Dwaipayan Sen - No Matter How, Jogendranath Had to Be Defeated

Indian Economic & Social HistoryReview http://ier.sagepub.com/ 'No matter how, Jogendranath had to be defeated': The Scheduled Castes Federation and the making of partition in Bengal, 1945 −1947 Dwaipayan Sen Indian Economic Social History Review 2012 49: 321 DOI: 10.1177/0019464612455273 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ier.sagepub.com/content/49/3/321 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for Indian Economic & Social History Review can be found at: Email Alerts: http://ier.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://ier.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://ier.sagepub.com/content/49/3/321.refs.html >> Version of Record - Aug 28, 2012 What is This? Downloaded from ier.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29, 2012 ‘No matter how, Jogendranath had to be defeated’: The Scheduled Castes Federation and the making of partition in Bengal, 1945–1947 Dwaipayan Sen Department of History The University of Chicago, IL This article offers an explanation for the defeat of Jogendranath Mandal and the Scheduled Castes Federation in the context of partition-era Bengal. Departing from analyses of Scheduled Caste integration, it explores the Federation’s efforts at creating an independent political platform through a strategic alliance with the Muslim League. To this end, it traces Mandal’s and the Federation’s trajectory through the following key moments: the anti-Poona Pact day and Day of Direct Action, the 1946 election, Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s election to the Constituent Assembly, the Calcutta and East Bengal riots, Mandal’s nomination to the Interim Government and the agitation against Partition. In so doing, it tries to show how the Federation’s defeat in Bengal was at least in part a consequence of the Congress’ efforts to engineer its marginalisation, as well as the Congress’ and Hindu Mahasabha’s agitation for the Partition of that province. The Hindu majoritarian impulse that led to the Partition in Bengal thus crippled the Federation’s struggle for Dalit political autonomy. Keywords: Jogendranath Mandal, Scheduled Castes Federation, partition, Bengal, the politics of caste and communalism Introduction The proposition is two-fold: first, that the success of the Congress’ and Hindu Mahasabha’s demand that Bengal be partitioned necessarily entailed their deliberate defeat of Jogendranath Mandal and the Scheduled Castes Federation; second, and following from this, that the partition itself be grasped as signifying a The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 49, 3 (2012): 321–64 SAGE Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC DOI: 10.1177/0019464612455273 Downloaded from ier.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29, 2012 322 / DWAIPAYAN SEN moment that foreclosed possibilities for the further development of Mandal’s and the Federation’s advocacy of Dalit political autonomy. Inured as we are to understanding partition’s significance within the rubric of the communal impasse between unmarked Hindus and Muslims, our historiographical sensitivities remain insufficient to understanding the peculiar problematic that the partition posed for Mandal and his hardly insubstantial following in the Scheduled Castes Federation.1 Received historiography has it that Dalits were largely responsive to the Congress’ and Mahasabha’s anti-Muslim exhortations in their bid to consolidate Hindu unity.2 No doubt there exists evidence of their participation in communal violence and their receptiveness to ideologies and practices of Hindu communal unity. It is indeed true that many amongst them supported the demand for Partition. Yet it is necessary to place within the same analytical field the substantial evidence that exists of their deep-seated reservations with the Congress’ and Mahasabha’s projects of anti-Muslim Hindu unity orchestrated by caste Hindu leaders, as well these nationalist parties’ efforts to nullify the Federation. Reconceived thus, I suggest that Mandal and the Federation’s protracted marginalisation, which originated in the critical period under consideration, might well be grasped as a necessity conjoined to the majoritarian imperatives of Indian nationalism in Bengal. As I will show, Mandal’s was a critique of the constitutively communal terms on which the transfer of power and Partition were decided. Achieving the long sought after Hindu unity of these years entailed manufacturing the defeat of Dalit political autonomy in Bengal. In what follows, I attempt to defend these propositions by locating the Federation’s participation in the Muslim League’s Direct Action Day against the backdrop of the two parties’ recent strategic political alliance; detailing the circumstances of the 1946 elections which resulted in the Congress winning the majority of reserved Scheduled Caste legislative seats; documenting Mandal’s attempts at getting Ambedkar elected to the Constituent Assembly; narrating Mandal’s quite exceptional view on the Calcutta riots; discussing his role in the Interim Government of India; elucidating the significance of unity between Dalit and Muslim political parties at a time when this was near unthinkable; and finally, by assessing the fate of Mandal’s anti-partition campaign. In so doing, 1 I have described Mandal’s following thus, because of the debatable view that Mandal and the Federation were essentially marginal political forces amongst Dalits in Bengal. It should also be borne in mind that Mandal and the Federation drew on support from some of the veteran Scheduled Caste MLAs of the time, who either did not contest, or lost, in the 1946 elections. I am thinking in particular of leaders like Amulyadhan Ray, Anukul Chandra Das or Rasik Lal Biswas, some of whom, despite being elected Congressmen, subsequently experienced a deep disillusionment with the Congress. 2 See, in particular, Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Protest and Identity; Chatterji, Bengal Divided. The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 49, 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29, 2012 ‘No matter how, Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 323 I touch on key moments in Mandal’s and the Federation’s trajectory through these final two years of British rule in India. Another view of the partition is possible, by bringing to bear his and the Federation’s critique of the Congress’ claim to represent the Dalits on the processes through which the decision to divide Bengal were reached. I hope to show that the partition in Bengal was as much about a nationalist resolution of the caste question, as it undoubtedly was about the politics of religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Papering over caste-difference was constitutive of the seemingly united Hindu demand for partitioning Bengal. Too long has the analytical tyranny of communalism overshadowed the insights Mandal might have offered on this troubled moment. The Dalit–Muslim Alliance The events of mid-August 1946, while typically understood to confirm caste Hindus’ fears about Muslim domination and thus the justification behind the partition, have yet to be adequately situated in the context of the three years of Dalit and Muslim political alliance that preceded them. Although these years are often used to explain the growing apprehensions amongst the Hindu intelligentsia they were also the only time in the history of Bengal, (including right up to the present moment) that governmental power in Calcutta was wielded by representatives of communities socio-economically most disadvantaged, namely, Dalits and Muslims. In the political history of Bengal then, they constitute a short period analytically untapped for their potentially radical vision. Mandal was at the centre of this novel political aspiration. He joined the previous Nazimuddin ministry shortly before founding the Bengal branch of the Federation in 1943, and was subsequently chosen to join the Suhrawardy cabinet, as Minister in charge of the Judicial and Legislative department and Works and Buildings.3 Mandal grounded the solidarity between Dalits and Muslims, significantly, in the perceived political–economic congruence of the two communities. In his view, the spirit animating his alliance with the Muslim League was closely linked to the socio-economic circumstances experienced by Dalits and Muslims alike. The shared experience of the grinding poverty of rural Bengal was common to both their communities.4 The following reification held force: the British and caste Hindus were capital, Dalits and Muslims, labour.5 The vast majority of the Dalit 3 In a recent publication, Bandyopadhyay perhaps mistakenly dates the formation of the Bengal Federation to 1945. Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Protest and Identity, p. 249. 4 There were, no doubt, earlier instances of their common cause, like Namasudra and Muslim indifference, even resistance, to the Swadeshi movement championed by leading Bengali nationalists in the first decade of the century. 5 The point is somewhat akin to that made by Partha Chatterjee in his essay ‘Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal’. Therein, he wrote, ‘As far as agrarian relations in eastern Bengal were The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 49, 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier.sagepub.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29, 2012 . in fact. the Prime Minister of Pakistan. 7 The Day of Direct Action was a Muslim League protest of the Cabinet Mission proposals. 354. p. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. must be placed in the context of the cooperation that developed between the Scheduled Castes Federation and the Muslim League over the previous three years. 6 ‘Mr Mandal’s Letter of Resignation to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. There is a longer history of solidarity between leaders of the Dalit and Muslim communities that stands insufficiently treated. 8 Star of India. as it were. Recurrent Exodus of Minorities.. 165. one might argue that even if in class terms an elite had developed amongst caste-subalterns. would further the cause of communal peace and harmony.324 / DWAIPAYAN SEN population was poor. 13 August 1946.8 concerned. The spirit motivating the political alliance in the domain of elite politics then was to draw on this shared experience. suppressed and oppressed people and anti-Fascist parties who have been unjustly bypassed by the British government and who are ready to make common cause with the League in its fight for the equal freedom of the Muslims. to be only able to comprehend the League’s concerns for Dalits as cynical and instrumental. We seem. the Star of India on 13 August 1946 featured a poster calling for. p. they were not considered sufficiently distinct from the communities they represented politically. and undermining the foundations of vested interest and privilege. 9 October 1950’. to end “British slavery” and fight the “contemplated caste-Hindu domination’’’. ‘Muslims through the country were “to suspend all business. 1926–1935’. and to observe the complete hartal”.7 Thus. Chatterjee. were considered part of the peasant community whereas Hindu zamindars and talukdars were not. the available evidence seems to suggest that the crucial element which deflected peasant agitations into anti-Hindus movement was not that most zamindars were Hindu and that the grievances of the predominantly Muslim tenantry consequently took on anti-Hindu overtones. and had been deprived of formal education—as were the majority of Muslims. ‘Representatives of minorities. the Hindus. sharecroppers and workers. The evidence points. There was no seeming contradiction in the elite amongst Dalits making demands on behalf of the masses of their economically less privileged communities. including agriculturalists. crafting policies benefitting the vast majority of the population of Bengal. the Adibasis.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. the tribals. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. as a result of the call for the Day of Direct Action. p. the Christians other peoples are welcome at the meeting’. 11. the Scheduled Castes. 49. Das.sagepub. Similarly. but the fact that Muslim rent-receivers where they did exist. to structures of political authority and ideology quite autonomous from the straightforward representation of the agrarian structure’. The Mission was mandated with overseeing the transfer of power.6 The events that transpired in August of 1946 then. while promoting the mutual welfare of the vast bulk of Bengal’s population. ‘Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal. Public meetings were to be held on that day to explain the League’s rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan and express the determination of Indian Muslims to “vindicate” their honour. in Indian Commission of Jurists. 2012 . 1905–1947. Mandal was: persuaded that my co-operation with the League and its Ministry would lead to the undertaking on a wide scale of legislative and administrative measures which. Communal Riots in Bengal. he would advise his people to embrace Islam’.13 A full appreciation of the political sentiments motivating the events of mid-August 1946 requires particular attention to the contemporary activities of the Federation in mofussil towns.D. Speakers urged the audience to have faith in the leadership of 9 The Poona Pact was an agreement arrived at between representatives of the contemporaneously termed depressed classes and caste Hindus in 1932. WBSA). I will unravel the full import of its simultaneity with Hindu–Muslim violence in due course. 14 August 1946. Rajbhoj. Government of West Bengal. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. ‘about 400 persons of the Scheduled Caste community of Gopalganj paraded through the main thoroughfares of the town under the leadership of Kiran Chandra Biswas shouting. “Down with British Imperialism”. dated 21 August 1946. 191/46. to have joint electorates with reserved seats for the depressed classes. 15 August 1946 was also coincident with the Federation’s ‘Anti-Poona Pact Day’.N. Although not too widely acknowledged.9 A day prior. WBSA. rather than separate electorates for depressed classes and caste Hindus as pronounced by British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald’s Communal Award earlier the same year. Kolkata. Inspector General of Police. File No. from which the subsequent paragraphs are drawn. The Indian Economic and Social History Review.11 He informed that he had received a letter from the Secretary of the Muslim League supporting the Scheduled Castes and added that they must take joint action to ‘force the Congress and the Government to concede their demands’. Mandal presided over a meeting where the speakers condemned the Cabinet Mission and the Congress for by passing the legitimate demands of the Scheduled Castes and called upon the members to be prepared for any future struggle under the leadership of Dr Ambedkar and Mr. P.12 It is of no small significance that a time so unavoidably associated with the Day of Direct Action should also have been designated ‘Anti-Poona Pact Day’. ‘fully subscribed to the view expressed by Dr Ambedkar that if the Scheduled Castes were not given separate representation. Intelligence Branch. adding ‘that he had lost faith in Hindu religion’. 191/46. In the wake of M.10 A procession of Federation and League activists paraded through several streets in central Calcutta and converged at the designated Ochterlony monument. West Bengal State Archives (hereafter File No. 11 Copy of S. 49. 12 Ibid. “Down with the zamindari system”. as was their association with the Muslim League.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. C. WBSA contains extensive primary material in this regard. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 325 Mandal and the Scheduled Castes Federation had responded in kind.I. 22 October 1946. A meeting was subsequently held with Jagabandhu Biswas in the chair. 2012 .A.. 10 Star of India. 191/46: Scheduled Castes Federation (Renamed as Republican Party).14 On 15 August 1946. Suffice it to add that the Federation’s agitation in the latter half of 1946 was a nationwide affair. Jinnah’s nomination of Mandal to the interim government several months later. Office of Dy. General Secretary of the All India Scheduled Castes Federation. 191/46.N. 14 File No. and “We want separate electorates”’. Jinnah.‘No matter how.B.sagepub. File No. the Secretary of the Calcutta District Muslim League issued a statement urging Muslims to support the Federation’s protest.D. 13 Morning News. paraded the main thoroughfares of Jessore town on 15 August under the leadership of Amulya Dhan Ray. spoke on the growth and development of the organisation and the difficulties which had been overcome by Dr Ambedkar in the interests of the upliftment of the Scheduled Castes. Secretary of the District Scheduled Castes Federation. They criticised the proposals of the Cabinet Mission and declared that the Ministers had not looked to the interests of the minorities. and Secretary of the District Scheduled Castes’ Federation. ‘about 50 Scheduled Caste students moved in procession through Khulna town on 15th August shouting “Down with Poona Pact”. About 300 persons. 49. They urged members of the Scheduled Castes to be ready to fight against the Congress and the British in alliance with the Muslims. without a doubt. In Khulna. Speakers. in order to wrest their legitimate demands.326 / DWAIPAYAN SEN Dr Ambedkar and declared that if their demands were not considered by the British Government and their interests overlooked when the Interim Government was formed. Maharaj in the chair. Ambedkar Zindabad and Benai Gandhi Murdhabad’. the presence of a political will and consciousness entirely resistant to caste Hindu and Congress dominance in the The Indian Economic and Social History Review. a ‘large procession organised by the Scheduled Castes Federation and consisting of about 1. Assistant Public Prosecutor. urged members of the Scheduled Caste community not to cooperate with the Interim Government as their interests had been overlooked by the Cabinet Mission.B.L. with K. They declared that Mr Jogijiban Ram was not the chosen representative of the 50 million Scheduled Caste Hindus in the country. He urged the audience to enrol themselves as members of the Federation and to fight for their legitimate rights. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. This procession was followed by a meeting held at the B. All these events evidence.sagepub. The procession terminated at the Khulna Municipal Park where a meeting was held with Ramdayal Das of Faridpur in the chair. and Jyotish Chandra Mandal. 2012 .500 persons moved through the main thorough-fares of Kanchrapara town shouting Dr. Resolutions were passed condemning the proposals of the Cabinet Mission and demanding separate electorates for the Scheduled Caste community. under the chairmanship of Rasik Lal Biswas. They appealed to the audience to unite under the flag of the All India Scheduled Castes Federation. about 200 persons attended a meeting organised by the local branch of the Scheduled Castes Federation on 17 August at Kharagpur. Members of the Muslim League who were present delivered similar speeches. Speakers explained that the Scheduled Castes had been duped by the caste Hindus. a student. “No compromise with the enemy” and other slogans’. including Manohar Dhali. In Midnapore. supporters of the Scheduled Castes Federation. Patel. who had defected several years prior from the Congress.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. and to follow the instructions of Dr Ambedkar. they would be prepared to lay down their lives in the interests of their community. On 31 August 1946. Sarkar Hall. M. 18 Letter from D.M. File No. the Depressed Classes League.21 Sekhar 15 It is not the case that that the Federation was solely concerned with questions of representation. they suggest the considerable pool of support the Federation drew on in rural Bengal. many of their resolutions. the institution of minimum wages. has been freighted with tremendous importance in recent historiography: the ‘integration’ of the Scheduled Castes into mainstream nationalism19. he also states in the new preface of the same edition that his main conclusions have not changed. amongst other issues. the Deputy Director of Intelligence concluded.C.15 Mandal once described this as the chance to ‘stand up on our own feet’ and not be dependent on either the Congress or the League. Similar protests occurred elsewhere in India.16 Similarly. The fact that the Congress swept the Scheduled Caste reserved seats by winning in 24 out of 30. 16 Intelligence Bureau Notes. a stunning response to Ambedkar’s and Mandal’s claim that Congress did not represent their communities.. 23 November 1945. WBSA. education. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 327 social and political life of Bengal. ‘Transfer of Power’. p. it is found that branches of the All India Scheduled Castes Federation exist in nine districts while a branch of the All India Depressed Classes League exists in only the subdivision of one district’.‘No matter how. (most recently in the post-script to the second edition of his book Caste. 21 Chatterji. ‘Scheduled Castes Federation is the main organization of Scheduled Caste [sic]’. 230. or the ‘extraordinary success of propaganda about a Hindu ‘community’. 20 Bandyopadhyay. 2012 . 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Brayden in a letter written in July 1945 to his superior. ‘On a reference to the different districts in the Province. the ‘crisis’ of the Federation brought about by its own inadequacies20. workers’ and women’s rights. The Federation’s struggle for Dalit political autonomy was at stake—the demand for recognition as a distinct political community to be represented by leaders selected by the Scheduled Caste communities alone. Ahmed.A. that the Federation ‘. the Viceroy’s estimation in a letter to Pethick-Lawrence in late 1945.is probably more representative of SCs opinion than any other’. London. 191/46. The 1946 Election Indeed. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Brayden to G. this question had been posed with particular urgency only months prior to Anti-Poona Pact Day during the 1946 elections. equitable prices for produce. Bengal Divided. bluntly noted. 191/46. IOR/L/PO/10/22.sagepub. Much of their pamphlet literature. and their various leaders’ concerns included questions of economic justice.A. British Library.17 Comparing the spread of the Federation to the Congress’ own organisation. zamindari abolition. 19 While it is true that Sekhar Bandyopadhyay has gradually complicated his argument about Scheduled Caste integration. 9 October 1945. 17 Letter from the Viceroy to Lord Pethick-Lawrence. As an Intelligence Bureau Officer. Protest and Identity).com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.18 Here is one answer to the vexed question of whether or not the Congress could justifiably claim to be the true representative of the Dalits.. 49. File No. Perhaps most significantly. WBSA. one P. one D. other indices of Dalit political consciousness might well include the fact that of the 121 candidates who stood for the primary elections in Bengal.K. That said. as opposed to the Congress.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.23 My own evidence corroborates this stance. Rawat. or that the property and education qualifications in force excluded the majority of the Dalit population from franchise. But there is more. IOR/L/PJ/10/50. See. a development I will shortly address. ‘Confidential— Brief for Dr Ambedkar’s Visit to the U. 142 were Congress. only 29 were from the Congress. only 25 were Congress. Or that of the 75 candidates who successfully emerged from the primary elections to the General elections to contest the 30 seats reserved for Scheduled Caste MLAs. it is possible to push further. 1948. 2012 . of popular will as well’. ‘Making Claims for Power’. it seems clear that the British government anticipated this eventuality: See. 153 were Congress. It is only thus one might appreciate the coincidence of Partition and the Federation’s defeat in Bengal.22 Such assessments have been called into question by Ramnarayan S. In Jessore. a Federation candidate who won the second-highest number of votes in the primary elections. 23 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. ‘Partition Politics and Acchut Identity’. 24 Indeed. p. New Delhi. 1946’. In Faridpur. Such data raises serious questions about the circumstances under which 24 of these 25 Congress candidates would emerge victorious in the general election. and whether the results of the general election ought to be read as a reliable indication of Dalit political preferences. neither did they concede that the Federation. the Congress’ hegemony over the Scheduled Castes of Bengal might further be qualified on account of the fact that four of their leaders subsequently defected to Mandal’s Federation after the elections. represented the Dalits on account of it having contested a limited number of seats. To begin with. Rawat.24 However. failed to win either of the two seats reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates in the general election—both went to the Congress. though still in a very limited sense. whereas Independents (the largest category) numbered 37.sagepub. British Library. both of the Federation’s candidates who won the second and third highest number of votes in the primary elections. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. who demonstrated the considerable weight to the Federation’s claim that the electoral arrangements under the Poona Pact in force during the election were heavily tilted in favour of the Congress’ candidates in the United Provinces. London. 49. Rawat. of a total of 383 candidates sent to the general elections.25 This being the case.328 / DWAIPAYAN SEN Bandyopadhyay has interpreted these results to have been ‘an index. ‘From Alienation to Integration’. 373. 25 The corresponding figures for the totals of all provinces where primary elections were held are as follows: of a total 505 candidates in the primary elections. Return Showing the Results of Elections. and more assiduously detail the circumstances and consequences of this crucial election. failed to win either of the two reserved seats in the general election. Mandal was one of but two Federation candidates all over India to have won in the election—even Ambedkar did not emerge victorious— from amongst the 151 seats in the various provincial assemblies reserved for the 22 Bandyopadhyay. Caste Hindu Presiding and Polling Officers snatched ballot papers from Scheduled Caste male and female voters in spite of protest and put in the Congress Candidate’s box. Here is Mandal.sagepub. Elections were stopped before due time for which many voters could not cast their votes. dvitiya khanda. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 329 Scheduled Castes. p. yet this only makes the depth of their anti-Federation sentiment all the more instructive. writing to the Governor of Bengal. Caste Hindu presiding and polling officers hobnobbed with caste Hindu Congressmen at all centres and encourage proxy and false personation by turning deaf ear to and disregarding objections raised by many polling agents at many polling stations. It is undoubtedly true that the Congress’ sheer organisational machinery and financial clout dwarfed the Federation’s. Polling stations wrongly selected at corner and caste Hindu areas causing inconvenience to Scheduled Caste voters and giving undue privilege to Congressmen. mahajans and school teachers threatened and stopped Scheduled Caste voters from voting. Masayuki Usuda has written that ‘there seems to have been a considerable degree of obstruction arising during the campaign’. Promulgation of Section 144 was utilised by educated and clever caste Hindu Congressmen to threaten illiterate Scheduled Caste voters with fear of imprisonment for attending polling stations. At some polling stations where the number of Scheduled Caste voters was very large. ‘Pushed towards the Partition’. All these facts and many others materially affected the whole election. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. An extensive quotation is required: Congressmen prevented Scheduled Caste voters from voting and attending many polling stations by force and intimidation. 252. They instructed and persuaded many voters to vote for the Congress Candidate. about the 1946 election. Mahapran Jogendranath. they delivered lectures showing pictures in which they depicted me as a man of very immoral character and narrated many false stories to prove me to be a man of vicious character which adversely prejudiced my voters and materially affected my election. More than 50% caste Hindu votes polled for the Congress candidate was proxy votes. In some cases. 49. At many polling centres. talukders. Usuda.‘No matter how. pp. it is difficult to calculate the precise effect of these astounding allegations Mandal levelled at the Congress on the 26 Mandal.26 In the absence of a detailed voter lists. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Many Scheduled Caste voters were refused ballot papers on frivolous grounds. Caste Hindu zaminders.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. 21–22. the Caste Hindu Presiding Officers opened polling booths much later than the due time and harassed my voters by making undue delay in issuing ballot papers for which my voters had to wait till late at night and many of them could not record their votes. Praying for kind orders re-election. Congressmen gave bribe to voters of different communities. 2012 . Jogendranath had to be defeated’. did not prevent this from occurring. Reaching back into this history. As Mandal recalled. Mandal was unable to canvass for the remaining Federation candidates in their own constituencies. The presiding officers. The Congress.29 Mandal eventually won from a reserved seat in the south Bakarganj constituency. nevertheless. 29 Ibid. to their defeat. in his view. 5 April 1946. but in lieu of several amongst their female relatives as well. as will soon be elaborated. Aprakasita Atmakatha. which sought to convince his superior of the ‘remarkably little trouble’ in Bengal) that there were in fact cases of Government Officer’s partiality towards a particular party. 123. Mandal.330 / DWAIPAYAN SEN election results if they are indeed true. ‘No matter how. Mandal mentioned the following transgressions in connection with the 1946 election in the northern Bakarganj general constituency. It is possible that these infringements were what Governor Burrows had in mind when he conceded to Lord Pethick-Lawrence (in contrast to the thrust of his report. well past the time the polling was meant to have ended. It is the coincidence of this imperative—‘had to be defeated’—with Partition’s politics that I wish to underscore. pp.sagepub. 126. decided that Mandal had to be stopped in his tracks. because of Mandal’s absolutely critical and largely unacknowledged role in ensuring Ambedkar’s election to the constituent 27 Mandal. who along with significant support from the large pool of wellwishers from amongst the Namasudra and wider Dalit community funded the election campaigns. the only candidate who could possibly carry the confidence of the various political outfits in northern Bakarganj at the time despite his being imprisoned in Meerut jail in their bid to outdo Mandal. He heard that thousands of voters had cast their ballots under false pretexts. not wishing to instigate disaffection.. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. p. the Congress put up one Manoranjan Gupta.. historic. Second. could only afford to put up eight candidates for election. Many women voters had been allowed to cast ballots not only for themselves. Burrows to Lord Pethick-Lawrence. What makes such activities all the more telling are the stringent financial circumstances under which the Federation operated. areas from which the first stirrings of Namasudra political activity emerged. 126–27.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.27 Having to attend to campaigning for his own election and the constraints of time and money. the very heartland of Namasudra political strength. Ibid. containing as it did Pirojpur and Patuakhali municipalities. 2012 . 28 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. one of the two elections in which he was a candidate (and the same constituency from where he had initially been elected in 1936 amidst unprecedented circumstances): several gazetted officers took it upon themselves to sign several thousand election ballots in favour of the Congress candidate and added these to the totals at the election office late at night.28 The political ideology he represented had become absolutely objectionable.J. leading. 49. he credited the Dalit voters of that constituency for his own historic election in 1946. p. Letter from F. as one of the two 30 There is considerable misinformation about this election. Congress has spoiled the entire field for you. I hope the evidence I present will be of some relevance to the broader set of debates Nigam discusses. 31 Mandal. was the surest claimant to the mantle of legislative representativeness. This emphatic assertion comes in the context of a rebuttal of Sudipta Kaviraj’s claim that Ambedkar was critically reliant on Congress support and Nehru’s dominance inside the Congress. including the incumbent Upendranath Edbar. p. 100. Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability. where Congress was the ruling party. but in Bengal. See Jaffrelot. amongst others. p.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. The implications of this should be obvious. and it was through their and various students’ organisational efforts that Mandal’s campaign succeeded. After today and tonight the vote collection will begin. not in Bombay. Besides this. The zamindars and talukdars of this area. I agree with Nigam’s impulse. Indeed. On returning to north Barisal after an absence of several days.sagepub. which the Deputy Magistrate rejected. and in his view the district Congress activists had made the most of his absence. his very candidacy emerged as a product of considerable debate amongst the Namasudras of southern Barisal about which leader of several.30 He had been approached by several prominent Namasudra social welfare workers of Pirojpur to seek election from south Bakarganj. are canvassing at the prajas’ homes. Aprakasita Atmakatha. one Surendranath Sikdar. He had devoted his time to south Barisal. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Another instance of this. 49. is Aditya Nigam’s mis-attribution of credit to the Muslim League in a recent blog posting: ‘Ambedkar was elected to the Constituent Assembly as independent member from Bengal with Muslim League support’. so much so that some are staying the night in the cowsheds. The caste-Hindu male and female students of the colleges are going round the homes of Namasudra leaders and are spending the night in some of these homes. Nigam. they are evenly distributing money. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 331 assembly. A gathering impulse of hagiographic exaggeration of Ambedkar’s single-handed impact on Indian society through its constitution does serious damage to an unexcited assessment of causes and consequences in political history’. 2012 . yet would argue that Mandal and his movement in Bengal be credited with Ambedkar’s election. bursting out in tears and narrating the following to him: Sir. where he was elected after winning the support of the Muslim League’. Many caste-Hindu vakils. Christophe Jaffrelot writes that in 1946. Mandal contended against the smear campaign the Congress had launched against him in northern Barisal. Mandal was elected from South Barisal. Ambedkar ‘had contested elections to join this body. Please consider what you will do now. 138.31 Despite the forethought the Congress appeared to have given to such adverse circumstances. Mandal recalled a student leader. who never set foot in the prajas’ homes. again. The basis of his candidacy was called into question given that his residence was in north Barisal and an election petition was filed against him. moktars and doctors are wandering the Namasudra villages canvassing against you. ‘Reflections on Sudipta Kaviraj’s ‘Marxism in Translation’. taking advantage of your absence.‘No matter how. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. In one of his reports assessing the probable outcomes of the 1946 election. Governor’s Report.32 How would Burrows have known that there would be such a dramatic swing in the number of Scheduled Caste seats that Congress would clinch. for the sceptic this may not constitute unimpeachable evidence per se.sagepub. Burrows’ casual bracketing of the monetary influence likely to be exerted in determining the outcome of the 1946 elections is of obvious relevance to the line of argument pursued herein. Mandal’s election in 1946 was all the more exceptional if considered in light of some of the contemporaneous correspondence between the Governor of Bengal and the Viceroy that suggests the charge of bribery. ‘by reason of enormous disparity in the voting strength of the Scheduled Castes and the Caste Hindus. the All India Scheduled Castes Federation’s memorandum to the Cabinet Mission which argued that the Federation’s routing in the election was because the joint electorates in which seats have been reserved for the Scheduled Castes have. To be sure. 34 Is it. the Congress and Muslim League respectively will come out in considerably greater strength than at present—and that. Written on 5 November 1945. 7 January 1946. catapulting him into an unexpected seniority within the Federation itself.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. failing agreement between Muslim League and Congress. of utterly dubious legality. become rotten boroughs from the 32 Governor’s Report.. 5 November 1945. but the present outlook is that. 49. in the General Constituencies and Muslim Constituencies. the significance of which cannot be underestimated.332 / DWAIPAYAN SEN sole successful Federation candidates all over India.34 Consider as well. to condition the expression of Dalits’ political preferences. but it strongly suggests that the electoral results were shaped by such premeditated attempts by the Congress. and the elections had not as yet occurred? A prior report casts some light on the matter. mere coincidence that a considerable number of the candidates who did eventually win with Congress support were relatively unknown figures in legislative politics? 33 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. and that too. wrote: ‘The Hindus will be a solid party of probably not less than 90 and not more than 96—according to the numbers of Scheduled Caste seats captured by the Congress.33 Consider this candid turn of phrase: Caste Hindu money is likely to influence the Scheduled Caste vote and elected members. Frederick Burrows. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. 2012 . Burrows speculated to Wavell on the outcome as follows: It is rash to attempt to forecast the result of the elections. we shall see a Muslim League Ministry with probably no Caste Hindu support and probably little Scheduled Caste support (Caste Hindu money is likely to influence the Scheduled Caste vote and elected members).. the Governor. There are 30 Scheduled Caste seats of which probably at least 24 will go to the Congress’. with such precision? Especially given that he wrote very early in the year. for instance. was a ‘fraud’ upon them. 2012 . Memorandum to the Cabinet Mission. the electoral mechanisms under the Poona Pact predominantly ensured the election of Scheduled Caste candidates palatable to the caste Hindu electorate and were thus unreliable as a measure of ascertaining the independent political preferences of Scheduled Castes themselves.. Furthermore. pp. while on the subject of representativeness. the President of the Muslim League in Great Britain. Ali Muhammad Khan. by the Congress’ own admission not a single one of its Scheduled Caste candidates who won in the 1946 elections was included in the list of 72 representatives from Bengal to the All India Congress Committee that year. 1946.36 The Federation’s point was that by implicitly enabling Hindu majoritarianism. 49–54. Indeed. Indeed. p.35 The system of joint electorates had made a ‘mockery’ of the Scheduled Castes’ right to send their truest representatives to the legislatures and as such. 36 Ibid. In ‘An Open Letter to the British Cabinet Mission and the Leaders of the Country’ which Dharam Prakash. 49. pp. delineated a near identical interpretation of the 1946 elections as they concerned the Scheduled Castes in his ‘Open Letter to the British Government’. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. President of Provincial Congress Committee in Calcutta. wishing to be their tools and get them elected in the joint electorates exclusively with Caste Hindu votes’. even if everyone of the Scheduled Caste voter were to come to poll.. who have been able to put up Scheduled Caste candidates. Exactly the same sort of situation exist [sic] in other provinces’. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. The memorandum included an appendix analysing the relative strength of the caste Hindu voters and Scheduled Caste voters in constituencies in which seats were reserved for Scheduled Castes in the Bombay provinces which showed ‘how the Scheduled Caste voters are vastly outnumbered by the Caste Hindu voters and how impossible it is for the Scheduled Caste voters to win the reserved seat by dint of their voting strength. 5 April 1946.38 Their conspicuous absence from any position of authority within the Bengal Congress’ party structure thus offers a comment on the depth of their integration. 4. 37 Congress Handbook.sagepub. 4–6. p.‘No matter how. 38 Ibid. founder of the All India Depressed Classes League sent to Surendra Mohan Ghosh. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 333 point of view of the Scheduled Castes and pocket boroughs from the point of view of the Caste Hindus. although there were serious differences between Dalit leaders in the Congress and those in the Federation.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Prakash opined that the parity granted to Hindus and Muslims 35 All India Scheduled Castes Federation. 16.37 Neither was a single one of them president or secretary of any of the district Congress Committees in the entirety of Bengal. representatives of the Depressed Classes League (the Congress body) were also disappointed with the absence of their representatives from the Cabinet Mission’s deliberations—the same context that motivated the Scheduled Castes Federation’s support and joining in the Muslim League’s protest. But. 49. 41 Certainly other members of the Federation concurred with this assessment. burning down Gandhiji caps. 5. p. He reasoned about the very possibility of Ambedkar’s work in the Indian Constitution as follows: ‘But Jogendranath’s achievement lay at the root of this. as we know. Ambedkar’s election to the Constituent Assembly in spite of violent Congress opposition’. and throwing mud on revered Gandhiji’. 2012 . 1946. Mandal’s attribution of his election to a sequence of events culminating in the existence of the constitutional provisions for the Scheduled Castes of postcolonial India is all the more remarkable. Thus they are the recipients of the gratitude of the Scheduled Castes of all of Bharat’. Report of the Second Session. who. Having noted how Mahatma Gandhi and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had agreed that the Cabinet Mission’s ‘declaration is the best form of what the British Government could do in the present circumstances’. We have sanguine hope and complete faith that the important and serious problem of the Depressed Classes shall receive due consideration at the hands of the British Cabinet Mission and leaders of the country. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Over and above all. at the same time. and that Jogendranath was elected by the Namasudras of Pirojpur and Patuakhali municipality. he has rendered greatest service to the Scheduled Castes community in India by securing Dr. as President-elect of the All India Scheduled Castes Federation’s student conference held in Nagpur in late December. picking up a quarrel with the Congress. ‘An Open Letter to the British Cabinet’. Aprakasita Atmakatha.D.41 It is undeniable however (irrespective of the Congress’ subsequent change in attitude).com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. fair play. p. Although he scolded the Federation for ‘cursing their twice-born Hindu brethren in the hour of elections. All India Scheduled Castes Students’ Federation. 129..39 Such hopes.sagepub. devotion to duty and magnanimity. hurling abuses at them.40 I leave aside the question of whether Mandal’s assessment was a reasonable one. 40 The Indian Economic and Social History Review.. his objections were nearly identical to those expressed by Mandal and Ambedkar. Manikpuri’s introduction of Mandal. were misplaced—the Mission and the Congress were only too eager to bypass the ‘problem of the Depressed Classes’. Mandal. perhaps. that within the historical present Ambedkar 39 Dharam Prakash. we cannot conceal the unpleasant fact that. Given the exceptional constraints recounted above. as suggested by J.334 / DWAIPAYAN SEN came at the cost of Depressed Classes representation. especially given Congress’ supposed cooptation of Ambedkar following on the transfer of power. will give evidence of their sense of justice. Following a listing of his various honours: ‘. Prakash concluded that ‘We also do not doubt their honesty and good intentions’. the missions have overlooked the claims of the Depressed Classes by an error of their judgment and that that wrong can still be rectified by the amendment of the proposals. p. 44 Ibid. whom Mandal had directed to elicit support from amongst the MLAs whose votes would count. Hindu Mahasabha. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. came away disappointed. Mullick and P. It is thus absolutely clear that even at this stage. They have circulated vile falsehoods and much propaganda against us. even as the latter returned to Delhi utterly dejected.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.B. 146. I have had to listen to various types of heartrending abuse. indeed. had also decided to contest the election. making Mandal’s efforts to get Ambedkar elected all the more challenging. 2012 . one of the senior-most leaders of the Bengal Congress.. 49. Gayanath Biswas. Thakur. Kiran Sankar Roy. all the caste Hindu organizations have tried to prevent the election of Dr. Both M. Ambedkar to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal.‘No matter how. Narendra Narayan Roy.R. He hoped to gain the support of the European MLAs in Bengal as he saw no prospects of his election from his base in Bombay.sagepub. major Dalit leaders in Bengal. Dr. quite the opposite.44 Various student activists of the Federation. He complained to Mandal that there was no chance of his being elected from any other province except Bengal and even that did not come to fruition.42 It was then that Mandal took it upon himself to get Ambedkar elected. The Congress apparently kept one of their MLAs from Tangail. the Congress launched its own efforts to stop Ambedkar from being elected. He personally secured the agreement of the independent Rajbangshi MLA from Rangpur. but upon hearing that they would not be participating. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 335 would not have been initially elected to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal were it not for Mandal’s efforts amidst entirely adverse circumstances. Ibid. I have been given thousands of rupees—this type of untruth 42 Mandal. Ambedkar’s Election to the Constituent Assembly Ambedkar travelled to Calcutta following the announcement of the elections to the Constituent Assembly from the various provincial assemblies. from meeting with Mandal evidently to stymie the latter’s campaign.. Ambedkar has to be defeated’. 144–53. Mandal described the Congress’ and Hindu Mahasabha’s vituperation towards him for trying to get Ambedkar elected at a Federation meeting in late 1946 as follows: You have seen to what extent the Congress. the much commented cooptation of Ambedkar by the Congress had not occurred. as ‘no matter how. p. 145. Before long. pp. was allegedly requested to stay away from the All-India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay that year. Aprakasita Atmakatha. the Congress was quite intent to ensure his exclusion.43 Mandal entered nomination papers in Ambedkar’s name. undertook the work of his campaign. 43 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. and commenced a campaign to elicit support. 47 First. 46 In a congratulatory letter to Ambedkar.336 / DWAIPAYAN SEN has been publicised. casts some light on the matter. Although they had joined Congress. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. It was an unprecedented affair in Calcutta. Mandal described the procession as follows: ‘. The procession paraded along many main roads and streets covering a distance of about 10 miles. p. 2012 . the Congress had ‘done grave injustice to the Scheduled Castes of all provinces’ ‘in depriving them of their due shares in the Constituent Assembly’. Mandal declined any reimbursement. Mullick heard that Gayanath Biswas and Dwarika Nath Baruri would vote for Ambedkar. I have digested so much poison that everything from my nails to the hair on my head ought to have turned blue. Dwarkanath Baruri. 31 December 1946. 12 October 1946. Mandal received a telephone call from Khwaja Shahabuddin confirming the former’s prediction during a conversation earlier in the day that once M. Scheduled Castes were disproportionately 45 ‘Bangiya Pradesik Taphasili Jati Phedareshaner Caturthha Barshik Adhibeshan’. Titled ‘Why We Left the Congress’. he would do accordingly. Ambedkar Jindabad”. pp. Dr Bholanath Biswas and Gayanath Biswas. A letter published in Jagaran (the Federation mouthpiece founded by Mandal) on 12 October 1946. see also Jagaran. and not Ambedkar himself. Mahapran Jogendranath o Babasaheb Ambedkar. dvitiya khanda. All went on smoothly’. “Boycott Congress”. so on and so forth.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. No police help was requisitioned.R. several of the MLAs Mandal had encouraged to vote for Ambedkar defected from the Congress. ‘as days passed by we became doubtful about the Congress attitude towards the Scheduled Castes.45 Although Gayanath Biswas was elected a Congressman.B. and news of Ambedkar’s election was celebrated at a victory procession taken out throughout Calcutta the following day and subsequent festivities Mandal hosted at his own home. 121. respectively. Mandal to B. “Benia Gandhi Murdabad”.N.’ their recent defection. he was willing to support Ambedkar and sent word of his intentions to Mandal from his concealed location. claiming whatever expenses had been occurred were for the wider political community. Letter from J.. 49. and extended assurances about the legitimate rights and interests of the Scheduled Castes. Mandal had also received the commitments of MLAs from Jessore and Pabna. 25 July 1946. the four MLAs deemed it their ‘duty to give our reasons to our constituents in particular and the public in general as to. A crowd of Federation activists gathered outside the Assembly to receive news of the elections results on the day they were to be announced. Ambedkar.46 Shortly after the election.sagepub.. The evening before the election at the Assembly. When they met in Delhi several days later. “Down with Cabinet Mission”. in Mandal. “Scheduled Castes Federation Jindabad”. Bholanath Biswas and Haran Chandra Barman. 47 Mandal. Our hopes and aspirations to serve our people were set at naught by a series of deeds and expressions of the Congress High Command’. about half a mile in length consisting of several thousands of people with slogans expressing our sympathy to the Satyagrahis and other slogans such as “Dr.. Ambedkar wrote to Mandal inquiring into the costs he had incurred over the course of the campaign—a sum of four and a half thousand rupees—to which the latter replied that they could discuss it in due course in person. by Haran Chandra Burman.. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Mahapran Jogendranath. 86–88. were elected with their support. ‘I am afraid that I cannot accept the view that the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy were unjust to the Scheduled Castes. the Scheduled Castes are doomed forever.. and the threat ‘to suppress with iron hand the Satyagraha and any other movement of the Scheduled Castes’ amply demonstrates the real motive of the Congress and how the Scheduled Castes will fair under Congress rule.. Mandal also emphasised this point as well as the brutal repression of the Federation’s satyagraha in Poona and Nagpur in his address to the Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation in Calcutta on 31 December 1946. The Cabinet Mission stated in the House of Commons that my influence was confined to Bombay and C. Vol. 253–54. ‘the fittest representative of the Scheduled Castes’ from the Interim Government.R. ‘three facts’ regarding his election to the Assembly: One is that I did not merely scrape through but I came at the top of the poll beating even Mr. or a few million Indian Christians. Fifth. Second. In a letter protesting Attlee’s stance that. in Ibid. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 337 under-represented. Third. p. they had appointed but one seat to 60 million Scheduled Castes..sagepub. Ambedkar.‘No matter how. the Congress had ‘forfeited the confidence’ of 60 million Scheduled Castes. pp. Indeed.. Fourth. 17. 49. while the same was awarded to 3 million Sikhs. 52 Protest Letter of Dr Ambedkar to Mr Attlee. 50 Ibid.49 The four MLAs thus concluded that the ‘Congress will never help the Scheduled Castes to secure their political rights and interests which can only be achieved by the united efforts of all the Scheduled Castes people under the banner of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation and leadership of Dr. Part 2.R. Jagjivan Ram is more a puppet in the hands of the Congress than a representative of the Scheduled Castes’. the topmost Bengalee leader of the 48 Ibid.50 This surge in support for Ambedkar that Mandal orchestrated became the basis for Ambedkar’s own appeal to the British government that they reconsider their refusal of recognition to the Federation. the Congress Government’s treatment of the Scheduled Caste satyagrahis in Poona and Nagpur. 49 Ibid.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.P. Ambedkar. How is it then that I was elected from Bengal?’52 Ambedkar then impressed upon Attlee. by excluding Dr. If they fail to do so. Jagjivan Ram’s selection to the Interim Government ‘reflects another act of gross injustice and insincerity to the Scheduled Castes inasmuch as the said Mr.’. in Ambedkar. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. 51 Letter from Mr Attlee to Dr B.51 Ambedkar replied as follows: ‘That the Mission was grossly misinformed is proved by my election to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. . 250. B. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s (Congress President) request to the Viceroy to ‘refuse recognition to the Scheduled Castes’ the ‘sole object’ of which ‘is to do away with the separate political entity of the Scheduled Castes in the national life of India’. Sarat Chandra Bose. 2012 . or a few million Parsees.48 Last but not least. Ambedkar.. Writings and Speeches. Secondly. in Ibid. with the anger and vitriol directed at Mandal in the days after the Calcutta riots. but the basis for not doing so was fundamentally conditioned by everything the Congress had done to effectively silence the organisation: from insisting on the joint-electorate terms of the Poona Pact which worked to the Federation’s disadvantage. pp... 54 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. In fact the people of my caste do not exist in Bengal at all and yet the Bengalee Scheduled Castes supported me. ‘if the Cabinet Mission are honest in their conclusion. ‘. and Ambedkar’s consequent election to the Constituent Assembly was of tremendous import to the course of post-colonial constitutionality. and Identity. Bandyopadhyay. as certain segments of public opinion. 55 Bandyopadhyay. ‘The Cabinet Mission and the Untouchables’. The Partition of Bengal and Assam.. They are of different castes to which I don’t belong. including other prominent Dalit leaders. Earlier in the same letter. Chatterjee. turned violently against him. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. to actively working to bias the electorate against him and the Federation. 49. from the work of Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. though the Scheduled Castes in Bengal had been returned on the Congress ticket. Culture and Hegemony. but the denial of recognition to the Federation signified the exclusion of their political agenda from the terms of debate under which power was being transferred.that the majority of the Scheduled Castes are with the Congress is an atrocious statement and has no foundation in truth’. to undertaking the electoral misdemeanours Mandal alleged. Caste. Ambedkar laid out his critique of the Cabinet Mission in a memorandum that he circulated prior to departure to London to meet with Attlee and Churchill in October 1946. so strongly that I was able to come first.. Bidyut Chakrabarty and Partha Chatterjee. Thirdly. they ought to revise their erroneous opinion which they have expressed in the House of Commons and . Protest. Mandal and the Calcutta Riots Scholars will be familiar. Caste. as is well known. give proper recognition to the Federation’. Ambedkar challenged Attlee.54 The Federation.338 / DWAIPAYAN SEN Congress party. demanding his resignation from the Suhrawardy 53 Ibid. ‘The Second Partition of Bengal’. yet they broke the rule of their party not to vote for anybody except for Congressmen and voted for me. I am in no way connected by communal ties with the Scheduled Castes of Bengal. Ibid. The implications of this exclusion become clearer when considered alongside the communal violence synonymous with Partition.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.sagepub. Chakrabarty. if one is to believe Mandal. See. 2012 . did not eventually receive due recognition. Ambedkar protested the exclusion of the Scheduled Castes from the consultations about the future of British India and argued. 263–65. To be sure. Does this prove that I have no following in Bengal?53 On account of his election from Bengal..55 ‘Jogen-Ali Mulla’ became a favourite slight. both his own election to the Bengal Assembly. ‘Lastly may I ask whether he is partially responsible for the so many lost lives of the Scheduled Castes in that riot?56 We know a great deal of how Mandal was pilloried by other Dalit and caste Hindu MLAs. It is singular that Mandal did not frontally address the Calcutta riots in his autobiography. ‘Phedareshan Sabhapatir Bibriti’. He presumably had in mind. is a close reading of his perspective a little less than a month after the worst of the Calcutta riots had subsided. one might also interpret this absence as reflecting a fundamentally different set of priorities that could not but reject the overwhelming communal significance of the prolonged event that was Partition. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 339 ministry. he reasoned. He expressed his belief that opinion would not be swayed by the injudiciousness and thoughtlessness of such men. Mandal was perceived as but a stooge of the Muslim League. he had even sent various statements to their offices to no avail: they refused to publish them. A lacuna of such major proportions will likely be read as an admission of guilt. This unwillingness. 49. As I hope will be demonstrated. what had he done to secure ‘the lives and property of the Scheduled Castes of the different parts of the province’ and what rehabilitation measures his cabinet had proposed for families destroyed by their relatives’ deaths. a Congress MLA. he alleged that the majority of Dalits placed no value in their accusations. posed his criticisms most pointedly.58 He complained that those caste Hindu papers which published various pieces chastising him. and the various protests in East Bengal that have been 56 The Nationalist. As the leading Dalit minister in the Muslim League ministry.sagepub. 57 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. What follows. 14 September 1946. given what he does focus on in the manuscript. he adopted an entirely exceptional view on the communal violence for which he was allegedly culpable. a view that misjudged his emphasis on Dalit political autonomy. Indeed. the full force of Hindu Bengal’s fury and indignation was directed towards him. Sarkar asked. Congress opponents like Radhanath Das and Pramath Ranjan Thakur. their exclusion from the proceedings of the Cabinet Mission thus far—he specifically emphasised the ongoing nationwide Poona Satyagraha. therefore. 58 Jagaran. 2012 . Bejoy Krishna Sarkar.‘No matter how. given that Mandal associated with the League’s direct action. we know relatively little about how Mandal himself was reacting and responding to the maelstrom of violence for which he was held accountable.57 Mandal first aired his views on the Calcutta riots in an editorial published in Jagaran. did not offer him the opportunity to respond to public censure.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Responding to critics trying to tarnish his reputation. Alternatively. given that they were predominantly Congress or Hindu Mahasabha salaried workers trying their level best to fancy themselves ministers. In contrast. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Mandal proceeded to clarify the misinformation disseminated amongst the Dalit public about his organisation. was an outcome of the fact that his policies and opinions no longer served the caste Hindus. Reprising the context for the Muslim League’s calling for the Day of Direct Action—namely. President of the Depressed Classes Association. As his arguments might suggest. It was in this context and this context alone. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. for instance. in the context of their exclusion from the Cabinet Mission. he made a plea to their leadership.340 / DWAIPAYAN SEN mentioned earlier on in this chapter. he would have been only too cognisant of the irony that Dalit participation and suffering in the riots bolstered the moral capital of Congress’ claim for Partition. was thus harnessed towards conflicting perceptions on extant political contexts. and his urging Dalits to adopt the same. and the unwillingness to recognise the Dalits as a minority community. Birat Chandra Mandal. a follower of Dr.sagepub. He hoped that both Hindu and Muslim leaders would refrain from trying to engage them against the other community. For some. he could not but have been painfully aware that Dalits had in fact been key participants and victims in the violence that brought the city to its knees. had nothing to gain from enmity with the Muslims. or their victimhood in the same. this is not a communal war’—this was simply a political battle between the Congress and the Muslim League. At Belliaghata in Calcutta. Despite the overall tenor of Mandal’s statement. that ‘A large number of Scheduled Castes residing in Calcutta bustees have been killed. averred in the context of the soon-to-be-nominated interim government. 59 Hindustan Standard. communal violence effected a certain sublation of caste-difference. he bracketed the full implications of his community being made into fodder for stakes of which he was hardly in control. keeping his own political and ideological commitments in mind. was his declaration of a policy of neutrality with regard to the violence in Calcutta. again. the house of Babu Satish Chandra Bairagi. Dalit participation in the Calcutta riots. 49. Mandal characterised the opportunistic claim that the vast majority of people involved in the Calcutta riots were Scheduled Castes as but a ploy to pit them against the Muslims. This was of particular significance. activists. he made the bald and categorical assertion that even though these riots had communal overtones. stood on essentially the same footing as they did. who in economic and political terms. however. Commenting specifically on the Calcutta riots. to bear in mind the future political and economic welfare of their community. The most notable aspect of Mandal’s statement. Nevertheless.59 The implication being that even Ambedkarites were not spared the wrath of Muslim rioters. Dalits. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. and that Dalits themselves would not respond to such exhortations. that the Scheduled Castes Federation’s participation with the Muslim League in protest ought to have acquired meaning. this was not at all a communal war: ‘Even if these riots appear communal. students and general populace. In closing. 27 August 1946. he contended. and remain aloof from the battles being waged between other political parties. Ambedkar has been burnt to ashes’.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. 2012 . Mandal’s contentions thus ran in direct contrast to the predominant thrust of Hindu public opinion. Fatehgarh.‘No matter how. Jinnah. 167. Newspapers that ostentatiously displayed their ‘progressiveness’ published pieces containing opinions about Mandal that ‘as a measure of caste-hatred put the violent black malice of the whites of South Africa and the negro animosity of one class of whites in America to shame’.. India Office. 63 Information Department. for his offering a seat to the Scheduled Castes Federation out of the Muslim League’s quota.. Mandal felt ‘that an injustice was done to the Scheduled Castes by the British Cabinet Mission.61 Note. in October 1946. Bombay and Nagpur. the caste Hindus of Bengal responded with ‘limitless malice and adverse criticism’. Congress captured a large number of seats because of the existence of the Poona Pact. India Office (Telegram A. New Delhi. ‘It is easy to make promises and then forget them. If one were to adopt a somewhat more sympathetic reading of the matter however. and this matter is on actual record’.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. but I believe in action. I am grateful to Mr. That was no indication that the Scheduled Castes supported Congress’. Aprakasita Atmakatha. New Delhi. that Mandal recalled how when his entry to the Interim Government was being celebrated by the Federation. 191/46. if not more appallingly brutal waves of mass violence elsewhere in Bengal and other Indian provinces. 2012 . and I shall always be your friend.. 49.. and I assure you that I shall never fail to do for you whatever lies in my power.000 Scheduled Caste men who went to the League leader’s house on 16 October to thank him for including their representative in the new central government’ that. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Expressions of such were on display in processions and demonstrations taken out all over the country—from Agra.63 60 File No. I did my very best for the Scheduled Castes at the Round Table Conference. He added: ‘I am your friend.’. Delhi.60 Jinnah addressed a gathering of ‘about 3. (Telegram A. one would have to contend with the very genuine sense of gratitude that Dalits all over the country felt towards Jinnah and the League for this choice.3563 from the Press Information Bureau. Mandal was nominated by the Muslim League to join the Interim Government as the Law Minister.sagepub. 62 Mandal. p. He would represent the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation which ‘commands the support of 90 per cent of the Scheduled Castes in India. to Calcutta. WBSA. and that Congress has been undone by this act of the Muslim League.62 At a press interview on 16 October. and not interpret all such gestures as though they were insincere. This selection is generally viewed as the League’s cynical attempt to retaliate against the Congress for including Muslims amongst their own list of nominated representatives. 17 October 1946).3561 from the Press Information Bureau. which provided joint electorates for the Scheduled Castes.’. Information Department. by contrast. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 341 The Interim Government Even as news of the Calcutta riots triggered similar. 61 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 18 October 1946). my first duty must be to the Muslim League which has taken up our cause. 461. Our cause is nearest my heart. held forth at one of his prayer meetings that. 17 May 1947.67 In his statements excerpted above.64 Nehru and Gandhi were hardly pleased with Mandal’s nomination. far from welcoming Mandal’s nomination. 2012 . 65 Letter from J. 17 October 1946). I will work for the betterment of the position of the Scheduled Castes. they might say.’ onwards. ‘Partition and the Ruptures’. Nehru to A. for his part. Particularly I shall work to change the unfairness of the position of the Scheduled Castes in regard to the primary and general elections. as well as ‘Although I have the cause of the Scheduled Castes deepest at heart.sagepub. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier.3561 from the Press Information Bureau.342 / DWAIPAYAN SEN At another press interview the following day.’ This enables the. ‘Transfer of Power’. (Telegram A. Wavell. India Office.. he countered claims that he was urging conversion to Islam by asking that if this were in fact the case.. 18 October 1946. See Bandyopadhyay. 15 October 1946. creed or province. 49.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. speaks to their willingness to accommodate his concerns. 932. the view of Mandal as a Muslim League representative on his nomination seriously flattens the distinctiveness of his political stance. that another seat had been given to a Harijan. New Delhi. A man like himself ought to be glad. I will work for the betterment of the whole country without considering caste. everything from ‘Our cause is nearest my heart. The Indian Economic and Social History Review.66 That Nehru and Gandhi hardly looked kindly upon. unsubstantiated argument that Mandal ‘seemed to be more keen on pleasing his patron than serving his community’. This is especially evident in their choice of a member of the Scheduled Classes’. he elaborated his stand: Although I have the cause of the Scheduled Castes deepest at heart. p. Other such puzzling assertions include that Mandal was allegedly at one point Ambedkar’s ‘solitary supporter in Bengal’. (Telegram A..65 And Gandhi. Jinnah if he said so’. ‘he could not sense any generosity’ in Mandal’s nomination. Secondly. Bandyopadhyay. why was he (along with the Federation) demanding separate electorates and an independent political existence. 66 Information Department. 67 Jagaran. At a Federation meeting in Calcutta in May 1947 for instance. That choice itself indicates a desire to have conflict rather that to work in cooperation. Mandal once again gestured at the problem of how the electoral arrangements agreed to under the Poona Pact could act as an 64 Information Department. and I shall work continually to eradicate the many injustices under which we now suffer. ‘especially when he read what was happening in Eastern Bengal. India Office. New Delhi. in my view. Thirdly. p.3563 from the Press Information Bureau. But he would be deceiving himself and Mr.. Nehru confided to Wavell: ‘I think I owe it to you to tell you privately and personally that I regret deeply the choice the Muslim League has made. Moreover. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay omits from his use of this source. Bose’s letter does not. 70 Mandal. Mandal. During much of his tenure as Minister of Law in the Interim Government.having been in close touch with public opinion both in West and East Bengal I can say that it is not a fact that Bengali Hindus unanimously demand partition. 2012 . There are. The Last Decades of Undivided Bengal. might temper the assumption that the vast majority of Dalits had fallen in line with the majority Hindu opinion in favour of Partition: ‘. p. A ‘personal comment’ about Mandal by Wavell is omitted from the official version. their political.. As far as East Bengal is concerned. and by extension. 24 February 1947. there is not the slightest doubt that the overwhelming majority of Hindus are opposed to partition’. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. that Mandal was ‘usually travelling around the country to attend Scheduled Caste political meetings.69 What might one take Mandal’s silence or silliness. 460. Mountbatten apparently asked Mandal. of course. when he does come to the Cabinet he is silent or silly’..com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. they speak about the general conditions of the country. This question of representativeness. For instance. some traces: Wavell wrote rather disparagingly to King George VI on 24 February 1947. had a bearing on who exactly demanded Partition in Bengal. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. asking him about the history of the Scheduled Castes.68 East Bengal. Therefore I have to speak about these oppressed and persecuted peoples. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 343 appropriate mechanism for accurately gauging Scheduled Caste political opinion. the following categorical assertion by Sarat Chandra Bose. whenever you come.‘No matter how. it will be recalled. p. When Pandit Nehru comes 68 Begum. importantly. 801. he spent an hour over the designated half-hour. however. p. The Transfer of Power. but you don’t say much about other matters—what is the reason for this?’ He answered: ‘The reason is that no other ministers say anything to you about this matter. social and economic situation. On his first meeting with Mandal. (one of the few Congressmen who held against the Partition of Bengal) in a letter to none other than Vallabhbhai Patel. PCSJM. or his absences to signify? His engagements with Mountbatten and his vantage on the transfer of power cast some light on the matter. 69 Mansergh and Lumby. Aprakasita Atmakatha.70 Mountbatten was deputed to replace Wavell upon the latter’s failure to reach an agreement between the Congress and the League. and Dr Ambedkar. 49. Perhaps this is why he does not feature too prominently in the Transfer of Power documents. At a later meeting. 176.sagepub. you only say various things about the interests of the Scheduled Castes. Mandal remembers Mountbatten having listened to him with great intent. conclusively demonstrate the proposition. ‘Mr. no. Mandal was preoccupied in shoring up the Federation’s various activities across the country. Mandal recalled that the cabinet held weekly meetings interspersed with biweekly meetings which the Governor-General held with individual ministers. the question of whether the Congress could claim the right to represent the Dalits. was the heartland of Dalit political mobilisation. 202. 1942–7. does not expect him tomorrow’. then I will no longer have to do so’.E. the faulty notion that Partition was primarily about solving the communal problem.. p. 203–204. 49. pp. 72 per cent of the Scheduled Caste voters in the primary election had voted for non-Congress candidates whereas the Congress had only claimed the remaining 28. Mandal registered a profound unease and sense of alienation from the proceedings of the Interim Government. Law has no official business to talk to H. 204–205. Mountbatten allegedly began to laugh. 72 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. and all those remaining supported the Congress. then H. He grounded this sentiment in the notion which had gained force upon the 1946 election that the Scheduled Castes Federation did not really represent the Dalits on account of their poor electoral performance. the private secretary of the Governor-General telephoned Jogendranath’s personal assistant and informed him that ‘If H. The British. in his view. 2012 . and that the fundamental problematic of the Partition thus turned on reconciling the Congress and the League. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Mahapran Jogendranath. not even his opinion was asked. This is why the British government and the Governor-General got the impression that if the founding of the future governance of India was agreed upon by 71 Ibid.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. irrespective of whether he was asked: But the sad thing is that a day before the date of the next interview.E. had erroneously looked on the election outcome as furnishing conclusive evidence that all Muslims supported the League.sagepub. Upon hearing this from the personal assistant.73 Later on.M.72 The British had thereby accepted. to his mind. This meant to in exceedingly polite language forbid Jogendranath from going to meet the GovernorGeneral. ‘Bangiya Pradesik Taphasili Jati Phedareshaner Caturthha Barshik Adhibeshan’. At this. especially with regard to the Partition. 31 December 1946. the Governor-General no longer did feel the necessity to meet with him or know his opinion. But the outcome of this election was determined by the Poona Pact. Mandal linked this sense of exclusion to the 1946 elections. in Mandal. PCSJM. and as Mandal claimed in his address at the fourth annual conference of the Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation. 73 Mandal.344 / DWAIPAYAN SEN and speaks to you of them. The chief reason for Jogendranath’s mortification being that on the logic of dividing India an extremely important matter would be brought about and despite being a minister in the central government. Mandal thought that he would certainly be consulted on account of his seniority.71 At several points in his autobiography. and decided to venture his opinion. 121. Aprakasita Atmakatha. there was no limit to Jogendranath’s sadness and distress. dvitiya khanda. He realised that since Congress had agreed to divide Bharat. In a plea to Muslims and Dalits all over Bengal. and link political parties with the disturbances. 25 October 1946.74 Here Mandal signals the sheer magnitude of the effect of the elections on Government’s thinking. Mandal asserted that it was ‘fantastic to impute political motives behind the recent outbreak. Rasik Lal Biswas. 231–32. they reasoned that their political alliance had no value if their communities were to forsake living together peaceably and 74 Ibid. in related discussions. the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten did not perceive the need to talk with Jogendranath.75 The Possibilities and Limits of the Dalit–Muslim Alliance In distinct contrast to his assessment of the Calcutta riots—which he characterised as a political battle between the Congress and the League—after touring East Bengal in October 1946 to urge calm upon various localities. pp. 2012 . 76 Information Department. We could not help’. Telling perhaps. It was an uprising of violent elements pure and simple. 5 August 1947. The demand for an independent political existence for the Scheduled Castes in the national life of Bharat that Dr Ambedkar had made on behalf of the Scheduled Castes Federation no longer survived. thereby offering an entirely new vantage on the matter: that in conjunction from the very outset. p. Bholanath Biswas and Dwarika Nath Baruri. that on the day of Mandal’s departure for Karachi as first speaker of the Government of Pakistan. ‘What is done is done. the joint-electorate. Jogendranath Mandal. he parted ways with Mountbatten after the latter allegedly conceded. India Office (Telegram A. Thus British Government and the Viceroy began to discuss all kinds of matters regarding the founding of India’s governance with the leaders of these two groups. fundamentally determined their defeat. caturthha khanda. British government or the Viceroy did not feel the necessity of speaking with Dr Ambedkar. The autonomous existence of the Scheduled Castes in the national life of Bharat was annihilated right here.‘No matter how. Choudhuri Moazzem Hossain.76 This was also partly the message conveyed in a joint communiqué co-signed by Khwaja Nazimuddin. Fazlur Rahman. and the idea that the transfer of power was essentially about solving the communal problem. Abul Hashim. 21. 75 The Indian Economic and Social History Review.. Mandal. For the very same reason. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Congress’ and Mahasabha’s anti-Federation ideology and practice. 49. and nothing but sheer lawlessness and the activities of the goonda elements are responsible.sagepub. and thus the inevitable occlusion of the Federation’s movement for political autonomy within the given terms of reference. No political parties are involved’.3602 from the Press Information Bureau) New Delhi.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Mahapran Jogendranath. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 345 these two parties no other disturbance would remain. Thus in the founding of Indian governance or whether India would remain undivided or partitioned. next to the last sentence of the report which ran as follows: ‘It is. and thus marshal such animosity. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. WBSA. as in Noakhali and Calcutta. ‘tended to promote feelings of enmity between the Hindus and Muslims’. not unlikely that their enemies will try to bring a disruption among them. advocated the formation of a ‘joint committee in every police station.78 Federation and League student leaders maintained correspondence to similar effect. Serial No.C. and cropped up in the Intelligence Reports of the time. and even as their hired goons proceeded to pit Dalits and Muslims against one another. and (b) to point out the mischievous character of the attempt to drive a wedge amongst the Hindu community’. the article had been written to ‘combat the two-fold propaganda—(a) to detach the Scheduled Castes from the main body of the Hindu community. in these articles. West Bengal State Archives. This leaflet was distributed as far afield as Jessore and Faridpur. that the Congress was doing its best to exclude the Dalits from their proportionate share in the future governance of independent India. Amrita Bazar Patrika.77 Various articles and editorials in Jagaran published after the East Bengal riots emphasised a similar message. union and villages with the representatives of the Muslims and Scheduled Caste people for the maintenance of peace and order and for the good of both communities’. Interestingly. ‘Security Demand on “Hindusthan”’. in the local government’s view. which could exploit the slippage between their dual identification as both Scheduled Caste and Hindu. In the Faridpur weekly confidential report ending 9 November 1946. which drawing similar conclusions as articles in Jagaran. 49. and which culminated in the Federation and League’s issuing their joint-statement. so it warns member of both communities—the Muslim and the Scheduled Caste (sic)—to refrain from killing each other’. Kolkata. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Twenty officers of the local Muslim League and Scheduled Castes Federation had circulated ‘An Appeal to the Jhenidah Sub-divisional Muslim League and Scheduled Castes Federation’.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Namely. and thus especially hoped that they would desist from such incitement and keep their two communities’ mutual welfare in mind. Chatterjee. 270. They warned that ‘Our enemies can instigate Muslims and Scheduled Castes into riots and mayhem’. the Hindusthan published a piece in response to the Federation and League’s pamphlet entitled ‘Satan’s Policy of Division’ that landed the paper in legal trouble because the article in question. 79 File No. 191/46.sagepub. ‘Musolman o Tapashili Sampradayer Prati’. towards the alleged irreconcilability of Hindus and Muslims. Speculations were rife. The article was written in condemnation of an entire series of events to which Mandal was central. The entire outlook on communal violence in this archive is utterly alien to and irreconcilable with the story of Partition and concomitant riots that Indian nationalist historiography tells. therefore.346 / DWAIPAYAN SEN lose sight of their conjoined futures. ‘But not Caste Hindus!!—a significant omission—has the leaflet come to notice elsewhere?’ File No. 78 File No. WBSA. 717D/46.79 77 Jagaran. one of the supreme leaders of the Partition agitation and legal counsel for Hindusthan described. As N. 2012 . even as they sought to speak on their behalf. the District Superintendent wrote. 717D/46 (Muslim League). that neither the Muslims nor the Dalits stood to gain from them—that the only parties that stood to benefit from this violence were the caste Hindu ones. Titled ‘Anti-Muslim feelings of the caste-Hindus and Calcutta riots’. ‘they will keep no connection with the caste Hindus. the writer chastised the ‘meanness displayed by caste-Hindus during the Calcutta carnage’ and ‘chalked out an aggressive program of complete boycott of the caste-Hindus by joint union of the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes with a view to bring the caste-Hindus down to their own level’. 2012 . We shall starve them to death. Muslim)—we really deserve to be freed. Primarily. There will 80 ‘Anti-Muslim feelings of the caste-Hindus and Calcutta Riots’. ‘What is the significance of the freedom of a country? It is the freedom of the poor and down-trodden masses and their peace and prosperity. overlapping with Mandal’s own rationalisations for the forging of the same.80 Significantly. 717D/46. these committees would control their jurisdiction according to the following directions. WBSA. If they [the caste Hindu landowner] were to take the land away. Rice. 1947. The committees would arrange for the market and other places of trade and commerce to be under the joint control of Muslims and Dalits. They may only be called at any time of necessity to notify them regarding orders of the committee’.‘No matter how. The pamphlet subsequently charted a programme for the Muslim League Revolutionary Workers Association. drafted by the Muslim League Revolutionary Workers Association in Calcutta presented an analysis of the ongoing violence which illuminates how they looked upon the alliance between Dalits and Muslims. the association laid responsibility for the breach of peace during the Calcutta riots with Congress activists. In this projected utopia. foodstuff and other commodities of trade are under our control. discussion and even association with the caste Hindus are prohibited. A revolution cannot be complete leaving aside the poor downtrodden people’. Hindu. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 347 A pamphlet circulating in Dacca district in mid-January. Exulting in the Muslim response to the ‘open attack and brutal torture perpetrated by the Congress’ the pamphlet reprised the broader context of freedom from British rule. though with obvious and crucial differences. caste Hindus would not receive more than a quarter share of the produce of the barga land which they would have to harvest and carry themselves. land tenure. and the attendant question of how a future state might be democratically governed by representatives of its communities.sagepub. So in this triangular fight (British. They must not be sold to the caste Hindus. File No. Proposing the formation of Union Defence Committees composed solely of Muslims and Scheduled Castes workers of each ward and union. 49. Muslims and a few other low caste Hindus (Namasudras). the pamphlet recapitulated in detail the reasons for their solidarity in their roles as the primary producers in agrarian relations. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Business.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Who are these masses in India [sic]. ‘Poor men are not their servants’. emphasising how Jinnah had insisted that the protests on the Day of Direct Action be peaceful. revenue. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. the cultivator occupier would cultivate it forcibly. As such. Within two months. If we carry on for two months only in this way you will find that they have come down to the same status with us. The imagined audience of the pamphlet.348 / DWAIPAYAN SEN be no necessity for killing them. Rice must not be sold to the caste Hindus even if they pay `5 for a seer. as in order to forestall such developments. ‘You must be careful’. on receipt of information. So long they have thrived sucking our blood. 49. Brahmin and other rich merchant leaders with a view to bring about complete ruin on the jute cultivators of Bengal’. it was promised. Continuing in this vein. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. The cultivator had no choice but to sell his jute for bare sustenance. Then the country will be free. The caste Hindus would have to obey the ‘direction and administration of the poor class Muslims and Namasudras whom they hated and oppressed so long’.sagepub. the pamphlet warned.81 As an instantiation of the desired policy changes. Since ‘caste Hindus have collected all the money due to the labour of the Muslims and the Namasudras’ they would be bound to contribute the major portion of finances for the defence of the country. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. it sketched the details of such government. We shall now turn the table. To transform these extortionate circumstances. ‘must on no account sell your jute to the Marwaris or caste-Hindu jute traders who are cheating you’. ‘thereby sucking the blood of the cultivators’. It will be sufficient to tell the Namasudras and other Scheduled Caste brethren that so long the caste Hindus who were under the British Government hated and 81 Ibid. Reminding its readers of the Muslim majority in Bengal. If any prominent man secretly visits the caste Hindus with a view to getting advantage for himself.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. proposing the development of various organisational features for a network of committees— including the raising and distribution of funds consistent with Islamic ideals. that man must be boycotted from the society and he must be insulted everywhere. the pamphlet predicated the loss of caste Hindu power on Namasudras combining with Muslims. the Muslim and Namasudra leaders of Bengal would soon be organising a jute-buying syndicate for the whole of Bengal which would enable the cultivators to sell their jute at more favourable rates. Then they will not accost a Muslim or a Namasudra as ‘thou’ (in contempt). they would be able to sell their produce at `40 per maund. We shall not kick the caste Hindus out of Bengal. It described the present situation where Hindu Marwaris cheated the cultivators by purchasing jute at `10 or 12 per maund (1 maund is approximately 37. the pamphlet seized on that emblem of Bengali labour—jute—proceeding to discuss regulation of the jute industry given that ‘the jute-growers of Bengal are mainly Muslims and Namasudras’. 2012 . ‘Hindu Marwaris are carrying on secret conspiracy with the Kayestha [sic].32 kg) and selling the same at `100. We shall rule over them. ‘No matter how. It is clear that many of these correspondents were deeply sceptical of the Congress’ and Mahasabha’s attempts at constructing what they perceived to be a spurious Hindu communal unity. of 27 April 1947. and essays. 2012 . being cornered the caste Hindus will hold out many promises but immediately after they achieve their object they will play the same game which they have done all through. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 349 tortured them more than us. No doubt the articulated programme did not come to pass.82 Bringing the reader up to speed with the cataclysmic riots following in East Bengal and Bihar (and how Kripalani and Gandhi were glad about the retaliation). H. Chief of Staff to the Viceroy. the pamphlet writer urged. but to the caste Hindus in the Congress. It is necessary to make them understand this. While still there is time. Indeed. Such incongruence needs to be thought alongside narratives that see in Partition the replacement of caste by religion as the defining criteria of community boundaries. but it is unmistakable that for the writer of this pamphlet. 49. In a letter to Lord Ismay. that the incitement to riots in Calcutta and Bihar for killing the Muslims have all come from our Bengalee educated Congressite caste Hindus’. but fundamentally held out the possibility of transforming the social and economic relations between caste Hindus on the one hand. poems. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. 83 The Indian Economic and Social History Review.S. or Hindus and Muslims.’ Suhrawardy elaborated: 82 Ibid. Chief of the Bengal Muslim League expressed his dissatisfaction with the ‘notional scheme of ascertaining the views of the people of those areas who in accordance with your determination. Partition was simply not about the resolution of relations between imperial rulers and those they ruled. and did not look upon Muslims as selfish and domineering oppressors.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. ‘Please note it specially. for their own future welfare and self-defence according to the direction of Quiade-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah the protector of the Scheduled Caste people and Dr Ambedkar. At this moment.83 The elite of the Muslim League in Bengal comprehended the problem of partition somewhat differently. you believe.. desire partition.. and Dalits and Muslims on the other.sagepub. Now let them understand what shall be their position if a free caste Hindu empire is established and join hands with us. Especially significant is the attribution of the most unprecedented acts of communal violence in Bengal not to Hindus as a blanket category. Jagaran contains a plethora of letters. This truly astonishing pamphlet indicates how the violence preceding Partition in Bengal was apprehended as gathering in its energies dynamics of struggle that far exceeded the structural coordinates of violence between Hindus and Muslims so ingrained in the historical understanding of this event. Suhrawardy. drawn from the everyday life of Partition-era Bengal that stand considerably at odds with the view of this historical moment as consumed by irreconcilable and unavoidable conflict between unmarked Hindus and Muslims. p. ascertaining the ‘wishes of the people’ referred primarily. 49. Ibid.. that the present representatives of the Legislatures of the Hindu community do not represent the interests of the Scheduled Castes. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier.85 Does Suhrawardy’s letter corroborate the claim that the Congress did not represent Dalit interests? Or was this sheer opportunism on his part? What are we to make of his accusation that Ismay was ‘knowingly’ proceeding on the basis of compromised veracity? Importantly.. He has had a very successful meeting in Burdwan. but obviously the difficulties are considerable and the time is short. as a proponent of the United Bengal Proposal along with Sarat Chandra Bose. Indeed. and it is hoped that we shall soon get the Scheduled Castes on our side there [i.?84 For Suhrawardy. 24 Parganas] and some headway in Burdwan Division. to the Scheduled Castes. In a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan.. Inside Bengal Politics. His propaganda is making considerable headway in Khulna. Not knowing the wishes of the people how can you determine the area in which you are to ascertain the wishes of the people.sagepub. his critique of the notional scheme was grounded not in an argument about his own political constituency—Muslim Bengal and India—but his sense that Hindus in the Bengal Legislature did not represent Dalits.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Suhrawardy was more closely aligned with Mandal’s own predilections. 76.. 1936–1947.. p. how do you know which are the areas which want partition? The statement of organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha which collapsed during the last elections are of no value. The Congress has thrown out a qualified support but it will be unable to demarcate the area because it is well known that the Hindus of Eastern or North Bengal do not desire partition. Suhrawardy thus wrote: I think I was unduly pessimistic regarding Jogen Mandal. This is an attempt on their part to capture Hindu sentiment.. He felt absolutely certain. 2012 . So. you are knowingly proceeding on a wrong basis which you cannot justify merely because of the difficulties of ascertaining the wishes of the people within the time that you have set for yourself. 80.. in Rashid (ed... It was composed of about 3000 Scheduled Castes.350 / DWAIPAYAN SEN In the first place.e. 85 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 86 Ibid..86 84 Suhrawardy Papers. if you proceed on the basis of the present composition of the Legislature. 27 April 1947. I met him yesterday with his group of workers and had a long discussion with him and have arrived at certain scheme of work. 19 May 1947.). the need for political unity. discounting notional schemes. and about how disastrously Partition would impact their communities.‘No matter how. and along with the sanction of the majorities in a divided one. pp. Also see Begum. The Last Decades of Undivided Bengal. he submitted: The propaganda of the Scheduled Castes in our favour will be that they will be divided.sagepub.. At the preliminary joint meeting (comprising MLAs of both East and West Bengal). On 20 June 1947 the Legislative Assembly of Bengal met to vote on the partitioning of the province. after all. were elected Congressmen in the 1946 elections.89 Mandal and the Anti-partition Agitation During his term as Law Minister in the Interim Government and increasingly once the certainty of Partition drew near. He travelled from Delhi to Bombay to Calcutta. In a subsequent letter to Liaquat Ali Khan. both Caste and Scheduled Caste. He laid great emphasis in his autobiography on the effusiveness of 87 Ibid. Partition proceeded against the will of the majority of MLAs in united Bengal. p. pp. 2012 . if Partition eventuated. Mandal toured the country extensively. a province which will be rich in resources and which we shall not surrender’.88 A closer look at the representative preferences of the legislators in Bengal as a whole. on the basis of the evidence available to me (which may very well be inaccurate). viz. hence there should not be a partition.87 The ‘propaganda of the Hindus’ ultimately triumphed. 83–84. should join Pakistan. 126 to 90 voted that the province. Ferozabad. in addition to countless smaller district towns all over Bengal. if remaining united. 88 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 351 Yet Suhrawardy acknowledged the limitations of the various propaganda marshalled in service of arguments against partition. Pune. The separate East Bengal Legislative Assembly meeting resulted in 106 to 35 votes against Partition. 89 Although I have not been able to consult the actual voting record on Partition as yet. two days later. addressing various meetings on the details of their constitutional and political demands. it is not likely that any more than 23 of the 30 Scheduled Caste MLAs voted for the partition of Bengal. on 21 May 1947. no. 369. 58 to 21 voted in favour of Partition and joining India. It should be no surprise if the majority of Dalit MLAs voted for Partition—they. Karimganj. 27 June 1947. At a separate West Bengal Legislative Assembly meeting the same day. The Transfer of power 1942–7. This is weak against the propaganda of the Hindus. shows that 127 as against 93 legislators voted against Partition. Nagpur. by totalling the votes from east and west. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. 49. That ‘we Hindus of these areas.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. and 107 to 34 votes in favour of union with Pakistan. 176–77. 681. Mansergh and Lumby. will govern together and have a great Hindu province which will be linked to the Hindu provinces of the rest of India and which will dominate over the Muslims. 91 Ibid. The veteran leader Amulyadhan Ray lectured at the annual Bengal Federation conference in late 1946. 27–28. in Mandal. that despite the mistake of having voted for the Congress during the elections and thus having compromised the rights their communities had gained over the past 15 years. ‘Partition of Bengal Injurious’. in Mandal.90 Mandal had struck a similar note at the same meeting.. therefore. p. catching fish in rivers in East Bengal. 93 Morning News. 49.. ‘the Scheduled Castes of Bharat have no more fear’.352 / DWAIPAYAN SEN his various receptions all over the country. 31 December 1946.. these had received a new lease of life on account of Ambedkar’s entry to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal. Indeed.. ‘Partition to Crush Scheduled’. 18 May 1947. Mahapran Jogendranath. Upon Ambedkar’s election. and the Scheduled Castes of Western Bengal will be subject to the perpetual slavery of the Caste Hindus’. the principal votaries of the divide. eliciting the wrath and opposition of the Bengal Congress and Mahasabha. p. he said. Mahapran Jogendranath.By no means. Mandal’s position in the Interim Government.94 The caste Hindus of East Bengal. and Ambedkar’s invitation to London to plead their cause. 122. was a necessity in the interest of the Scheduled Castes people of the province. pp. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 92 It is certainly one of the greatest of ironies that Mandal became the lynchpin for the Partition of Bengal once the sordid effects of the decision began to materialise.. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. A united Bengal. could the poor helpless people belonging to the Scheduled Castes be rehabilitated in West Bengal.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29.sagepub. 118. there was a near inexplicable undercurrent of optimism that Mandal and some of his colleagues expressed given that the Federation was confronted with a situation where Congress had for all intents and purposes manufactured their redundancy. the Federations’ satyagraha.91 This curiously upbeat assessment changed with the fact of Partition. 95 Free Press.95 90 ‘Bangiya Pradesik Taphasili Jati Phedareshaner Caturtha Barshik Adhibeshan’. seemingly having invested great meaning in the rituals of neta-darshan. In May 1947 Mandal and the Bengal Federation launched a campaign throughout the province opposing the demand for the Partition of Bengal. . 94 The Nationalist. ‘could easily move to West Bengal’ whereas.92 He reasoned that Partition would not solve the problem of communalism in Bengal. 2012 . dvitiya khanda. moreover.the Scheduled Castes were very poor and they lived by cultivation of land. that the ‘present scheme for the Partition of Bengal is only to crush the Scheduled Castes and get all power in the hands of the Caste Hindus’.93 At a meeting in Harinarainpur in 24 parganas he claimed that Partition would result in a situation where ‘the Scheduled Castes of Eastern Bengal will be at the mercy of the majority community.. dvitiya khanda (1979). ‘mostly rich and influential’. pp. Khulna. it might also be considered that several senior Dalit leaders— some of whom had been prominent leaders prior to provincial autonomy in 1937— like Amulyadhan Ray. while as a counterpoint to this. published misinformation about them. Partition would destroy the very possibility of Dalit political autonomy. Jessore. if the supporters of Partition amongst the Bengal Congress were as democratic as they claimed to be. 5 April 1947. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 353 Partition would ‘decay the growing political consciousness’ and ‘ruthlessly crush the solidarity of the Scheduled Castes of Bengal’. Finally.96 Articles and editorials in Jagaran thus opined that Partition was essentially about the consolidation of caste Hindu power. motivated by the fear of losing their already battered hegemony. Haora. Dinajpur. Bankura. 2012 . Jagaran reported that a meeting in Kholapota village in 24 parganas (potentially the same one to which Bandyopadhyay referred) was attended by individuals of various communities amongst the Scheduled Castes amounting to ‘nearly 5000’ people. indicated a different scenario. Shyama Prasad Burman. however.99 The very archival materials which form the evidentiary bases for historical argument were thus shaped by these prejudices. By contrast.97 The writer of one of these asked.‘No matter how. Throughout May 1947. inflated the numbers of Dalits present at meetings they reported on which supported the Partition of Bengal. Bandyopadhyay. a report by an attendee to one of the meetings in Calcutta which was allegedly largely attended by Dalits found that the majority of the audience was composed of caste Hindus and non-Bengali Dalits who had been paid for their presence at the gathering. 98 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay writes in response to Mandal’s claim that Dalits opposed Partition: ‘The reality of the situation. Anukul Chandra Das. especially articles titled ‘Barnahindu Kagaj Anandabajar Patrikar Taphasili Bibhrantamulak Apapracar’ and ‘Jalpaigurir Sabhar Prakrta Bibaran’. 97 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Birbhum. 49. A meeting organised by him in early May 1947 in the 24-Parganas was attended by not more than 50 people. as Mandal’s anti-Partition rallies attracted little attention. Hooghly. The claim that these meetings were ‘isolated demands’ and ‘attracted little attention’ likely underestimates their scope and significance. ‘Tathakatithha Taphasili Sabhar Swarup’. Also see Ajad. ‘Taphasili Jatike Bibhranta’ . Mandal and the Federation held meetings in localities as far afield as 24 Parganas. as well as what seems to have been a fairly wide party network for having existed for a mere three years. and in some cases local Congress committees attempted to muzzle gatherings resolving against Partition. Jagaran.sagepub. p. Culture and Hegemony. “including a thousand members of the Depressed Classes”’. a meeting organised by the Congress-supported Bengal Provincial Depressed Classes League on 27 May 1947 was attended by about 2500 people. Advaita Kumar Majhi and Rasik Lal Biswas. 96 The Nationalist. distributed as they were throughout the province. 16 May 1947. why were they unwilling to conceive of living equally in a province with both Muslims and Dalits? For the Federation. Caste. Also. 40–41.98 Various articles in Jagaran indicated that the caste Hindu press allegedly deliberately ignored these rallies in an effort to minimise their import. in Ibid. 99 See the entire issue of Jagaran for 17 May 1947. ‘24 Pargana Jelar Kholapota’. 229.. Nadia. Darjeeling and Calcutta. Jagaran.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Ajad. Bardhaman. Rangpur. Kshetra Nath Sinha. 000. 103 Jagaran.’106 Towards late May. he addressed a meeting in Calcutta104.000–7. he elucidated the drawbacks of the proposed Partition.000 presided over by the ex-MLA Shyamaprasad Barman.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. One section of Baruijibis. Nath.. Barori presided over a meeting at the Kalachora in Hooghly district which was attended by ‘over six thousand people representing such scheduled caste communities as Santal.000 attendees presided over by the ex-president of the Kshatriya Samiti Girijakanta Sinha in Jalpaiguri.000–8. President of the Tippera–Noakhali Hindu People’s Party to this effect. ‘Bardhhaman. ‘24 Pargana Jelar Kholapota’. and 100 Mandal. but their attempt was foiled by the gathered audience.108 Several days later Mandal noted. 108 Jagaran. Bowri. On 4 May 1947.000–8. Kaora. Mandal addressed meetings in 24 Parganas. a crowd of predominantly Federationist Namasudras silenced several of the Congressmen who were present at the gathering. 104 The Statesman. Dom. ‘Bengal Partition Move Opposed’. on 17 May 1947. Tyer. some Congressmen tried to forestall the proceedings. resolving against Partition. Mahapran Jogendranath. Mandal’s private papers contain a statement dated 16 May 1947 issued by G. 49.109 Shyama Prasad Barman. 105 Jagaran.000 people at Rangpur in Khulna. have also opposed partition’. 2012 . he addressed a gathering of 7. 22.100 On 6 May. Jelia. dvitiya khanda (1979). Mandal addressed a meeting attended by about 10. 107 The Statesman. 23. Indeed. Some caste Hindu goondas of the Congress tried to disrupt and stop the meeting. 12 May 1947’. Besides.S. ex-MLA and President of the North Bengal Rajbanshi Kshatriya Samity took his colleague Prem Hari Barman to task for initially standing against. and resolved in favour of a united Bengal. one in Bardhaman. Bagdi. Ibid. At a meeting called by the Congress in Poradanga village in Jessore on the 8 May 1947 about the prospective partition. p. ‘Jashohar Jela Kangresi Netader Shocaniya Parajay’. who are Caste Hindus. with no effect.000–12.N.107 Two other such meetings in Khulna were attended by 7. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. 106 Bengal Provincial Scheduled Castes’ Federation. Especially given the hostile political atmosphere of the time.103 On 16 May 1947. the President of Tippera-Noakhali Hindu People’s Party has issued a statement opposing Partition. Hadi. Like in Jalpaiguri.sagepub. at a meeting of 10.102 On 9 and 10 May 1947. it is unlikely these meetings could have taken place without a fair degree of local support and conferral of legitimacy. ‘Jibaner Binimayeo Banga-bhanga Rodh Kariba’. 101 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Muchi.000 people.354 / DWAIPAYAN SEN supported the Federation’s meetings against Partition. ‘Mandal Opposes Bengal Partition Plan’. 102 Jagaran.105 D. Banga-bhanger Biruddhe Prastab Grhita’. 109 The Statesman. Mandal addressed a meeting in Darjeeling attended by approximately 6. ‘Partition Opposed By Scheduled Castes’. etc.101 On 7 May 1947 in Dinajpur. Kaibarta. including local leaders and other notables amongst the Rajbanshi community. Birbhum o Hugli Jelar Tapshil Jatir Caturthha Barshik Sammelan. ‘The President of the All-Bengal Mahishya Samity has already expressed that the Mahishyas are against the division of the province. p. ‘Press Message. 115 Birat Chandra Mandal. 314. Bardhhaman and Mymensingh opposing Partition in late May and early June. 111 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Jagaran reported at least three more meetings in 24 Parganas. 117 Mansergh and Lumby. attended by audiences of over a thousand. and a few satellites of his. opposing partition. Thakur—Depressed Classes Leader of Bengal and a member of the Constituent Assembly ‘strongly repudiated the contention of Mr.113 Mr.sagepub. who had warned him against Mr. 5 May 1947. 116 Amrita Bazar Patrika. Jogendranath Mandal’ since his appointment in the Interim Government.000 Scheduled Caste Hindus of Noakhali are definitely and solidly in favour of partition of Bengal into two separate Hindu and Muslim areas’.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. 7 June 1947.110 There thus existed substantial.. p.117 110 Morning News. dvitiya khanda (1979). in Mandal. Mandal. had been ‘studying the movement’ of ‘Hon’ble Mr. 115 Amrita Bazar Patrika. P. and asserted.‘No matter how. The former submitted that widely attended meetings were held in Rangpur on 27 April.116 Finally. 114 Amrita Bazar Patrika. and. Mandal who they thought had been misleading him’. They informed him that the Scheduled Castes ‘on no account wanted separation from the Caste Hindus’ and were determined not to be left under the ‘brutal suppression and domination’ of the Muslims.N. no. Jagaran. ‘150. J. secretary of the Noakhali Scheduled Castes Association averred. Mahapran Jogendranath. a resolution condemned Mandal and his ‘baseless propaganda’ that the Scheduled Castes of Bengal did not support the Partition demand.112 Similarly. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 355 subsequently supporting the Partition demand. The Transfer of Power. ex-minister of Bengal. ‘On the very day he declared himself as a representative of the Muslim League. Manoranjan Das. 28 April 1947. that the Scheduled Castes of Bengal were opposed to the Bengal Partition movement’. ‘Except for Mr. the League nominee in the Interim Government. he has forfeited his right to speak on behalf of the Scheduled Castes’. They firmly demanded partition and claimed to represent the view of the Scheduled Castes in Bengal. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Prem Hari Burman. 56. He repudiated Jinnah’s stance that the partition of Bengal was predominantly a caste Hindu demand.N. 112 Pioneer. the Viceroy reported that ‘he had been “attacked” at the Garden Party on 3 May by two Scheduled Caste representatives to the Constituent Assembly from Bengal. 617–18. 30 May 1947. 113 Ibid. then Dinajpur on 7 May. no other independent Scheduled Caste Leader in any part of Bengal has raised a voice of protest against the move for partition of Bengal’. J. declared that his ‘community as a whole’ was in favour of partitioning the province.R.114 At a conference of the Bengal Depressed Classes League on 27 May 1947. opposition to partition amongst the Scheduled Castes of Bengal. 49. the President of the All-India Depressed Classes Association. 2012 . 1942–7. even if far from unanimous. 29 May 1947. Mandal. ‘Bengal Partition Opposed’. 30 May 1947..111 The Federation’s advocacy for a united Bengal and their claim that the Dalits of Bengal did not desire Partition was furiously countered by many other prominent Dalit leaders. pp. amongst the currently elected Dalit leadership. as I have shown above. ‘Repatriation Before Partition’. so often given to the depressed classes that they should at once start whole-scale reform of the Hindu social structure on the basis of equality’. irrespective of community. elected a Congressman.356 / DWAIPAYAN SEN Clearly. P. to scrutiny for their arguably dubious efficacy in calling forth the leaders most representative of political opinion amongst Dalits in Bengal. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Chatterjee. p.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. ‘an Association of the Hindu leaders of Bengal who are against partition should be immediately formed to devise ways and means of how to retain solidarity of Bengal in the interests of all people living in the province. 37.118 Before being converted to the Partition cause for instance.119 At a subsequent meeting Thakur presided over in Faridpur. Indeed. 121 Amrita Bazar Patrika.120 Bejoy Krishna Sarkar. 120 Amrita Bazar Patrika. in no circumstances. For them. In addition.121 Evidently. which despite resolving in favour of partition nevertheless strongly urged that ‘Caste Hindu leaders should declare that they will not go back on their words of honour. caste or creed. ‘Scheduled Castes Demand Partition of Bengal’. specially the scheduled caste people. Mandal was the object of critique. Thakur presided over the All-Bengal Nationalist Depressed Classes Association meeting in Calcutta on 14 March 1947 that ‘seriously requests the Hindu leaders to cry a halt to the movement and earnestly urges upon the people of Bengal to work for the establishment of peoples’ Government in united Bengal’. what these various claims and counter-claims about partition suggest is that opinion was far more unresolved and uncertain than we might believe. ‘The Second Partition of Bengal’. 49. held a meeting in Calcutta. be allowed to take place unless and until definite measures for the total repatriation of the poor class Hindus. 2012 . 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. the security of living in a Hindu majority province within India far outweighed the uncertainties of being part of the Hindu minority in a Muslim majority independent and undivided Bengal or Pakistan. from the Muslim majority areas of East Bengal were taken by the Hindu leaders’. questions remained about whether Partition was in their communities’ best interests and whether Partition would bring about the kind of social equality between caste Hindus and Dalits which they themselves desired. ‘Depressed Classes Association Against Movement’. those gathered made it ‘definitely clear that the proposed partition of Bengal for the purpose would.sagepub. there are likely good reasons to re-examine whether Dalits in Bengal as a whole unambiguously desired Partition. 119 Amrita Bazar Patrika. Perhaps most indicative of the British government’s willingness to forego sustained consideration of Mandal’s 118 There is also Partha Chatterjee’s point that it is ‘historically inaccurate’ to suggest that the decision to partition Bengal ‘actually involved the participation of masses of people’. Indeed. even for Dalit leaders who had joined the Congress.R. Yet the majority of those who criticised him had been elected under the terms of the 1946 elections amenable. there were many cases where caste was not entered or needed checking. 125 Ibid. it cannot obviously be taken as the verdict of a majority’. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 357 claims against Partition (despite claiming to do so). 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier.sagepub. if applied in Calcutta. would have to be applied elsewhere—which would result in endless complications. 124 The Statesman.126 This was why he called for a referendum. 2 June 1947. on the Hindu Roll. Ibid. ‘Hindu Population of Bengal: Dr. Mookerjee’s Statement Refuted by Mr. pp. 1942–7. 2012 . the same census which recorded a decline in the Scheduled Caste population on account of the Congress’ and Hindu Mahasabha’s attempts to both encourage the withholding of Dalits’ caste identifications as well as enumerators’ intentional omission of the same. Mandal had raised the necessity of a Scheduled Caste referendum which was rebuffed.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. because the police and military were so stretched that an elaborate referendum in Calcutta itself was out of the question. no.123 The necessity of ascertaining Dalit opinion was thus dismissed on expediency.‘No matter how. pp.124 The Scheduled Caste population in the province had artificially ‘declined’ between the 1931 and 1941 censuses. because.125 Such calculations were in part the basis for Mandal’s conjecture that. Mandal also pointed out that since the election to the provincial assemblies had occurred on the basis of existing territorial boundaries it would be ‘only just and fair’ that Government ‘should proceed on the basis of existing facts’. ‘Even if cent per cent of the Caste Hindus of West Bengal support partition. and because the principle. ‘Partition Will Not Solve Problem: Majority of Non-Muslims Against Proposal’. whereas in Mandal’s opinion it should have grown by more than 20 per cent. It would be impossible to hold a referendum of the Scheduled Castes in Calcutta at short notice because there was no separated Scheduled Castes Electoral Roll. Mandal’. 127 Ibid. 23. 49.127 Instead. on his claim that the Mahasabha had not made considerable headway amongst Dalits in their campaign to persuade Hindus to not mention their caste at all.. In early May. 39–42. one of the key protagonists of Partition. 39–42. The Transfer of Power. consider the following excerpts from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian Leaders on 2 June 1947—the day before the decision was formally announced. Mandal therefore challenged Syamaprasad Mukherjee. the most recent population statistics derived from the 1941 census. 123 The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Furthermore. and be recorded simply as Hindus during the 1941 census.122 The reasons provided included: During the disturbances in Calcutta the Scheduled Castes had contributed to their full share of the casualties on the Hindu side. the notional scheme eventually adopted in Mountbatten’s plan which divided the 122 Mansergh and Lumby. 126 The Statesman. He granted that if the plebiscite revealed that they chose Partition along with the caste Hindus. ‘Taking all points into consideration. there exists other evidence as well that suggests Government moved on the decision to Partition Bengal without specifically ascertaining public opinion as is clear from the ‘Explanatory Note’ on the Partition of Bengal from a Secret and Confidential Governor’s Secretariat File. Indeed. in his lengthy submission to the British Government on the Partition decision therefore argued that the ‘tragedy of the situation’ was that not only were Dalits being treated as Hindus. 78. But if you take a notional vote of the representatives who have been elected to the legislature. it is necessary to have a general referendum. Like Mandal. ‘A propaganda is going on amongst them and they are being rapidly converted. He argued that ‘Calcutta ought not to go to the non-Muslim area’ as it had been ‘built up by the British’ and was a ‘cosmopolitan city’. President of the Muslim League Branch of Great Britain. and to help their Caste Hindu oppressors to establish their own hegemony on the Scheduled Castes together with others’. ‘but their number is being utilised to make up Hindu majority in the Provisional Plan of partition of India between Hindustan and Pakistan.358 / DWAIPAYAN SEN legislative assembly into Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority districts implicitly gave precedence to the Congress’ and Mahasabha’s demand for Partition. to join either Hindustan or Pakistan’. p. the status quo would remain unchanged.S. ‘If you really want to know what people are thinking about it. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Scheduled Castes in West Bengal had held meetings at which they declared against partition. It would not be fair to partition Bengal because some leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha are continuously shouting for it and some newspapers have taken up the cry’. 2012 . in a letter dated 19 May 1947. The note conceded: There being no time now specifically to consult public opinion on the basis of adult franchise. Principal Secretary to H. we must make a partition which will conform to what is 128 129 Rashid. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Suhrawardy raised objections about Calcutta to Sir Eric Mieville.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. ‘But on this ground there is no justification to refuse the Scheduled Castes the exercise of their birthright of freedom of expression of their opinion on such a vital issue as the partition of their home-land’. Inside Bengal Politics. IOR/L/PJ/7/1246. particularly in areas where they formed a considerable part of the population. the Viceroy.sagepub. 49. It only needs a little more time and the whole atmosphere will change. London. Suhrawardy continued.E. H. then of course Bengal is doomed’.128 Ali Muhammad Khan. Khan felt that their opinion had to be established.129 Such appeals fell on deaf ears. it seems eminently just and fair that a plebiscite of the Scheduled Castes people should be taken in all the areas where their decision might change the majority decision of the areas concerned. Further. British Library. London.‘No matter how. IOR: Mss Eur E341/46. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 359 believed on present evidence to be the wish of the majority community in any particular area. this was not simply the outcome of the Federation’s inadequacies. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. as evidenced at the General Election of 1945–6 and by the current ‘partition’ agitation. p. 130 ‘Explanatory note’ titled ‘Partition of Bengal’ in Secret. apart from a large number of Hindus who did not specify their caste (or lack of it))—the Hindus at the General Election may be said to have voted for Congress ideals and against Pakistan. 131 Mandal. they now demanded division.132 Conclusion The defeat of Mandal and the Federation’s project for Dalit political autonomy coincided with the ‘united Hindu demand’ for the Partition of Bengal. As I have shown.sagepub. Besides the task of assessing the depth of pro-Partition sentiment amongst the Dalits.130 The Government thus proceeded on the unverified assumption (despite the acknowledged uncertainty) that since Dalits voted for Congress in the 1946 elections.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. 230. The very antagonisms for which Bengal was divided had not been resolved and moreover. but equally the result of sustained efforts by the Congress to ensure that an independent political movement amongst Dalits found no fertile terrain. communal riots continued in both Bengals. while undoubtedly turning on the axis of communalism. came this tragic vindication: ‘But the country’s leaders and people did not listen to him. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. he felt that the widely proclaimed Dandakaranya plan was ultimately a ‘farce’. there is the equally crucial issue of its results—a matter to which I will but gesture.. Except for some uncertainty as to the effect of the Scheduled Caste vote—(the various ‘scheduled castes’ aggregated some nine millions of Bengal’s twenty-five million Hindus in the 1941 census. the failure to rehabilitate Dalit refugees in West Bengal or elsewhere. Confidential Governor’s Secretariat File. 229. 2012 . Gandhi’s coercion of Ambedkar in 1932 thus cast its long shadow on the Partition of Bengal. 132 Ibid. Partition. was also meaningful in its historical present as a moment entailing the loss of possibilities for the political mediation of caste inequality in Bengal. ‘Only destiny knows when all these problems will be settled’. p. Was freedom from Muslim domination worth the consequences of the divide for their communities? During his agitation against Partition.131 Amongst these he included the life conditions of Dalits in East Bengal. The various things he had said about the consequences of the Partition of Bengal have all come true’. 49. many others were created as a result thereof. Mandal delineated these potential effects in great detail. British Library. and finally. Writing towards the end of his life. PCSJM. Aprakasita Atmakatha. Indeed. and members of the chamber of commerce—the signatories averred: The Partition of Bengal will seriously affect the interest of the Scheduled Caste Hindus. Kolkata. and leave the Dalits vulnerable to caste Hindus in the West and Muslims in the East. but would equally enact irreversible damage on the Federation’s existence. not only would Partition fail to resolve communalism. and many others within the Federation and League. against the backdrop of the most unprecedented acts of mass communal violence in modern South Asian history. Mandal’s and the Federation’s considerable campaign against the move was yet again met with Congress’ opposition. which for all practical purposes will be a Pakisthan [sic]. he was not entirely alone. the riots of 1946 were not easily assimilated as a simple matter of irreconcilability between Hindus and Muslims. 1128/46(1). leaving the poorer caste Hindus and the Scheduled Caste Hindus (who are mostly poor) to their fate in an area. Mandal was able to organise Ambedkar’s election to the Constituent Assembly—an exceptional triumph amidst utterly hostile circumstances. Mandal furthermore became the object of Indian and Hindu nationalist critique given his association with the League both in the Government of Bengal and the Interim Government of India. Serial No. In case of Partition the well to do section of caste Hindus will naturally be inclined to move out of East Bengal and migrate to West Bengal. And in spite of the Congress’ inimicality.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier.133 Evidently even those who stood to presumably benefit the most from Partition— the caste Hindus of East Bengal—could not share in the certitude that its enactment would not exacerbate the caste divide. the Congress deliberately sought to marginalise the sole political organisation that posed a threat to its hegemony over the Dalits in the 1946 elections.sagepub. 459/1946. When the Partition of Bengal became a distinct possibility. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. West Bengal State Archives. This same point was raised once again at a conference presided over by Sarat Chandra Bose in Calcutta. both for Mandal. 2012 .360 / DWAIPAYAN SEN Despite the Federations limitations. in his apprehensions. In his view. in File No. His views on this violence thus stood considerably at odds with those who saw in them the ultimate justification for the Partition of Bengal. Subsequently. In a little-known seven-point public statement published by prominent caste Hindu personalities of East Bengal—lawyers. ‘Move for Partitioning Bengal Condemned’. who form a predominantly large percentage of Hindus in East Bengal. members of the legislative assembly and council. 49. The very move for the partition will thus widen the gulf between the Scheduled Caste Hindus and caste Hindus at a time when we are seriously trying to do away with all inequalities and caste distinctions. As I have suggested. which opposed 133 The Nationalist. ‘Security Demand on “Hindusthan”’.134 The evidence furnished will not. ———. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Memorandum to the Cabinet Mission. References Ajad. 1946. Certainly. 717D/46. Report of the Second Session held at Nagpur on 25. it is difficult to situate Mandal and his Federation within the received narrative of Dalit integration and identification with the Bengal Congress’s and Hindu Mahasabha’s aggressive anti-Muslim stance that valorised a united Hindu demand for a divided province. ‘Depressed Classes Association Against Movement’. WBSA. ———. 25 March 1947. 19 March 1947. is to perceive the uneasy Hindu nationalist resolution of the caste question in Partition as a necessary and deep premise of the communal logic structuring this foundational event. ———. 30 May 1947. Despite this. Pamphlets Collection. the various attempts to ensure their decline. 134 Amrita Bazar Patrika. 2003. Amrita Bazar Patrika. 2012 . ———. No doubt Mandal and the Federation’s defeat in Bengal may well be traced to their own shortcomings. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. Part 2. ———. 5 May 1947. ———. Dr B. ‘Scheduled Castes Demand Partition of Bengal’. ‘Tathakatithha Taphasili Sabhar Swarup’. ‘Repatriation before Partition’. ‘Bengal Partition Opposed’. These were bound to the Congress’ and Mahasabha’s efforts at constructing a united Hindu community which unanimously demanded the Partition of their province. 18 March 1947.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. Vol. ‘Anti-Muslim Feelings of the Caste-Hindus and Calcutta Riots’. Ambedkar. I have inclined my efforts towards indicating that the various experiences that went into the making of an event such as Partition cannot be contained by the story of communal politics and violence alone. which lays emphasis on the replacement of caste by religion in community identifications. one might add the very possibility for Dalit political autonomy. displace popular memories and understandings of the ‘turn to communalism’ that so visibly marked public life in the decades prior to Partition. I am certain. To the many casualties of Partition. 18 Jaishtha 1354. But as this article has shown. ‘Taphasili Jatike Bibhranta Karar Byapak Sharayantra’ (Widespread Conspiracy to Delude Scheduled Castes). File No. there were other explanations as well: namely. Jogendranath had to be defeated’ / 361 Partition ‘not only in the interest of East Bengal caste and Scheduled Caste Hindus but in the cause of nationalism in India and of Indian independence itself’. 5 April 1946. All India Scheduled Castes Federation. 26 and 27 December. All India Scheduled Castes Students’ Federation. To do so adequately however. 28 April 1947. Mumbai. 29 May 1947.R.‘No matter how. 18 Jaishtha 1354. ———. 26 March 1947. ———. 17. Writings and Speeches. ‘Bengal Partition Opposed’. 49.sagepub. British Library. pp. British Library. 3 (2012): 321–64 Downloaded from ier. in File No. Delhi. Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition. Begum. Jagaran. 191/46. Serial No. ‘Phedareshan Sabhapatir Bibriti—Tapashil Jatike Nirapeksha Thhakibar Nirddesh—Danga Hangamay Kono Sampraday Upakrita Hoibe Na’(Federation President’s Statement – Request to Scheduled Castes to Remain Unbiased – No Community Will Benefit in Riots). New Delhi. 1937–47’. Government of West Bengal. 18 October 1946). Vol. Communal Riots in Bengal. 1965. File No.D. Intelligence Branch. Pamphlets Collection. 27 August 1946. Chakrabarty. 2000. 9–38. ———. London.3561 from the Press Information Bureau. New Delhi. 1128/46(1). Protest and Identity in Colonial India: The Namasudras of Bengal. Caste. 893–942. IOR: Mss Eur E341/46. 1932–1947. ‘Partition and the Ruptures in Dalit Identity Politics in Bengal’. ed. S. J. Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste. ‘Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal. 25 October 1946.362 / DWAIPAYAN SEN ‘Move for Partitioning Bengal Condemned—Seven point statement by prominent personalities’. London. in The Present History of West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism. Protest and Identity in Colonial India: The Namasudras of Bengal. The Last Decades of Undivided Bengal: Parties. Intelligence Bureau Notes. Free Press. File No. New Delhi. 17 October 1946). 1872– 1947. IOR/L/PJ/10/50. Chatterjee. Das. 349–91.K. pp. 31(3).B. IOR/L/P&J/5/152. 2011.com at UNIV OF CHICAGO LIBRARY on October 29. West Bengal State Archives. Confidential—Brief for Dr Ambedkar’s Visit to the U. Culture and Hegemony: Social Dominance in Colonial Bengal. Chatterji. ‘The Second Partition of Bengal’. New Delhi. ‘Transfer of Power and the Crisis of Dalit Politics in India’. Recurrent Exodus of Minorities from East Pakistan and Disturbances in India: A Report to the Indian Commission of Jurists by its Committee of Inquiry. Congress Handbook. Explanatory note’ titled ‘Partition of Bengal’ in Secret. 34(4). London. Bengal Provincial Scheduled Castes’ Federation. 1946’. British Library. London. 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