central NWFP, Northern NWFP, and Southern NWFP, respectively. Posters and other illustrated print materials in the community, while mentioned less frequently than television, are more likely to reach lower income and less educated people. Politicians used banners; leaflets that can be brought into homes in local communities—especially in rural areas—are an important means of supplementing the broadcast and print media. Illustrations and posters are somewhat more likely to reach people in NWFP. Like Pakistan, in NWFP, education is highly localized and privatized, and most children live at home until they are married. Even then, many remain with the older generation rather than establishing a new residence. The average family size per household among respondents in the survey is 10-12, pointing to the strong influence of numerous family members on an individual’s life. Parental influence on voting trends is largely influenced as mentioned in Michigan Model. SECTION 4.4: AWARENESS AND ACCESS TO ELECTORAL PROCESSES. 4.1.1 AWARENESS OF VOTER REGISTRATION: Interviewers asked survey respondents whether they had heard about the upcoming national and provincial assembly elections and whether they were aware that the elections were likely to be held in coming months. About one third of respondents (35%) claimed to be aware of the upcoming election, while two thirds (65%) were not aware that an election was due. Of those who were aware of the election, 87% identified the election period correctly, while 13% did not (Table 4.4.1a). Table 4.4.1a: Awareness of Time Period for 2007/2008 Election31 Responses Not Aware Aware of upcoming Election Period Yes 65 35 Correct between 2007-2008 14 87 Gives incorrect Period/DK 86 13 When asked to identify the location where eligible voters in the area could register, only 15% of respondents answered correctly that a voter must go to the district 114 election commission office, while 84% said they did not know or named an incorrect registration venue (Table 4.4.1b). Table 4.4.1b: Awareness of Registration Location. Q45: Responses District Election Commission office Union Council Office Tehsil Office Others Don’t Know Total %age 16 34 3 2 46 100 Accuracy 16 % 84% As with levels of political interest, responses to these four questions are related—the same respondents who report awareness of one policy change also report awareness of the other policy changes. Combining these measures permits the creation of a registration procedure “awareness index” that facilitates analysis of political knowledge by location and demographic groups, as well as political interest. Overall awareness of the changes was low, reinforcing concerns that the house-to-house enumeration had been inadequate (re-registration requirement) and that frequent voters might not even be on the new list. Men were aware of all the new policies twice as often as women; 30% of men were unaware of any changes, compared with 62% of women; 20% of men compared with 11% of women were aware of two policy changes; 13% and 5%, respectively, were aware of three policies; and 9% compared with 5% were aware of all four (see Table 4.4.2d). Table 4.4.1c: Perception of voters. Responses Registration Requirement Q36: Are you aware that all citizens must register again if they want to vote in the upcoming elections, even if they registered to vote in the past? Display of Provisional Voters List (June-July 2007) Q39: Are you aware that the provisional voters' registration list will be displayed in May and June2 and that registered voters can check the list to see if your name is correctly listed? Special Registration Opportunity Q42: Have you heard that there will be a special registration period in May/June for all citizens of voting age who did not register during the past 12 months? ECP Policy Change to Accept Old and New Identity Cards32 Q50: Have you heard that the Election Commission of Pakistan has decided to accept the old national identity card (NIC) for voter registration and elections? Yes 23 No 77 27 73 19 81 27 74 These findings, combined with election commission data showing a lower than usual percentage of women registered through the house-to-house enumeration, pointed to a serious need early in the process to encourage and facilitate women to register to vote. Awareness differed by regions, with respondents in Hazara and Southern NWFP, surprisingly, more aware of the policy changes. (Table 4.4.1d). In Central NWFP and Northern NWFP, 45% and 46% of respondents, respectively, were unaware of any new election procedures, compared with 20% and 30% of respondents in Hazara and Southern NWFP. In NWFP, 16% were aware of all four 115 procedures, and in Southern NWFP, 18% were aware of all four. In contrast, 6% of respondents in both Central NWFP and Northern NWFP were aware of the new procedures. This may be attributable to sampling bias and smaller sample size in the two less populous provinces, or information about new registration requirements may have been distributed more extensively in these traditionally disadvantaged provinces. There were no significant differences in awareness of the four policies according to the respondent’s age. Table 4.4.1d: Index of Election Awareness: Number of Policies of Which Respondent is Aware. None Gender Male Female Areas North South Centre Hazara Political Interest Index Low Interest Medium Interest High Interest Total 30 62 46 30 45 20 None 52 42 33 42 One 28 18 23 19 25 23 One 27 21 26 24 Two 20 11 15 19 16 26 Two 11 18 21 17 Three 13 5 10 14 9 13 Three 5 12 12 10 Four 9 5 6 18 6 16 Four 5 7 9 7 However, when disaggregated for each question, the results suggest a slight difference in awareness of acceptance of identity cards by age. Older voters--age 50 years or more--were more likely to know that the ECP decided to accept the old NIC. These findings indicate that major efforts are necessary to ensure that adults of voting age, particularly women, are registered to vote in all four regions of NWFP. Without this critical step, even those who are aware of an election, but unable to find out about procedures necessary to register, will be unable to participate. 4.4.2 ACCESS TO THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS Questions about subjective awareness of different voter registration policy changes were followed by objective questions to assess the extent to which election commission efforts had succeeded in registering voters. Table 4.4.2a shows how many of the respondents were aware if their household had been reached by the national door-to-door registration process. Sixty-two percent of men and 35% of women respondents knew that someone had come to their home. When respondents were asked if they had actually registered as a result of this process, 89% of men compared with 80% of women said they registered at that time. One in ten women compared with one in 20 men reported that they were not registered even if they knew 116 their home was reached by the enumeration campaign (Table 4.4.2a, Q28). There may be a number of reasons for this finding. Many men and women who were aware of the door-to-door visit may not have filled out the form themselves, even if someone in the household had registered all members. Women, especially those living in separate women’s compounds, may not have opened the door for an enumerator. Some may have been unaware if the men in the household had registered on behalf of women. In any case, certainty about final registration would require verification that one’s name could be found on the registration list. At the time of the survey, a larger percentage of urban respondents reported that they had been reached by the door-to-door process as compared with rural respondents. Urban respondents reported being enumerated in Central NWFP, Hazara, and Northern NWFP, at rates of 55%, 40%, and 47%, respectively. Only in southern NWFP did a larger percentage of rural respondents report door-to-door visitation at a higher rate (40% rural and 32% urban had been reached). According to the survey, the lowest overall reported door-to-door access rate was in Hazara and Southern NWFP (Table 4.4.2a). Table 4.4.2 a: Respondent Exposure to National Door-to-Door Registration Process. Was household reached by Door-to-Door registration (Q37)? Male Gender Female North Urban North Rural South Urban South Rural Regions Central Urban Central Rural Hazara Urban Hazara Rural 21-24 Years 25-34 Years Age 35-49 Years 50 and above Follow-Up Question: (If Yes) Did a household member register at that time? (Q38) Male Gender Female Yes 48 62 35 47 43 32 40 55 48 40 28 44 43 51 48 85 89 80 No 47 35 60 40 53 64 57 41 48 59 65 49 53 47 47 7 6 8 Don’t Know 5 3 6 12 4 3 3 4 4 1 7 7 5 2 5 7 5 12 About half of respondents in each age group were aware of an enumerator visit to the household (44-51%), but older people were slightly more likely to have been reached, with 44% and 43% of 21-24 year-olds and 25-34 year-olds, respectively, compared with 51% and 48% of 35-49 and the over-50 age group receiving door-to-door registration teams. However, any of these people may have been registered by their family, a process that would have ultimately succeeded only if their family members had included their NIC numbers on the registration forms. The number of people 117 aware of the door-to-door process, therefore, may be lower than the actual number of households reached. Furthermore, the survey found that younger people are less likely to have the NIC (see Table 4.4.2d in the following pages). Respondents were asked to report their willingness to take the effort to register themselves, given their perceived distance to the district election commission office. Of those reporting living close to the election office, 65% reported that they would be somewhat or very likely to register. One third (33%) reported that they were very or somewhat unlikely to register, even if they lived close. Forty percent living very far were somewhat or very unlikely to register. Fifty percent who did not know the location of the office were unlikely to register (Table 4.2b). Figure 4.2a illustrates this relationship. Table 4.4.2 b: Likelihood of Registering Outside of Home if Travel Required, by Respondent Distance to Election Registration Office / District Returning Officer Likelihood of Registering if Travel to EC Required. EC Distance from Respondents (Q 46) Close Far Very Far Don’t Know Column Total Don’t Know 2 4 3 22 28 Very Unlikely 22 11 26 40 10 Somewhat unlikely 11 10 14 10 20 Likely 35 46 36 19 42 Very Likely 30 29 22 8 21 Row Total 100 100 100 100 100 It was important to assess voters’ willingness to register through the normal process, in order to know whether the display period would be an essential time for additional voter registration, whether providing mere information about the location of display centres and procedures would be sufficient to ensure registration, or additional mobilization would be needed to assist more directly in the process itself. The fact that 30% of all respondents who reported living close to the district election commission office would still be unwilling to make the effort to register, among other factors, convinced the partners to implement a three-part voter information and mobilization initiative. The nationwide strategy was designed to (1) inform communities about the need to register again and the procedures to do so; (2) help eligible voters obtain their NICs; and (3) provide transportation and facilitation to help people reach display centres and complete required voter registration forms. Possession of identification is a critical requirement for both registration and voting under Pakistan’s amended electoral law (Section 33, Representation of the People Act, 1976).33 Figure 4.2b shows the numbers of people in possession of different forms of identification. Eighty-percent of respondents said they possessed NIC— 44% had the 118 old card and 77% had the new card. Only 22% had a birth certificate, so many other forms of identification must have been used to obtain the national identification cards. Table 4.4.2 c: Possession of Different Forms of Identification Forms of Identification New Computerized Identity Card (CNIC) Old National Identity Card (NIC) National ID Card for Overseas Pakistanis Birth Certificate Respondent Possesses Either CNIC or NIC Yes 77 44 3 22 87 No 23 56 97 78 14 It is important to note that the NIC is useful for access to many government public services, so the respondent’s possession of this identification does not reflect anything about his or her intention to register to vote. Although a relatively large percentage of the total population possessed a NIC at the time of the survey, Table 4.4.2d shows that women and younger adults were less likely to have NIC. In the Central NWFP, respondents reported having ID equally in rural and urban areas at a rate slightly higher than the national average (88%). The results indicate that 19% of the rural electorate of the Hazara and Southern NWFP did not have identification, compared with 13% and 10% of their urban electorates, respectively. When respondents who did not possess a CNIC were asked why (Q49), most mentioned a variety of different reasons too varied to analyze. Table 4.4.2 d: Possession of NIC Gender Demographic Male Female 21-24 Years 25-34 Years 35-49 Years 50 and above North Rural North Urban South Rural South Urban Central Rural Central Urban Hazara Rural Hazara Urban Total Neither % 6 21 25 17 6 4 19 10 21 19 12 12 19 13 14 NIC % 94 79 75 83 94 94 81 90 79 81 88 88 81 87 87 Age Regions Eighteen percent of respondents said they did not know where or how one could obtain the CNIC, while 15% said they had not heard of the ID. Another 15% reported not wanting an ID, while 9% said the cost was too high. These findings indicate that while the CNIC is required for citizens to access a number of state services unrelated to the elections, ensuring that eligible voters have the CNIC is an important first step in enfranchising them. With 30% of respondents without the CNIC saying they had not heard of the card or did not want one, providing both education and intervention to help eligible voters obtain the card should be an important part of voter education programming. Based on the survey results confirmed that women, rural and younger 119 people were less likely to have the CNIC. In addition, the assessment found that many people had filled out all of the necessary paperwork but were still waiting for their CNIC to arrive. 4.4.3 BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS ELECTIONS: The survey asked respondents question, why they had voted (Q26) or abstained (Q25) in past elections. All sub-questions were asked of all respondents unless they reported having voted in every election or never voting. These questions asked respondents to indicate the level of importance of different factors in the decision to vote or abstain, with 2-3 questions each in four broad categories: (a) personal reasons, such as lack of time or interest, as well as belief in the efficacy of their vote; (b) procedural or logistical barriers, such as distance to the polling station, inability to register or to vote once inside the polling station; (c) personal exposure to non-violent forms of election fraud, such as vote-buying; and (d) exposure to election violence and intimidation. This section presents findings for those questions addressing procedural and logistical barriers as explanations for the respondent’s past voting and non-voting behaviour. These questions deal with measures that are largely the responsibility of the election commission and areas in which the partners could recommend improvements in communication, logistical delivery of election materials and services, and attention to pre-election empowerment of voters. Respondents were asked to talk about their past experiences with polling-station access, accuracy of voter lists, and problems with identification requirements at polling stations. When asked about the importance of difficulty of reaching the polling station (Q25b) in decisions to abstain in one or more past elections, 63% said this factor was not at all important, and additional 12% said not very important. Only 10% said polling station access was a somewhat or very important factor in a decision to abstain. Similarly, those who have not voted because they did not know where the polling stations are in the minority—only 10% said this factor was somewhat or very important in abstention. Surprisingly, difficulties finding or getting to polling stations are reported equally by respondents in urban and rural areas. Urban dwellers may be less likely to be connected to family and other community networks of information about polling station locations, as well as transportation options, especially if they are newly urbanized. Traffic, transportation, and the complexity of the urban environment may make polling stations more difficult 120 to find and reach, suggesting that, even when polling station distance does not seem to be a major reason for abstention, other physical factors may be relevant. For respondents in the Hazara, reaching the polling station was a somewhat more common problem than in the other provinces. Nineteen percent in Hazara compared with 5% in Central NWFP, 15% in Northern NWFP, and 11% in Southern NWFP said difficulty of reaching the polling station was a somewhat or very important factor in abstention. Women, the poor and younger voters were no more likely to report polling station access as a problem than other demographic groups. In contrast, 36% of respondents claimed that inability to register was a very important factor in non-voting, while 55% said the problem was not at all or not very important. The number of people reporting this explanation did not differ by regions, nor were poor people or women more likely to name inability to register as a barrier to abstention. Neither education nor Urdu or minimum literacy were related to registration problems as an important factor in non-voting. These results may seem somewhat surprising given the findings of the preceding section that show women and rural electorates somewhat less likely to be registered. However, given that previous elections did not require strict forms of identification, vested interests in the constituencies may have helped mobilize likely supporters based on clan or family ties, irrespective of demographic characteristics. Thus, to the extent to which people were excluded from previous electoral lists, this exclusion, while substantial, does not appear to have been based on particular ascribed characteristics such as race and class. This is consistent with research on turnout and registration earlier in the histories of advanced industrialized democracies, in which parties would mobilize voters irrespective of race or other characteristics if they knew or could guarantee these groups would support them.34 Almost as many respondents (29%) reported that they went to the polling station, but that they couldn’t vote due to a lack of personal identification, while 42% said identification was not a factor in abstention. While women and younger people did not differ significantly in the importance they attributed to having personal identification, there were significant differences among different levels of education and lower and upper classes, especially the poorest category of respondents. As Table 4.4.3a shows, respondents in the two lowest income categories reported that lack of identification was a somewhat or very important factor in abstaining more often (42% in the lowest income category and 41% in the lower middle class category), compared 121 with under 30% for the other income categories. Those with less education also cited identification problems more often than better educated people. Forty-eight percent of those with only a primary school education who answered the question, for example, said ID was a somewhat or very important factor, compared with 22% high income category. Table 4.4.3 a: Importance of Lack of Identification at Polling Station as Reason for NonVoting, by Class and Education. Don’t Know % Not at all important% Class Lowest Income Lower Middle Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class 14 16 12 6 36 40 44 51 8 3 16 14 10 4 5 3 32 37 23 27 Not very important % Somewhat % Very % High Income None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate 13 21 2 18 1 9 11 6 55 11 Educational Attainment 32 5 40 17 46 3 41 9 45 13 52 12 59 12 1 8 7 6 9 5 620 2 21 33 34 26 39 29 21 For 24% of respondents, arriving at the polling station and not finding their name on the voter list was a somewhat or very important factor in abstention, a result that does not differ significantly across demographic groups or the provinces. These findings reinforce results presented in the previous section about awareness and access to the current election procedures, particularly with respect to ensuring that eligible voters— especially the poor and less educated—register, verify that they are on the electoral lists in their communities, and have the proper identification when they arrive at the polling station. 4.4.4 PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION It is well-known that with each election in Pakistan, ordinary men and women, the parties, the media, and civil society refer to the problem of “rigging” elections. However, people in NWFP have different views about what “rigging” means, when and where in the process it occurs, and who is responsible. Some observers may imagine rigging to be a centralized process involving manipulation of the count, ballot stuffing, and other election-day problems, but for ordinary people, free and fair elections may be compromised by less obvious problems that occur well before election-day by actors who remain largely behind the scenes. The survey asked questions seeking to identify what types of problems most threaten free and fair elections in the perception of ordinary adults, as well as what types of administrative 122 and procedural measures would most effectively strengthen citizen confidence in the efficacy of their participation in the electoral process. This section addressed citizen perceptions of the types of problems that occurred in past elections and what actors and levels of government are responsible. The final section presents data about respondents’ reactions to potential recommendations in election administration. The survey sought to assess the perception of ordinary citizens about the role of local politicians and other actors in the quality of national and provincial elections in NWFP. The sample population responded when forced to choose between two statements designed to measure the level of government perceived as most important in ensuring a fair election (Q31). Approximately one-third (29%) agreed with the first statement—that the government at Federal level was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election, while another one-third (36%) said they agreed with the statement that local officials corrupt the process despite efforts at the national level. An additional (35%) said they did not know, even though they were not presented with this option. As both education and income increase, the number perceiving local government influence over election processes increases; 52% in the highest income group attributed corruption to local officials, compared with 34% in the lowest income group. Those who are illiterate, live in rural areas, are less educated, younger people, and lower income respondents said they did not know in response to this question at much higher rates than urban respondents, those with more education, and higher incomes (see Table 4.4.4a for illustrative example). Thirty-three percent of rural respondents chose the second statement attributing problems to local officials, compared with 41% of urban respondents, while 39% of rural compared with 28% of urban respondents said they did not know how to choose between the two statements. About the same percentage of rural and urban respondents (28% and 30%, respectively) said the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps. It appears that urban respondents are somewhat more likely to attribute problems in national elections to local officials. Women chose a statement less than half as often as men (50% of women compared with 20% of men said they did not know how to choose). When they did choose a response, 45% of men attributed election unfairness to local officials compared with 27% of women, but even fewer women (23%) compared with 34% of men said the government in Islamabad was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election. The number of respondents who did not choose a statement declined with increased age. Respondents of all ages were more likely to attribute 123 responsibility for election corruption to local governments, but both 21-24 year olds and those over 50 were significantly more likely to attribute problems to local government than to credit national government. Thirty-six percent of 21-24 year olds and 42% of those aged 50 and over blamed local officials, compared with 24% and 27%, respectively, who attributed election quality to the national government (Table 4.4.4a). Regional differences indicate that eligible voters in the central NWFP and Northern NWFP are more cynical about local officials’ role in the election process, while those in the Hazara and Southern NWFP are more likely to believe in central government steps to ensure free and fair elections. In Hazara and Southern NWFP, despite the fact that more respondents appear underserved by objective measures of election access and awareness, 34% and 42% of respondents said they believed the central government was taking positive steps to ensure a free and fair election, compared with 29% and 23% of those in central NWFP and Northern NWFP. In the latter two regions, 39% of all respondents’ confidence in central government measures was tempered by skepticism of local politicians’ corruption of the process (Table 4.4.4a). Table 4.4.4a: Attribution of Election (Un)Fairness to National versus Local Government, by Age, Educational Attainment, and Regions. Demographic Group Government in Islamabad is Taking Positive Steps to Ensure Free Election 24 30 34 27 30 42 29 34 25 23 23 31 30 31 37 It does not matter what Islamabad does, local and provincial politicians corrupt the process. 36 33 35 42 39 28 39 24 34 30 41 37 37 43 36 Don't Know / Cannot Choose Age Region Education 21-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50 and above North South Centre Hazara None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above 40 36 31 30 39 30 32 42 41 47 36 32 33 26 27 When asked the respondents to compare their expectations for upcoming elections to past elections in NWFP (Q32), 45% of respondents said they expected the level of fairness in upcoming elections to be about the same as past elections. Only 12% said they expected the election to be less free, while 45% said they expected the elections to be somewhat or much more free than past elections. Expectations did not differ significantly by age, educational attainment, and income, but there were significant regional, gender, and rural-urban differences in expectations of fairness (Table 4.4.4b). 124 Forty-five percent of rural respondents compared with 40 percent of urban respondents said upcoming elections were likely to be somewhat or much more free and fair compared with past elections, while slightly more urban (16%) than rural (10%) respondents expected these elections to be less free and fair. Surprisingly, comparatively more respondents in the Hazara expected the elections to be more free and fair than past elections (53%), a result that may reflect their local, provincial, and national representation. Women were less likely to expect major differences between past and present elections, while more men thought elections would be less free (14% compared with 10% of women) or more free (44% compared with 42% of women (Table 4.4.4b). When asked about their confidence in the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) (Q33f), the same percentage of respondents (35%) said they had no trust at all or some trust, while fewer (25%) said they had a great deal of trust in the ECP, results that did not differ significantly across levels of educational attainment, regions, or age group. Urban respondents said they had no trust in the ECP more frequently (44%) than rural respondents (34%), while rural respondents expressed some or a great deal of trust more frequently than urban respondents. Table 4.4.4 b: Perception about the Fairness of upcoming elections as Compared with Past Elections. Demographic Group Milieu Regions Rural Urban North South Centre Hazara Male Female Somewhat or Much Less Free and Fair 10 16 11 12 12 13 14 10 About the Same 45 44 43 43 48 34 41 48 Somewhat or Much More Free and Fair 45 40 46 46 40 53 44 42 Gender Forty percent and 27% of rural respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the ECP, while 34% of urban respondents had some trust in the ECP and 22% a great deal (Table 4.4.4c). These response patterns may reflect the relative lack of exposure of rural respondents to media and other analysis of the ECP, as well as more trust in government institutions in general among people in rural areas. These results also are consistent with the survey’s previous finding that rural populations are generally less likely to have been reached by election registration efforts (See Table 4.4.2c). Similarly, almost half (48%) of women said they had no trust in the ECP, compared with less than one third (29%) of men. One in three men (32%) compared with less than one in five women (16%) expressed a great deal of trust in the institution (Table 4.4c). These data may reinforce the findings that women are less likely to know about and to be reached by election procedures or may reflect women’s greater awareness 125 that some women face serious obstacles to voting on Election Day.35 Thirty-nine and 36% of men and women, respectively, had some trust in the ECP. The low level of trust (16%) among women in the ECP, the Human Rights activist Afrasiyab Khattak in an interview suggests, ‘there is need to do efforts to make women aware of their rights as voters and to assist them directly in taking the steps necessary to exercise their voting rights should be a major priority, while the ECP should be encouraged to do a better job of registering women, facilitating their access to the election process, and ensuring that they express their opinions freely in the polling booth.’36 When asked about their confidence that most voting-age citizens in their communities would be registered on the electoral list in time for the election (Q43), 21% said they were very confident, 34% said they were somewhat confident and only 7% said they were not at all confident. Classes and rural and urban settings did not differ significantly in their level of confidence about registration, while those with only a madrasa education stand out as much less likely to express confidence in the registration process (only 12% of madrasa-educated respondents said they were very confident that people in their communities would be registered in time, compared with 18-25% of respondents in the other educational groups). Table 4.4.4c: Trust in Election Commission of Pakistan, by Milieu, Class, and Gender. Demographic Group Rural Milieu Urban Lowest Income Lower Middle Middle Class Upper Middle High Income Male Female 46 34 29 48 39 35 39 36 15 31 32 16 No Trust at All 10 16 33 37 43 Some Trust 45 44 39 40 35 Great Deal of Trust 45 40 28 23 22 Gender The number of respondents who do not know how confident they are in registration process decreases as the level of education increases. Confidence in registration for the upcoming election differs by regions, with 12% of respondents in southern NWFP, 8% each in Hazara and Northern, and 5% in central NWFP saying they were not at all confident of the registration process at the time of the survey. Respondents in Northern NWFP said they did not know (49%) more often than those in the other regions (Table 4.4.4d). More males than females were somewhat or very confident that eligible voters in their communities would be registered (69% and 48% of men and women, respectively); with more women also saying they did not know. Women’s lower confidence level may indicate that women respondents had in mind 126 the low level of women’s voter registration, whereas some men respondents may have had in mind only men as registered voters. In any case, the data are consistent with the survey’s other findings pointing to the need for targeted voter registration efforts aimed at women. Table 4.4.4d: Confidence that Eligible Voters in Community Will Be Registered, by Regions and Gender. Demographic Group Regions North South Centre Hazara Male Female Not at All Confident (%) 8 12 5 8 7 6 Somewhat Confident (%) 25 39 38 32 42 27 Very Confident (%) 18 14 22 21 27 21 Don't Know (%) 49 35 35 39 24 39 Gender Similar percentages of respondents expressed confidence in the accuracy of electoral lists in their communities (Q44), with 22% very confident, 33% somewhat confident, and 8% not at all confident. Levels of confidence in list accuracy differed significantly across most demographic groups except rural and urban respondents (Table 4.4e). A lower percentage of respondents in northern NWFP and Southern NWFP expressed high confidence in the electoral lists (16% and 14%, respectively, compared with 25% and 21% in Central NWFP and Hazara), although more respondents in Southern NWFP (40%) said they were somewhat confident— higher than in the other regions (see Table 4.4.4e). Table 4.4.4e: Confidence in the Accuracy of the Electoral List in Your Community. Demographic Group Regions North South Centre Hazara Age 21-24 24-34 35-49 50 and above Class Lowest Income Lower Middle class Middle class Upper Middle class High Income Education None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above Gender Male Female Not at All 10 9 6 8 10 8 8 4 7 7 9 9 6 7 6 5 8 7 9 9 8 7 Somewhat 28 40 35 31 31 33 33 34 33 34 33 32 30 29 40 34 30 36 35 36 38 28 Very 16 14 25 21 17 18 23 31 18 23 21 23 36 19 14 21 25 27 29 22 28 16 Don't Know 46 37 34 40 43 40 35 31 41 36 38 36 28 45 39 39 37 31 26 33 25 50 127 The percentage confidence in the accuracy of the electoral lists increases steadily with respondent age, with 17% of 21-24 year-olds compared with 31% of those over 50 expressing high confidence in the electoral lists. This data is consistent with earlier findings of lower levels of voter registration among youth (see Table 4.4.2a). While about one-third of respondents in each income group said they were somewhat confident in electoral lists, the number saying “don’t know” decreased with increased education, and the number of respondents who said they were very confident in the lists increased with income—higher income groups said they were very confident in the lists twice as often as the lowest income group, and at least 13% more often than the other income groups (Table 4.4.4e). Finally, women (16%) said they were very confident in the list almost half as often as men and women were twice as likely to say they did not know about list accuracy in their communities (Table 4.4.4e). These results are consistent with findings that women have less trust in the ECP, less confidence that people in their communities are registered and less knowledge about whether their household is registered to vote. Equal percentages of respondents expected names to be left off of electoral lists at polling stations as expected no problems with electoral lists (39%), while 24% did not know how likely this problem might be in the next election. Despite the fact that some groups reported personally experiencing this problem in the past, demographic groups did not differ substantially when answering this question about expectations for the coming election. SECTION 4.5 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS A population’s participation in elections and political processes reflects, in part, its trust in political institutions. Greater levels of trust in political institutions have been associated with higher levels of citizen engagement with political processes. Many analysts consider trust in political institutions—particularly elected institutions and their ability to regulate unelected leaders—as critical to the consolidation of democracy.37 New research has questioned this assumption, arguing that citizens who are more skeptical of institutions do a better job of holding governments accountable, especially along with an independent judiciary and media. 38 Survey questions that measure citizen trust in a variety of institutions can shed light on the health of governance and democracy. Furthermore, proposals for improvements in the election process, including electoral administration reform and scrutiny of elections by 128 observers, may be irrelevant if low trust in both bureaucratic and elected institutions keeps eligible voters away from the polls. Understanding public regard for the institutional landscape helps provide a context for interpretations of the quality of the electoral process by long- and short-term election observers and civil society. Additionally, in an environment of distrust, informing citizens about the nature of reforms designed to increase their participation may be an important part of creating public demand that hastens the institutional strengthening process. The survey asked respondents a series of questions about their perceptions of a variety of state and nonstate institutions in country. 4.5.1 ELECTED ASSEMBLIES: When asked about their trust in a variety of country’s institutions (Q33, respondents expressed little trust in the elected national and provincial assemblies (Q33e), with 43% saying they had no trust at all in these institutions. The assemblies ranked second after the police (67% distrust) with respect to level of distrust, although more people had some trust in the assemblies--39%-compared with just 23% who had some trust in the police. At the time of the survey, more respondents in rural areas said they had some or a great deal of trust (63%) in the assemblies than did urban respondents (48%). Over half (52%) of urban respondents compared with 37% of rural respondents had no trust at all in the assemblies. While it is beyond the scope of this survey to explain these differences between rural and urban electorates, closer links between rural electorates and patronage networks and family connections to representatives may explain this higher level of trust. In addition, a more diffuse and transient urban electorate may be less familiar with their representatives and their constituent activities (Table 4.5.1a). Table 4.5.1 a: Trust in National and Provincial Assembly. Variables Milieu Demographic Group Rural Urban Lowest Class Lower Middle Middle Upper Middle High Income Male Female No Trust at all 37 52 38 43 49 52 41 35 53 Some Trust 42 34 41 41 37 40 34 43 33 Great deal of Trust 21 14 21 17 14 9 26 22 44 Class Gender Women expressed mistrust of the assemblies more frequently than men, with one in two women (53%) saying they had no trust at all in the assemblies compared with one in three men (35%). Sixty-five percent of men had some or a great deal of trust in the assemblies, compared with 47% of women (Table 4.5.1a). 129 Respondents in the middle and upper middle class reported less trust in the assemblies than higher and lower income groups; 47% and 49% of middle and upper middle class respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the legislatures compared with 58% or more of low and high income respondents. Interviewers asked respondents to assess the likelihood of suggesting the their Member of the National Assembly (MNA) or Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) (Q19) when asked: “Looking at the problems in your area and the way they affect families like yours, or your relatives’ and friends’, who would you suggest to go to in order to resolve these problems?” Fourteen percent said they would be likely to suggest the MNA or MPA to solve a problem, while 16% and 65% said they were unlikely to or would never suggest, respectively, the MNA or MPA. Fewer women (17%) than men (23%) were likely to suggest the assembly members, and more women (69%) than men (59%) would never recommend the MNA or MPA to solve a problem. Eighteen percent of men and 14% of women respondents said they were unlikely to recommend these politicians. About one in five respondents at all educational levels said they were likely to recommend the MNA or MPA (Table 4.5.1b), with the exception of those who have a madrasa education, who said they would recommend the MNA or MPA more often (about one in three). Table 4.5.1b: Likelihood of Recommending MNA or MPA to Resolve Local Problems, by Gender and Educational Attainment. Demography None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Education Middle School Matric Intermediate and Above Male Gender Female Would Never 70 51 70 60 64 58 59 59 69 Unlikely 13 17 13 15 14 18 22 18 14 Likely 17 32 18 25 22 23 19 23 17 However, the number of respondents saying they would never recommend an MNA or MPA decreases with higher levels of education, which may reflect a greater awareness on the part of educated respondents of the functions of the MNAs and MPAs and how they might be contacted, as well as greater knowledge about their constituencies’ representatives. Perceived power of the assemblies is not related to39 the respondents’ likelihood of recommending the MNA or MPA to solve local problems. This result suggests that perceptions of the individual politicians and their ability to deliver services at the local level shapes public views of MNA or MPA 130 efficacy more than the influence of the institution itself. The Frontier electorate was divided in its opinion about the degree of power the national and provincial assembly have to direct political development in Pakistan (Q60); 26% said that the National Assembly and Senate (Q60a) had no power at all, while 28% said it had a great deal of power. The perceived power of the national assembly did not differ across regions and demographic groups. More respondents had an opinion about the provincial as compared with the national assembly. When asked about the Provincial Assemblies’ (PA) power to direct political development (Q60b), 26% of respondents said the PA had some power, and about one in five respondents said it had no power, little power, or a great deal of power, respectively. Forty-eight percent said the PA had some or a great deal of power, compared with 42% for the National Assembly. Not surprisingly, these findings vary somewhat by regions (Table 4.5.1c). In Central NWFP, 52% of respondents said the PA has some or a great deal of power, compared with 44% in Hazara, 41% in Northern NWFP, and 43% in Southern NWFP. In both Central and Southern NWFP, 39% of respondents said the PA had little or no power. In Hazara and Northern NWFP, respectively, 35% and 41% perceived little or no power in the PA. Respondents in the Hazara were twice as likely to say they did not know how much power the PA has. Table 4.5.1c: Perceived Power of the Provincial Assembly, by Regions. Areas North South Centre Hazara Don’t Know 18 18 9 21 None 18 17 20 16 Little Power 24 22 19 19 Some Power 23 26 27 26 A Great deal of Power 18 18 25 18 National and provincial elected institutions enjoyed relatively little esteem from the NWFP electorate; 43% of respondents—and 53% of women—had no trust at all in elected assemblies; 64% would never recommend a member of the provincial or national assembly to solve a local problem. Around 40% of the electorate perceived that neither the Provincial nor the National Assembly had power to shape political development. Furthermore, rural and less educated people may trust these institutions more than urban, middle class, and educated populations, a finding consistent with patronage patterns, rather than an informed electorate overseeing the performance of electoral institutions. 4.5.2 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT The electorate expressed more trust in the national government compared with the elected assemblies (Q33a); 34% had no trust at all in national government, but 38% 131 and 28% had some or a great deal of trust, respectively. As with the elected assemblies, women were less likely to trust national government; 41% had no trust at all compared with 28% of men. Thirty-five percent of women and 41% of men regarded the government with some trust, and 24% and 31% of women and men, respectively, expressed a great deal of trust in the national government. The urban electorate was also more skeptical of the central government; 70% of rural respondents had some or a great deal of trust while comparatively fewer urban respondents (60%) felt the same way. Forty percent of urban respondents had no trust at all in the government compared with 30% of rural respondents. The low levels of trust in national government correspond with a prevailing (39%) perception that corruption is both a very common and major problem in government (Q53). Those with more education as well as those with higher incomes were more likely to view corruption as a frequent and serious problem. Only 30% of those with low education compared with 54% with a F.A. / F.Sc degree or higher believed government corruption is a common and serious problem. Women said more frequently that they did not know about the level of corruption in government, but were otherwise similar to men. An additional measure of corruption—the degree to which employment depends on friends and relatives in government (Q52b)—was included to assess the potential effectiveness of voting trends to make independent decisions based on evaluation of party platforms and policies, rather than on candidate personalities and personal benefit. Over one third (36%) agreed strongly with the statement “employment depends on friends and relatives in government” and an additional 22% agreed, for a total of 58% who view connections as important. A minority (26%) disagreed with this statement. In the Hazara, 76% of respondents agreed or agreed strongly that jobs depend on government connections, compared with 57% in Central NWFP, 51% in Northern NWFP, and 65% in Southern NWFP. Twenty-six percent of respondents in Central NWFP, 14% in Hazara, 29% in Northern NWFP, and 25% in Southern NWFP disagreed with the proposition. Respondents in Hazara appear to believe connections are more important to employment than those in the other four regions of NWFP. 4.5.3 JUDICIARY The survey asked about the third pillar of government, the judiciary, in part because judges have a major role in elections in Pakistan. District judges approve polling 132 station schemes and appointment of polling officials, oversee candidate nomination and election observer accreditation processes, and manage the consolidation of election results. At the time of the survey, levels of trust in the judiciary mirrored support for other institutions (Q33b). Important national events regarding the judiciary have taken place in the intervening period, such that survey findings do not reflect views about judges of the current national or local courts.40 Data shows that about one in three (31%) NWFP adults had a great deal of trust in the judiciary; while an additional one-third (31%) had no trust at all. Thirty seven percent of respondents had some trust in the judiciary. Urban respondents expressed distrust of the judiciary more often; 37% said they had no trust while only 28% of rural respondents had no trust. On the other hand, 26% of urban and 35% of rural respondents had a great deal of trust in the judiciary. Equal percentages (37%) of both rural and urban respondents had some trust in the judiciary. Similarly, women trust the judiciary less than men; 36% and 27% of women and men, respectively, had no trust in the judiciary. Twenty-five percent of women compared with 37% of men had a great deal of trust in the institution, and 39% and 36% of women and men, respectively, had some trust. In Central NWFP, 74% of respondents had some or a great deal of trust in the judiciary, followed by 67% in Southern NWFP and 60% each in Hazara and Northern NWFP. 4.5.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS Of the institutions respondents were asked to evaluate- the police (Q34c) were trusted the least. Only ten percent of respondents had a great deal of trust in the police, followed by 23% with some trust, and over two-thirds (67%) with no trust at all. There were provincial differences in levels of trust for the police, and rural respondents expressed trust in the police somewhat more than urban respondents. In Northern NWFP, more respondents (75%) distrusted the police, followed by Central NWFP (67%), Hazara, and Southern NWFP (57% each). Higher percentages of respondents in Hazara and Southern NWFP, 42% and 43%, respectively, had some or a great deal of trust in the police, compared with 33% and 24% in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP, respectively (Table 4.5.4). Men and women did not differ with respect to trust for police, but 59% of men and 49% of women had a great deal of trust in the army (Q33d), 28% and 27%, respectively, had some trust, and 23% of women had no trust at all compared with 14% of men. 133 Table 4.5.4: Trust on Police Regions North South Centre Hazara No Trust 75 57 67 58 Some 18 26 23 30 Great Deal 7 17 10 12 4.5.5 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT Fewer people have a great deal of in trust provincial government (Q33g) (understood as the Chief Minister and cabinet and to a lesser extent the Governor, who is appointed by the President) 22%, than in national government 28%, but 38% of respondents have some trust in both. Forty percent said they had no trust at all in provincial government. These attitudes do not differ across the regions. The number of respondents in urban versus rural areas who said they had no trust at all in provincial government differed by 10% (47% and 37%, respectively). Forty percent of the rural electorate expressed some trust and another 24% a great deal of trust in provincial government, while only 35% of urban respondents had some trust and 18% had a great deal. Gender differences in trust of provincial government are more pronounced than for national government. The percentage of women expressing a great deal of trust in provincial government was 16%, compared with 25% of men; 42% had some trust compared with 32% of men; and 51% had no trust at all compared with just 32% of men (table not shown). Perceptions about corruption in provincial government (Q53b) mirror those of the national government, with a similar distribution of responses, suggesting that those who believe there is a great deal of corruption in NWFP perceive it as a problem at multiple levels of government.41 Forty percent of respondents said the problem of provincial-level corruption is both common and serious. Eight percent said corruption is not a problem at the provincial level, while 18% said it is somewhat common and 11% said it was very common but minor. The distribution of responses in each province is the same as the national average. Respondents with higher levels of income and educational attainment view corruption as a problem more frequently than those with lower incomes and with less education. 4.5.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT Local Government is out of the scope of this study, but to find out electoral/voting trends, questions about Local Government were incorporated in survey for more comprehensive analysis of voting trends. Approximately one in three respondents each have no trust (35%), some trust (36%), and a great deal of trust (29%) in the re- 134 established local governments elected in 2001 and again in 200542 (Q33i). The level of perceived corruption is also similar to that for provincial and national government, with 39% of respondents saying local government corruption is a common and major problem (Q53c). Again, those who think corruption is a major problem think that it occurs at all levels of government. 43 However, a greater percentage (59%) would recommend local government to solve a problem (Q19g), a function, perhaps, of the relative proximity of local government rather than high levels of trust or expectations of low corruption. Women were less likely to trust local as well as the other levels of government. Forty three percent of women compared with 29% of men have no trust in local government. Women respondents report some or a great deal of trust less often (33% and 24%, respectively) than men (38% and 33%), although they said they were likely to recommend local government for solving problems as often as men. Respondents ages 21-24 were less likely to name elected local officials as a resource for resolving local problems. While 60% or more of respondents in each of the other age groups recommended local officials, 51% of 21-24 year-olds do so, while 49% said they the would be unlikely to or would never do so, compared with about 39% of respondents in the other age groups (Table 4.5.6). In each of the region with the exception of Southern NWFP, urban respondents recommend local government officials more often than their rural counterparts do (see Table 4.5.6). Respondents in Central NWFP and Hazara (64% and 60%, respectively) say they are likely to recommend elected local officials more often than those in Northern NWFP and Southern NWFP (49% and 46%, respectively). The percentage of respondents in the two lowest income groups surveyed who said they were likely to recommend local officials (50% and 62%, respectively), was lower than that for the other income levels (between 66% and 65%) (Table 4.5.6). Within the lowest income group, 37% would never recommend local officials, compared with 23%-31% in the other classes. As with other levels of government, this may reflect a lack of knowledge about the process, or a general feeling of powerlessness to influence government among the poor. Because income and education are related, education may be the primary explanation for low government engagement by lowincome respondents. Those with no or some primary education were likely to recommend local officials less often (48% and 54%, respectively, compared with 60% or more for the other educational groups (Table 4.5.6). About 30% of respondents in each of the four highest educational levels (those who finished primary school or 135 more) were unlikely to or would never recommend local officials, compared with about 50% of respondents with no education, madrasa, or some primary school. Analysing the results for perceived corruption at other levels of government, the percentage of respondents who perceive local government corruption as a common and serious problem increases with income and education, but does not vary by regions, age, gender, or urban/rural milieu. Respondents who view local officials as corrupt recommended them less frequently as a solution to local problems. Of those who said there is no corruption among local officials, 68% recommend them as a solution to problems, compared with 58% of those who think that local corruption is common and serious. Table 5.6: Likelihood of Recommending Local Government to Solve a Problem. Variables Age Group Category 21-24 Years 25-34 Years 35-49Years 50 and Above North Rural North Urban South Rural South Urban Centre Rural Centre Urban Hazara rural Hazara Urban Lowest Income Lower Middle Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class High Income None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Educational Attainment Middle Matric Intermediate and above Would Never 40 28 28 29 44 36 45 45 29 26 31 21 37 31 23 23 30 42 29 34 31 22 21 23 Unlikely 9 9 11 9 12 11 9 10 11 5 11 9 13 7 9 12 3 10 11 13 8 10 7 10 Likely 51 62 60 62 44 53 46 45 60 70 58 69 50 62 68 66 67 59 60 54 61 68 72 67 Area Class Thirty-five of these skeptics said they would never recommend local officials compared with 22-25% of those who believe corruption is a minor problem or no problem at all (data not presented). While many respondents would still consult local government for a problem, the finding suggests that perceived corruption may reduce the degree to which citizens view local government as a resource, perhaps leading them to seek alternative sources of information and assistance. People in NWFP understand “district government” as the district bureaucracy or civil service, namely the District Coordination Officer (DCO) and subordinate Executive District Officers (EDOs). 136 It may also include the elected District Nazim, but most people probably think of these elected representatives as part of the new “local government” structure. Respondents were, overall, unlikely to recommend district-level officials as resources in solving local problems (Q19h). Seventy-five percent said were unlikely or would never recommend this resource, and only 25% would be likely to recommend district officials to solve a local problem.44 4.5.7 PRESS: Historically, the domestic press has enjoyed more respect than other institutions. Indeed, 72% of the survey respondents have some or a great deal of trust in the press. Furthermore, trust in the press, surprisingly, does not vary with respondent age, education, rural or urban milieu, frequency of use of any media— television, radio, or newspapers – or interest in politics (both with self-reported and the behavioral index measures (see section 3). Literacy in at least one language corresponds with greater trust in the press, but it is interesting that even among those who are illiterate, 64% have some or a great deal of trust in the press, compared with 78% of literate respondents. Not surprisingly, those with literacy in Urdu or English have more trust in the press. Forty-three percent of those literate in Urdu have a great deal of trust in the press, compared with 30% of those who cannot read, write, or speak Urdu. English speakers have even more trust in the press, with 48% expressing a great deal of trust compared with 34% of those without English literacy. Respondents in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP express a great deal of trust in the press more often (38% each) than those in Hazara and Southern NWFP (31% and 24%, respectively), who say they have no trust more often (40% and 36% in Hazara and Southern NWFP, respectively) than the 25% and 26% who have no trust in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP. The relatively high level of confidence in the press, even in a population with low levels of media consumption, may have several implications for voting trends. First, the electorate, even while not highly engaged with the news on a personal level, may assume that the media is playing an important role in representing their interests or in holding other institutions accountable. Secondly, the electorate may rely on others who do consume media to share information and thus form opinions about the quality of the media based on these second hand accounts. Finally, people may not consume the media under normal circumstances, but limited, elevated consumptions during salient events and crises may influence perceptions of a larger audience. Further research would be required to 137 confirm the speculation that people consume the press indirectly through educated or more engaged family and community members, but the relative level of confidence in the press may point to the importance of using the media as an important resource in voter education, despite low levels of direct consumption. 4.5.8 SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: In developing democracies, social institutions often wield considerable influence over people’s lives as well as the political system itself. These institutions, operating at the community level, are often closer to ordinary people. Public opinion about the influence of local figures and institutions should not be viewed as a static continuation of long-standing traditions, but rather as a snapshot of the views of ordinary people given relatively recent changes in local governance. In developing democracies, there is a tendency to assume that citizen ties to local institutions are remnants of primordial social interaction, but there is evidence that institutional changes are equally if not more influential.45 A 1999 study of the Pakistani electorate, found that agricultural landowners’ influence on elections had diminished as of the 1997 elections, 46 but recent research suggests that the new devolution program and non-party local elections may have reversed that trends.47 The survey included questions to measure citizen attitudes toward three social institutions—religious leaders (Q19b), landowners (feudal leaders) (Q19a), and biradari elders (Q19c)—in anticipation of programming that might seek to engage these local influential’s in voter registration, voter education, and other electionrelated activities, or to encourage voter independence from them, depending on various factors. Specifically, respondents were asked how likely they would be to recommend each type of community member to solve a local problem. The goal of the question was to identify what leaders people think of most readily when they have a question or problem, which may be a proxy for measuring the level of engagement between citizens and those institutions. Almost one in three respondents (27%) would recommend religious leaders if they knew someone with a problem in the community. This places religious leaders above nongovernmental organizations, political party offices, Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, district administration officials, and feudal leaders as perceived problem solvers, even though 58% of respondents would never recommend them and 15% would be unlikely to do so. Respondents’ likelihood of recommending religious leaders did not differ by regions, age group, gender, or urban/rural milieu. The percentage of respondents who recommend religious leaders as a resource diminishes, to some extent, with income 138 and education (Table 4.5.8a). Among low-income respondents, one in three (32%) said they would be likely to recommend religious leaders, 14% would be unlikely to recommend them, and 54% would never recommend them. In comparison, 19% of the highest income group would recommend religious leaders while 82% would be unlikely to or would never do so (Table 4.5.8a). Table 4.5.8a: Likelihood of Recommending Religious Leaders to Solve a Problem. Demography Lowest income Lower Middle Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class High Income Education None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above Class Would Never 54 59 56 62 74 56 33 55 54 67 63 64 Unlikely 14 17 18 16 8 15 17 17 21 9 23 15 Likely 32 23 26 23 19 29 50 28 25 24 24 21 The middle class respondents recommended religious leaders slightly more frequently (26%) than did the lower middle class (23%) and the upper middle class (23%). Not surprisingly, those with a madrasa education recommend religious leaders to solve problems two times as often (50%) than the other education groups, with the exception of those with no education and some primary school education (29% and 28%, respectively) (Table 4.5.8a). Four out of five (80%) respondents with Matriculation or an F.A. /F.Sc degree or more education said they were unlikely to or would never recommend these leaders, compared with 76% of those with a middle school education, 75% with a primary school education, and 71% of those with no education.58 Religious leaders could be a relatively important partner in reaching lower income and less educated people. Religious leaders come to mind for one in three low income respondents compared with one in four middle class respondents or one in five highincome respondents in the context of solving local problems. Religious elements play a key role in shaping voting trends in NWFP. Although declining, the so-called feudal system still holds sway in the social dynamics of NWFP. Many low-income people still depend upon landowners for their livelihood and income. In the political sphere, the patron-client relationship between feudal elites and lower income groups persists in some parts of the NWFP. For many years, observers of Pakistani politics have argued that the influence of large landowners, who often parley their “landed power” 139 into political power, is a critical obstacle to democracy in Pakistan. That is, where landlords are influential, they dominate the electoral process.48 These feudal leaders represent an important influence on the lives of their tenant farmers, and their political influence, often manifested in the form of provincial and national assembly seats or influence within political parties, means that understanding their role is critical to any assessment of elections. Percentages of respondents who would suggest feudal leaders to their relatives or friends to find solutions to their local-level problems are similar to those for religious leaders. 26% of respondents said they were likely to recommend these leaders in the event of a local problem, while 62% would never do so. Twelve percent said they would be unlikely to recommend feudal leaders. Women and men recommend feudal leaders equally often, as do different age groups. Less than half the number of respondents in urban central NWFP as in rural Central NWFP said they were likely to recommend feudal leaders to solve local problems (13% and 28%, respectively), and 87% were unlikely or would never recommend them, compared with 71% of those in the province’s rural areas. Urban versus rural respondents in Hazara have similar responses (see Table 4.5.8b), while both urban and rural respondents in Northern NWFP and Southern NWFP were more similar to each other in their willingness to suggest feudal leaders, which is, perhaps, consistent with the greater degree of influence these leaders may have overall in these two provinces in both rural and urban areas. Table 4.5.8b: Likelihood of Recommending “Feudal Leaders” to Solve a Problem. Demography North Rural North Urban South Rural South Urban Centre Rural Centre Urban Hazara Rural Hazara Urban Class Lowest Income Lower Middle Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class High Income Education None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above Areas Would Never 53 47 61 57 60 77 63 72 52 66 66 74 83 52 46 66 60 73 75 74 Unlikely 14 14 13 18 11 10 10 10 9 14 17 11 4 10 12 11 17 8 10 15 Likely 32 39 25 25 28 13 27 17 38 20 16 14 13 38 41 22 24 18 15 10 140 Differences across income and education groups are striking; the lowest income respondents suggest feudal leaders twice as often as the next highest income group (40% compared with 20% of lower middle class respondents) (Table 5.8b). While 61% of low income respondents are unlikely to or would never suggest feudal leaders, 80% of lower middle class respondents would not. Similarly, about 40% of those with no education or a madrasa education are likely to recommend feudals, while 22% and 24% of those who have some or finished primary education, respectively, would suggest feudals (Table 4.5.8b). A large percentage of the uneducated and low income electorate think of feudal leaders when asked to recommend someone to solve their problems, and existing research suggests the electoral power of these influentials. This data shows that voting trends are under the influence of local landlords. An even larger percentage (70%) of the electorate is likely to turn to biradari elders. The biradari, or clan, is more specifically a group of patrilineal kin who generally reside in the same village, but who often extend their influence to those who have migrated outside it. Table 4.5.8C: Likelihood of Recommending Biradari Leaders to Solve a Problem. Demography Rural Milieu Urban North Rural North Urban South Rural South Urban Regions Centre Rural Centre Urban Hazara Rural Hazara Urban Lowest Income Lower Middle Class Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class High Income None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Educational attainment Middle Matric Intermediate and above Would Never 9 29 22 31 25 19 16 28 25 40 18 23 24 23 36 23 10 23 16 25 23 28 Unlikely 6 8 8 6 9 8 6 9 6 9 5 5 10 10 7 5 6 12 7 5 6 12 Likely 75 63 70 63 66 72 79 63 69 51 77 72 65 68 57 74 84 65 78 70 71 60 These groups of elders may help members find employment, arrange marriages, and collect and administer loans to poorer members, for example. Clan loyalty, or biradarism, is reportedly strong during elections, in which people often follow the recommendations of their elders as opposed to political ideology when voting. Although biradari is an important informal institution to which many people turn, 30% 141 of respondents say they would never or would be unlikely to suggest biradari to solve problems. Of rural respondents, 75% would recommend biradari, while only 63% of urban respondents would do so. Urban respondents never or are unlikely to recommend biradari more often (37%) than those in rural areas (25%) (Table 4.5.8c). These urban-rural differences are more pronounced by province. In rural Central NWFP, 79% recommend biradari, compared with 63% in urban areas. Respondents in Hazara are less likely overall to recommend biradari, and more urban respondents (69%) than rural (51%) do so. Seventy percent and 63% of rural and urban respondents, respectively, in Northern NWFP recommend biradari; while only in Southern NWFP does the number of urban respondents who recommend biradari (72%) exceed those in rural areas (66%) (Table 4.5.8c). The latter finding may be a result of sampling bias. Those with higher incomes are less likely to recommend biradari to friends and relatives to solve local problems—77% of the lowest income respondents compared with 68% of those in the upper middle class said they were likely to suggest biradari (Table 5.8c). Educational attainment does not seem to diminish respondents’ willingness to turn to biradari, with over 70% (the national average or more) of all educational groups likely to recommend clan leaders, with the exception of those with F.A./F.Sc degrees or more education, of whom 60% recommend biradari (Table 4.5.8c). The kinship system in NWFP is important, particularly in rural areas. 4.5.9 NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups have been increasing exponentially since the 1990s. A prevailing assumption is that ordinary citizens view such elite-led groups with cynicism. While NGOs are not among the first institutions respondents recommend to solve a problem (only 14% do so, while 86% would not recommend them) (Q19d), a majority (55%) do not know when asked to agree with one of two alternate statements, “NGOs make a positive contribution to society” or “NGOs are a waste of resources.” While 29% choose the former statement, 16% choose the latter (Q34). Similarly, 19% perceive corruption to be a common and major problem among NGOs—much lower than that for elected and non-elected government institutions—and 40% do not know (Q53d). Overall, respondents seem generally unaware, ambivalent, or somewhat positive about the role of NGOs compared with other institutions. Women say they would recommend NGOs as a 142 resource less frequently (12%) than men (16%). Eighty-eight percent of women would never or would be unlikely to recommend NGOs compared with 84% of men. One in four women (25%) say NGOs make a positive contribution compared with one in three men (32%); 15% and 17%, respectively, see NGOs as a waste of resources, and 59% of women compared with 50% of men do not know. Respondents in Central NWFP said they did not know whether NGOs’ role in society is positive or negative twice as often (66%) as respondents in Hazara (30%) and Southern NWFP (36%). Twenty-four percent of Central NWFP respondents viewed NGOs positively and 10% negatively, compared with 40% and 30% in Hazara, 33% and 23% in Northern NWFP, and 37% and 27% in Southern NWFP, respectively. Those with more education and income recommend NGOs more frequently and are more likely to see their contribution to society as positive. The findings in this section indicate that the voting-age population is more likely to trust and to turn to non-elected institution outside of government, such as biradari elders and feudal leaders to solve problems. Some non-elected institutions have persisted over time at the local level regardless of fluctuating political loyalties and systems of government. They have had greater power to address people’s grievances, if only as a function of their proximity and profile in their communities. The press and NGOs represent non-elected institutions with relatively positive, but more weakly. All these actors framed the voting trends in NWFP. SECTION 4.6: PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL FRAUD, COERCION, AND VIOLENCE: Electoral fraud and violence have occurred in the electoral histories of most countries,49 and Pakistan is no exception. People often talk about “rigging,” but little research has explored exactly what people have in mind when they use this term. With a wide range of methods--from ballot stuffing to vote buying to gerrymandering to various forms of intimidation—at the disposal of political and social actors, every polity experiences electoral misconduct differently. While some people think of “rigging” as a centrally managed and organized process, others see electoral manipulation as a local phenomenon, carried out by specific candidates, parties, or others in particular place. Understanding how voters define and experience electoral misconduct can help voting trends. The survey included a series of questions to assess the degree to which the electorate has experienced different types of electoral misconduct. This section presents data on 143 non-violent electoral fraud, as well as violence and intimidation, to identify the most serious problems with various aspects of NWFP’s electoral strategy that influence the quality of elections. Respondents were asked to discuss reasons why they have voted or abstained in past elections in order to assess the degree to which they have experienced electoral malpractice personally, and the degree to which their views and actions are based on general impressions of elections. The survey asked about many of the acts described as “electoral offences” or “crimes” in the election laws of some countries in the world,50 ranging from spiritual coercion (involving religious figures to influence voters), to landlord or employer intimidation of voters to candidate or party vote buying. Other questions focused on direct experience of and impressions about specific kinds of electoral fraud, such as ballot stuffing, and electoral violence. The section concludes with data on the possible impact of remedies designed to mitigate fraud and violence, such as a party code of conduct or election observers, on citizen confidence in the electoral process. 4.6.1 PERCEPTIONS OF NON-VIOLENT ELECTORAL FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT: Even when elections are relatively free and fair, governments have access to many resources that give them an electoral advantage, while parties seeking power can also promise allocation of resources according to their electoral support. In Jamaica, for example, housing and other resources are allocated based on party patronage. Similarly, the weakness of political parties and ideology- or policy-based platforms in Pakistan has been connected in part to the reportedly common practice of elected representatives promising their constituencies and supporters development funding and other public service allocations. When asked about their opinions of a number of statements seeking to measure perceptions about patronage (Q52), 46% of respondents agreed strongly with the statement: “Public services like road repair and water are delivered, improved, or repaired in this area for the purpose of influencing elections” (Q52a). An additional 22% agreed, while 18% disagreed. Respondents in Hazara agreed (29%) or agreed strongly (47%) that government resources are used to influence elections more frequently than those in the other regions of NWFP, followed by respondents in the Central NWFP, 21% of whom agreed and 36% of whom agreed strongly with the statement. In Northern NWFP, 20% agreed and 31% agreed strongly about the use of public service delivery in elections, while 34% and 31% of respondents in Southern NWFP did so. In sum, 76% 144 in Hazara viewed public service delivery as an instrument of electoral manipulation, compared to 65% in Southern NWFP, 57% in Central NWFP, and 51% in Northern NWFP. The percentage of those who disagreed or disagreed strongly by provincial regions was 15% in Hazara, 25% in Southern NWFP, 15% in Central NWFP, and 26% in Northern NWFP. Respondents in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP were almost twice as likely to say they did not know about the issue (17% and 20% respectively, compared to 8% and 9% in Hazara and Southern NWFP). Similarly, 47% agreed strongly and 21% agreed with the proposition that political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after the election (Q52c). Seventeen percent disagreed. Perceptions of party use of patronage to reward their supporters also differ by provincial regions, with 79% of Hazara respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, “Political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after elections”, compared to 71% of respondents in Southern NWFP, 67% in Central NWFP, and 65% in Northern. The percentage saying “don’t know” is similar to that for the previous question, while the percentage disagreeing or strongly disagreeing was 12% in Hazara, 20% in Southern NWFP, 18% in Central NWFP, and 14% in Northern NWFP. The perceived behaviour of the political parties, as the primary political actors during elections, is an important factor in both voter turnout and belief in democracy, regardless of the procedural quality of the election. Political parties in Pakistan have been associated, traditionally, with particular leaders and candidates, rather than ideological or policy positions. Political parties are also commonly said to be internally undemocratic. The survey asked about the related concept of “corruption” within the parties. Fifty-one percent of respondents said that corruption is both a common and major problem within Pakistan’s political parties (Q53e), and an additional 13 percent said it is common but a minor problem. One in three (31%), however, said that corruption was only somewhat or not at all common. Table 4.6.1: Corruption in Political Parties Regions Not at all Somewhat Common but Minor Problem North South Centre Hazara 12 12 10 6 26 28 9 20 14 14 12 14 Common and Major Problem 46 40 54 52 1 5 5 7 Don’t Know 145 A larger percentage (54%) of respondents in the Central NWFP said the problem was common and serious, followed by 52% in the Hazara, 46% in Northern NWFP, and 40% in Southern (Table 4.6.1). Despite these differences in the perception of political party corruption across provincial regions, the percentage of respondents who would recommend going to a political party office to solve a local problem is the same in whole NWFP, with only 14% saying they would tell a friend or family to seek assistance from this resource (Q19e). While the main actors in NWFP’s elections are perceived as delivering services and rewarding supporters in order to enhance their electoral chances, they are not viewed as a primary community resource for solving local problems. More people recommend their MNA or MPA and NGOs than political party offices. These findings indicate that a majority of the electorate views patronage, including government or political party delivery of services to communities as well as personal rewards to supporters, as important factors in the electoral process that shape the voting trends. When interpreting election results, it is important to keep in mind the social and institutional factors that may weaken citizen confidence in the electoral process and democracy more generally. While it is difficult to encourage voters to evaluate and support parties based on the quality of the party platforms and policies rather than on expectations of short-term personal or community benefit. 4.6.2 EXPERIENCE OF TURNOUT-INFLATING AND SUPPRESSING ELECTION FRAUD: The effect of flawed elections on citizen participation over time can undermine support for democracy as well as the effect of positive electoral reforms designed to make elections fairer. Alternatively, when participation is affected by “turnout inflating” measures, such as vote-buying, or “turnout-suppressing” measures, such as intimidation, the quality of election administration may have little relationship with voter participation. In fact, voter turnout diminished throughout the history of advanced democracies as electoral laws limited the use of money, free refreshment, food, and other incentives to vote. The survey aimed to identify the extent to which certain types of non-violent and violent coercion, as opposed to objective measures of election quality, have influenced past voter participation. The purpose of these questions was to highlight the situations that mitigate the types of electoral misconduct that suppressed participation in the past, security measures to allay fears of violence, or other aspects of the process. 146 Respondents were asked how often they had voted. All those except those who said they had voted in every election were then asked, for those elections in which they abstained, how important a variety of factors were, from a sense of civic duty to being forced to vote, in influencing their decision to vote in one or more past elections (Q25). 51 Only a small percentage (14%) said the elections not being free and fair (Q25g) was either somewhat or very important in influencing their decision to stay away from the polls. Whether the election was free and fair was “not at all important” for 57% of respondents and “not very important” for an additional 13%. Respondents in Hazara said the fairness of the election was somewhat or very important in their abstention almost three times as often (30%) as those in the other regions of NWFP (9% in Central NWFP, 11% in Northern NWFP, and 10% in Southern NWFP, respectively). In contrast, 81% in Central NWFP, 69% in Southern NWFP, 61% in Northern NWFP, and 47% in Hazara said election fairness was not at all or not very important in the decision not to vote. The percentage of non-voting respondents who abstained because of unfairness of the election is higher among those with the most education as well as madrasa-educated respondents. Fourteen percent of both those with F.A. /F.Sc and above and those with a madrasa education said fairness was a very important factor in non-voting. Nine per cent of madrasa-educated respondents said fairness was somewhat important, compared to 6% of those with the highest level of education (Table 4.6.2). Less educated respondents said they did not know more frequently, while the percentage of respondents saying fairness was not at all or not very important ranged from 62% (those with no education) to 91% (those who have finished primary school). Table 4.6.2: Importance of Perceived Election Fairness in Decision to Abstain in One or More Elections, by Educational Attainment. Educational attainment None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above Don’t Know % 27 3 22 3 13 12 8 Not at all important % 50 55 61 72 59 67 60 Not very Important % 12 21 3 19 12 12 14 Somewhat Important % 7 9 8 2 7 6 6 Very Important % 4 12 6 3 9 3 13 The relative insignificance of the substantive differences between educational groups, compared to clear provincial regional differences, may indicate the degree to which abstention depends on local and individual-level factors rather than educational attainment. 52 Turnout-inflating, measures can include legal activities, such as campaigning, as well as illegal activities, such as vote-buying. Incentives are also 147 used to suppress turnout among certain demographic groups or in specific locations. The survey asked voters about the importance of material or other non-violent incentives or disincentives to abstain or to vote in past elections. Only 5% admitted that receiving a gift or money was a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to abstain, while 79% said this factor was not at all or not very important. Survey respondents often hesitate to answer questions about such stigmatized behaviour. Some who said “don’t know” may have said yes in the absence of social desirability bias. Respondents in Northern NWFP said financial incentives were somewhat or very important (9%) in non-voting twice as frequently as those in the other regions (5% in Central NWFP, 4% in Hazara, 5% in Southern NWFP). Northern NWFP also had the highest number of “don’t know” responses (23%, compared to 10% in Central NWFP, 20% in Hazara, and 20% in Southern NWFP). In Central NWFP, 86% of respondents said financial incentives were not at all or not very important, compared to 76% in Hazara, 69% in Northern NWFP, and 76% in Southern NWFP. The percentage of respondents who reported having voted in one or more elections because of material incentives is somewhat higher than the percentage saying they abstained in response to economic coercion, if one includes questions about employer influence on voting behaviour. Twelve percent of respondents admitted that employer influence was a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to vote, while 88% said this factor was not at all or not very important. The percentage saying they did not know was only one percent, which may suggest that less stigma surrounds questions that ask respondents to attribute their stigmatized action to a specific actor. The importance of employer influence in voting varies by provincial regions, with 14% of respondents in Southern NWFP saying employers were somewhat or very important in their decision to vote, compared to 13% each in Hazara and Northern NWFP and only in 8% in Central NWFP. In Southern NWFP, 22% of respondents said this factor was not very important, while 63% said it was not at all important, followed by 15% and 69%, respectively, in Hazara; 11% and 76% in Northern NWFP; and 8% and 84% in Central NWFP. Based on these findings, employer influence on voters may be more common in Southern NWFP and Hazara. It is notable that gender, age, educational attainment, class, and rural-urban division where not individually associated with higher or lower rates of employer influence. The importance of material incentives, such as gifts or cash (Q26g), in voting is reported even less often than that for abstention. This factor was important or 148 somewhat important for only 3% of respondents, while 86% said it was not at all important and 5% not very important. It is widely reported that parties and candidates give cash incentives to potential voters in advance of elections in NWFP. Survey results either indicate a very strong social stigma bias for this question or a discrediting of the widespread belief that vote buying is common. The influence of vote-buying in encouraging participation varied by regions but not urban-rural divisions, with 4% of respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP, respectively, saying a gift or money was very important in their decision to vote, compared to 1% in Central NWFP and 2% in Hazara. An additional three percent of respondents in Hazara said receiving a gift or money was somewhat important, compared to less than one percent in the other regions. This factor was not very important for 9% of respondents in Northern NWFP, 8% in Southern NWFP, 7% in Hazara, and 3% in Central NWFP, and not at all important for 75% in Northern NWFP, 85% in Southern NWFP, 75% in Hazara, and 93% in Central NWFP. Respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP said they did not know twice as often (11% and 12%, respectively), as those in Central NWFP (3%) and Southern NWFP (4%), which may point to higher rates of vote-buying than reported in these two regions. Women were more likely to say they did not know in response to this question (9% compared to 3% of men), but 3% of both men and women said material incentives were somewhat or very important in their electoral participation in one or more past elections. Four percent of women and five percent of men said this factor was very important and 84% and 89%, respectively, said it was not at all important. Respondents ages 50 and over said that material incentives were somewhat or very important in their voting decision more frequently (4%) than 35-49 year-olds (3%), 25-34 year-olds (2%), and 18-24 yearolds (3%). Older voters have been exposed to more opportunities for vote buying, but younger voters may have been somewhat more vulnerable to such incentives. Younger voters said they did not know in higher numbers than older voters, but the number saying this factor is not at all or not very important increases with each age category (table not shown). 53 Neither education nor class was related to reported importance of material incentives in voting behaviour. The threat of economic loss (specifically loss of job or land) (Q26k), was a somewhat or very important factor for 6% of respondents who report voting in past elections, while 6% said this factor was not very important. Only one percent said they did not know, while 88% said economic threats were not at all important. Responses differed significantly only by 149 regions, with 11% of respondents in Northern NWFP reporting such threats as somewhat or very important, compared to 7% in Hazara, 6% in Southern NWFP, and 3% in Central NWFP. In Northern NWFP, 10% of respondents said this factor was not very important and 79% said it was not at all important, compared to 9% and 80% in Hazara, 12% and 81% in Southern NWFP, and 4% and 92% in Central NWFP, respectively. 4.6.3 PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF VARIETIES OF ELECTION FRAUD: The types of non-violent election misconduct analyzed in the previous section are those in which the electorate is directly involved. The questions discussed in this section aimed to assess voter perceptions of the likelihood, extent, and types of party-, candidate-, and government-driven misconduct that do not involve voters. (Q54).54 Compared to offences that respondents report experiencing directly, problems outside of their direct control and experience appear to be more common in NWFP or at least more readily reported. A majority of respondents (53%) believed that levels of cheating and fraud would be the same in the upcoming election as in past elections (Q55) Twenty per cent expected reduced fraud, while 17% expected more fraud in the upcoming election. The percentage of respondents saying they did not know was smaller with higher incomes and education, while those with more education expected more cheating more often. Ordinary people and those who follow politics closely in NWFP refer frequently to the problem of “rigging” in elections. The Survey included a question designed to understand better what people mean when they use this term and at what level of the process they believe that it occurs. Respondents were asked, “During elections, people talk about ‘rigging’. When you hear talk about cheating or rigging in NWFP, which of the following three statements best describes what happens, or is it something else”(Q57)? (1) Rigging is something controlled by the central government. (2) The central government works with certain parties and officials to rig results in different places around the country. (3) Local politicians rig elections to benefit themselves, even if the central government tries to stop it. About one in three respondents (32%) chose the third statement, compared to one in four (26%) who chose the first. A substantial minority (15%) chose the second statement, while 3% proposed other descriptions of the problem. These findings differ slightly by regions, with respondents in Hazara saying they do not know more frequently (33% compared to 20-25% in the other regions) 150 and respondents in northern NWFP proposing something else more often (6% compared to 1-3% in the other regions) (see Table 6.3a). Respondents in all regions of NWFP attribute the problem to local politicians most frequently, but relatively more do so in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP (35% and 33%, respectively, compared to 27% each in Hazara and Northern NWFP). Perceptions of rigging do not differ substantially among other demographic groups, although women, the poor, and less educated respondents are less likely to express an opinion, as with most other questions in the survey. Table 4.6.3a: Statements that Best Describes Responsibility for Rigging Elections, by Regions. Regions North South Centre Hazara Don’t Know 27 25 21 33 Central Government 26 25 27 26 Parties and Central Government 15 13 16 13 Local Politicians 27 33 35 27 Something Else Happens 6 3 2 1 The survey also asked about specific forms of electoral manipulation or rigging. When asked about the likelihood of certain candidates being prevented from running for office (Q54a), 39% said the problem would be somewhat or very likely in the coming election, while 9% and 29%, respectively, thought it would be somewhat unlikely or very unlikely. Respondents believed that stuffing of ballot boxes by officials or members of political parties was likely in the upcoming election (Q54e). Forty-eight percent expected ballot stuffing to be very or somewhat likely, while another 48% said it would be very or somewhat unlikely. In Central NWFP, 51% of respondents expected ballot-stuffing, while 45% did not, followed by Northern NWFP, where 44% percent expected stuffing and 53% did not; Southern NWFP, where 40% expected stuffing and 54% did not; and Hazara, where 39% expected ballot-stuffing and 48% did not. Respondents with higher incomes and educational attainment expected ballot stuffing to be somewhat or very likely more often than the less educated and poorer electorate. Of those with no education, for example, 35% thought ballot stuffing would be somewhat or very likely to occur in the next election, compared to 53% of those having graduated Matric. Madrasa-educated individuals were an exception to this overall linear trend, saying ballot stuffing would be somewhat or very likely at a higher rate than the other educational groups. While 30% of those with an F.A./F.Sc or more education said ballot stuffing would be likely, 38% of madrasa-educated respondents did so; 27% and 22% of F.A./F.Sc graduates and 151 madrasa graduates, respectively, expected ballot stuffing to be somewhat likely. Expectations about ballot stuffing did not differ by gender, age, or rural/urban milieu. A history of multiple voting,55 often organized by local leaders and parties, has been a subject of complaints by political parties and candidates in past elections and is one of the reasons a national identity card is now required to vote. The survey’s findings indicate that much of the electorate had obtained identity cards and a little less than half thought they had registered to vote.56. When asked how likely multiple voting might be in the upcoming election (Q54f), 21% said very likely and 20% said likely. Thirty-six percent thought multiple voting would be somewhat or very unlikely, while one in four respondents did not know what to expect. When asked about the likelihood of counting fraud (Q54g), 48% of respondents expected the problem to be somewhat or very likely to occur in the next election, compared to 32% who said it would be somewhat or very unlikely. While expectations did not differ by provincial regions, urban respondents expected counting fraud to be somewhat or very likely more often than rural respondents; 50% of those in urban areas thought counting fraud would be somewhat or very likely compared to 41% of rural respondents. Thirty-four percent in rural areas thought counting fraud was somewhat or very unlikely, while 25% did not know; 38% of urban respondents thought counting fraud unlikely, and 22% did not know (table not presented). Expectations about the likelihood of counting fraud, as with other forms of fraud, were greater among those with higher levels of educational attainment, as well as among madrasa-educated respondents. Similar percentages of respondents believed that results would be changed after the counting process (Q54j). Thirty-eight percent thought results manipulation would be somewhat or very likely to occur, and the same percentage thought it was unlikely, findings that do not differ by gender, province, age, or urban-rural milieu. As with perceptions of other forms of fraud, those with higher educational attainment and higher incomes were more sceptical of the process. Although most respondents did not admit to having received gifts or money to vote or abstain, many believed that counting fraud and ballot stuffing were likely to occur in the next elections with few expecting improvement. When asked about what political actors they think of when they hear people talk about rigging, about one third of respondents blamed local politicians, while about one fourth blamed the central government. Together these findings indicates that about 40% of the population believed some form of non-violent electoral fraud was likely, even if they had not experienced or been affected 152 personally by electoral manipulation. If self-reported rates of experience of either turnout-inflating or turnout-suppressing activities, such as vote buying or intimidation, are to be believed, procedural misconduct, such as ballot-stuffing and counting fraud, appears to be more common than voter-level fraud. While personal exposure to fraud differs by province, perceptions about polling station or centralized fraud are more similar across provinces. If perceptions of fraud are, in fact, greater than actual experience with fraud, confidence in the quality of the election is related not only to local-level election administration and quality, but also to perceptions of the nationwide quality of elections. Even if voters feel fraud in their own community is limited, they believe that it occurs elsewhere and corrupts the process overall. 4.6.4 EXPERIENCE OF TURNOUT-INFLATING AND SUPPRESSING ELECTION VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION Although the severity of election violence, with respect to injuries, national impact, and the effect on final vote tabulation, is often low compared to other forms of political violence and means of electoral manipulation, even minor incidents can weaken citizen trust in the process and convince losing parties to challenge results, undermining support for the system itself. No matter how localized the incidents, violence attracts disproportionate publicity, contributing to a perception that it is simply the most visible manifestation of a more systemic disease of widespread electoral irregularities that could include padded registration lists, vote buying, and ballot counting or consolidation fraud. In addition to reducing participation, violence undermines the perceived legitimacy of electoral outcomes and support for elections as the preferred method of resolving disputes and choosing leaders. The survey aimed to measure the degree to which the electorate had experienced electoral coercion and violence personally, their perceptions of the problem of violence more generally, and their expectations for the upcoming election. Table 4.6.4a: Importance of Fear of Violence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting. Regions North South Centre Hazara Don’t Know 0 6 1 7 Not at all 75 79 83 56 Not Very 9 6 5 14 Somewhat 7 2 4 8 Very 9 7 7 15 The survey responses were analysed to identify the types of violence. Respondents who said they had abstained in one or more elections for which they were eligible to vote were asked to estimate the importance of a number of different factors in their 153 decision to abstain (Q25).57 Only a small percentage (14%) said that fear of violence and unrest (Q25k) was either somewhat or very important. Fear was “not at all important” for 77% of respondents and “not very important” for an additional 7%. However, a disproportionate number of respondents in Hazara (15%) said that fear of violence and unrest was very important in their decision to abstain from voting, and an additional 8% of Hazara respondents said fear was a somewhat important factor. 58 In Northern NWFP, 9% said violence was very important in non-voting and 7% said it was somewhat important, compared to 7% and 4% in Central NWFP and 7% and 2% in Southern NWFP (Table 6.4a).59 Election laws in many countries prohibit involvement of religious leaders in partisan activities and elections. These laws often refer to the use of religious leaders, symbols, and teachings as spiritual coercion, which is listed alongside physical coercion in the election crimes section of election laws in many Islamic countries. Religious influence frequently takes the form of religious leaders using the opportunity of mass congregation in their venues, such as Friday prayer, to suggest to citizens how to vote. When asked whether instructions by religious figures to respondents not to vote was important in their decisions to abstain in past elections (Q25l), only 5% said this was a somewhat or very important factor, while 8% said it was not very important. Over two thirds (71%) said religious influence was unimportant. Again, respondents in Hazara said religious influence was somewhat or very important more than twice as often (12%) as respondents in other regions (4% in Central NWFP, 7% in Northern NWFP, and 4% in Southern NWFP) (Table 4.6.4b). In Northern NWFP and Hazara respectively, 11% and 13% said religious influence was not very important, compared to 6% in each of the other two regions. These findings suggest that, while relatively low, self-reported spiritual influence is somewhat more important in Northern NWFP and Hazara. Those with middle school and madrasa education were more likely to report spiritual influence in non-voting behaviour. 15% of madrasa-educated individuals and 12% of middle-school educated individuals reported religious figures to be somewhat or very important in encouraging them to abstain, compared to no more than 6% (finished primary school) in the other educational categories. Table 4.6.4b: Importance of Fear of Religious Leaders' Influence in Decisions to Abstain from Voting, by Regions. Regions North South Centre Hazara Don’t Know 22 19 10 20 Not at all 60 71 81 55 Not Very 11 6 6 13 Somewhat 3 2 2 3 Very 4 1 2 2 154 Social or family pressure is rarely defined as an election crime in election law, nor do organizations involved in promoting democracy and free and fair elections measure or attempt to influence such informal aspects of the electoral process. The influence of culture and family is strong in NWFP and is often viewed as a factor that militates against democracy and free elections. It is often said that women, in particular, are subject to these influence in ways that may prevent them from voting or making choices that would be in their own interest. When asked whether being stopped from voting by family was an important influence in their reasons for not voting in past elections (Q25n), twelve percent said this factor was somewhat or very important, while 7% said it was not very important. Sixty-eight percent said it was not at all important and 14% did not know. Women said family pressure was somewhat or very important three times as often as men. Twelve percent of women said being stopped by their family was a very important factor, while an additional 3% said this factor was somewhat important. Six percent of women said family pressure was not very important in non-voting decisions and 64% said it was not at all important. Only 5% of male respondents said family pressure was somewhat or very important; 8% said it was not very important, and 73% said it was not at all important. Women were also more likely (15%) than men (14%) to say they did not know (table not shown). The data provide evidence that women in Hazara experience family pressure more often than women in other parts of the provincial regions;60 27% of women in the province compared to 6% of men said that being stopped by family from voting was very important, while 8% of women and no men said the factor was somewhat important. Family pressure to encourage voting behaviour is more difficult to measure; the line between normal influences in the family environment, which are well-documented in surveys of electorates in advanced democracies, and coercion of those who would otherwise abstain or choose different candidates is not clear, particularly in societies where family ties are much stronger than in some of the world’s older democracies. When asked why they had voted in one or more past elections, 24% of respondents said that the influence of family or friends was very important, and another 15% said it was somewhat important. 14% said this factor was not very important, while 42% said the role of family in convincing them to vote was not at all important. It is not possible to conclude from the data whether people view family influence as unwelcome pressure, however, or part of the normal course of events. Neither class nor educational differences are associated with a greater degree of influence by family 155 members in voting behaviour. However, women, younger people, and rural dwellers all say family influence was a somewhat or more important factor in voting more often than the others. There are also differences by regions (Table 4.6.4c). Family influence was most important in the Hazara, where 12% of respondents said being convinced by family members was somewhat or very important, followed by Northern NWFP, where the percentage was 7%. Thirty-nine percent of women and 38% of men said family influence was somewhat or very important, but women said it was very important (27%) more often than men (20%). Only 16% of men said this factor was not very important, compared to 41% of women, which may suggest that women are more likely to experience more pressure to vote, even if they ultimately decide to do so for their own reasons (Table 4.6.4c). Rural respondents placed more importance on family influence. In rural areas, 26% compared to 18% of urban respondents said being convinced by family was very important (Table 4.6.4c). Compared to family, the role of political parties in pressuring or coercing people into participating in elections (Q26f) is reportedly relatively minimal. Five and six per cent of respondents said that having a party supporter make them vote was somewhat or very important, respectively, and 9% said the party pressure was not very important. This factor was not at all important for 73% of respondents. Table 4.6.4c: Importance of Being Convinced by Family Members in Decision to Vote: Demography North South Regions Centre Hazara Male Gender Female Rural Milieu Urban 21-24 25-34 Age 35-49 50 and above Don’t Know 22 19 10 20 3 9 7 3 11 9 5 1 Not at all 60 71 81 55 42 9 35 52 49 42 42 36 Not Very 11 6 6 13 16 41 15 14 10 16 16 14 Somewhat 3 2 2 3 18 12 16 13 11 13 14 21 Very 2 1 2 9 20 27 26 18 19 22 23 29 Party coercion was not reported as important disproportionately by class, education, milieu, age, or gender, although both young and women respondents said they did not know more frequently than older people and men. In Northern NWFP and Southern NWFP, party influence was mentioned more frequently. Ten per cent of respondents in Northern NWFP said party coercion was very important and 5% said somewhat important, compared to 9% and 3%, respectively, in Southern NWFP. In Central NWFP, 5% of respondents said party agents making them vote was very important and 6% somewhat, compared to 6% and 6%, respectively in Hazara. Those who said 156 party influence was not very important totalled 19% in Southern NWFP, 11% in Northern NWFP, 13% in Hazara, and 7% in Central NWFP. The sum of these responses suggests that more voters in Southern NWFP may have actually experienced attempted party coercion more often than those in other regions (41% giving some importance to this factor compared to 26% in both Northern NWFP and Hazara and 18% in Central NWFP). Respondents in Hazara (12%) and Northern NWFP (11%) said they did not know more than twice as often as respondents in Central NWFP (3%) and Southern NWFP (5%). Whether external influence by others amounts to physical violence, in which people feel that they are in physical, spiritual, or serious economic danger if they choose to participate or not, is difficult to assess. Very few respondents said that feeling afraid was a somewhat (2%) or very (3%) important factor in voting, while 6% said fear was not very or not at all (83%) important (Q26h). Respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP reported feeling in danger if they did not vote in higher percentages; 10% of respondents in Hazara and 9% in Northern NWFP said fear of danger was somewhat or very important, followed by Southern NWFP, where 5% did so. Only 2% of Central NWFP respondents said fear was somewhat or very important. The percentages in each region who said fearing danger was not very important in voting were: Northern NWFP, 10%; Southern NWFP, 10%; Hazara, 8%; and Central NWFP, 4%. Twelve per cent of respondents each in Hazara and Northern NWFP said they did not know compared to 5% and 3% in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP, respectively. These findings may indicate that family or party coercion does not necessarily rise to the level of physical intimidation or violence. Nevertheless, the fact that almost one in ten respondents in both Hazara and Northern NWFP report that they voted because they feared that not doing so would put them in danger is an unacceptable degree of fear in an electoral process in any polity. The findings imply that at least 6% (Central NWFP) of the electorate in each region was exposed to some threat of turnout-inflating intimidation in a past election process, rising to 20% in Hazara, 19% in Northern NWFP, and 15% in Southern NWFP (Table 4.6.4d). Table 4.6.4d: Importance of Fear of Danger in Motivation for Voting. Regions North South Centre Hazara Don’t Know 12 5 3 12 Not at all 70 80 91 71 Not Very 10 10 4 8 Somewhat 3 2 1 5 Very 6 3 1 5 The role of spiritual coercion in encouraging voting was reported about as frequently as it was in discouraging participation. Six per cent of respondents said a religious 157 figure’s instructions to vote was somewhat or very important in their decision to participate, while 8% said it was not very important and 80% not at all important. With turnout-suppressing religious influence, more respondents in Hazara (14%) reported that this factor was somewhat or very important in voting, followed by Southern NWFP (10%), Northern NWFP (7%), and Central NWFP (3%). The percentages in each region who said religious figures’ influence was not very important in voting were: Northern NWFP, 12%; Southern NWFP, 9%; Hazara, 12%; and Central NWFP, 5%. Again, respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP said they did not know more often than in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP. Although no single form of coercion is reported with overwhelming frequency by respondents, significant minorities report that some form of coercion was significant in either discouraging or encouraging them to vote, while the evidence suggests that even larger numbers are actually exposed to coercion or external influence, even if that influence may be relatively unimportant in their overall decision to participate in elections. None of the measures of coercion are highly correlated—that is, the respondents who report family influence as important are not the same respondents reporting religious influence as highly important; those who fear danger are not the same people reporting party pressure. This suggests that the cumulative sum of the number of respondents who have been directly exposed to and influenced by various forms of social, physical, economic, and spiritual pressure is substantial. 4.6.5 PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF VARIETIES OF ELECTORAL FRAUD, COERCION, AND VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS Self-reported exposure to and influence by violence and intimidation may be subject to social desirability bias and stigma. Questions about general perceptions of coercion in the electoral environment complemented more direct questions about personal experience with such tactics. Media and party emphasis on specific instances of fraud and violence may also increase voter concern about these problems even if they have not experienced them directly. When asked about the types of things that can occur in elections and whether they are likely in the upcoming election (Q54), the percentages perceiving some intimidation in elections was much higher than for self-reported experience. When asked how likely prevention of people from registering and voting would be in the next election (Q54d), 25% said the problem would be somewhat or very likely, while 52% said it would be somewhat or very unlikely. These expectations did not vary by provincial regions, but 30% of urban respondents 158 compared to 22% of rural respondents expected this in the upcoming election, while 48% of urban and 53% of rural respondents did not. Those with higher income and education thought people would be prevented from participating in higher percentages, while madrasa educated individuals were more likely than those with an F.A./F.Sc or more education (37% compared to 31%) to expect this problem. Economic coercion, in the form of single individuals who wield control over groups of people who depend on them for jobs or land, is commonplace in the early phases of democratic development. Many electoral laws make such economic coercion, which involves a feeling of obligation to vote physically—at the same time and place—or ideologically, or both, with other employees or land tenants, an electoral crime. These forms of informal electoral coercion are by far the most frequently reported by the electorate, according to the findings of this survey. When asked about the likelihood of “employers getting employees to vote together as a group” (Q54h), 42% thought it would be somewhat or very likely to occur, while 33% thought it would be somewhat or very unlikely. An even greater percentage of respondents (45%) expect landlords to get tenants to vote together as a group (Q54i) in the next election, while 31% think it unlikely to happen. Surprisingly, there are no significant urban-rural or provincial differences in responses to these questions. Additionally, although one might expect those who are poor and less educated to be victimized by such use of influence more frequently and therefore to think it more likely in the upcoming election, those who are educated and have higher incomes anticipate such events in higher percentages. This may point to a general perception among the more privileged that the less privileged are less likely to think and act for themselves, when in fact there is no reason to assume those groups are easily manipulated. Less privileged respondents also may be afraid to answer honestly and complain openly about the local social forces that operate in their lives, even when a survey interviewer reassures them of anonymity. In fact, when asked who they expect to be the most likely targets of intimidation and violence (Q58), the largest percentages believe candidates (27%) and voters (35%) will be targeted, compared to only six percent who say that low income people are most likely to be targeted, the same percentage who expect political party supporters to be the primary targets (Table 4.6.5). Further research designed to minimize the effects of question sensitivity on the results would be required to know in what ways respondents believe candidates and voters will be threatened. A greater percentage of urban respondents (41%) believe voters will be targeted, compared to 159 32% of rural respondents. Twenty-five percent of urban respondents compared to 27% of rural respondents expect candidates to be the primary targets of violence. Six percent of women and 4% of men believe women will be the most likely targets of coercion. When asked about their expectations of violence and unrest in the upcoming election (Q51), 42% said they expected the same amount of violence, 14% expected more, and 14% expected less. These results differ substantially by regions. At the time of the survey, twenty-one per cent of respondents in Hazara expected more violence, compared to 17% in Northern NWFP, 14% in Southern NWFP, and 12% in Central NWFP. Greater percentages of respondents in Hazara (36%) and Northern NWFP (37%) did not know compared to 26% and 24% in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP. Table 4.6.5: Most Likely Targets / Victims of Electoral Intimidation and Violence Victim Category Don't Know Candidates Voters Female Candidates Female Voters Election Workers NGO Workers Security Officials Low Income People Political Party Supporters No One Percent (%) 6 27 35 2 5 5 1 1 6 6 6 Male (%) 4 28 39 2 4 6 1 0 6 5 3 Female (%) 8 25 32 2 6 5 1 1 6 7 8 Rural (%) 7 27 32 3 6 5 1 1 6 6 7 Urban (%) 4 25 41 2 4 5 1 0 6 7 3 In Central NWFP, 48% expected the same level of violence and 14% less, compared to 28% and 15%, respectively, in Hazara. In Northern NWFP, 35% expected the same levels of violence and 12% less; 41% expected the same levels and 22% expected less in Southern NWFP. Consistent with expectations about the disproportionately greater impact of violence on voter perceptions of election quality -- even though relatively few respondents report direct exposure to physical fear, threats, and/or danger 38% believe violence and intimidation will be a more serious threat to a free and fair election than will fraud, while 43% believe fraud and malpractice are more likely than violence to undermine the next election (Q56). Nineteen per cent believe that the election will be generally free and fair. This finding does not differ across regions or any other demographic group mentioned in the survey. 4.6.6 OPINIONS TO PREVENT FRAUD AND VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS The survey asked two questions about measures that could influence actual levels of violence as well as voter expectations about violence. When asked about the additional confidence that these measures might give to eligible voters if implemented in the next election (Q59), over half (56%) said having trained observers from the 160 local area to monitor the whole process would give them somewhat or much more confidence in the election process (Q59b). Twelve per cent said observers would have no effect on their confidence while 10% said observers would decrease their confidence. Signed and enforced party codes of conduct have been shown to decrease levels of violence, as well as fraud, in other electoral contexts. When asked about this measure, 64% of the electorate said they would have some or much more confidence in the process if such a code were in place.61 These findings did not differ by regions or demographic group, suggesting widespread support for such measures and the importance of not only attempting to implement them, but also publicizing them in order to reassure potential voters who fear violence and intimidation personally, as well as more generally. Efforts to promote free and fair elections often treat violence and intimidation as epiphenomenal, at best as factors beyond the control of voters and at worst as irrelevant to electoral results unless they disrupt the process altogether. Electoral violence is often seen as a security problem rather than a problem of electoral institutions and regulation. Similarly, while ballot counting fraud and other forms of non-violent manipulation can be documented in terms of the number of ballots affected, providing clear evidence to election complaints bodies that can be ruled upon, violence is rarely the source of complaints because its effect on elections is rarely concrete enough to document systematically with respect to number of votes inflated, changed, or suppressed. The survey results show, however, that violence and intimidation, even if objectively low, are perceived by the electorate as a serious threat to democratic elections. As long as a significant portion of the electorate believes violence will compromise an election, citizens and competing candidates may not accept the election process is free and fair, regardless of the quality of procedural and administrative components of an election. SECTION 4.7: PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY Elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democracy. When elections are unaccompanied by other characteristics of democracy, such as the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, repeated flawed elections and subsequent weak or corrupt elected governments may, in fact, undermine support for democratic institutions. While most respondents to surveys throughout the world say they support democracy when asked directly, most people mean different things when they use this term. The survey asked a short battery of questions aimed at assessing citizen perception of the 161 power of democratic institutions, the status of freedoms characteristic of democracy, and the meanings that people assign to democracy. In addition to electoral procedures, voting rights, and the electoral environment with respect to fraud and security, these questions were more relevant to measure voting trends. 4.7.1 PERCEIVED STRENGTH OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: When asked respondents about their perception of the degree of power of the national and provincial assemblies in determining the course of political development in NWFP (Q60), 28% said the national assembly has a great deal of power and 22% said the provincial assembly has a great deal of power. Almost twice as many respondents said the provincial assemblies have some power (26%) as said the national assembly has some power (14%), so that overall, 42% believed the national assembly (NA) has some or a great deal of power, while 48% perceived some or a great deal of power at the provincial level. Forty percent and 39% believed the national and provincial assembly (PA), respectively, have little or no power. While there were no significant regional differences in perceived power of the national assembly, 54% of respondents in Central NWFP believed their PA has some or a great deal of power, followed by 44% in Hazara, 41% in Northern NWFP, and 41% in Southern NWFP. More than twice as many respondents in Hazara (21%), Northern NWFP (18%), and Southern NWFP (18%) said they do not know how much power the PA has than in Central NWFP (9%). Thus, in Central NWFP, even though more people believed the PA has power, 49% say it has little or no power, compared with 35% in Hazara; 42% in Northern NWFP; and 39% in Southern NWFP. Those with higher incomes and education were more likely to answer the questions, so that higher numbers of educated and wealthier respondents said both that the PA and NA have little to no power or some to a great deal of power. 4.7.2 PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOM: When asked about their level of agreement with three statements about politics pertaining to democratic freedoms (Q61), a majority of the electorate felt that ordinary people can influence government and have basic freedoms of speech and association. Twenty-five percent strongly agreed with the statement, “citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government”, while an additional 26% agreed (Q61a). Thirty-five percent disagreed. Respondents in Hazara and Northern NWFP were slightly less likely to believe that citizens influence the 162 government (46% in each province agree/agree strongly) than in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP, where 53% and 52%, respectively, were optimistic about citizen influence. Consistent with other survey findings, less educated and poor respondents said they did not know more frequently than others for all three questions about citizen efficacy and freedom. Although the lower and middle class respondents report a slightly higher level of agreement about citizen influence in government (56% and 55%, respectively) than the other categories of income (ranging from 46% among the lowest income respondents to 52% of highest income respondents) (Table 4.7.2a), these differences are similar for all three questions. Education and income are associated more generally with a better understanding of democratic rights and freedoms, as opposed to perceptions about different degrees of freedom. With respect to the number agreeing that citizens in NWFP have power to influence the government, those with a madrasa education (62%) were more like those with middle school (60%) matric (59%) or higher degrees (54%) than those with none (46%) or only some primary school (40%) education (Table 4.7.2). The number of those who express an opinion and view citizens as influential on government jumps between those who have some primary and those who finished primary school, which may point to the effectiveness of even basic education on democratic behaviour. Table 4.7.2: Pakistan's Citizens have Power to Influence Government. Demography Lowest Income Lower Middle Class Middle Upper Middle High Income None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above Don't Know (%) 21 11 8 8 5 24 9 20 7 7 4 4 Strongly Disagree (%) Disagree (%) Agree (%) 24 31 26 25 25 24 37 20 29 28 29 26 Strongly Agree (%) 22 25 29 27 26 20 25 20 22 32 30 28 Class 15 17 17 17 17 21 21 19 22 23 Educational Attainment 15 16 10 20 20 21 20 22 17 16 19 19 20 22 A larger percentage of respondents agreed with the statement, “People are free to criticize the government without fear” (Q61b) than the percentage who agreed that citizens can influence government. 48% agreed or agreed strongly with the statement, while 39% disagreed. As with opinions on citizen efficacy, Hazara, Northern NWFP, and Southern NWFP respondents agreed less often with this statement (44%, 41%, and 44%, respectively) than do citizens in Central NWFP (52%). When asked if they agreed that citizens can join any party or organization they wish (Q61c), a much 163 smaller percentage of respondents disagreed (19%), while 68% agreed or agreed strongly. More respondents in the Hazara (73%) agreed or agreed strongly about citizens’ freedom of association, followed by 67% in Hazara, 61% in Southern NWFP, and 59% in Northern NWFP. Eight percent of respondents in Central NWFP and 17% (Southern NWFP) – 21% (Hazara) did not know, while respondents in Northern NWFP (25%) disagreed more frequently, followed by those in Southern NWFP (22%). Eighteen per cent disagreed that citizens can join organizations without fear in Central NWFP and 12% disagreed in Hazara. Respondents in Northern NWFP appeared to question the freedoms of association more than those in other regions, while those in Central NWFP and Hazara were relatively more likely to feel that citizens can join any group or organization they want, even while those in Hazara reported a greater degree of fear in criticizing government. 4.7.3 MEANING OF DEMOCRACY: For many people in developing countries facing high unemployment, health problems, and other quality of life issues, democracy often represents different things to different people, but is particularly seen as related to economic advancement. The survey findings indicate that economic advancement is an essential part of the meaning of democracy for many people in NWFP. When asked to chose the two most important factors they felt are essential for democracy (Q62), the most common response (chosen by 37%) was the provision of basic necessities for everyone, followed by having a low gap between rich and poor (32%) (Table 4.7.3a). Table 4.7.3a: Most Important Factors Essential for Democracy Essential Factors for Democracy 1. Changing Governments Through Elections 2. Low Rich-Poor Gap 3. Freedom to Criticize Government 4. Absence of Any Violence 5. Basic Necessities for Everyone 6. No Influence of Religion in Politics 8. Other Suggestions 9. No Opinion 10. Don't Know Mentioned % 28 32 13 27 37 5 1 4 11 Not Mentioned % 72 68 87 73 63 95 99 96 90 The change of government through elections—a minimalist definition democracy— was chosen by 28% of respondents, and the absence of violence was mentioned by 27% of respondents. Table 4.7.3b shows the combined responses of the top two factors each respondent said was essential for democracy. If a respondent mentioned only one factor and said do not know for the other, they are counted only in the single-factor row category. Elections and freedom of speech are grouped and described as “political freedoms,” while all economic factors are combined under “economic 164 security” and the absence of violence is described as “physical security.” One in three respondents (33%) mentioned only economic factors as essential for democracy, compared with 10% who mentioned elections and political freedoms only and 12% who mentioned economic security in association with civic freedoms. Twelve percent mentioned only physical security, while an additional 7% mentioned it in association with economic security. Over half (54%) mentioned economic factors alone or in conjunction with another factor, while many (19%) associated democracy with peace and stability and 24% mentioned only political freedoms. Very few (4%) mentioned separation of religion and government as essential for democracy. While lower income respondents (36% of lowest income) mentioned economic security alone more often than higher income respondents (26% of highest income), the number mentioning economic security in conjunction with political freedoms and physical security increases with income. The differences between education levels and those mentioning economic factors are not significant, while those with higher education mentioned secularism and civic freedoms more frequently. Table 4.7.3b: Essential Features of Democracy (Response Types) Features of Democracy DK/No opinion Economic Security/Equality Economic and Institutional Factors Economic and Physical Security Economic Security and Secularism Institutional Factors Secularism and Institutional Factors Physical Security Mentioned % 21 33 12 7 2 10 2 12 Not Mentioned % 21 53 66 73 76 86 88 100 While substantial percentages of the electorate believed that the elected assemblies and ordinary citizens have some influence on the course of politics in the country, larger percentages were either ambivalent or see citizen and elected institutions as powerless or ineffectual. More than half of respondents believed that people have the right to associate freely and to criticize the government without fear, but these freedoms were not viewed as particularly effective in changing policies that influence the lives or ordinary people. For over half of the electorate, democracy requires (and perhaps promises) economic equality and well-being, while for one in five, it requires physical security. Only 10 percent say elections and freedoms are alone essential for democracy. Voting trends largely revolved around the needs and preferences of citizens and these trends further articulated through the electoral process, rather than seeing the process as an end in it. Even if they perceive an election to be free, fair, and competitive, eligible voters in NWFP may be unlikely to feel that democracy as a 165 system of government will make a difference for them personally. Political parties, candidates, elected representative, and civil society groups that want to strengthen “democracy” should understand how citizens perceive this term in order to help ensure that Pakistani institutions live up to citizens’ hope and expectations. SECTION 4.8 ELECTORAL AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION Participation in elections declined steadily in Pakistan between 1970 and 2002.62 Low voter turnout undermines the legitimacy of elected governments as well as the extent to which elected officials represent the population. Cynicism about the efficacy of electoral institutions, the fairness of electoral processes, and the integrity of elected representatives may weaken citizen participation. However, non-electoral participation, such as contacting a government representative or attending political party meetings, may be higher than electoral participation. In fact, those who respond to calls for electoral boycotts by abstaining from voting are engaging in a form of participation. The survey assessed the extent, nature, and voter characteristics, such as educational attainment, that are associated with past political participation as well as expected participation in the upcoming election. The survey also asked respondents to identify political or personal motivations for participation/non-participation (in contrast to the external factors, such as procedural barriers and coercion, explored in sections 4 and 6, respectively). As the findings from previous chapters suggest, NWFP women are as interested in politics as men, but they report less trust in political institutions (Section 5), greater procedural barriers (Section 4), and more influence by family and other social institutions in either voting or abstaining (Section 6). The first part of this section presents findings about participation in past elections, respondents’ expectations about their participation in the elections, and their involvement in preparations necessary to vote in upcoming elections. The second part examines personal motivations for voting or abstaining in past elections, in order to determine to what extent the electorate is motivated by “participatory” factors, such as interest in the candidates, a desire to change policy. The third part explores forms of democratic participation other than voting, and the fourth part addresses attitudes toward women’s participation. The fifth part explores relationships between voting and interest in politics. 4.8.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION: When asked about their past participation in elections (Q22), 33% of respondents claimed to have voted in every election, 15% voted in many elections, 166 16% recalled voting in 2-3 elections, and 9% in one election. Twenty-eight per cent of the eligible electorate had never voted. Younger respondents said they had never voted more often than older age groups; 36% of 21-24 year-olds had never voted, compared with 30% of 25-34 years olds, 25% of 35-49 year-olds, and 18% of people over 50. One in five (23%) of the youngest respondents said he or she had voted in every election, compared with almost one in two (46%) of people over 50 (Table 4.8.1a).Women vote less frequently than men; 31% said they voted in every election, while 34% of men reported doing so. The percentage of women who voted in many elections (13%) was four percent less than the percentage of men (17%), and 15% of women and 18% of men voted 2-3 times. One in three women (31%) reported never having voted, while one in four men (24%) did so (Table 4.8.1a). Table 4.8.1a: Past Electoral Participation (Number of Elections in Which Respondent has Voted) Demography 21-24 Years 25-34 Years 35-49 Years 50 and above Male Female North South Centre Hazara Lowest Income Lower Middle class Middle class Upper middle class High Income None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle Matric Intermediate and above Never 36 30 25 18 24 31 26 32 26 37 19 27 22 27 28 28 33 28 24 27 29 27 Once 9 9 8 7 8 9 10 11 7 11 7 8 13 11 7 5 13 10 7 14 10 12 Two-three times 19 18 16 11 18 15 24 14 14 14 16 17 14 15 18 14 9 14 18 20 17 19 Many elections 12 13 18 18 17 13 17 12 15 14 14 20 13 18 11 19 5 16 11 13 10 15 Every Election 23 30 32 32 34 31 24 31 38 23 34 29 38 29 37 34 41 32 39 27 33 26 Age Group Gender Regions Class Education Rural and urban respondents did not differ significantly with respect to past voting behaviour, which, consistent with findings in previous section, may be attributable to stronger local ties at the rural level that increase the effectiveness of “get out the vote” efforts, paired with greater cynicism about the electoral process in the urban electorate. Voter participation differs significantly by provincial regions; 38% of respondents in Hazara claim to have voted in every election, followed by 31% in Southern NWFP, 24% in Northern NWFP, and 23% in Hazara (Table 4.8.1a). The percentage of those who had never voted (“non-voters”) is highest in Hazara (37%), followed by 32% in Southern NWFP and 26% each in Central NWFP and Northern NWFP. While the survey findings suggest that higher class and income are associated positively with 167 levels of political interest, awareness, and many other pro-election attitudes, the data suggest that they are associated somewhat negatively—or less systematically—with actual voting behaviour. This result is consistent with findings that show that the reasons for voting may include economic or physical coercion. Those in the middle class report voting in every election more frequently than those in the other income categories; 38% of middle class respondents voted in every election, followed by 37% in the highest class and 34% in the lowest class. The percentage of respondents voting in every election was 29% in both the lower and upper middle classes (Table 4.8.1a). Almost one in two members of every class voted in many or every election—many more than the number who report high political interest, media use, or other personal political inclinations, suggesting a considerable influence of social or other external motivations for voting. While most studies of political behaviour in advanced democracies find strong links between education, income, and voter turnout, the survey results for NWFP suggest a different pattern of electoral participation. Education is also, somewhat surprisingly, almost inversely related to voting behaviour, with madrasa students (41%), who reported voting in every election, followed by 39% of those who finished primary school and 34% of those with no education (Table 4.8.1a). Those with an F.A./F.Sc degree or more education reported voting in every election less often (26%) than all of the other educational categories. Those with these higher degrees reported never voting at a rate (27%) similar to the other groups (24% - 33%). Electoral participation often increases with age; younger people who study away from home are less likely to register and vote. They are still in a process of “political socialization.” In addition, the eligible voting age was lowered in 2000 from 21 to 18 years. 4.8.2 PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR ABSTAINING OR VOTING: Section 4.4 addressed some of the procedural reasons why people do not vote, while section 4.6 analyzed external incentives and disincentives for electoral participation. In reality, every individual votes or abstains for a multitude of reasons, many of which are personal as well as circumstantial. To gain a better picture of those who vote or abstain, the survey included questions designed to measure these motivations for voting that are, in many cases, beyond the influence of voter education or procedural reform. Because such reasons are highly individual, one would not expect them to differ predictably across geographic regions or ascribed 168 characteristics such as gender, but rather to be more a function of individual circumstances, such as education and political socialization. Of those respondents who said they had abstained from voting in at least one past election, only 12% said they intended to vote but did not do so as a result of personal circumstances on the day of the election (Q25a), while 62% said such circumstances were not at all important. Those with more education gave this explanation significantly more often (12% of degree holding respondents, for example) than less educated respondents (6% of respondents with no education), as were respondents in Hazara, 13% of whom said personal circumstances were very important in abstaining almost twice as often as in the other provinces (6% in Central NWFP, 8% in Northern NWFP, and 6% in Southern NWFP). There is no evidence that percentages for whom this explanation was important differed by gender, class, rural and urban areas, literacy, or age. One in five (21%) of non-voting respondents said that work was somewhat or very important (Q25i) an explanation that differed only across educational groups, with about one in five of those with middle school, matric, or higher degrees saying work was a very important factor in abstaining, compared with only one in ten respondents with primary school education or lower, despite the fact that election day is a non-working day in Pakistan. The belief that one’s vote makes no difference (Q25f)—a quite rational belief according to many political scientists—was a somewhat or very important factor in non-voting for 22% of past abstainers. Not surprisingly, those for whom this explanation is very important are more educated; 20% of those with middle school education, 12% with matric, and 15% with higher degrees, compared with 11% or less among those with less education (data not presented). This attitude did not vary significantly by age, gender, or class, but 20% of respondents in Hazara who abstained in at least one past election said this factor was very important, compared with 13% in Northern NWFP and 9% each in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP (data not presented). These findings confirm the general provincial trends evident in previous analysis. Election-specific reasons for abstention, such as a lack of enthusiasm for parties and candidates, are often associated with lower turnout in older democracies and attributable to the nature of the political system and political competition. These factors are often more common among those interested in politics who have both access to information and the means to understand it. On the other hand, it is often said in NWFP that voters have been jaded by the country’s mixed governance history and believe that all politicians are the same and say, “whoever 169 gets elected, things won’t change.” However, only 16% of survey respondents who abstained at least once said that dislike of the candidates was a somewhat or very important factor (Q25h). These findings differ across educational groups; 16% of those with higher degrees say this explanation was very important in their non-voting decisions, compared with 8% of those with matric, 6% with middle school, and 11% who finished primary school education. Of those with no education, 7% said candidate choices were very important in non-voting, compared with 10% for madrasa-educated people and 5% of those with some primary school (data not presented). Respondents in Hazara also mention candidates as a very important factor more often (15%) than those in other regions (less than 9%) (data not presented). Further dispelling the common wisdom about disenchantment with politicians, among the reasons that respondents gave for having voted in one or more elections, feeling strongly about one of the candidates or parties (Q26b) was very important for over one in three (35%) and somewhat important for one in five respondents (19%). Over half (54%) of the voting electorate said strong feelings about a candidate motivated them to vote. There is no evidence that these sentiments differed by gender, rural urban area, class, or educational group, but literate voters were more likely to mention support for candidates as an important factor (41%) compared with 32% of illiterate voters. The importance given to candidate support as a reason for voting, increases steadily with the respondent’s age. Finally, attachment to candidates appears to be more important in voting for respondents in Central NWFP and Southern NWFP, where 40% said support for the candidate was very important in voting, followed by 35% in Hazara and 27% in Northern NWFP. These data point to the possibility that NWFP voters remain hopeful that their elected representatives, regardless of past mixed performance, have the potential to govern well. Other possible interpretations are that voters feel a strong connection either to prominent national party leaders (even though their local representatives may disappoint constituents) or to local politicians whom voters know (even if high profile national leaders do not live up to expectations). A final explanation for respondents’ seeming optimism is that they provided answers they expected interviewers would want to hear with regard to all of the questions in this group. Providing further evidence that the electorate has not given up on electoral politics, over half (56%) of those who voted in at least one past election said that the belief that their vote makes a difference (Q26c) was very important in their decision to vote, while 19% said it was somewhat important (Figure 170 8.2f).63 Men said this factor was somewhat or very important more than women (82% and 64%, respectively). The percentage giving importance to this explanation also increases with the age, literacy, and educational attainment of the respondent, contradicting the notion that experience or information about past governments leads to cynicism. More voters in Central NWFP (63%) see this factor as important, compared with half of voters or fewer in the other three regions (50% in Southern NWFP, 45% in Hazara, and 41% in Northern NWFP. A desire to change things in (Q26j) was a very important factor for 38% of voters, and somewhat so for 17%. A larger percentage of voters in Hazara (44%) say desire for change is a very important reason for voting, compared with 38% in Central NWFP, 39% in Northern NWFP, and just 25% in Southern NWFP (data not presented). Desire for change as a factor in voting increases with age, but not education or class. Among literate voters, however, 48% said change was very important, compared with 29% of illiterate voters. Forty-six percent of voting men compared with 29% of voting women said desire for change was a very important motivation, while 17% of both men and women said it was somewhat important. The most common explanation for respondents who have voted was the belief that voting is a duty of every citizen (Q26a), with 74% saying duty was very important and 12% somewhat important in past electoral participation. It is notable that this attitude does not differ significantly across classes or educational groups, but that literacy seems to make a difference in whether a person votes based on a sense of duty. While there are no regional differences, rural voters attribute a sense of duty to their voting behaviour less often (70%) than urban voters (82%) (Table 4.8.2a). Duty is also a less important motivation for women than for men, with 66% of women and 81% of men saying duty was very important in their decision to vote (Table 4.8.2a). It is somewhat surprising that younger voters said duty was important about as often as other age groups; 76% of 21-24 year-olds felt duty to be very important, compared with 70% of 25-34 year-olds, 77% of 35-49 year-olds, and 74% of those 50 and older. The youngest group was among the least likely to say duty was not at all important, although more said they did not know than did older respondents (Table 4.8.2a). When asked about their perception about the difference the respondent’s vote was likely to make in the upcoming election (Q30), 49% said it would make a big difference, 27% said some difference, and 24% said no or little difference. 171 Table 4.8.2a: Voting out of a sense of duty, by demographic subgroup Demography 21-24 Years 25-34 Years 35-49 Years 50 and Above Male Female Illiterate Literate Rural Urban Don't Know (%) 10 9 3 1 3 9 9 1 7 3 Not at all Important (%) 5 4 7 7 2 8 8 2 6 3 Not Very Important (%) 2 4 3 6 3 5 5 2 4 4 Somewhat Important (%) 8 14 13 12 11 13 16 7 14 8 Very Important (%) 76 70 77 74 81 66 61 88 70 82 Age Group Gender Literacy Milieu Younger respondents value their vote as a tool of change less than older respondents; nevertheless, more than two-thirds (69%) of 18-24 year-olds said voting would make some or a big difference, compared 77% of both 25-34 year-olds and 35-49 year-olds. Eighty-three percent of respondents over 50 felt their vote would make some or a big difference, once again dispelling the notion of growing cynicism with experience (Table 8.2b). Table 4.8.2b: Difference respondent's vote will make in 2008, by demographic subgroup. Demography 21-24 Years 25-34 Years 35-49 Years 50 and Above Male Female Illiterate Literate North South Centre Hazara None Madrasa Some Primary Finished Primary Middle School Matric F.A./F.Sc or above None (%) 19 14 14 9 12 17 16 12 20 25 10 20 17 19 12 12 7 11 15 Little Difference (%) 13 9 9 8 10 10 9 10 17 8 7 12 11 12 8 6 11 10 7 Some Difference (%) 29 30 27 20 25 29 30 23 35 27 24 25 28 25 34 26 23 24 27 A Big Difference (%) 40 47 50 63 54 44 45 54 28 40 59 43 44 45 46 56 59 55 51 Age Group Gender Literacy Areas Educational Attainment More men (54%) than women (44%) said their vote would make a big difference in upcoming elections, but more women (29%) than men (25%) said it would make some difference, and equal percentages (10%) viewed voting as ineffective. More women did not know how they would answer the question (Table 8.2b). Similarly, although literate respondents said their vote would make a big difference more 172 frequently than illiterate respondents (54% and 45%, respectively), 30% of illiterate respondents compared with 23% of literate respondents thought it would make some difference. Feelings about the efficacy of individual electoral participation also differed across educational groups, but in a somewhat curvilinear fashion, with the percentage saying their vote would make a big difference peaking with those who had finished middle school, and slightly higher numbers of those with little and those with more education saying their vote would make little difference (Table 4.8.2b) Respondents in Southern NWFP (67%) and Northern NWFP (63%) said voting will make some or a big difference less frequently than respondents in Central NWFP (73%) and Hazara (68%). Those in Northern NWFP and Hazara who said their vote will make little difference (17% and 12%, respectively) outnumber those in Central NWFP (7%) and Southern NWFP (8%) (Table 8.2b). 4.8.3 NON-ELECTORAL DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION Voting is only one and, arguably, the least costly in terms of time and effort, of many forms of political participation. In countries in which elections are not necessarily associated with democracy or political change, abstention may be, in fact, a form of political participation, especially when paired with formal electoral boycotts. The survey sought to assess the extent to which the electorate has participated in other forms of democratic action in addition to voting, in order to assess the best forms of delivery of voter education messages, as well as to understand whether people participating in non-electoral activities are different from those who vote. Interviewers asked respondents about a variety of activities and whether they have been involved, would be likely to, might be, or would never be involved in such an activity. When asked in about participating in an election boycott (Q21b), 5% said they have participated, while 13% said they might or would be likely to participate in a boycott. Seventy-three percent would never boycott an election. The likelihood of participating in an election boycott rises steadily with income and education, but does not differ significantly by age, gender, rural urban milieu, or province. Ten percent of respondents have participated in rallies or demonstrations (Q21c), and an additional 13% said they might or are likely to do so, a finding that does not change significantly by age, rural-urban milieu, or region. Not surprisingly, men reported having participated in rallies more often than women (12% compared with 8%), but 5% and 4% of men and women, respectively, said they would be likely to 173 participate in such an event. Seven per cent of women and 10% of men might attend a rally, while 72% of women and 64% of men would never do so (table not presented). Patterns of participation in rallies and demonstrations are not linear for different levels of income and educational attainment. Those who have at least finished primary school report higher participation (12% or more) in rallies than those with no or madrasa education (6%), but 19% of those who have finished primary school say they might participate or would be likely to participate, compared with 10% of those with no education and 14% with the highest level of education (data not presented). Similarly non-linear patterns are found for class, where 12% of the lower middle class and 13% of the upper class claims to have participated in a rally. Higher percentages of those in the middle three class categories report that they are likely or might attend a rally compared with the highest class, which is also exceeded in likely demonstration behaviour by the two lowest classes (data not presented). When asked about attending a party or election-related meeting (Q21d), 14% of respondents said they had already done so, while 18% said they might or would be likely to participate. Fifty-nine per cent would never participate. As with other forms of participation, women, less educated individuals, and illiterate voters are less likely to have attended or to be likely to attend a party or election meeting (data not presented). Class is also associated with meeting participation; 16% of lower middle class respondents have attended a party or election meeting and 19% might or would be likely to do so. Twenty-five per cent in the upper class have attended such an event, while 14% might or would be likely to do so. Sixteen and 17% of middle class respondents, respectively, have done or might participate in a rally (data not presented). Finally, when asked about their likelihood of visiting a political representative’s office (Q21g), 13% of respondents have done so, while 15% might or are likely to do so. Education and income are associated with higher participation in this activity, and men are more likely than women to visit a representative (data not presented). 4.8.4 WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION The survey found significant differences between women’s and men’s self-reported political interest, access to information, perceptions of institutions, exposure to fraud, and rates of participation. Again and again, the findings suggest that women are at a disadvantage, both in terms of the lower rates at which they are educated and literate, but also with respect to specific gender norms, particularly family influence and the 174 relative neglect of women in voter registration efforts, the mechanisms through which parties and civil society deliver their political and civic education messages, and opportunities to engage in political action. The fact that women’s behaviour demonstrates a level of interest and engagement in political issues on par with that of men (see section 3) suggests that broader social and cultural norms may make mobilization of women to participate in democratic processes difficult without engaging society as a whole. The following section examines various attitudes of the general electorate on women’s participation in electoral processes in order to identify the types of messages that might be aimed at the voting age population more broadly, not just women, to create a climate that is more conducive to their participation. Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with a series of questions about types of women’s participation.64 Three-quarters of respondents agree or agree strongly with the notion that women can run for political office (Q63a), dispositions that are consistent with constitutional and electoral law65 and the increasing number of women participating in government at the local level. 66 However, one in four respondents (24%) disagrees or disagrees strongly with this proposition. These percentages do not differ significantly by age, urban or rural area, or religious sect. Respondents in lower levels of income and education are less likely to agree that women can be political candidates (data not presented). It is interesting to note that men and women are not substantively different in their responses to this question. While over half of women (52%) strongly agree and 45% of men strongly agree, 25% of women compared with 27% of men agree with the statement. Nine percent of women and 10% of men disagree, and 11% and 16% of men and women disagree strongly. A substantial number of female respondents (20%) do not support the idea that women should represent them in political office. Consistent with lower female participation rates in Hazara, respondents in this region disagree or do so strongly more frequently (32%) than those in central NWFP (25%), Southern NWFP (23%), and Northern NWFP (14%) (data not presented). Although Pakistan was the first Muslim country with a female head of state, only 64% of survey respondents agree that a woman can be head of a Muslim country (Q63b), while one third disagree or disagree strongly with the idea of a Muslim female head of state. Respondents in Hazara disagreed more often than those in other regions (43% compared with 37% in Central NWFP, 29% in Southern NWFP, and 19% in Northern NWFP). Respondents in Northern NWFP, , were more likely to agree or agree 175 strongly; 47% agreed strongly, while 28% agreed; 41% of southern NWFP respondents strongly agreed and 27% agreed; 39% of Central NWFP respondents strongly agreed and 23% agreed, and 28% of Hazara respondents agreed strongly and 27% agreed (table not shown). Although three quarters of respondents agreed that women can run for office, almost that many (72%) agreed with the proposition that men are better suited to politics than women, while 26% disagreed. Regional patterns follow the previous question (data not presented), as do linear relationships between income and education and attitudes towards women’s suitability to politics. There are no generational or rural urban differences in these attitudes, nor are there differences by gender. It should be noted that were one to ask the same question to electorates in western democracies, it is not unlikely that, while most would agree that women can serve in elected office, given the relative paucity of women in office in most democracies, many might also say that men are better suited to politics. Similarly, the vast majority of all respondents, even women, also agree with the proposition that a university education is more important for boys than for girls (Q63d). Perhaps surprisingly, more women than men agree strongly with this statement—65% of women compared with 58% of men, while 24% of women and 29% of men agree with the statement (table not shown). This may be due to the fact that in NWFP, women often rely on a son and his family to care for them in old age, so that a son and a daughter-in-law are more important than a daughter for women’s personal livelihood in older age. As with the other findings, these attitudes about women are less frequent among those with higher incomes and educational levels. These findings suggest that, while barriers exist and women are still thought to be less suited to politics than men, NWFP society as a whole is receptive to an increased role for women in politics. One possible explanation could be the increased representation of women in national and provincial assemblies and local government councils,67 as well as their increasing appearance in media talk shows, the work place, and other public venues. However, barriers to women’s participation exist in general attitudes about political roles for women among respondents of both genders. 4.8.5 ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST IN POLITICS: While surveys in older democracies find consistently that those with greater interest in politics and are more likely to vote and participate in other ways, the findings of this survey suggest that the relationship between interest and electoral 176 participation is not so clear in NWFP. Income and education are not related to voting behaviour in ways that are consistent with explanations for turnout in older democracies. However, both the respondent’s self-reported level of political interest and his or her interest index (calculated in section 3) does correspond with a higher frequency of voting. Only 14% of those who report the highest interest report never voting compared with 21% who are somewhat interested and 34% who are not at all interested. While those who said they were very interested in politics reported voting in every election somewhat (2%) more frequently than those who are not very interested, 25% of those said they have a great deal of interest voted 2-3 times compared with 16% of those who report being not very interested in politics. The relatively high numbers (over one third) who said they voted in every election, regardless of self-reported political interest may be attributable to the role of “get out the vote” operations and family pressure among those who are uninterested, or, perhaps, a greater level of trust in institutions and less skepticism of the electoral process from one election to the next (see Section 6). Those who report that they are somewhat or very interested in politics are more likely to say that they voted 2-3 or many times; 22% of those reporting some interest said they voted in many elections, while only 14% of those who expressed a great deal of interest in politics said they voted many times. One-fourth (25%) of the very interested respondents said they voted two to three times. When political interest is measured with an index of both self-reported attitudes and actual behaviour (see Section 3), the findings are similar, but there are greater differences between the low, medium, and high levels of the index with respect to voting behaviour than between the lower and higher levels of self-reported interest, and the lines cross less frequently. That is, the correspondence between self-reported interest and voting is less clear than when actual engagement in politics in the form of discussing politics with family and friends or other behaviors are included in a measure of political interest. The relationship of the behavioral index with voting behaviour is stronger than the self reported measure. This provides further support for the findings in Section 3 that suggest that self-reported interest may be linked to particular meanings of how interest is expressed, whereas including behaviour better approximates a respondent’s actual willingness to participate in different types of political activities. The findings show that willingness to engage in political activities may translate into a greater likelihood of voting, even when selfreported interest might be low. Forty-one per cent of those categorized as high- 177 interest voted in every election, compared with 31% with medium interest and 28% with low interest. Eighteen per cent of high-interest respondents report voting many times compared with 14% and 11% of medium- and low interest respondents, respectively. About the same percentage of those with medium and high interest (19% and 18%, respectively) report voting two to three times, compared with 15% of those with low interest. The index of respondents’ awareness of various types of electoral procedures (see Section 4) is, surprisingly, unrelated to voting behaviour. Awareness of current registration, identity card, and other requirements does not appear to correspond to a respondent’s past participation. Both self-reported political interest and the behavioural interest index are associated with higher self-reported voting in both elections mentioned specifically to voters. These questions are less subjective, rely less on memory than the general voting history question, and are less subject to social desirability bias. As the foregoing findings indicate, both self-reported interest and past voting behaviour may be somewhat unreliable measures. Table 4.8.5 presents voting participation for 1988 and 1997 with both measures of political interest. The percentage of respondents reporting having voted is, not surprisingly, higher among respondents with both self-reported and behavioural political interest. However, it is notable that over one in three of the lowest interest respondents by both measures voted in one or the other election, and 36% or more of the most interested respondents declined to vote in 1997 and/or 1988. Table 4.8.5: Participation in 2002 and 2005 Elections, by Political Interest. Self-Reported Interest Not at All Not Very Somewhat Very Interested Don't Know Low Medium High Voted in 1997 Local Election? NO YES 59 41 47 53 41 59 36 64 76 24 Behavioural Interest Index 65 35 49 51 36 64 Voted in 1998 General Election? NO YES 62 38 52 48 48 52 41 59 85 15 68 54 43 32 46 57 These findings point to several general conclusions. First, self-reported lack of interest in politics or elections does not indicate an unwillingness or disinterest in engaging in other kinds of democratic action, civic education, or community participation. Second, low voter turnout does not measure the extent of cynicism, or optimism, about democratic processes or the potential for greater public demand for good governance in the country. Third, there may be a “silent majority” of citizens in all demographic groups who are prepared to be more involved in broader civic engagement if they had more information, opportunity, and a conducive environment 178 to do so. All of these voting trends underlie the importance of more robust programming giving people in NWFP the chance not just to hear about their basic civic rights and responsibilities, such as the importance of voting, but also to take action on a wider range of issues that directly affect their lives. 4.9 CONCLUSIONS This chapter presents the key findings of the voting trends in NWFP including electoral knowledge, attitudes, and political participation of the electorate with respect to the Electoral Politics and electoral behaviour. This survey also reflect the main argument, that how electoral politics effect voting behaviour in NWFP. The study found significant disparities based on gender, rural/urban location, income, education, age, regions in province, and other demographic characteristics regarding knowledge, access, and attitudes toward electoral procedures and issues. Since there were repeated elections during 1990s, the survey measured voters’ experience with electoral processes, including their exposure to and perceptions of electoral politics, in order to identify populations vulnerable to disenfranchisement or misrepresentation as a result of these problems. These findings highlight the prevalence of different types of irregularities that have been common in past elections for different population subgroups, which might help to inform those involved in the interpretation of electoral conduct before, during, and after Election Day. During the analysis of survey results about demographic characteristics and implications for electoral trends, 47% reported reading and writing at least one language (almost always Urdu). In rural areas, 40% are literate, while 60% of the urban electorate is literate. Among native Pashtun and Hindko speakers, 51% and 55%, respectively, are also literate in Urdu, while the other language groups in the sample have 35% or less Urdu literacy. For all the major language groups, literacy rates in Urdu are higher than that for literacy in the mother tongue, but substantial numbers of Pushto speakers (27%) and Chitrali speakers (42%) are literate in their mother tongue. Print materials with a large amount of text in any language may be less effective than illustrations and audio-visual voter education strategies in regional languages in rural areas, particularly in Northern NWFP and the Hazara (NWFP), where the sample’s literacy rate is particularly low (30% and 44% respectively). However, almost half of their populations speak and understand Urdu (44% and 48%, respectively). In Southern NWFP and Hazara, about 60% of the population speaks Urdu. In all languages, more women are illiterate than men. Only 23% of percent of 179 women and 44% of men are literate in their mother tongue. More people are literate in Urdu, with 32% of women and 53% of men reporting that they can speak and understand it. Only 5% youth reported as students, and about 40% of people in all age groups report having no education. In fact, educational attainment levels are about the same across generations. Young people have somewhat higher rates of literacy. Forty-three percent of 21-24 year-olds are literate in their mother tongue compared with 31% of both the 25-34 year-old and 35-49 year-old age groups, and 21% of respondents over 50. Forty-four percent of respondents in the youngest age group are literate in Urdu, 49% in the 25-34 age group, and 41% and 36% in the two oldest age groups, respectively. During the survey analysis about the interest on politics, the eligible electorate is relatively disinterested in politics based on self-reporting. Only one in three respondents (32%) said they were somewhat or very interested in politics and 67% were disinterested. The behavior of the eligible voting population suggests that their interest in politics is elevated during elections and that there are more people who are actually engaged in politics than say they are interested in politics. One in three (32%) discusses elections with friends and family and 20% say they are likely to do so. One in four (23%) have told friends and family how to vote and 21% say they might or would be likely to do so. One in five (21%) have argued about elections and 18% might or would be likely to do so. Surprisingly, the survey did not provide evidence that men and women respondents differ with respect to interest in politics or likelihood of discussing politics with friends and family, trying to convince others how to vote, or arguing about elections. Disinterest in politics is not more characteristic of younger adults, but more young people tend to exhibit medium interest in politics (42%) than high interest (34%). Lower income people are also less interested in politics, with 56% of the lowest income respondents expressing no interest at all in politics compared with 36.5% of those in the highest income category. Fifty-four percent of those in the lower middle class have no interest, but of those in the middle class, the number expressing no interest at all falls to 40%. Respondents who have some or a great deal of interest in politics tend to have higher incomes; 28% in the lowest income group are somewhat or very interested in politics compared with 24% in the middle class and 29% in the upper middle class. While analysing the survey results about information consumption preferences it have 180 been found that consumption of media is surprisingly low in NWFP; 60% of eligible voters never listen to radio or read a newspaper, and 51% never or very rarely watch television. Young people of voting age are no more likely than other segments of the population to listen to radio or watch television. Neither are women, who one might expect to be home more often then men. When asked to choose two among a variety of potential media for receiving election information, such as a radio drama, a TV debate, or newspapers, a plurality (38%) indicated a preference for some form of television program. Twenty-seven percent would prefer to hear about elections through illustrations and posters, particularly low-income (33% compared with 19% of upper middle class respondents) and rural respondents (30% compared with 23% of urban respondents). More respondents mention Radio (22%) and TV 9%) as their primary source of political information than any other single sources, although 28% prefer sources too diverse to identify. The lowest income members of the electorate are less inclined than those with higher incomes to attend any kind of voter education event; over half (54%) compared with 42% of wealthier respondents would decline to attend any voter education activity. However, more (21%) of poor respondents prefer private, home-based events while 15% are willing to attend rallies and other public activities. Surprisingly, though one might expect younger people to be interested in going out, there is no evidence of a real difference between age groups in publicprivate venue preference, even when disaggregated by gender. More men are willing to attend public events (22%) than women (13%). In NWFP, however, only 7% of women compared with 35% of men prefer public venues, while 17% of women prefer private events compared with 20% of men. Sixty-three percent of NWFP women say they would not attend any event, compared with only 34% of men. During the analysis of survey results about election awareness and access, it have been found that awareness of registration procedures was low; 42% of the electorate was unaware of any of publicized aspects of the electoral process. Women were particularly uninformed; 62% were unaware of any of four election registration procedures compared with 30% of men. Women were less likely to know whether or not the national door-to-door registration process, carried out by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), had reached their homes. 62% of men and 35% of women were aware that someone had come to their homes to register eligible voters. Of those who were reached by the ECP registration, 80% of women and 89% of men said they registered through this process, which results in an estimated registration 181 rate of 28% of women and 55% of men, keeping in mind that more women may have been registered by male family members. Four in five (80%) respondents said they possessed either a new or old identity card required for both registering and voting, but women and younger adults were less likely to have the necessary ID. The majority (94%) of men reported having one of the necessary identity cards compared with 79% of women. One-fourth of 18-24 year olds lacked the necessary ID. Surprisingly, people in lower income groups are not less likely to have the necessary ID; about 85% of people in all economic classes reporting having at least one form of necessary identification. Nineteen percent of eligible voters in both NWFP did not have ID, compared with 13% and 10% in their urban areas. Both rural and urban respondents in Northern NWFP lacked ID more often than respondents in the other regions; 21% in rural and 19% in urban areas had neither the old or new ID. During the analysis of survey results about procedural barriers to political participation it has been found that more than one in three (36%) respondents said that inability to register was a very important reason for their lack of participation in previous elections. Twenty-nine percent of respondents said that lack of identification after reaching the polling station was a very important factor in non-voting. Lowincome and less-educated respondents reported that a lack of ID was a greater problem than did the wealthy and educated. For 17% of respondents, showing up at the polling station and not finding one’s name on the voter list was a very important factor in not voting. Although difficulty getting to the polling station was an important factor in nonvoting for only 10% of respondents, the percentage for whom reaching the polling station deterred past voting was as high as 19% in central NWFP and 15% in North Eastern NWFP (Hazara). During the analysis of survey results about perceptions of electoral administration and conduct it have been found that, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) was regarded with a great deal of trust by only one-fourth (25%) of the electorate. Thirtyeight percent of eligible voters had some trust in the ECP and another 38% has no trust at all in the ECP. A significant portion of the electorate expected names to be missing from electoral lists at the polling stations in the coming election; 13% said this problem would be very likely and 26% said it would be somewhat likely. Better training for election officials would give 40% of eligible voters much more and 18% somewhat more confidence in the election process. Before knowing about the new privacy screens being used in the elections, 24% of eligible voters thought it would be 182 somewhat or very likely those authorities would know how they voted in the upcoming elections. Almost half (45%) of the electorate expected the upcoming election to be no more free and fair than past elections. Eighteen percent expected them to be somewhat more free and fair and 27% expected them to be much more free and fair. Only 12% expected the upcoming election to be less free and fair than those in the past. During the analysis of perceptions of proposals to increase election access and fairness and when asked about types of measures that might improve fairness of elections in NWFP, 42% of eligible voters said having a procedure for ordinary citizens to complain about fraud would give them much more confidence in the election process. Local trained observers to monitor the entire process would give 56% of respondents somewhat or much more confidence in the election. More than a third (38%) of the electorate would have more confidence in the election process if local governments were dissolved during general elections—a proposal that has been contemplated in the national media--while 37% would have less under these circumstances. During the analysis of survey results about the trust in governmental and nongovernmental institutions, over two-thirds of respondents (67%) said they had no trust at all in the police, who have responsibility for election security. The provincial and national assembly’s ranked second to last after the police among institutions with respect to citizen trust. Only 18% of respondents had a great deal of trust in the elected assemblies, while 43% had no trust at all. More people had some trust in the assemblies (39%) than had some trust in the police (23%). Only 20% would recommend a Member of the Provincial or National Assembly (PA/NA) to a friend or family member searching for a solution to a local problem, and one-fourth (26%) of the electorate believed the MNA had no power at all. Over one in three (34%) of respondents had no trust in the national government, while 38% had some trust and 28% have a great deal of trust. Levels of trust in local and provincial government had a very similar distribution. Similarly, 31% had no trust in the judiciary, 37% had some trust, and 31% had a great deal. Over half (58%) of eligible voters felt it important to have friends and family in government in order to get a job. Many potential voters believed that corruption was a major and common problem. About the same percentage of respondents (40%) said corruption was a major problem for all levels of government--local, provincial and national, but more people (59%) said they would 183 be likely to recommend local Nazims and Union Councilors to solve local problems— a rate much higher than that for other levels of government. Social institutions had greater trust among the electorate than government and elected institutions. While only 27% of respondents would recommend religious leaders to solve a local problems, these leaders ranked higher than district officials (25%) and members of provincial and national assembly’s (20%). The electorate, even those who are illiterate and those who rarely listen to radio, read a newspaper, or watch television, had a great deal of trust in the press. Of illiterate respondents, 64% had some or a great deal of trust in the press, compared with 78% of literate respondents, for a provincial average of 72%. Biradari, or clan, elders are the institution most often referenced as a likely source for solving local problems, regardless of the respondents’ level of educational attainment. Seventy percent of respondents would recommend this source, while 30% would not. Rural and lower income respondent were somewhat more likely to turn to Biradari. One-fourth of the electorate (26%)—even higher percentages in rural Southern NWFP (39%) and those with no education (38%)--said they would be likely to recommend large, influential landowners (“feudal” leaders)to solve local problems. While analysing the survey results about corruption and fairness in politics, and when asked their opinions about a number of statements seeking to measure perceptions about patronage, 46% of respondents agreed strongly that government delivers or improves public services like road repair and water in their area for the purpose of influencing elections. An additional 22% agreed, while 18% disagreed. Similar percentages believed political parties and candidates reward their supporters by helping those who voted for them after elections. The problem of corruption in political parties was perceived to be common and major more often (51%) than for other institutions. Over one-third (39%) of the electorate said they thought that it would be somewhat or very likely that candidates would be prevented from competing in the upcoming election. During the analysis of survey results about “Rigging” and Misconduct in Elections it have been found that in central NWFP, respondents who had abstained from voting in past elections said the fairness of the election was a somewhat or very important (30%) factor in non-voting almost three times as often as those in the other regions (9% in Hazara, 11% in Southern NWFP, and 10% in Northern NWFP, respectively). Asked about the likelihood that people would be able to vote more than once in the 184 upcoming election, 21% said very likely and 20% said likely. Forty-eight percent said they expected cheating in counting the ballots to be somewhat or very likely, and 38% expected authorities to make changes in the count after the counting process. The electorate was divided in its attribution of responsibility for election-rigging in NWFP; 26% said it is the central government that rigs elections, 32% said local politicians, and 15% said that political parties work together with the government to rig elections in NWFP. During the analysis of survey results about about undue influence, intimidation, and violence, it has been found that fourteen percent of respondents, who had abstained in one or more past elections said that fear of violence and unrest was somewhat or very important in their decision not to vote. Twelve percent of women said a somewhat or very important factor in their decision to abstain from voting in past elections was that family members had stopped them from doing so. While few eligible voters actually reported experiencing intimidation personally in past elections, quite a few expected different forms of malpractice to happen in the upcoming election; 42% said it was somewhat or very likely that employers 45% said that landlords would get their employees and tenants, respectively, to vote together as a group. Forty-two percent of respondents said they expected the same amount of violence as in past elections, 14% expected more, and 14% expected less. Candidates and voters were identified as the most likely victims of electoral violence by the largest percentage of respondents (27% and 35%, respectively, said candidates and voters would be targeted). Thirty-eight percent of respondents believed violence and intimidation would be the most serious threat to a free and fair election, while 43% said fraud and malpractice would be more likely to undermine the results of the next election. Nineteen percent expected the election to be free and fair. It is notable that the number who believed fraud and violence might compromise elections exceeded the number who reported experiencing voter-targeted fraud and coercion directly. During the analysis of survey results about perceptions of proposals to reduce election misconduct, over half (56%) of respondents said having trained observers from the local area to monitor the entire process would give them somewhat or much more confidence in the election. A signed and enforced party code of conduct would give 64% of respondents some or much more confidence in the election process. While analysing the survey results about perceptions of democratic rights and freedoms, twenty-five percent of eligible voters agreed strongly with the statement, 185 “Citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government,” while an additional 26% agreed. Forty-eight percent of eligible voters agreed or agreed strongly that citizens can criticize the government freely, while 39% disagreed. When asked if they agreed that citizens can join any party or organization they wish, 68% agreed or agreed strongly and 19% disagreed. During the analysis of survey results about beliefs on democracy and when asked to chose the two most important factors essential for democracy, the most common response (chosen by 37% of respondents) was the provision of basic necessities for everyone, followed by having a smaller gap between rich and poor (32%). Almost one in three (27%) mentioned absence of violence as essential to democracy. One in three respondents (33%) mentioned only economic factors as essential for democracy, compared with just 10% who mentioned elections and political freedoms alone. During the analysis of survey results about political participation, one-third (33%) of respondents claimed to have voted in every election, 15% voted in many elections, 16% in 2-3 elections, and 9% in one election. Twenty-eight percent of the eligible electorate, many in the younger age group had never voted. One in three women (31%) reported never having voted, while one in four men (24%) had never voted. The percentage of those who had never voted was highest in central NWFP (37%), followed by 32% in Northern NWFP and 26% each in Hazara and Southern NWFP. Forty-five percent of respondents said they were very likely to vote in the next election and 24% said they were somewhat likely to vote. Eighteen percent were uncertain whether they would vote and 14% were unlikely to vote. Eighty percent of male respondents compared with 58% of female respondents were somewhat or very likely to vote, and women said they were very unlikely to vote twice as often as men (10% of women compared with 5% of men). The most important reason for voting in past elections mentioned by the largest percentage (74%) of respondents was a belief that voting is a duty for every citizen, followed by a belief that voting makes a difference (56%), a desire to change things in NWFP (38%), and strong feelings about the candidates (36%). Almost half of respondents (49%) said voting in election would make a big difference, while 27% thought it would make some difference. One in four (24%) thought voting would make little or no difference. Less than 20% of respondents said they had or would be likely to engage in each of four other forms of democratic participation—election boycotts, attending rallies, going to political party meetings, and contacting representatives. 186 During the analysis of survey results about women’s political participation it has been found that three-quarters (75%) of respondents agreed or agreed strongly with the notion that women can run for political office, one in four (24%) disagreed or disagreed strongly, and respondents of both genders believed that men are better suited for politics than women. Similarly, while one-third of respondents (64%) agreed that women can lead Muslim countries, one-third disagreed. See FG. Bailey, Structure and Change in Indian Society, Pacific Affairs, 1969-1970, Vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 494-502. 2 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census 1998 (Islamabad: Ministry of Population, 2002) 3 Age calculated from 1997, 21 years means, age at the time of 1997 election. At that time the minimum age limit for voting was 21 years. 4 All the population figures are taken from, Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census Report 1988 (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 2002). 5 Figures mentioned in ( ) represents the population. 6 See Robert A. Dhal, Democracy and its critics (New Haven: Yale University, 1989) also see Charlas Tilley, Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 7 For detailed study, see Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006) 8 Ibid. 9 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2005: South Asia, (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2005). 10 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census 1998 (Islamabad: Ministry of Population, 2002). 11 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) (Islamabad: Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, 2004) 12 Oxford Policy Management, Poverty and Social Impact Assessment: Pakistan Microfinance Policy (London: DFID, 2006). 13 Education in NWFP is divided into five levels: Primary (grades one through five); Middle (grades six through eight); High (grades nine and ten, known as matriculation, or matric); intermediate (grades eleven and twelve), after which a diploma is awarded upon successful completion of a test. This diploma is now called the 'Higher Secondary School Certificate' or HSSC, but people still refer to the degree as F.Sc./F.A. (“Familiar of Science”/Familiar of Art”) or 'intermediate'. 14 The survey included a question about religious affiliation. The Shia respondents in the survey was about 6% of respondents. No results were found to be significantly different according to religious sect, although the small number of respondents in minority religious groups is insufficient for robust statistical analysis at the subgroup level. 15 Most people surveyed who read a language also write that language. 16 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census Report 1988 (Islamabad: Population Census Organistaion, 2002). 17 Election Commission Electoral awareness slogan, Repeatedly broadcast from PTV and Radio before 1997 General elections. This advertisement was also printed in National Newspapers. 18 Election Commission Electoral awareness slogan, Repeatedly broadcast from PTV and Radio before 1997 General elections. This advertisement was also printed in National Newspapers. 19 Syed Junaid Qasim, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Balakot 14 April 2006. 20 See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) and also see Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 21 See, for example, Voogt, Robert J. J., and Willem E. Saris, ‘To Participate or Not to Participate: The Link Between Survey Participation, Electoral Participation, and Political Interest’, Political Analysis 11 (2), 2003: pp.164-79. 22 The difficulty of determining voting trends are whether age differences are due to age, or life-cycle effects, or enduring changes in attitudes across generations as a result of circumstances is well- 1 187 documented in the literature on survey research on political socialization. See, for example, Alwin, Duane F., and Jon A. Krosnick. 1991. 23 "Aging, cohorts, and the stability of socio-political orientations over the life span." American Journal of Sociology 97 (1):169-95. 24 For detail see, Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics (Peshawar: Statistics Division, 2002) 25 Adnan Rehmat and Aslam Khan, ‘Grace Under Pressure: Pakistani Journalists Hold Their Own in Changing Media Scene.’ In Press Freedom Reports, Islamabad: Intermedia, Internews Pakistan, and Green Press Pakistan 2002. 26 The figure of 28% for frequent or daily newspaper use in NWFP may be inflated due to sampling bias in the province. 27 See Muhammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections. 28 PBC means Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, the state owned media, popularly known as Radio Pakistan. 29 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) world service in Urdu/Pashto language is widely listening in NWFP. 30 VOA (Voice of America) broadcast its programmes both in Pashto and urdu. 31 Questions about the latest political development is also included to observe the past electoral trends. 32 The question wording mentioned May and June for the display period, which was later delayed by one week, starting in June and lasting into July with the two-week extension. 33 Voting Procedure.---(1) Where an elector presents himself at the polling station to vote, the Presiding Officer shall issue a ballot paper to the elector after satisfying himself about the identity of the elector and shall, for that purpose, require the elector to produce his identity card provided for in the National Registration Act, 1973 (LVI of 1973) or issued under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000). 34 See, for example, Tracy A. Campbell, ‘Machine Politics, Police Corruption, and the Persistence of Vote Fraud: The Case of the Louisville, Kentucky, Election of 1905’, Journal of Policy History 15 (3) 2003: pp. 269-300. 35 See, for example, Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team, “Pakistan Local Bodies Elections, 19 and 25 August 2005,” pages 15-16, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/commonwealth-lb-elections.pdf 36 Afrasiyab Khattak, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 25 June 2007. 37 See, Richard Rose, and William Mishler, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’ The Journal of Politics 59 (2) 1997:, pp.418-51. 38 Stokes, Susan Carol, and Matthew R. Clearly, Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico New York, (NY: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2006) 39 Regression analysis has been used in this and subsequent cases to substantiate such findings from the cross-tabulated data. 40 See Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, Issued November 3, 2007, Amended November 15, 2007. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco_1_2007.html 41 The correlation coefficient for these two questions is .87. 42 See Local Government Plan 2000 http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/LG_Final_Plan_2000.pdf and Local Government Ordinance 2001 www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/SBNP_Local_Govt_Ordinance_2001.pdf. retrieved on 25 February 2010. 43 Correlation coefficients for the three questions relating to government corruption range from .75 to .86. 44 See Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 264-265. 45 See Richard Rose and William Mishler, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’ The Journal of Politics 59 (2) 1997:41851. 46 Andrew R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 47 Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007) 48 Rafi Khan, Shahrukh, Foqia Sadiq Khan, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007) and also see Andrew R. Wilder, The Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in the Punjab (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) also see Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst 2009) 188 See Fischer Jeff, "Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention." In IFES White Papers, ed. IFES. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems, 2002. Posada-Carbó, Eduardo, Elections Before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America (London: University of London, 1996). 50 Megan Reif, "Electoral Laws on Election Crimes Database (ELECD)." University of Michigan, 2008. 51 “I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past election.” 52 In developed democracies, surveys generally find a strong relationship between education and bases for making voting and non-voting decisions. Nevertheless, in advanced democracies, mobilization of voters and targeting of important districts has been associated with higher turnout. John Aldrich H, "Rational Choice and Turnout." American Journal of Political Science 37 (1) 1993 :246-78. 53 Cross-tabulation results had more than sufficient numbers in each cell to conclude reliably that the small differences across age groups were nonetheless real, even while responses are undoubtedly tied to the number of opportunities each age group has had to vote in their lifetimes. These data are presented because they represent one of the few instances in which age seems a relevant factor in the survey. 54 Question 54 wording: “Now I’m going to mention some other things that can happen during elections. For each one, tell me how likely you think each will occur in the next election. 55 For related analysis of past Pakistan elections, see, Aurat Publication and Information Service Foundation, Unethical Electoral Practices: A Citizens’ Report on the Local Government Elections 2005, p. 16; European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly Election 10 October 2002,” p. 6; International Crisis Group, Pakistan's Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, November 22, 2005, p. 9; and Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, Pakistan: Entire Election Process "Deeply Flawed". October 9, 2002. 56 See Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), “Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable,” August 2007, www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4729d6fb5a19e.pdf. For related recommendations see FAFEN 2007 press releases, e.g. www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=44 and www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45. See also Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT) Citizens’ Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), “Position Paper: Proposed Electoral Reforms,” September 25, 2007, pp. 5-6, www.pildat.org/CGEP/Publications/PDF/Electoral_Reforms_2007.pdf. 57 “I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people do NOT vote. For each, tell me whether the reason has been very important, somewhat important, or not at all important for you when you have not voted in past election.” 58 These findings are not surprising given the ongoing unrest in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), as well as parts of NWFP. See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” December 11, 2006. 59 See FAFEN Election Update 17, “FAFEN Introduces Election-Violence Monitoring, “February 16, 2008, http://fafen.org/admin/products/p47b739cba9396.pdf. 60 Provincial differences were not statistically significant except when disaggregated by gender, and only in Hazara was there a gender difference bordering on conventional significance at the 99% level. 61 See “Election Commission Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates for the Forthcoming General Elections, 2007-08,” November 20, 2007, http://ecp.gov.pk/COCFinal.pdf. Also see PILDAT CGEP, “Model Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, Government, and the Media, General Elections 2007/08,” June 2007, at http://www.pildat.org/eventsdel.asp?detid=203; and later recommendations by CGEP and FAFEN, such as “FAFEN Election Update 1,” November 30, 2007, at http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4750048b2fda5.pdf. Also see National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Statement of the NDI Pre-Election Delegation to Pakistan,” October 21, 2007. 62 Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63 Base weighted, 1836; unweighted, 1872. 64 “Now I would like to know your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behaviour and situation of women in our society. I will read out some statements and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them—whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.” 65 Reserved seats for women were re-introduced in advance of the 2002 general elections. Women can compete for general (unreserved) seats in addition to winning reserved seats based on party allocations. 49 189 There were 164 provincial and national constituencies with women competing for office in the 2008 elections. 66 United Nations Development Programme, Political and Legislative Participation of Women in Pakistan: Issues and Perspectives (Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme, 2005). 67 Ibid. 190 CHAPTER-5 ELECTORAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF PESHAWAR INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the nature of electoral politics at micro level i.e in Peshawar for narrow investigation of electoral politics on voting behaviour. The provincial capital of the Frontier province, Peshawar is bounded by tribal agencies on its three borders. It is the closest Pakistani city to Afghanistan, serving as a key route for trade. At the height of the Afghan conflict it supported three million Afghan refugees. Estimated population of nearly five million. Peshawar city is famous for its Qissa Khawani Bazaar, Balahisar Fort and Chowk Yadgaar, the latter built to commemorate the martyrs of the 1857 War of Independence against the British. A sizeable Christian population lives in the heart of the region that is synonymous with Muslim fundamentalism to the outside world. A small Sikh population also resides in the city. Peshawar had three National Assembly seats and eight Provincial Assembly seats during 1990s. In the 1988 elections, there were four National Assembly’s seats in Peshawar, but after the creation of Nowshera district adjacent to Peshawar, NA-IV was included in Nowshera district. The politics of Peshawar have been dominated by the Bilours, long affiliated with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s brand of Pashtun nationalism. The other prominent political family is that of Arbabs. At the pinnacle of their political power, Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan served as the provincial chief minister. Arbab Niaz is another prominent politician. From 1988-1997, the major electoral contesters for National Assembly seats were PPP and ANP. Table 5.1: Gender Balance 1988-1997 elections: 1988 Constituencies NA-1 Male 69.20 Female 30.80 Male 67.50 1990 Female 32.5 Male 66.40 1993 Female 33.6 Male 69.86 1997 Female 30.14 NA-2 70.80 29.2 68.20 31.8 69.38 30.62 70.84 29.16 NA-3 72.50 27.50 68.80 31.2 71.24 28.76 73.42 26.58 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Total population of Peshawar in 1998 was 2026851, male 1065188 and female 961663 population density was 1612.5, urban share of population was 48.5 and rural area population share was 51.5 average house hold size was 8.5. Total rural localities are 246 out of 7335 from whole NWFP lies in Peshawar. 99.3 % population was Muslim in Peshawar. 85.7 percent population speaks Pashto while 14.3 % speaks Hindko and other languages. Literacy Ratio in Peshawar was 41.8 % with considerable disparity between male and female literacy rate. Female literacy ratio was 25.8 % and male literacy ratio is 55.9 %. There is also a significant difference in the literacy rate in rural and urban areas of Peshawar. In rural areas the female literacy 191 rate is 10.7 % while male ratio is 46.2 %. The total literacy ratio including both sexes in rural Peshawar was 29 %. In urban areas the total literacy rate was 54.1 % and the female ratio was 41.1 % and male ratio was 65.3 %. 1 Major clans are Afridi, Khattak, Orakzai, Wazir, Mahsud and Punjabi (Hindko speakers). 47.4 % have their own housing facilities and 68.26 % population had government sponsored water facility. 94.99 % people had electricity facility. In employment, 25% were professionals while 27 % had elementary occupation. As the provincial capital, and the cultural, economic, and political centre of the NWFP, events in Peshawar reverberate throughout the province, and often, throughout the country. It was Peshawar in 1947 that became a central point in favour of Pakistan in 1947 referendum. Since Independence, Peshawar has remained the centre of political activity, and one of the most politicized cities.. The city has often been the nucleus of anti-government movements since British period, such as Khudai Khidmatgars nonviolence movement in 1930, the anti-Ayub movement of the late1960s, or the PNA movement of 1977 that resulted in Bhutto’s downfall2. Prominent politicians like Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto and leaders of religious parties and ANP tried to win elections from Peshawar. Table 5.2: Breakup of population in urban and rural areas of NWFP Areas Peshawar Cantt. Peshawar M. Corporation Peshawar University T.C Total Urban Peshawar Rural Grand Total Both Sexes 68740 910807 3269 982816 1044035 2026851 Male 42045 478128 1728 521901 543287 1065188 Female 26695 432679 1541 460915 500748 961663 Source: Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002) Population wise, Peshawar is the NWFP’s largest city. According to 1988 census, its population was 2026851 with annual growth rate of 3.63. Peshawar was mainly consisted of three urban areas including Peshawar Cantonment, Peshawar Metropolitan Corporation, Peshawar University Town Committee with 246 rural villages.4 Table 5.3: Literacy Ratio (10 years and above) by Sex, Rural/Urban areas. All Areas District Peshawar Both Sexes 41.8 Male 55.9 Female 25.8 Both Sexes 29 Rural Male 46.2 Female 10.7 Both Sexes 54.1 Urban Male 65.3 Female 41.1 Source: Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002) Table 5.2 shows the breakup of population in urban and rural areas of NWFP.5 With 1998 literacy rate of 41.8 per cent, Peshawar’s population was one of the NWFP’s most literate areas (ranked fifth behind Abbottabad, Haripur, Kohat and Nowshera). Literacy ratio of Peshawar is given in table 5.3. 192 The mother tongue of 85.7 per cent of the population of Peshawar is Pashto, 8.7 percent is Hindko, 2.7 percent Urdu, 2.6 percent Punjabi and 0.2 percent is Saraiki.6 In the 1970 election, the NAP swept the polls in this symbolically important city, winning seven out of eight Provincial Assembly seats and two out of four National Assembly seats. PPP got one Provincial Assembly seat and QML won two National Assembly seats from Peshawar in 1970 elections7. From 1988 to 1997 elections, the NAP renamed party ANP obtained mixed number of seats from Peshawar. Party position in Peshawar during 1988-1997 is shown in table 5.4. Table 5.4: Party Position in Peshawar Constituency NA (3) PA (8) 1988 PPP(3) PPP(5), ANP (2), IND(1) 1990 ANP(3) IJI(2), ANP(5) 1993 PPP(2), ANP(1) PPP(3), ANP(4) IND (1) 1997 ANP(3) ANP(7) PML-N(1) PDA(1), Source: Compiled by the Author obtaining data from Election Commission of Pakistan, General Election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics for General Elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997, Government Printing Press, 1997. Numbers in () shows the number of seats. The analysis of table 5.4 shows that ANP suffered a defeat in its former stronghold, losing all three of National Assembly seats and 6 of 8 of the Provincial Assembly seats in 1988 elections. In 1990 elections ANP got their strength both in National and Provincial Assembly seats. In these elections IJI with the coalition of ANP got two Provincial Assembly seats from Peshawar. In 1997 elections, ANP again got complete victory from Peshawar. The detail of vote castes to each party and registered votes in Peshawar during 1998-1997 are shown in table 5.5 below. Table 5.5: Registered Votes and Votes Polled in NWFP Provincial Assembly Political Parties 1988 Votes ANP IJI/PML-N PDA/PPP Religious Parties JUIF MDM PIF *Other Parties 16831 5033 8.4 24032 110 11.3 476 9190 10957 0.76 4.7 15991 47354 23995 74080 Share % 23.7 12.0 37.1 1990 Votes 66593 26394 58616 Share % 31.3 12.4 27.5 1993 Votes 57212 17043 61119 Share % 29.4) 8.8 31.4 Votes 72893 16095 28962 1997 Share % 46.7 10.3 18.6 **Independents 29583 0.2 35026 0.2 35097 0.2 18886 1.2 Valid Votes Rejected Total Casted Votes Registered Casted as % of Registered Votes Total Contesters 196876 3135 200011 520272 38.49 210771 2232 213003 536719 40 192103 2380 194483 522682 37.36 152819 3348 156167 599181 26.16 35 48 44 36 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). *ANP-A, PAI PNP, PAT PML-J. PMN, IJM, HPG, PKMAP, WP, GAP, PTI 7315, PPP-SB, PMA, AQP , UNA , Diat Ithiad MKP(KBG) , ** No of Independent contesters were 28, 43, 32 and 26 respectively. 193 From 1990 to 1997, IJI made an electoral alliance with ANP for National Assembly seats to defeat the PPP from Peshawar. Following table shows the electoral position of political parties for National Assembly seats from Peshawar. Table 5.6: Party’s position in National Assembly from Peshawar Parties ANP IJI/PML-N PDA/PPP Religious (JUI-F) *Others **Independents Valid Votes Rejected Total Registered Percentage Total contesters 1988 80076 24638 97510 1080 1018 15781/5 220103 4318 224421 601126 37.31 10 share % 35.7 11 43.4 0.4 0.4 7.0 1990 121185 0 78065 25077 577 16706/6 241610 3049 244659 606886 37.97 11 share % 49.5 0 32 10.2 0.2 6.8 1993 92693 0 98264 35216 1482 4904/6 232559 4056 236615 649235 36.44 11 share% 39.1 0 41.5 14.8 0.6 2.0 1997 98475 0 31566 12415 8007 2099/7 154236 4101 158337 676876 23.85 15 share% 62.1 0 19.9 7.8 5.0 1.3 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). *ANP-A, NDP, PAT, HPG, PKMAP, AQP, HPG, NPP-WG, PPP-SB, PTI, **No. of Independent contesters were 5, 6, 6 and 7 respectively. This chapter will take a closer look at Peshawar’s election results in order to identify patterns of voting behaviour in the area over time. The chapter classifies the city into seven different categories, and identifies similarities and differences in 1988, 1993 and 1997 voting behaviour of these categories. It then examines the Peshawar constituency results, provides a brief overview of the results in NA-01, NA-02, and NA-03. 5.1 ELECTORAL RESULTS Peshawar is divided into three constituencies during the period under study. Numbers of polling stations in NA-1 were 145 during 1988-1993 and 201 in 1997. The polling stations as shown in table 5.7. In NA-2, polling stations were 112 during 1988-1993 and 145 in 1997. In NA-3, numbers of polling stations were 142 during 1988-1993 and 154 in 1997.8 Table 5.7: Election Results by electoral/polling areas Categories. Polling Stations Urban-Rural Industrial Lower Middle Middle Upper Old City Cantonment 47 48 49 50 54 65 48 1988 Figures in % ANP PPP 50 51 49 48 45 34 52 R 3 1 2 2 1 1 0 1990 Figures in % ANP 51 54 57 55 58 56 52 PPP 48 46 41 43 42 43 48 R 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 58 55 58 57 58 57 54 1993 Figures in % ANP PPP 40 44 39 40 41 41 45 R 2 1 3 3 1 2 1 ANP 64 62 63 65 60 62 62 1997 Figures in % PPP 34 37 33 32 40 38 37 R 2 1 4 3 0 2 1 Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3. 194 These Polling areas have been classified into the following seven general categories: “Urban-Rural Periphery” Industrial; Lower Middle Class;’ Upper Class;’ Old City; and ‘Cantonment’. As polling areas could not always be classified precisely. For example, upper class polling/electoral areas sometimes include katchi abadis (shanty towns), and middle class housing societies can be found in lower middle class polling areas. Nevertheless, these broad polling areas categories can be identified and their voting behaviour analysed accordingly.9 The table below illustrates the voting behaviour of these different categories of polling areas for the 1988 to 1997 elections. 5.2 URBAN-RURAL PERIPHERY POLLING STATIONS The electoral units (polling stations and their jurisdictions) on the urban–rural periphery of Peshawar still includes some rural areas as well as old villages that have been incorporated into the sprawling city. To a certain extent these former villages have retained some of their rural social relationships even after being incorporated into the city. Here, traditional identities such as biradari (clan)10 play a more important role in determining voting behaviour than in the rest of the city. These peripheral polling areas, however, are also home to lower class neighborhoods and katchi abadis that house the growing influx of rural migrants. For these migrants, the traditional relationships which often determined the political behaviour in the villages are no longer as relevant. Often they form new social and political identities that differ from those found in the peripheral villages incorporated into the city. The table 5.8 illustrates that the urban-rural periphery was a PPP stronghold in 1988. These are some of Peshawar’s poorest electoral units, and the PPP’s 50 to 47 per cent lead over the IJI/ANP supports the perception that the PPP is the ‘party of the poor’. In 1993, the PPP could not show better results than ANP in the urban-rural periphery. Between 1988 and 1997 the PPP lost more support, than the ANP in Industrial polling areas as well as cantonment areas. 5.3 INDUSTRIAL POLLING STATIONS Peshawar is one of the industrialized districts in the NWFP and in 1998, 26 per cent of all the NWFP’s registered factories fell within Peshawar’s boundaries.11 In addition to the industries located in the city, all the major roads, i.e (Kohat Road, Jamrud Road, Bara Khyber Road) leading out of the city whether to Afghanistan, Central Asia or Punjab are lined with industries. Consequently, industrial labour comprised a higher percentage of Peshawar’s work force than in most other cities of the NWFP. Peshawar’s ‘industrial’ polling areas are those in which high concentrations of organized industrial labour reside. They include the industrial zones of Kohat Road, Hayatabad industrial zone as well as the Railway Workshops and railway worker residential quarters in the centre (civil quarters) of Peshawar. In 1988, the PPP’s best results were in the industrial areas where it won 51 per cent of the vote, Its best 195 performance in all of Peshawar was in the industrial area of Sadder, where the PPP received 55.3 percent of the vote compared to the ANP 45 per cent. As with the urban rural periphery polling areas, however, the PPP’s 1993 results in the industrial wards represented a serious decline over it 1988 performance. 5.4 LOWER-MIDDLE CLASS POLLING STATIONS Peshawar’s ‘lower-middle class’ wards are generally found north of the Grand Trunk Road and west of the old walled city bordering the river Kabul. These polling areas often include a substantial number of lower class neighbourhoods and katchi abadis. Many of them lack basic civic amenities such as adequate water and sanitation system, natural (Sui) gas, roads, health and education facilities.12 Most of these polling areas, however, are also home to a thriving small-scale industrial and commercial sector. A large number of workers in northern Peshawar are employed in the scrap iron business and the iron and steel smelting foundries. Handlooms can be seen operating in many of the homes, and cottage industries abound producing everything from carpets and footwear to soaps and cosmetics. It is surprising that the PPP did not do better than it did as a large percentage of the population in these wards belong to lower income groups. The IJI/PML(N)/ANP did better than the PPP in the lower-middle class polling areas in 1993-1997 as shown in above table. When compared with the industrial polling areas, these results indicate that the PPP receives much more support in polling units where labour is organized, such as polling areas which include large industrial units or the highly unionized railway workers. The PPP receives less support in wards where the labour force is self employed or unorganized, as in the smaller-scale industrial and commercial enterprises found in the lower-middle class neighbourhoods of northern Peshawar and the Old City. 5.5 MIDDLE CLASS POLLING STATIONS Peshawar’s middle class’ wards are mostly located along and between University Road in the west, Sadar (Mall Road) in the north and the Gulbahar area in the east. These include traditional middle class neighbourhoods such as Rahatabad, Wazir Bagh, Asia Park, and Bagh-e-Naran, as well as more recent middle and upper-middle class housing colonies such as Hayatabad Town. In addition to physicians, Lawyers, engineers, and other professionals, and members of the trading and business community, these wards are home to large numbers of government employees who live in government employee housing colonies such as Rahatabad Colony. The middle class wards, along with the upper class wards, have been the least supportive of the PPP during the last three elections. In 1988, the PPP won only 48 per cent of the vote in the middle class wards as compared to the ANP’s 52 per cent, and only 32 per cent in 1997 as compared to the ANP’s 65 per cent excluding religious votes. 196 5.6 UPPER CLASS POLLING STATIONS Peshawar’s ‘upper class’ wards encompass the elite residential neighbourhoods of Hayatabad Town, and Rahtabad Town that lie between the Peshawar to Jamrud Road, Also included in this category is the highly sensitive red zone of NWFP (Khyber Road) north of Sadar Raod, where many government high officials reside. In both 1988 and 1993, the IJI/PML (N)/ANP received its strongest support from the upper class wards. In 1988, it received 54 per cent of the vote compared to the PPP’s 45 per cent. By 1997, ANP’s support had increased to 60 per cent and the PPP’s vote bank had decreased to 40 per cent. Between 1988 and 1997 the PPP lost five per cent of their votes in upper class wards. 5.7 OLD CITY POLLING STATIONS The old walled city of Peshawar is the most densely populated region of the city, and is home to a wide spectrum of social groups ranging from the very poor to a substantial number from the lower and middle classes. These areas include old citizens residing here through centuries and newly migrated people from surrounding districts and agencies of FATA but these migrated people could not cast votes in this polling area. They are allowed to cast their votes in their respective constituencies. Within its narrow winding streets and alleys a surprising amount of business was transacted, both in terms of providing goods, as in its wholesale markets, and in services in Qisa Khawani Bazzaar area and Haji camp lary ada (Bus Stations). As in the rest of Peshawar, support for the PPP fluctuated dramatically between 1988 and 1997. In 1988, the PPP had a 34 % and ANP had 65% votes. By 1997, the PPP trailed behind the ANP by 24 per cent. The religious parties received less support in the Old City area of Peshawar. 5.8 PESHAWAR CANTONMENT POLLING STATIONS In the cantonment, the range of social groups is even greater than in the Old City, as some of Peshawar’s poorest localities are found next door to some of its wealthiest. In addition to the Army Garrison and officers’ colonies, the Cantonment contains elite residential neighbourhoods, defense officer colony, Shami Road, Army flats, Falcon Complex middle class neighbourhoods Swati Phatak, Nauthia, Gulberg, labour colonies. Katchi abadis, and villages Budhber, and Michni. The PPP’s best result in 1988 was in the Cantonment where it won 52 per cent of the vote. In 1997; however, the PPP suffered its greatest setback in the Cantonment areas by winning only 37% votes. 5.9 CONSTITUENCY RESULTS Following Table gives the results of the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections in the eight Provincial and three National Assembly constituencies of Peshawar. It illustrates the reversal that has taken place, whereby the PML(N)/ANP has now replaced the 197 PPP as the favoured party of voters. When the PPP contested elections in 1988, after being out of power for 11 years, it still won a respectable 51.78 per cent of the vote. In the controversial 1990 elections, the PPP won 50.17 per cent of the vote and only one of Peshawar’s seats (NA-1).13 By 1993, its support had declined even further and it won only 29.31 per cent of the vote and no seats. In contrast to the PPP’s decline, the PML (N)/ANP’s support steadily increased from 41.68 per cent to 67.68 per cent from NA-1.14 Between 1988 and 1997, the number of votes won by the IJI/PML (N)/ANP in Peshawar increased, while those of the PPP decreased as shown in table 5.9. Table 5.3 also illustrates the development of a strict two-party system. In all three elections few voters cast their ballots for third party and independent candidates. Table 5.8: Peshawar Constituency Results. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 1988 1990 1993 1997 1988 1990 1993 1997 ANP 41.68 53.18 39.36 67.76 32.95 47.95 32.50 52.71 31.18 46.56 44.62 65.19 PPP 51.78 40.42 50.17 29.31 41.15 29.31 42.93 0 35.82 24.11 37.75 27.30 IJI/PML-N NA-1 0 0 0 0 NA-2 1.43 0 0 0 NA-3 30.01 12.60 0 0 R 0 0 10.73 0 1.83 20.23 19.60 27.16 0 19.83 16.06 0 Others 5.6 7.2 2.01 6.1 18.62 1.40 3.50 16.5 4.1 6.8 3.20 6.8 Turnout 38.13 60.34 36.91 24.51 37.17 29.92 36.58 28.56 36.62 41.70 35.82 33.44 Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3. 5.10 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA-1): NA-1 was dominated by ANP affiliated Bilour family during 1990s. Both the PPP and the ANP had a vote bank in the constituency. ANP and PPP both alternatively got victory from this constituency during 1988-1997 National Assembly elections. Bilour defeated Benazir Bhutto in 1990 and Qammar Abbas in 1997. But in 1988 and 1993 it was the PPP’s Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao and Syed Zafar Ali Shah who had emerged victorious. The constituency was mainly inhabited by Hindko, Pashto and Persian speakers and a sprinkling of minority community members. Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour was the ANP candidate who continuously contested elections since 1988 to 1997. The major factor of his victory in NA-1 was firstly his party affiliation with ANP, secondly as there was dominance of Hindko speaking people inside city15 and Bilour is basically a Hindko speaking person, so party identification and ethnic support were the major factor of his success. In 1988 PPP candidate Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (44658) defeated Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (35947). Two independent candidates, Said Anwar (1826) and Mohammad Rafique (2335) got considerable number of votes that effected PPP victory from this constituency in 1988 elections. In 1990 elections, PDA leader, Ms. Benazir Bhutto (38951) was defeated by Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (51233). Five independent candidates including Ghulam Jaffar got 1507 votes, Maulana Muhammad 198 Yousaf Qureshi (Jamia Ashrafia) got 1190 votes, Ms. Banazir another independent candidate got 1067 votes, Qamar Abbas got 397 votes, Abdul Majid and Syed Javed Hassan Shah got 290 and 95 votes respectively. Other minor parties candidates got less number of votes, including PAT candidate Khalid Mehmood Durrani got 373 and NDP candidate Qazi Shah Jehan got 204 votes. During 1993 elections, nine candidates contested elections from this constituency. PPP candidate Syed Zaffar Ali Shah got victory with 40343 votes (the major factor of victory was the business community support. He was also the owner of widely circulated urdu newspaper daily Mashriq in Peshawar, he was also the chief patron of Anjuman Khudamul Islam through which he got religious votes) while Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour of ANP was the runner-up with 35755 votes. PIF, the alliance of religious parties’ candidate Haji Dost Mohammad (late) got 9725 votes while the HPG candidate Mrs. Zakira Aslam got only 91 votes. Five independent candidates including Mr. Riffatullah (360), Syed Javed Hassan Shah (408), Mr. Zahoor Khan (834), Mr. Ghulam Jaffar (1943) and Mr. Muhammad Rafiq (447) could not show considerable vote strength from this constituency. Haq Nawaz, a journalist from Peshawar explained that the considerable rise in the religious vote bank during 1993 elections from this constituency was the impact of Taliban regime in neighbouring Kabul.16 In 1997 elections, eight candidates contested for one National Assembly seat from this constituency. ANP candidate Ghulam Ahmad Bilour won the seat by taking 25930 votes while the runner up was the PPP candidate, Qammar Abbas who obtained 11275 votes. Five independent candidates, Aurangzeb Mohammad (223), Rehmat Gul Afridi (150), Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Bazaz (193), Qamar Ali Shah (54) and Mr. Mohammad Khurshid Anwar (67) could not influence the electoral trends of the voters from this constituency. The constituency of NA-1 encompasses the industrial town of Peshawar city, near Kohat road, as well as the Polling areas of northern Peshawar. In addition to several large industries, hundreds of automobile industries and small-scale manufacturing units operate in the constituency. NA-1 is Peshawar’s economically mixed constituency, where lower, middle and upper class is living and the majority of its inhabitants live in surrounding areas of Katchi abadis and lower and lower –middle class neighbourhoods with inadequate civic amenities. In 1970 NA-1 was part of the constituency of NW-1, where Khan Abdul Qayum Khan received 64.5 per cent of the vote-the QML’s best result in Peshawar. Since 1988, however, the PPP seemed well in NA-1, as major contesters were PPP and ANP. In 1988, the PPP candidate was Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and won this seat while in 1990 Benazir, herself contested this seat but was defeated by Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, an ANP candidate. In 1993, the PPP ticket was given to Syed Zaffar Ali Shah, a wealthy Syed businessman, who was selected with the expectation that his money 199 and the support of the Syed biradari in NA-1 would make him victorious. The PPP gave a Provincial Assembly ticket from this constituency to a Syed Ayub Shah from 1988-1997. Ayub Shah got victory in 1988 elections and in 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections, ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour was the victorious candidate from this constituency. The ANP candidate for National Assembly, and his brother Bashir Ahmad Bilour, ANP candidate for Provincial Assembly during 1990s were viewed as a strong candidate because he had done a lot of development work in the constituency. The pre-election analysis of the constituency that appeared in the press focused on the PPP’s advantage with the Syed biradari and with lower income voters.17 The ANP strengths were Ghulam Ahmad Bilour and Bashir Ahmad Bilour’s good development record in the constituency. The PPP’s selection of candidates for NA-1 was heavily influenced by biradari considerations, and yet biradari did not appear to be a major determinant of voting behaviour. The PPP’s best results in 1988 were in the industrial and urban rural periphery polling area of Gulbahar, Nauthia, Kakshal, and Wazir Bagh. The ANP top five ward results in all of Peshawar were in the following wards of NA-1: Civil Quarters, Yakatoot, Asia Gate, Dabgari, and Khalid Town. The electoral politics in this constituency, on the basis of above results shows that the voters supported only the winning candidates for patronage or sociological and political basis as discussed in the chapters of sociological and political determinants of electoral politics in NWFP. 5.11 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA-2): NA-2 is located is located in the east of the city and is composed of 112 polling stations in 1988-1993 and 145 polling stations in 1997. Peshawar Metropolitan and Cantonment areas are also included in this constituency. As with the rural areas surrounding most cities in central NWFP, the dominant biradari on Peshawar’s periphery is Arbabs.18 These polling areas also contain katchi abadis inhabited by rural migrants seeking to improve their lot in the city. In the katchi abadis traditional rural vertical social structures play a less important role in determining voting behaviour, NA-2 also encompasses some lowermiddle, middle, and upper class wards. In Peshawar Cantonment, some of Peshawar’s wealthiest residential neighbourhoods are found next to poor neighbourhoods on the urban-rural periphery. The 1993 contest in Peshawar was between the PPP’s Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan and the ANP Abdur Rehman Khan. Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, a well-respected politician whose family was originally from Charsada, was the PPP’s strongest candidate in 1990 from NA-2. In 1988, he defeated the IJI candidate from NA-1 but in 1990 Benazir contested from NA-1 so Aftab was contested from NA-2. From 1990 to 1997, ANP vote bank split up into religious parties.19 200 Arbab Jehangir Khan was a much stronger candidate than other candidates who preceded him. As a well-educated and wealthy industrialist he appealed much more to the conservative middle and upper class voters of this constituency than his predecessors. For the poorer voter in NA-2, his reputation was good for having done a lot of development work when he was the Chief Minister. He lived up to his reputation during the 1993 campaign by financing development work and distributing truckloads of food staples such as flour and cooking oil in poor neighbourhoods. His industrialist back ground came in useful; both in terms of running what many political commentators felt was the most expensive campaign in Peshawar, as well as one of the best managed.20 Arbab Jehangir is an example of the growing number of industrialist politician who are gaining prominence on Pakistan’s political landscape, particularly in urban areas. His campaign illustrated some of the advantages that industrialists have in electoral politics. First, they have access to ready cash which is becoming increasingly important to win tickets as well as to finance election campaigns. Second, they are better trained to use modern management techniques to market themselves, and to run more efficient and organized election campaigns. As the art of fighting elections develops in NWFP, money and organizations are likely to become increasingly important, which will further strengthen the industrialist politicians. Until 1997, this constituency was in the possession of the Arbab family. But in 2002 Maulana Rahmatullah Khalil of the MMA stole the show, polling 37,728 votes against Dr Arbab Alamgir Khan’s 15,771. Dr Alamgir, a PPP candidate, stands a better chance this time against Khalil and Arbab Najeeb Khan of the ANP. His family has undertaken several key development projects in this constituency and some analysts believe that Dr Alamgir will reap a rich harvest of votes as a result. Dr Alamgir is the son of former chief minister Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan who had won this constituency three times on two different party tickets: in 1990 as an ANP candidate, in 1993 as a PPP man and in 1997 again on an ANP ticket. The PPP’s Khan Bahadur Khan was the winner in the 1988 election. It is generally believed that the candidates of other parties do not have many votes in the area. But some analysts are skeptical about the PPP nominee’s chances, noting that Dr Alamgir could not even win the local government election. In 1988 six candidate contested elections for one National Assembly seats from this constituency. PPP candidate Khan Bahadur Khan got 24,444 votes and won the seat by defeating ANP candidate Arbab Saif-ur-Rehman who got 19402 votes. The third leading candidate was Mr. Rafique Ahmad Khalil who got 10377 votes as an independent candidate. Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khalil, an IJI candidate got 840 votes and JUI-F candidate Mr. Salim Jan Khalil got 1080 votes. The candidate of ANP (A), an ANP faction got 1018 votes. Tahir Khalil, a political worker from this 201 constituency explained that it was personal character and influence of Khan Bahadur Khan, that he won the elections.21 In 1990 four candidates contested elections, ANP candidate Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan got victory with 31222 votes. The runnerup was PDA candidate Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao who got 19137 votes. JUIF candidate, Mr. Mursaleen Khan got 13307 votes and independent candidate Muhammad Hassan Khan got 891 votes. In 1993 elections, Arbab Jehangir Khan a PPP candidate, who was the ANP candidate in 1990 elections once again got victory with 27345 votes. The runnerup was the ANP candidate, Mr. Abdur Rehman Khan with 20,804 votes. PIF candidate Mohammad Azam Khan Chishti was the third candidate who got 12486 votes. Arbab Mohammad Humayun a PKMAP candidate got 1173 votes, Arbab Mushtaq Ahmad HPG candidate got 218 votes. Mr. Mursalin Khan Advocate, an independent candidate got 912 votes. Total valid votes were 62938, rejected 860, total 63398 registered 17439 and percentage of vote caste 36.5%. During 1997 the total contesters were seven who started their electoral struggle to win the votes out of 180496 registered voters. Total 45683 votes polled in which number of valid votes were 44562 and rejected were 1121 votes. The vote cast percentage was 25.31%. Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan an ANP candidate in this election got 24094 votes. JUI-F candidate Haji Ghulam Ali who got 12415 votes was the runnerup. Arbab Mustaq Ahmad HPG candidate got 631 votes, Imtiaz Elahi Paracha an independent candidate got 570 votes, Mr. Taj Mohammad Amar NPP (WG) candidate got 65 votes, Mr. Ibadatullah Khan PTI candidate got 4348 votes and Mr. Mohammad Fayyaz Khan Khalil PPP-SB got 1859 votes. The results of this constituency shows that the electors voted only personality of Arbab Jehangir irrespective of their party affiliations, while interviewing from this constituency voters and political activist have the opinion that Arbab Jehangir’s politics based on patronage and development works along with their Arbab biradari.22 This behaviour shows that people voted under Michigan Model and Downs theory as discussed in first chapter, theoretical models of voting behaviour. 5.12 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA-3): NA-3 composed of 140 polling stations in 1988, 142 polling stations in 1990 and 1993 and 154 polling stations in 1997 elections. During 1988- 1999, ANP and PPP were the major leading parties in this constituency. In 2002, Qari Fayyazur Rahman of the MMA defeated Kiramatullah Khan, a joint candidate fielded by the PPP and the ANP, by a margin of 19,000 votes. This time Rahman has not been given a party ticket. In these circumstances, Engineer Iqbal Zafar Jhagra of the PML-N, Hashim Khan Babar of the ANP and Noor Alam Khan of the PPP are all eyeing victory. Maulana Azizuddin of the MMA and Intikhab Khan Chamkani of the PML-Q are also contenders. The PPP has a strong vote bank in 202 Vadpagga village, also known as Chota Larkana, one of the largest constituencies of the province. The ANP has a traditional edge over its rivals here as its contestant Arbab Sadaullah Khan polled 48,451 votes against Sardar Ali Khan of the PPP in 1997 when this seat was NA-3 Peshawar-cum-Nowshera. Arbab Zahir Khan had won this seat in 1993 and 1990. ANP’s Babar is trying to secure this seat because his party’s key political leader Zahir Khan is now contesting from the NA-4 seat. Unlike Zahir Khan who used his personal charisma to win the seat twice, Babar banked mainly on the party’s diehard supporters. PMLN’s Jhagra has also risen to prominence, especially after the APDM meeting held at his native Jhagra village. Alam Khan of the PPP tried to repeat the 1988 performance when his party colleague Sardar Ali had won the seat by a margin of 5,000 votes. During the 1988 polls, six candidates contested elections for 216553 registered votes from this constituency. Total 79300 votes polled, in which the number of valid votes were 78176 and rejected were 1124. PPP candidate Sardar Ali Khan got 28408 votes and won the seat. ANP candidate Abdul Lateef was the runner up candidate who got 24727 votes. Third close candidate was Pirzada Nabi Amin (IJI) who got 23798 votes. Three independent candidates, Haji Noor Muhammad ,Arbab Mohammad Zahir and Nisar Khan got 614, 385 and 244 votes respectively. In 1990, ANP candidate Arbab Mohammad Zahir defeated three other contestants i.e. Mr. Abdul Lateef PDA (19977), Maulana Mohammad Usman JUI-F (11770) and Pirzada Nabi Amin IND (11269). Total valid votes 81746, rejected 1103, Total 82849, registered 218206. Vote caste ratio 37.97%. In 1993, three candidates contested, ANP candidate Arbab Mohammad Zahir won the seat with 36134 votes. PPP candidate Sardar Ali was the runnerup candidate who got 30576 votes. PIF candidate Mr. Abdul Haseeh got 13005 votes. Valid votes 79715, rejected 1271, total 80986, registered 226079 percentage of vote caste ratio is 35.82%. In 1997 four candidates contested for one seat from this constituency. ANP candidate Arbab Saadullah Khan got victory with 48451 votes. PPP candidate Sardar Ali Khan was the runnerp candidate who got 20291 votes. PPP (SB) candidate Mr. Salim Akhtar Afridi and independent candidate Mr. Mohammad Naheem Qasmi got 2149 and 842 vote respectively. Valid votes 71733, rejected 2595, total 74328, registered 235412. Vote caste ratio 31.57%. 5.13 CASE STUDY OF NA-1 The three constituencies briefly examined above identified patterns of PPP and ANP/PML (N) support in the different polling area categories used in this study. The following section will take a closer look at these and other patterns and trends by conducting a much more detailed analysis of electoral politics and voting behaviour in the Peshawar constituency of NA-1. Two features of the election in this constituency 203 make it a good choice for a more detailed case study. First, the constituency provides a good opportunity to analyse class-based voting behaviour as it contains some of Peshawar’s richest neighbourhoods alongside poor neighbourhoods and colonies of industrial labour. Second, the constituency was one of the few where the Religiopolitical parties candidate won a considerable percentage of the vote. NA-1 Peshawar 1 has traditionally been aligned to three major vote banks in the shape of PPP(P), ANP and JI. Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao won this seat in 1988 but left the seat to become the Chief Minister. In the subsequent power sharing deal by PPP(P) for the Provincial Government with ANP, this seat was given to Ghulam Ahamd Bilour who won the seat on by elections and also went on to defeat Benazir Bhutto in the 1990 elections. Gulam Ahamd Bilour was defeated in 1993 by Syed Zafar Ali Shah of PPP. The seat swung back to ANP in 1997. In the 2002 general elections PPP(P) and ANP had an alliance in the Peshawar District and Usman Bilour who is the nephew of Gulam Bilour was pitted against the seasoned JI activist and General Secretary of MMA in NWFP Shabbir Ahmad Khan who went on to defeat Usman Bilour with a huge margin. The constituency is split upon ethnic and urban/rural lines. The part of the constituency which falls within the boundaries of the old city predominantly votes in the favour of PPP(P) while the suburbs usually are aligned with ANP and JI. In 2008 elections, the contest was between Syed Ayub Shah of PPP and Ghulam Ahmad Bilour of ANP. Ghulam Ahmad Bilour was considered the stronger candidate who was also the senior vice president of ANP but the family reputation had received severe dents following the murder of Syed Qamar Abbass (Former Provincial Minister and General Secretary PPP(P)NWFP) and the nephew of PPP(P) candidate Haji Iqbal on the PF-3 constituency in which members of Ghulam Ahmad Bilour family have directly been named. They were also facing criticisms from within the party as three members of the same family are standing within this constituency. As Ghulam Ahmad Bilour’s brother Bashir Ahmad Bilour and his son Haroon Bilour were standing from PF-3 and PF-2 respectively. Another brother of Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Ilyas Bilour is a senator from ANP ticket while his son is the president of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce. There is large scale discernment within the party as its becoming a family soap opera for most of the ANP supporters in the area. The wave of Public sentiment after the killing of Benazi Bhutto also worked in favour of Syed Ayub Shah of PPP (P) who belongs from a lower middle class background and was generally thought of as a very humble person and in highregards. 5.14 THE CONSTITUENCY NA-1 composed of 145 polling stations in 1988-1993 and 201 polling stations in 1997. The constituency has been classified as’ upper class; middle class; or industrial 204 Approximately 25 per cent of those who voted in 1993 lived in elite residential neighborhoods in the polling areas of Wazir Bagh (West East, and Central). Quaid-eAbad, and Kakshal. Another 45 per cent lived in middle and upper-middle class neighbourhoods in the polling areas of Nauthia, Dabgari, Gor Gathri, Nishtarabad, and Sarfaraz Colony. About 30 per cent lived in working class neighbourhoods in the industrial polling areas of Railway Quarters, Kohat Road, Pandu Road, and Gulbahar. Many of the inhabitants of this last category are employed in the factories located in and around Peshawar’s Industrial Area. These polling areas are located on the city’s southern periphery so they are also home to sizeable populations of rural-to-urban migrants, and therefore share some of the characteristics of the ‘urban-periphery’ polling areas discussed earlier. 5.14 THE CANDIDATES ANP affiliated politician Bashir Ahmad Bilour was born in December 1939, Bilour got his early education from the Khudad Model School and Islamia School Peshawar. As a youth, Bilour participated in the election campaign of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah. He, however, joined active politics from the platform of the Awami National Party (ANP) in the 1970s and ever since has remained with the nationalist party. Ghulam Ahmad Bilour was first elected to the National Assembly in the 1988 by-elections. In the 1990 elections, he again contested for the National Assembly and defeated the late Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. Bilour recollects that the people of his constituency did not let him down in that crucial contest, which was perhaps the toughest of his long political career. In the 1993 elections, he lost to Zafar Ali Shah but regained the National Assembly seat in the 1997 elections. Bilour did not contest the 2002 elections. He was again elected to the National Assembly in the 2008 general elections, and is currently the federal minister for local government and rural development. Only late Ajmal Khattak and Afzal Khan Lala have been associated with the ANP for longer period than Ghulam Ahmad Bilour. Of his more than 30-year-long political career, he has spent six years behind the bars on different counts. He is widely respected for not compromising on principles and remaining loyal to the party. He considers securing the rights of the people of the province as his greatest achievement; and losing his only son, Shabbir Ahmed Bilour, during the 1997 elections as his greatest loss. About entrance into politics he was also influenced by parental sociological patterns as explained in Michigan Model. As a youth I participated in the election campaign of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, when she was contesting for the seat of president as a candidate of the Combined Opposition Party against Ayub Khan in 1965. I was not affiliated with any political party at that time. Late in the 1970s, I decided to join the ANP as my father was a great admirer of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his political ideas. I was 205 also impressed by Bacha Khan and the sacrifices he had rendered for the people of this area during the British Raj. Since then, I have strongly adhered to the political manifesto of the ANP, and worked hard to strengthen it in Peshawar in particular and the province in general. It was the result of my hard work that the ANP won many National Assembly and NWFP Assembly seats from Peshawar in the recent general elections.23 The PPP affiliated politician Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao was also the prominent political figure during 1988-1999 from Peshawar. The rise of the Sherpao family to political eminence has come within a short span of time. This is remarkable given the fact that its home province, the NWFP, has traditionally been dominated by veterans like late Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, his later brother Dr Khan Sahib (Abdul Jabbar Khan) and his son Abdul Wali Khan. Besides the Khudai Khidmatgars (God's servants) movement, led by Bacha Khan, this politically fertile land has given birth to a peasant movement led by late Major Ishaq Mohammad and Afzal Bangash in the early seventies. Some of the leaders of this romantic revolutionary movement are still alive nursing their nostalgia. Hayat Mohammad Khan was amongst the earliest lieutenants of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who brought politics out of the cozy drawing rooms to the masses. He made an enduring relationship with the people, particularly the lowest strata of society. In 1967, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called his friends at Sherpao to discuss his idea of launching a new political party in the country. He went back with some half-baked ideas and assembled his colleagues at the residence of Mubashir Hasan in Lahore. The Pakistan People's Party was born. Like Yahya Bakhtiar, at that time, Hayat Khan was also in the then Council Muslim League. His late father Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider was a staunch supporter of the Muslim League. Hayat Khan was the youngest governor of the province. He was a senior provincial minister, when he was killed in a bomb blast on Feb 8, 1975, in Peshawar University. His assassination stalled, for a while, the PPP's smooth sailing in the province. After his death, ZAB got his younger brother, Major Aftab Sherpao, retired from the army, and nominated him PPP's provincial vice-president. When Nasrullah Khattak disappeared from the political scene, Aftab was elevated as the party's provincial president24. Aftab remained at the forefront during Ziaul Haq's regime. In 1988, he manoeuvred the fall of the PML's government and became chief minister of the province. He took an extra-nationalist line to appease the nationalist forces, hostile to the PPP, and broadened his political base in their stronghold areas. In the PML's second tenure, when he was on the opposition benches, he tabled a resolution, demanding that the name NWFP be replaced with Pakhtoonkhawa, and then he left the field for the centrifugal ANP and the centripetal PML to expose themselves. The house defeated the PML but NWFP's name could not be changed owing to constitutional constraints. 206 Aftab Sherpao, made of a sterner stuff, emerged as a shrewd politician in the province. He succeeded in securing the support of a big chunk of bureaucrats and is one on whom the establishment can bank. His close aides believe that he will make a comeback and will play an important role in the country's future politics. His differences with Benazir Bhutto came to light, when Maj-Gen Naseerullah Babar mistakenly suspected Aftab's role in the allotment of party tickets in Nowshera.25 Babar considered it a move by Aftab to undercut him, though that had no basis. After that Babar sided with all those, Masood Kausar and Khwaja Hoti, who were opposed to Aftab. Now Aftab is running his faction of the PPP. Speaking to a public meeting on Feb 8, on the occasion of his elder brother's death anniversary in Sherpao, he called on Benazir Bhutto to restore democracy in the PPP, if she wanted democracy in the country". But, some of Aftab's close aides say that they had not yet severed ties with BB. They hope that Ms Bhutto will carry all of them along in her political struggle. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27 December 2007 in Liaqat Bagh Rawalpindi during her election campaign. Aftab and his like-minded group think that politics has become a hostage to the powers-that-be. When Aftab Shaban Mirani was made defence minister instead of Naseerullah Babar, it was to be attributed to the weakness of the party. They are caught in a dilemma: the party's agenda as an opposition force does not work when it comes into power. They find their future only in provincial politics. Aftab's family tree and cross-marriages in other influential families has given him an edge over others in his ambition of realizing his dream of reaching the corridors of power. His elder brother, Wali Mohammad Khan, was related to the former president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari. He himself is a son-inlaw of the Nishtar family. Two of his cousins, Abbas Khan (former IGP, Punjab) and Azam Khan (former chief secretary of NWFP), carry much weight in local administration. His elder son, Sikandar, has already jumped into politics. In 1988 elections, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao won the election on PPP ticket by defeating ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour with vote’s difference of 8711. In 1990, the political situation changed and the PPP leader Benazir Bhatto contested against Bashir Bilour of ANP from this constituency while Aftab contested from NA-2. Bashir Bilour defeated PPP leader Benazir Bhutto by vote difference of 12282. In 1993 again PPP, Zafar Ali Shah taking lead over ANP by defeating constantly contesting candidate of ANP, Bashir Ahmad Bilour. In 1997, ANP once again defeated PPP contester Qamar Abbass by vote difference of 14655. So NA-1 is the constituency of two parties, ANP and PPP while IJI/PML-N supported ANP candidates against PPP. 5.16 NA-1 RESULTS Following Table provides the 1988 and 1997 election results for each of NA-1’s polling areas. It is evident from the table that the PPP’s strength was in the industrial 207 areas, and the ANP’s strength in the remaining middle and upper class areas. They also reveal the consistent decline in the PPP’s percentage of the vote in all 15 polling areas, and the increase in the ANP’s totals. Table 5.9: PPP Electoral Results in Peshawar. Name of Polling area S. Areas No 1 Nauthia 2 Civil Quarters 3 Railway Quarters 4 Wazir Bagh 5 Asia Park 6 Dabgari 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Jehingirpura Shahi Katha Yakatoot Zargarabad Ganj Gate Lahori Gate Peshawar City Andar Sher Sheikh Abad Gulbahar Nishtar Abad Shahi Bagh Peshawar Cantt Landi Arbab Beri Bagh Hassan Garhi Lateefabad Total Upper Class Total Middle Class Total Lower Total PPP votes Category Middle Class Middle Class Lower Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Upper Class Upper Class Middle Class Middle Class Upper Class Middle Class Lower Middle Class Middle Class 1988 67.28 45.83 41.47 39.94 48.02 50.41 60.15 59.02 52.91 36.39 63.49 54.50 70.19 60.18 35.43 49.41 54.20 54.44 53.52 40.96 42.36 56.80 46.36 46.12 53.39 41.91 47.14 1990 50.37 31 34.16 24.81 41.80 38.28 48.77 4.98 43.11 19.63 60.27 49.90 59.55 49.74 22.98 38.79 39.79 42.41 42.29 32.36 31.97 46.06 36.92 34.69 39.99 33.06 35.91 1993 51.59 40.66 38.41 29.12 48.82 42.18 49.28 56.41 49.93 25.26 59.66 52.96 49.25 51.28 28.47 41.42 43.33 38.21 39.95 39.12 38.61 48.94 39.20 36.61 45.29 38.51 40.14 1997 31.79 16.93 18.77 14.80 24.89 15.04 31.21 30.53 17.35 30.52 49.81 43.52 57.27 30.38 22.01 51.08 35.87 42.59 31.57 24.70 20.66 34.89 21.01 34.89 30.73 19.71 28.44 Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3. Table 5.10 shows the electoral trends in favour of PPP in middle, lower and upper class poling areas. ANP vote position in NA-1 polling areas are shown in table 5.10. The major political parties in electoral politics of NWFP during 1990s were ANP and PPP. The party of Nawaz Sharif PML-N had alliance with ANP during the 1990s. So electoral trends in Peshawar revolves around two parties ANP and PPP and two other minor groups i.e religious parties and independents. ANP, is also one of the leading Political party in Peshawar. PPP and ANP both have mixed vote bank in different clusters of Peshawar. PPP and ANP vote bank fluctuated in each election as shown in table 5.9 and 5.10. 208 Table 5.10: ANP vote position in NA-1. Name of Polling area S. Areas No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Nauthia Civil Quarters Railway Quarter Wazir Bagh Asia Park Dabgari Jehingirpura Shahi Katha Yakatoot Zargarabad Ganj Gate Lahori Gate Peshawar City Andar Sher Sheikh Abad Gulbahar Nishtar Abad Shahi Bagh Peshawar Cantt Landi Arbab Beri Bagh Hassan Garhi Lateefabad Total Upper Class Total Middle Class Total Lower Class Total ANP Category Middle Class Middle Class Lower Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Middle Class Upper Class Upper Class Middle Class Middle Class Upper Class Middle Class Lower Middle Class Middle Class 1988 27.28 48.51 50 53 46.87 43.87 35.23 36.38 42.11 52.09 32.20 38.79 25.52 31.52 57.87 43.81 40.04 37.40 40.04 51.26 50.18 35.10 43.79 47.24 40.05 50.09 45.79 1990 42.88 62.46 59.50 67.76 51.96 55.43 46.53 17.16 51.31 71.95 33.97 43.86 35.40 44.51 70.35 55.44 55.31 50.72 52.03 60.80 59.92 46.46 54.38 59.27 49.60 59.71 56.19 1993 35.07 45.14 46.87 47.60 38.16 43.89 38.61 34.25 37.05 47.81 43.49 36.78 27.57 33.68 45.75 42.85 41.74 37.35 42.39 40.78 39.38 29 28.77 43.66 38.15 43.13 41.65 1997 64.30 79.80 78.70 82.92 73.85 82.86 66.60 67.72 79.98 66.40 48.32 55.08 41.33 66.66 72.23 46.83 61.66 55.67 65.82 72.39 74.83 59.49 72.29 61.63 66.52 76.77 68.31 Source: Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3. Religious parties could not show better results in NA-1. In 1993 PIF candidate Haji Dost Mohammad contested elections from this constituency and could get only 9725 209 votes. Table 5.12 shows that ANP and PPP were the major leading parties from NA-1. The turnout declined in 1997 elections as voters were disillusioned by what they perceived as repeated and useless elections. Voters had no other option except PPP and ANP and they were frustrated from the policies of PPP and ANP. Voters felt that both parties were corrupt but they opted for the least corrupt while voting.26 Table 5.11: Votes cast infavour of each party: Parties PPP/PDA ANP NDP PAT HPG PIF AQP Independent Valid Rejected Total Registered Percentage Winner Number of votes in each election 1988 1990 44658 38951 35947 51233 Not contested 204 Not contested Not contested Not contested Not contested 4161(2) 84766 1470 86236 226170 38.13 PPP 373 Not contested Not contested Not contested 4546 (6) 95307 1209 96516 228734 42.20 ANP 1993 40343 35755 Not contested Not contested 91 9725 Not contested 3992 (5) 89906 1925 91831 248765 36.91 PPP 1997 11275 25930 Not contested Not contested Not contested Not contested 49 687 (5) 37941 385 38326 260968 14.68 ANP Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). 5.17 COMPARISON OF 1988-1997 RESULTS Comparing the 1988 and 1997 election results reveals interesting similarities in voting patterns through the years. The 1988 Peshawar constituency of NA-1 was the major contest between one major National Party (PPP) and Regional Party (ANP). In the polling areas that are today in NA-1, PPP’s weakest results were in Gulbahar and Nishtar Abad where PPP won 52.4 per cent of the vote in both. PPP’s strongest result was in Peshawar cantonment where he won 67.3 per cent of the vote.27 Similarly, the PPP was still receiving its lowest results from middle and upper class polling areas of Gulbahar and Gulshan Rehman. This comparison lends support to the perception that the PPP’s policies during the 1990s further lost the party support from the already skeptical middle classes, but that among the urban poor, at least until 1993, its popularity remained strong. 5.18 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VOTING BEHAVIOUR (PESHAWAR) Most urban constituencies have separate male and female polling stations which make it possible to analyse gender differences in voting behaviour. Table 5.13 gives a detailed breakdown of the 1988-1997 election results for NA-1 by category of polling area, and factors in gender differences in voting behaviour as well as voter turnout.28 The patterns of male and female voting behaviour in NA-1 are consistent with those examined in previous Chapter for the NWFP’s urban constituencies as a whole. The 210 preference of female voters for the ANP/PML (N) over the PPP is clearly evident as women voted in higher percentages than men for ANP/PML (N) candidates in all three categories of polling areas. The differences between female and male support for the ANP/PML (N) was greater in upper and middle class polling areas than in industrial polling areas, indicating that women living in middle and upper class polling areas were more likely to vote independently of their male family members than women living in poorer polling areas. Table 5.12: NA-1 Election Results by Gender and Class Polling area Category Upper Total Middle Total Male Industrial Total Male Total Female Grand Total Source: Calculated from Election Commission of station results), for NA-1. Female Male Female Male Female 1988 46.5 41.2 43.85 47.7 44.5 46.16 63.2 63.3 1990 36.2 31.2 36.41 34.23 53.12 53.52 PPP 1993 45.3 40.3 42.8 48.9 45.5 47.2 64.9 62.8 1997 24.8 21.2 27.5 25.2 43.8 43.2 63.25 63.85 51.2 41.5 53 32.3 48.4 38.5 48.9 27.2 51.78 40.42 50.17 29.31 Pakistan. ‘Form XVII Result of the Count’ (Polling The ANP and IJI/PML(N)’s coalition advantage with women voters was already evident in 1988, when it won 49.4 per cent of the total female vote compared with 45.3 per cent of the total male vote. Between 1988 and 1997, however, female support for the ANP/PML(N) increased by 4.1 per cent and male support by only 1.9 per cent. Table 5-5 given the voter who turnout figures for the respective polling areas categories by gender. The 43.8 44.8, and 42.9 per cent of registered voters who turned out to vote in the upper, middle, and industrial polling areas respectively, indicate there was not a major difference in voter turnout the three different polling area categories. These figures seem to indicate that in 1993, at least, the popular perception that the upper classes all stay at home on Election Day is not entirely accurate. There was a significant difference between male and female voters, with the overall turnout of the being 46.9 percent and the latter only 40.4 per cent. Women living in the poorer industrial polling areas were the least likely vote (38.1 per cent). The significantly lower female voter turnout weakens the argument of many PPP supporters that the PPP’s poor performance with women voters was a result of massive rigging in the female polling stations. If as they allege, thousands of bogus female votes were registered in each urban constituency, and in particular in the poorer neighborhoods, 211 female voter turnout should be equal to or higher than male turnout, and should be particularly high in the poorer polling areas. Table 5.13: Results of ANP. Polling area’s Category Upper Total Middle Total Male Industrial Total Female Male Female Male Female 1988 36.2 31.6 33.9 37.5 35.4 36.45 53.8 53.4 1990 37.2 42.1 39.65 48.2 47.3 47.75 63.2 63.4 ANP 1993 27.4 30.2 28.8 37.2 35.2 36.2 41.4 41.2 1997 53.2 58.2 55.7 64.4 62.2 63.3 77.8 77.5 53.6 63.3 41.3 77.65 Male 41.5 53.1 39.5 67.4 Total Female 38.4 50.2 36.2 63.5 Grand Total 39.95 51.65 37.85 65.45 Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan. ‘Form XVII Result of the Count’ (Polling station results), for NA-1 A more convincing explanation is the PPP does not do well with women because it is less effective at organizing the women’s vote on election day As one PPP campaign worker from NA-1 observed; You see what happened in Andher Sher-my problem is manning the female polling stations with women who can read and write. In ’88 I had to hire about 15 per cent of the polling station agent-they were teachers, etc… There were enough volunteers from the People’s Party but they couldn’t read and write. If you can’t read and write there is no point in doing the polling station duty-you can do transport duty or bring out the voters, but you can’t be in the polling stations because you have to tick names off lists, and you have to know what is going on, and when counting takes place you have to be able to see what the person is writing down. Now when you were hiring these people you don’t know who they are. You’re paying them Rs.200-300, somebody else pays them Rs.500 and they’ll do anything. I don’t know if you walked into a polling station but there is a tremendous difference [between the PPP and ANP female polling agents].29 The explanation given by Salman Bangash, an academician from Peshawar, was as follows: In NWFP the majority of women are religious. They are very conscious about ethics, character for their children, for society, for a family system. The majority of women dislike the women who associate in mixed gatherings. This is a fact that the majority of women are anti-People’s Party because they think that the People’s Party represents the liberal, the anti-Islamic, the western civilization.[I]f they have a choice, they always vote anti-People’s Party.30 5.19 PARTY/LEADER IDENTIFICATION: The solidity of the PPP’s’vote bank’, and the extent to which voters voted for parties rather than for candidates in 212 NA-1, is shown clearly by comparing the National Assembly results with the results of the Provincial Assembly elections held two days later. NA-1 is divided into two Provincial Assembly constituencies PF-1 and PP-2. Approximately 40 per cent of the voters in PF-1 live in the upper class polling areas of Kekshal (West, East, and Central) and Jehangirpura. The remaining 60 per cent live in the industrial polling areas of Dabgari, Zargarabad and Andher Sher (inner city). PF-2 includes the upper class polling area of New Gulbahar, Sathian and Nishtar Abad, as well as the middle and upper middle class polling areas of Sheikhabad, Sikandarpura. Zaryab colony, Dilazak, Nanakpura and Gojiwara. Table 5-6 compares the results in PF-1 and PF-2 with their equivalent polling area results in NA-1. Table 5.14: Provincial Assembly and National Assembly Election Results: Constituency Parties PPP ANP IJI/ PML-N Religious Others PPP ANP IJI/ PML-N Religious Others PPP ANP PF-2 IJI/ PML-N 1988 51.78 41.68 0 0 5.23 38.31 31.91 15.16 8.89 4.23 56.85 22.51 18.33 1990 40.42 53.18 0 0 7.21 36.01 52.89 0 9.33 3.23 40.38 0 51.84 1993 50.17 39.36 0 10.73 1.24 39.13 39.26 0 2.37 19.27 47.14 0 44 1997 29.31 67.76 0 0 5.62 22.78 70.80 0 0 7.88 26.06 0 44.29 NA-1 PF-1 Religious 0 4.86 Others 4.26 5.2 PPP 19.67 11.75 ANP 20.68 29.20 PF-3 IJI/ PML-N 19.18 0 Religious 5.97 9.37 Others 20.42 50.37 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). 3.27 0 5.8 23.23 37.06 24.47 41.20 52.60 0 0 3.44 0 18.3 1.1 II: Comparative Statistics For The 1988-1997 PPP candidate in PF-1 was Mr. Ayub Shah who, had won in 1988 by defeating ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour with the difference of 2245 votes. Bashir Bilour contested two seats, one from NA-1 and one from PF-1 but defeated on both seats. In by-elections he was able to win the National Assembly seat, this seat vacated by Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, as he retained provincial assembly seat for chief ministership. In 1990 ANP candidate Bashir Ahmad Bilour defeated the PPP candidate with the huge margin of 5552 votes. The contest in 1993 was very close and ANP candidate Bashir Bilour won with 42 votes by defeating PPP candidate, Ayub Shah. In 1997 ANP candidate Bashir Bilour won the elections. The most interesting results were drawn by Religious Parties including JUI-F in PF. In all these elections the third party was JUI-F. It has been seen by the results of Religious parties that, whenever little bit increase came in religious votes then elections results of ANP and PPP changed alternatively. It is surprising given Bilour’s prior experience in the constituency, and greater appeal than Ayub Shah among the elite 213 voters, he did not secure more votes. He won almost the same number of votes as Ayub in 1993, indicating that PPP supporters voted along party lines irrespective of the merits and demerits of the respective PPP candidates. As Ayub Shah is a Syed and Bashir a Bilour, it also indicates that biradari was not a significant determinant of voting behaviour in central Peshawar. The PPP and ANP candidate were the same during 1990s, both familiarity with the constituency and contest always were tough. From PF-2, PPP candidate Qamar Abbas defeated ANP candidate Mr. Adeel Ahmad with the difference of 9429 votes. The third candidate was Shabir Ahmad from IJI. During 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections, PML-N and ANP’s electoral alliance made a better position in electoral politics. During these elections, ANP supported PML-N candidate in Provincial seat and PML-N supported ANP on National assembly seats. This strategy seems to be useful to bring ANP in National politics and PML-N into provincial Politics. The major benefit was to the PML-N as it established its own government in NWFP after 1990, 1997 with the coalition of ANP. During 1990 and 1993 the PPP and IJI/PML-N contests were very close. In 1990s, IJI candidate, Haji Mohammad Javed defeated Syed Zafar Ali Shah with the margin of 3138 votes. In 1993 Qammar Abbas, a PPP candidate defeated PML-N candidate Syed Ali shah with the difference of 853 votes. In 1997, PML-N candidate Syed Ali Shah defeated PPP candidate Qamar Abass with great difference of 3397. PML(N)/ANP voters also appeared to vote along party lines rather than for the candidates. The only difference was the split in the conservative vote caused by the religious parties. CONCLUSIONS Through an analysis of polling areas results from the 1988-1997 elections, this chapter has shown that while levels of support for the PPP and the ANP have changed over time, patterns of support have remained consistent. In all four elections the PPP did best in the urban-rural periphery areas and in the polling areas with large concentrations of industrial labour, which confirmed its reputation as the party of the poor. The ANP always received its strongest support from the middle and upper class polling areas. These findings were supported in the more detailed analyses of various constituency results which showed that class still played an important role in determining voting behaviour. The case study on NA-1 also revealed that there were gender differences as well, and that female voters preferred the ANP to the PPP. Biradari did not seem to be a major determinant of voting behaviour except perhaps in some of the polling areas in the urban-rural periphery of the city. Candidate loyalty also did not seem to be a major determinant as relatively unknown candidates like Zafar Ali Shah got victory in 1993 and Qammar Abbas were able to go considerable votes on PPP ticket in 1997 elections. The major conclusion of this chapter is that the most important determinant of voting behaviour in Peshawar was 214 party or party leader identification. Almost all those who held PPP and ANP ticket holders won elections alternatively due to party identification. 1 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 2002) 2 During the anti-government campaigns against General Ziaul Haq’s martial law regime, Peshawar remained uncharacteristically docile. 3 Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002), pp.1-2. 4 Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level N.W.F.P. (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of statistics, 2002), p.3. 5 6 7 Ibid. Ibid., p.21 Javed Kamran Bashir, N.W.F.P. Elections of 1970: An Analysis (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973), p.1 8 9 Calculated from ‘Form XVII, Result of the Count’ (Polling Station results), for NA 1,2,3. It is important to bear in mind the limitations of using aggregate data, in this case polling station’s results, to predict the voting behaviour of individuals living in polling units. Thus, while we can make generalization about how, middle class wards’ or ‘industrial wards’ vote. We cannot conclude from this how middle class voters or industrial voters vote. 10 For a more detailed definition and discussions on this subject, see the section on biradari in chapter eight. 11 Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level N.W.F.P. (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2002), p.305 12 Arguably, many of the lower middle class polling areas could have been classified under the eighth category of ‘lower class’. This was not done in order to keep the number of categories to a minimum. Furthermore, while the distinction between the lower middle and lower-middle class areas are more difficult due to the higher population densities and more complex residential patterns in these areas. It was therefore decided to use only the one category of lower middle class, bearing in mind that these areas also include sizeable lower class neighbourhoods and katchi abadis. 13 The figure in the last three columns led some support to those who argue that the 1990 elections were partially rigged. Whereas voter turnout statistics have tended to decline steadily, there was a suspicious increase of 2.2 percent in Peshawar in 1993 where less than the number cast in 1990, despite the fact that more than 100000 new voters were registered during this period. 14 15 16 17 Between 1988 and 1997, the number of votes won by the ANP, while those of the PPP decreased. Muhammad Jawad, Interview by author, Peshawar, 08 May 2010. Haq Nawaz, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 26 August 2008. See, Daily The News, 9 September 1993. 215 18 There are four prominent Arbab Families in Peshawar. These families are living in Landi Arbab, Budhai, Daudzai and Tehkal. They were given the title of Nawaban of Peshawar. Arbab's residing in Landi Arbab are known as "Momands" by Tribe and Arbab's residing in Tehkal are known as "Khalils" tribe. In Peshawar Khalil and Momand were two brothers Migrated from Afghanistan. Arbab family of Peshawar has so many contributions in the field of politics and still remains the repute of a very good family. Arbabs often owned much of the land surrounding cities where they grew produce for the city markets. As cities expanded outward, so did the value of his land, and with it the economic and political fortunes of many Arbabs. Their political fortunes further improved under the rule of fellow Chief Ministership of Arbab Jehangir Khan, who patronized many from his biradari, specially those from his home town of Peshawar. 19 Election results shows that ANP and PPP contest during 1990s were very close, both the parties could not make an alliance with Religious parties however Nawaz Sharif extended full support to ANP due to electoral alliance. 20 See Kamila Hayat, ‘For the poor, Democracy Means Nothing at All’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 9 December 1994, 10 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Tahir Khalil, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 28 August 2008. Arbab Aslam, Interview with author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 19 March 2008. Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 19 March 2008 http://www.pashtunforum.com/pashtun-history-8/aftab-ahmad-khan-sherpao-2335. ibid Haji Adeel, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 21 March 2008. Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). 28 The poling list giving the number of registered voters for each polling station could not be located for 1988, so it was not possible to calculate 1988 voter turnout statistics by gender and ward category. 29 30 Name withheld, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar 20 April 2008. Salman Bangash, Interview by author, Peshawar, 25 April 2008. 216 CHAPTER: 6 PARTY POLITICS IN NWFP 1988-1999 6. INTRODUCTION Party politics in NWFP had two dimensions. One was party politics at mainstream level, i.e. Macro Level and the other was party politics at the constituency level, i.e. Micro Level. Both levels go parallel to safeguard politician, voters and party interest as per Downs’s theory. Political players in NWFP seek two prong strategies while contesting elections. On the one hand they need electoral constituency to win the election and on the other hand a space in political party or alliance(s) that has enjoyed power. In this chapter both macro and micro level strategy will be discussed. 6.1 PARTY POLITICS AT MACRO LEVEL IN NWFP The political situation in NWFP is different from the other provinces of Pakistan in its historical and socio-cultural aspects. It is in the multi-polar mode with four major players, and can be called it Quad-polar: the PPP, the ML(s), the Religious parties (JUI, JI) and the Regional/Ethnic Political party (ANP). Since 1970, each one of the four has secured around 20% of the vote although there have been ebbs and flows from election to election. All the same, at one or another election, none has ever crossed 40% limit on its own. The NWFP electoral politics is one of alliances or electoral seats adjustments with ethnic political party or independents. The data in table 6.1 show that until 1997 the Muslim League vote had been steadily rising since early nineties (a gain of 10% points since 1988) cutting into the earlier vote bank of PPP, which had been losing its share of votes. Since the 1970 elections it seems that there are four clusters of voters: The PPP cluster, the Muslim League(s) cluster, the Religious Parties cluster and Regional Parties cluster. Past electoral behaviour shows that roughly 60% to 75% of votes are claimed by the first two clusters (PPP and ML) while the remaining gets distributed among the other two clusters as well as independents and miscellaneous parties.1 Since the 1970 elections it seems that there are four clusters of voters. The PPP cluster, the Muslim League(s) cluster, the Religious Parties cluster and Regional Parties cluster. Past electoral behaviour shows that roughly 60% to 75% of votes are claimed by the first two clusters (PPP and ML) while the remaining gets distributed among the other two clusters as well as independents and miscellaneous parties.2 217 Table 6.1: Voting percentage of political parties in NWFP. Major Political Parties PPP and PPPled Alliances PML and PML Led Alliances Religious Parties Primarily JUI and JI % of votes No. of seats % of votes No. of seats % of votes 1970 14% 1 27 7 33% 1988 23% 9 27 8 JUI-F: 11% 1990 23% 5 24 8 JUI-F: 20 % 1993 16% 6 32 10 PIF: 11% MDM:2% IJM: 11% PIF (2) MDM (1) IJM (2) 15 3 13 2 1997 10% 0 37 15 JUI-F: 8% JI Boycott No. of seats 6 4 JUI-F: 4 0 Regional Parties Primarily ANP Others % of votes No. of seats % of votes No. of seats 19 3 7 8 18 2 21 3 15 6 18 3 19 10 26 1 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) In the 1970 elections the PPP won only one national assembly seat and three provincial seats from NWFP. NAP, QML and JUI emerged as leading political parties by winning 11, 9 and 4 seats respectively out of 80 provincial assembly seats. After the election JUI formed a coalition government in NWFP with NAP up to 15 February 1973 when JUI coalition government resigned on federal government decision to dissolve the Baluchistan government.3 There were four political parties in NWFP during 1990s electoral politics. These were PPP, PPP led electoral alliance PDA in 1990 elections, PML-N, and PML led electoral alliance IJI in 1988 and 1990 elections and ANP. JUI-F also had a considerable vote bank in NWFP. PML-Nawaz group contested 1988 and 1990 elections from the platform of IJI and PPP in 1990 contested elections from the platform of PDA. From 1988-1999 no political party had got clear majority from NWFP so coalition governments were established during this period. Each political party had their own vote bank in different parts of the province. PML-N had strong hold in North eastern region of NWFP (Hazara), ANP in Central Pakhtun districts and JUI-F in DI. Khan. PPP had a mixed share throughout NWFP depending on the reputation of its ticket holders. At the macro level, during the period under study there were four major parties in NWFP including two mainstream political parties of Nawaz and Benazir, one ethnic and religious parties. Level of support of these parties and percentage of winning the seats varies from 1988-1997 elections and it depends on various factors. 4 There were different complex set of factors contributed to power struggle in NWFP and no list of explanations will be 218 comprehensive. This study has selected the following factors that to a greater or lesser extent contributed to political development. The political legacy of PPP Legacy of Zia-ul-Haq and the rise of PML-N Ethnic/Regional Legacy of ANP in NWFP Religious Legacy of Islamic Parties: Transformation and fragmentation in NWFP and military-mullah intervention to establish conservative thoughts and military backed political environment for religious parties in NWFP. 6.1.1 POLITICAL LEGACY OF PPP: The legacy of PPP and the policies of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from 1971-1977 still influence the voting behaviour of many voters5. The PPP popular slogan i.e. Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our politics, Socialism is our Economy and All Power to the People attracted voters from NWFP. Even though the PPP founder Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was defeated by JUI leader Mufti Mehmood in the 1970 elections from DI. Khan with the difference of 10,000 votes6 the PPP policies seem to exert a considerable impact on the electoral politics of NWFP. There is a positive legacy that still wins the party support from PPP ‘jiyalas’the diehard party workers whose loyalty to Bhutto and the PPP resulted in lashes, torture, and prison sentences for them during the Zia years. There is still a strong ‘vote-bank’ among industrial labours and the urban and rural poor for the PPP in Peshawar, Mardan and Charsada. But for the urban middle classes in NWFP in general and the business community in particular, there is a strong negative legacy, which continues to influence their political attitudes and behaviour. The urban middle and upper classes have never been the PPP’s strongest supporters7. Even in the 1970 elections, the PPP received the least support in urban NWFP from the middle and upper class neighbourhoods. The policies of the PPP government soon turned the initial ambivalence of the middle classes towards Bhutto into strong dislike. In many cases, they were the ones most adversely affected by these policies, including the nationalization of small and medium sized industries, the nationalization of private schools catering to the middle classes, the politicization of the bureaucracy which reduced their access on the basis of merit to government jobs, and the political abandonment of the urban intelligentsia in favour of the traditional landed elites8. In 1977, these disenchanted middle classes coalesced into a united political force under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA’s agitation movement, which gave the military the excuse it needed to overthrow Bhutto, provides a vivid example of the new-found political strength of the urban middle classes. The PNA 1. 2. 3. 4. 219 Movement also gave birth to the ‘anti-PPP party’-a coalition of primarily urban middle class forces which has remained remarkably resilient through the years. The results of the 1988 and 1993 elections in urban NWFP indicate that while memories of the ‘positive legacy’ that inspired the jiyala and the urban lower classes are beginning to fade, the middle class’s memories of the ‘negative legacy’ are not. For example, despite Benazir Bhutto’s publicly stated support for privatization and an open economy, the business community still explains its dislike and distrust of the PPP by citing the example of her father’s nationalization policy carried out more than twenty years earlier. Few members of the business community seem to remember some of the positive results of nationalization. For example, many of today’s small and mid sized industrialists owe their existence to the PPP’s policy of nationalizing banks owned by industrial families like the Habibs and Saigols. For the first time, many middle class traders and businessmen were able to access credit that previously had been monopolized by a few large industrial houses. One political observer pointed out the double standards as follows: [T]aking the granting of credit facilities out of the hands of a few industrialists was a big service to the majority of the business class, but…they are still anti PPP. The new families, the present boom during Zia’s time-they are all a product of the financial bureaucracy created by Bhutto. Otherwise the Saigols wouldn’t have given loan to any bloody fool and create a rival for them. Similar situation is with the Habibs. Before the nationalization of banks, the ordinary middle class person couldn’t ever imagine getting a loan from a bank. But after nationalization, they were able to cultivate friendship with the middle class bank bureaucrats and got maximum privileges. But they would not utter a word of thanks. All these people do is continue to harp about Bhutto’s nationalization policies. But these same never complain about Ayub’s nationalization of Pakistan Progressive Papers of Mian Iftikharuddin. They supported him in the nationalization. They have double standards.9 Sharafat Ali Mubarak, the President of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry, gave Bhutto’s policies as the most important reason for the business community’s support for Nawaz Sharief and their alliance with ANP during 1990s: [The] element which I consider to be the most important element of all was the shadow or the specter of the horror of the “70s that envelops and surrounds the image of the People’s Party [and which] hasn’t really been wiped out…. The Party promise of the elimination of feudalism to its established principles of socialism could not protect and advance the interests of peasantry in NWFP.10 6.1.2 PPP ORGANISATIONAL WEAKNESSES: The PPP’s maintenance of a strong position in the NWFP in the absence of patronage and support from the provincial bureaucracy is an impressive example of the loyalty of its voters and the appeal of its leader, Benazir Bhutto. In 1988, despite strong opposition from within the ranks of the military and civil bureaucracy, the PPP won the first party-based elections to be held since 1977. Much of this victory, especially in urban constituencies, can be attributed to the ‘positive legacy’ of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 220 referred to earlier, the sympathy vote for the PPP which had been harshly suppressed during the Zia regime, and the appeal of Benazir Bhutto who had fought a long and hard battle for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Once the PPP was in power, however, many voters were disappointed with its performance,11 and did not protest when Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990 on charges of corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement. The PPP’s lackluster performance in office affected the politically aware urban voters more than the rural voters, where a candidate’s reputation is often more important in determining voting behaviour than a political party’s reputation. In retrospect, it now seems that the 1988 elections were the last ones in which the PPP could win seats based on past legacies and sympathies rather than on its performance (or its opponents’ lack of performance) in office. Another important reason for the decline of the PPP in urban NWFP was the weak and divided nature of the PPP party organization. It is particularly important to have strong urban party organizations because party loyalty and party-based voting are much more important in urban areas than in rural areas. The PPP party organization has never been strong, but during the martial law years it was further weakened through repression. From 1977 to 1988, it also operated more as an anti-government protest organization than as a political party oriented towards winning elections. Furthermore, once in power from 1988 to 1990, issues of party organization were not placed high on the agenda. This alienated many party workers who had suffered in the Zia regime (as well as many who had not) and who, perhaps, had high expectations of what the new PPP government could do for them. Nevertheless the lack of attention paid to party organization while in office further weakened the PPP. The BBC correspondent from Peshawar, Haroon-urRasheed, explained the importance of remembering the party. People are no longer working for the party with the same dedication that they used to. This invariably happens when you move from the opposition into government. Once in government, you forget the first Machiavellian maxim that when you become the head of state you shouldn’t forget the party-you shouldn’t give up the party for government. You get government, but use government to strengthen your party. It is a classic PPP thing. Bhutto gave up the party when he became the head of the government, and then he tried to create a new party. But it didn’t have the same kind of organic links as the original PPP. So he began to rely on the bureaucracy and he 221 lost touch with the party, which is why the party wasn’t around to bail him out when he needed it. The same thing happened to Benazir Bhutto12. In the 1990s, the PPP NWFP organization became increasingly divided under the leadership of its President, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao. His differences with Benazir Bhutto came to light, when Maj-Gen Naseerullah Babar mistakenly suspected Aftab's role in the allotment of party tickets in Nowshera in 1993 elections 13 . Babar considered it a move by Aftab to undercut him. After that Babar sided with all those, Masood Kausar and Khwaja Hoti, who were opposed to Aftab. The PPP organization was also divided into different factions and had to deal with an incompetent leadership. It was generally believed that Sherpao deliberately appointed weak figures as PPP office-bearers so that he could control the organization. The factions within the PPP were numerous and were an important contributing factor to the PPP’s poor electoral performance in the NWFP. Factionalism is not a recent phenomenon with in the PPP. Jones points out that four distinct factions-rural political, urban political, Islamic Socialists, and Left Socialists-were visible within the party as early as the party’s founding convention in 196714. According to PPP leader from NWFP: Every leader of the People’s Party is more interested about his rival inside the party than his rival outside the party. Mr. Sherpao may be more interested in what Mr. Naseerullah Baber is doing, and Naseerullah Baber is more interested in knowing what Sherpao is doing, than both of them trying to know what JUI-F and ANP or Nawaz Sharief is doing 15 . There was the Sherpao faction versus the non-Sherpao faction, the old party workers versus the new party workers, and the left versus the right. One of the most important divisions was along class lines, between PPP leaders with working class backgrounds and those from elite families. The highly centralized and personalized nature of the PPP party organization has contributed to factionalism, and has alienated many party workers. Journalist Haq Nawaz points out that while factionalism is not a recent development, the growing personalization of the party is exacerbating the problem: It’s a historical fact that the PPP has always been very factionalized, very personalized. The point is, and what I think is the real complaint against the PPP, is that it has become even more personalized and consequently more factionalized. Because there is no party ideology, party line, party policy on anything. The personality is far more important than anything else… It’s very intriguing, this interview she [Benazir Bhutto] gave to Arif Nizami in the Nation a few months ago, when they asked her, ‘What are the four pillars of your government?’ You expect her to say, ‘Democracy, Parliament, Judiciary etc., and she turned around and said, ‘Asif Zardari, Shahid Hassan Khan, Naheed Khan, and Hussain Haqqani.’ This to me is the epitome of the personalization of her second round in power. The four pillars are people and not institutions and structures16. 222 An important factor contributing to this problem is that like most political parties, the PPP has always appointed rather than elected its office-bearers. While this is commonly justified on the grounds that elections are divisive. The primary argument given by PPP leaders for not holding elections for party leadership positions is that this would be divisive. However, Haneef Ramey, the PPP leader has proposed that party elections be held on the basis of proportional representation in order to strengthen the party’s organisation while minimizing the divisive nature of elections. In a city ward, for example, party election could be held and the winner declared the ward president, the runner-up vice president, the third place candidate the General Secretary, and so on. This would ensure that the party members with the most support in award all office bearers. The ward office bearers, in turn, could elect the city office bearers, and also play a major role in selecting the party’s Provincial and National Assembly candidates from their respective constituencies. The advantage in having elected office bearers is that it would show who had the support of the majority of party members with in a constituency. Furthermore, if ward presidents had to get elected, they would have vested interest in registering new voters and party members in their constituency and doing work in their constituencies to win support.17 It seems more likely that it is done to ensure that power remains in the hands of the party leaders. The consequence, however, was that being a PPP office-bearer was a reflection of the level of support someone had from Benazir Bhutto and the party’s senior leaders, rather than from their party members in their own constituencies. Labour leader Abdullah Qureshi from Peshawar explained: PPP workers are not in touch with the people. They believe in only one thing, to keep his boss happy, and his boss has only one concern, to keep his boss happy, and that person’s only concern is to dance around Begum Benazir Bhutto and to keep her happy. They don’t think that people are with them. They think that people are with Benazir Bhutto. On the other hand, the Muslim League worker is most interested in his constituency18. Afrasiyab Khattak, a Human Rights activist explains that if political parties were organized at the grassroots level, and if party office-because were elected rather than selected, it would reduce the power of the party leaders. This would also strengthen parties at the local level and improve their electoral prospects by ensuring that candidates with the greatest support among party workers are the ones who are given tickets. In 1993, neither the PPP nor the PML (N) had strong formal party organization. The PML (N)’s control over Local Body politics during Zia era, 223 however, gave it a strong informal party organization at the grassroots level. In urban constituencies in particular, PML (N) candidates relied heavily on ward councilors to manage and advise their election campaigns. An important contributing factor to the PPP’s defeat in urban NWFP was the atrophied party organization which was not in a position to assist PPP candidates in mobilizing voters and organizing their campaigns19. 6.1.3 LEGACY OF GENERAL ZIAUL HAQ: Party politics during 1990s were greatly affected by the Zia legacy. One of the reasons for decline in support for the PPP in urban NWFP is the legacy of General Ziaul Haq. While Bhutto and the policies of his government helped create an ‘anti-PPP’ party, the policies of Zia contributed to its expansion and consolidation. On the one hand, he weakened the PPP by banning the party and arresting its leaders and supporters. On the other hand, he patronized and promoted the interests of the conservative urban middle classes who formed the core of the anti-PPP party. In Burki’s words, ‘it was General Ziaul Haq who had his finger on the quickening pulse of the Pakistani middle class’ 20 . He introduced Islamization measures that appealed to the conservative urban middle classes, liberalized the economy which won him the support of the traders and industrialists, and permitted private schools which catered in particular to middle class children to reopen. In exchange for his patronage, the urban middle classes remained politically passive for the duration of Zia’s eleven years in power. One of General Zia’s most durable political legacies, and perhaps the one that has been the most harmful to the PPP, was the ‘localization of politics’. This shifted political attention away from national politics, where the PPP had a comparative advantage as Pakistan’s only major national party, to local politics, where it was politically weak. It also gave birth to a new political class that soon graduated from local politics and effectively began to challenge the PPP in provincial and national politics. The process of ‘localization’ began in 1979 when, after canceling national elections for the second time, Zia announced that there would be elections to ‘Local Bodies’ on a non-party basis21. These were designed to serve as a political pressure valve after two years of military rule, and to deflect people’s attention from national to local issues. In the NWFP, in particular, this strategy proved extremely effective. It helps explain why, for example, when the PPP-led Movement for the Restoration of 224 Democracy (MRD) was causing serious political unrest in Sindh province, the NWFP remained quiet. Labour leader and political activist Abdullah Qureshi explained: Zia did a very clever thing. He introduced Local Bodies and created an absolutely new class of political activists. For example, in 1983 the MRD movement coincided with the Local Body elections. One day I was returning from a demonstration at which only 100 or so people participated, and was feeling very dejected…. I was walking down the Peshawar Sadar, and there I saw various offices of electioneering local body candidates, tape recorders on, banners, flood lights. Suddenly I realized that this is where everyone was-people had an alternative. The youth felt that this was more realistic than my empty talk-it was more exciting than an MRD demonstration22. Local identities and local issues became the substance of NWFP politics. Political loyalties were increasingly determined by family, faction, and biradari ties, and political power was determined by the amount of patronage at one‘s disposal. A classic system of ‘machine politics’ developed where politics consisted not of formulating and implementing public policies or concerning oneself with the national interest, but in assisting constituents with thana katcheri [police station and court house] problems, introducing local community development schemes, and in doling out patronage in the form of government jobs, welfare funds, contracts, licenses, loans, and land23. Zia’s strategy of diverting political energy from national to local issues had the intended effect. During his reign, student politics were reduced from demonstrating over national and even international issues, to fighting over campus dorms. The labour movement was reduced from a powerful political force to a weak and divided movement with little political importance. The political role of biradaris, which had been virtually eliminated in the 1970 elections, again increased in NWFP politics and MNAs/MPAs were converted into glorified councilors, whose days were spent not dealing with national/provincial issues, but with writing chits to get their constituents a job, or to got admission for medical treatments into a hospital, or out of a thana [police station]24. The 1985 National and Provincial Assemblies elections demonstrated that Local Body politics had become the entry point into provincial and national politics. According to one press account, 34 of the 80 members elected to the NWFP Provincial Assembly were sitting members of Local Bodies and others had the strong support of local bodies’ representatives25. This had two important consequences. First, it meant that provincial and national politics began to resemble local body politics. Patronage politics became the order of the day, and representing personal and constituent interests became much more important for legislators than representing national interests. The second important consequence was that this put the PPP which had not actively participated in Local Body politics, at a severe disadvantage. In 1979, many 225 PPP candidates did win in the Local Body elections contesting under the party pseudonym of Awam Dost (friend of the masses). Many of these, however, were subsequently disqualified by the military regime26. Thereafter, the PPP never took an active interest in Local Body politics, and performed poorly in the 1983 Local Body elections. This was not surprising, since an opposition party with no access to patronage and bitterly opposed by the establishment had little chance of electoral success in a system fuelled by patronage and easily manipulated by the bureaucracy. From 1979 to 1985 therefore, the PPP was effectively sidelined from the most important political arena in Pakistan and particularly in NWFP. The PPP’s boycott of the 1985 elections compounded the problem by keeping the party out of the mainstream of politics for another three years. By the time the PPP re- entered the political mainstream at the time of the 1988 elections; the anti-PPP forces had a virtual monopoly of power at the local level, which they were able to use successfully as a platform to challenge the PPP at the provincial and national level. 6.1.4 PATRONAGE OF NAWAZ SHARIF: Another legacy of General Ziaul Haq that contributed to the decline of the PPP and the rise of the PML (N) in urban NWFP is Mian Nawaz Sharief. In 1981, Sharief was inducted into the cabinet of General Ghulam Jillani, Governor of the Punjab. For the next 12 years he held positions that enabled him to consolidate his position in the Punjab in general, and in Hazara region of NWFP in particular. From 1981 to 1985, he had the important portfolio of Finance Minister in the Punjab Provincial Cabinet, and from 1985 to 1990 he was the Punjab Chief Minister. In 1990, Sharief became the first Punjabi to become Prime Minister since Feroze Khan Noon’s ten-month tenure in office in 1958. Nawaz Sharief won the support of many in the Punjab and Hazara who wanted to see a fellow-Punjabi as Prime Minister27. There were strong base of Nawaz Sharief in Hazara region and southern region of NWFP. ‘This is because the Pakhtuns and nonPakhtuns rivalries and close ties of these area with Punjab’28. Without the benefit of being the Chief of Army Staff like Zia, or of having strong ties with the traditional landed elite and the support of their’ vote-banks,’ Sharief relied heavily on patronage to create a base of support for himself, As Finance Minister, Chief Minister, and Prime Minister, he was in a position to dole out patronage, which he did on a scale never before witnessed in Punjab politics. In addition to patronage, Nawaz Sharief had twelve years to develop ties with the Punjab provincial bureaucracy. This helped 226 him to consolidate his position at the expense of the PPP. He was remarkably successful in making the provincial bureaucracy subservient to a civilian politician. The key to his success was his discovery that the carrot was much more effective than the stick when dealing with the bureaucracy. Whereas Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had sought to subdue the bureaucracy through intimidation and force, Nawaz Sharief bought their loyalties. During his various tenures in office, Sharief was able to fill thousands of government jobs with his supporters. He appointed hundreds of loyalist police officers, particularly into the lucrative positions of Assistant Sub-Inspectors (ASIs) and Station Head Officers (SHOs). This was especially significant as the police play a central political role in Pakistan because of their ability to selectively apply laws in order to harass political opponents or to turn a blind eye to the misdeeds of political allies. Sharief could also use his position to transfer loyal and pliable bureaucrats into key government posts and to transfer out those who showed signs of independence. His control over the provincial government undoubtedly also made it much easier for those sympathetic to the IJI/PML (N) to register to vote in the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections than or the PPP supporters. While Nawaz Sharief’s twelve-year monopoly over patronage and his control of the provincial bureaucracy played a critical role in the rise of the PML (N) and decline of the PPP in urban Punjab, they are still insufficient explanations. This trend also affected the frontier politics where Nawaz workers extended their links with Punjabi burucracy in NWFP for the deliverance of patronage in their localities. One indication of this is the support for the PML (N) that was visible in the cities and towns throughout the province. In contrast with Nawaz Sharief’s home town of Lahore, many of these had not received much support or development assistance while he was in power. The rise of the PML (N) also cannot be simply explained by an increase in support for the anti-PPP party. Between 1990 and 1993 speech against President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Nawaz Sharief was transformed from a person of the establishment into a popular national leader with a mass following, and in particular a mass urban following. In 1993, there was clearly a considerable vote-bank of proNawaz voters, and not just anti-PPP and pro-patronage voters, which contributed to the PML (N)’s strong performance in urban Punjab and Punjabi cultured areas of NWFP. The real test of the popularity of Nawaz Sharief and the PML (N) will be the extent to which they can retain support out of power, without access to patronage, as the PPP was able to do from 1977 to 1988. 227 6.1.5 TRADE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES IN NWFP IN 1980s: The 1980s were a decade of considerable prosperity in the Pakistan29, as well as in NWFP in general. Remittances from migrant workers in the Gulf, the bonanza of foreign aid following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a series of good harvests, and increasing amounts of drug money all helped to fuel a ‘buoyant and vibrant middle class revolution’ in Pakistan and NWFP 30 . Official statistics indicate that remittance earnings alone during the decade totaled US Dollar 23.2 billion31. Between 1977 and 1988, Pakistan’s GDP grew on average by an impressive 6.9 per cent a year32. Furthermore some have estimated that official statistics reflect only one third of the actual economy, with the balance remaining hidden in the ‘black economy’33. The statistics are reflected in shops stacked with consumer goods, streets crowded with new Japanese vehicles, neightbourhoods filled with ostentatious new marble mansions, restaurants filled to capacity on every other street comer. Ironically, as a result of this prosperity the PPP’s reputation of being the party of the poor, which used to be its greatest strength in urban NWFP, became a partial liability. Many who were inspired by the PPP’s 1970 slogan of ‘roti, kapra, aur makan’ (bread, clothing, and house) were aspiring to own VCRs, satellite dishes, and Suzuki vehicles in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The PML (N), the party of the middle classes, could well have gained much of it support in urban areas because cities and towns prospered and became more middle class. According to I.A. Rehman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the growth of the middle classes was a development the PPP failed to recognizer: [T]he PPP leadership…did not come to grapple with the socioeconomic change s that has been taking place over the last 20 years. In NWFP and in urban areas in particular, people have moved a couple of steps ahead in their pursuit of more rewarding labour. A mechanic has become a shop-owner. A small mechanic has become a bigger establishment. And the PPP, to may mind, did not comprehend the urges of this new addition to the Punjab’s lower middle class34. There is evidence to support the conclusion that as voters moved from the lower classes into the middle classes, they were likely to switch party affiliations from the PPP to the IJI/PML (N). For example, the majority of migrant workers who went to the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s were from the lower classes, and thus likely to have been PPP supporters. The remittances they sent home enabled many of their families to enter the ranks of the middle classes. Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 exit poll survey indicated that 41 per cent of recipients of overseas remittances supported the IJI in 1990, compared with only 31 per cent who supported the PPP 35 . This statistical evidence is supported by anecdotal evidence collected in interviews. Arbab 228 Muhammad Jahangir Khan, a PPP MNA from Peshawar-II in 1993, related the following example. What I have seen in the last ten years is that anyone who starts to prosper economically then wants to change his class. He quietly leaves the PPP, which represents the poorer classes, and tries to join the Muslim League which represents the class which he aspires to become a member of. I’LL give you a very good example. In 1977, there was a man who was a very staunch supporter of PPP. He started a little business exporting garments, and would come to visit me and would get advice from me. As he began to prosper, his support for PPP slowly began to fade….Then come the ’88 elections and I went to him and told him how we had known each other for a long time, how he had supported PPP candidate in ’77, and asked for his support once again. He said, ‘I’m sorry, I never supported you….Your people are terrible people. The PPP is not my party’. I was very surprised but then realized what he was doing. He wanted to leave his old class behind, and the party which represented it, and to enter the new class. He wanted more respect in society and to be viewed as a member of the class of shurafas [respectable people] which they think is represented by the Muslim League36. Abdullah Qureshi, the labour leader, described a similar change in party affiliation that takes place when a landless peasant moves to the city and prospers: The kammies [members of low-status caste-like artisan and service groups] who had no respect, no land, no houses in the village, are the ones who migrate to the cities and adopt the new industrial life of the urban areas. These people are born Bhuttos and give their votes to the Bhuttos. The magic of the PPP is in the villages. Once kammies who move to the cities become prosperous, they leave the PPP and join the Muslim League37. 6.1.6 RISE OF THE TRADERS: Nawaz Sharief was the Pakistan’s first industrialist Prime Minister. Without a traditional rural constituency, it was only natural for him to turn to his friends and colleagues in the business community for support. The traders and industrialists, who during the prosperous 1980s had grown both economically and politically more powerful, gave him their overwhelming support from NWFP. Strong ANP leaders made a power alliance with Nawaz during 1990s. This was a new and important development in politics as the business community has traditionally kept a very low political profile38 . Leading industrial houses often engaged in politics covertly, but they usually tried to protect themselves by maintaining links with both ruling and opposition parties. This cautious approach was not surprising in a country with a highly regulated economy and a high government turnover rate. Overt political support for one government could easily lead to victimization by the next.It is in this context that the open and overwhelming support which the business community gave to Nawaz Sharief gains its significance. This support was dramatically apparent at the time his government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, when several Chambers of Commerce and Industry took out advertisements in the country’s leading newspapers, condemning the act and expressing their solidarity with Nawaz Sharief. This was followed in 1994 and 1995 by a series of overtly political one-day strikes called by the business community to condemn the policies of the PPP government 39 . Mr. Riaz Arshad, a leading 229 industrialist and president of the Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry, dates the increasingly open political involvement of the business community to the restoration of democracy in 1985. Chronologically, I think the revival of democracy which started with Ziaul Haq installing the Junejo government in 1985, would probably be the time when the business community began to become more active in projecting its point of view. This period was preceded by a long period of martial law during which the business community lobbied in a very different manner40. Several factors help explain the willingness of the business community to openly support Nawaz Sharief. The first and most obvious reason was that as fellow businessmen, he and his family had personal links with this community. As a result, the business community had much more access to Nawaz Sharief than to any previous national leader41. They also believed that as an industrialist himself, Nawaz Sharief was committed to reducing the bureaucracy’s control over the economy with a policy of privatization. According to Rahimullah Yosafzai, an analyst from Peshawar: The bureaucracy has been running this country, and even the top industrialists of this country have had to go and grovel in front of Section Officers. They hate that. They think the time has come when they should have a voice in government, and Nawaz is the only one who promises to do that. He’s the only one who did something about it. That’s a very, very important psychological factor. They think that this is our government42. The business community in general viewed Nawaz Sharief as the first political leader who was sympathetic to urban commercial and industrial interests, in contrast with the traditional politicians who defended the rural interests of the landed elites. By the late 1980’s the business community was increasingly viewing politics in terms of urban versus rural interests, or commercial/industrial interests versus feudal interests. Akmal Hussein, an economist and businessman, explained this development as follows. The entrepreneurs and the business elite have recognized that over time economic advantage has been obtained by various pressure groups on the basis of organization…And I think this was the first time that they recognized that if they got their act together and organized, they could influence budget making…If they didn’t get their act together, the government, under pressure to raise revenues, would turn the screws on the entrepreneurs. That is one of the reasons also behind the feudal landlord versus capitalist rhetoric…The capitalists recognized that revenues could also be increased by placing a tax on the rural rich. So where the balance was struck with respect to tapping the available surplus in the urban and rural areas respectively would to some extent depend on how well organized the two elites were-rural and urban.. I think this is a phenomenon we have seen emerging essentially since the end of the Zia regime43. Finally, the business community supported Nawaz Sharief because he generously provided patronage to them in form of government loans, privatized industries, and tax exemptions. As one close observer of NWFP politics noted: You see, the entire business community of Pakistan has not grown in a normal competitive manner. It will be hostile to any effective government. Its liking for Nawaz Sharief was not for ideological reasons, but because of the tradition of a loose and arbitrary government; because he made nonsense of taxation by giving individuals and companies and groups exemptions on a very generous scale; because he was not opposed to the basic, some of them illegal, methods of accumulating money, So this entire industrial and business community grew in a hot house, without their own capital, without their own managerial skill, dependent entirely on the state’s goodwill and public resources and external loans. They would prefer a party that would continue this44. 230 The rise of the trader and industrialist is reflected in the growing number who are being elected as MNAs and MPAs. In the 1970s lawyers dominated urban politics, whereas in the 1990s businessmen and industrialists figure prominently. In Peshawar and Banu, for example, Arbabs, Bilour and Saifullah brothers entered into the industrialist class and extend their coalition with PML-N in 1990s. Labour leader Abdullah Qureshi pointed out the growing political influence of traders: It is now the era of the trading class. In 1975, a trader of Peshawar came to me. He wanted some favour from the Deputy Commissioner and he came to know that I knew the D.C. So he came along in his car and took me to the Commissioner’s office and gave me the application. I told him to come in with me. He said, ‘no, you go-‘officeron se milna leaderon ka kam, Mein bahir kara hun. Ap kam kara lein’ [Meeting with officers is the job of leaders. I will wait outside. You get the work done.] In the 1985 nonparty elections this man was elected as an MPA. He is now a more active politician than the rest of us….45 Traders are now on the rise. Every gulli (street), every bazaar (shoping center), is now organized. Local people take a great interest in elections to their bazaar shopkeepers associations. These traders have ‘shutter power’. If a 2,000 worker factory is closed by workers in a rural area it has no effect. But say the shopkeepers of Qisa Khawani and Sadar Bazar close their shutters for two hours; it will have a much bigger effect. “A very big transformation has taken place ….I have been a great Nawaz Sharief hater, but objectively I have to admit that workers have been leaving the PPP and joining the PML Shopkeepers have led the movement. In every mohallah [neighbourhood] and every gulli (street) there are shopkeepers who have switched their support and are able to influence others to switch their support”46. The economic and political influence of the traders and industrialists is increasing, but their traditional antipathy towards the PPP is not decreasing. At a time when money is playing a more important role in NWFP politics, the support of the commercial and industrialist groups with the greatest access to ready cash has been important factors in helping Nawaz Sharif to strengthen his position. Furthermore, the growing commercial linkages between urban and rural areas also ensures the spreading of the political urban and rural areas also ensures the spreading of the political views and influence of urban traders into rural NWFP. 6.1.7 DECLINE OF ORGANISED LABOUR: Another important factor contributing to the decline of the PPP and the rise of the PML (N) and its coalition partner ANP during 1990s in urban NWFP is that while the social groups most opposed to the PPP-such as the middle classes in general and the business community in particular-are politically ascendant, the groups most supportive of the PPP- such as industrial labour-are in political decline. The labour movement in NWFP has never been particularly strong, but it did play an important role in bringing down the Ayub government in 1969, and in supporting Bhutto in the 1970 elections47. As election results in central NWFP revealed, that the PPP received some of it best results in1988 and 1993 in the wards with the highest concentrations of industrial labour. The most important difference between 1970 and 1993 was that while the majority of industrial workers still appeared to favour the PPP over the PML (N), PPP election campaigns 231 no longer benefited from the organizational abilities of committed labour leaders and cadres of organized workers. After partition Pakistan inherited a very weak labour movement as most of the subcontinent’s industries and organized labour force were in regions that became part of India. The fledgling labour movement that did exist was entered in the Railways and was led by the Communist Party Leader, Mirza Ibrahim. During the 1960’s the workers movement grew along with the rapid industrialization that took place during Ayub’s government and was fuelled by the growing ideological polarization in urban areas between the left and right. Many left-wing student activists entered the labour movement after graduating from universities. Groups such as the Mutahida Mazdoor Majlis-i-Amal, (MMMA) (United Worker’s Action Committee) emerged and began to establish unions in factories and government institutions. Discontent over working conditions and the perception that the benefits of rapid industrial growth were not being shared with the workers, led labour unions to join the student protests against Ayub’s government that eventually forced him to step down in 1969. Bhutto’s socialist slogans and promises to nationalize industries won him the overwhelming support of organized labour during the 1970 election campaign. Even Bashir Bakhtiar, head of the powerful WAPDA union, supported the PPP despite his traditional position that the labour movement should remain aloof from politics and focus on winning workers’ rights. However, following the PPP’s electoral victory, it did not take long for many labour leaders to grow disillusioned with Bhutto. The 1972 police firing on workers demonstrating in Karachi and the dismissal of the left oriented National Awami Party (NAP) governments in the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan and the ban on NAP in 1974 alienated many on the left. Bhutto’s antipathy towards any independent pressure groups led him to adopt a carrot and stick approach to take control of the labour movement. The stick was used to push out the ideologically committed labour leaders whose primary loyalty was to the workers, moment, while the carrot was employed to create a new group of leaders who were politically dependent on Bhutto and the PPP. Increasingly, the labour movement became weak and ineffectual as its ideologically committed leaders were replaced by leaders on the government’s payroll. Despite the weakening of the labour movement and the disaffection of many of its committed activists, the majority of workers benefited from the pro-labour policies of the PPP government and remained strong supporters of Mr. Bhutto. The PPP retained the votes of the majority of 232 workers, but without its militant leadership cadres the labour movement played a much less important role in the 1977 elections than it had in 1970. What was left of the labour movement by the end of the Bhutto period virtually disappeared during the Zia years. Abdullah Qureshi, leader of the Labour Party Pakistan, gave the following reasons for the further decline of the labour movement48. (i) the suppression of the labour movement and its leaders by General Ziaul Haq; (ii) the Gulf phenomenon, whereby the active and dynamic sections of the working class left to make their fortunes in the Gulf states; (iii) the introduction of new technologies that have reduced the need for large numbers of workers in a factory; (iv) the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism and the resulting ideological vacuum on the left; (v) the prosperity of the 1980’s that has contributed to the depoliticization of society; (vi) the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have absorbed many of the leftleaning intellectuals and activists, but have ‘taken out their sting’ by giving them high salaries and comfortable offices far removed from the masses; and (vii) the rise of ethnic politics, which has divided labour unions along ethnic rather than class lines. During the 1980’s labour politics experienced the same ‘localization’ that affected nearly all political activity. Rather than involving themselves in national political issues as they had in the 1960’s and 1970’s trade unions confined their activities to their factories- struggling for salary increases, bonuses, and other privileges. As a result they were sidelined room the mainstream of politics. In 1970, students and labour unions played the most important role in organizing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s campaign in urban NWFP49. By 1990s, these groups no longer played an effective or important role in national and provincial politics, which contributed to the PPP’s poor urban performance in 1990s. 6.1.8 ETHNIC/REGIONAL LEGACY OF ANP IN NWFP: The Awami National Party draws its inspiration from the example and teachings of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as Baacha Khan. The Party is dedicated to the promotion of democracy and freedom, the eradication of poverty, the protection of human rights, the combating of extremism in all its forms and the creation of equal opportunities for all citizens. It firmly believes in peace and non-violence as the best way to resolve all issues. It is committed to securing for all the federating units of Pakistan their full political, social and economic rights as equal partners in the federation and their fair share in national progress and prosperity.50 In 1986, the National Democratic Party 233 merged with several other progressive political and nationalist groups including National Democratic Party, the Awami Tehrik of Sindhi nationalist Rasul Bux Palejo and the Pakistan National Party of the Baluch Nationalist Mir Bux Bizenjo, to form the Awami National Party. Abdul Wali Khan Son of the ‘Frontier Ghandi’ Abdul Ghaffar Khan was elected its first president and Sindhi nationalist Rasul Bakh Palijo was elected its secretary general. The party from 1986-1988 was a member of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The party formed a coalition government with the People's Party in NWFP and Islamabad after the 1988 election. This alliance collapsed in 1989 after differences cropped up between the two parties. After the election of Nawaz Sharief to power after the 1990 elections the ANP again formed a coalition with former rivals Pakistan Muslim League. Ajmal Khan Khattak the president of ANP from 1991-1999 held office in Nawaz Sharief’s federal cabinet as minister for communication. This alliance proved longer lasting, surviving till 1998 when it collapsed over differences over Kalabagh Dam and renaming the province Pakhtunkhwa.51 Table 6.2: ANP Electoral situation 1988-1997. Election 1997 1993 1990 1988 National Assembly 10 03 06 02 NWFP Provincial Assembly seats won 32 18 23 10 National percentage of polled votes 2.31 1.67% 1.68% 2.80% Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 6.1.9. POLITICS OF PASHTO IN NWFP: The Pakhtuns of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) had a strong sense of self identification and honour. The ‘Khudai Khidmatgar’ movement of Pakhtun nationalists had a popular rural base in predominantly Pakhtuns areas especially in central districts of NWFP. It won both the provincial elections of 1937 and 1946 and formed the provincial governments in NWFP. The Pakhtun nationalists were not impressed by the Two Nation theory of All India Muslim League and resisted against their inclusion in Pakistan. They demanded an autonomous Pakhtun state in 1947. Their demand was not entertained and they boycotted the referendum. The Pakhtuns Party Khudai Khidmatgar tried to persuade Lord Mountbatten, the then governor general of India, to include a third option in the referendum: a right to opt for Pakhtunistan, a state for Khudai Khidmatgar, next to the options to join either Pakistan or India. However, Muslim League successfully mobilised the masses in favour of Pakistan and ‘managed to get 99% of the polled votes52’ 234 Pakhtunistan means ‘different things to different people, ranging from the demand for the formation of a new state incorporating Pathan areas on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to mere change of nomenclature for the NWFP’53 .Soon after the creation of Pakistan, the Pakhtuns stressed that by ‘Pakhtunistan’ they meant regional autonomy of NWFP54. Afterwards, the temporal (April 1972- February 1973) sharing of power with Pakhtun’s under the tripartite accord pursued Pakhtun nationalists to abandon the Pakhtunistan issue. (In the general elections of 1970 the Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto got victory in the Punjab and Sindh. Jamiat-ul-ulmai Islam (JUI) and National Awami Party (NAP) – the representative of Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists – were the leading parties in NWFP and Baluchistan. The three leading parties entered into the tripartite accord and decided to respect the mandate of each party in its respective jurisdiction.).Abdul Ghaffar Khan – who previously demanded a separate homeland for Pakhtuns – declared, ‘Our demand for Pakhtunistan has been fulfilled’55 . The politics of accommodation – the resultant of tripartite accord – were broken down soon. The central government intervened into the minority provinces. Islamabad dismissed the NAP (National Awami Party) government in Baluchistan. The coalition government of NWFP resigned as a protest against the dismissal of Baluchistan government. The central government banned the NAP alleging that it had been working against the integrity of the country. The Baloch waged a war against the dissolution of provincial government and Pakhtuns pursued ban on NAP by challenging the decision in Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Pakhtun nationalist feelings resurfaced once again. On a question whether he was, ‘a Muslim, a Pakistani or a Pakhtun first’, Wali Khan claimed that he was, “a six thousands years old Pakhtun, a thousand years old Muslim and 27 years old Pakistani”56 . Meanwhile, the gradual migration of Pakhtuns into Karachi and urban centres of Punjab resulted in their ‘dominance in privately owned transport sector’ and larger share in employment. They acquired the share in the Pakistani powerstructure and the ‘primary source of incorporation remained the army’57. The majority of Pakhtun soldiers and officials whom got jobs belong to the areas that had traditionally been ‘stronghold of the Pakhtunistan movement’58 . This incorporation and accommodation of the Pakhtuns in the power-structure resulted in the decline of the Pakhtunistan movement. This decline led to the argument that ‘Pakhtun Movement had died down’59. Conversely, evidence suggests that all the way through 235 Pakhtun Nationalist Party (ANP) has been successful to attain a considerable electoral support in Pakhtun areas60. 6.1.10 RELIGIOUS LEGACY IN NWFP: ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSERVATISM IN NWFP: Religion is a strong motivational force in the electoral politics of NWFP. Maddaris and Mosques are the key centres during election campaigns in NWFP. Religion in politics is deeply rooted in the historical roots of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan, envisioned Pakistan as a democratic state upholding representative governance, constitutionalism, civil and political rights and equal citizenship for all. They maintained that such a polity would derive its ethical inspirations from Islam.61 However, Jinnah’s vision could not be fully converted into viable institutions and processes. The political track record is marked by discontinuities, periodic constitutional breakdown, military rule, absence of fair and free elections after regular intervals, a selective enforcement of the rule of law and a poor tradition of accountability of rulers. Pakistan experimented with two interim constitutions (1947, 1972) and three regular constitutions (1965, 1962, and 1973). The current constitution (1973) was thoroughly revised by the military governments in 1985 and 2002. This was in addition to four phases of direct military rule when the constitution was either abrogated or suspended. The military-dominated power elite consciously discouraged the development of autonomous political and societal activity and engaged in constitutional and political engineering to entrench themselves in power. Several factors explain state’s failure to evolve viable participatory political institutions and processes.62 A major contributory factor is the inability of the major political interests to evolve a consensus on the relationship between Religion and the state and society in operational terms and the rapid rise of religious orthodoxy, fundamentalism and militancy since the early 1980s against the backdrop of Pakistan’s active involvement with the Afghan resistance to the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (December 1979 to February 1989) and the subsequent development. The Islamised politics, Afghan crises and military mullah alliance affected the electoral politics in NWFP. All these factors contributed the establishment of conservative class in NWFP that supported religious parties in elections. The rise of religious fundamentalism, extremism and militancy (i.e. the jihad movement) in the 1980s and the subsequent years, constitutes a major obstacle to governmental efforts to promote socio-cultural pluralism and create viable participatory political institutions and processes. The 236 democratic prospects have suffered mainly due to the emphasis on literalist and fundamentalist interpretation of state religion, threat or use of violence by various extremist and fundamentalist groups for pursuing religious based partisan political agenda and religious-sectarian violence in their base camp of NWFP. These trends increased socio-cultural intolerance and reduced the space for the autonomous functioning of civilian institutions and process and stifled consensus building on the operational norms of the polity through dialogue and accommodation. Religious extremism and militancy flourished in NWFP mainly with the blessings of the military regimes which used these groups to deflect participatory pressures and to seek legitimacy because they did not always insist on participatory governance and civilian supremacy. Most of them were willing to support any government that allowed them to pursue their partisan religious agenda. These religious groups also served the foreign policy agendas. At times, some civilian governments also appeased them to win over their support to pressure their political adversaries. Maulana Fazalur-Rehman, the leader of JUI-F and JI are still representing religious groups from NWFP who had strong affiliation with establishment.63 Consequently, the rising tide of Islamic extremism and militancy undermined the prospects of democracy. Islamic groups and leaders can be divided into three broad categories for this study. First, several Islamic political parties function like other political parties, engaging in political mobilization, contesting elections and working towards assumption of power. 64 Second, Islamic seminaries 65 pre-date the establishment of Pakistan. However, these proliferated in NWFP during the last three decades. As institutions of Islamic learning, Islamic seminaries inculcate extremely conservative and orthodox Islamic orientations among their students who often develop a narrow religious worldview and question the modern notions of state and participatory governance. There are several Islamic groups who are not directly engaged in politics but pursue literalist and fundamentalist Islamic perspective on societal and state issues. Like Islamic seminaries they are critical of modern state system and participatory governance as being contrary to the basis tenets of Islam. They talk of return to the “ideal Islamic order” as it existed in the earliest period of Islam. A large number of Islamic seminaries are formally linked with Islamic parties and make their students available for street agitation. Similarly, some seminaries have linkages with the militant groups involved in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir and help their militant agenda. They also provided volunteers to the militant Islamic groups, 237 especially those fighting in Afghanistan. Some of Islamic seminaries in NWFP and Baluchistan would send a large number of their students to Afghanistan to fight along with the Taliban against the northern alliance during 1996-2001. Third, a number of militant Islamic groups surfaced with reference to Afghan resistance to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. These groups were patronized by Pakistani establishment, the U.S. and several conservative Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated with the U.S. intelligence agency, CIA, for training and equipping these groups so that these fought effectively against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. After the exit of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrew its support to these militant groups which continued to function in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some of them devoted their attention to the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s ISI continued to support them because their active involvement in Indian-administered Kashmir served Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda. Some of them extended their support to Islamic causes elsewhere. Their involvement in Pakistan’s domestic affairs is limited mainly to mobilizing support for their external agenda. Some militant organizations use their organizational skills to propagate their perspective on Islam and periodically use violence against those who subscribe to other perspectives on Islam. This causes Islamic-sectarian violence which escalated as the militant groups gained strength. As religious hardliners, these militants do not subscribe to the modern notion of governance and political management. They advocate “jihad’ (holy war) in pursuance of Islamic causes any where in the world and aspire to establish a truly Islamic order as articulated by them. Islamic parties and groups falling in the first category maintain a favourable disposition towards the electoral process and an elected parliament. They view them as instruments for securing power which they plan to use for implementation of an Islamic order as articulated by them. For them, democracy is not an ideal but has instrumental value to the extent it facilitates the implementation of their religiopolitical agenda. If they come to the conclusion that they cannot win or share power through the electoral process, they may have a greater tendency to resort to extra constitutional means to pursue their Islamic agendas. Most groups and organizations, especially the militants, falling in the second and third categories reject the modern notions of participatory governance, the electoral process, assemblies and the existing legal and judicial system. Rather than offering a detailed alternative Islamic political 238 framework, they question the legitimacy of the modern notions of governance and democracy and highlight the abstract Islamic principles or the narratives of the earliest period of Islamic history as the foundations of a model Islamic state.66 However, they hardly agree on the ways and means to interpret these principles and historical narratives to build institutions and processes. They question each other’s interpretation. Their denominational differences and mutual conflicts often produce violence. Religious political parties have been functioning in Pakistan since the early days of independence, although the roots of some of them can be traced back to the preindependence period. Some of the leading Islamic political parties like the JI, Jamiati-Ulema-e-Hind, the Khaksar Movement, and Majlis-i-Ahrar, opposed the political movement for the establishment of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. In the post independence period some of these parties re-organized themselves and a couple of new Islamic parties entered the political domain. They argued for making Pakistan an Islamic state. The dominant political elite did not question the notion of Islamic state but they diverged from the Islamic parties on its details. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and processes to be set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the Islamic state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality, socio-economic justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and participatory governance.67 To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical foundations of the polity rather than a specific political structure or a legal code for the modern times. 68 While subscribing to a democratic political order, Pakistan’s various constitutions created a linkage between the Pakistani state and Islam. However, these constitutions rejected the literalist and classical notion of an Islamic state which the Islamic parties often advocated. The Religious parties expressed varying degrees of reservations on the Islamic nature of the constitutions and they continued the advocacy of their notions of Islamic state. Three major factors helped their activism. First, Islam was closely associated with the establishment of Pakistan. The Muslim League invoked Islam in the preindependence period as a mark of special Muslim identity and an instrument for political mobilization. Second, the Muslim League leadership was convinced that it could combine the modern democracy with the principles and teachings of Islam. This 239 sentiment was reflected in the passing of the Objectives’ Resolution in March 1949. Third, the fragmentation of the PML soon after the attainment of independence and the unnecessary delay in constitution-making caused much political confusion. This enabled the Islamic religious parties to insist on establishing an Islamic political and economic order. However, they played a limited role in the power management during 1947-1970 and performed poorly in the elections. Islamic parties gained importance and won-over some state patronage during the military government of General A.M. Yahya Khan (1969-1971). It relied on some of these parties, especially the Jamaat-iIslami (JI), to build support for the federal government in East Pakistan. The military government also adopted the oft-repeated slogan of the Islamic parties that the ideology of Pakistan is the ideology of Islam in order to counter Awami League’s Sixpoint political agenda in East Pakistan that aimed at converting Pakistan into a loose federation that granted unprecedented autonomy to the provinces. The civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (December 1971 to July 1977) and the Islamic political parties viewed each other as adversaries. The former adopted some Islamic measures to take the wind out of the sails of the Islamic parties. However, these measures proved counter-productive, adversely affecting the liberal credentials of the Bhutto government and strengthening the Islamic parties, which spearheaded the anti Bhutto agitation in March-July 1977. The steps undertaken by the Bhutto government included the designation of Islam as a state religion in the 1973 Constitution.69 All Pakistani constitutions assign a special place to Islam in the constitutional arrangements but Islam was never declared a state religion until 1973. In 1974, the constitution was amended to accommodate the demand of the Islamic parties and groups to include the definition of a Muslim in the constitution, thereby declaring the Ahmadya Muslim sect as a non-Muslim community. In 1977, the Bhutto government imposed a complete ban on alcohol. These steps emboldened the Islamic parties that were hostile to the Bhutto regime. Islamic political parties made the maximum gains during the 11 years of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government (1977-1988). General Zia-ul-Haq’s domestic power imperatives as well as the international and regional situation contributed to strengthening their role. General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government pampered the Islamic parties and encouraged the orthodox and fundamental groups to enter politics in order to undercut the support of his political adversaries. The JI either openly supported General Zia-ul-Haq or maintained a cooperative interaction with him until the withdrawal of martial law in 1985. His 240 regime’s policy of encouraging religious orthodoxy encouraged all types of Islamic parties and groups to get actively involved in the political fray. Several new religioussectarian and ethnic groups also surfaced, fragmenting the political process. The regional and international context for rise of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy was provided by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan willingly joined with the United States and some conservative Arab states to strengthen Afghan-Islamic resistance to Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. These countries provided financial resources, weapons and training to the Islamic groups fighting against the Soviet troops. The international financial and diplomatic support strengthened the Zia regime in the domestic Pakistani context which increased support to Islamic political parties, seminaries and other orthodox Islamic groups. It gave special attention to strengthening militant Afghan and Pakistani groups that were actively engaged in resistance to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This boosted religious orthodoxy in Pakistan and many such groups took advantage of the Afghan war by getting hold of funds and weapons for advancing their partisan agendas. General Zia-ul-Haq thus tilted the political balance in favour of orthodox and conservative interpretation of Islamic polity. He made several administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the orthodox and conservative groups.70 The government made more funds available to Islamic seminaries, causing their proliferation. It also encouraged political and social discourse on conservative and orthodox lines and patronized Islamic militancy. These developments strengthened Islamic extremist forces and increased religious and cultural intolerance in Pakistan. Some of these groups functioned as religious and cultural vigilantes and used or threatened to use coercion against those who did not accept their vision of Islam. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and political rights describing these as western implants in Pakistan.71 Commenting on the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy in Pakistan, President General Pervez Musharraf wrote in his autobiography: “The entire decade of the 1980s saw religious extremism rise, encouraged by Zia…. Actually, Zia, for his own personal and political reasons, embraced the hard-line religious lobby as his constituency throughout Pakistan and well beyond, to the exclusion of the huge majority of moderate Pakistanis. Fighting the infidel soviet Army became a holy cause to the jihadis, and countless Pakistani men signed up.”72 After the withdrawal of 241 Soviet groups from Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to support some Afghan resistance leaders and their Pakistan supporters to install a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul; the Taliban were the last such group that emerged in Afghanistan in 1994 and enjoyed Pakistan’s support. Pakistan also encouraged some Afghan war linked groups and some new Pakistani militant Islamic groups to launch military operations in Indian-administered Kashmir in support of the insurgency that ignited there in 1989-90. Despite the pro-Islam tilt in the disposition of the Pakistani state, the Islamic parties did not perform well in the elections during the post-Zia period, 1988-1999. Two clear trends emerged from the elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. First, Pakistan began to move in the direction of a two major political parties system. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PMLN) emerged as the leading political parties but none could establish a government without winning over some smaller parties. All governments during 1988-1999 were coalitions between one major party (either the PPP or the PML-N) and some regional and smaller parties. Second the Islamic parties performed poorly in these elections except when they entered into an electoral alliance with the mainstream political parties. Some Islamic parties shared power at the federal level in 1990 as part of the political coalition, Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), dominated by the PML-N. However, the partnership with the mainstream political party diluted the role of the Islamic parties. In 1993, the JI launched a massive electoral campaign under the banner of Pakistan Islamic Front in a bid to show that it could alone perform in the elections. The election results were a major disappointment for the JI. The Islamic parties performed exceptionally well in the October 2002 general elections organized by the military government of General Pervez Musharraf. This can be attributed to the peculiar political and ethnic context in NWFP and the Pakhtun areas in Baluchistan in the aftermath of the U.S. military action in Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban government in Kabul. The Islamic parties also benefited from the policy of the military government of General Pervez Musharraf to encourage them emerge as a political force to counterbalance the mainstream political parties that openly challenged his rule. A major setback to democracy in Pakistan was the growth of religious extremism and militancy and sectarian movements from the early 1980s. Pakistani state encouraged these trends by extending support to the hard line Afghan-Islamic resistance, especially the pro-Pakistan groups. The close relationship between the Pakistani 242 establishment, especially its intelligence agencies, and the extremist and militant religious groups persisted after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Pakistani military authorities launched these militant Islamic groups in Indianadministered Kashmir to bolster the on-going insurgency. The continued state patronage of Islamic militancy boosted their fortune in NWFP and encouraged more and more people to join such organizations. This caused the proliferation of militant groups in NWFP.73 Pakistan based Islamic militancy is sectarian in character. Most activists belong to Whabi/Slalafi, Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith traditions of Islam, known for their hard line on socio-political and cultural issues. The Bralvis or the Shia elements played a nominal role in militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir.74 They learnt to use violent means, especially modern weapons, mainly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Some of them took to violence to pursue their religious agenda within Pakistan and attacked and killed those who did not share their perspective on Islam. This stepped up Islamic-sectarian violence in Pakistan. 75 Several Islamic-sectarian organizations engaged in targeted killing of the prominent personalities of the opposite sect.76 This type of violence was also caused by factionalism in the militant Islamic movement. Each major group produced breakaway factions that functioned independent of the parent organization and often resorted to violence against other sects in order to make their presence felt. 77 A good number of Islamic-sectarian activists got military training in Afghanistan during the Taliban days or they took refuge there when Pakistan’s security authorities decided to round them up. Cultural and religious intolerance also increased as Islamic seminaries proliferated in the 1980s and the 1990s. Most seminaries had sectarian-denominational character and inculcated a narrow straight-jacketed worldview among the students marked by religious extremism and intolerance towards other perspectives on Islam. Some of these young people joined militant Islamic groups that were fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In other words, Islamic seminaries created a state of mind among their students, making them vulnerable to the appeals for fighting a “holy war” to foil “Christian-Jewish conspiracies” against Islam. Some of these young people were recruited by Islamic-sectarian organization to pursue their sectarian agenda within Pakistan. The rise of religious extremism and militancy undermined social and cultural pluralism, political tolerance and respect for dissent. Such a political and cultural environment is not conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law and gender equality. Most extremist and militant Islamic groups had 243 no faith in modern democratic institutions and processes and often described them as western implants in Muslim societies which must be totally discarded. However, the Islamic political parties were committed to democracy to the extent its processes enabled them to win the elections so that they could argue that they possessed a popular mandate to create a fundamentalist Islamic political order. 6.2.1 PARTY POLITICS AT MICRO LEVEL IN NWFP: For detailed analysis of Party politics at micro level, the electoral politics in NWFP, it is divided into four electoral parts i.e. central, southern, northern and north eastern (Hazara) as mentioned in the chapter ‘Electoral Geography of NWFP’. In this section the researcher will examine the election results area-wise, and then to explain them in historical and sociological terms. 6.2.1.1 CENTRAL NWFP: Central NWFP consists of five districts, Peshawar, Mardan, Charsada, Swabi and Nowshera.78 First electoral contest on the basis of one man one vote was started in 1970s elections. Electoral politics during 1990s is to be compared with 1970 elections for in-depth analysis. In 1970s elections central NWFP consisted of two districts i.e. Peshawar and Mardan and had seven National Assembly seats (4 for Peshawar and 3 for Mardan). In the Peshawar National Assembly constituencies, NAP won two of the four seats with the total winning votes of 6922. The remaining two seats were won by QML and JUI amounting to 60782, which is less than the winning votes of NAP. To examine the total vote polled by winning and non-winning candidates of each party, it will be realised that NAP polled more votes than the other two winning parties. NAP got 91244 votes, QML got 21900 votes and JUI won 58648 votes.79 In the Provincial elections, Peshawar was divided into eight PA constituencies during 1970 elections. In these elections, NAP won seven out of the eight seats with total winning votes of 112826. The remaining seats went to PPP.80 In 1970 National Assembly elections Mardan was divided into three National Assembly constituencies. Of these three seats, NAP, QML, and PPP won one each. By calculating in total the votes of the winning and non winning candidates of each party, it will be revealed that NAP obtained more votes than any other party. For purpose of the Provincial Assembly elections, Mardan was divided into five constituencies (if we exclude Mardan-cum Hazara-PF). Of these five seats, NAP won four, and PPP won one. In these elections the total vote polled by all NAP candidates is more than that of any other party. NAP got 72529 votes, QML got 44789 votes, 244 PPP had 47482 votes and JUI got 29307 votes. 81 Even if researcher includes Mardancum Hazara constituency (where QML) won NAP still obtained the largest number of votes as shown below82:NAP 72529 352 72881 QML 44789 13043 57829 PPP 47482 1902 49384 JUI 29307 1867 31174 Total During 1988-1999 the National Assembly results in Central NWFP are shown in 6.3. Table 6.3: Party politics in central NWFP (National Assembly): Total Seats-8 Elections % votes/ seats won 1988 1990 1993 1997 ANP % votes/ seats won 40.55/2 37.47/6 39.52/2 51.70/8 PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won 21.41/4 33.24/0 36.10/5 16.76/0 PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won 12.60/0 18.41/1 0/0 6.30/0 Religious % votes/ seats won 19.83/1 3.59/1 19.77/1 8.11/0 Others % votes/ seats won 0.17 0.65 0.38 8.50 Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 3.68/10/1 4.43/13/0 2.52/9/0 5.54/16/0 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Above table indicates the strength of ANP in central districts, where it has huge popularity and large number of vote bank. The second one in PPP and third one is religious vote bank. During 1988-1999, the provincial assembly results from central NWFP are as: Table 6.4: Party politics in central NWFP (Provincial Assembly) constituencies=27 Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 1988 28.60/10 28.96/14 18.22/2 7.16 1.43 14.16/71/1 1990 34.61/18 23.57/2 13.63/6 9.98 0.42 16.71/93/1 1993 29.54/16 26.69/10 7.19/0 9.64 6.38 19.26/81/1 1997 39.82/21 18.64/1 14.74/4 0.15 8.72 15.59/69/1 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Elections ANP % votes/ seats won PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won Religious % votes/ seats won Others % votes/ seats won Above data also revealed that ANP has got good votes from Central NWFP in provincial assembly elections. The second largest political party is PDA/PPP and the third is PML-N/IJI. For more brief analysis, party politics is to be analysed at district level. PESHAWAR: The provincial capital of the Frontier Province, Peshawar is bounded by tribal agencies on its three borders. It is the closest Pakistani city to Afghanistan, serving as a key route for trade and smuggling. At the height of the Afghan conflict it supported three million Afghan refugees.83 Having an estimated population of nearly three million, most of its inhabitants are professionals in contrast to its neighbouring agrarian districts.Peshawar city is famous for its Qissa Khawani Bazaar, Balahisar 245 Fort and Chowk Yadgaar, the latter built to commemorate the martyrs of the 1857 War of Independence against the British. A sizeable Christian population lives in the heart of the region that is synonymous with Muslim fundamentalism to the outside world. A small Sikh population also resides in the city.84 During 1988-1999, Peshawar had three National Assembly seats and eight provincial assembly seats.85 The politics of the district has been dominated by the Bilours, long affiliated with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s brand of Pakhtun nationalism. The other prominent political family is that of Arbabs. At the pinnacle of their political power, Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan served as the provincial chief minister. Arbab Niaz is another prominent politician. Major clans are Afridi, Khattak, Orakzai, Wazir, Masud, and Punjabi. Table 6.5: Party position in Peshawar (National Assembly) Constituency NA (3) PA (8) 1988 PPP(3) PPP(5), ANP (2), IND(1) 1990 ANP(3) IJI(2), PDA(1), ANP(5) 1993 PPP(2), ANP(1) PPP(3), ANP(4) 1997 ANP(3) ANP(7), N(1) PML- Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. Above table shows that the main contest in Peshawar district is between regional party ANP and mainstream parties PPP/PDA and IJI/PML-N. Key development variables which to some extent moulded the shape of electoral politics are its population which is 2.86 million, urban and rural literacy rates are 54.09% and 29.19% respectively. 68.62% population have water facilities and 94.99% have electricity facility. In employment sector, 25% are professional and 27% have elementary occupation. 47.4% have housing facilitites including kacha and semi pakka houses.86 Key political players during 1990s are Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Syed Zafar Ali Shah, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Arbab Mohammad Jahnagir Khan, Khan Bahadur Khan, Arbab Mohammad Zahir, Arbab Saadullah Khan, Bashir Ahmad Bilour, Haji Mohammad Adeel, Sardar Ali Khan, Syed Ali Shah, Qamar Abbas, Haji Mohammad Javed, Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khalil, Arbab Saif-urRehman, Muhammad Azam, Abdur Rehman Khan, Arbab Muhammad Ayub Jan, Iftikhar Ahmad Khan, Hidayatullah Khan, Haji Abdul Raziq and Muhammad Iqbal Khan.87 MARDAN: Mardan, located in the Peshawar Valley, was made a district in 1937 with the bifurcation of the district of Peshawar. Swabi and Charsadda districts were later carved out of Mardan in the 1980s. Mardan city is the second largest in NWFP 246 after Peshawar having six Provincial Assembly constituencies and two National Assembly constituencies. Its history dates back to the Gandhara kingdom, the remains of which are scattered around the district, including the Takht-e-Bahi Buddhist monastery. The famous sons of Mardan include the late Mir Afzal Khan, former chief minister of NWFP (1990-1993) and owner of Premier Sugar Mills. The main source of employment in the district is agriculture and the main crops are Virginia tobacco, sugarcane and wheat. Major clans are Yusafzai, Khattak and Mohmand. 88 Total polupation of Mardan is 1.96 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 48.27% and 37.31% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 55.11% and electricity is 83.53%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 34% and service ratio is 29%. Housing ratio is 50.28% includingkacha and pakka89. Key politicians in this district during 1990s were Haji Nasim-ur-Rehman, Khanzada Khan, Mohammad Azam Khan, Haji Mohammad Yaqoob, Khan Mir Afzal Khan, Haji Mohammad Ahmad, Syed Manzoor Hussain, Khawaja Mohammad Khan, Mir Afzal Khan, Abdus Samad Khan, Muhammad Sufaid Khan, Ghanidad Khan, Raza Khan, Abdul Subhan, Abdul Akbar Khan, Munawar Khan, Muhammad Iqbal Khan, Taufiq Muhammad Khan, Iftikhar Mohmand, Said Rehman Mohmand, Rahim Dad Khan, Mohammad Akram Khan, Haji Bahadur Khan.90 Table 6.6: Party position in Mardan: Constituency NA (1) PA (6) 1988 JUI-F(1), PPP(1) PPP(5), ANP(1) 1990 ANP(1), IJI(1) IJI(3), ANP(3) 1993 PPP(2) ANP(3), PPP(3) 1997 ANP(2) PML-N(2), ANP(4) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. Above table shows that Mardan District has four clusters of votes, i.e. ethnic (ANP) cluster, Religious cluster, PPP and PML-N cluster. CHARSADA: With a history that dates back to the ancient Gandhara civilisation, Charsadda is known for being the home district to many of the well-known politicians of NWFP. However, its most famous son has been Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known among his disciples as Bachha Khan. The leading exponent of non-violence in this part of what was then undivided India, Khan was known as the Frontier Gandhi91. The district is divided into three tehsils: Charsadda, Tangi and Shabqadar with five provincial assembly constituencies and one nationalism assembly constituency. It is also the hometown of former Chief Minister of NWFP Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao. Major clans are Mohammadzai, Gigani and Mohmand. 247 Total polupation of Mardan is 1.35 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 39.82% and 28.97% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 16.25% and electricity is 90.53%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 35.1% and service ratio is 9.3%. Housing ratio is 71.72% includingkacha and pakka92. Key political players during 1990s in this District were Asfandyar Wali, Molvi Hassan Jan, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Mohammad Hashim Khan, Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Iftikhar Ahmad Khan, Javed Iqbal Khan, Rehmatullah Khan, Amir Khisro Khan, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao and Muhammad Bashir Khan93. Table 6.7: Party position in Charsada. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) ANP(1) JUI-F(1) ANP(1) ANP(1) PA (5) ANP(3), PPP(2) ANP(4), PDA(1) ANP(4), PPP(1) ANP(5) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. NOWSHERA: Nowshera is famous for cantonments, a military college and a Pakistan Air Force academy. Nowshera is surely military-dominated area and mapped out as district in 1988. It is the Frontier’s link to the Punjab and is at the heart of the debate about the Kalabagh Dam. The other most known landmark in the district is Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak, the seminary from where most of the senior Taliban leadership, including Mullah Umar, received their religious education. Nowshera is represented by one National Assembly seat and four provincial assembly seats during 1990s. Major Clans are Khattak, Durrani, Awan, Khakakhel and Malyar.94 Total polupation of Nowshera is 1.16 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 55.64% and 37.59% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 30.40% and electricity is 90.50%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 21.8% and service ratio is 33.6%. Housing ratio is 32.31% includingkacha and pakka95. Key political players in this District during 1990s were Wali Mohammad Khan, Naseerullah Baber, Ajmal Khan Khattak, Mian Muzaffar Shah, Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Iqbal Hussain Khattak, Tariq Hamid, Pervez Khan Khattak, Haji Wali Muhammad, Syed Inayat Ali Shah, Mian Muzafar Shah and Jan Mohammad Khattak96. Table 6.8: Party’s position during 1988-1997 in Nowshera. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) PPP(1) ANP(1) PPP(1) ANP(1) PA (4) IJI(1),PPP(1), NP(2) ANP(4) ANP(1), PPP(3) ANP(4) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. 248 SWABI: Swabi was separated from Mardan and made a district in July 1988. This area has a rich history dating back to the ancient kingdom of Gandhara and such archaeological sites can be found at numerous places. This district also has an important connection with education as Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan, the founder of Islamia College, Peshawar, was from Swabi. The district is home to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute for Science and Technology at Topi, former Communist leader Abdul Khaliq Khan and senior bureaucrat Roedad Khan. Swabi is also famous for its white marble. The world’s largest earth-filled dam, Tarbela Dam, is also located in this district. Swabi is represented by one National Assembly seat and four provincial assembly seats during 1990s. Major clans are Yusafzai, Razar, Rajar, and utman, Jadoon, Gadoon and Khattak.97 Total polupation of Swabi is 1.96 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 43.35% and 34.45% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 69.18% and electricity is 83.38%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 52.6% and service ratio is 21%. Housing ratio is 30.57% includingkacha and pakka98. Key politicians in Swabi during 1990s were Haji Rehmanullah, Qazi Maulana Fazlullah, Abdul Khaliq Khan, Saleem Khan Advocate, Haji Zain Mohammad Khan, Ghafoor Khan Jadoon, Inayatullah Khan, Muhammad Shuaib, Asmatullah Khan, Awal Sher Khan, Abdul Majid and Sher Zaman Khan99. Table 6.9: Party’s position during 1988-1997 1988 1990 1993 1997 ANP(1) ANP(1) IJM(1) ANP(1) ANP(2), IJI(1), ANP(2), IJI(1), ANP(4), IND(1) ANP(2), PMLPPP(1) IND(1) N(1), IND(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. Constituency NA (1) PA (4) SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL NWFP: The majority of inhabitants of central NWFP belong to the Yusufzai tribe. It will be noted that the Yousafzais are Afghanis i.e. decedents from the Bannu Afghana tribe, which was Jewish tribe that many years ago migrated from the Middle East and settled in Afghanistan. The other Pathan tribes in NWFP are known by the general name of Kirlani and include the waziri, Masood, Afridi, Khattak, Bangash, Marwat, Niazi and Ghalzai tribes. The Kirlanis do not call themselves Afghani since they claim descents from Alexander the Great. Most Kirlanis claim that the Afghani language was a bastardised from the Arabic. The chiefs of the Yousafzai tribe were the Hotis. When, inspite of Pathan resistance, the British Government got established, the Hoti loyalty 249 was purchased by a present of 40000 acres areas. The Yusafzais thenceforth ceased paying allegiance to the Hotis, and transferred it to Ghaffar Khan, whose opposition to the Rowlett Bill of 1919 and after his association with Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement. Ghaffar Khan opposed the Muslim League, and in the elections of 1937 formed a Congress government in the Frontier. The Muslim League did not win in the Frontier till the referendum of 1947. In those elections, the main opposition to the Muslim League came from Mardan and Charsada where Muslim League was badly defeated. The main support for Pakistan came from Hazara and southern districts of NWFP. In the 1970 elections, the main opposition was directed against Qayyum Khan of QML, mainly because of the Babara firing incident of 1952 and because Qayyum was a Kashmiri and not a Pakhtun. Inspite of this opposition to QML however, it will be noted that QML obtained the second highest total vote in Mardan National Assembly elections. The main NAP slogan during the elections was “Pakhtunkhwa” (a pure pathan culture), and main demands were (a) a government of Pathans, (b). restitution of rights taken away by Punjabis and (c). revenge for the cruelty perpetrated by Punjabis.The ANP the rename of NAP, politics during 1988-1999 was also the renaming of NWFP, Kalabagh Dam issue and provincial autonomy. In the Peshawar constituencies it has been seen that urban and rural areas are in opposite camps. Urban areas inclined towards PPP and PML-N, while the rural areas went to ANP. It seems that urban and rural political aspirations were divergent. In Mardan on the other hand, urban politics seems to have had a small effect on rural areas near the cities. The most striking feature in the 1988-1997, NWFP elections is the fact that the areas of ANP and JUI strength, at least for purposes of the NA elections, are the same: Namely, the over-half constituencies. In these areas ANP enjoyed a fixed and nonfluctuating support, unlike JUI. 6.2.2 NORTH EASTERN NWFP (HAZARA) Hazara belt of NWFP consists of five districts including Abbottabad, Haripur, Mansehra, Battagram and Kohistan. 100 During 1970s elections, the strongest party was the QML. Probably accepting it as a QML stronghold, the NAP contested only two out of four National Assembly constituencies, and only seven out of the nine provincial assembly constituencies in Hazara. 101 In the four National Assembly constituencies, QML and JUI won two seats each. QML got 78051 votes while JUI 250 got 40103 votes. During 1988-1999, the National Assembly results from North Eastern NWFP (Hazara) are as: Table 6.10: National Assembly results 1988-1997: Constituencies=7 Elections ANP % votes/ seats won 0.82 0 0 0 PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won 14.46 7.50 3.45 2.34 PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won 30.23/4 43.40/4 34.906 58.26/6 Religious % votes/ seats won 5.34 8.53/2 13.61 7.05 Others % votes/ seats won 9.77 1.90 19.73 5.12 Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 36.72/14/3 37.02/26/1 6.50/9/1 24.28/13/1 1988 1990 1993 1997 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). In 1970s elections, the provincial assembly elections, only QML contested in all nine constituencies. NAP contested in seven PPP in six and JUI in four constituencies. In these elections, QML won six seats, JUI won two seats, and NAP won one seat. QML got 90867 votes, JUI got 40103 votes and NAP won 1935 votes. During 1988-1999, the party position for provincial assembly from Hazara is as: Table 6.11: Provincial assembly results from Hazara: (Total Seats=19) Elections Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 1988 1.71 11.67 27.93/10 5.28/1 3.39 48.24/76/9 1990 2.07/1 5.62 37.81/8 8.07/1 0.48 44.18/78/9 1993 2.56/1 5.41/1 41.02/10 13.11 6.49/1 30.00/67/5 1997 3.64/1 1.09 48.77/14 1.60 4.25 38.17/93/4 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. ANP % votes/ seats won PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won Religious % votes/ seats won Others % votes/ seats won ABBOTTABAD: Lying on the fringes of the Himalayas, Abbottabad in its 1,967 square kilometres wide expanse is famous for its Galiyat, the summer escape of the well-heeled and the hoi polloi alike. Abbottabad city itself is a popular hill station. Originally part of the Hazara division, of which the city served as the headquarters. Abbottabad, the name derived from its first Deputy Commissioner James Abbott, was given district status in 1981. It has two National Assembly and five provincial assembly seats. Major clans are Dhund, Karlal, Awan, Tanoli, Syed, Jadoon and Gujjars.102 Total polupation of Abbottabad is 1.05 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 76.63% and 51.58% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 78.30% and electricity is 74.98%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 19.1% and service ratio is 71.2%. Housing ratio is 32.97% including kacha and pakka103 . Prominent names from the district include Amanullah Khan Jadoon, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Sardar Mehtab Khan, Fareed M. Jadoon, Sardar Haji Gul Khitab Khan, Javed Iqbal Abbassi, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharief, Sardar Haiderzaman, Ali Afzal Khan 251 Jadoon, Shamroz Khan Jadoon, Sardar Gulzaman, Sardar Ghulam Nabi, Haji Munsif Khan, Khurshid Azam Khan and Muhammad Ayub Khan.104 Table 6.12: Party’s position in Abbottabad during 1988-1997. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (2) IJI1, IND1 IJI2 PML-N2 PML-N2 PA (5) IJI3, IND2 IJI4, IND1 PML-N4, PPP1 PML-N5 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. MANSEHRA: Home to the most spectacular mountain ranges, Lake Saiful Muluk and Karakoram Highway, Mansehra has had a flourishing tourism industry. Most sites, however, stay closed due to inhospitable weather for a good part of the year. The area consists of two NA and six provincial assembly seats. Major clans are Gujjar, Swati, Tanoli, Awan and Syed.105 In Mansehra the age old domination of the Gujjars by the Syeds and Swatis, who represented less than a third of the population but owned more than two third of the land and forestry resources, seems to be on the wane. Two factors are central to this transition. First, as the economy expanded and communications improved, the Gujjars population has had opportunities to work in cities within the country and also abroad. The remittances coming back have made the households less in awe of landowners and dependent on the Syed/ Swaties for livelihoods. Second, repeated elections and populist ideology, starting with the PPP populism of the 1970, have taught them that their numbers represent strength and they have been more willing over time to exercise this political muscle to ensure service delivery to them as constituents.106 This final goal of getting service delivery interacts in a complex fashion with the politics based on quom (caste such as Gujjars, Syed, Swati or Awan, biradri, clan or sub clan. In fact, an electoral alliance could take the form of jamba that is the formation of a group or faction for that particular election. It is possible that the faction could cut across biradri lines in a particular election. Pragmatism and expediency were in evidence among the candidates, given the change in the political reality.107 The quantitative findings were not as rich as the qualitative analysis. None the less, we quantitatively established that education, land owned and being a village notable like member of committees like the Zakat or Khidmat committee or being a Numbardar significantly enhanced the probability of becoming a candidate. This is not surprising because success depends on more intangible factors like ambition, drive, and the ability to build social and political capital and use these to deliver to 252 constituents or to get ahead despite not doing so via intimidation and other methods.108 Total polupation of Mansehra is 1.15 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 68.49% and 34.40% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 26.74% and electricity is 49.10%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 44.2% and service ratio is 9.9%. Housing ratio is 36.54% includingkacha and pakka109. Key political players in Mansehra during 1990s were Sardar Mohammad Yusaf, Syed Qasim Shah, Nawabzada Salauddin Saeed, Zar Gul Khan, Muhammad Hanif Khan, Syed Ghulam Nabi Shah, Tariq Khan Swati, Asif Akbar Swati, Baber Nasim Khan, Mian Wali-ur-Rehman, Akhtar Hussain Shah, Shazada Muhammad Gustasip khan, Abdus Sattar Khan, Ashiq Raza Swati, Waji-uz-zaman, Haq Nawaz Khan, Faiz Mohammad Khan Sakhi Mohammad Tanoli, Habib-ur-Rehman Tanoli, Zareen Gul Khan and Muhammad Afsar Khan110. Table 6.13: Party’s position in Mansehra during 1988-1997. Constituency NA (2) PA (6) 1988 IND(2) IND(4), IJI(2) 1990 IND(1), IJI(1) IJI(1), IND(5) 1993 PML-N(2) PML-N(4), IND(2) 1997 PML-N(2) PML-N(5), ANP(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. BATTAGRAM: Battagram obtained the status of district in July 1993 when it was upgraded from a Tehsil and separated from Mansehra District. Before Battagram obtained the status of district, it was a Tehsil of the Mansehra District. It has geographical borders with Kohistan District, the Tribal Area of Kala Dhaka (Black Mountain of Hazara), Shangla District and Malakand Division. The district consists of two sub-divisions or Tehsils, containing one National Assembly constituency and two Provincial Assembly constituencies. 111 Tribal divisions rather than political ideals determine the voting pattern in Battagram. Each clan seems to cultivate new enemies during national and provincial elections. A majority of the candidates during 1990s do not have any affiliation with a political grouping. Among the clans residing in the constituency, the Swatis are quite strong. Other clans are Akhundkhel and Medakhel.112 Total polupation of Battagram is 2.89 million. Literacy ratio is 18.37%. In utilities water ratio is 30.84% and electricity is 42.35%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 60% and service ratio is 21%. Housing ratio is 34.59% includingkacha and pakka113. Key political players in Battagram during 1990s were Mohammad Nawaz Khan, Alam Zeb Khan, Muhammad Ayub Khan and Fateh Mohammad Khan. 253 Table 6.14: Table showing the Party’s position in Battagram during 1988-1997: Constituency NA (1) PA (2) 1988 IJI(1) IJI(2) 1990 JUI-F(1) IND(1), ANP(1) 1993 PML-N(1) ANP(1), PML-J(1) 1997 PML-N(1) IND(1), PML-N(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. KOHISTAN: Kohistan is one of the largest yet most sparsely populated districts in the NWFP. The district has been victim to a host of invasions and is therefore mottled with ethnic diversity. It sits on the border of two aggressive tectonic plates, the Eurasian plate and the Indian subcontinent, making it susceptible to earthquakes. The area comprises three provincial seats and one National Assembly seat. Kohistan faces many a dilemma with the lowest literacy and employment rates in the NWFP, and severe paucity of utilities. Major clans living in Kohistan are Manzar, Money, Koka, Mankekhel and Darramkhel.114 The elected representatives have failed to do much in the way of improving the lot of people of this impoverished district. Agricultural development is not promising at all, with only one crop growing in high altitudes and two in lower areas. Cultivation of crops such as barley and rice has almost ceased.115 Total polupation of Khistan is 4.69 million. Literacy ratio is 11.08%. In utilities water ratio is 19.90% and electricity is 2.90%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 83% and service ratio is 6.3%. Housing ratio is 44.17% includingkacha and pakka116. Key politicians in Kohistan during 1990s were Aurangzeb, Malik Said Ahmad, Molvi Mohammad Amin, Maulana Abdul Baqi, Sarangzeb, Mian Noor, Malik Moon, Aurangzeb, Mohammad Taus Khan, Muhammad Asmatullah, Qadam Khan, Farmas Khan, Sikandar Malik and Umar Khan.117 Table 6.15: Party’s position in Kohistan District. Constituency NA (1) PA (3) 1993 1997 IND1 IND1 PML-N1, IND2, IND3 MDM1 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. 1988 IJI1 IND2, IJI1 1990 JUI-F1 IND2, JUI-F1 Haripur: Haripur is one of NWFP’s most developed and literate district. The district borders Islamabad, with the Khanpur Dam here supplying water to the federal capital. The famous Jaulian Buddhist monastery overlooking Taxila is also located here. It is also home to Hattar, NWFP’s largest industrial area, and the Telephone Industry of Pakistan. Haripur has produced Field Marshal Ayub Khan (Pakistan’s first military ruler) and his son Gohar Ayub (a regular member of the National Assembly and also its former speaker). Haripur District has one National Assembly and three Provincial Assembly seats. During 1990s the electoral contest seems between the families of 254 Ayub Khan and Sikandar Zaman. Major clans in this district are Tareen, Dilzak, Tarkheli, Mishwani, Ghakkar, Jadoon, Tanooli and Turk.118 Total polupation of Haripur is 8.59 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 69.70% and 51.39% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 32.18% and electricity is 76.33%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 29.4% and service ratio is 13.3%. Housing ratio is 15.21% including kacha and pakka119. Key political players in Haripur District during 1990s were Gohar Ayub, Raja Sikanadar Zaman, Umar Asghar Khan, Syed Mohammad Sabir Shah and Akhtar Nawaz Khan.120 Table 6.16: Party’s Position in Haripur district during 1988-1997: Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1) PA IND(1), IJI(1) IJI(2) PML-N(1), IND(1) PML-N(2) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS: The greatest popularity of Muslim League lies mainly in the fact that when Qayyum was the Chief Minister of NWFP in the beginning of 1950s, he introduced revolutionary revenue reforms. He introduced the twenty years tenure during which time no tenant could be ejected without valid reason. In Hazara all land is in the hands of the big Jagirdars, who previously could eject tenants on little or no pretext. In 1970s Qayyum’s popularity rested on the fact that that he was not only domiciled in Hazara but considered himself a Hazarite. The fact that he was not a Pathan did not carry much weight with the electorate also because Hazara is the residence of mixed races, and not all of them are Pathans. This fact is itself encouraged a less parochial view of Politics. During 1988-1997, Nawaz issued tickets to influential candidates who had strong biradari affiliations. On the basis of biradari affiliations Nawaz candidates win the elections from Hazara. 6.2.3 NORTHERN NWFP: Northern NWFP consists of seven Districts, i.e. Swat, Malakand, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Shangla, Buner and Chitral. In 1970s Northern NWFP comprised of three major areas, i.e. Swat, Dir and Chitral. During 1988-1997 electoral contests, IJI/PML-N got majority seats both from National and Provincial Assembly. The second largest parties were PPP and ANP and third one was Religious Party/Alliance.121 During 1988-1999, the situation for National Assembly from northern NWFP is shown in Table 6.27. 255 Table 6.17: National Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFP: Constituencies=6 Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 1988 14.26/4 34.37 31.15/2 10.56 0.32 6.96/9 1990 1.69 30.45/3 37.79/2 14.46 0.30 15.39/13/1 1993 4.73/1 18.46 19.94/1 36.57/2 8.80/1 9.34/9 1997 12.95/1 21.71 35.16/5 4.65 11.60 10.48/13 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Elections ANP % votes/ seats won PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won Religious % votes/ seats won Others % votes/ seats won During 1988-1999, the party positions for provincial assembly and vote percentage from Northern NWFP is given in table 6.28. Table 6.18: Provincial Assembly’s situation in Northern NWFP: Constituencies=18 Elections Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 1988 15.17/1 24.90/7 28.18/9 5.43 1.03 23.07/48/1 1990 7.70/2 25.57/2 33.34/12 5.76 0.94 25.26/61/2 1993 15.26/3 31.38/10 19.55/1 20.60/4 0.75 10.9/37 1997 20.63/5 18.10/3 29.91/8 2.69 12.44 13.27/43/2 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. ANP % votes/ seats won PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won Religious % votes/ seats won Others % votes/ seats won SWAT: Swat was a princely state till its dissolution in 1969. Swat’s Malam Jabba ski resort was once popular with foreign tourists as were the Gandharan civilisation sites. The capital of Swat is Saidu Sharief, but the main town in the Swat valley is Mingora. Major clans are Yusafzai Pathan, Mian, Kohistani, Gujjar and Piracha122. Swat was represented by two National Assembly and five Provincial Assembly seats. In 1970s elections, Swat was divided into two National Assembly constituencies and four Provincial Assembly constituencies. In both elections, QML emerged as the strongest party. The National Assembly results are as follows:NA Swat 1 Swat 2 Total QML 18761 35538 54299 NAP 16885 2376 40161 JUI 6881 21549 28430 PPP 18481 9530 28011 Two things stand out in the National Assembly elections of Swat. Firstly, QML won both seats. Secondly if we consider the total vote polled, QML emerges as the strongest party followed by NAP. In the Provincial Assembly elections, QML won two seats; NAP won one and an independent one seat. The total vote polled infavour of QML were 48291votes, NAP had 39406 votes, JUI 8607 votes and PPP won 13833 votes. It will be obvious that the QML lead over NAP was equal to 8885 votes. If the 256 researcher adds to the above result, the result of the Swat-cum Dir constituency (where QML won), than QML had 52419 votes, NAP got 42019 votes, JUI got 10610 votes and PPP had 16703 votes. It will be obvious that by combining the result, the QML lead increases to 10400. Furthermore, JUI fared worse than PPP in the provincial elections because JUI contested only in three of the four PA constituencies. Total polupation of Swat is 1.75 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 48.05% and 25.53% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 33.23% and electricity is 67.84%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 48.16% and service ratio is 17%. Housing ratio is 23.27% including kacha and pakka123. Key political players in Swat District during 1990s were Mohammad Karim, Nadar Khan, Sarzamin Khan, Muhammad Karim, Bakht Jehan, Said Rahim, Malik Fida Mohammad Khan, Wajid Ali Khan, Dr. Mehbub-ur-Rehman, Mian Gul Asfandyar Amir Zeb, Syed Mohammad Ali Shah Bacha Lala, Qaimoos Khan, Syed Allauddin, Feteh Mohammad Khan, Dost Mohammad Khan, Malik Hazrat Ali, Mohammad Didar Khan, Badi-uz-Zaman, Muhammad Zahir Shah Khan and Pir Muhammad Khan.124 Table 6.19: Party’s Position in Swat District: Constituency NA (2) 1993 1997 PML-N(1), PML-N(2) PKQP(1) PA (5) PPP(2), IJI(2), IJI(2), PDA(2), PPP(3), ANP(1), PML-N(4), ANP(1) IND(1) ANP(1) PML-N(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. 1988 PPP(2) 1990 IJI(1), PDA(1) SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS: Swatis are not all Yusafzai, and there are a sizeable number of Kohistani Pathans whose language is not Pushto and who reside mainly in the hills. Before Yahya changed the political status of Swat, Nawab Wali of Swat was not only popular with the people but was also the spiritual leader of Swat. Furthermore, he was related to Pir Saidu Sharief who had a large following. The fact that Prince Aurangzeb Khan, son of the Wali, won the election from Swat, indicates the value of his father’s popularity and of his religious connections. It was possible that because Prince Mian Gul Aurangzeb contested on a PML-N ticket in 1993 and 1997125 and other PML-N candidates derived some of the benefit. Yet another reason for the ML success could be the mixed racial complexion of the population (Kohistani and Yusufzai). DIR: Dir is included in the northern part of NWFP having two districts, Upper Dir and Lower Dir. In 1970s Elections Dir was divided into one National Assembly constituency and two Provincial Assembly constituencies. In the National Assembly 257 constituency JI got 14187 votes, JUI got 5882 votes, PPP obtained 6250 votes, QML won 12728 votes and NAP share in voting was 8681. 126 In 1970s, the Provincial Assembly elections, the results were as follows:JI Dir 1 Dir 2 Total JUI 5404 5249 10653 PPP 1498 1478 2976 QML 1638 2023 3661 NAP 1235 6249 7484 3687 1545 5232 It will be noted that in the NA elections, Jamaat-e-Islami polled the largest number of votes followed by QML. In the PA elections, JI got one seat and QML the other. Here too JI polled the highest number of votes followed by QML. UPPER DIR: Upper Dir is famous for its high mountain peaks and waterfalls. Timergara is the district headquarters, with the majority of its people from the Yousufzai tribe. The district’s transportation and communication facilities are in need of repair, with only one motor road connecting it with Chitral. The population of the region is mostly rural and scattered over more than 1,200 villages situated in the plains of Adenzai and Munda. The annual rainfall in Upper Dir is over 1,000 mm. Much of the area is covered by forest. The main crops grown here are maize and potato. The expansion and diversification of agriculture has raised living standards to some extent over the years. Major clans are Kohistani, Yusafzai, Kalani, Roghani and Swati. 127 During 1990s Upper Dir consist of two Provincial and one National Assembly seat. Total polupation of Upper Dir is 7.59 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 41.05% and 20.34% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 71.67% and electricity is 38.46%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 61.8% and service ratio is 16%. Housing ratio is 15.28% includingkacha and pakka 128 . Key Political players in Upper Dir during 1990s were Inayat Khan, Sahibzada Fatehullah, Najmuddin, Haji Amanullah Khan, Sherzada, Hamidullah, Inayatul Haq, Muhammad Anwar and Abdul Hamid Khan.129 Table 6.20: Party’s Position in Upper Dir District: Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) IJI(1) PDA(1) PIF(1) PML-N(1) PA (2) IJI(2) IJI(1), IND(1) PPP(1), PIF(1) PPP(2) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. LOWER DIR: Lower Dir is situated in the north-west of NWFP, bounded by a long chain of the Koh-e-Hindu Kush. This is a hilly and green area and has many tourism 258 attracting valleys. From an agricultural point of view, the most important and productive valleys are the Talash, Jandool and Maidan. The only famous river – Panjkora – sweeps through the bases of all the mountains in a zigzag line and irrigates the cultivable areas of the district. Forestry and agriculture are an important source of production and economy for a large segment of the population. It has four Provincial Assembly constituencies. Major clans are Mashwani, Sadat, Shakhel, Mastkhel, Shinwari, Yusafzai and Umerkhel. 130 Total polupation of Lower Dir is 1 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 43.51% and 28.97% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 16.25% and electricity is 72.07%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 43.2% and service ratio is 25%. Housing ratio is 21.65% includingkacha and pakka131. Key Political Players in Lower Dir during 1990s were Mohammad Hassan Khan, Muhammad Yaqub Khan, Syed Sardar Alam Bacha, Bahadar Khan, Mohammad Shah Haroon, Behram Khan, Malik Jehnzeb, Muzzafar Khan, Zakirullah Khan, Bakht Baidar, Mohammad Hashim Khan. Table 6.21: Party’s Position in Lower Dir District: Constituency NA PA (4) 1993 1997 PIF(2), ANP(1), PPP(1), ANP(1), PPP(1) PML-N(2) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. 1988 IJI(3), PPP(1) 1990 IJI(4) SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS: Dir was ruled by Nawab Shah Jehan who was a cruel man and therefore not popular. Ayub Khan removed him and seated his son as ruler of Dir. Subsequently Yahya Khan altered its political status and included it under the government of NWFP. The people of Dir are mainly Yusafzai, but perhaps because Dir was a princedom, they remained out of the mainstream of ANP influence which might have eroded the control of the ruler. In Dir the religious factor played an important part since the people are deeply religious. CHITRAL: A landlocked northern district of the Frontier province, Chitral is cut off from the rest of the country for four to five months during winter. In the intervening period, its sole link is the whimsical PIA. The rugged terrain of the district has many strategically important mountain passes. Inhabited chiefly by the Chitralis, it has some Pakhtuns in the south but more importantly it is home to the Kalash people. Part of the Hazara division, this former princely state’s inhabitants are deeply religious and the area served as a base for the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation. It has one National Assembly and one Provincial Assembly seat. Major clans are Adamzada, 259 Arbabzada, and Fakir Miskeen. 132 In 1970s elections, Chitral was a composite National Assembly seat of Chitral-cum Dir-cum Swat constituency. For purposes of the Provincial elections, Chitral comprised the Provincial Assembly constituency.133 The results of National and Provincial Assembly elections are as follows:NA PA Total QML 6418 5462 11880 JUI 5835 --5835 PPP 4302 1905 6207 NAP 3192 3106 6298 IND --5644 5644 It will be noticed that whereas the QML won in the National Assembly elections, an independent candidate, Qadir Nawaz, won in the Provincial Assembly elections. By consider the total vote polled, it will be realised that the total vote polled by QML is the largest and that by NAP the second largest. Total polupation of Chitral is 4.08 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 56.65% and 38.40% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 7.56% and electricity is 29.37%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 25% and service ratio is 30%. Housing ratio is 67.12% including kacha and pakka134. Key Political Players in Chitral District during the 1990s were Shazada Mohi-ud-Din, Maulana Abdur Rahim, Said Ahmad Khan, Zain-ul-Abidin, Maulana Ghulam Mohammad and Muhammad Wali Khan.135 Table 6.22: Party’s Position in Chitral District Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) PPP(1) IJI(1) PIF(1) PML-N(1) PA (1) PPP(1) IJI(1) PIF(1) PML-N(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: Chitralis are not Pathans, and they have unique language of their own. Some of them are Muslims and the others are kafir. (Kafiristan is a part of Chitral). It was ruled by Mahtri Chitral (Mehtr means Nawab). The factor of religion is also seen during 1990s. In 1993, Religious Alliance PIF won both National and Provincial Assembly seats. It has been noticed from the above table that Chitral had no space for ANP. SHANGLA: The isolated district of Shangla with its beautiful valleys has the lowest human development index in the entire province. This is unfortunate as the district is rich in natural resources and has potential for hydel power generation even though only one such project is underway at the moment. Agriculture provides the main source of income for the inhabitants. Shangla has one National Assembly and Two Provincial Assembly seats. Major clans are Afgan, Gujjar (Ajar), Syed, Mian and Qureshi.136 Total polupation of Shangla is 1.99 million. Literacy ratio is 14.73%. In 260 utilities water ratio is 41.59% and electricity is 15.22%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 58% and service ratio is 23.1%. Housing ratio is 22.69% including kacha and pakka 137 . Key political players in Shangla District during 1990s were Abdul Mateen Khan, Pir Mohammad khan and Mohammad Zahir Shah Khan. Table 6.23: Party position in Shangla District. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) IJI1 IND1 ANP1 ANP1 PA (2) PPP1, IJI1 IJI2 ANP1, PPP1 PML-N1, IND1 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). MALAKAND: Malakand is a small district encompassing an area of 952 square kilometers. Formerly known as Malakand Agency or Malakand Protected Area, it was given the status of a district in 2001. Politically, no clear vote bank exists there for any political party, be it the PPP or ANP.The Malakand Pass is an essential communication link for the districts of Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Buner, Shangla and Chitral along with other parts of the country. Chromite, iron, china clay and fuller’s earth are mined here, with mineral extraction still an untapped resource for the economy. The district was also affected by the recent wave of militancy in the Frontier province.138 In 1997, when this constituency fell within the NA-26 Malakand (Protected Areacum-Lower Dir) al-Haaj Mohammad Khan of the PMLN won this seat while Mohammad Humayun Khan of the PPP garnered the second highest number of votes. In the earlier election of 1993, the PPP-backed PDA’s Ahmed Hasan won the seat while IJI’s Maulana Gauhar Rahman was the runner-up. In 1988, the seat was won by PPP’s Mohammad Hanif Khan while the ANP’s Abdur Rahman Khan stood second. In fact, this area has remained the monopoly of the PPP. During 1990s, this area represented two Provincial and one National Assembly seat.139 Total polupation of Malakand is 0.62 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 39.29% and 39.52% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 52.38% and electricity is 82.02%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 31% and service ratio is 33%. Housing ratio is 39.10% including kacha and pakka140. Key political players in this area during 1990s were Al Haj Mohammad Khan, Muzaffar Khan, Ahmad Hassan, Hanif Khan, Nek Alam Khan and Jehingir Khan. Table 6.24: Party’s Position in Malakand. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) PPP(1) PDA(1) PDA(1) PML-N(1) PA (2) PPP(2) ANP(1), IJI(1) PPP(2) ANP(2) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. 261 BUNER: Part of the Malakand division till 2000, Buner is surrounded by high hills densely covered by pine and other trees. This scenic district is also known for a number of great saints. Though the majority of the district’s population is descended from the Yousufzai tribes, Buner is also home to other ethnic groups as well as religious minorities, including Sikhs and Hindus. Agriculture provides the main source of livelihood and wheat, maize and tobacco are the main crops grown here. A significant number of the younger generation works abroad. Unlike a number of its neighbouring districts, Buner is known for its peaceful atmosphere. Before NA-28 was carved out in 2002, Buner was part of NA-23 Buner-cum-Shangla seat in 1997 and fell into NA-23 Buner-cum-Swat in 1993. And Mateen Khan had won the NA-23 seats in both 1993 and 1997. Buner has two Provincial and one National Assembly seat. Major clans are Yusafzai, Mandar, Syed, Gujjar and Sikh.141 Total polupation of Buner is 0.7 million. Literacy ratio is 22.62%. In utilities water ratio is 32.05% and electricity is 51.15%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 72.7% and service ratio is 8.4%. Housing ratio is 21.65% including kacha and pakka142. Key political players in this District during 1990s were Fanoos Gujjar, Maulana Abul Rehman, Mohammad Karim, Nadar Khan, Sarzamin Khan, Said Rahim, Abdur Rashid. 6.25: Party’s Position in Buner 1988-1997. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) IJI1 IND1 ANP1 ANP1 PA (2) ANP1, IJI1 IJI1, PDA1 PPP1, ANP1 ANP2 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). 6.2.4 SOUTHERN NWFP: Southern NWFP consists of Kohat, Bannu, DI. Khan, Hangu, Karak, Lakki Marwat and Tank Districts. Southern NWFP is divided into five National Assembly constituencies. IJI/PML-N and JUI-F (Religious Party) had strong hold in southern NWFP during 1990s. The detailed breakup for the National Assembly contests is given in following table. During 1888-1999, the National Assembly situation is as: Table 6.26: Party position on National Assembly seats (Constituencies=5) Elections 1988 1990 1993 1997 ANP % votes/ seats won 5.84 0 0 4.76/1 PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won 4.49 23.88/2 3.45 0 PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won 32.03/2 23.90/1 34.90/3 40.99/4 Religious % votes/ seats won 36.15/3 33.30/1 31.71/2 17.66 Others % votes/ seats won 3.24 4.32 2.76 11.60 Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 16.40/26 13.54/14/1 25.61/23 22.38/28 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). For Provincial Assembly southern NWFP is divided into sixteen constituencies. Provincial Assembly results from the following table shows the heterogeneous nature of southern part of NWFP. Following table shows the religious, ethnic, PPP and 262 PML-N clusters of voters. During 1988-1999, the provincial election detail from southern NWFP is as: Table 6.27: Party’s position on Provincial Assembly seats : (Constituencies=16) Elections ANP % votes/ seats won 8.31/1 4.87/2 5.91/1 2.31/3 PPP/PDA % votes/ seats won 9.45/1 5.16/2 6.99/1 28.61 PML-N/IJI % votes/ seats won 30.22/6 26.29/7 26.02/4 10.41/6 Religious % votes/ seats won 14.80/2 0.07/1 9.74/1 7.38/1 Others % votes/ seats won 0.91 0.09 14.64/3 12.49/2 Independents % votes/ no. of candidates/ seats won 34.90/102/6 46.43/74/4 35.34/74/6 36.40/104/4 1988 1990 1993 1997 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). KOHAT: Kohat is a district of southern NWFP and is famous for the traditional Khattak dance; the area is home to the Bangash and Khattak tribes. Kohat city is a military town, containing the main headquarters of the Signal corps in the army and an air force base. It is also notorious for being the second busiest smuggling route between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The district has been done proud by poet Ahmed Faraz. Kohat represented three Provincial and one National Assembly seat. Major clans are Bangash and Khattak. 143 In 1970 elections Kohat comprise one National Assembly constituency and three Provincial constituencies. In the National Assembly elections, JUI won, with the second highest vote going to PMLC. (Convention Muslim League). JUI got 35817 votes, PMLC got 15014 votes, QML had 14433 votes, JI obtained 10563 votes and NAP got 10426 votes.144 In the Provincial Assembly Elections, NAP, QML, JUI and PPP contested in all three constituencies, whereas PMLC contested in only two. Of the three seats, JUI and PMLC won one each, and the third seat went to an independent, Mohammad Aslam Khan Khattak. Total polupation of Kohat is 7.74 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio was 67.02% and 34.52% respectively. In utilities water ratio was 85.5% and electricity is 6.17%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio was 60% and service ratio is 26.6%. Housing ratio is 21.65% including kacha and pakka145. Key political players during 1990s were Hidayatullah Khan, Nawabzada Mohabbat Ali Zafar, Syed Sanaullah Shah, Mohammad Aurangzeb Khan, Saith Saifullah Shah Bangash, Syed Masud Kauser, Iftikhar-ud-Din, Shad Mohammad Khan, Ghani-ur-Rehman, and Muhammad Farid Muffakar. Table 6.28: Party’s Position in Kohat: Constituency NA PA 1988 1990 1993 1997 IJI(1) PDA(1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1) JUI-F(1), IND(1), IJI(1), PDA(1), PML-J(1), ANP(1) PML-N(2), ANP(1) PPP(1) ANP(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. 263 SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS: The Pathan residents in Kohat are in the great majority Kirlani. They are simple, backward, religious and hospitable. These Pathans are largely anti-ANP and anti-Afghan. Religious considerations were the deciding factors in Kohat. For instance, in the National Assembly elections, Maulana Nehmat-Ullah Khan won with the slogan of an Islamic constitution for Pakistan in 1970 elections. In 1970s Provincial Assembly elections, the PMLC candidate Nawabzada Azmat Ali Kahn won because of his reputation as a very good man. Also the Shias were not in sufficient number in this constituency to put up their own candidate. In PF 25, JUI candidate, Maulana Habib Gul won also because in this constituency, the majorities were Sunni. The Shias put up their own candidate who lost. In PF 26 Aslam Khattak won because of personal popularity. During 1988-1997, voting behaviour has changed due to development indicators and political developments. During 1990s, IJI/PML-N and PPP were the major leading parties in Kohat district. BANNU: Bannu is mainly a rural district of southern NWFP, though its urban centres are well-populated and date centuries back in history. The old city of Bannu is walled and can be entered through one of its many gates. The land in the district is fertile and known for producing high quality vegetables, fruits and spices. From 1988-1997, Bannu was represented three Provincial and one National Assembly seat. Major clans are Banochi, Wazir, Marwat, Bhittanai, Syed and Awan.146 In 1970 elections, Bannu was divided into one National Assembly constituency and two Provincial Assembly constituencies. In the National Assembly elections JUI got 60511 votes, QML got 14896 votes, NAP had 5362 votes and PPP had 1891 votes.147 In the Provincial Assembly elections as in the National Assembly elections, JUI candidates swept the polls. JUI got 34070 votes, QML had 18557 votes, NAP obtained 4018 votes and PPP had 1904 votes. Total polupation of Bannu is 8.93 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio was 60.47% and 29.65% respectively. In utilities water ratio was 31.19% and electricity was 94.06%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio was 39% and service ratio was 23.7%. Housing ratio was 73.94% including kacha and pakka148. Key political players during 1990s were Malik Nasir Khan, Syed Abbas Shah, Molvi Ali Akbar, Mohammad Kabir Khan, Anwar Saifullah, Mr. Akram Khan Durrani, Attaullah Jan, Baz Mohammad Khan, Naser Khan, Syed Munir Shah, Naqibullah, Syed Munir Shah, 264 Anwar Kamal Khan, Khan Mashal Khan, Humayun Saifullah and Saleem Saifullah.149 Table 6.29: Party position in Bannu District 1988-1999. Constituency NA (1) PA (3) 1988 1990 1993 1997 JUI-F(1) JUI-F(1) PML-N(1) PML-N(1) IJI(1), ANP(1), JUI-F(1), ANP(1), PML-J(1), PML- JUI-F(1), ANP(1), IND(1) IJI(1) N(1), IND(1) IND(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: In Bannu, majorities of Pathans are Kirlani and comprise of three main tribes, Banochi, Marwat and Wazir. The Bannu Pathans are more backward, more religious, and more traditional compared to all the other areas of NWFP. Bannu was previously the stronghold of QML candidate, Malik Hamidullah Khan. The slogan of JUI candidate was “vote Hamidulla ko duo ge ho ya Khuda-wan-t-Allah ko duo ge” (whether you vote for Hamidullah or Allah i.e. God). A similar slogan was employed by another JUI candidate in PF 31 against the NAP candidate Abdul Majeed. “Vote Abdul Majeed ko do ge ya Quran Majeed ko do ge”, (whether you vote for Abdul Majeed or Quran Majeed i.e. holy book). On the basis of these religious slogans the JUI candidates won from these constituencies. Above table shows that JUI-F had strong hold in this district during 1990s. PML-N/IJI is second largest party in this area from 1988-1997. DI. KHAN: Dera Ismail Khan takes its name from Ismail Khan, a Baloch chief who settled here after migrating from Sri Lanka in AD 1469. The present day city is situated four miles away from Indus River. Its population is a mix of ethnic Baloch and Pakhtuns, with a significant Urdu-speaking migrant population. D.I. Khan lies in the Seraiki belt and is linked via roads to Bhakkar and Mianwali in the Punjab. It is also connected to Afghanistan through the Gomal Pass. From 1988-1997, D.I. Khan has two National Assembly seats, one of which (NA-25) it shares with Tank. DI Khan represented four provincial and one National assembly seat. Major clans are Mootani Pathan, Baluch, Rajput and Jat.150 In 1970 elections, D.I Khan was divided into one National Assembly constituency and two provincial assembly constituencies. On National Assembly seats, JUI got 45978 votes, QML got 7416 votes, PPP got 33267 votes and NAP got 1372 votes.151 Although JUI won the National Assembly seat, yet it lost both provincial assembly seats. The provincial assembly results were as follows:- 265 Const: PF 27 PF 28 Total JUI 7265 80151 17416 PPP 5001 9900 14901 QML 4368 12905 17273 NAP 382 904 1286 MLC -13764 13764 IND 9249 ---___ 9249 It will be noted that in the above two constituencies and independent, Sardar Inayat Ullah Khan, and an MLC candidate, Makhdoom Atta-ur-Rehman won. However, if we consider the total vote polled, it will be seen that JUI polled the most votes. If to the above total we combine the results of the e combined provincial assembly constituency of DI khan-cum-Banu (PF 29), JUI still polls the largest number of votes. This is obvious from the following:JUI 17416 12411 29827 PPP 14901 425 15126 QML 17273 9495 26768 NAP 1286 6296 7582 MLC 13764 14251 28015 PF29 Also, if we combine PF 29 with PF 27 and PF 28, than QML loses its position as the second strongest party to MLC. Total polupation of DI. Khan is 0.11 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 65.17% and 24.40% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 33.88% and electricity is 73.17%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 40% and service ratio is 28%. Housing ratio is 78.24% including kacha and pakka152. Key political players from this district during 1990s were Fazal Karim Khan Kundi, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, Umar Farooq Khan, Mussarat Shaheen, Abdul Halim Khan Qasuria, Bin Yameen Khan, Abdul Khai Mufti Abdul Quddus, Fetehullah Khan, Haji Sardar Inayatullah Khan, Sardar Umar Farooq Khan, Javed Akbar Khan, Makhdumzada Murid Kazim Shah, Javed Akbar Khan, Habibullah Khan Kundi and Amanullah Khan.153 Table 6.30: Party’sPosition in DI. Khan. Constituency NA (1) PA (4) 1988 1990 1993 1997 JUI(1) PDA(1) IJM(1) PML-N(1) JUI-F(1), IJI(2), PDA(1), IND(3) IJM(1), PPP(1), PML-N(4) IND(1) IND(1), PML-N(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS: In D.I Khan, people are religious and many madrassas are located here with the aid of Saudi Arabia under the supervision of Deobandi cleric and JUI-F leader Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. The majority are Sunnis. The Kirlani Pathans are in majority. There are number of Baluchis and Punjabis settlers. Religion played a major role in elections. In 1970s National Assembly elections, Maulana Mufti Mehmood of JUI defeated Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of PPP. The grounds for the JUI victory were religious. The slogan was “Socialism Kufar Hai”. (Socialism is un-Islamic). In PF 28, CML candidate Makhdoom Atta-ur-Rehman, Pir 266 of Shias, won largely because the Sunni vote got split between QML, CML, PPP, and NAP. In PF 29, CML candidate Humayun Saif Ullah Khan won largely due to Pir Sahib Zakori Sharif appeal to his followers to cast their vote in favour of Saifullah. In PF 28, the independent candidate, Sardar Inayatullah Khan, Nawab of Gandapur, won on the family and personality basis. From 1988-1997, religious Party JUI-F played a dominant role in electoral politics of DI. Khan. A religious alliance IJM got one National Assembly and one Provincial Assembly seats from DI. Khan as shown in above mentioned table. TANK: Tank is the district of southern NWFP and represented one Provincial Assembly from 1988-1997. The primary profession of its Pakhtun population is agriculture, with many of those who have moved to urban centres employed as menial labour. Spread over 1,679 square kilometres, Tank shares its borders with Lakki Marwat in the north, Mianwali in the east, Dera Ghazi Khan in the south and South Waziristan Agency in the west. In fact, it also serves as the administrative headquarters of the Waziristan-Mahsud territory. Tank city is inhabited by the Bittani, Marwat, Jat, Kundi, Mahsud and Burki tribes. The last two are natives of the neighbouring South Waziristan agency but have now settled here. 154 Table 6.31: Party’s Position in Tank: Constituency NA PA (1) 1988 IND(1) 1990 IJI(1) 1993 IND(1) 1997 IND(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. Total polupation of Tank was 3.23 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio was 43.14% and 23.15% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 80.42% and electricity is 92.35%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio was 49.2% and service ratio was 15.8%. Housing ratio was 83.57% including kacha and pakka155. Key political players were Habibullah Khan Kundi, Humayun Saifullah, Muhammad Iftikhar Zaffar, Nisar Ahmad and Molvi Feteh Khan.156 HANGU: Hangu was represented by one Provincial Assembly seat during 1988-1997. The district takes its name from the town of Hangu. The name Hangu may also sometimes be applied to the Miranzai Valley which is partly within the district, bordering the Samana Range. Hangu was separated from the district of Kohat in 1998. Its area starts from a village named Khawaja Khizer (Jawzara) which is the boundary between Kohat and Hangu Districts. Hingu is famous for its scenic hills, rivers and ancient forts, and is under the sectarian influence of Sunni and Shia sects. It shares 267 this characteristic with the adjoining Kurram Agency where similar sectarian clashes prevail. Moreover, being at the receiving end of the ill effects of the long-running strife in Afghanistan, Hangu is awash with drugs and arms. On the bright side, the people of the district are known for their hard work and tough survival instincts. In search of livelihood, they can be found in any corner of the country and beyond. Major clans are Bangash, Orakzai, Khattak, Shinwari and Afridi.157 Total polupation of Hangu is 4.3 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 45.90% and 26.23% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 73.09% and electricity is 91.40%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 46% and service ratio is 10.1%. Housing ratio is 33.29% including kacha and pakka158 . Key political players during 1990s were Ghani-ur-Rehman, Malik Nawab Khan Bangash, Muhammad Farid Muffakkar, Syed Haider Ali Shah.159 Table 6.32: Party’s Position in Hangu. Constituency NA (1) PA (1) 1988 IJI(1) IND(1) 1990 PDA(1) IJI(1) 1993 PML-N(1) PML-N(1) 1997 PML-N(1) IND(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997).Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. KARAK: Karak is a district of the North-West Frontier Province having two Provincial and one National Assembly seat. It is situated to the south of Kohat District and on the north side of Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts on the main Indus Highway between Peshawar and Karachi. Due to a rising literacy rate, Karak produces the bulk of bureaucrats and generals coming from the Frontier. Because of the alkaline soil and low rainfall, most of the land falling in this district is unsuitable for cultivation. In the absence of agriculture people rely on the public and private sectors for their livelihood. For this obvious reason the district is a hotbed for recruitment for the military as well as other government departments. Major clans are Barak sub tribe of Khattak. 160 Over the past few decades, Karak has been a battleground for the ANP and politico-religious outfits. However, the individuals who met with electoral success nearly always had the establishment’s blessings. The district, which is mostly inhabited by the Khattak tribe, was previously under the sway of the family of the late Nawabzada Ali Quli Khan, which loosened its grip after the Nawabzada’s two sons developed differences with each other. Now his grandson Ayub Khattak is in the arena to try to revive his family’s fortunes. Afrasiyab Khattak, human rights campaigner and ANP leader, had also stood from this seat in the 1990 elections. 268 Table 6.33: Party’s Position in Karak. Constituency 1988 1990 1993 1997 NA (1) JUID(1) IND(1) MDM(1) ANP(1) PA (2) IND(1), IJI(1) ANP(1), IJI(1) IND(2) IND(1), ANP(1) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Numbers in () shows the number of seats won by Party. Total polupation of Karak is 0.5 million. Urban and rural literacy ratio is 53.84% and 41.07% respectively. In utilities water ratio is 43.04% and electricity is 81.20%. In employment sector, agriculture ratio is 39% and service ratio is 21.8%. Housing ratio is 46.38% including kacha and pakka 161 .Key political players from Karak during 1990s were Mr. Shamsur Rehman, Maulana Shaheed Ahmed, Aslam Khan Khattak, Fareed Khan Toofan, Abdul Haleem Khattak, Sher Nawaz, Nawab Zada Mohsin Ali Khan and Malik Zaffar Azam.162 6.3 CONCLUSIONS There were different factors affecting party politics and their electoral strategies in NWFP. These factors go a long way towards explaining the important reversal whereby the PML-N coalition party ANP replaced the PPP in its former stronghold in urban NWFP. No list, however, will comprehensively explain this complex issue. Furthermore, as this role reversal proves, the political situation in urban NWFP is not static. Political preferences and voting behaviour changes over time, and change is more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. The urban voters, who voted for the PPP in 1988 and for the ANP in 1993 and 1997, may well change their voting behaviour once again. http://www.pildat.org retrieved on 13 March 2010 http://www.pildat.org retrieved on 13 March 2010 3 Wusatullah Khan, Pakistan Political Parties, BBC Report, 22 August 2009. 4 See Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1994), pp. 157-69 5 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (New York St. Martin's Press, 1980) , pp. 221-39 6 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 7 Philip Jones, The Pakistan People Party: Rise to Power (New York: Oxford University Press) pp. 520-1 8 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977, pp. 108-41 9 Zaman Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Faisalabad, 22 March 1905 10 Sharafat Ali Mubarak, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 September 2009 11 Talat Aslam, ‘The Year of Living Dangerously’, Herald, December 1989, pp. 31-42 12 Haroon-ur-Rasheed, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 September 2006 13 http://www.khyber.org/people/pol/AftabAhmadKhanSherpao.shtml retrieved on 25 March 2010 14 For more details see Jones, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party’, pp. 399-436 15 Name withheld, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, September 2005 16 Haq Nawaz, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 16 December 2006 17 Haneef Ramey, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 19 September 2005. 2 1 269 Tariq Lateef, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 6 September 2005. Afrasiyab Khattak, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 12 May 2006. 20 Shahid Javed Burki, op.cit., p.210 21 For historical account of local government, see Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local SelfGovernment in India, Pakistan and Burma (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1954). 22 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Swat, 6 September 2006 23 Adnan Adil, Local Bodies polls, 1991’, Newsline (Karachi), January 1992. 24 Cutting the Head off National Politics’, Daily The News, 30 September 1994, p. 10 25 M.A. Niazi, ‘Local Bodies: The History’, The News on Friday, 30 September 1994, p. 10 26 Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Interview by Author, Lahore, 12 march 2005 27 Nawaz Sharief was known on occasion to Punjabi chauvinist sentiments during election speeches by raising such slogans as, ‘Jag Punjabi Jag, Tera pug nu lug geya dagh’ (Wake up Punjabi! Your turban has been stained)-an unsubtle allusion to the fact that Punjabis were being governed by a Sindhi Prime Minister. 28 Niaz Pasha Jadoon, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 16 November 2007 29 Mohammad Waseem, ‘The Brave New Punjab’, The Herald (Karachi), February 1991, pp. 106-109 30 S. Akbar Zaidi’s description of this ‘revolution’ ‘the Hidden Revolution’, Herald Election Special 1993, November-December 1993, pp. 54-58 31 Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan Economy under Zia’, Pakistan Under the Military, p. 107. 32 Ibid., p. 90 33 Zaidi, ‘The Hidden revolution’, p. 56. 34 I.A Rehman, Interview by Author, Tape recording, Lahore, 8 September 2005 35 Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Polls, 1990’, Gallup Political weather report, Special Issue (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p. 43. 36 Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, p.17 April 2005 37 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 38 For the history of business community’s involvement in politics, see Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983). See also Gustave F. Papanek, Pakistan’s development: Social Goals and Private incentives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) 39 For a description of business versus government conflict, see M. Ziauddin, ‘Benazir vs the Bazaar’, The News, 21 October 1994; Syed Talat Hussain, ‘Politics of Business Strike’, The News, 26 March 1995; and the Special Report, ‘Government vs. Business Community’, The News on Friday, 31 March 1995. 40 Riaz Arshad, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 14 January 2009 41 In contrast, it was more than year after coming to power in 1993 that Benazir Bhutto finally agreed to a meeting with the President of Pakistan’s premier business association, the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FPCCI) 42 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 September 2005 43 Akmal Hussain, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 25 September 2006 44 IA Rehman, interview by author, tape recording, Islamabad, Islamabad, 15 March 2006. 45 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, tape recording, Islamabad, 16 March 2006. 46 Ibid. 47 Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party, pp. 418-24 48 Abdullah Qureshi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad 49 The Director of Lahore Goethe Institute, Dr. Mubarak Ali, pointed out that a similar localization or ‘depoliticisation’ took place with student politics: This is why during Zia’s period there was no student demonstration for democracy, no student demonstration for human rights, no demonstrations over national issues. There has been the process of de-politicization of students. The students are now confined to their campuses and there are rivalries between the different groups and they are fighting each other over local campus issues-they don’t like a teacher, they don’t like the Vice Chancellor, these are the issues they are fighting over. At this is why Zia-ul-Haq remained in power in peace, without any trouble. Mubarak Ali, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Lahore, 12 September 2005 50 www.anp.org.pk 51 Raja Zulfikar, ‘ANP quits govt. after talks fail’, Daily Dawn (Karachi), 28 February 1998 52 Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and Pakistan Movement: The Growth of Muslim League in North West and North East India, 1937-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1988). 53 Charles H.Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1987) 19 18 270 54 Tahir Amin, Ethno-national movements of Pakistan: domestic and international factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998) 55 Ibid. 56 Supreme Court judgment on dissolution of NAP, government of Pakistan, 1975, p. 27 57 Omar Noman, The political Economy of Pakistan 1947-1985 (London: KPI Limited, 1988) 58 Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation: Pakistan Searching for it identity, Ed. Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (New Dehli: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2002) 59 Tahir Amin, Ethno-national movements of Pakistan: domestic and international factors. 60 Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: space book Publishers, 1970) 61 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the movement for the establishment of Pakistan and the first Governor-General, talked of combing the notions of modern state and democracy with Islamic principles. He said that Pakistan would be a democratic state but “with Islam as its underlying ethical principle.” See Sharif al Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (Karachi: Quaid-iAzam Academy, 1981), pp.143-144. 62 For a review of the factors and political conditions that undermined democracy in Pakistan, see Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.146199; Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1994), pp. 88-131. 63 Wusatullah Khan, BBC Urdu Service Broadcast Report, 20 April 2004. 64 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Islamic Parties and Power Politics.” Dawn (Karachi), 14 August 2004. 65 The data released by the government of Pakistan in October 2006 showed that up to 1,549,242 students were enrolled in 12,153 Islamic seminaries in Pakistan. In addition to 12,153 Islamic seminaries, 826 other seminaries did not provide information about their students. There could be some more Islamic seminaries functioning without the knowledge of the government. See Daily Times (Lahore), 7 October 2006. 66 Some religious leaders and organizations openly talk of establishing a Caliphate system in the Muslim world on the lines of the Islamic Caliphate of the earliest period of Islamic history. They maintain that this would promote internal consolidation amongst the Muslims and enable them to withstand external pressures. An Islamic-militant organization, Hizb ut Tharir, banned in Pakistan and Great Britain, distribute pamphlets or sends e-mail messages in Pakistan in favour of establishing the Caliphate system in place of democracy in the Muslim world, including Pakistan. 67 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.160-184. 68 For a discussion of the issue of relationship between Islam and the state, see Inamur Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 3-40. 69 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973), Article 2. 70 See Shaukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1997), pp.195-285. 71 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005), pp.170-172. 72 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p.275. 73 For a detailed study of relationship between the Pakistan state, especially the Army, and the Islamic extremist and militant groups, see Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment, 2005), pp.159-197, 261-309; see also Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004, pp.19-25. 74 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The Terrorism Debate,” Daily Times, 31 July 2005 75 S.V.R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation? (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp.85-114. 76 Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” in Christofer Jaffrelot, op.cit. pp.115-128. 77 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp178-216. 78 Government of Pakistan, 1998 Provincial Census Report of NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistic Division, 2000) 79 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 80 Ibid. 271 81 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 82 Ibid. 83 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Peshawar (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 84 Ibid. 85 Government of Pakistan, Report on General elections 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 86 Data Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 87 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 88 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Mardan (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 89 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 90 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 91 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Charsada (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 92 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 93 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 94 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Nowshera (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 95 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 96 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). 97 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Swabi (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 98 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 99 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 100 Government of Pakistan, NWFP Census Report, 1998 (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, 1998) 101 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 102 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Abbottabad (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 103 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 104 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 105 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Mansehra (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 106 SDPI Research & News bulletin, Vol. 9, No-2, Islamabad: March-April-2002. P.2 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 272 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 110 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 111 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Battagram (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 112 Ibid. 113 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 114 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Kohistan (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 115 Daily Shammal (Local News Paper of Hazara in Urdu), Abbottabad, 13 March 1996. 116 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 117 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 118 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Haripur (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 119 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 120 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 121 See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 122 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Swat (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000), P. 8 123 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 124 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 125 Ibid. 126 Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 127 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Upper Dir (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 128 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 129 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 130 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Lower Dir (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 131 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 132 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Chitral (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 133 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 134 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 109 273 135 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 136 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Shangla (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 137 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 138 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Malakand (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 139 See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 140 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 141 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Buner (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 142 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 143 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Kohat (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 144 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 145 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 146 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Bannu (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 147 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 148 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 149 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 150 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of DI. Khan (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistic Division, 2000) 151 Election Commission of Pakistan: Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) 152 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 153 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 154 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Tank (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 155 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 156 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 157 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Hangu (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 158 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 159 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 160 Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Karak (Islamabad, Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2000) 274 Datta Calculated from Government of Pakistan, Socio-Economic Indicators at District Level in NWFP (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, 2002) 162 For the names of politicians from this district, See Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 161 275 CHAPTER-7 URBAN-RURAL DIVISION OF ELECTORAL POLITICS 7.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter shifts attention from the regional differences in voting behaviour to an analysis of urban and rural differences. It shows how the rural landed elites have been dominating NWFP politics ever since the colonial period. Despite the growing economic clout of urban NWFP, it has generally been politically under-represented. The fact that Pakistan has one of the highest urbanization rates in south Asia1, however, ensures that the political importance of urban NWFP will grow over time. The chapter analyzes constituency returns for the 1970, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections, and polling station returns for the 1988 to 1997 elections, and highlights the changes that have taken place between the voting behaviour of urban and rural NWFP. Rural and urban population of NWFP is shown in following table. Table 7.1: Urban and Rural population in NWFP. (In Millions) Year 1951 1961 1972 1981 1988 Total 4557 5731 8389 11061 17736 Urban 505 759 1196 1666 2994 Rural 4052 4972 7193 9396 14742 Source: Government of Pakistan, Hand book of Population and Housing Census NWFP (Islamabad: Population Census Organisation, Statistics Division, 2002) The least urbanised province with only 17 percent of provincial population living in urban areas was NWFP. The shares of urban population in total population of Punjab and Balochistan were respectively 31 and 23 percent. In 1998 Sindh was the most urbanised province with 49 percent of total provincial population living in urban areas.2 7.2: URBAN-RURAL DIVISION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES The political divide between urban and rural NWFP is not a recent development. Indeed, the structure of imperial rule established by the British in NWFP was premised on this divide. The operating assumption of the colonial administrators who followed ‘the NWFP tradition’ was that political stability was best ensured by securing the support of the countryside rather than the cities, and therefore priority should be given to co-opting and strengthening rural rather than urban elites.3 British occupied Frontier region in 1849 after Anglo-Sikh War and had brought these regions under the administrative setup of Punjab. In 9th November, 1901 Lord Curzon formed the province of NWFP by separating five districts (Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Dera 276 Ismail Khan and Bannu). These districts were put under the charge of a Deputy Commissioner assisted by the Assistant Commissioners in the tehsils.4 The uprising of 1857 in particular, when many of the landed elites of NWFP proved their loyalty by helping to suppress the uprising, strengthened the belief of British administrators that future stability lay in the support of rural NWFP. The British then set about identifying ‘natural leaders’ and established then a loyal class of ‘hereditary landed gentry’ by awarding pensions, titles, and land grants in the rural areas. In return, the elites who benefited from this policy-mostly traditional tribe chieve, heads of biradaris (clans), and sajjada nashins (hereditary custodians of Sufi sharines)maintained law and order and defended colonial interest in their respective jurisdictions. To a remarkable degree, the symbiotic relationship between the government and the rural landed elite continues to be one of the fundamental bases for ruling NWFP.5 During the late nineteenth century a new urban political class began to emerge in NWFP’s cities from the ranks of the small but growing middle classes. As the Hindus/Sikhs dominated trade and commercial activities, the growth of a Muslim middle class was fuelled primarily by the needs of the expanding colonial government that required civil servants for its bureaucracy, lawyers for its courts, physicians for its hospitals, engineers for its public works programmes, and teachers for its schools and colleges. Along with the growth of this new class came the expectations of greater political influence. However, there was little room for these upward mobile urban professionals within the existing traditional hierarchical social and political structures. It was their search for new social, cultural, and political identities and new structure through which they could exert influence that led to the development of the first modern Muslim organizations in the cities of NWFP.6 In 1906 the All India Muslim League was founded and in 1912 its branch was established in NWFP which provided the first distinctly political platform from which this new Muslim middle class could articulate its demands. The first organizers of the Frontier Muslim League were young western educated Muslims (Mian Abdul Aziz, Qazi Abdul Wali Khan, Syed Ali Abbas Bokhari, Qazi Mir Ahmad and Hakim Muhammad Amin from the urban areas of NWFP)7. But while a new political class was emerging and organizing in the cities, the rural elites, patronized by the colonial administrators, continued their overwhelming domination of frontier politics. The political significance of the cities was that they became centers of political opposition to the government, and became 277 the launching ground for opposition movements. Most of the movements were over communal issues, and for the Muslim community were spearheaded by the urban based ulema.8 While the urban areas agitated, however, rural areas ruled-a pattern that persists to this day. Following the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, and until the elections of 1946, NWFP politics were controlled by the Khudai Khidmatgars from semi urban and rural areas of NWFP. The NWFP Muslim League, whose members and leaders like Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar were mostly drawn from the urban middle class, played a distinctly peripheral role in provincial politics. This fact was highlighted in the 1937 elections for the 50 members Legislative Assembly seats in the NWFP; Muslim League did not nominate any candidate in NWFP. The main contesters were the Congress Party, Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party and the Independents. Jinnah recognized that power in the NWFP rested in the hands of the rural notables, and that there was little future for an urban based party like the League. Jinnah’s political calculation was proved correct in the elections of 1946, when the League won 17 of 50 Muslim Seats. The League’s overwhelming victory among Muslim voters in these elections in the NWFP by securing 147133 votes while congress secured 15922 votes,9 did not reflect any major social or political change, but rather that the former urban-based Muslim League, had successfully been taken over by the rural elites. 7.3 THE JAGIRDARS VERSUS THE BUREAUCRATS 1947-1958 Having led the Pakistan Movement, the leadership of the Muslim League inherited power in Pakistan after independence. At the national level it was the predominantly urban-based Muslim League leaders from the minority provinces who took control. In the League’s Working Committee following Independence, 17 of the 28 members were from the urban professional classes.10 This resulted in a reversal, albeit temporary, of the colonial policy that favoured the rural political elite.11 In addition to the urban bias of the central leadership, there was a strong refugee influence when the first post-Independence session of the All-India Muslim League was held in December 1947, 160 of 300 participating councilors were from regions that became part of India.12 As they had left their constituencies behind in India, the refugee politicians had to find a new base of political support in Pakistan. The first constituency to which they turned was their fellow refugees from India who had migrated in large numbers to Karachi, and to lesser extent to other cities of Sindh and 278 the Punjab.13 They also looked for support from the Gujrati-speaking trading and entrepreneurial families based in Karachi.14 Numerically, however, this predominantly urban-based constituency was weak. This was one of the major factors contributing to the reluctance of the League leadership to hold elections that would inevitably have led to their replacement at the national level by the indigenous rural elite of the NWFP and other provinces. To strengthen their position, the League’s refugee politicians allied themselves with the powerful civil administrators who also considered the rural landed elite as their only serious political rivals. It did not take long for the balance of power to shift from the politicians to the bureaucrats. The assassination of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951 symbolized the end of the dominance of national politics by politicians.15 As the position of the urban politicians at the national level grew weaker, so did their political utility for the bureaucracy, and over time the colonial model of bureaucratic rule with the support of the rural notables was restored. In NWFP provincial politics, in contrast with national politics, it was the rural rather than the urban politicians who inherited power after independence. The few urban, progressive League leaders, such as Abdul Qayum Khan, either left or were forced out of the party. In 1951 provincial assembly elections, majority of politicians came from rural NWFP. The widespread anti-Ahmadiya disturbances in 1953 in Punjab, which forced the government to ask for the military’s assistance in restoring law and order, helped shift the balance of power from the politicians firmly back in favour of the bureaucracy.16 The quick and efficient handling of the situation by the army, in stark contrast to the vacillating and irresponsible behaviour of the politicians, weakened the credibility and legitimacy of the politicians. The rural notables, now organized under the banner of the Republican Party, were again reduced to their traditional role as junior partners in the ruling alliance. From 1953 to 1958, the colonial model of bureaucratic rule supported by the landed elite prevailed. In 1951, NWFP’s first Provincial Assembly’s elections were held. Elections would have strengthened and legitimized the position of the politicians in general and rural politicians in particular, at the expense of the bureaucracy. 7.4 AYUB ERA 1958-1969: Ayub Khan a person from NWFP continued the colonial pattern of developing a rural support base for his regime. He was from a rural 279 background of village Rehana from Haripur District. Rather than relying on the rural elite, he turned instead to the rural middle classes for political support.17 Ayub adopted several measures which strengthen the rural middle classes, often at the expense of the traditional rural elite. In 1958 he promulgated the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) that barred anyone from holding office who was found guilty of misconduct. The order barred approximately 40 percent of all the big landlord politicians from holding office, which provided an opportunity for many from the rural middle classes to enter politics.18 Ayub also struck the crux of rural elite power by introducing ceilings on land ownership. Although the reforms were modest in scope, they were Pakistan’s first successful attempt to implement land reforms. Ayub’s system of basic democracies, which provided a mechanism for the rural middle classes to enter politics at the local governmental level, also challenged the rural elite’s monopoly for power. Furthermore, at the same time the rural middle classes were gaining politically, ‘Green Revolution’ technology was strengthening them economically. Ayub could do without the support of the rural notables as long as martial law was in force. But when martial law ended in 1962, and Ayub was confronted with the prospect of elections in 1964-5, he felt the need to broaden his base of support. Ayub turned away from the middle classes and back to the landed elite for political support. This shift is reflected in the changing fortunes in the Assemblies of the rural elite and the rural middle classes from NWFP. In National Assembly, the percentage of large ‘Ashrafi’ landlord-politicians from the NWFP went from 57.2 percent in 1955 down to 21.3 percent in 1962 and than up to 27.6 percent in 1965. The number of representatives from the ‘middle’ and ‘gentry’ landholders in the National Assembly went from 9.5 percent in 1955, up to 44.7 percent in 1962, and than back down to 29.8 percent in 1965.19 The decline of the rural middle classes’ newfound political power coincided with a downturn in their economic fortunes following droughts in the mid-60s and the 1965 Indo-Pak war. This led to growing disenchantment with Ayub which Bhutto was able to use to his political advantage.20 In urban areas Ayub’s martial law regime was initially welcomed by a population tired of corruption, black marketeering, a deteriorating law and order situation, and the irresponsible behaviour of the politicians. It soon became clear, however, that Ayub, like the British administrators, distrusted the urban political classes. The big industrialists were the only important urban group that Ayub cultivated and patronized. He adopted deliberate measures to weaken other politically influential 280 urban groups, which included the censorship and seizure of the ani-government Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) which further curtailed the freedom of the press; martial law which reduced the scope for litigation and hence the economic well-being and political clout of the legal community; the University Ordinance which limited the autonomy of universities; the Industrial Dispute Ordinance which curtailed the rights of organized labour; and the creation of the Auqaf Department which reduced the economic and political independence of the religious establishment.21 Not surprisingly, it was these politicized urban social groups,22 supported by many from the rural middle classes that led the movement which brought down Ayub’s government in 1969. Jones noted that the anti-Ayub movement represented the … late political ‘coming of age’. ‘It was the breakthrough of the mass public into the political sphere, and it signaled a fundamental and ultimately irreversible alteration in the relationship between rulers and ruled.’23 In particular, it represented the political awakening of urban NWFP. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, a primarily urban-based political movement brought down the national government which was backed by the powerful bureaucracy and the traditional landed elite. Furthermore, unlike previous urban agitation movement like the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances of 1953, this was a secular movement making secular political and economic demands. 7.5 ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO 1970-1977 During the period between Ayub’s downfall in 1969 and 1970 elections, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the recently founded Pakistan People’s Party succeeded in winning the support of the bulk of the Anti-Ayub constituency. The PPP’s strongest support initially came from urban left group such as students and organized labour, but also from middle class professionals such as lawyers and the intelligentsia. Bhutto realized, however, that urban support alone was not sufficient to win elections in an overwhelming rural country. In organizing the PPP and campaigning for the 1970 elections, therefore, he was careful to sell the PPP as an ‘inclusionist’ and broadbased party so as not to alienate influential social groups such as the rural elite.24 Thus while the urban left strongly opposed the entry of ‘feudals’ into the PPP, Bhutto did not, and instead actively sought their support. In his speeches Bhutto, who himself came from a rural elite background, rarely mentioned ‘feudalism’ as a national problem. Instead he focused his criticism on the bureaucrats and capitalists whose 281 numbers in terms of voting power were relatively insignificant.25 In Sindh, Bhutto’s home province, the PPP was dominated by the landed elite. The case in NWFP was different, which reflected the miscalculation of the rural notables as to who would win the election rather than the PPP’s unwillingness to accept them into the fold.26 Their setback was temporary, for soon after the elections the majority switched their loyalties to the wining side.27 The NAP (National Awami Party) strong urban support in the NWFP was reflected in the results of the 1970 elections, Pakistan’s first national elections based on universal suffrage. The following Table reflects the detail of the 1970 elections in NWFP. Table 7.2 Name and party affiliation of winning candidates (National Assembly) in 1970 elections. Name of Constituency Peshawar NW1 NW2 NW3 NW4 Hazara NW6 NW7 NW8 Mardan NW10 NW11 Kohat NW12 NW9 NW5 Winners Khan Abdul Qayum Khan Ghulam Faooq Khan Abdul Wali Khan Maulana Abdul Haq Sahib Maulvi Abdul Hakeem Maulana Ghulam Ghous Sardar Inayaut-ur-Rehman Khan Qayum Khan Abdul Khaliq Khan Pirzada Khan Khan Abdul Qayum Khan Maulvi Niamatullah Mufti Mehmood Maulana Sardar-ul-Shahid Dir cum Swat Ataliq Jafar Ali Shah Party QML NAP NAP JUI JUI JUI QML QML PPP NAP QML JUI JUI JUI QML DI. Khan NW13 Bannu Chitral NW15 Swat NW17 Dir NW18 NW16 NW14 cum Rahim Shah Prince Aurangzeb Khan Safi-ullah Saheb QML QML QML Party Position: QML(08), NAP (02), JUI (06), JI (01), PPP (01) Total: 18 Source: Datta compiled from 1970 General Election Report. Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) Above table shows that NAP (National Awami Party) won National Assembly seats from urban centre while QML (Qayyum Muslim League) and JUI (Jamiat-i-Ulema-eIslam) won seats from rural NWFP. This argument also reflects from the results of 282 NWFP provincial assembly results of 1970 as indicated in table 7.3. In 1970 elections, it is clear from the table that JUI had strong vote bank in rural areas. Table 7.3: Winning candidates (Provincial Assembly) in 1970 elections: Name of Constituency Peshawar PF:1 PF:2 PF:3 PF:4 PF:5 PF:6 PF:7 PF:8 Hazara PF:9 PF:10 PF:11 PF:12 PF:13 PF:14 PF:15 PF:16 PF:17 Mardan PF:18 PF:19 PF:20 PF:21 PF:22 Mardan-cum Hazara PF:23 Kohat PF:24 PF:25 PF:26 DI. Khan PF:27 PF:28 DI. Khan cum Bannu PF:29 Bannu PF:30 PF:31 Chitral PF:32 Malookni (Protected Area) PF:33 Swat: PF:34 PF:35 PF:36 PF:37 Swat cum Dir PF:38 Dir PF:39 PF:40 Winners Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Arbab Sikandar Khan Arbab Saif-ur-Rehman Abdul Wali Khan Muhammad Akram Khan Haji Taj Muhammad Khan Wali Muhammad Khan Saadullah Khan Muhammad Zareen Khan Haq Nawaz Khan Muhammad Haroon Khan Badshah Syed Muzamil Shah Muhammad Iqbal Khan Jadoon Sardar Gul Zaman Raja George Sikandar Zaman Khan Muhammad Nawaz Khan Abdul Samad Khan Muhammad Ikram Khan Amirzada Khan Mian Ghulam Jilani (Maj. Gen. Retd.) Muhammad Firdus Khan Abdul Mastan Khan Nawabzada Azmat Ali Khan Maulvi Habib Gul Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak Sardar Inayat Ullah Khan Makhdoom Atta-ur-Rehman Humayun Khan Saifullah Molvi Muhammad Yaqub Abdul Samad Qadir Nawaz Muhammad Hanif Khan Abdul Rauf Khan Abdul Baqi Muhammad Afzal Khan Haji Muhammad Rehman Rehman-ullah Saheb Dr. Muhammad Yaqub Khan Amanullah Khan Party PPP NAP NAP NAP NAP NAP NAP NAP IND NAP JUI QML QML QML QML QML QML PPP NAP NAP NAP NAP QML PMLC JUI IND IND PMLC PMLC JUI JUI IND PPP QML IND NAP QML JI JI QML Party Position: PPP (3), NAP (13), IND (05), JUI (04), JI (02), QML (10), PMLC (03), Total: 40 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on general elections, Pakistan, 1970-71 (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972) The NAP won all 12 seats from the major cities of the NWFP, and PPP won three seats from urban centres. JUI, JI (Jamat-i-Islami) and QML have their influence in rural areas of NWFP. Like all the previous governments, the Bhutto regime was to turn away from its urban constituency and to look instead towards the NWFP’s rural elite for political support. From 1972 to 1974, members of the PPP’s urban left such as Hayat Sherpao, Abdul Samad Khan, and Muhammad Hanif Khan were influential in shaping the government’s policies. Shaid Javed Burki has shown how PPP policies benefited the urban left’s constituencies (i.e. Industrial labour and urban poor), but 283 hurt many from the urban middle classes who had also supported the PPP in 1970.28 Nationalization of both large and small scale industries, labour reforms that harmed small businesses, and nationalization of private educational institutions were just some of PPP’s policies that alienated the urban middle classes. Furthermore, in addition to being effected economically, the rural and urban middle classes were hurt politically when Bhutto failed to introduced a local government system to replace the Basic Democracies system. By the time Bhutto decided to go to the polls in 1977, it was clear that while the PPP had retained the support of industrial labour and the urban poor, it had lost the support of the urban middle classes. Like all his predecessors, Bhutto turned to the NWFP’s rural notables for political support the PPP’s slate of 1977 elections candidates read like a, ‘whose who’, list of the NWFP’s landed elite-the Hayats of Peshawar; Samad, and Malik of Mardan and Malokani. While the PPP’s 1970 manifesto promised ‘to destroy the power of the feudal land owners’, the 1977 elections manifesto stated that the PPP’s policies had ‘brought an end to feudalism in Pakistan’, employing that there was no further need for land reforms.29 Much to Bhutto’s surprise, the entire spectrum of anti-PPP forces, from left to right, succeeded in cobbling together the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to contest the 1977 elections against the PPP. The PNA movements brought under one banner all those social groups, and in particular the middle classes, which had been negatively affected by the policies of the PPP government.30 Following the PPP’s suspiciously impressive election victory, the PNA launched an agitation movement to protest the rigging that had taken place. Unlike the anti-Ayub agitation which had involved a cross-section of urban social classes, the PNA movement was more specifically a middle class movement which in many ways marked the political ‘coming of age’ of the urban middle classes. It also marked the beginning of an unusually resilient (by Pakistani standards) anti-PPP vote-bank in urban NWFP that appears to have grown over time. While weak in terms of the number of votes, the concentration of the middle classes in urban areas that are the economic, political, and communications hubs of the country gives them a disproportionate amount of political influence. The PNA movement demonstrated the growing political clout of the urban middle classes, a development that the usually astute Bhutto apparently failed to understand. Shahid Javed Burki noted following about Bhutto: the 284 [H]e was a rural aristocrat who had developed a deep empathy for the poor. He was at home in two very different worlds: the world occupied by Pakistan’s elite and the world in which lived million of Pakistanis under-privileged groups. But he was not at home with the ground that lay in-between: the growing space occupied by the middle classes. He did not understand their value system, did not appreciate their economic interest, and did not comprehend the power they had begun to wield. He abandoned them and they allowed him to go to the gallows.31 7.6 GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ 1977-1988 The PNA agitation movement eventually forced Bhutto to call in the military to help quell the civil unrest. On 5th July 1977, the chief of army staff, General Zia-ul-Haq removed Bhutto in a coup d’etat, declared martial law, and ruled Pakistan for the following eleven years. Not surprisingly, General Zia-ul-Haq turned to the conservative urban middle classes for political support, and combined this with the standard practice of co-opting the NWFP’s rural elite. Much more remarkable, however, was Zia’s success in maintaining the support of the urban middle classes throughout his eleven years of power. By providing them with patronage, introducing a limited Islamisation programme, repealing some of the PPP’s socialist economic policies, and of course receiving the backing of the military, Zia was able to maintain the support of the urban middle classes. 7.7 URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE IN ELECTORAL POLITICS (1988-1999) The urban rural divide is not a recent phenomenon in NWFP. What give this divide growing importance, however, is Pakistan’s extremely high urbanization rates. Pakistan’s urban population is estimated to be growing at 50 per cent every decade, compared to the rural population growth of 25 per cent.32 The percentage of the NWFP’s population living in urban areas has increased from 21.4 per cent in 196133 to an estimated 34.2 per cent by 1993.34 The political importance of urban NWFP will therefore undoubtedly increase over time. The urban-rural divide has always been visible in the NWFP’s election results. For example, when the 1946 elections for Provincial Legislative Assemblies were held, the Muslim League won 17 of 50 seats but only 2 of 3 urban seats.35 In the 1964 Presidential elections the rural areas voted for Ayub and the major urban areas generally voted for Fatima Jinnah.36 In the 1970 elections in NWFP the PPP won 57.4 per cent of the vote in the urban constituencies and only 40.5 per cent in the rural. 285 As the discussion on the history of the urban-rural divide has illustrated not only has the divide been visible in election results, but the electoral process has contributed to deepening the divide. As Jones points out that the gradual extension of representation and the franchise, reforms demanded by urban politicians, have really benefited the conservative landholding elite. From 1937 onward NWFP Legislature was dominated by the rural elites, and if, in 1946, the elites moved aside to make room for the rural gentry, and was squeezed even further aside by the entry of the middling zamindariat (landlords) into the Assemblies of the Ayub years, ruralist interests continued to dominate NWFP politics and to act as a brake on the progressive schemes of urban politicians. Table 7.4: PPP/PDA Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results of National Assembly Seats. Region (s) North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg Urban %age 40.4 43.3 4.1 10.2 24.5 35.1 25.4 28.4 9.5 24.6 20.1 48.4 2.8 0 17.83 27.1 19.1 0 3.2 12.35 seats 2/2 2/2 0 0 4 2/2 0 1/1 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 Urban/Rural %age Seats 1988 Elections 36.7 0 41.2 2/2 5.6 0 13.4 0 24.23 2 1990 Elections 39.5 1/1 27.1 0 28.1 1/1 8.7 0 25.85 2 1993 Elections 28.5 1/1 39.6 2/2 3.9 0 0 0 18 3 1997 Elections 25.4 0 18.2 0 0 0 2.6 0 11.55 0 Rural %age 40.2 31.3 6.2 12.1 22.45 34.8 28.2 26.2 7.6 24.2 21.8 31.8 4.2 0 14.45 26.2 91.1 0 2.8 30.03 seats 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 %age 34.37 33.24 4.49 14.46 21.64 30.45 21.41 23.88 7.50 20.81 18.46 36.10 3.45 0 14.5 21.71 16.76 0 2.34 10.2 Total Seats 4/6 4/8 0/5 0/7 8/26 3/6 0/8 2/5 0/7 5/26 1/6 5/8 0/5 0/7 6/26 0/6 0/8 0/5 0/7 0/26 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). The cities have thus far been the incubators of political ferment and demands for change in NWFP, but even those ruling groups that have ridden to power on movements spreading outward from the cities have finally always looked to the countryside for the stability of their rule.37 What is the most interesting about the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 election results, therefore, is not that an urban-rural divide is visible, but the dramatic increase in support for the ANP/PML(N) in urban areas at the expense of the PPP. Indeed, perhaps the single most significant development of 286 the 1997 elections in the NWFP was the role reversal that took place whereby the Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz PML(N)/ANP (Awami National Party) replaced the PPP as the party of urban NWFP. For the urban-rural division of electoral politics, in this study only National Assembly elections will be analysed from 1988-1997. There were four major voting groups in electoral politics of NWFP, i.e. Mainstream voters PPP/PDA (Pakistan People’s Party/Pkistan Democratic Alliance) and PML-N/IJI (Islami Jamuri Itehad), Religious and regional/ethnic (ANP). In following sections these four categories are to be analysed. In 1988 National Assembly Elections, PPP won four National Assembly seats from NA 21 (Swat-1), NA 23 (Swat-III), NA 24 (Chitral) and NA 26 (Malakand Protected Area cum Dir). In NA-21, Shazada Amani Room won the National Assembly seat on PPP ticket obtaining 28730 votes. The runner up was Mr. Obaidur Rehman of JUI-F (Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam-Fazal-urRehman) having 21748 votes. Mian Gul Aurangzeb, the prince of Swat with IJI (Islami Jamuri Itehad) ticket got third position having 19061 votes. PPP vote bank is largely in rural and urban areas. In NA 23, swat-III, Mr. Mehboob-ur-Rehman (PPP) won elections with 23613 votes having close contest with ANP candidate, Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan who got 22597 votes. Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto won PPP seat from NA-24 (Chitral) having 32819 votes, the runner-up was local prince Shazada Muhayud Din (IJI) having 23405 votes. Muhammad Hanif Khan won NA seat on PPP ticket from Malakand protected area cum Dir (NA 26) with 39174 votes. The major PPP vote bank was in urban and urban/rural areas of Chitral and Malakand Protected area cum Dir. In central NWFP PPP won National Assembly seats from NA 1,2,3,4 (Peshawar-1,2,3,4), where strong PPP candidates were contesting elections. In NA 1, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (PPP) won elections having 44658 votes. The runner up was Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (ANP) with 35947 votes. In NA 2, Khan Bahadur Khan (PPP) won elections with 24444 votes. Arbab Saif-ur-Rehman from ANP was runner up with 19402 votes. In NA3 there was close contest between ANP and PPP. From NA3, PPP candidate Sardar Ali Khan won the election with 28408 votes, while ANP candidate Abdul Lateef got 24727 votes. The much close contest had been reported in NA 4 between ANP and PPP candidates. Mian Muzaffar Shah, a PPP candidate got 27902 votes with only 92 votes lead over ANP candidate and Mr. Ahrar Khatak (ANP) got 27817 votes. PPP vote bank was in Urban and Urban/Rural areas in central NWFP. PPP put only one candidate, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani from southern part of NWFP (Kohat), 287 obtained second position with 19049 votes. Majority vote bank was reported in Urban areas of Kohat. In Hazara region PPP put five candidates in elections but could not win any seat. From NA-11 Abbottabad-1, Syed Sultan Ali (PPP) got third position with 13845 votes out of total 91627 votes. From NA-12 Abbottabad-II, Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan (PPP) placed on fourth position with 10760 votes out of total 83201 vote caste. In NA-13 (Abbottabad-III), PPP candidate Begum Bilqis Nasrum Minallah got second position having 25066 votes with huge difference of Raja Sikandar Zaman (IJI), who got 60128 votes. In NA-14 Mansehra-1, Gen (R) Muhammad Mumtaz Khan (PPP) got 8211 votes and obtained fourth position. From NA 16 (Mansehra-III), Sardar Muhammad Yousaf (PPP) got 9198 votes from the rural areas of this constituency only for the biradri votes. In 1988 Ms. Benazir Bhutto returned to National politics after a gap of 11 years of Zia rule. The national politics had impacted the politics of NWFP. In 1990 elections, PPP led coalition PDA, won five National Assembly seats out of 26 from NWFP. PDA won three National Assembly seats from the Northern NWFP and two National Assembly seats from the southern NWFP. From southern NWFP, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani (PPP) candidate from NA-9 Kohat and Fazal Karim Khan Kundi from NA-18 D.I. Khan won elections. In southern part, the PPP vote bank was in urban and urban/rural areas. From the Northern NWFP, Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan (PDA) got 32515 votes, Mr. Najmud Din (PDA) got 28533 votes and Mr. Ahmad Hassan (PDA) got 31331 votes. All three candidates won from their respective constituencies due to personal reputations and tribal affiliations. PPP vote bank was also in urban and urban/Rural areas. From central NWFP and Hazara, no PPP candidate could win the election, however in some urban and urban/rural areas the competition was tough. PDA put their candidates in all six constituencies of National Assembly in Central NWFP. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of PDA, her self contested on NA-1 (Peshawar-1) and defeated by ANP leader Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, got second position with 38951 votes. The other prominent leader of PDA, Aftab Ahmad Khan sherpao from NA-2 (Peshawar-II) was also defeated by Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan (ANP). Aftab was runner-up with 19137 votes. Only three candidates contested election on PDA ticket from Hazara, Sardar Inayat-ur-Rehman (NA-12 Abbottabad-II), Mr. Omar Asghar Khan (NA13 Abbottabad-III), and Mr. Sajid Mumtaz Khan (NA-14 Mansehra-1) but could not win any seat. 288 In 1993, PPP won six seats from NWFP, five from Central NWFP and one from northern NWFP. From Northern NWFP constituency NA-26 Malakand Protected Area cum Dir, Muzaffar Khan with close contest of Maulana Gohar Rehman (PIFPakistan Islamic Front) won the election. Other PPP candidates, Mr. Najmuddin (NA25 Dir), Zauja Mohammad Suleman Khan (Na-24 Chitral could not win election but have close contest. From Central NWFP, Syed Zafar Ali Shah (NA-1 Peshawar-1), Arbab Muhammad Jehangir Khan (NA-2 Peshawar-II), Maj. Gen. (R) Naseerullah Khan Babar (NA-4 Nowshera) and Mr. Khanzada Khan (NA-6 Mardan-1) won elections mostly from urban and urban/rural areas. In southern region of NWFP, PPP put one candidate, Masood Kausar from NA-9 Kohat but defeated by Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, an old PPP politician who had change their political affiliations and joined PML-N. PPP could not issue ticket to any candidate from Hazara due to their weak political bases. In 1997 elections, PPP contested 17 National Assembly seats out of 26 from NWFP, six from central NWFP, one from southern NWFP, four from Hazara and six from northern NWFP. PPP could not win any single seat from NWFP during 1997 elections however their vote bank was seen in urban and urban/rural areas. Qamar Abbass, a PPP candidate from NA-1 Peshawar-1, Sardar Ali Khan from NA-3 Peshawar cum Nowshera, Maj. Gen. (R) Naseerullah Babar from NA-4 Nowshera, Haji Muhammad Yaqoob from NA-6 Mardan-1 were the runner-up in 1997 elections. In Hazara region of NWFP, PPP candidates were Muhammad Gulzar Abbasi (NA-11 Abbottabad cum Haripur-old Abbottabad-I), Mr. Abdul Lateef Abbasi (NA-12 Abbottabad cum Haripur-II-Old Abbottabad-II), Mr. Muhammad Tahir Qureshi (NA13 Haripur) and Mr. Guldad (NA-17 Kohistan). All these candidates could not win in their respective constituencies. These candidates had only biradaris and personal votes instead of party votes. In 1988 elections, IJI won eight National Assembly seats out of total twenty six seats, two seats from Northern NWFP, two from Southern and four from Hazara. IJI put four candidates from central NWFP but could not win any seat. From southern part of NWFP, IJI contested five seats but only two seats could win. These were from Maulvi Niamatullah (NA-9 Kohat) and Anwar Saifullah (NA20 Bannu-II). In Northern NWFP, IJI put six candidates for elections but only two could win election. The winning candidates were Haji Fazal-i-Raziq (NA-22 Swat-II) and Mr. Fathullah (NA-25 Dir). In Hazara region of NWFP, JUI won four seats. These were of Sardar Haji Gul Khitab Khan (NA12- Abbottabad-II), Raja Sikanadr 289 Zaman Khan (NA-13 Abbottabad-III), Haji Muhammad Ayub Khan (NA-16 Mansehra-III) and Fazal-e-Haq (NA-17 Kohistan). The majority vote bank was in rural areas, while urban and urban/rural areas have same ration as indicated in above table. In 1990 elections, IJI got eight National Assembly seats, two from northern NWFP, one from central NWFP, and one from southern NWFP and four from Hazara. In Central NWFP, IJI put one candidate Khan Mir Afzal Khan (NA-7 Mardan II) with the electoral seat adjustment coalition with ANP and Khan won election with 37452 votes. Table 7.5: IJI/PML-N Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats. Urban %age North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg 34.7 20.1 35.1 34.6 31.13 34.8 10.4 23.1 40.8 27.28 21.4 0 39.2 60.1 30.18 34.8 7.1 40.1 60.2 35.55 Seats 0 0 0 1/1 1 0 0 0 1/1 1 0 0 1/1 2/2 3 1/1 0 1/1 2/2 4 Urban/Rural %age Seats 1988 Elections 38.2 1/1 22.7 0 39.8 1/1 35.7 1/1 34.1 3 1990 Elections 37.2 1/1 12.1 0 32.1 1 43.2 1/1 31.15 2 1993 Elections 25.4 1/1 0 0 37.2 1/1 61.3 2/2 30.98 4 1997 Elections 42.5 2/2 4.8 0 52.5 2/2 65.8 2/2 41.4 6 Rural %age 40.2 24.8 38.6 46.2 37.45 38.6 13.6 20.2 57.2 32.4 20.2 0 35.1 65.6 30.23 45.1 4.6 39.8 69.6 39.78 seats 1/1 0 1/1 2/2 4 1 0 0 2/2 3 0 0 1/1 2/2 3 2/2 0 1/1 2/2 5 %age 31.15 18.41 32.03 30.23 27.96 35.79 12.60 23.90 43.43 28.93 19.94 0 34.90 58.31 28.29 35.16 6.30 40.99 58.26 35.18 Total Seats 2/6 0/8 2/5 4/7 8/26 2/6 1/8 1/5 4/7 8/26 1/6 0/8 3/5 6/7 10/26 5/6 0/8 4/5 6/7 15/26 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). On other seats of central NWFP, IJI supported ANP to defeat the PPP candidates. In southern NWFP IJI put five candidates and won only one seat from NA-20 Bannu-II with close margin of JUI-F (Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman Group) candidate.. ANP supported IJI candidates in southern NWFP during these elections. In Hazara, IJI put six candidates but could win four seats from NA-11 Abbottabad-1, NA12-Abbottabad-II, NA-13 Abbottabad-III and NA-15 Mansehra-II. In northern NWFP, IJI put six candidates but only two could win from NA-21 Swat-1, and NA-24 Chitral. In 1993 elections, IJI had majority of voters in rural, rural/urban constituencies as indicated in table 7.5. 290 In 1993 elections, IJI split coalition PML-N got ten seats out of twenty six National Assembly seats. In central NWFP PML-N did not contest election due to the electoral coalition with ANP. In southern NWFP, it could win three seats from NA-9 Kohat, NA-19 Bannu and NA-21 Lakki Marwat cum Bannu out of five contested seats. In northern NWFP, PML-N candidate Mian Gul Aurangzeb (NA-21 Swat-1) won elections. PML-N got one seat out of five contested seats. In Hazara region of NWFP, PML-N won six seats out of seven contested seats. Majority of vote bank during 1993 elections lies in rural, rural/urban parts of NWFP. In 1997 elections, Nawaz Shrif was the Prime Minsiter, that is why Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) PML-N did so well in NWFP. PML-N got fifteen seats with average votes of 35.18 per cent. In Northern NWFP, it won all five contested seats from NA21 Swat-I, NA-22 Swat-II, NA-24 Chitral, NA-25 Upper Dir cum Lower Dir, NA-26 Malakand Protected Area cum Lower Dir. In NA-23 Bunair-cum-Shangla (Old SwatII), PML-N supported ANP candidate Abdul Matin Khan under seat adjustment policy in this constituency. In Central NWFP, PML-N contested only one seat from NA-8 Swabi but defeated by ANP candidate. In southern NWFP, PML-N contested five seats and won four seats from NA-9 Kohat cum Hangu, NA-18 D.I Khan cum Tank-Kulachi (Old D.I Khan), NA-19 Bannu (Old Bannu-I) and NA-20 Lakki Marwat cum Bannu. PML-N candidate was defeated by ANP candidate from NA-10 Karak during 1997 election. PML-N contested seven seats from Hazara region and won six seats from NA-11 Abbottabad cum Haripur (old Abbottabad-1), NA-12 Abbottabad cum Haripur-II (Old Abbottabad-II), NA-13 Haripur, NA-14 Mansehra-1, NA15 Mansehra cum Haripur (Old Mansehra-II), NA-16 Battagram cum Mansehra (Old Mansehra-III). PML-N defeated constituency was NA-17, where Mr. Aurangzeb Khan, an independent candidate defeated PML-N candidate Maulana Abdul Baqi. IJI voters were from rural and rural/urban localities of NWFP as indicated in above table 7.5. In 1988 elections, the ANP won only two seats out of the total of eight seats it contested from NWFP. The constituencies where it won elections were from central NWFP, i.e. NA-5 Charsada, where Khan Abdul Wali Khan won with majority of votes and NA-8 where Abdul Khaliq Khan won ANP seat. In southern NWFP ANP contested four seats from NA-9 Kohat, NA-10 Karak, NA-19 Bannu-I and NA- 20 Bannu-II, with average votes of 5.84 per cent but could not win any seat. In Hazara region, ANP candidate Mr. Muhammad Siraj contested election from rural 291 background constituency NA-17 Kohistan and could not win seat. ANP three candidates contested elections from rural/urban constituencies of NA-22 Swat-II, NA23 Swat-III and NA-25 Dir with average of 14.26 per cent of votes but could not win any seat. In the 1990 elections, ANP won six seats, and all six were from central NWFP. The constituencies of central NWFP where it won seats were NA-1 Peshawar-I, NA-2 Peshawar-II, NA-3 Peshawar cum Nowshera, NA-4 Nowshera, NA-6 Mardan-I and NA-8 Swabi. Table 7.6: ANP Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats: Urban %age North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg 12.4 41.8 4.6 0.72 14.88 1.2 45.7 0 0 11.73 3.8 45.2 0 0 12.25 15.3 45.8 7.8 0 17.23 seats 0 1/1 0 0 1 0 2/2 0 0 2 0 1/1 0 0 1 0 2/2 0 0 2 Urban/Rural %age seats 1988 Elections 13.6 0 40.5 1/1 8.2 0 0.93 0 15.81 1 1990 Elections 1.6 0 46.1 2/2 0 0 0 0 11.93 2 1993 Elections 5.9 0 48.3 1/1 0 0 0 0 13.55 1 1997 Elections 14.8 0 46.7 2/2 10.8 1/1 0 0 18.08 3 Rural %age 18.6 32.2 7.4 1.5 14.93 0.9 48.1 0 0 12.25 10.2 40.1 0 0 12.58 20.4 61.8 6.3 0 22.13 seats 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/2 0 0 2 1/1 0 0 0 1 1 4/4 0 0 5 %age 14.26 37.47 5.84 0.82 14.6 1.69 40.55 0 0 10.56 4.73 39.52 0 0 11.06 12.95 51.71 4.76 0 17.36 Total Seats 0/6 2/8 0/5 0/7 2/26 0/6 6/8 0/5 0/7 6/26 1/6 2/8 0/5 0/7 3/26 1/6 8/8 1/5 0/7 10/26 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). From Hazara and southern NWFP, it could not contest elections due to weak political support, however from the northern NWFP, ANP contested only one seat from NA-23 Swat-III and defeated by PDA candidate. In 1993 elections, ANP got only three seats from whole of NWFP, one from northern NWFP and two from central NWFP. ANP contested seven constituencies but won only two, i.e. NA-3 Peshawar cum Nowshera (Arbab Muhammad Zahir) and NA-5 Charsada (Asfandyar Wali Khan). In northern NWFP, ANP contested one seat from NA-23 Buner cum Swat and won it. ANP won these seats from rural, urban/rural areas. From southern and Hazara region, ANP put no candidate for electoral contest. In 1997 elections, ANP won ten seats, all eight from central NWFP and one from southern and one from northern NWFP. In these elections ANP won urban and rural constituencies from central NWFP, while rural constituency of northern NWFP. i.e. NA-23 Buner cum Shangla. The urban/rural constituency of southern NWFP, where ANP won seat is NA-10 Karak. In 1988 292 elections, JUI-F, a leading religious party won four seats, one from central NWFP and three from their base camps of southern NWFP. In central NWFP, JUI-F contested on one seat from NA-7 Mardan-II and its candidate Haji Muhammad Ahmad won the elections. Table 7.7: JUI-F/Religious Urban, Urban/Rural and Rural NWFP Election Results on National Assembly seats. Urban %age North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg North Central South Hazara Total/Avg 12.1 4.2 31.4 5.5 13.3 18.4 13.2 8.8 5.8 11.55 37.4 20.1 16.2.2 12.1 21.5 8.5 9.1 22.8 10.2 12.65 seats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Urban/Rural %age seats 1988 Elections 13.5 0 6.8 0 35.2 1 6.9 0 15.6 1 1990 Elections 20.2 0 15.8 0 12.2 0 8.2 1 14.1 1 1993 Elections 43.2 1 16.5 0 30.1 1 17.2 0 26.75 2 1997 Elections 10.1 0 12.4 0 28.9 0 12.6 0 16 0 Rural %age 16.1 16.3 37.1 8.8 19.58 22.1 38.1 42.4 41.4 36 45.4 42.1 40.1 20.6 37.05 12.4 15.2 30.2 15.3 18.28 seats 0 1 2 0 3 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 %age 10.56 3.95 32.46 5.34 13.08 14.43 19.83 32.78 8.53 18.89 36.54 19.77 21.71 13.61 22.91 4.65 8.11 17.66 7.05 9.37 Total Seats 0/6 1/8 3/5 0/7 4/26 0/6 1/8 1/5 2/7 4/26 PIF2/6 IJM-1/8 2/5 0/7 5/26 0/6 0/8 0/5 0/7 0/26 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). In southern NWFP, JUI-F contested four seats from NA-10 Karak, NA-18 D.I. Khan, NA-19 Bannu-I, NA20 Bannu-II and won all except NA-20 Bannu-II. In Hazara region JUI-F contested on NA-14 Mansehra-I, NA-15 Mansehra-II, NA-16 MansehraIII and NA-17 Kohistan but could not win any seat. From northern NWFP, JUI-F contested on NA-21 Swat-I, NA 22 Swat-II, NA-23 Swat-III and NA-26 Malakand Protected area cum Dir having average votes 10.56 percent but could not win any seat. In 1990 elections, JUI-F won four seats, one from central NWFP, one from southern and two from Hazara region of NWFP. JUI-F contested from central NWFP on NA-2 Peshawar-II, NA-3 Peshwar cum Nowshera, NA-4 Nowshera, NA-5 Charsada, Na-6 Mardan-I, NA-7 Mardan-II, NA-8 Swabi. JUI-F candidate From NA5 Charsada, Molvi Hassan Jan defeated Wali Khan (ANP) and won the elections. In southern NWFP, JUI-F contested five seats from NA-9 Kohat, NA-10 Karak, NA18 D.I Khan, NA-19 Bannu-I, NA-20 Bannu-II and won only one seat from NA-19 Bannu-I where Moulvi Ali Akbar won the seat. In northern NWFP, JUI-F contested all six seats from NA 21 Swat-I, NA 22 Swat-II, NA 23 Swat-III, NA 24 Chitral, NA 293 25 Dir and NA-26 Malakand protected area cum Dir with 14.43 per cent of votes in rural and urban/rural areas but could not win any seat. In Hazara region, JUI-F contested five seats from NA-13 Abbottabad-III, NA-14 Mansehra-I, NA-15 Mansehra-II, NA-16 Mansehra-III and NA-17 Kohistan and won two seats from NA16 and NA-17 where JUI-F candidates Alam Zeb Khan and Molvi Muhammad Amin won election respectively. In 1993, Religious Parties Alliance PIF and MDM contested elections. Here in this study another religious party IJM is also included in same category to analyse the religious vote in 1993 elections. Religious parties won five seats during 1993 elections, two from north, one from centre and two from south. In northern NWFP, religious parties contested from NA-21 Swat-I, NA-22 Swat-II, NA-23 Buner cum Swat, NA-24 Chitral, NA-25 Dir and NA-26 Malakand Protected Area cum Dir and won two seats from NA-24 Chitral where Maulana Abdul Rahim won election and NA-25 Dir where Sahibzada Fathullah won elections. In central NWFP, religious parties contested all seven seats but could win one from NA-8 Swabi where Qazi Maulana Fazlullah won elections. From southern NWFP, Religious parties contested five seats and won two seats from NA-10 Karak and NA-18 DI. Khan cum Tank. In Hazara region, Religious parties contested five seats and could not win any seat. Majority of vote bank of religious parties were in rural/urban areas of NWFP. In 1997 religious parties could not win any seat from NWFP; however its candidates contested for four seats from Hazara, five seats from south and four seats from northern NWFP. The average votes of religious parties during 1997 elections were 9.37 per cent mostly in rural areas where local imam Masjids and Madaras were the supporters of religious parties. 7.8 ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENCY RESULTS IN URBAN-RURAL NWFP 7.8.1 URBAN CONSTITUENCY RESULTS: There are fifty five urban localities in NWFP, including five in northern NWFP, seventeen in southern NWFP, twenty three in central NWFP and ten in Hazara.38 Central NWFP is the most urbanized region of NWFP. Table 3, illustrates the precipitous decline in support for the PPP in its former political stronghold in the urban constituencies of the NWFP i.e. from Peshawar and Mardan. In 1970, the PPP swept the polls in urban constituencies of Mardan and Peshawar winning one provincial and one National assembly seat. PPP won one provincial assembly seat from rural constituency of Malakand area in 1970 elections. By 1988-97, its urban support had dropped to 24.5 per cent in 1988 to 12.3 percent in 1997. The winning seats were also decreased in Urban and rural areas of 294 NWFP during 1988-1997. It further decline to 10.2 per cent of the vote in 1997 proved disastrous for the PPP as it was unable to win a single NA seat from urban areas and rural areas of NWFP. In 1990 and 1993, the PPP did better in the urban areas of central NWFP than in the other regions of the province, although its percentage of the vote fell in each successive election. Between 1988 and 1993 the PPP’s support declined in the urban northern NWFP. In 1993, the PPP-PML (J) received its satisfactory urban results in southern NWFP, which was the only urban region to show an improvement over the PPP’s 1990 result. Even more striking than the PPP’s decline in urban NWFP has been the rise in support for the PML (N) and ANP alliance. In 1997, Nawaz Sharif was in power, therefore his seats in NWFP had better results.The PML (N) made a clean sweep in Northern, southern and Hazara region of NWFP and ANP won all National Assembly seats from central NWFP including major cities of Peshawar, Mardan, Charsada, Swabi and Nowshera. Table-4 illustrates how the PML (N)’s support in urban constituencies increased from 27.16 per cent in 1988, to 35.18 per cent in 1997. The 1993 result was even better than the IJI’s result in the 1990 elections which were widely believed to have been rigged. From 1988 to 1997 the PML (N) increased its share of the urban seats it won from one to four. In 1988 and 1990 it got one urban seat while in 1993 and 1997, it won three and four urban seats respectively. Table 7.5 also reveals regional variations in urban support for the PML (N). The party’s best result has consistently been in Hazara region of NWFP, reflecting the strong electoral support for the party as well as for its Haripur, Abbottabad and Mansehra city candidates. In both northern and southern NWFP urban support for the PML (N) increased between 1988 to 1997. Table 7.6 illustrates the strength of ANP in urban areas of NWFP. ANP urban vote strength fluctuated during 1988-1997. In 1988, ANP got 14.88 percent votes from urban NWFP and in 1990 it decreased to 11.73 percent but in 1993 it gradually raised high from 12.25 percent to 17.23 percent in 1997. Table-6 illustrates the Religious Parties strength in different constituencies of NWFP. Religious parties votes tremendously fluctuated from 1988-1997 Religious parties’ strength in urban parts of NWFP were not good. In 1988, Religious parties got 13.3 percent votes and in 1993 their vote’s percentage decreased to 11.55 percent. In 1993 elections, their vote’s percentage in urban areas went up to 21.5 percent and then again decreased to 12.65 percent in 1997 elections. 295 7.8.2 URBAN-RURAL CONSTITUENCY RESULTS: Ten constituencies were categories as ‘urban-rural’ in this study, in which approximately 25 to 50 percent of the votes were from the urban areas and the remaining from rural. These include the cities with a population of between 100,000 and 300,000 at the time of the 1998 census. The PPP-PML (J) and the PML (N)-ANP won approximately the same percentage of votes in these mixed constituencies in 1993, although the former won ten seats and the latter only six. In 1997, the PML-N-ANP did better than the PPP had in previous elections, winning 43.2 percent of the vote. It did particularly well in central NWFP where it won all urban/rural constituencies. Although the percentage did increase from 34.1 per cent in 1988 to 41.4 in 1997, the ANP also increased its support from 15.81 per cent in 1988 to 18.08 per cent in 1997. This was still more than 6 per cent greater support than PML-N received in the urban constituencies. The weaker PPP and the stronger PML-N-ANP performance in the mixed rather than the urban constituencies is explained by the fact that in most cases the rural votes out numbered the urban votes, in thus the PML(N)’s urban advantage was partially neutralized where ANP got maximum votes. 7.8.3 RURAL CONSTITUENCY RESULT: In NWFP total rural localities in 1988 were 7335, in which 2610 were in Northern NWFP, 1164 in southern NWFP, 916 in central NWFP and 2645 in Hazara. The most ruralised area is Hazara.39 In 1997, the contest for urban NWFP was decisively won by the ANP. Rural NWFP, where 15 of the NWFP’s 26 National Assembly constituencies were it stake, was more closely contested and won by PML-N. The PPP could not win any seat from rural NWFP. Furthermore, between 1988 and 1997, the PPP consistently lost support in the rural constituencies and gained support in the rural constituencies. The PML (N), on other hand, consistently gained in both categories. In rural constituencies of southern NWFP and Hazara, electoral positions of Religious parties were strong as indicated in above tables. 7.9 CONCLUSIONS In electoral politics of NWFP there are considerable regional differences in the rural results. The region where an urban-rural divide is clear is in Hazara, Northern and southern NWFP where the PML-N had lead over the PPP in the rural areas in 198897. Electoral democracy in NWFP largely depends on rural areas and rural stakeholders dominated political structure. The urban middle classes have generally prospered under electocratic governments for whom maintaining stability in urban 296 areas is of prime importance. Democratic governments, seeking to win elections from NWFP, must turn for support to rural elites who can influence the voting behaviour of the majority of voters living in rural areas. But socio-economic and demographic trends ensure that the importance of urban areas will continue to grow relative to rural areas.40 Shahid Javed Burki, Urbanisation: dangers ahead, Daily Dawn (Karachi), 17 July 2007 G. M. Arif and Sabiha Ibrahim, ‘The Process of Urbanisation in Pakistan, 1951–81’, The Pakistan Development Review 37 : 4 Part II (Winter 1998) pp. 37:4, 507–522 3 P.H.M van den Dungen, The Punjab tradition: Influence and authority in Nineteenth Century India (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972) 4 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP (Karachi: Royal Bok Agency, 1992), pp.3-4 5 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.11-38 6 Philip E Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press), pp. 87-121 7 Syed Waqar Ali Shah, Muslim League in NWFP, p.20. 8 Ibid, pp. 103-5 9 Abdul Waheed Qureshi, Tarikhi Faisala (Urdu) (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976), p. 126. 10 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), p.19. 11 Ibid., pp.17-21 12 Muhammad Rafiq Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan Vol-I, 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998) ,pp.36-7 13 Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), pp.106-115 14 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.144 15 Ibid, p. 147 16 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire in to the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1954) 17 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp.180-222 18 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977, p.29 19 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.219 20 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977, p.45-48 21 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.200-4 22 Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Social and Economic Determinants of Political violence: A Case study of the Punjab’, The Middle East Journal 25 (Autumn 1971): pp.465-0 23 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp. 307-8 24 Ibid., 380-1 25 Ibid., p.428. 26 Ibid., p.474 27 Craig Baxter, ‘The People’s Party vs. the Punjab “Feudalist”, Journal of Asian and African Studies 8 (July and October, 1973): pp. 166-89. 28 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, pp.108-170. 29 Pakistan People’s Party, The Election Manifesto (Lahore: Pakistan People’s Party, 1970), p.13. 30 Ibid., p.184. 31 Ibid., p.217 32 John Adams, ‘Population and Urbanization’, James, William E., and Subroto Roy, eds., Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.241. 33 Richard W. Helbock, ‘Urban Population Growth in Pakistan: 1961-72’, The Pakistan Development Review 14 (Autumn 1975): p.316. 34 Government of NWFP, NWFP Development Statistics (Peshawar: Statistics Division, 2002), pp.333353. 2 1 297 35 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 22-3 36 Sharif al-Mujahid, ‘Pakistan’s First Presidential Election’, Asian Survey 6 (June 1965): pp. 280-94 37 Phillip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.106 38 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Housing Census NWFP, 1988 (Islamabad: Population Census Organistaion, Statistic Division, 2002), pp.4-6 39 Ibid. p.7 40 Andrew R. Wilder, Pakistani Voter: Electoral Politics and Noting Behaviour in the Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 89. 298 CHAPTER-8 SOCIOLGICAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP 8. INTRODUCTION It is a popular perception that voting behaviour in NWFP, especially in rural areas, is determined more by social than political factors. Traditional group loyalties of family, factions or biradri (clan) are thought to influence voting decisions to a much greater extent than more modern or political factors, such as party loyalty, patronage, or issue orientation. This chapter will focus its attention on the social factors that influence the voting decisions beginning with our detailed analysis of polling stations to compare gender and class differences in voting behaviour. Exit poll survey data will then be examined to see what affects age, literacy, and educational levels have on voting behaviour. Finally, information collected in interviews will cost light on the role played by the religion and group loyalties of faction and biradri in electoral politics. 8.1 GENDER Two common perceptions have prevailed about the voting behaviour of women in NWFP. The first is that the more women vote for the PPP than the PML/ANP. Because the former was lead by a women and was thus viewed to be more sympathetic to the rights of women and minorities. The second perception which is stronger then the first, is that women vote as instructed by their male family members and do not vote independently. Neither view, however, is supported by the data, in both the 1988 and 1993 elections, women in the central NWFP, especially in urban areas, voted in higher percentages than men for the ANP, and lower percentages than men for the PPP, Similarly in Northern, Southern and Northeastern NWFP the majority of women in urban centers voted PML-N which indicates that many voted independently of their male family members. It is possible to determine gender differences in voting behaviour because in most of the NWFP’s urban constituencies separate male and female polling stations were established. Rural polling stations were much less likely to be segregated since rural constituencies cover a larger area and would require too many stations to provide separate facilities. Table 8.1 provides a breakdown of the vote by gender in all of the NWFP’s cities, nearly half its towns, and approximately half its rural areas. The table clearly shows the PML (N)’s consistent advantage with female voters in all categories, although its lead diminished 299 while moving from the cities to the towns to the rural areas. The difference between female votes for PML(N) and PPP candidates in urban areas was 18.3%, whereas for male voters it was only 10%. The PML(N) candidate received 4% more of the total female votes than the total male votes, while the PPP-PML(J) received 4.3% more of the male votes than the female votes. In rural areas, the preference of female voters for the PML(N) was still visible but not as strong as in urban areas. The vast majority of rural polling stations were not segregated by sex as the villages were insufficiently large to warrant having two polling stations. Thus the results probably reflect voting behavior in large villages. In the 26 urban constituencies examined, 193308 rural votes identified as being cast in segregated polling stations, PML(N) candidates received 2% votes more of the female than male votes, whereas PPP-PML(J) candidates received 3% more of male. The PPP-PML(J) had a 10.7% lead over the PML(N) with male voters but only a 5.7% lead with female voters. The narrower margin in rural areas is an indication that predominantly illiterate rural women are less likely to vote independently than more educated urban counterparts. Table 8.1: Summary of 1993 Urban and Rural Results by Gender (In %age) PML –N Male Female Large Cities 52.3 56.3 57.5 57.3 52.1 56.1 Total 53.8 54.2 53.1 50.2 52.6 PPP-PML-J Male Female 42.8 41.3 41.1 44.1 40.5 38.7 36.7 36.5 40.4 37.9 Total 41.3 40.1 41.6 43.9 43.3 ANP Male 3.6 2.4 1.4 3.7 1.6 Female 2.8 1.9 1.2 3.5 1.4 Total 3.3 2.4 1.3 2.8 1.4 Others Male 1.3 3.2 4.5 3.5 4.1 Female 2.2 3.9 4.9 4 4.5 Total 1.6 3.3 4 3.1 2.8 Mid 53.0 Small 53.1 Large 48.8 towns Small 53.8 Towns Urban 52.4 Rural 41.7 Source: Calculated 56.4 53.4 42.4 38.1 41.4 3.1 2.4 2.7 2.2 3.0 2.5 43.7 42.5 52.4 49.4 49.7 2.5 2.7 2 3.4 4.2 5.8 from Election Commission of Pakistan, Form XVII, result of the count’ (Polling Station results), for 26 NWFP National Assembly Constituencies. At the time of the 1998 census, the population of the large cities ranged from 1460100 to 2026851; Mid-sized cities from 1022364 to 1257602, small cities from 238216 to 880666; large towns from 10000 to 19000. The male and female percentage reflected the total number of votes cast in polling station identified as being segregated by gender. In urban NWFP 87 percent of the vote, and in rural NWFP 3.7 percent of the votes, were so identified. The total percentage includes the results of the polling stations not identified by gender. 300 Table 8.2: Large City Election Results (NA) by Gender (In %age) City IJI/PML-N M Peshawar 1988 1997 Gain/Loss Mardan 1988 1997 Gain/Loss Kohat 1988 1997 Gain/Loss Abbottabad 1988 1997 Gain/Loss DI. Khan 1988 1997 Gain/Loss Swabi 1988 1997 Gain/Loss 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28.7 28.7 0 10.2 10.2 0 19.94 19.94 70.5 85.2 14.7 28.2 37.8 9.6 49.53 62.19 12.66 F T PPP/PDA and PPP-PML-J M F T ANP M F T 28.2 0 -28.2 38.3 85.3 47 70.2 80.7 10.5 12.4 65.3 52.9 70.2 48.2 -22 13.2 0 -13.2 21.1 38.8 17.7 42.3 46.1 21.73 0 -21.73 29.72 63.73 34.01 56.71 67.58 10.87 34.4 30.4 -4 37.2 0 -37.2 0 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 16.2 16.2 25.3 14.1 -13.11 24.2 0 -24.2 0 2.5 2.5 0 0 0 0 6.4 6.4 31.00 22.94 -8.06 31.24 0 -31.24 0 3.76 3.76 0 0 0 0 11.23 11.23 28.3 60.1 40.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68.2 55.4 12.8 12.1 37.2 14.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.2 16.3 3.9 20.82 48.01 27.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.66 36.41 -8.25 4.3 19.1 14.8 28.1 18.2 -9.9 8.58 42.62 34.04 49.83 33.45 -16.38 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Table 8.2 reveals that in NWFP’s large cities the preference of female voters for ANP over PML(N) and PPP was also evident in 1988, but not to the same extent as in 19931. Between 1988 and 1997 the ANP increased its support among female voters in the large cities by 12.6%, and along male voters by 9.8%. Conversely, the PPP lost 8.1% of the female vote between 1988 and 1993, and 5.9% of the male vote. 8.2 WOMEN IN ELECTORAL POLITICS OF NWFP NWFP has traditionally been a male dominated society like other parts of the country in which women have been widely discriminated against and form the most oppressed social class, facing lack of education and discrimination in many areas. throughout the NWFP only 18.8 percent of female were literate in 1998 the ratio in rural areas were 14.7 and urban areas were 39.1 percent respectively. Although the status of women is better in literate and urban areas of NWFP, than in the rural areas even so they too face a variety of problems. Underdevelopment of the society in general, the agrarian economy and feudal social relations add to discrimination against them. Laws ending 301 institutionalized discrimination against women and the protection of their fundamental rights are the responsibility of the state. The empowerment of women is one of the central objectives of the feminist movement in NWFP and in other societies. But this objective cannot be realized without political equality and participation of women in the political process. Voters in NWFP cast their vote in blocks that are formed on the basis of castes, sub-castes, tribes and extended families. Even the male members of a community seldom cast their vote on the bases of individual preferences. Voting is a group decision, and unfortunately women in large sections of the rural population in NWFP are excluded from that process. A few women from the elite landowning families have contested elections, and in some cases have defeated their male opponents. Begum Nasim Wali contested elections in 1997 and 1993 from the plate form of ANP and won the provincial assembly seat by defeating her male opponents, similarly Begum Nusrat Bhutto from the PPP ticket contested national assembly elections in 1988 from NA-24 Chitral and won the seat. The following table shows the breakdown of female contestants in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP during 1998-1997. Out of eighty Povincial Assembly seats, two female candidates contested elections in the 1993 and 1997 elections and three women candidates contested elections in 1990. In the 1998 elections, no single female candidate contested elections. No women candidate contested election in 1988 elections. Nasim Wali Khan won provincial assembly elections in 1993 and 1997 from PF-15 Charsada-III being a major leader of Awami National Party. Nasim Wali Khan got married to Khan Abdul Wali Khan in 1954 and she is the mother of Sangeen Wali Khan (late) and the step mother of Asfandyar Wali Khan. Table 8.3: Female candidates for NWFP Provincial Assembly PF 15 1997 Name Begum Nasim Wali (ANP) Begum Perveen (IND) Vote %age 47.86 1993 PF 2 Name Nafeesa Akhtar (IND) Begum Nasim Wali (ANP) Vote %age 0.15 1990 PF 10 Name Vote %age 1.65 Ms. Nasreen Khilji (IND) 19 0.39 15 37.09 32 Ms. Bakht Bibi 0.29 (IND) 39 Ms. Tahira Baidar 0.33 (IND) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Alphabets in () represent parties. ANP means Awami National Party, IND means Independents. NWFP’s 26 National Assembly seats, four female candidates contested elections in 1988, one in 1993 and three in 1997 elections. During 1990 elections, no single 302 female candidate contested elections. Percentage of votes and the names of female candidates along with their party affiliations are shown in table 8.4. Table 8.4: Female candidates for National Assembly in NWFP: 1997 NA 11 18 19 Name Ms.Rashida Batool (PPP-SB) Ms. Mussarrat Shaheen (IND) Ms. Noor Jehan Begum (PPP-SB) Vote %age 47.86 0.39 0.53 1993 PF 1 Name Ms. Zakira Aslam (HPG) Vote %age 0.09 1988 NA 10 13 24 Name Ms. Bakht Bibi (IND) Begum Bilqis Minhallah (PPP) Begum Sher Wali (IND) Vote %age 1.23 25.37 2.36 Begum Nusrat 54.49 Bhutto (PPP) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Alphabets in () represents parties. PPP-SB means Pakistan People’s Pary (Shaheed Bhutto Group). HPG means Haq Parast Group. 24 No women candidate contested election in 1990 elections. The political parties devised affirmative action for female representation by fixing 20 seats for women in parliament for twenty years in the 1973 constitution. But the respective provincial assemblies forming an electoral college elected them. The Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued by General Pervez Musharaf introduced a set of amendments in the constitution, which have been sanctioned by the 17th amendment. Under these changes the seats in National Assembly have been raised to 60 with same proportion in the provincial assemblies. Eight seats reserved for women in National Assembly and twenty two seats for provincial assembly in NWFP. This was a major change, but the seats had to be filled on the basis of proportional representation according to the list provided by the parties. This does get women in to the assemblies but leaves them out of the electoral contest. The decision as to which women will represent the party in the assemblies rest with the party bosses who, with very few exceptions, invariably choose their own daughters, wives, sisters and other close relatives2. In effect, party list appear to be the best instrument for balancing gender representation. This is certain to the extent that electoral behaviour is not determined by gender. At the day when women vote for women, there will be no need to fix political representation of women in legislation or within party list. But we are presently far from that situation. With the rare exceptions of women becoming leaders of their parties and being elected by the whole electorate, in general, the single member district does not favour female candidates in NWFP. Men are more likely to be adopted as candidates and to win the constituency. Responses by the interviewees to the question why women chose to vote in higher percentages for PML(N) candidates then men from north eastern and southern part of 303 NWFP ranged from female jealousy of Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif’s good looks. Others cited more plausibly explanations such as the failure of the PPP government between 1988 and 1990 to take any concrete steps to improve the status of women in NWFP. This, however, was also clearly an inadequate explanation. This trend was also visible in 1988 elections. 8.3 RIGGING IN FEMALE POLLING STATIONS Rigging refers to all activities that violate the laws of a country and constitutional provisions in the holding of elections to determine the will of the voters to form a government of their Choice. Rigging takes place on three levels of the electoral process (Pre-poll, polling day and post-poll). Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gillani highlighted the intensity of rigging.3 Table 8.5: Detail of rigging at Female Polling stations: Elections Pre-poll Rigging Polling Day Rigging Post Poll Rigging 1988 High Low Moderate 1990 High Low Moderate 1993 High Low Low 1997 High Low Low Source: Syed Ijaz Shafi Gillani, A Dispassionate Analysis of Electoral Rigging in Pakistan 1970-2002 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2008). The above mentioned intensity of electoral rigging was also reflected by respondents in interviews. In interviews with PPP supporters the explanation cited for female voters, preference for the PML(N) was the allegation that most rigging takes place in female polling booths. For cultural reasons, photographs of women do not appear on their national identification cards as on men’s, which makes it difficult to verify a female voter’s identity at the time of polling. The PPP alleged that between 1990 and 1993 the IJI added the names of thousands of bogus female voters to the electoral rolls in urban areas and manufactured fake identity cards to match these names. On election day teams of their female supporters were transported around the polling stations where they used these fake identity cards to vote repeatedly.4 The PPP interpretation of its decline in urban NWFP and with female voters is clearly stated in an article written by the former PPP information secretary, Senator Shafqat Mahmood. He explains how a concentrated drive was launched to register bogus women votes in the urban areas during the local elections in 19925. He describes how this exercise was concentrated in the urban areas, and arrives at the following conclusion. “It is no surprise that the PML(N) which was ruling the NWFP in 1992 did so well in the cities. It’s a real strength was the bogus voter lists which included a large percentage of the women votes”6. It got more women votes because these were 304 bogus votes.7 The PPP’s explanation that the registrations of the bogus votes, and in particular female voters, took place in urban but not rural NWFP is refuted by an examination of voter registration data which revealed that approximately the same number of new voters per constituency were registered in rural as in urban areas.8 Furthermore, as table 8.6 reveals between 1990 and 1993 a disproportionately high percentage of males and not females were registered-60% of the new voters registered during this period were males and only 40% females. Thus, the charges that the IJI registered a large number of bogus female voters in urban constituencies, does not bear close scrutiny. In a political environment where the stakes are high and a large amount of money was spent to secure elections, it would be surprising if some vote rigging did not occur. The more important question was the extent to which this took place. It is highly doubtful that it occurred on a scale that could adequately explain the disparity between male and female voting behaviour. Table 8.6: Increase in registered voters in NWFP 1990 and 1993. Elections Registered %age Registered %age Total %age Male Female 1990 3387427 37.26 2584839 29.86 5972266 33.65 1993 3688513 40.58 2680012 30.96 6368525 35.89 +/301086 3.32 95173 1.1 396259 2.24 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). The consistency of trend lends its credibility-not one city was found where it was contradicted. Furthermore, within constituencies the trend was visible in the results of the vast majority of the polling stations while rigging may have occurred, it is highly unlikely that only PML(N) candidates engaged in it, and that they could all have been so well organized as to have arranged rigging in virtually every female polling station in every constituency. 8.5 CONSERVATISM OF FEMALE VOTERS Two explanations seem more plausible in explaining the advantage that the PML(N) enjoyed with female voters. The first is that women in NWFP tend to be more traditional in their values than men, or at least, in this conservative society, must appear to support traditional values. This finding should not come as a surprise since women in many countries where democratic elections are held tend to vote more conservatively than men.9 The PML (N)’s advantage with female voters is considerably higher in middle and upper class neighborhoods than in lower class neighborhood. It is in the more conservative urban middle class localities that women appear particularly reluctant to earn the reputation of being PPP supporters. In an 305 interview, a PPP female party worker from Peshawar recounted that while she was campaigning for the 1993 elections, conservative middle class women would ask her why they should vote for the ‘Kanjar’ (prostitute) party.10 For the conservative urban middle classes the PPP’s image of being liberal often translates into being secular and immoral and its concept of being ‘the party of the poor’ translates into a party that attracts goondas (thugs) and rough elements of the society. 8.6 PML (N) ELECTION CAMPAIGNS The second explanation for the PML (N)’s success with female voters is that PML(N) candidates, particularly in urban/rural constituencies, were generally better organized, better financed, and ran more effective campaigns than PPP candidates. Most important was the fact that PML (N) candidates were better organized on Election Day and provided more transport facilities for women than PPP candidates. The director of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), which organized the most extensive monitoring of the polls on Election Day, made the following observation. It was observed that there was a more disciplined distribution of immobilizers to vehicles on the part of the Muslim League. They knew where to go, where to get the voters from. They had in the cities, at least better resources also…. [I]t was an aspect of their better mobilization that they were able to bring their voters to the polling stations earlier, so in the mornings they had a head start at the polling stations11. Another important factor was that PML (N) candidates had a large number of educated female polling agents assisting women voters. In light of the importance of the educating and assisting illiterate voters on Election Day, the PML (N)’s edge in this area is significant. In interviews, several PPP candidates complained that they could not find enough literate women to serve as polling agents12. For example Maj(R) Mukhtar Ahmad, a PPP candidate for MNA from Charsada in 1993, made the following observation: [A]ll my female polling agents were illiterate. I could not find any educated females willing to be PPP polling agents, so my agents did not understand, what was going on. The Muslim League girls were well educated and well paid and understood what was going on.13 8.7 GENDER RELATED FINDINGS 8.7.1 IMPACT OF CANDIDATE’S GENDER ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR The result of the only two NWFP constituencies where female candidates contested and won seats in 1993 suggest that both male and female voters were not overly influenced by a candidate’s gender. The first, PF- 15 located in Charsada district, is 306 primarily rural and most of its polling stations were not segregated. In the town of Charsada, however, twenty polling stations with a combined total of 15,863 votes were segregated by sex. In these polling stations 65.8% of female voters voted for the female ANP candidate, Begum Nasim Wali Khan supported by PML-N in 1993 and 1997 elections (using seat adjustment strategy), compared to 61.6% of male voters. The male PPP candidate in 1993 (Mr. Jahangir Khan) received 15% of female vote and 20.1% of male vote. These results were consistent with the result elsewhere, indicating a higher percentage of female than male support for ANP/PML(N) [Coalition partners] , but also indicating that there did not appear to be any reluctance on the part of women to vote for another women if she belonged to PML(N) and not the PPP.14 The second constituency NA-24 in Chitral district, was primarily a rural constituency, in which 58,373 out of total 116,400 votes were cast in polling stations during 1988, identified as segregated. In these the female PPP candidate Begum Nusrat Bhutto, won 52.9% of total male votes but only 49.4% of the total female votes. The male PML(N) coalition party IJI candidate Shahzada Muhayud Din won 40.3% of the total male votes and 42.9% of the female votes. As these statistics were consistent with the others, it would seem that it was Begum Nusrat’s Bhutto’s PPP affiliation rather than her gender that influenced women voters to vote in higher percentages for the PML(N).15 8.7.2 GENDER DIFFERENCES (SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS PARTIES) Male and female voters also differed in their level of support for Islamic parties. Data showed that women were less likely than men to vote for JUI-F, Jamat-e-islami Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) candidates. Table 8.7: Status of religious parties (NWFP in National Assembly): Religious Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 Contested/ winner JUI-F 12/03 22/02 X 11/0 JUI-D 03/1 X X X TNFJ 01/00 X X X JUP-N X 01/00 X X PIF X X 15/01 X JUI-S X X X 03/0 IJM X X 09/02 X Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). X means no candidate contested. JUI-F means Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group), JUI-D means Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Darkhasti Group), TNFJ means Tehriq-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqa Jaffiriya, JUP-N means Jamiat-i-Ulem-e-Pakistan, PIF means Pakistan Islamic Front, JUI-S means Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam Sammiullah Group and IJM means Islamai Jamuri Itehad. In Dera Ismail Khan, JUI-F, did better with female (58.3%) than with male voters (53.9%) during 1988 and 1993 elections. The electoral positions of religious party 307 were not satisfactory during 1988-1997 elections. Table 8.7 shows the status of religious parties in National Assembly elections.16 8.7.3 FEMALE VOTER EDUCATION Another finding was that women were much more likely to vote, usually, erroneously, for other candidates who were not serious contenders. Many candidates have covering candidates in the race to step in for them in case they are forced to withdraw. Although covering candidates should not receive votes, they invariably do, indicating confusion on the part of the voters17. Often candidates will adopt tactics to deliberately confuse voters. In NWFP where the majority of voters are illiterate, political party symbols that appear on ballot papers along with their candidate’s names take on added significance. A candidate will often deliberately give his or her covering candidate an election symbol that resembles the opponent’s symbol in order to trick illiterate voters. One of the allegations made by the PPP following the 1990 elections was that dummy candidates were put up by the anti-PPP establishment and given the symbol of the pencil in order to steal votes away from PPP candidates whose symbol, an arrow closely resembled a pencil on ballot papers. In 1993, many PML-N candidates complained that voters confused their tiger symbol on the ballot with symbols of goat, cows and horses used by PPP candidates to confuse voters. The majority of these votes(often by a ratio of more then 21) are cast by women, despite the fact that fewer women were voting than men. The number of erroneous votes being cast indicates the need for voter education, and in particular assistance for illiterate voters, most of whom were women. A PPP campaign worker from a rural constituency gave the following description of some of the problems faced by the female voter on Election Day. In rural areas women are not educated. We train them, but at the time of voting they get confused. Women usually never meet people outside of their family and their village, so they feel shy in intimidated when confronted by the polling station staff. In every election women waste a lot of votes by not marking the ballet properly, and candidates deliberately pick symbols for covering candidates to confuse the voters, especially the women voters. Interestingly, not as many women made the mistake of stamping the similar electoral signs. The Muslim League female polling station workers are better educated and better trained to instruct and pressurize women to vote for the Nawaz Sharif candidate. Their polling station workers are trained to recognize confused voters, stand next to them and accompany them all the way to the voting booth, instructing them how to vote. The simple women get confused by everyone telling them to stamp the arrow or stamp the tiger, stamp the arrow stamp the tiger, and they just want to get over with…. Its very common after the election for the men to tell jokes about how their women folk became confused and voted for the wrong candidate18. In an interview with female voters from NA-14 Mansehra in 1997 elections, some of the female voters pointed that she stamped on electoral symbol, ‘cup of tea’ as she like to take tea.19 While interviewing to a researcher one female activist highlighted 308 that some of the females in urban and rural areas of NWFP considered polling day just like a festival.20 The main conclusion to be drawn was that candidates and the political parties could no longer afford to ignore female voters. The data reveals that a significant number of women, especially in urban areas, were voting independently of their male family members. In close contests, of which there were usually many, the votes of these women could well determine who wins a seat. Recognition of their power to affect the outcome of electoral contest should encourage women to organize more effectively, educate female voters, and be more vocal in their demands21. During the 1993 election campaigns, The Aurat Foundation, a Pakistani nongovernmental organization that serves as an information and advisory service for women, launched a ‘campaign for putting women on the political agenda of Pakistan’. In this first non-partisan campaign of its kind, posters, pamphlets, stickers, and broadcast material were prepared, and media support messages were aired to educate voters on issues of concern for women and to encourage women to vote. Political parties were asked to include women’s issues in their manifestos and candidates were asked to state their positions on these issues. Although it is not possible to assess the impact of this campaign, the data of this study certainly indicates the need for female voter education. 8.8 CLASS The findings of the case study of voting behaviour represented, supports the popular perception that the PPP is the party of the poor, and the PML(N) is the party of middle and upper class industrialists22. It revealed that while levels of support had changed, the pattern of class support had remained remarkably consistent since the 1970s election. The following section uses polling station data, postal ballet results, and the returns from the capital city, Islamabad, to further illustrate the important role that class plays in determining voting behaviour in urban NWFP. In chapter five, ward-level data were used as the basic unit to analyse class voting patterns. The data presented in this section are more precise as they are based on an analysis of the 1988 returns from polling stations categorized by class23. By expanding the scope of our analysis to include NWFP’s three largest cities-Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera-it becomes clear that the class voting patterns observed in Peshawar were not unique. Table 8.8 revealed that in all three cities the PPP 309 consistently did better in the polling stations located in poorer neighbourhoods and the ANP/PML(N) in middle and upper-class neighborhoods.24 Table 8.8: Table showing the Lower and Middle/Upper Class Neighbourhood Voting Patterns (Provincial Assembly) in NWFP cities. City Peshawar IJI-88 PML-N- 97 +/PPP- 88 PPP- 97 +/ANP 88 ANP 97 +/Abbottabad IJI-88 PML-N- 97 +/PPP- 88 PPP- 97 +/ANP 88 ANP 97 +/Swat IJI-88 PML-N- 97 +/PPP- 88 PPP- 97 +/ANP 88 Lower Class Male % Female % 10.2 10.4 0.2 60.5 36.10 -24.5 23.5 80.5 57 38.3 78.8 40.5 10.8 1.5 -9.3 0 0 0 8.7 6.2 -2.5 39.8 14.5 -25.2 33.8 50.4 16.6 26.8 36.8 10 6.1 1.7 -4.4 0 0 0 Total % 10.6 8.4 -2.2 50.04 25.80 -25.75 28.4 65.8 37.4 32.8 57.0 24.2 8.3 1.8 -6.5 0 0 0 Middle/Upper Class Male % Female % 20.3 18.2 -2.1 35.01 17.6 -17.41 25.5 47.8 22.3 30.2 70.4 40.2 30.2 3.1 -27.1 0 0 0 8.20 6.7 -2.5 15.8 5.23 -10.57 12.2 10.6 -2.4 20.5 60.8 40.3 10.4 1.5 -8.9 0 0 0 Total % 14.2 12.5 -2.3 25.03 11.4 -13.63 18.8 28.5 10.3 25.5 67.8 42.3 20.8 2.8 -18 0 0 0 Total Male % 18.2 12.2 -6.0 20.4 10.7 -10.3 21.4 41.2 20.2 23.2 54.2 31 10.2 1.3 -8.9 0 0 0 Female % 6.1 8.4 2.3 54.4 26.4 -32.0 25.1 51.4 26.3 31.3 70.3 39 18.3 3.2 -15.1 0 0 0 Total % 12.0 10.31 -1.69 37.04 18.55 -18.49 23.68 46.68 23 27.41 62.04 34.63 14.91 2.93 -11.98 0 0 0 23.4 42.4 18.8 13.09 6.2 -6.89 18.7 13.4 18.3 4.9 21.5 10.4 -11.1 14.7 18.8 30.5 11.7 17.8 8.5 -9.3 16 40.3 60 19.7 17.2 13.5 -3.7 35.2 16.3 30.6 14.3 33.6 19.6 -14 17.8 28.8 45.8 17 25.6 16.4 -9.2 26.2 30.2 40.5 10.3 15.2 3.4 -11.8 23.4 16.1 36.2 20.1 29.2 8.9 -20.3 21.4 23.84 38.24 14.4 21.88 6.23 -15.65 21.58 16.68 -4.9 27.69 48.83 21.14 16.14 2.05 -14.09 0.72 0.04 -0.68 ANP 97 14.3 18.8 11.2 29.8 15.4 21.5 15.4 17.2 +/-4.4 -4.1 -4.8 -5.4 -2.4 -4.7 -8 -4.2 DI Khan IJI-88 20.8 15.9 23 45.6 15.2 31.3 34.5 20.4 PML-N- 97 49.8 21.3 35.2 78.2 42.4 60.4 68.2 28.7 +/29 5.4 12.2 32.6 27.2 29.1 33.7 8.3 PPP- 88 10.4 13.8 12.8 13.2 27.3 20.5 13 19.4 PPP- 97 0.1 1.3 1.24 2.1 4.6 3.2 1.8 3.2 +/-10.3 -12.5 -11.56 -11.1 -22.7 -17.3 -11.2 -16.2 ANP 88 0.3 0.4 0.82 0.3 0.8 1.00 0.23 0.51 ANP 97 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.01 0.03 +/-0.1 -0.1 -0.32 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.22 -0.48 Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘Form XVII, Result of the count’ (Polling Station results) In 1993, the PPP-PML(J) won 47.4, 48.5, and 48.1% of the vote in the lower class neighbourhoods of Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera respectively, and only 36.2, 35.1, and 39.4 percent in the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of these cities. The PML(N) won about the same percentage (48, 48, and 45 percent respectively) as the PPP-PML(J) in the lower class neighourhoods of these cities, but won 58.5, 61.4 and 54.7 percent of the vote in the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of Abbottabad, Kohat, and Swat. The table indicates that the PML(N)’s strongest supporters are women living in middle and upper class neighbourhoods while the men 310 living in lower class neighbourhoods are the PPP’s staunchest the followers. While these figures might confirm the popular perception that the PPP is the party of the poor, comparing the 1988 and 1993 polling station results reveals the more significant finding that the PPP is the party of a smaller number of the poor then it used to be.25 In Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera the PPP lost 9.4, 6.5, and 7.9% of the vote in the lower class neighbourhoods which were traditionally its vote bank. The PPP’s 15 to 20% edge over the PML(N) in these areas in the 1988 elections had been all but been eliminated by the 1993 elections26. The PPP trailed behind the IJI in middle and upper class neighbourhood in 1988. By 1993, however, the PPP had lost an additional 7.6, 6.0 and 6.5% of the vote in the middle and upper class neighbourhoods of Peshawar, Mardan, and Nowshera, giving the PML(N) an impressive lead of 22.3, 26.3 and 15.3%. although not shown in table seven PIF received a higher percentage of the vote (4.6 and 3.0%) in the middle and the upper class neighbourhoods of Peshawar and Mardan than in the lower class neighbourhoods (3.0 and 2.6%), although in Nowshera it did slightly better (4.92, 4.7%) in the lower class neighbourhoods. PIF did better with male voters than with the female voters. Its strongest support came from men living in middle and upper class areas (4.9, 3.1 and 5.2%) and its weakest support living in lower class areas (2.7, 2.3 and 3.9%). 8.9 POSTAL BALLOTS: The following section seeks to identify the voting behaviour of one important component of the middle class-civil and military government employees. While it is not possible to completely isolate the vote of government employees, an examination of postal ballot results as well as polling station data from Islamabad allows one to make some educated guesses.27 In Pakistan, unlike the United States or UK where any eligible voter can use an absentee ballot, only the following categories of voters are eligible to vote by postal ballots: (i) civil and military employees of the government who are posted somewhere other than where they are registered as voters; (ii) their eligible accompanying family members; (iii) polling staff on duty at polling stations; and (iv) prisoners.28 In Interviews with people who counted postal ballot results it was reported that government employees accounted for the vast majority of those who voted by post. The postal ballots results summarized in table 5 indicate that those voting by postal ballots preferred the PML(N) over the PPP-PML(J) coalition by a margin of nearly 25 per cent. These results could reflect the better organization of the PML(N) election campaign, although most candidates claimed that little effort was made to get people to vote by 311 postal ballot because the number of votes involved was limited. It is likely, therefore, that the results reflected the strong preference of government employees for the PML(N) over the PPP. This would help explain the strong showing of PML(N) in northern NWFP where 17.8 per cent of the labor force in 1981 were government employees, more than double the number in any other region of the NWFP. The PIF percentage of postal ballot votes was nearly twice the percentage of regular ballots it won, reflecting its greater support from predominantly middle class government employees than from the rest of NWFP society. PIF did considerably better in northern and central NWFP than in southern and Northeastern NWFP, although much of this can be attributed to contesting from more seats in the former regions than the latter. Independent candidates and the Islamic parties other than the PIF did especially well in western NWFP, much as they had in the regular balloting. Table 8.9: Postal Ballot Results in NWFP: 1997 (In %age) NWFP Region PML-N PPP ANP Religious Others Independent Central 14.7 18.6 39.8 0.15 3.76 14.1 South 28.6 2.3 10.4 7.38 3.08 35.4 North-East 48.8 1.1 3.6 1.60 0.62 37.2 North 29.9 18.1 20.6 2.69 2.24 13.3 Total/Average 30.5 10.0 18.6 3.0 2.4 25.9 Source: Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘Form XVII, Result of the count’ (Polling Station and Postal Ballot results), for NA-1 through NA-26. Although complete postal ballot results from the 1988 elections are unavailable, an examination of the results from 26 constituencies reveals an even greater reluctance on the part of postal ballot voters to vote for PPP than in 1993. In the constituencies examined, the IJI won 65.7 per cent of the vote in 1988 and 58 per cent in 1993, whereas the PPP won 24.5 per cent in 1988 and 31 per cent in 1993.The PPP’s poorer performance with postal ballot voters than with regular voters was a pattern that was also visible in the 1970 elections, although to a much lesser extent. In contrast to the twelve NWFP districts where the PPP won the most votes in the general balloting, the PPP won the most postal ballots in only five districts. Six of the remaining districts were won by the Council Muslim League, six by the main religious parties (JI, JUP, JUI), and one each by the Pakistan Democratic party and independents.29 According to Jones, ‘The postal ballot data reveals elites that were far more ambivalent about the PPP, than were the broader public’.30 8.10 ISLAMABAD RESULTS The polling station results from the nation’s capital, Islamabad, provided another good indication of the voting behaviour of the middle class and government employees. Islamabad is a new city that was built in a rural area outside of 312 Rawalpinidi following Ayub Khan’s decision to shift Pakistan’s capital from Karachi in the 1960s. As such, it has no historic roots and no traditional elites. It also has little in the way of industry, and other than those employed by the services sector of the economy, foreign embassies and international organizations, the majority of its population is employed by the government. As housing is scarce and therefore expensive, with the exception of a few katchi abadis (shanty towns) and lower middle class housing colonies, the lower classes tend to live in nearby Rawalpindi and commute to work. Islamabad is therefore unlike most Pakistani cities since a much higher percentage of its population belong to the middle and upper classes, and a disproportionately high number of it population work for the government. As with the postal ballot results, Islamabad’s polling station results supported the conclusion that the large majority of the government employees favored the PML(N) over the PPP. In the polling stations located in the city , 59.3 per cent favoured the PML(N) candidate and only 28.6 per cent voted for PPP. Less than half of Islamabad’s city polling stations were identified as being segregated by gender. In those that were, 64.9 per cent of women and 56.6 per cent of men supported PML (N), while 25.2 per cent of women and 30.6 per cent of men supported PPP. In the rural areas of Islamabad constituency, which accounted for two thirds of the total constituency votes, the PPP candidate won 47.1 per cent of the votes and the PML(N) candidate only 44.6 per cent. The PML (N) candidate won the seat due to the overwhelming support of the predominantly middle and upper class voters of Islamabad, many of whom were current or former government employees. The PIF also did better with Islamabad’s voters than in most other constituencies of the NWFP. In Islamabad it won 9.7 per cent of the city vote (11 per cent of the identified male vote and 7.4 per cent of the female vote) and 5.5 per cent of the rural vote. In 1970 elections, the PPP did relatively well in Islamabad, indicating that it had considerable support in bureaucratic circles. Nevertheless, the Islamabad results revealed that the bureaucracy was clearly polarized and that a substantial number remained opposed to PPP. Jones pointed out the ideological divide that existed. Apart from the popularity of Awami League-doubtless among resident Bengali civil servants-the 1970 elections in Islamabad were clearly a contest between the PPP and the Jamaat-i-Islami. If we extract the Awami League votes, the PPP-JI polarization is even more evident, the PPP taking 49.2 per cent and the JI 37.1 per cent. The Islamabad figures point to a marked political polarization of the civil service elites 313 between the two major ideological parties in Pakistan, each, in its own way, supporting systematic change.31 This analysis indicates that class is still an important determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP. The conclusion was further supported by the findings of the case study of voting behaviour in Peshawar. In both cases the data reveal that there is a distinct class division between the PPP and the anti-PPP (or ANP- IJI/PML) that has been visible since 1970. It supports the popular perception that the PPP draws its strongest urban support from the lower strata of society, and that the core of the antiPPP vote is formed by the conservative urban middle classes. The 1993 election results, however, show a strong upsurge in support of the anti-PPP forces led by Nawaz Sharif. While the patterns of class support are still very visible, the PML-N clearly made inroads into the PPP’s former strongholds in lower and lower-middle class neighbourhoods. Table 8.10: Effect of Age, Literacy, and Education on Voting Behaviour. Demography 1988 1990 1993 1997 PPP Age: Under 30 Over 30 Literacy: illiterate Literate Education: Primary Middle Matric (Grade 10) Intermediate(Grade 12) Graduate or above 38% 37 44 34 32 35 34 38 35 IJI 29% 34 28 34 33 40 37 28 28 PDA 36% 31 34 33 39 29 32 29 33 IJI 28% 37 29 35 29 37 37 39 35 PPP 33% 36 38 33 x x x x x PML-N 37% 35 33 37 X X X X X PPP x x x x x x x x x PML-N x x x x x x x x x x means that Gallup Pakistan not recorded data. Source: Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls, 1990’, and 1993 exit poll survey results. 8.11 AGE: Survey analysis is the most accurate way to identify determinants of voting behavior. The only serious electoral surveys in Pakistan have been the exit poll surveys of male voters conducted by Gallup Pakistan.32 These surveys were conducted throughout the country and the figures given are for Pakistan and not just for the NWFP. The above Table summarizes some of the findings of these surveys for the 1988, 1990 and 1993 elections, and indicates the role that age, literacy, and education play in influencing the voting behaviour for Pakistan’s male voters.33 The PPP has traditionally been perceived to be more popular among youth than other parties, which is why the party has traditionally supported lowering the voting age from 21 to 18. The survey data confirm that in 1998 and 1990 the PPP did indeed have considerable more support from male voters under 30 than the IJI. A very significant development in 1993, however, was the increase in support by under-30 314 male voters for the PML-N from 29 and 28 percent in 1998 and 1990 respectively, to 37 percent in 1993. This is especially significant because exit poll results suggest that voter turnout is highest among voters in the 21-30 age group.34 The PML-N’s support among over-30 male voters actually decreased from 37 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 1993. In 1993, for the first time, the PPP had less support from under-30 than from over-30 male voters. The data indicate that a considerable percentage of the increase in support for the PML-N between 1990 and 1993 could be attributed to the increase in support it received from younger voters. Not surprisingly, since the 1993 election the PPP has made no mention of lowering the voting age. There are several explanations for the apparent increase in support for the PML-N by younger voters in the 1993 elections. The first was the interesting reversal that took place in 1993 where by the PPP replaced the PML-N as the party perceived to be the favourite of the civil-military establishment. Since the late 1960s, the PPP was viewed as the anti-establishment party, or at least as the party opposed by the establishment. This earned the PPP the support of many younger voters who were disillusioned with how the generals and bureaucrats had governed the country, and who wanted to change the status-quo. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s dismissal of Nawaz Sharif’s government in the spring of 1993, however, transformed perceptions of him from being a member of the establishment into an underdog fighting it. This new personna was further strengthened when in July the military pressured both him and President to resign, appointed a care-taker government, and called for elections in October. For the first time in its history the PPP was perceived to be the favorites of the establishment. If indeed younger voters in Pakistan are more inclined to support antiestablishment parties this would help explain why they switched their support to the PML-N in 1993.35 Another explanation for the increase in their support for the PML-N was Nawaz Sharif’s image as the ‘Development’ Prime Minister, and his success in addressing voter concerns on the issue of unemployment. Interviews conducted with voters and candidates before and after the 1993 elections, especially of young voters highlight this. Respondents in Gallup Pakistan’s exit poll surveys also identified unemployment as the most important problem facing the country.36 During the 1993 campaign, Nawaz Sharif’s media manager addressed this concern directly by developing his image as the industrial Prime Minister who was committed to economic development and preparing Pakistan for the 21st century. Newspaper advertisements reminded 315 voters of his privatization policy and politically popular (but economically disastrous) projects such as the massive Lahore to Islamabad Motorway Project and the ‘Yellow Cab Scheme’.37 Yellow cabs worth US$700 million had been imported, and another US$ 750nmillion planned, when the caretaker government came to power and discontinued the programme. The PML-N election manifesto promised to expand the programme to include schemes for yellow bicycles, yellow tractors and ‘yellow gold cards’ to provide free higher education to all students securing top marks in degree level courses.38 The Yellow Cab scheme, which provided soft-term loans to cover 90 percent of the cost of purchasing a yellow cab, was one of the government’s ‘SelfEmployment Schemes’ to address the unemployment problem. By the time of the 1993 elections, 54,000 yellow cabs were operating on the streets of Pakistan’s cities and towns, which served as a visible advertisement of Nawaz Sharif’s policies to help alleviate unemployment. 39 Referring to a loss of PPP among younger generation, Shahid Afridi, a journalist from Peshawar, gave the following explanation as one factor: [T]he new generation…has acquired the vote that has never voted for the PPP in the past….This is the generation that must have been eight, nine or ten years old when Ziaul Haq came on the scene. They were too young to understand what Bhutto was all about. They were too young to have any empathy for Bhutto when he was assassinated or executed. But they were not young enough during the time Ziaul Haq stayed in this country, so they imbibed a lot of that culture and they did not bring any baggage with time. That’s the generation that now has the vote. And that generation has no empathy for Benazir Bhutto. In fact that generation has grown up to be a very conservative generation.40 Referring to the PPP’s loss of support among younger voters, another political observer commented: We have a term ‘pukki pakai’-ready-made. The PPP’s politics is ready-made. It was made by Bhutto and still depends on those who saw Bhutto. As long as those who saw Bhutto are alive, Bhutto is alive and the PPP is alive. When they die, Bhutto will die and the PPP will die.41 8.12 LITERACY (LEVELS OF EDUCATION) There is a strong correlation between literacy rates and class; therefore, it is not surprising that their effects on voting behaviour are very similar. The exit Poll results given in the above table indicate that the PPP gets more support from illiterate male voters and the IJI/PML-N from literate male voters. Between 1998 and 1993, the PPP lost more support among the illiterate (Six percent) than literate (one percent) male voters. Exit Poll data indicates that voters’ turnout among literate male voters is approximately double that of illiterate male voters, which is a big disadvantage for the PPP.42 Thus, the PML-N’s lead among literate voters becomes more significant than the PPP’s lead among illiterate voters. The PML-N’s apparent advantage with literate 316 voters helps explain why the party’s strongest regional result was in northern NWFP, the province’s most literate region.43 Exit poll data on the impact of levels of education on voting behaviour were not available for the 1993 elections. A comparison of the PPP and IJI data for the 1988 elections indicate that the PPP tended to do better with better educated male voters, and the IJI with those who had received only a little education. The PPP received the most support from male voters who had been educated only up to the primary level, and the IJI from the better-educated voters. 8.13 MINORITIES IN ELECTORAL POLITICS OF NWFP From the beginning, the post partition leaders of West Pakistan Demanded separate electorates for the minorities, which meant that minority representation in the National and Provincial Legislatures would be fixed in proportion to their population and only the minorities would vote for their candidates. The 1956 constitution that was aborted by Ayub Khan’s martial law in October 1958 had left the issue unsettled but had referred the matter to the National Assembly which allowed West Pakistan to apply separate electorates for the minorities. However, East Pakistan which had more minorities had rejected the idea. The 1962 and 1973 Constitutions adopted the joint electorate system. Under the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq, who had political interest in cultivating the religious constituency, the Constitution was amended in 1973 establishing separate electorates. Although separate electorates guaranteed the election of 10 representatives of the minorities, in reality this system excluded 3.8 percent of the population from voting. The religious minorities namely Christians, Sikhs, Buddhist and Qadianis are scattered all over NWFP without any major concentration. Five elections, beginning in 1985 to 1997, were held under separate electorates in which religious minorities did not vote for the mainstream candidates. Their votes in well contested constituencies could have tipped the balance in favour of one candidate or another. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Civil Society Groups (CSGs) and the associations representing minorities demanded a repeal of separate electorates, but the mainstream political parties fearing political attacks from religious parties did not respond with the abolition of separate electorates. However, they had little or no representation in the assemblies with the ending of special seats 317 for them. One suggestion that has been circulated in this regard is that special seats allocated to the minorities in the assemblies be restored. Table 8.11: Results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP: seat reserved for Sikh, Budhist, Parsi and Non- Muslim communities (1 seat). 1997 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1.Engineer Gayan (IND) 2. Mr. Bahari Lal (IND) 3. Mr. Jesvenat Das (IND) 4. Dr. Singar Singh (PMI) 5. Mr. Sajan Bishandas Choan (IND) 6. Mr. Sherzada (IND) 7. Ganga Veshan (IND) Votes polled 1993 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1. Engineer Gayan (IND) 2. Mr. Behari Lal Votes polled 1990 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1. Dr. Singar Singh (IND) 2. Mr. J.R Gill (IND) Votes polled 1988 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1. Mr. Behari Lal (IND) 2. Mr. J.R Gill (IND) 3. Mr. Hakim Bhag Chand (IND) 4. Mr. Singar Singh (IND) 5. Mr. Saifullah Jan (IND) 6. Mr. Abdul Khaliq (IND) Votes polled 809 616 495 563 447 654 444 416 41 3. Mr. J.R Gill (IND) 371 3. Mr. Behari Lal (IND) 4. Mr. Noor Shahideen (IND) 5. Mr. Amar Jeet (IND) 6. Mr. Bashara Khan (IND) 7. Mr. Raja Amir Nath (IND) 8. Mr. Hakim Bhag Chand (IND) 9. Mr. Gul Darshan (IND) 10. Mr. Abdul Khaliq (IND) 408 169 112 300 4. Mr. Singar Singh (IND) 5. Mr. Raja Amar Nath (IND) 6. Mr. Sherzada (IND) 7. Mr. Wazir (IND) 353 164 280 249 439 293 735 409 243 323 254 168 213 105 77 06 Source: Data compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). Their participation rate in electoral politics of the province is illustrated in table 8.11. During the Musharraf period (1997-208), minorities re-entered mainstream politics The minorities have great interest in voting. Their voting percentage is comparatively high as compared to other communities. Qadianis, one of the other minority groups also contested elections, except 1988 elections. The detailed results of this community are shown in table 8.13. Table 8.12 shows that voter turnout rate is much lower in this minority community as compared to other minority communities. Pakistan’s 1973 constitution provided for a ‘joint electorates’ system allowing religious minorities to vote for the same candidates as Muslim voters. However, the 8th amendment to the constitution, pushed through the National Assembly by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1986, instituted a system of ‘separate electorates’. Under this system minorities could only vote for candidate for 10 minority seats in the National Assembly, and 23 minority seats in Pakistan’s four provincial Assemblies. 318 Table 8.12: Detailed results of elections to the seats reserved for minority communities in the provincial assembly of NWFP: seat reserved for persons belonging to the Quadianis group or Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis) (1 seat) 1997 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1. Mr. Tahir Aftab (IND) 2. Malik Qaseemuddin (IND) Votes polled 1993 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1. Mr. Rana Ghuyur Ahmad (IND) 2. Mr. Muhammad Anwar (IND) 1. Malik Qaseemuddin (IND) Votes polled 1990 Names of the contesting candidates with party affiliation 1. Malik Qaseemuddin Khan (IND) 2. Mrs. Khaudeeja Khanum (IND) Votes polled 1988 Names of the Votes contesting polled candidates with party affiliation No Candidate filed nomination papers, consequently this seat remained funfiled. 15 7 29 48 4 01 81 Source: Data compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). While this ensured that they would be represented in the assemblies, it cut them off from the political mainstream as candidates from the major political parties no longer needed to seek their votes. At the time of 1981 census, minorities constituted 2.2 percent of NWFP’s population and 3.7 per cent in the seat-rich districts of central NWFP.44 In Peshawar, Kohat, and DI. Khan, the number exceeded five percent and in Battagram and Mardan, more than four percent. 8.14: RELIGIOUS DETERMINANTS: Without more complete survey data, it is impossible to provide a detailed explanation of the role that religion or religious views play in determining voting behaviour. The data presented in this study, however, have provided some indications of which social groups are most supportive of Pakistan’s most organized and best known Islamic party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).45 In 1993 contesting under the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) banner, JI did better with urban than with rural voters, with lower-middle and middle-class voters than with lower-and upper-class voters, and with male than with female voters. Overall, however, JI as well as Pakistan’s other Islamic parties never fared well in electoral politics until 2002. As table 3-2 illustrates, their best result before 2002 was in the 1970 elections when all the Islamic parties combined won 20.5 per cent of the vote but only 5 of 82 seats. In 1993 they received only 3.9 per cent of the vote and only one seat. Both western and Pakistani political experts are fond of interpreting this as an indication of the lack of popular support for Islamic political parties.46 It is a mistake, however, to equate lack of electoral support with lack of popular support. Islamic parties suffer from the same electoral problems that nearly all third parties have with a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system47. Few voters are willing to waste their votes on a 319 losing candidate, especially in a political system that is heavily based on patronage. JI’s leader, Munawar Hassan, pointed out the dilemma confronting his party on 6 September 1994. At present, people might be disinterested with the politics of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir, but its not true that they would not vote for them. If elections were held tomorrow, they would call them bad names and would say that they are disintegrating the country, an that they have bad people and bad budgets and bad policies. But they will vote for them again because they feel they do not have any options. We shall have to prove our worth and that we really are an option, an alternative. Not theoretically that they are bad and so we are good. People do say that we are good people and are very well knit and organized, but they do not think we can be a substitute or alternative in this type of politics.48 In the 1993 elections, many voters sympathetic to the JI, including card carrying members, refused to waste their votes on JUI-F candidates. One JUI-F candidate, a well respected religious figure in Mansehra, described his experience: [P]eople really apologized and said, ‘You are the best candidate we have ever had in this city since partition. But we are sorry to say that you will not succeed so we will be wasting our vote….’ [E]very one came to me and said, ‘…everything you say is one hundred percent right. We sincerely believe that you are a man that will not tell a lie, and that if you come to power you will not distinguish between rich and poor, between Christians and Muslims, or between parties. You will be true to your call. The only thing is that you will not win.’49 The electoral history of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the leader of JUI-F’s is a good example of why political popularity should not be judged solely by the number of votes won in an election. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, won DI. Khan NA-18 in 1988 contesting as JUI-F candidate, narrowly lost in 1990 and 1997 as the JUI-F candidate, and than won in 1993 an IJM candidate. This indicates that voters did not hesitate to vote for a ‘fundamentalist’ as long as they thought the candidate had a chance of winning. It was only as a PIF candidate in 1993 that he came in a distant third behind the two major party candidates. 8.15 SECTARIANISM One disturbing development in the 1993 elections was the growing influence that sectarianism played in determining voting behaviour. In the past, Sunni-Sh’ite tensions have played a role in electoral profiles, but this was usually confined to a few areas such as Kohat and Hangu, which had a long history of sectarian strife. The last few years, however, have witnessed the spread of sectarian politics throughout the province and the country, along with a dramatic increase in the number of acts of violence. Many of these were linked to sectarian parties that have emerged during the last ten years such as the virulently anti-shi’ite organization, Anjuman-e-Sipah-iSahaba Pakistan (ASSP).50 While these parties did not fare well in the elections,51 several politicians commented during interviews on the new role that sectarianism was playing in the politics of their constituencies. In listing the factors effecting 320 voting behaviour in this constituency, one PML(N) National Assembly candidate observed: A new thing has developed which is playing havoc in politics, and which is not a happy trend. That is religious sectarianism, whose adherents whether one asks them for a vote or not, vote according to whatever decision is taken by their high command. This does not mean religious political parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami. It means an altogether different thing….For example, the PPP had an alliance with the Fiqh Jafria [a Shi’ite party], so all Shi’ites in my village gave their votes to the PPP because of their religious beliefs. They have gone out of my influence.52 The common perception in NWFP is that Shi’ites who fear any further attempt to introduce Islamic laws in accordance with Sunni Schools of Islamic thought, favour the more secular PPP over the PML(N).53 One political observer pointed out an electoral dilemma at the PPP faces, ‘If Shi’ite are with PPP, anti Shi’ite vote against the PPP. But if Shi’ite are with the PML, anti Shi’ite religious voters still vote for the PML. The PPP loses both ways’.54 In NWFP there are two major Sunni Schools of thought, the Deobandis55 and the Barelvis. Jamiat-i-Islami (JUI) is the party of the more orthodox Deobandis and Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP)56 the party of the more heterodox and populist Barelvis. On election day, for the same reason the majority of their supporters are unlikely to ‘waste’ their votes on the JUI and JUP. According to one observer they are likely to vote as follows: Sunni Barelvis tend to be more liberal and vote for the PPP…. If someone converts from Barelvi to Wahabi, than immediately they become anti-PPP. Political affiliation is closely linked with religious affiliation in the popular mind. If someone becomes a Wahabi the question does not even arise that they had vote for the PPP.57 8.16 MAULVIS, PIRS, AND SAJJADA NASHINS One of the problems faced by the religious parties seeking to increase their influence in rural NWFP is that the local religious leaders, the village maulvis (or mullahs),58 are held in much lower esteem than their urban counterparts.59 As maulvis in rural areas are often dependent on the handouts of the village Malik/Sardar (chief) their status is often no better than that of the other sipis (low status caste-like artisans and service groups).60 According to Rahimullah Yousafzai, a senior journalist from Peshawar: ….The concept of maulvi or the mullah is that he’s only fit for [performing] religious rituals. He is not fit to rule, this is the concept here in this society. They do not regard mullah as a respectable person. This is especially true in rural areas [where] this concept is very strong. There is a mosque and a madrassa, so the image of the maulvi is to lead the prayer and to teach in the school. Even socially he’s is not equal to landlord. So this is their drawback. They are not viewed as competent enough, or well educated enough, or modern enough to rule the country.61 In rural NWFP, therefore, the political influence of the village maulvi is limited. The better educated maulvis in urban areas command greater respect and undoubtedly play a more important political role. It is still doubtful, however, that they have much influence in determining the voting behaviour. The consistently poor performance of 321 religious parties would be one indication that secular concerns motivate the voters more than the religious ones. While village and urban maulvis may not wield much political influence, it was clear that religious leaders such as pirs (spiritual guides) and Sajjada nashins (hereditary custodians of Sufi sharines) often do.62 This was especially true of southern NWFP where in every election a large number of makhdooms, syeds, and pirs contest.63 In 1993, for example, in Multan and Khanewal districts alone, the PPP and PML(N) gave tickets to eight MNA and eight MPA candidates who had religious titles. Many of these pirs and sajjada nashines do wield considerable influence, but it was not clear whether this was due to their religious powers or more secular factors. Hamza Alavi argued forcefully that their control stems more from their secular powers as landlords and their access to patronage networks than from their religious powers as pirs and sajjada nashins.64 This argument is supported by Mian Gul Aurangzeb, a former PML-N, MNA from Swat, who is from one of the most prominent religio-political families of Northern NWFP. Not only is he the sajjada nashin of an important shrine (Saidu Baba) near Swat, but his father Mian Gul Jahan Zeb (Wali-e-Swat) had a respectable position in NWFP. According to him, however, his family background will no longer get him elected as what counts in today’s electoral politics is ‘delivery’. Every weekend he was free he therefore travels home to his constituency to ‘deliver’. People are more conscious. People are more aware. We have had successive quick elections and that had effected the voting behaviour of people. People are more demanding and are more conscious of their rights. And that thing that you come from such and such family, or are the son of so and so-that is gone to a great extent. I do not think that, though I am from a traditional family, a respected family in the areas because of my ancestors who also were missionaries and religious people…yet I do not think that I can just get elected on the basis of that any more. people want a candidate who can deliver. And delivery has become increasingly important and it will become more and more important as time goes by.65 8.17 FACTIONALISM IN NWFP Virtually every NWFP village is split into two or more dharas, of factions.66 The bitter enmities that often existed between factions frequently resulted in factions playing a more important role in determining voting behaviour than biradari rivalries, or class divisions between the landed and the landless. Paul Brass has defined a 322 faction as ‘a vertical structure of power which cross cuts caste and class divisions.’67 Inayatullah has defined it as ‘a secondary group, super-imposed on the other primary groups [of family, kinship, and caste]. Sometimes it runs parallel and sometimes across, but always seeking cohesion in order to ascertain power or to meet a challenge from another group.68 According to Inayatullah, the need for factional affiliation arises due to the tension within the village, ignorance of the law and legal procedures of the villagers and arbitrary powers of the police. In all these situations, a family needed the help of a person who had influence with police, knows the law and legal procedures, and has effective friendship all around….[T]hese ‘leaders’ try to align themselves with another leader on a higher level of influence and gradually the link touches the political party in power. Thus factional affiliations ultimately connect the village to one or more political parties….The factional affiliations are growing gradually, especially as isolation and social and economic self-sufficiency of village is breaking down.69 The result of factionalism at election time is that if faction A lends its support to candidate A, the rival faction B will be compelled to endorse candidate B, regardless of the candidate’s reputation, biradri, or party affiliation. The following example of factional politics in a village in the Batagram constituency of NA-16, was a case in point. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Khan was a completely alaiwal village from NWFP. No other alaiwal lived in other parts of this constituency. But Nawaz Khan [a alaiwal] won purely due to local party bazi [another term for factionalism]. There were two groups, a murder took place-this is jor-tor [make and break] politics. One faction supported Mr. Alamzeb Khan [a swati] so the other faction had to support Nawaz Khan. Biradri is not a factor. Development is not a factor. Its purely a matter of two factions in the village. These traditional rivalries in NWFP have a big effect on elections.70 This may help explain why only a few candidates, especially in central and northern NWFP, win overwhelming victories in rural constituencies.71 An MNA candidate from a rural constituency of DI. Khan-cum-Tank-Kulachi (old DI. Khan) explained the influence of factions on electoral politics as follows: Normally people do not shift their alliances in villages; why they do not shift is because normally every village is divided into different factions or dharas. If I belong to the Muslim League then your faction, if you are opposing me, will go and join the other party to seek protection and refuge. And these personal feuds lead people to seek refuge through politics. Every village is divided which is why no party can win 100 percent of the votes in any village, except in those villages that are religiously effected. There are three villages in my constituency which are Shi’ite where I cannot get a single vote. Or where a lot of development work has been done nobody can get single vote. All dharas disappear if I have given them 323 the favour of electricity or roads. All the dharas are there for local feuds but if I have done a lot of development everyone will vote for me.72 In his opinion, while factionalism was viewed as a significant determinant of voting behaviour. Sectarianism and development seemed to be even more important. The theme that development and patronage have increasingly become the most important determinants of voting behaviour was one that was heard repeatedly during the course of this study. 8.18 BIRADARI (CLANS) AS A SOCIAL DETERMINANT It is commonly argued that ‘primordial’ group identities such as family, kinship and caste, or membership in a village faction, played a more important role in determining voting behaviour in the subcontinent, than individual political preferences. In village life in Northern India, Oscar Lewis wrote: “The theoretical assumption behind a democratic system based on voting is that the individual is an independent, thinking being capable and ready to make his own decision. However, in a kinship organized society…it is the large extended family which is the basic unit for most decisionmaking. At, best, voting becomes an extended family process”.73 In NWFP, this argument was commonly heard referring to the important role that biradari played in the politics of the NWFP, especially at election time. Biradari (literally ‘brotherhood’) was important kinship system operating in NWFP. Zekiye Eglar has defined it as a patrilineage whereby ‘all men who can trace their relationship to a common ancestor, no matter how remote, belong to the same biradri.74 However, both Eglar and Hamza Alvi have pointed out that the term was not very precise as it can also be used to describe other relationships and groupings75 In rural NWFP, for example, the term can be used to refer to the paterilineal kinship groups of the zamindars, or landowners, but also signified the different occupational groups of landless seipis.76 Furthermore, there can be numerous ‘microbiradaries’ (i.e Awans, Gujjars, Parachas) within a macro biradaries, (i.e Jat). The term ‘biradari’ was often used interchangeably with words as ‘qaum’ (tribe or nation) and ‘zat’ (caste). Biradari has played an important role in Muslim politics in NWFP throughout twentieth century. Some of the first modern Muslim organizations in the subcontinent were founded near the turn of the century on the basis of biradari. Gilmartin pointed out the importance of biradari in the pre-partition urban politics of the NWFP.77 Colonial policies that distinguished and discriminated along the basis of caste and biradari, such as the Land Alienation Act of 1900, served to reinforce their political 324 importance. Biradari considerations were also taken into account by colonial administrators while drawing district and sub-district administrative boundaries.78 These were often designed to create local strongholds for landed elites and tribal and biradari leaders who were co-opted to maintain political stability in their areas of control. A single member constituency electoral system was subsequently grafted onto these pre-existing administrative boundaries. As Waseem has pointed out that the idea was to keep the local power structures intact in which the locally dominant elite could mobilize their traditional support base in terms of ethno-linguistic ties, tribal loyalties, caste/biradari identity and factional grouping for the purposes of election. In this way, the prevalent patronage structures in the locality found an expression in the emergent democratic framework.79 In the colonial era voting rights were limited because of property and education qualifications which further bolstered the role of the traditional elites. In India there has been considerable scholarly attention given to the role of ‘primordial’ identities, caste in particular, in determining voting behaviour.80 The initial tendency was to treat caste as the primary determinant of voting behaviour. Subsequent studies, however, highlighted that caste was only one of several determinants, and that it should be treated as a dynamic variable. Increasing emphasis was also given to the politicization of caste, and how politics affected caste and not just how caste impacted on politics81. Other observations were that caste was a more important factor in local than in national politics, and in rural than in urban areas.82 On the subject of caste as a determinant of voting behaviour in India, Norman Palmer sums up as follows: A broad conclusion for which considerable support can be found is that increasingly caste has become only one of many determinants of voting behaviour, and that at least in state and national elections it is seldom if never the most decisive factor.83 In NWFP, the role of kinship and biradari as a determinant of voting behaviour had received much less scholarly attention. This was especially true of the period since electoral politics was restored in 1985. Several village studies conducted at national level in the late 1950s and 1960s did examine the role played by traditional rural social structures in provincial and local government elections.84 Inayatullah’s study of the attitudes and beliefs of Punjabi villagers in Gujranwala district in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the primacy of the group over the individual. The first important fact about the village life is that it is an aggregate of individuals. In fact, the real individual in the sense of Western urban society does not exist in the village. He is an inalienable part of multiple groups which completely overshadow his individuality. 325 The various decisions in different fields of life are made by groups for him and he felt the need to challenge them. The first and most important group for the individual was the family which made for him the major decisions in life. The eldest [male] in the family decides, in the light of custom and tradition, what profession one adopted, how much education one should receive, whom one should marry and what type of interpersonal relations one should maintain. Next to the family comes the biradari group.85 First it was biradari as a whole which was contacted and when it was realized that there were some families who were loosely integrated to the larger units then pressure was shifted to the family.86 Saghir Ahmad argued from a Marxist perspective ‘that class relations of South Asian villages are more fundamental for most of their life experience…than is their membership in qaums or caste like status groups.87 Hamza Alvi qualified this by pointing out that the importance of kinship and caste on voting behaviour will differ depending on whether someone is economically dependent or independent. Hamza Alavi notes that where the voter is an economic dependent of a landlord or other figure, his ‘vertical’ alignment to this figure is likey to take precedence over his’horizontal, alignments of kinship or caste were determining his vote. The horizontal alignment of voters, as in instances of lineage solidarity, was by contrast strongest among voters who had some economic independence.88 To the surprise of nearly every one, in the 1970 national elections that swept the PPP into power, class defeated kinship and caste in determining his vote. The horizontal alignment of voters, as in instances of lineage solidarity, was by contrast strongest among voters who had some economic independence. To the surprise of nearly everyone, in the 1970 national elections that swept the PPP into power, class defeated kinship ad caste in determining voting behaviour. The only detailed analysis of the role of biradari in this election is included in Philip Jones’ study of the PPP and the 1970 elections, in which he concluded: PPP leaders…claimed to have finally ‘shattered’ the biradari system, at least insofar as its customary political functions are concerned. This claim was premature, since biradari considerations became a factor in by-elections as early as 1973 and were a major element in the national elections of 1977. nevertheless, the 1970 elections did show strong ‘horizontal’ patterns of ‘party voting’ that broke through ‘verticle’ biradari identities.89 In the rural areas of western and southern NWFP traditional vertical ‘feudal’, tribal, and religious identities proved stronger on election day than modern horizontal identities. However, in the rural areas of central and northern NWFP, where biradari identities are strongest, horizontal identities usually won over vertical. Party support patterns in rural areas were generally divided along class lines between landowners 326 and the landless rather than on biradari lines. Since Jones’s study on the 1970 elections there has been little research on the relationship between biradari and voting behaviour. However , that biradari is once again viewed as one of the most important determinants of voting behaviour was made abundantly clear during elections when virtually all central and northern NWFP constituency analyse that appear in the press make it a central consideration. The 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections in NA-14 Mansehra-1, there were a straight battle between two leading biradaris, the Gujjars and the Syeds. The Syeds in numbers were few people but are politically strong. The PML-N awarded national assembly party ticket to Sardar Muhammad Yousaf (Gujjar biradari) and for provincial seats awarded ticket to Muhammad Tariq Khan Swati, (swatis family) to win the support in elections. These arrangement were taken to get the support of important biradaris in Mansehra. Moreover the electoral contest of Baber Nasim Khan (an MPA in 1988 election on IJI ticket), turned the electoral environment in favour of PML-N to break the votes of Awans and Qureshi biradaries in this constituencies.90 A common argument heard in NWFP is that biradari regained its importance as a powerful political force during the Zia years when national level politics was banned.91 From 1979 until 1985, only Local Body elections were held, and in 1985. As the candidates were disassociated from national parties and issues they appealed to local issues and traditional identities such as biradari to win votes. Rasul Buksh Rais presented this argument that partyless nature of elections and the ban on traditional means of electioneering (through public rallies and speeches) prevented debate on national issues. And, of course, the elections restricted to only independent candidates would not allow any group either to take formal shape or to formulate a national programme. The personal influence of the candidates, the ties to clan, tribe, or biradari and feudal social base, in particular, largely determined the outcome of elections.92 Using constituency report for the 1990 elections that appeared in the press, Theodore Wright wrote a short article on ‘biradaris’ in elections’. Based on these press accounts he found that biradari was a stronger determinant of voting behaviour than party allegiance, except when the two major candidates were from the same family or biradari93 (which is often the case). He also found that ‘a good deal of biradari “ticket balancing” was done between the candidates for National Assembly seat and the several [sic] provincial assembly constituencies within each.94 The most significant finding was the ‘new tendency of voters to vote regardless of biradri, against 327 incumbents who have neglected their constituents…or made unfulfilled promise in the last elections’.95 Wright concluded that ‘candidates are still largely selected with their biradaris in mind and voters are swayed, more often than not by their biradari membership because it effects their access to state largesse’.96 In interviews with candidates and political observers, the importance of biradri received a mixed response. One former MNA from Mansehra, who won in 1988 as independent candidate and latter became the federal Minster for tourism in PPP government and latter lost in 1993, attributed his defeat to biradari factor. ‘[w]here I have won I had syed biradari support. Where Sardar Muhammad Yousaf won he had Gujjar biradari support. The Gujjar biradari is in the majority so he has won.’97 In the neighbouring constituency of NA-11, however, the losing PPP candidate, Muhammad Gulzar Abbasi, a PPP candidate in 1997 elections attributed his defeat to the anti-PPP vote.98 In NWFP, PPP candidates played with strong biradari system. My biradari is very prominent but still I lost. I would say that more than 60 percent of my biradari voted against me because of the simple fact that they were ant-PPP’. Another political observer argued that economic classes were more important than biradri: ‘Traders are a biradari, not Abbasi and Jadoons. When an Abbasi becomes a trader he votes like a Jadoon trader. If a Jadoon becomes a zimindar [landlord], he will vote like an Abbassi zimindar’.99 Biradari clearly plays a very important role during the stages leading upto election day as it is one of the factor taken into consideration when constituencies are delimited.100 According to the Election Commission’s report on the 1970 elections, “castes and ‘biradaries’ were not regarded as sacrosanct, following the principle of homogeneity of population, representation of predominant ‘biradari’ and castes was ensured in forming the constituencies in the case of Gujars and Awans of Gujrat district”.101 One Gujjar PML-N, NA candidate, described the faulty biradari strategy adopted by his party in 1993 to select a PA running mate in a constituency dominated by the Swati102 biradari. We thought that if we could get a swatti as a Provincial Assembly candidate we would be able to breakup their vote….But because there was Gujjar at the top as the MNA candidate, all the swati voted for their candidates. And because the Awans were the next largest biradri, they felt they should have been given the PA ticket. When the PML-N gave the ticket instead to another Swati, the Awan made sure that they also voted for the PML-N candidates. Furthermore, they felt that if there was Gujjar in both the MNA and MPA slots, this would not be in their interests.103 A detailed analysis of the biradari ties of all the PPP and PML(N) candidates for the 1993 elections concluded that, ‘apart from a few seats in big cities like Haripur and Mardan, all the candidates represent dominant biradaris of their constituencies’.104 The only statistical data available, Gallup Pakistan’s exit poll surveys, indicated that biradri is not as important determinant of voting behaviour as is commonly assumed. In response to the question, ‘would you tell us the most important reasons which led you to vote for the candidate for whom you have just voted’, 12 percent chose 328 biradari/clan in 1998, 7 percent in 1990 and 6 percent in 1993.105 The fact that the PML(N) won every urban constituency in NWFP, and in some cases with virtually unknown candidates with little biradri support, indicated that biradari was certainly not the major determinant in urban NWFP. As the case study of voting behaviour in North-east NWFP revealed, party (or Nawaz Sharif) loyalty was a much more important factor. As is the case with caste in India, however, biradri does play a more important force in local than in national level elections.106 The prevalence of village factions that often cut across biradari identities also serve to limit the influence of biradari in the electoral politics of rural NWFP. As Wright observed, it is also common for both parties to select candidates from the same biradari, thus partially or fully canceling out the biradari factor. Furthermore, as the following quote reveals, it is important to bear in mind that in rural areas members of one biradari never constitute a majority of the voters in a constituency. The majority of the people are mazaras [tenants] and kammies and they vote for PML-N. One tenant’s representative, Ishaq Khan from Abbottabad said in an interview that Jadoon landholders supported Amanullah Jadoon because he is a Jadoon. But their tenants supported him because he was the candidate of the PML-N. Only when they feel intimidated do they vote according to how their landholders tell them. If Jadoon had been running on a PPP ticket, he would have lost even in his own village.107 CONCLUSIONS There is ample evidence to suggest that candidates are increasingly being judged on the basis of their performance as deliverers of patronage and development. Increasingly, in order to win elections candidate will have to add ‘development votes’ to their ‘biradari votes’. This study’s conclusion differs from the one reached by Wright in 1990 that ‘voters are swayed, more often than not by their biradari membership because it effects their access to state largesse’.108 In the 1993 elections, biradari still seemed to be a more important determinant of voting behaviour than in the 1970 elections, but a less important determinant than was commonly believed. In general, the importance of biradari is greater in central and northern NWFP than in southern and western NWFP, in rural than in urban constituencies, and in local than in national elections. Its importance is reduced by biradari and factional rivalries within constituencies, by class tensions between the haves and have-nots, and by the fact that both parties take biradari factor into consideration when awarding tickets. The evidence indicates that party loyalty in urban areas and the performance of candidates in providing patronage and development to their constituents in rural areas play an important role in determining voting behaviour. This supports the overall conclusion 329 of this study that political factors are growing in importance relative to social factors in determining the behaviour of the voters in the NWFP. Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 535-539. 2 Daily Dawn (Karachi), 28 March 1999. 3 Syed Ijaz Shafi Gillani, A Dispassionate Analysis of Electoral Rigging in Pakistan 1970-2002 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2008), p.iv. 4 Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 12 April 1994. 5 Daily Jang (Rawalpindi), 23 June 1993. (Urdu Newspaper) 6 Ibid. 7 Shafqat Mahmood, ‘who Got more Votes Debate’, The News, 3 August 1995, 8 For detail see, Andrew R. Wilder, ‘Changing Patterns of Punjab Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Election Results, 1988-1993’, Asian Survey 35 (April 1995). 9 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (Darham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), p.296 10 Name withheld, Interview by author, Peshawar, February 03, 2006 11 I.A Rehman, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 8 September 2005. 12 Name withheld, interview by author, Peshawar, February 03, 2006 13 Maj (R) Mukhtar Ahmad, Interview by author, tape recording, Charsada, 17 April 2006. 14 Daily Dawn (Karachi), 24 October 1993. 15 Daily Pakistan Observer, 13 December 1993. 16 Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997). X means no candidate contested. 17 Zahid Hussain, Interview by author, tape recording, Batagram, 28 April 2006. 18 Zauja Muhammad Suleman, Interview by author, Tape recording, Chitral, 17 June 2006. 19 Zakia Khatoon, Interview with Author, Mansehra, 13 January 2007. 20 Saiqa Jabeen, Interview with author, Mansehra, 13 October 2009 21 Aurat Foundation (Quarterly Newsletter), Arat 5, Nos. 2-3, 1993. 22 Daily Jang (Rawalpindi), 15 March 1995 23 Through interviews with candidates, campaign staff and journalist, polling stations were classified as being either in lower class neighbourhoods on the one hand, or in lower-middle, middle or upper class neighbourhoods on the other. A more precise classification system would have been desirable, as there is clearly a considerable degree of subjectivity involved in classifying neighbourhoods and in defining what is ‘lower class’ or ‘middle class’. Informants sometimes disagreed as to whether a neighbourhood was lower or lower middle class. Furthermore, on occasion a polling station served both an elite residential neighbourhood as well as katchi abadi (shanty town) located within or next to upper class neighbourhoods. Despite these difficulties, in the majority of cases polling stations could easily be classified. 24 It is important to recall the ‘ecological fallacy’ using aggregate electoral data to draw conclusions regarding the voting behaviour of individuals. The data in this section can inform us about the voting behaviour of lower class neighbourhoods, on the one hand, or lower middle, middle and upper class neighbourhoods, on the other, but not how lower class, and lower-middle, middle and upper class voters vote. However, a study with an analysis on the small and relatively homogeneous unit of the polling station, is much less likely to suffer from the ecological fallacy, than a study basing its assumption on the characteristic of much larger and more heterogeneous unit, such as constituency. 25 Calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘Form XVII, Result of the count’ (Polling Station results) 26 Ibid. 27 1 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp.505-10. Election Commission of Pakistan, Report on the General Elections, 1990, Vol. 1, 134. Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, pp.507-8 30 Ibid., 507 31 Ibid., 509 32 Gilani, Pakistan at the Polls: Campaign Candidates and Voters; Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Poll’, November 1988; and Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Polls’, 1990. 33 Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls, 1990’, and 1993 exit poll survey results. 29 28 330 34 Exit poll data indicate the following national (not just NWFP) male voter turnout figures by age group. Year 21-30 31-40 41-60 60 and above 1988 35% 26 32 7 1990 38 30 27 4 1988 results are from Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls’, 22. the 1990 results were given to the author by Dr. Ijaz Gillani of Gallup Pakistan. 35 Daily The Frontier Post (Peshawar), 29 August 1994. 36 Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Polls’, 1990, p. 69. 37 Javed A. Malik, ‘What to do with 16000 Yellow Cabs?’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 10 September 1993. 38 Pakistan Muslim League, Election Manifesto 1993 (Islamabad: Central Secretariat, 1993) 39 The political benefits of the yellow cab scheme clearly outweighed the economic benefits, and the programme was much more effective in promoting Nawaz Sharief than in reducing unemployment. There wee widespread allegation of fraud, numerous cases were reported of people painting their yellow cabs another colour and using them as personal vehicles, or of political cronies buying fleets of Yellow cabs which were than rented out on a daily basis. 40 Shahid Afridi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, September 24, 2006 41 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, September 24, 2006 42 Gallup Pakistan, Pakistan at the Poll, 1990, 40 43 Northern NWFP’s literacy rate at the time of 1997 census was 35.4 per cent, compared to 37.58 per cent in central NWFP., 33.7 per cent in southern NWFP, and 28.14 per cent in Northern NWFP and 35.2 in North-Eastern part of NWFP. 44 Government of Pakistan, Handbook of Population Census Data, NWFP, 17-22 45 Reza Nasr, ‘Democracy and Islamic Revivalism’, Political Science Quarterly 110 (Summer 1995): 261-85 46 Hassan N. Gardezi, ‘Politics of Religion in Pakistan’s Elections: An Assessment’, South Asia Bulletin, Vol. XIV No.1 (1994) 47 For detail see Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems 2nd edition Dehli: MacMillan India Limited, 1996) 48 Munawar Hassan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Lahore, 6 September 1994. 49 Ghulam Nabi Shah, Interview by author, Tape recording, Mansehra, September 29, 2006 50 Aamer Ahmad Khan, ‘The Rise of Sectarian Mafia’, Herald, June 1994 51 ASSP did win the DI. Khan city seat with JUI-F. 52 Piracha, Interview by author, Tape recording, Kohat, 1 September 2006. 53 Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections, p.168 54 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 7 March 2006. 55 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 56 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam’iyyat ‘Ulama-i-Pakistan, 1948-1979 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993) 57 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 7 March 2006. 58 The term ‘maulvi’ is a more respectful title than the term ‘mullah’. 59 Richard Kurin, ‘Islamization: A View from the Countryside’, in Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987), pp.115-28 60 Seipis (also commonly referred to by the pejorative term ‘kammi’) include following occupational groups: Mochis (cobblers), Qasias (butchers), Dhobis (washermen), Darzis (tailors), Julahas (weavers), Nais ( hair dressers) 61 Mubarak Ali, Interview by author, Tape recording, Islamabad, 12 September 2005. 62 Katherine Ewing, ‘The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan’, Journal of Asian Studies 42 (Februrary 1983): 151-67. 63 In 1993, for example, in four districts of Swat, Mansehra, DI. Khan, and Kohat, the following pirs and sajjada nashins were elected as MNA: Mian Gul Aurangzeb, Sardar Muammad Yousaf (Mian Wali-ur-Rehman), Syed Iftikhar Gillani, Fazalur Rehman, 64 Fred Halliday and Hanza Alavi, eds., State and Idealogy in the Middle East and Pakistan (London: MacMillan Education, 1988), 84-6 65 Mian Gul Aurangzeb, Interview by author, tape recording, Islamabad, 6 September 2005. 331 66 For detail see, Hamza Alavi, ‘The Politics of Dependency: A Village in West Punjab’, South Asian Review 4 (January 1971). 67 Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p.236 68 Inayatullah, ‘Perspective in the Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan’, People and Society Series (Karachi: Development Research and Evolution Group, USAID, 1963), p.10 69 Ibid., 53-4 70 Niaz Pasha Jadoon, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 7 March 2006. 71 In 1993, 2188327 voters were cast for 26 NA seats. Of these, only 12 were ‘landslide victories’ won by more than 20,000 votes, only three of which were in central and northern NWFP. 72 Sardar Umar Farooq Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Tank, 7 March 2006. 73 Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northern India (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p.149 74 Zekiya Eglar, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.75 75 Hamza Alavi, ‘Kinship in West Punjab Village’, In T.N. Madan, ed., Muslim Communities of South Asia (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1976), pp. 1-27 76 Inayatullah, ‘Perspective in the Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan’, People and Society Series (Karachi: Development Research and Evolution Group, USAID, 1963), p.51 77 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.82-95 78 See I. Talbot, Punjab and the Raj 1949-1947 (NewDelhi: Manohar, 1988) 79 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.18. 80 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience, pp.276-93 81 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) 82 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience, pp.287-9 83 Ibid., p.290. 84 Saghir Ahnad, Class and Power in Punjabi Village (Lahore: Punjab Adabi Markaz, 1977), pp. 92126 85 Inayatullah, ‘Perspective in the Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan’, People and Society Series (Karachi: Development Research and Evolution Group, USAID, 1963), pp. 50-1 86 Ibid., p. 90 87 Kathleen Gough, ‘Introduction’, in Saghir Ahmad, Class and Power in Punjabi Village (Lahore: Punjab Adabi MArkaz, 1977), p.9. 88 Ibid., p.11-2 89 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.520 90 Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 5 October 1993. 91 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003). 92 Rasul B. Rais, ‘Elections in Pakistan: Is Democracy Winning?, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 12(Fall 1985), p.47. 93 Theodore P. Wright, Jr., ‘Biradaris in Punjab Elections’, The Journal of Political Science (Lahore) 14, Nos. 1& 2 (1991): pp.81-2 94 Ibid., p.82 95 Ibid., p.84 96 Ibid., p.84 97 Nisar Akbar, Interview with author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 27 June 2006. 98 Gulzar Abbassi, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 27 March 2006. 99 Matiullah Jan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 17 March 2006. 100 Swati’s: the respectable landowning biradari of Mansehra; equally respected like Syeds. 101 Government of Pakistan, Report on General elections, Pakistan 1970-71, Vol. 1, p. 40. 102 The electoral clash between Swati and Syeds leads towards the winning of Gujjar’s (peasant tribes) candidate. 103 Tariq Khan Swati, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 22 March 2006. 104 In the electoral politics of the NWFP, the Bilour and Sherpao biradaris tend to dominate urban politics, while the sardar and swatis, kundi, Gillani biradaris in rural politics. Other politically important biradaris are the syeds (who claim decent from the Prophet Muhammad), Awans (who are one of the dominant biradaris in north-eastern NWFP), Jadoon, also return a number of candidates in every election.. See elections’, The Friday Times, 16-22 September 1993, 5-8 332 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990 (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p.29 106 Rahimullah Yousafzai, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 7 March 2006. 107 Ishaq Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Abbottabad, 13 March 2006. 108 Theodore P. Wright, Jr., ‘Biradaris in Punjab Elections’, The Journal of Political Science (Lahore) 14, Nos. 1& 2 (1991): p.84 105 333 CHAPTER-9 POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN NWFP 9. INTRODUCTION From 1988 to 1997, voters in NWFP had the opportunity to vote in four National Assembly elections and in four Provincial Assembly elections. Eight campaigns followed by four elections brought the NWFP voter into contact with political parties, candidates, and campaign issues to an extent never before witnessed in the province.1 This chapter presents major conclusion of this study, which is that for these increasingly experienced and politicized voters, political determinants of voting behaviour are more important than social determinants. This chapter will examine the importance of three political determinants of voting behaviour: (i) Party or Party leader2 identification; (ii) patronage orientation; and (iii) national issue orientation. 9.1 PARTY LEADER IDENTIFICATION This study has provided sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that identification with (or against) a political party or party leader was now the most important determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP. In central NWFP, ANP possesses a strong vote bank and captured more seats than other political parties. Following table shows the detail of parties contested provincial assembly elections in urban NWFP.3 Table 9.1: Political Parties (Provincial Assembly Elections in Urban NWFP) Election (PA) 1988 1990 1993 1997 ANP 11 18 16 21 PPP* 13 02 10 01 PML-N** 02 06 0 04 Religious Parties 0 0 0 0 Source: Data compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) *PPP contested elections 1990 on the platform of PDA and in 1993 contested elections as coalition partner with PML-J. **PMLN contested election on the platform of IJI in 1988 and 1990. ANP had majority of urban seats, except 1988 elections. In 1988 and 1990 elections IJI led by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) contested elections and PDA (PPP as major coalition Party) contested 1990 elections. In National Assembly elections ANP and PPP both were the leading parties in urban NWFP. Following table shows the detail of National assembly elections in urban NWFP. In 1997 National Assembly elections, the ANP won every urban seat. Analysis of polling station data revealed that the size of an urban area had little bearing on its voting behaviour, ANP consistently maintained its lead over the PPP and PML-N in the small and large towns and cities of the urban NWFP. 334 Table 9.2: National Assembly Elections in urban NWFP: Election (NA) 1988 1990 1993 1997 ANP 02 06 02 08 PPP* 04 0 05 0 PML-N** 0 01 0 0 Religious Parties 01 01 0 0 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) *PPP contested elections 1990 on the platform of PDA and in 1993 contested elections as coalition partner with PML-J. **PMLN contested election on the platform of IJI in 1988 and 1990. The data also indicated that there was little regional variation in support levels, and that the ANP maintained its lead over the PPP and PML-N in the urban areas of Central NWFP. In northern, North Eastern (Hazara), and southern NWFP National Parties including PPP and PML-N had a significant majority than ANP due to its semi and non Pakhtun locality. In 1988 Mr. Aftab Ahmd Khan Sherpao a candidate of PPP won the National Assembly seat from NA-1 and Syed Zaffar Ali Shah a candidate of PPP won from NA-1 in 1993 shows that these are Pakhtuns and they also highlighted Pakhtun sentiments in their electoral campaigns for getting votes.4 Once again, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the majority of voters from urban areas of central NWFP were voting either for the Pakhtuns or ANP. Party identification was not as strong in rural constituencies as it is in urban ones. This was especially true of southern NWFP and Northeastern (Hazara), where traditional tribal and semi feudal social structures still exert a strong influence. To a much greater extent than elsewhere in the province, votes are cast for tribal or landed elites rather than for parties, which is why southern and North eastern NWFP are the regions where independent candidates have survived. Following table shows the status of independent candidates’ percentage of votes and seats won in Provincial and National Assembly Elections in NWFP. Table 9.3: Voting status of independent candidates for Provincial Assembly (In %age) NWFP (Regions) North Central South North East 1988 5.55 (01) 3.70 (01) 37.5 (06) 47.36 (09) 1990 11.11 (02) 3.70 (01) 25.00 (04) 52.63 (10) 1993 5.55 (01) 3.70 (01) 37.5 (06) 26.31 (05) 1997 11.11 (02) 3.70 (01) 25.00 (04) 0 Total 21.25 (17) 21.25 (17) 15.00 (13) 13.75 (11) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Note: Figures shown in brackets indicates the number of independent winning candidates. Even the two thirds of the votes won by PPP and PML (N) in southern and North Eastern NWFP are misleading as the majority of these votes were also probably not cast for the parties, but for the influential candidates who were given tickets by the parties. In the other parts of rural NWFP, the importance of party identification is greater, and is increasingly becoming a major determinant of voting behaviour. This is 335 reflected in the movement towards a strong two-party system, and by the decreasing number of votes won by independent candidates. Table 9.4: Voting status of independent candidates for National Assembly (In %age)) NWFP (Regions) North Central South North East 1988 0 12.5 (01) 0 42.85 (03) 1990 16.66 (01) 0 20.00 (01) 14.28 (01) 1993 0 0 0 14.28 (01) 1997 0 0 0 14.28 (01) Total 15.38 (04) 11.53 (03) 3.84 (01) 3.84 (01) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Note: Figures shown in brackets indicates the number of independent winning candidates. In rural constituencies, the selection of candidates were much more important than in urban constituencies where voting behaviour is influenced more by party identification. Political parties carefully weigh the relative strength and weaknesses of candidates seeking tickets, including the strength of their biradaris (clans),the functional support they will receive, their record in providing patronage and development, and the amount of money they will be able to spend of their campaign. It is difficult to determine what percentage of a candidate’s votes arise from their personal influence, what percentage belong to a political party, and what percentage are cast as a result of factional rivalries What was clear is that candidates who used to consider contesting as independents are now fighting harder than before to win major party tickets. Thus, while parties must select strong candidates to win in rural constituencies, candidates also require strong parties to win. There was evidence suggesting that even in rural NWFP party votes exceed candidate votes, which contradicts the conventional wisdom.5 The importance of a major party (i.e PPP or IJI/PML-N) tickets are illustrated in table 9.2, which compares the results of all candidates from northern, central, and southern NWFP who contested elections in 1990 as IJI or PPP candidates, but in 1993 as religious party candidates or as independents. In only one constituency (NA-15) in Mansehra district, which socially and politically resembles southern NWFP, did a ‘feudal’ candidate manage to win a respectable number of votes in 1988 without a party ticket. The reason for a few of the unsatisfactory 1988 results could be because candidates filled nomination papers to contest, but then decided not to contest when they were not awarded party tickets.6 This was clearly not the case with the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) candidates who campaigned hard, but did not come close to winning the number of votes they had won in 1990 as IJI candidates. The evidence therefore suggests that, with the 336 exception of Northern NWFP, possessing a major party ticket was a virtual prerequisite for a candidate to win in the 1993 election. The results of Gallup Pakistan’s exit poll survey of male voters, support the popular perception that party identification was a more important determinant of voting behaviour for PPP, than IJI/PML(N) candidates. In 1990, 32% of respondents who voted for the PPP gave party identification as their reason for doing so, compared to only 23% for the IJI. Between 1990 and 1993, party identification declined in importance for PPP male voters to 28% and increased in importance for PML(N) male voters to 25%. The 1990 survey revealed that party affiliation was a much more important determinant for the middle and upper class than for the poor, and for the educated then the un-educated. Only 17% of ‘poor’ respondents listed party affiliation as the most important attribute of a candidate compared to 28% for ‘middle’ and 31% for ‘upper middle and above’; similarly, only 20% of ‘illiterate/primary’ voter selected it in comparison to 23% of middle/matric (grade 10) and 36% of ‘above’ matric.7 9.2 VOTING FOR DELIVERY There is a common perception in NWFP that candidates votes for party votes in rural constituency and that the former are determined primarily by traditional, social ties of family, kinship, and faction.8 In 1993 one of the factors was the perception that Nawaz Sharif was not removed for nothing…and that he would not become prime minister again. Voters would tell me, ‘if we vote for you, we will be voting for losing man at the top, even if you do become an MNA.’9 As John’s pointed out: To a significant extent, successful vote getters in NWFP have been men who have been able ‘ to deliver ‘- an ability that is itself a source of power. This did not change in 1970.What changed was the perception on the part of the non-privileged that what they wanted would better be brought through party connections, than by way of the old parochial influence networks.10 Table 9.5 indicate the status of religious parties11 in National and Provincial Assembly elections. Table 9.5: Religious parties for NWFP Provincial Assembly elections NWFP (Regions) North Central South North East 1988 0 0 12.5 % (02) 0 1990 0 0 06.25% (01) 5.26% (01) 1993 22.22% (04) 0 0 0 1997 0 0 6.25% (01) 0 Total 2.5% (02) 2.5% (02) 5.0% (04) 1.25% (01) Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 337 Table 9.6: Religious parties for NWFP National Assembly elections NWFP (Regions) North Central South North East 1988 0 12.5% (1) 0 42.85% (03) 1990 0 12.5% (01) 20.0% (01) 14.28% (01) 1993 33.33% (02) 0 0 0 1997 0 0 0 0 Total 15.38% (04) 11.53% (03) 7.69% (02) 0 Source: Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) Table 9.7 gives the results from Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 and 1993 exit poll survey question: ‘would you tell us the most important reason which led you to vote for the candidate.’12 The results indicated that for the male voters interviewed, the most important attribute of candidate was they be ‘helpful in personal needs and community development’, or in other words, effective in providing patronage and development. Table 9.7: Voters perception about the candidate: (In %age) Candidate PPP IJI/PML (N) Others Total Attributes 1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993 Helpful in Personal needs and 26 29 26 31 21 28 25 30 community development* Party 32 28 23 25 20 12 25 23 candidate Religious and 9 12 22 14 20 26 17 17 honest Competent in 13 11 12 15 15 14 13 13 national affairs Biradari/Clan 8 7 7 5 8 7 7 6 choice Better than 3 2 5 2 4 1 4 2 competitor Source: Gallup Pakistan, ‘Pakistan at the Poll’, and 1993 exit poll survey results. *In the Gallup Survey there were two separate categories: ‘helpful in personal needs’ and ‘helpful in community development’. These have been combined in this study to represent the overall category of ‘patronage and development’. The results also indicate that patronage and development are growing in importance as determinants of voting behaviour. In 1990, party affiliation and patronage and development were ranked equally at 25 per cent by respondents. By 1993, 30 per cent ranked patronage and development as the most important attribute of a candidate, compared to only 23 percent for party affiliation. In 1993, patronage and development was a more important determinant for IJI/PML(N) than for PPP voters, which might reflect the emphasis placed on the development theme in Nawaz Sharif’s 1993 election campaign. Although data were not available for 1993, the 1990 survey also gave a breakdown of these determinants of voting behviour based on levels of income and education, and urban and rural differences. Among ‘poor’ voters, 30 percent listed the patronage and development categories as the most important, compared to only 23 percent for ‘middle class’ and 21 percent for ‘upper middle and above’. The greater emphasis placed on this factor by poor and illiterate voters helps explain the 338 inroads Nawaz Sharif made into the PPP’s vote bank of poor voters in the 1993 elections. Finally, the survey results support the perception that patronage and development are more important determinants of voting behaviour for rural (28 percent) than for urban (22 percent) voters.13 Mr. Goher Ayub Khan, a PML-N MNA from Haripur (NA-13) from 1990 to 1997, and Mr. Qammar Abbas from Peshawar (PF-2) an unsuccessful PPP MPA candidate in 1997 observed: …. People now think that the job of an MNA and MPA is to fix their gutters, get their children enrolled in a school, arrange for job transfers. These small petty tasks are what consume your whole day so that you cannot concentrate on any social welfare, you cannot concentrate on any plans, and there is no time to legislate. The whole day your problem is: ‘we need a sui gas connection, get me an electricity connection, my gutter is closed, we need street lights….’ In this campaign, we did not talk at all about international or even national issues.14 According to Begum Nasim Wali MPA (PF-13) from Charsada-1 from 1988 to 1990 observed as: In the last election it was jobs, that was the big issue, and the more you lied, and the more jobs you promised, the more votes you got. One of the reasons I lost the lost election, was that people were haranguing me for making promises on jobs. And I said no, we are in bad economic situation, it’s going to be around for a while and there are going to be no government jobs….My rival on the other hand was promising a thanedar [local police officer] and tehsildar [local revenue officer] post to every house hold….So in the last election unemployment was number one because there wasn’t much inflation during the last government. I don’t doubt at all, however, that in the next election the main issue will be inflation.15 Mr. Fareed Khan Toofan, a ANP MPA from PF-32 (Karak-1) in 1990 and 1997 and an unsuccessful candidate in 1988 and 1993 said: If I don’t do any development, or if my Chief Minister doesn’t involve me in development, than I am almost out of my area. People will say, ‘what type of representative is this? He cannot deliver the goods. He cannot get the jobs. He cannot give us development….’ All dharas [factions] disappear if I have given them the favor of electricity or roads. All the dharas are there for local feuds but if I have done a lot of development everyone will vote for me.16 These thoughts were echoed by Pir Muhammad Khan from Shangla/Swat (PF-71), a former IJI MPA elected in 1988 and 1990: I had been elected an MPA, and people had seen me work from 1988-97. I was elected from same constituency as independent candidate in 1997 and in 1993 on PIF ticket and people had seen me work there from 1988-1997. So one slogan was that my work speaks for itself. Look at the work I have done. Compare my performance with the performance of all other candidates elected from this constituency since 1947.17 Arbab Muhammad Ayub Jan PF-VI (Peshawar-VI) a PPP, MPA in 1988-1993 and ANP MPA in 1997, noted: ….They consider me a councilor of the local government-not only from one ward but from all wards of my constituency. They treat me like a councilor: ‘what about my street, what about our street lights, what about my naili [gutter] and gulli [alley]’, and all the time, ‘what about the job for my son’. They are only interested in this.18 Sadar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, a PML-N/IJI, MPA from PF-35 (Abbottabad II) in 1988-1997 emphasized voters’ focus on performance19. 339 9.3 DEMOCRATIZATION OF PATRONAGE POLITICS A visit to a politician’s office (and often residence) or khuli katcheri (open courts) vividly illustrates the strong system of patronage politics. Crowds of applicants wait outside to see the politician or a personal assistant in order to get the all important ‘chit’ of paper that orders the concerned individual or authority ‘to do the needful’. In a scene reminiscent of the Mughal darbar (royal courts)-more than one hundred supplicants crowded inside and outside the office waiting for an audience. According to the Political Secretary, he dealt with an average of 150-200 requests a day.20 The majorities of the requests were for jobs or were related to thana-katcheri (police stations and court house) politics such as getting criminal charges and resolving land disputes. The researcher witnessed the Political Secretary deal with cases related to requests for government jobs, job transfers, job promotions, admission to schools/colleges and universities, admissions to government hospitals, free medical treatment, phone connections, natural gas connections, lease and land, a request for funds for a sports club, and a request by a women to get her son out of a police station where he had been held for several days without any charges being filed. The fact that the Political secretary to the Chief Minister of the NWFP was taking time to get people phone connections illustrates that politicians recognize that their legitimacy in the eyes of voters is increasingly being determined by their effectiveness as patrons. Since the time of the Mughals patronage has served as an important basis for state formation. The British colonialists distributed patronage in the form of land and titles in exchange for the support of local leaders and their followers. Similar policies were followed by all of Pakistan’s post-Independence rulers. What is a recent development, however, is the extent to which patronage has been ‘democratized’. With the crumbling of traditional hierarchical social structures in much of the NWFP, the hold of group leaders over their followers is decreasing. In many ways, the growth of patronage politics in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s parallels similar developments in India in the 1950s and 1960s as India’s voters became familiar with elections, local leaders and issues increasingly began to dominate electoral politics. The dramatic increase in the magnitude and reach of patronage was one of the legacies of General Ziaul Haq. Zia banned national level politics and instead promoted local government by establishing local bodies. To strengthen and legitimize 340 them, he gave them more authority to raise and spend money than had Ayub’s system of basic democracies. In the words of one politician, this was Zia’s way of ‘giving opium to the people’.21 In addition to development funds, patronage was generously distributed ( or pocketed) in the form of zakat and Baitul Mall welfare funds22, local body development fund,23 discretionary funds’24, government jobs,25 bank loans,26 tax breaks,27 medical expenses28, Yello Cabs29, and plots of land30. The massive scale of this patronage was vividly illustrated after the collapse of Nawaz Sharif government in 1993, when the PPP acquired thousands of pages of computerized data in which the patronage distributed by his government had been carefully registered.31 For every National Assembly constituency spent IJI’s MNA and MPA candidates.32 Another press account cited the example of Nawaz Sharif loyalist, Sardar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, who won both MPA and MNA seats during 1988,1990, 1993 and 1997 election from Abbottabad-II. Interestingly, in the seven weeks prior to the 1990 elections, Mr. Mehtab Ahmad was awarded 50 plots of land and Rs. 43 million. This was presumably to finance his election campaign and to buy political support. Apparently, it was a successful strategy as he won the seat for the first time.33 In 1993, PML(N) campaign focused more on emphasizing Nawaz Sharif’s development record. This change in emphasis could explain why large number of younger voters apparently switched their support from PPP to PML(N) in 1993. The PML(N)’s message of progress, development, and employment was much more inspiring for younger voters than the IJI’s slogans against a Prime Minister most of them could not remember. As a result of its origin as a patronage party, the PML(N) recognized. While the PPP’s 1993 campaign themes were vague concepts of ‘public-private partnership’, and ‘new social contracts’, the PML(N)’s central campaign theme was Nawaz Sharif’s commitment to development. Nawaz Sharif’s development record presented him as a ‘doer’ who delivers.34 Muhammad Waseem emphasized the same point in his book on the 1993 elections: He was able to focus public attention on developmentalism as the most significant aspect of his 30-month rule….What the caretaker and the PPP considered to be the Nawaz Sharif government’s weakest point, namely his economic policy, was billed as his strongest point by the PML(N) leaders and workers.35 341 The emergence of a classic system of ‘machine politics’, fuelled by access to patronage has had both positive and negative consequences. The most important aspect of patronage politics is corruption. While imparting patronage, politicians misuse of public office through bureaucracy for private ends. Weak political culture and patronage trends in electoral politics, increases the concepts of corruption in administrative, political, business and religious fields. 9.4 PATRONAGE AND LEGISLATURE Perhaps the most serious consequence of the dominant role of patronage politics is that while the representative function of MNAs and MPAs has improved, their legislative function has virtually ceased to exist. MNAs are spending more time in their constituencies than before since they know that they will be judged by voters according to what they have done in their constituencies and not for what they have done in the federal capital Islamabad and provincial capital Peshawar. One perspective observer of NWFP politics related a conversation he once had with a NWFP MNA which sums up the problem. My skill is that laws don’t mean anything to me, and that I can cut right across them and help people whether they are in the right or in the wrong. If somebody’s son is first class, he’s not coming to me to get him a job. If some body has merit they very rarely come to meoccasionally they come to me. But it’s the real wrongdoers who come to me. 36 Lawbreakers, rather than lawmakers, are therefore what many voters are looking for when casting their ballots. As a result, patronage rather than policy is the substance of government. While this has resulted in the majority of voters being better represented and having greater access to MNAs and PMAs than ever before, it has also led to the Provincial and National Assemblies becoming increasingly irrelevant to the politics of the NWFP and Pakistan. With the exception of government ministries, almost the only functions of MNAs in Islamabad and MPAs in Peshawar was to verbally (and sometime physically) attack political opponents. Taking one’s role as a legislator seriously, or being appointed a government minister which requires spending more time in Islamabad or Peshawar than in one’s constituency, can today be a recipe for electoral suicide. Of the 27 ministers who were members of Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet at the time his government was dismissed and who contested the 1993 elections, only nine were successful.37 Similarly in 1997 NWFP Provincial Assembly elections no Cabinet member of the then Chief Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (April 24, 1994-November 12, 1996) could win the elections. Syed Qasim Shah an Independent MPA from Mansehra in 1990 elections, explained the problem as follows: 342 In the urban areas, people can appreciate your role and they knew what you have done. But in the rural areas, especially the remote rural areas, they are not in the main stream of media….Radio is controlled by the government, and TV is controlled by the government, so people never hear what you as a legislator are doing in Islamabad or in provincial capital Peshawar. Although I visited my constituency a fair amount, and visited 9-10 villages a day, people’s expectations were not met. And I think this is a disservice that has been done post-85 that the legislators have become patrons rather than lawmakers.38 9.5 COMMERCIALIZATION OF POLITICS Many candidates commented on the dramatic increase in the amount of money spent on election campaigns.39 First, as one PML(N) MNA candidate pointed out, this is the cost for many candidates to buy votes:40 Several candidates mentioned a growing class of very poor voters in urban constituencies who sell their votes. Even if voters do not demand money, they often expect to be provided transport on Election Day. In rural constituencies, voters often refused to go to the polling stations if they were not provided transport. As one PML(N) MNA candidate explained, ‘it is increasingly becoming the case that the candidate with the most vehicles can secure the most votes’.41 Same was the technique used in 1937 and 1946 election campaigns as discussed in chapter three.It is not only voters, who are expecting tangible rewards for their support, but party workers as well. Gone are the heady days of 1970, when ideologically motivated activists and party workers campaigned on a voluntary basis. The politics changed.42 Similarly, I.A.Rehman noted that, in commercialization of politics the culture of the grassroots worker has changed. There are no volunteers now. Everything is paid. People who attend meetings are paid. People who join processions are also paid. They have to be provided transport, and food, and daily allowances. This has become a type of commercial tamasha [spectacle]. In this situation, one quite cynically feels that the basis of party mobilization was not there.43 According to one PPP MNA candidate who won in 1988 but lost in 1993, his campaign failed because ‘everyone started asking for money, both the voters and our workers. I had not seen that before. Not in ’88, not in the ‘70s, not before. But this time everyone was asking money.’44 If even party workers have to be paid to campaign, it is clear that candidates who are not extremely wealthy stand little chance of being successful in electoral politics. Money is increasingly becoming the basis for political power in the NWFP. Politics, which was often used to preserve wealth, is increasingly being used to generate wealth. More and more money is replacing traditional factors such as family background and biradari support as the basis for power. One of the disturbing consequences of this 343 development was the increasing importance of drug barons and drug money in politics. Several well-known drug/ timber smugglers from NWFP are members of the National/Provincial Assembly, and many other legislators are rumoured to be financially backed by drug money45. In NWFP, one frequently hears the observation that wealth was respected regardless of how it was made. As one observer noted, ‘NWFP is like a rich candidate. They think he had been blessed by God. The poor would rather vote for a rich and powerful candidate than for another poor candidate.46 9.6 POLITICAL INSTABILITY The spread of patronage politics has contributed to the instability that has afflicted NWFP politics. First, in a political system where access to patronages was the key to success and often survival, the cost of being in opposition was often unaffordable. On the one hand, this had led to ‘horse-trading’ and floor-crossing that at times has reached embarrassing and politically destabilizing proportions.47 On the other hand, it has encouraged the opposition to go to any length to try to bring down the government. The IJI fought a non-holds barred campaign that contributed to the downfall of PPPs first government in 1990. The PPP fought a similar campaign that helped bring down PML-N in 1993. From 1993, the PML(N) has launched several agitation movements against the PPP government. These were designed to cause a sufficient degree of political instability to provide the military and the President a pretext to intervene and call fresh elections.48 A second way in which patronage politics has contributed to political instability is that it encourages politicization and corruption in the bureaucracy. Providing patronage often means bending and breaking rules, so politicians must have the support of accommodating and compliant bureaucrats. As the tenure of bureaucrats is not secure, many look for political patrons to protect their interests. A symbiotic relationship often develops between politicians and bureaucrats, where the former help the latter get lucrative postings and out-of-order promotions, and the latter help the former bend and break rules.49 Bureaucrats who are not sufficiently compliant, or who are suspected of having sympathies with the opposition, are ‘OSDed’ (put ‘On Special Duty’)50 or khuday-lined (side-lined). The extent to which the bureaucracy has been politicized was clear every time there was a change of government and hundreds of bureaucrats are immediately transferred to accommodate political favorites.51 The more patronage politics contributes to politicizing and corrupting bureaucratic 344 institutions, the less effective these institutions will be in implementing policies and development (or patronage) schemes that would strengthen the legitimacy of the government. Patronage politics also contribute to instability because there are insufficient resources for any government to satisfy the demands and expectations of the majority of voters. Not only will those who receive nothing be unhappy, but many who do receive something will also be unhappy because they did not receive more. It is therefore unwise for a government to rely too heavily on its patronage and development record for political support and to ignore broader issues of policy and governance. This will become even more true when the privatization of state-run industries and IMF-imposed austerity measures reduce the amount of patronage at the disposal of the government. Similarly, only a few candidates can provide a sufficient amount of patronage and implement a sufficient number of development schemes to keep their constituents happy. This is one of the factors that contributes to the very high candidate turnover rate in elections (and possibly to the high government turnover rate as well). Unlike the situation in most electoral democracies, incumbents appear to be at a political disadvantage in NWFP. This belies the popular perception that it is the same old political elite that have been ruling since independence. There are only 13 out of 207 MNAs who were successful in the 1985, 1988, 1990, and 1993 and 1997 elections. Only ten more (i.e., a total of 23) were successful in 1988, 1990 and 1993. In 1997, of the 202 Muslim seats contested, 90 were won by newcomers. Of the 26 NWFP NA seats, 10 were won by the newcomers.52 Patronage politics and corruption paved way towards militarization in Pakistan. Democracy means corruption as portrayed by the leaders of every coups d'etat in Pakistan. Corruption begets bad politics, but bad politics begets further corruption. No democracy was free of corruption53, and some authoritarian regimes (notably Singapore and Chile) have low levels. 9.7 NATIONAL/PROVINCIAL ISSUE ORIENTATION The conventional wisdom in NWFP, as in most parts of the world where democratic elections were held.54 Before elections, the major parties dutifully prepare manifestos that make grandiose promises and outline the major economic, social, and foreign policies the party intends to follow once in power.55 These manifestos are generally not taken seriously by the public, and it is highly unlikely that they play a significant role in determining voting behaviour. Furthermore, in recent years the PPP and 345 IJI/PML(N) manifestos have been very similar since there were very few substantive differences in their official positions on major foreign policy issues such as Pakistan’s nuclear policy and stand on Kashmir, or on domestic policy issues such as privatization of the economy. However, politics is not static, and the fact that politics was ‘localized’ by Zia, and national issues have not been the major determinants of voting behaviour, does not mean that the situation will always remain this way. It is instructive in this regard to remember the events of 1969-70 in Pakistan, when Ayub Khan’s similar decade-long attempt to localize politics was reversed in a matter of months. A small-scale protest movement was soon transformed into a national movement that eventually forced his resignation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then succeeded in nationalizing politics even further. At a time when patronage politics dominated Indian politics, Indira Gandhi, like Bhutto, was able to win an impressive electoral victory by nationalizing politics. Myron Weiner described that it was widely assumed that factors other than national issues or the appeal of a national leader would affect electorate behaviour. The first assumption was that most Indian voters and local influential were more concerned with the administration of policies and programmes than with policy itself. By nationalizing banks, disinheriting the princes, proposing ceilings on rural land holdings and urban property, and publicly challenging big business, she sought to move the electorate toward issues and away from politics of patronage…. The defeat of prominent members of the old guard in the 1967 elections, the loss of many seats, and the declining position of the Congress in parliament meant that that the Congress party could no longer win if it continued to operate as it had in the past. Mrs. Gandhi recognized this, while most members of the old guard did not.56 While local issues dominated electoral politics in recent years, there was evidence to suggest that national issues played a more important role than was generally assumed. Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 exit poll survey indicated that 26 percent of the male respondents who voted for PPP in Pakistan (and 34 per cent of Pukhtoon speakers) did so because of the party’s reputation of being ‘pro-poor’. Similarly, 50 percent of those who voted for IJI said they did so because of its ‘Islamic stance’.57 Thus, a high percentage of ‘party loyalist’ votes could also be votes determined by national issues, such as the PPP’s perceived pro-poor policies, and the IJI’s perceived stronger Islamic orientation. This was true of the ideologically motivated voters who would like to see a more orthodox Islamic state established in Pakistan. 346 Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 and 1993 exit poll surveys indicated that 15 percent of voters in 1990, and 14 percent of voters in 1993, voted for a candidate because they were ‘competent in national affairs’. This was a surprisingly high figure, given the popular perception that national issues play only a minor role in determining voting behaviour. There are other indications that also suggest that national issues play a significant, and possibly growing, role in influencing voting behaviour. In 1993 elections, for example, the perception that PPP would adopt more agriculture-friendly policies than the industrialist-led PML(N) could help explain the PPP’s strong performance in the rural areas of NWFP. The PML (N)’s perceived commitment to developing and industrializing the country, and to tackling the problem of unemployment, were national issues that appear to have won Nawaz Sharif the support of many voters. Muhammad Waseem has also argued that the perception of PML(N) being tougher on national security issues and more hawkish in its stance on India won it support in the more security conscious districts and constituencies bordering India.58 As one ANP, MPA in 1997 elections pointed out: Party politics are…more issue oriented and are increasingly being passed on socio-economic divisions such as urban versus rural. This is positive trend away from sectarian and ethnic politics, and towards political divisions along economic lines.59 In addition to party politics, the communication revolution was also contributed to the nationalization of politics. According to a recent survey, 74.8 per cent of urban households have television sets.60 Those who do not, often have easy access to TVs those are located in tea stalls, restaurants, or in the homes of friends or relatives. Popular TV dramas directly address national social issues such as the problems of literacy, inadequate education and health facilities, environmental pollution, high population growth rates, increasing crime rates, women’s rights, the tyranny of feudal lords, and economic problems such as unemployment and inflation. Satellite dishes, which can now be found on roof tops and even the remotest regions of the province, are exposing viewers to everything from BBC news, to soap operas and ‘Baywatch’, to VTV (the Star Satellite equivalent of MTV). Thus both national and international issues are finding their way into homes and conversations were formally in isolated regions of NWFP. Physical isolation was reduced through the construction of more farm-to-market roads and the explosive growth in the number of Suzuki mini-vans and Ford wagons, which can be found transporting people and goods to and from the remotest regions of the country. Farmers whose fathers rarely got beyond the local mandi (market) town can now easily make day trips to their district headquarters, or 347 even to the provincial capital of Peshawar. The effects of economic policies adopted in Islamabad are being felt throughout the province much more quickly than before. This was especially apparent on the day the national budget is presented, when the country comes to a virtual standstill to hear the budget speech presented by the finance minister. The details that are presented whether they pertain to taxation policies or the price of fuel oil, fertilizer or utilities, have an almost immediate impact on the livelihoods of the majority of households in Pakistan. As a result, voters are becoming increasingly sensitized to national economic issues. The most sensitive economic issues are unemployment and inflation. Gallup Pakistan’s 1990 Exit Poll survey included the following question: ‘what is the most important problem faced by the country at this time? Thirty percent of the respondents indicated unemployment and another 17 percent indicated inflation.61 Several politicians who were interviewed for this study indicated that they believe that national issues in general, and economic issues in particular, are going to grow in importance as determinants of voting behaviour.62 9.9 CONCLUSIONS During the analysis of political determinants of voting behavior, it has been found that political determinants are more powerful than social determinants. It has been also found that local bodies have localized electoral politics and local issues seems much important than national issues. This has been the affect of local government elections and impact of non-party campaigns on local issues. During the period under study it has been found that unemployment and inflation are becoming increasingly important and throughout the electoral race during 1990s it has an important factor in determining peoples voting behavior. Daily Frontier Post (Peshawar), 14 March 1997 Political parties in Pakistan, with the exception of Jamaat-i-Islami, are usually centralized, personalized, and leader oriented to such an extent that in many cases the leader virtually is the party. Thus, votes for the PML(N) are likely to be votes for Nawaz Sharief or against Benazir Bhutto, and votes for the PPP are likely to be votes for Benazir Bhutto or against Nawaz Sharief. 3 Data calculated from Election Commission of Pakistan, General election Report Vol. II: Comparative Statistics For General elections 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 (Islamabad: Government Printing Press, 1997) 4 Syed Zaffar Ali Shah, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 25 March 2007. 5 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1994), p.107 6 It is also possible, although unlikely, that some of the 1993 candidates were ‘covering’ or back-up candidates, and did not intend to contest seriously. 7 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990 (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p.52. 8 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.93 9 Al-Haj Sardar Umar Farooq Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, DI. Khan, 25 May 2005 2 1 348 10 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.576 11 Religious parties won NWFP elections in 2002 due to the continuity of conservatism in 1990s and 9/11 incident. MMA, a coalition of religious parties emerge on electoral scene in 2002. 12 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990 (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p.52. 13 Ibid. 14 Mr. Goher Ayub Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Haripur, 1 April 2005 15 Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Charsada, 10 May 2005 16 Mr. Fareed Khan Toofan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Karak, 20, May 2005 17 Pir Muhammad Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Shangla (Swat), 08 August 2005 18 Arbab Muhammad Ayub Jan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 13 December 2005. 19 Sardar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Abbottabad, 05 September 2005 20 Nasir Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar 12 March 2006 21 Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Charsada, 25 March 2006 22 M.I Lashkar, ‘Funds Earmarked for Baitul Maal Scheme Go Missing’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 26 July 1993. 23 M.A.K Lodhi, ‘IJI Legislators Make a Killing Through Local Bodies’, The Friday Times, 22-28 April 1993, 6 24 Adnan Adil, ‘The Discretionary Charm’, The Friday Times, 23-29 September 1993, 9. 25 ‘PDF MNAs to get share in Recruitments’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi) 21 July 1994. 26 Idrees Bukhtiar, ‘Scandal’, Herald, April 1994, 24-32. 27 Zahid Husain, ‘The Great Tax Scandal’, Newsline, October 1995, 22-36 28 Nasir Iqbal, ‘Nawaz Govt. Paid Rs. 16m as medical expenses: Senate Told’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 20 August 1993. 29 Javed A. Malik, ‘What to do with 16000 Yellow Cabs?’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 10 September 1993. 30 Navaid Saeed, ‘The Great Land Game’, Newsline (Karachi), June 1995, pp.87-96 31 This data was exhibited in ‘The Hall of Shame’ at the PPP’s Central Secretariat in Islamabad in September 1993. 32 Amjad Warriach, ‘The Politics of Development’, Daily The News, 9 December 1994. 33 Mariana Baber, ‘PPP’s anti-Patronage Campaign Reveals Pindi’s “Plot, Cheque Boys”’, Daily The News, 29 September 1993. 34 Asfandyar Wali Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Charsada, 03 April 2006. 35 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.162. 36 Nawabzada Salauddin Saeed, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Mansehra, 28 April 2006 37 Hasan Iqbal Jafri, ‘Yes Minister, No Minister’, Herald, special Issue, Election ’93 Vital statistics, November-December 1993, p.41. 38 Syed Qasim Shah, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Mansehra, 04, June 2006 39 Mustafa Haroon, ‘The Clash of Cash’, Newsline (Karachi), October 1993, pp. 42-3. 40 Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Interview by author, Tape Recording, 14 February, 2006. 41 Sardar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Abbottabad, 08 June 2006 42 Gul Badshah, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 01 May 2006 43 I.A Rehman, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Islamabad, 20 May 2006 44 Mr. Sardar Ali Khan, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 10 August 2006 45 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.66 46 Mr. Jan Muhammad Khattak, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Karak, 20 September, 2006. 47 Jhon Stakehouse, “Island of Carnal Desire” at Centre of Islamabad’, Daily The News, 8 August 1993. 48 For detail see, Charlas H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987) 49 Ibid. 50 Jeved Jaidi, “Today’s Blue-eyed Boys, Tomorrow’s Black Sheep: OSDs’, The News on Friday, 13 Januarury 1995, p.10. 51 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, pp.62-3 52 Hasan Iqbal Jafri, ‘Strangers in the House’, Herald (Karachi), Special Issue, November-December 1993, pp.38-45. 53 Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Kohat, 28 September 2006 349 54 Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience (Darham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), p.273. 55 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, pp.116-24 56 Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics, ed. Ashotosh Varshney (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 225-7 57 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990 (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), pp.44-9 58 Mohammad Waseem, 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.168 59 Haji Muhammad Adeel, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 20 November 2006. 60 Ministry of Population Welfare and Population council, Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey 1994-95: Basic Findings (Islamabad: n.p., 1995), p. 45. 61 Gallop Pakistan, ‘Pakistan At The Poll 1990’, Gallup Political weather Report, Special Issue 1990 (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1990), p. 69. 62 Haji Muhammad Adeel, Interview by author, Tape Recording, Peshawar, 20 November 2006 350 CONCLUSIONS This research work consists of theories and case studies including political and social aspects of electoral politics in NWFP to find the answer of basic research question, who is voting for whom and why? Which is the increasing determinant of voting behaviour? In order to build up an analytical framework, contemporary theoretical approaches are used. Political parties in NWFP generally operate in the form of public meetings, alliance building activity, dissemination of propaganda and projection of leadership profiles. They lacked mass contact at the doorsteps. There were few local mobilizers who would make a point to knock at the door and deliver an oral or a written message from the party. This was so because the basic electoral unit in NWFP society is not the individual citizen but the leader or spokesman of the local community. The electoral candidates operating from the platforms of political parties contacted not men and women in their homes but the local ‘big man’ who would deliver votes in hundreds or even thousands. Not surprisingly, parties have increasingly become coalitions of sub-organisational groups and communities. In the absence of a potent and intrusive role for parties in the locality, the understanding between factional groupings became crucial for the electoral activity at the local level. Elections in 1990s made it clear that political parties operating at the national level and particularly in NWFP were essentially representation oriented not movement oriented. They were less cadre oriented and more leader oriented. Their electoral strategy was more candidates oriented than issue oriented. Electoral politics gradually emerged as a competitive exercise for access to patronage. In the political system, policies are not fully implemented. There was a widespread feeling among the voters that they failed to influence policy. Therefore they made good with patronage. Elections in NWFP have resulted in mobilizing the under privileged masses to seek instant patronage from the local or national leaders. During the study of electoral politics in NWFP (1988-1999) four major categories were found. First, there was a civic voter. This voter tended to be a party voter, even an ideologue but more generally the holder of a partisan opinion on public issues. Secondly, there was the client voter. Typically, he belonged to feudal areas where his economic dependence on the local landlord-politician was complete. Thirdly, there was a maverick voter. He was a typical patronage seeker, who was not prepared to wait till after the elections. His demand could be either individualistic or even 351 community oriented. Finally there is a primary voter. He voted for either ethnic identity or sectarian identity. Electoral politics in NWFP revolved around the characteristics represented in these categories of voters in a varying degree. Voter was bound by considerations of local power structure in terms of caste, biradri and tribe, tempered by instant patronage in the form of development funds or money. In electoral politics of NWFP voter was ultimately bound by a political culture based on choice not between issues and policies but between leaders and candidates. Khel (social groups within biradari) and biradari still have greater influence in the social structure of NWFP region. Family reputation and helping the people in distress, leaves a lasting impact on the recipients who in turn, for favouring the contestant, go for voting him as a measure to return the favour. Local issues have a close concern in the electoral politics of NWFP. National and provincial issues seemed less urgent to voters in NWFP. Therefore they wanted assurance from the contestants to resolve their immediate problems of local nature. Thus the focus on the issues of rural development has sharpened in NWFP. To test the research question, who is voting for whom and why, and hypothesis this study is divided in to two parts. Part-1 provided the theoretical and historical framework for the study. In terms of understanding the context within which voting decisions are made, the most important aspect was the power imbalance that exists between the non-elected and elected institutions. Electoral politics in NWFP cannot be understood without reference to this imbalance, and electoral strategies adopted by ruling elites to try to ensure that elections legitimize but do not alter the status quo. Chapter one based on theoretical framework of electoral politics. Rational choice theory and Michigan Model seemed to much close with electoral politics in NWFP. Chapter two outlined the NWFP’s electoral geography and highlighted the differences in voting behaviour between central, northern, southern, and north-eastern NWFP. It was shown that the key to electoral success- is central NWFP, which had one third of the Provincial Assembly seats. It was the most densely populated, urbanized and industrialized of the NWFP’s four regions, and hence politically the most volatile. The PPP’s strongest regional support in 1988-1997 came from northern and central NWFP, the region most dependent on agriculture, whose political elites resented the decline in their influence relative to the politicians of north-eastern NWFP (Hazara) and southern NWFP. The PML(N)’s strongest performance was in Hazara region of NWFP. The region that was dependent on agriculture and the most dependent on 352 employment in the civil and military branches of government. For historical reasons, north-eastern NWFP (Hazara) experienced the least socio-economic and political change, and traditional social determinants of the tribe, ‘feudal’ tenurial relations, and religion therefore overwhelmed political determinants of voting behaviour. Chapter three is focused on historical background of electoral politics in NWFP. Chapter four is based on empirical study of voting trends in NWFP. This chapter focused on demographic and other factors on voting behaviour. Chapter five examined in detail voting behaviour in the NWFP’s largest city, Peshawar. An analysis of polling stations results from the 1988-1997 elections revealed that while levels of support for the PPP and the IJI/PML and ANP have changed over time, patterns of class support have remained consistent. The PPP continued to do better in the poorer urban-rural periphery polling stations and in the polling areas with large concentrations of industrial labour. The IJI/PML and ANP consistently received its strongest support from the middle and upper class wards. Therefore class remained an important determinant of voting behaviour, and the PPP’s reputation as ‘the party of the poor’ continues to be warranted. Class, however, seems to be losing ground to party and/or party leader loyalty. Chapter six focused on party politics in NWFP. It discussed how the legacies of ANP, PPP and General Zia-ul- Haq had helped, create and consolidate a strong ‘anti-PPP’ party based in urban NWFP. It examined how organizational weakness and factional politics within the PPP contributed to its decline, while the patronage at the disposal of Nawaz Sharif contributed To the PML(N)’s rise. Another important factor contributed to the reversal in urban NWFP was the effect that the prosperity of 1990s had on the ‘party of the poor’. Related to this prosperity was the economic and political rise of middle class traders and businessmen who formed the core of the ‘anti-PPP’ party and the decline of groups, such as organized labour, who were the strongest urban supporters of PPP. Chapter seven traced the history of the urban-rural political and electoral divide in the NWFP and showed how the countryside has traditionally dominated the cities. It then highlighted the important change that took place in the 1990s elections when the PML(N) electoral alliance with ANP replaced the PPP as the strongest party in urban NWFP. From small towns to large cities in all four regions of the province, the PML(N) and ANP consistently outperformed the PPP. This indicates that party and party leader identification played a major role in determining the voting behaviour of urban voters. The PPP, did better than PML(N) in the far more numerous rural constituencies and therefore ended up 353 winning more seats. As the majority of the province’s population live in rural areas, elections have reinforced the political dominance of rural NWFP and rural politicians. However, in a country that has one of the highest urbanization rates in the world, and with the communications revolution rapidly narrowing the distance between cities and countryside, it is clear that the cities are gaining political ground at the expense of the countryside. If economic interests increasingly become articulated along urban versus rural lines, which seems likely, the urban-rural cleavage will become even more important in determining party alignments and voter behaviour. Chapter eight turned its attention to the social determinants of voting behaviour. It examined the role of gender in influencing voting decisions and showed that women in urban NWFP favoured PML(N) and ANP over PPP. Next, an analysis of polling stations’ results in the Punjab’s three largest cities indicated that a distinct class division existed between the neighbouhoods and wards supporting PPP and those supporting the PML(N). This confirmed the earlier assessment of the continuing relevance of class as a determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP. Exit poll survey data revealed that a significant percentage of younger voters, who traditionally had supported the PPP, shifted their support to the ANP/PML(N) in 1990s. The effects that literacy and education had on voting behaviour closely approximated to those of class, with illiterate voters preferring the PPP and literate voters the ANP/PML(N) . The Chapter then looked at the role of religion in determining voting behaviour. The poor performance of religious parties in elections illustrated that it was not a major factor, although sectarianism and the influence of traditional religious leaders do effect the voting decisions of some voters. Overall, voters decided not to ‘waste’ their votes on religious parties which were not expected to win, and which would therefore not be in a position to provide patronage. The chapter ended by looking at the influence of faction and biradari, which are viewed by many to be the most important determinants of voting behaviour in the NWFP. The conclusion reached, however, was that while important in selecting candidates, their importance in determining how votes are cast on Election Day is exaggerated. Finally chapter nine discussed the growing importance of political determinants such as party and party leader identification, patronage orientation, and national issue orientation. Party identification was the most important determinant of voting behaviour in urban NWFP, but even in rural Punjab it was much more important than was assumed. While parties still needed strong candidates in rural constituencies, 354 strong candidates increasingly need strong parties to win. The chapter than emphasized the growing importance of patronage and development in determining voting behaviour. Voters, especially in rural areas, are therefore casting their ballots for the candidates and parties they perceive will be the most effective conduits for delivering patronage. The chapter concluded by arguing that national issues, while not major determinant of voter behaviour in the past (other than the 1970 elections), were likely to become more important when the next elections are held. Concerns over the economic issues of inflation and unemployment could divert attention away from local issues to national issues. It is important to remember that voting behaviour is not static, and with time new divisions may emerge or old ones becomes less salient. Generational change may lead to political re-alignments. Rapid urbanization and industrialization may increase the political relevance of the urban-rural divide and industry versus agriculture cleavages, and decrease those based on kinship or faction. Furthermore, new cross-cutting issues such as inflation or environmental concerns may emerge that do not immediately lend themselves to existing categories but could lead instead to ‘issue-oriented’ voting. 355 BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIVATE PAPERS : Cunnigham Papers, India Office Library, London, Mss. Eur D 714/19 Linlithgow Papers, India Office Library, London, Mss. Eur F 125 M. 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Palmer, Norman D. ‘The Two Elections: A Comparative Study’, (Asian Survey, July 1977). Pasha, Hafiz A., Malik, Salman and Jamal, Haroon, ‘The Changing Profile of Regional Development in Pakistan’, Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics 9 (1990). Rais, Rasul B. ‘Elections in Pakistan: Is Democracy Winning?, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 12 (Fall 1985). Richter,William. ‘Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order’, Asian Survey, February 1986). Rose Richard and Mishler,William. ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’ The Journal of Politics 59 (2) 1997. Waseem, Mohammad. ‘Pakistan’s Lingering Crises of Dyarchy’, Asian Survey, July 1992. ________. ‘Democratisation in Pakistan: The Current Phase’, In Contemporary Political Studies 1996, (Belfast, 1996). Weinbaum, MG. ‘The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost’, Asian Survey, July 1997. 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Paid Rs. 16m as medical expenses: Senate Told’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 20 August 1993. Jafri, Hasan Iqbal. ‘Yes Minister, No Minister’, Herald, special Issue, Election ’93 Vital statistics, NovemberDecember 1993, 41. ________. ‘Strangers in the House’, Herald (Karachi), Special Issue, November-December 1993, 38-45. Jaidi, Jeved. “Today’s Blue-eyed Boys, Tomorrow’s Black Sheep: OSDs’, The News on Friday, 13 Januarury 1995, 10. Javed A. Malik, ‘What to do with 16000 Yellow Cabs?’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 10 September 1993. Khan, Aamer Ahmad. ‘The Rise of Sectarian Mafia’, Herald, June 1994. Khan,Wusatullah. Pakistan Political Parties, BBC Report, 22 August 2009. Lashkar, M.I. ‘Funds Earmarked for Baitul Maal Scheme Go Missing’, Daily The News (Rawalpindi), 26 July 1993. Lodhi, M.A.K. ‘IJI Legislators Make a Killing Through Local Bodies’, The Friday Times, 22-28 April 1993, 6. 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The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1987. NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS: Aurat Foundation (Quarterly Newsletter), Arat 5, Nos. 2-3, 1993. Current Affairs Digest (Lahore). Daily The News. Daily The Pakistan Times. Dawn (Karachi). Lahore Tribune 20 March 1932. Pakhtun 25 September 1945. Pakistan Observer. Tarjuman-ul- Quran (Lahore). The Frontier Post (Peshawar). The Herald ( Karachi). The Khber Mail, Peshawar, 5 April 1946. The Newsweek (New York). The Review (Karachi). Zarb-i- Momin (Karachi). WEB SOURCES: http://www.anp.org.pk http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/commonwealth-lb-elections.pdf http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45 http://www.khyber.org/people/pol/AftabAhmadKhanSherpao.shtml http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/SBNP_Local_Govt_Ordinance_2001.pdf. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_03nov07/pco_1_2007.html http://www.pildat.org/CGEP/Publications/PDF/Electoral_Reforms_2007.pdf. http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articlete... 366 APPENDIX-I: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE VOTING TRENDS IN NWFP For item non-response, following codes are used: 444 don’t know/don’t remember, 111 no opinion, 555 refused, 333 irrelevant / skipped, 222 other Q1: What is your gender: 1. Male 2. Female Q2: What is your marital status? 1. Married. 2. Unmarried/engaged. 3. Divorced. 4. Widowed Q3: What is your approximate age in years? Q4: Where did you spend most of your childhood? City______. Region_______. Country________. Q5: For how many years have you lived in your current residence? Q6: What is the total number of family members living in the household? 1. Adults. 2. Children. Q7: Who owns your current residence? 1. Respondent 2. Close relative 3. Distant relative 4. Landlord 5. Employer 222 Other. Q8: What language is your mother tongue? 1 Urdu 2 English 3 Punjabi 4 Service 5. Hondko 6. Pashto 7. Sindhi 8. Bloch 222 OTHER: Q9: Can you speak, read, and/or write your mother tongue or any other languages? Language 9.1 Speak 9.2 Read 9.3 Write Yes Yes Yes a. Urdu No No No Yes Yes Yes b. English No No No Yes Yes Yes c. Punjabi No No No Yes Yes Yes d. Seraiki No No No Yes Yes Yes e. Hindko No No No Yes Yes Yes f. Pashto No No No Yes Yes Yes g. Sindhi No No No Yes Yes Yes h. Balochi No No No Yes Yes Yes i. Others No No No Q10: What is your current employment status? 1. Full time 2. Part-time 3. Seeking work 4. Retired 5. Homemaker 6. Student 222 Other Q11: What is your primary occupation (or anticipated occupation if student)? 1. Self-employed shopkeeper 11. University staff or professor 2. Self-employed business or trade (except shop keeping) 12. Engineer 3. Government servant 13. NGO Staff 4. Private sector employee 14. International Agency 5. Industrial Manual labour 15.Primary/secondary teacher 6. Farm/rural manual labor 16. Religious teacher / mosque 7. Small or medium sized farmer 17. Army/military/security 8. Large farmer / landowner 18. Housewife/domestic 9. Medical professional 222. Other 10. Lawyer/Judge/Legal 444. Don’t Know Q12: What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 1. None 2. Madrasa/Religious School 3. Some Primary 4. Finished Primary School 5. Middle School 6. Matric 7. F.A/F.Sc (Intermediate) 8. B.A./B.Sc 9. M.A or a professional degree 10. Doctorate or post-doctorate 444 Don’t Know Q13: For statistical purposes, we would like to know which of the following income groups your household falls into, approximately: 1. Up to Rs. 1,000 2. Rs. 1,001 – Rs. 2,000 3. Rs. 2,001 – Rs. 3,000 4. Rs. 3,001 – Rs. 4,000 5. Rs. 4,001 – Rs. 5,000, 6. Rs. 5,001 – Rs. 10,000 7. Rs. 10,001 – Rs. 15,000 8. Rs. 15,001 and above 444. Don’t Know Q14: With which religion/sect are you affiliated most closely? 1. Sunni Islam 2. Shia Islam 3. Christian 4.Hinduism 222.Other, 444.Don ‘t Know: MEDIA USE & PREFERENCES: Q15: Can you tell me about how often you use each of following media resources? 367 Media a. TV b. Radio c. Newspapers d. Web A. Daily B. Frequently C. Once a week E. Never Q16: Please name the two specific sources you use most often to find out information about politics and government (names of stations or newspapers)? 1 _______________. 2.____________. Q 17: I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get information about elections in their communities. you’d like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to attend two events, which two would you choose? 1. Live drama or comedy about elections. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 2. Workshop by an international. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 3. A meeting about elections in someone’s home. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 4. A party rally or meeting. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 5. A short film or movie. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 6. Special meeting for women. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 7. I would not attend any of these events. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 222. Other: 333 Irrelevant/Skipped 444 Don’t Know 555 Refused 111 No Opinion Q18: I am going to describe several ways that voters might be able to get information about elections from the media. I’d like you to tell me, if the election were held this weekend and you had to spend one hour learning more about the election, which two types of sources would you choose for your time? 1. Radio drama or comedy about the election process. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 2. Watching a TV program. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 3. Looking at illustrations or posters in the community. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 4. Reading newspapers or the internet. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 5. Watching candidates or parties debate on television. a. Yes________. b. No_________ 222. Other: 111. No Opinion 333. Irrelevant/Skipped 444. Don’t Know 555. Refused POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, ENGAGEMENT, EFFICACY AND KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTORAL PROCESS Q19: Looking at the problems in your area and the way they affect families like you, for your relatives or friends, who would you suggest to go to in order to resolve these problems (District administration official like EDO, DCO, MO)? Responses Likelihood of Suggesting Likely to Suggest Unlikely to Suggest Would never suggest a. Feudal Leaders b. Religious Leaders c. Biradari Elders d. NGOs e. Political Party Office MNA or MPA Local Officials like Nazims or councillors District Administration like EDOs, DCOs etc Q20 How interested would you say you are in politics? 1. Very Interested 2. Some what interested. 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested 444 Don’t Know Q21: I’m going describe some political activities that people engage in. I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done each of these things, whether you are likely to do it, whether you might do it, or would never do it. Responses Have Likely to Might Do Would Done Do Never Do a. Discuss elections with friends/family b. Boycott an election c. Attend demonstrations or rallies d. Attend a party or election meeting e. Tell friends, family, or co-workers to 368 vote for a particular candidate f. Get into an argument about election g. Visit a local representative’s office Q22: Since you have been eligible to vote in elections, how often have you voted in elections? 1. Never 2. Once 3.Two or three times. 4. Most elections. 5. Every election 444. Don’t Know Q23: Did you vote in the General Elections in 1988? 1 Yes 2 No 444 Don’t Know Q24: Did you vote in the General elections in 1997? 1 Yes 2 No 444 Don’t Know Q25: REASONS FOR NOT VOTING: I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people do not vote. For each, tell about the reason. Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all Important Important Important Important a. I intended to vote but circumstances on the day prevented me b. The polling station is hard to reach c. I wasn’t able to register d. I went but I didn’t have ID e. I didn’t know where to go f. My vote makes no difference g. The elections are not free & fair h. I did not like the candidates i. I was too busy with work to vote j. I received some money or a gift k. I was afraid of violence and unrest l. A religious figure told me not to m. My name was not on the voter list n. I was stopped by my family OTHER REASONS MENTIONED: Q26: REASONS FOR VOTING: I’m going to read you a list of reasons why people vote. For each one, please tell me about the reason, when you voted in past elections. Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all Important Important Important Important a. It is the duty of every citizen b. I felt strongly about a party/candidate c. My vote makes a difference d. My relatives & friends convinced me e. My employer asked me to vote f. A political party agent made me vote g. I received some money or a gift h. I was afraid I would be in danger i. A religious figure told me to vote j. I want to change things in country k. I was afraid of losing my job or land OTHER REASONS MENTIONED Q27: Have you heard when the next elections will be held? 1 Yes 2 No 444 DK Q28: Approximately what date to you think the elections will be held? 1. Gives any date from Nov 2007 to Feb 2008 2. Gives answer other than these dates 444 DK Q29: How likely is it that you will vote in the next National Assembly election? a.Very Likely b. Somewhat Likely c. Somewhat unlikely d. Very unlikely e. Don't Know Yet Q30: Do you think that if you vote in the upcoming general elections that your vote will make a big difference, some difference, little difference, or no difference? 1. Big difference 2. Some difference 3. Little difference 4. No difference Q31: For the following two statements, tell me whether you agree more with statement A or statement B. A. The government in Islamabad has taken positive steps to ensure that elections are free and fair. B. It doesn’t matter what the government in Islamabad does to ensure a fair election, because the local and provincial politicians corrupt the process. Q32: If you compare the upcoming elections with the previous elections in NWFP would you say that compared to earlier elections, the next elections will be much more, somewhat more, about the same, somewhat less, or much less free & fair? 1. Much more free 2. Somewhat more free 3. About the same 4.Somewhat less 5.Much less free 6. Don’t Know 369 Q33: Now I would like your opinion on various institutions and organizations working in NWFP. Tell me how much trust you have in these institutions--A great deal of trust, some trust, very little trust, or no trust at all. Responses Great deal of Some trust No trust at all Trust a. National government b. Judiciary c. Police d. Pakistani Army e. National & Provincial Assembly f. Election Commission of Pakistan g. Provincial government h. The press i. Local government elected officials like Nazims and Union Councillors. Q34: Thinking about the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have offices in your community, do you think that overall, they make a positive contribution, or are they wasting money and resources that should go somewhere else? 1 Positive Contribution 2 Waste of resources, 3. Don’t Know Q35: Can you name two or three NGOs respected by you and people in your community, or do people have negative views of all of them? 35a_______________, 35b_______________, 35c________________, 4. No, People have negative views of all of them: Q36: Are you aware that all citizens must register again if they want to vote in the upcoming election, even if they already registered to vote in the past? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q37: Has anyone come to your home in the past 12 months asking you or someone in your household to fill out a form to register on a new voters’ list? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q38: Did you or someone in your household register to vote by filling out the form when someone came to your home in the past 12 months? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q39: Are you aware that the provisional voters’ registration list will be displayed in May and June and that registered voters can check the list to see if your name is correctly listed? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q 40: How likely is it that you will check your name on the provisional voters’ list? 1.Very Likely 2.Somewhat Likely 3.Somewhat unlikely 4.Very unlikely 5.Don’t Know Q 41 If you did not fill out a form in the last 12 months, have you made plans to register to vote in order to get your name on the electoral list in your area before the next election? 1. Yes 2. No 444. Don’t Know Q 42: Have you heard that there will be a special registration period in May/June for all citizens of voting age who did not register during the past 12 months? 1 Yes 2 No 444. Don’t Know Q 43: Looking at that whether other eligible voters have registered in your area, how confident are you that most people in your community of voting age will be registered on the electoral list in time for the election--very confident, somewhat confident, or not at all confident? 1.Very Confident 2. Somewhat confident 3. Not at all confident 444. Don’t Know/Can’t Say Q 44: How confident are you that the electoral list in your area will be accurate and complete in time for the election--very confident, somewhat confident, or not at all confident? 1.Very Confident 2.Somewhat confident 3.Not at all confident 444. Don’t Know/Can’t Say Q 45: If someone asked you where they could register to vote, what would you tell them? ____________________________________________________ 1. District Election Commission (EC) office 2. Union Council Office (UC) 3. Tehsil Office 222. Others 444. Don’t Know Q 46: How far away is the closest election commission office from your home -- very far away, a significant distance away, or close (in your town or village)? 1. Very far away 2. A significant distance away. 3. Close (in your town or village). 444. Don’t Know Q 47: If it’s necessary to go to the election commission office to register, how likely are you to go and register – very likely, likely, not very likely, very un likely? 1. Very likely 2. Likely 3. Very unlikely 444. Don’t Know Q 48: Please tell me which forms of identification you have. I’ll read each one, and just tell me yes if you have it, and no if you don’t. 370 Responses a. New Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) b. National ID Cards for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) or Pakistan Origin Card (POC) c. Old National Identity Card (NIC) d. Birth Certificate Q 49: If you don’t have either an old NIC or a new CNIC, why don’t you have either form of identification? ____________________________________________ 1. I don’t know how or where to get an ID card. 2. The cost to get an ID card is too high or not worth it. 3. I don’t know anything about ID cards. 4. I don’t want an ID card. 222. Other. Q 50: Have you heard that the Election Commission of Pakistan has decided to accept the old national identity card (NIC) for voter registration and elections? 1 Yes 2 No 444. Don’t Know CORRUPTION, ELECTORAL VIOLENCE, AND FRAUD Q 51: Compare your expectations for the upcoming elections with other elections. Would you say that compared to earlier elections, there will be more, about the same, or less violence, unrest, and intimidation than in the past? 1. More Violence/Unrest 2. About the same 3. Less Violence/Unrest 444. Don’t Know Q 52: Now I will read out some opinions about how politics sometimes works in NWFP. I’d like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them? Responses LEVEL OF AGREEMENT Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree a. Public services like road repair and water are delivered, improved, or repaired in this area for the purposes of influencing elections. b. Employment depends on friends and relatives in government. c. Political parties reward people for supporting them by helping those who voted for them after elections Q 53: I’d like to know how you feel about corruption in the local, provincial, and national governments, as well as NGOs. For each of these, can you tell me about your response mentioned on each category? Responses PERCEIVED LEVEL OF CORRUPTION Somewhat Very Not at all Common common, Not Problem a. National government b. Provincial government c. Local government d. NGOs e. Political parties Very, Common, Big Problem Yes No Q 54: Now I’m going to mention some other things that can happen during elections. For each one, tell me how likely you think each will occur in the next election. Responses: LIKELIHOOD OF HAPPENING Very Somewhat Somewhat likely Likely Unlikely a. Certain candidates prevented from running for office b. Authorities knowing how I voted c. Names not on the electoral roll at the polling station d. People prevented from registering or voting e. Officials or parties stuffing ballot boxes f. People voting more than once g. Cheating in counting the ballots h. Employers getting employees to vote together as a group i. Landlords getting their tenants to vote together as a group. j. Officials changing the results after the ballots have been counted Very unlikely Q 55: Based on your experience or what you’ve heard about past elections in NWFP, do you think that in the upcoming elections the level of cheating and fraud will be more, about the same, or less than in the past? 1. More cheating & fraud 2. About the same 371 3. Less cheating & fraud 444. DK Q56: In your opinion, which is a more serious threat to free and fair elections in NWFP, election violence/intimidation, election malpractices/fraud, or is the election process generally free and fair? 1. Violence / intimidation 2. Malpractices / fraud 3. Process is generally free and fair Q57: During elections, people talk about “rigging”. When you hear talk about cheating or rigging in NWFP, which of the following three statements best describes what happens, or is it something else? 1. Rigging is something controlled by the central government 2. The central government works with certain parties and officials to rig results in different places around the country 3. Local politicians rig elections to benefit themselves, even if the central government tries to stop it. 222. Something else 444. Don’t Know, Don’t Remember Q 58: In your opinion, which types of people are most likely to be victimized by violence or intimidation in elections in your area, or will no one be victimized? 1. Candidates 2. Voters 3. Female candidate 4. Female Voters 5. Election workers 6. NGO Workers 7. Security Officials 8. People with low income 9. Polling Officials 10. Political party supporters 11. No one 444. Don’t know Q 59: Some people are talking about different ways that the fraud and corruption could be prevented in the election process. I’ll list a few of the suggestions we’ve been hearing and some that have already been implemented. I’d like you to tell me whether each measure would give you much more confidence, somewhat more confidence, have no effect, or give you less confidence in the election process. Responses LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE Much Somewhat No Less More more Effect a. A procedure for ordinary citizens to complain about fraud b. Trained observers from the local area to monitor the whole election process c. A simple procedure to make voter registration easier d. If every voter checked the voters’ registration lists to make sure the lists are accurate e. If political parties agreed to a code of conduct and the code was enforced f. If local government was dissolved during the election period g. If election commission officials were better trained DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE Q 60: In your opinion, how much power does the parliament (national and provincial) have in determining the course of political development in NWFP? Responses Great deal of Some Little No Power power power power at all 1. National Assembly & Senate Don’t Know 2. Provincial Assembly Don’t Know Q61 Now I will read out some statements about politics in NWFP, and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them? Responses LEVEL OF AGREEMENT Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Agree Disagree a. NWFP’s citizens have the power to influence the policies and actions of the government b. People are free to criticize the government without fear c. People can join any political party or organization they wish Q 62: People often differ in their views on what factors are essential for democracy. If you have to choose only one thing, what would be the most important, and what would be the second most important? 1. Changing governments through elections. Yes_________. No.__________. 2. Little difference in income between rich and poor. Yes_________. No.________ 3. Freedom to criticize government. Yes_________. No.__________. 4. Absence of any violence. Yes_________. No.__________. 5. Basic necessities like food & shelter for everyone. Yes_________. No._______ 6. No influence of religious ideas or leaders in politics. Yes_________. No.______ 222. Other: Yes_________. No.__________. 111. No Opinion. Yes___. No.___ 333. Skipped. Yes_________. No.____. 555. Refused. Yes_________. No.____. 372 GENDER Q 63: Now I would like to know your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behaviour and situation of women in our society. I will read out some statements and I would like for you to tell me to what extent you agree with them? Responses LEVEL OF AGREEMENT Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Agree Disagree a. Women can run for political office b. A woman can be president or prime minister of a Muslim country c. Men are more suited for politics than women d. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl e. Women should dress modestly, but chador is not obligatory Don’t Know