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Page 1 of 39Special Proceedings Recent Digested Cases (20102011) CONTENTS: 1. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person a. Probate of the will in the foreign country where the alien deceased resides condition sine qua non for Reprobate of the will in the Philippines IN RE: In the Matter of the Petition to approve the will of Ruperta Palaganas with prayer for the appointment of Special Administrator, Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011 2. Guardianship a. Guardianship of Minor Cabales vs. Court of Appeal, G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007 b. Appointment of a Guardian: Court Authority Required People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010 c. Fiduciary Funds Shall Remain With Court Posted January 31, 2011; By Anna Katrina M. Martinez (SC Website) 3. Legal Guardian: When one of the spouse is incapacitated – Sole Administration Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000 a. Guardian over Incompetent Person: Who is an incompetent person Hernandez, et.al. vs. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 and 169217, August 7, 2009 4. Escheat Page 2 of 39 a. Escheat Proceeding: Proper Party and Citizenship of the owner of the property to be escheated. Balais-Mabanag vs. Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010 5. Adoption a. Validity of Adoption when the Surviving Spouse remarries IN RE: Petition for Adoption OF Michael Jude P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 b. Adoption under Article 33, New Civil Code and SC Cir. No.12: decree of Adoption cannot be made solely by case study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court DSWD vs. Judge Antonio M. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-961362 July 18, 1997 c. Penalty for a public officer for simulating birth certificate: Application of the Civil Service Rules Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen, A.M. No. P-082549, June 18, 2010 6. Habeas Corpus a. Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus ancillary to a Criminal Case: Dismissal of the latter rendered moot and academic of the former So vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., G.R. No. 190108, 19 October 2010 b. Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA: ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, et al., G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007 c. A detention previously invalid becomes valid upon the application, issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus denied. (Section 4 of Rule 102) Page 3 of 39 Ampatuan vs. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010 7. Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data: a. Command Responsibility b. Amparo: Not applied to those instances other than right to life, liberty or security (i.e. personal property) In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas, G. R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 8. Rule 103: Change of Sufficiency of Evidence Name: Jurisdiction and Republic vs. Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, G.R. No. 160597, July 20, 2006 9. Rule 108 a. Authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE RTC BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC, A.M.No.06-7-414-RTC, October 19, 2007 b. When civil status affects the changes in the entry in civil registry, adversarial proceedings applied – Jurisdictional and Notice are essential Republic vs. Julian Edward Emerson CosetengMagpayo (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZLIM COSETENG), G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011 c. Change of Status: Alien Spouse failed to comply on the Jurisdictional Requirement Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 10. RULE 103, 108 and RA 9048: Distinguished Republic vs. Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010 Page 4 of 39 . nephews of Ruperta. which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin). filed with the a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. 169144.) citizen. devisee. the U. HELD: Section 1. 2011 FACTS: Ruperta C. as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U. the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.S.-based executor designated in the will. she designated her brother. MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS VS. The CA affirmed order of the RTC. at any time after the death of the .Page 5 of 39 A. Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country. died single and childless. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. may. Palaganas (Ruperta).S.S. January 26. holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will. In the last will and testament she executed in California. and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U. Respondent Ernesto C. Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. or any other person interested in the estate. The CA pointed out that Section 2. Palaganas (Ernesto). ERNESTO PALAGANAS G. a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S. before it can be probated in the Philippines. another brother of Ruperta. Palaganas (Sergio). or legatee named in the will. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON Probate of the will in the foreign country where the alien deceased resides condition sine qua non for Reprobate of the will in the Philippines IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR. Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution. (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio. Sergio C. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor.R. The present case is different from reprobate.S. where she executed it The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will. ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. However. arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U. No. petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. Saturnina and six children. it cannot be made to apply to the present case. the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country. 03-02-05-SC NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting. B. and her four children. 162421. reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Sometime later and within the redemption period. Corrompido. On 1971. No. Nelson. so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts. and Rito. Lenora. and residences of the heirs. tendered their payment to Dr. the name of the person having custody of it. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show. petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. C. legatees. No. the estate he left in such province. Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son. Francisco and Leonora sold the . Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.J. and devisees of the testator or decedent. the said brothers and their mother. Alberto. JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIANO FELIANO G. Bonifacio. GUARDIANSHIP Guardianship of Minor: AM. 2007 Puno. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent. or is lost or destroyed. Albino. Contrary to petitioners’ stance. since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court. (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate. Besides. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. COURT OF APPEALS. Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to his wife. But. the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed. since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will. namely. In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California. On 1972. FACTS: Sometime in 1964. Saturnina. (b) the names. Bonifacio. August 31. it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance. ages. Subsequently. in lieu of Alberto. whether the same be in his possession or not. In reprobate. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will. herein petitioner. and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court.Page 6 of 39 testator. Francisco. Albino. prior to the redemption of the property.R. the contract of sale was valid. the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable. However. He was a minor at the time of the sale. she did not have the legal authority to do so. It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito. being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same. It was only in 1988. Rito. rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts. HELD: With regard to the share of Rito. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians. his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. the contract of sale was void. and (2) Nelson. the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. who was working abroad for six years. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable. However. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina. 188315. sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in subject land. No. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA G. failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price. and the management of his estate. August 25. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no longer entitled to the property since. 2010 FACTS: AAA lived with her adoptive mother. he effectively ratified it. Rule 96 “A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward. x x x” Indeed. Thus. since she was just a few months old. as legal guardian of petitioner Rito. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.Page 7 of 39 said land to Spouses Feliano. could validly sell his share in the property. will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21. Consequently. being minor at the time of the sale. Appointment of Guardian: Court authority required PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Alberto. Appellant . petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were binding upon them. With respect to petitioner Nelson.143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. BBB is married to appellant. BBB. or the management of the estate only. when Saturnina.R. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. Accordingly. Under Section 1. that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle. In 1986. Rito received the sum of 1. The respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share. when he received the proceeds of the sale. Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano. since he does not fit into that category. that is. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People vs. appellant again raped her. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week. Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward. Two weeks after the incident. In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659. The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA then 11 yrs old. Two days after. old. HELD: To justify the death penalty. RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure. which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA. at around the same time and while BBB was at work. and not qualified rape.Page 8 of 39 came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian. . Be that as it may. 2002. then appellant was able to penetrate her. but did so only on 2 counts and consider the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court authority Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable. appellant could only be convicted for two counts of simple rape. For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship. The following day. was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. we cannot impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same time until October 15.CA affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant. a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period. when she was 14 yrs. this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Information. the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender. including the Supreme Court. or earlier as the courts may direct. 1-97. In an En Banc Resolution. which is under the Executive branch. and under the Constitution. the funds in custodia legis will be returned to their rightful owners. the COA recommended that the Court deposit the amount of P4.” and the remittance of interests of the Fiduciary Funds to the national government “is erroneous and must be discontinued.976. subject to a service fee of 10% per annum of the interests earned. regardless of income source. 1-97. Joint Circular No. 1949 (PD 1949). as suggested by COA. an exemption is provided under Presidential Decree No.Page 9 of 39 Fiduciary Funds Shall Remain With Court Posted January 31 .” Thus said the Supreme Court as it ruled that Fiduciary Funds in custodialegis shall remain under the custody and control of the courts. “The control of funds in custodia legis is an exercise of judicial power. 325 provides that. Martinez The deposit of the Judiciary’s Fiduciary Funds. unless otherwise provided. The Court said while funds that properly accrue to the General Fund must be turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. while Fiduciary Funds deposited with the Court in its administrative capacity. and not in custodialegis. the Supreme Court clarified whether the deposits in its Fiduciary Funds and in those of the lower courts as well as the Philippine Mediation Center should be remitted to the National Treasury. “Neither the Executive nor Legislative branch can encroach on the power of the courts to control custody or disposition of funds in custodia legis. EO 338 directs government offices and agencies to immediately transfer all public moneys deposited with depository banks and other institutions to the Bureau of Treasury. to be deposited and disposed of as the courts may direct in the exercise of their judicial functions.838. shall accrue to the General Fund of the National Government.’” said the Court. which established the JDF “for the benefit of the members and personnel of the Judiciary to help ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary. which shall accrue to the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). on the other hand.” . Sections 7 and 8 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (2008 GAA). In its 2008 Annual Audit Report. By Anna Katrina M. ‘[T]he judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.8 billion.” adding that upon termination of the case. all collections from fees and charges of government agencies. and all subsequent collections of trust and other receipts with the Bureau of Treasury “has no legal basis.011. amounting to more than PhP4. 2011. shall be remitted to the National Treasury. The High Court said that while Batas Pambansa Blg. and COA-DOF-DBM Joint Circular No. while the 2008 GAA directs government agencies to book trust and other receipts “which have been received as guaranty for the fulfilment of an obligation” with the National Treasury. requires that all National Government cash balances be deposited with the National Treasury.86 “and all subsequent collections of trust and other receipts with the Bureau of Treasury” in conformity with Executive Order 338 (EO 338). the custody and disposition of any fund of whatever nature that is in custodia legis (custody of the law) is under the exclusive control of the courts in the exercise of their judicial functions. It added that interests on deposits of the JDF accrue to the JDF for the benefit of the members and personnel of the Judiciary. although derived from legal fees and charges. Gilda. Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose and depriving him of his mental and physical capability to act. the JDF... 2011) Legal Guardian: When one of the spouse is incapacitated – Sole Administration Jose Uy vs.Page 10 of 39 PD 1949 provides that the Chief Justice shall administer and allocate the JDF and shall have the sole exclusive power and duty to approve the authorized disbursement and expenditures of the Fund. does not accrue to the General Fund by express provision of PD 1949. are income of the government and shall be remitted to the National Treasury and that unclaimed fiduciary funds of private parties. AM No. and the interests thereon. Days later. Jardeleza. The Court also ruled that its own practice of remitting the interests of the Fiduciary Funds to the national government is erroneous and must be discontinued. he prayed for the issuance of the letters of guardianship in favor of his mother and petitioner.” said the Court. The High Court added that Fiduciary Funds also do not accrue to the General Fund as these are not “collections from fees and charges” but are funds that are deposited in court which are held in trust for the parties and litigants. shall remain with the courts until a law is passed authorizing the escheat or forfeiture of such unclaimed funds in favor of the State. Gilda filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of Dr. AM No. under the staggered payments proposed by retired Chief Justice Reynato S. Upon learning that the real property he owned is about to be sold. Re: Audit Observation Memorandum. the Supreme Court ruled that the amounts it previously remitted to the National Treasury representing interest earned on the Fiduciary Fund and forfeited/confiscated bonds covering the period from 2004 to 2007. Court of Appeals and Teodoro Jardeleza GR No. Upon termination of the case. administration of conjugal properties. Re: Fiduciary Fund Deposits Not Remitted to the Bureau of Treasury. In the petition. In . the interests should be returned to the parties together with the principal. “Following the right of accession conferred on the owner of the property under Article 440 of the Civil Code. November 29. Res.” the Court held. Finally. however. Res. the interests on these fiduciary funds also belong to the parties who own the principal amount. “Thus. 10-8-3-SC. 05-3-35-SC. The interests should not accrue to the General Fund because it is tantamount to taking private property for public use without just compensation. and authority of sell the same. ruled that forfeited cash deposits made to guarantee undertakings in favor of the government. Puno to the COA in 2009. (Min. 109557. The Court. Teodoro filed a petition for the issuance of the letter of guardianship of his father. 2000 Facts: Dr. including interests. shall be credited to whatever amounts the Court is required to remit to the National Treasury. January 18. Min. Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property. As such. Jardeleza is confined in an intensive care unit (ICU). and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. he argued that were one spouse is “comatose without motor and mental faculties. the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition. Teodoro filed an Opposition contending that he was unaware that the case was already decided. the case cannot be heard under the rules of summary proceedings as contemplated in Article 253 of the Family Code. In such case. comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Thus. In the absence of such authority or consent. she prayed for such reliefs because of the increasing hospital bills due to the fact that Dr. or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. the husband’s decision shall prevail.” the said provisions cannot be made to apply. 124. On the same date of the hearing. In this case. without motor and mental faculties. Upon the finding of the petition to be in form. . (165a). the RTC issued a notice for hearing. “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the proper remedy in the case is not the petition filed by his mother. the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. However. granted such petition.” In regular manner. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. which happened few days after. the RTC. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows: “ART. a victim of stroke. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. but the petition for guardianship proceedings.Page 11 of 39 the said petition. upon hearing the witnesses presented by Gilda. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. In case of disagreement. Issue: Whether the provision of Article 124 of the Family Code applies in this case when one of the spose is incapacitated to give his consent? Held: No. cerebrovascular accident. VICTORIA C. Lulu was given full control of her estate. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene. Nevertheless. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis. it did require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted. rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS G. No. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN. the latter died due to complications during childbirth. HERNANDEZ. Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18. Indeed.Page 12 of 39 Consequently. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Rizal. 2009 FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14. In the case at bar. because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education. Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. On October 2. herein petitioners. upon reaching the age of majority. trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse. 166470 and G. San Juan. not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Unfortunately. 169217 August 7.400. In 1974. Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. 1964 Revised Rules of Court. respondent Jovita San JuanSantos. In September 1998. Felix married Natividad Cruz. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family. Thus. Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle. 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. TERESA C. Felix and petitioners undertook various “projects” involving Lulu’s real properties. Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight. respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo. During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993). petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero. The union produced three children. Upon Felix's death in 1993. the trial court did not comply with the procedure under Revised Rules of Court. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE and NATIVIDADCRUZ-HERNANDEZ vs. Meanwhile. a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95. unkempt and smelled of urine.R. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of . 1998. After Maria's death. the the the not Guardianship over Incompetent Person: Who is an Incompetent Person? CECILIO C. In 1968.206.R. Sotero C. Thus. 1951. Branch 76. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. On December 16. No. Lulu signed a special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. the trial court did not even observe requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. MA. respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. persons who. it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. ALCARAZ AND RAMONA ALCARAZ G. 2010 Facts: The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down payment” in favor of Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50. Teresa and Ma. she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications. weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid. for their part. Lulu’s legal guardian. they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state. stepmother. Rule 92 of the Rules of Court. claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle. 153142. CONCEPTION D. Lulu identified and described her parents. March 29. Furthermore. since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families.00 as a down . ESCHEAT Escheat Proceeding: Proper Party and Citizenship of the owner of the real property to be escheated CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG v. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent. Ciriaco San Juan. within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. During the hearing. Under Section 2. half-siblings and maternal relatives. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and. HELD: YES. are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. If warranted. for that reason.000. Subsequently.R. ISSUE: Whether or not Lulu is an incompetent and the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property is necessary. an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez. to deliver the properties for her to manage. No. Thus. Cecilio. C. though of sound mind but by reason of age. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY. aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. Victoria. the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.Page 13 of 39 herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. disease. 1985. they will execute a deed of absolute sale immediately upon the transfer of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel because the same was named to their father. Lim married Primo Lim. the affected property reverts to the State. The limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State and not against individual. For this reason. Primo died. Ruling: The High Court ruled that it should be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualification to acquire land.00. Nos. On 27 December 2000. minor children. ADOPTION Validity of Adoption in case the surviving spouse remarries IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. On June 5. Unfortunately. LIM G. J. Thereafter. petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. whose parents were unknown. TCT 351382 was issued in the name of petitioner herein. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the registration by the Registry of Deeds of the DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE despite the lack of indication of citizenship of the buyer. not to the previous owner or individual. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.: Facts On 23 June 1974. Being so eager to have a child of their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. Hence. 2009 CARPIO. were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. instead the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State according to BP Blg. 168992-93. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Lim. petitioner married Angel Olario. Consequently. May 21.R. In the agreement with Ramona. On Feb. on 28 November 1998. Petitioner Monina P. 000. Lim and Michael Jude P. respondents filed a case for specific performance and caused the annotation of lis pendens over the property. Subsequently.18. they sold the same property to petitioner herein for a higher contract price than that of Ramona. 1985. an American citizen. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who .Page 14 of 39 payment for the sale of their inherited house and lot in Quezon City. And that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen. D. They were childless. this petition. The children were named Michelle P. It will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Only the Government through the Solicitor General has the personality to file the case challenging the capacity of person to acquire or own land based on non-citizenship. RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of the TCT in the name of petitioner. 185. Coronel rescinded the first agreement with Ramona by depositing to her the down payment of P50. before the trial court. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c). Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. On the ground that since petitioner having remarried. the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. at the time the petitions for adoption were filed. Thus. has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Michelle. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights. Dura lex sed lex. can singly adopt. and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. On 15 September 2004. Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. without being joined by her husband Angel Olario. of good moral character. that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity. . That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines. Section 7. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Monina Lim. that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country.The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age. Monina’s husband Angel likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee. together with her husband and Michael. In denying the motion. Held: Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife It is undisputed that. petitioner had already remarried. Who May Adopt. petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c). She filed the petitions by herself. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption.Page 15 of 39 simulated the birth of a child. and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided. Article III of RA 8552. further. gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. or . or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent. on 24 April 2002. who has remarried. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children. 7. The law is explicit. who was already 25 years old and already married and 18 years and seven months. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied. (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided. However. Adoption has. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Effects of Adoption Petitioner contention that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable. Petitioner. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter. or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter. without joining her husband. the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. In case husband and wife jointly adopt. must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. thus: Joint adoption of the husband and wife may not be dispensed. That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto. when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child. or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses. and . or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other. or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided. joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.Page 16 of 39 (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse. however. the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee. thus. Angel Olario. parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other. having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed. it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption. including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known. respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario. and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. RTJ-96-1362. even if emancipation terminates parental authority. the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. July 18. the DSWD found that it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the . Conversely. the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother. in her Memorandum. (2) to receive support from their parents. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario is of no moment. He asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P.M. the adoptive parents shall. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. joint adoption is mandatory. 1997 FACTS: Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano. Adoption under Article 33. BELEN A. enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. However. basing his decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor. Vedaña. No. No. insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Angel Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. New Civil Code and SC Cir. We disagree.12: Decree of Adoption cannot be made solely by case study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. the marriage still subsists. with respect to the adopted child. Petitioner." On these considerations. filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece. We reiterate our ruling above that since. petitioner was married to Olario. and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. both of whom are naturalized American citizens. That being the case. JUDGE ANTONIO M. Therefore.Page 17 of 39 (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child. at the time the petitions for adoption were filed. when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States. his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents. has made a case study of the child to be adopted. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence. or the Social Work and Counseling Division. as a complementary measure. . was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges. to make the proper recommendation. . if any. . and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. By respondent's failure to do so. he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. is in a large measure a legal device by which a . 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted. ISSUE: May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court? RULING: No. respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. . The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer. together with all the other requirements of the law. the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings. there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption. (2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . that the petition should be denied. xxx xxx xxx The Staff Assistant V. Furthermore. Circular No. 12. after such case study. its natural parents.Page 18 of 39 DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. after all. 12. Moreover. in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases: (1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development. Pursuant to Circular No. and the adopting parents. . of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that: No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts. Adoption. thru its local agency. M. According to complainant. for dishonesty and falsification of a public document. respondent executed an affidavit for delayed registration of the alleged birth of her child. respondent Elma P. in fact. P-08-2549. in fact. Respondent . On 6 March 2007. was the biological father. of Lingayen. 12. Simulation of Birth: Penalty of a public officer who registers a child to the Civil Registry not of the child’s biological parents. 2010 Facts: This is an administrative case against Emma Baldonado Curamen. Court Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the child’s original birth certificate to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. June 18. Article VII of Domestic Adoption Act: Rules on Civil Service Applied Anonymous vs. arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD. The complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the same child. and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act. is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Olga. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain. ACCORDINGLY. Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. In his Report. her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports. Pangasinan. Belen of the Regional Trial Court. respondent Judge Antonio M. respondent’s granddaughter. the social welfare officer concerned. Vedaña. Emma Curamen A. No. Ricardo Curamen.Page 19 of 39 better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. the child’s maternal grandmother. respondent included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration. 603 and Circular No. with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court. Branch 38. the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint charging respondent with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth. Regional Trial Court of Lingayen. Judge Caspillo confirmed that the child was. was one of respondent’s children. Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006. Nueva Ecija. The child’s real mother. Complainant submitted the child’s purported birth certificate to show respondent misrepresented that she was the child’s biological mother and her husband. 21. Complainant claimed respondent was. Vedaña. Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court. 12 of this Court. and respondent Elma P. Sec. G. accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed. was born on 30 November 2005. Respondent’s application was given due course and the supposed birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal. Ma. This second birth certificate of the child indicated that the child’s parents were respondent and her husband. J. Nueva Ecija under Registry No. we may appreciate the mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty. being a public document. Although under the schedule of penalties adopted by the Civil Service. dishonesty and falsification of a public document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal. the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document proclaims. No. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter. A birth certificate. E.: FACTS: Petitioner David E. 190108. Petitioner So alleged. Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen. TACLA. Held: With respect to the alleged falsification of the child’s birth certificate. especially where mitigating circumstances exist. that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH. The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document. even if not raised by respondent. When public documents are falsified. 19 October 2010 NACHURA. 2006-507. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus ancillary to a Criminal Case: Dismissal of the latter rendered moot and academic of the former DAVID E. serves as prima facie evidence of filiation. HON. But in the interest of substantial justice. Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to the child’s prejudice. Elena So Guisande (Guisande). the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong .R. the fact that this is respondent’s first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her favor. SO v.Page 20 of 39 claimed that her supposed child. We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree. ESTEBAN A. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper party. However. we find respondent guilty of dishonesty and falsification of a public document. JR. Issue: Whether Curamen is liable for simulation of birth by falsification. among others. which is suspension for six months and one day without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH to have temporary legal custody of the accused. in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. the court resolved to issue a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the Court of Appeals for decision. Judge Tacla contends that the cases for issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. The case arose from the following facts. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the . who was being charged with a non-bailable offense. various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court. and thereafter.confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of. issued by Judge Tacla which states that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge". a persons life. Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft against Guisande. On the contrary. claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel. and security for amparo cases . the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear. Meanwhile. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings. the petition for review on certiorari. upon motion of the NCMH. NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report according to which. or threat to violate. ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC HELD: The petition should be dismissed. Guisande. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that. accused Guisande and her father filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo. Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Fundamentally. Eventually. had assessed Guisande fit for trial. albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter. is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Hence. In view of such dismissal. Judge Tacla. the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. liberty. the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of . prima facie. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. There is no affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ.should be illegal or unlawful. the NCMH. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process. The court granted the Motion for Relief. Subsequently. a well-reputed government forensic facility. therefore. During the pendency of these consolidated cases. Thus. Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial. Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). While habeas corpus is a writ of right. the petitioner is entitled to the writ. Guisande is competent to stand the rigors of court trial.Page 21 of 39 City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande. respondents. In the cases at bar. In response. the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention. giving due regard to constitutional rights. They were. the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which. They were consequently detained in Fort Bonifacio under the custody of the Philippine Marines. In addition. No.". In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA: ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of . petitioners were not released. she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures. petitioners were taken into custody by their Service Commander. can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed. in the often cited David v. Gen.Page 22 of 39 petition for habeas corpus be granted. 170924. and GEN. among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Despite of the order and the service thereof. G. and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have. and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority." Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division. the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing. MacapagalArroyo. to suppress and quell the "rebellion. is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events. it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. As a response. accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion” and General Order No. EFREN ABU. the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande. as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority. the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital. In short. July 4. Moreover. Certainly. accused Guisande’s person. much less at the NCMH. the petition should be dismissed. 2007 Facts: In line with their participation in the “Oakwood Mutiny” that led to Pres. in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy.R. With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. A petition for bail was filed by the accused soldiers which the RTC subsequently granted. Effectively. a Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf. however. ERNESTO DE LEON. Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War. so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. Where the issues have become moot and academic. For this very same reason. the Petition for Habeas Corpus has. Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was proper despite of the pending special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division. heretofore footnoted. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court. The question this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court? We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point. indeed. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. there ceases to be any justiciable controversy. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i. the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. Thus. we should not entertain the present petition as the matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and Mesa’s release. That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin.Page 23 of 39 Appeals and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th Division. the petitioner seeks to implement through a petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The present petition. In effect. Thus. been rendered moot. NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus denied. the release of Gonzales and Mesa). on the other hand.. the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Held: No. XXX XXX XXX When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected. To be sure. This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for. Writ of Habeas Corpus: Section 4 of Rule 102 A detention previously invalid becomes valid upon the application.e. MACARAIG . The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower court’s grant of bail. was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the order granting bail is already executory. With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales. we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case. thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. there is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. we have this case. they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. petitioner. Seeking the reversal of RTC. 29 June 2010 PEREZ. such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. On 24 April 2008. Manila. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP. the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody. inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. 182497. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990). The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition. at the earliest. Republic Act No. J. by reason of some supervening events. Dalaig. RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. On 18 April 2008.Page 24 of 39 G.: FACTS: Atty. rendered his PreCharge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan. If it is. It is a permissible precautionary measure to . Police Senior Superintendent Guinto. on 21 April 2008. Likewise. it may. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. as amended by Republic Act No.R. and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. for even if the detention is at its inception illegal. Consequently. be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application In this case. the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus. at best. Alioden D. PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan. ILLEGAL. the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office. the writ cannot be issued. Ermita. No. H. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998). Meanwhile. HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of. such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102. clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Head of the COMELEC Legal Department. PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE. filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets. was killed at the corner of M. nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. Restrictive custody is. F. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009. She was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or else something bad will happen to her and her family. 2010. PO1 Ampatuan. then dragged them inside a van parked outside the house. Roxas. decided to rest in the house of Mr. Before being release. Sometime after her release. FACTS: Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. banged inside. tied and blindfolded Roxas and her companions. Roxas inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur. she is enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan. a blouse and a pair of shoes. Nueva Ecija. Roxas. Carabeo and Jandoc. a plastic bag containing biscuits and books. her companions and Mr. petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband. . The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.Page 25 of 39 assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. After about an hour of travelling. Roxas continued to receive calls from one of her abductors via the cellular phone given to her. R.United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. Tarlac for a future medical mission. Roxas threw away the cellphone. the van stopped. G. After she was informed that she was detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). Tarlac. Roxas Melissa C. Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and were wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open-up. En Banc Perez. however. No. Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. During the course of her immersion. Roxas and her companions. In sum. While in the United States. Carabeo amd Jandoc. Suddenly 15 heavily armed men forcibly opened the door. in April of 2009. a slip of paper cantaining an email address with password. et al. 2009. La Paz. Roxas vs. WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Barangay Kapanikian. On May 25. September 7. she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz. 189155. the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle. the abductors gave her a cellphone with a sim card. At around 1:30 in the afternoon. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family. J. Roxas toured various provinces and towns in Central Luzon and. the handcuffs used on her. From there she could hear the sounds of gunfire. Roxas was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room which she believed is a jail cell from the sound of the metal doors. the appellate court absolved the respondents from the petition. Whether or not the respondents are liable in her abduction and torture? c. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. fix liability for such disappearance. command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability. if not incorrect. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance. cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. "command responsibility. in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life. Whether or not the principle of command responsibility shall apply in writ of amparo? b. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and. ISSUES: a. In which case. In amparo proceedings. by so doing. however. It must be clarified. extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not. that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not. whether that may be criminal. Her prayer for the return of her personal belongings and for the inspection order and production order were denied.Page 26 of 39 Roxas fied a petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. or at least accountability. means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. liberty or security." In this sense. civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. According to Fr. the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity . Whether or not her prayer for the return of her personal belongings be granted? d. killing or threats. commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility. b. Roxas invokes he doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities. by this account. Bernas." in its simplest terms. Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data is proper? RULING: a. is legally inaccurate. Whether or not her prayer for inspection order be granted? e. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition. preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. First. by any measure. it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. However. The Court of Appeals granted her petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. Unfortunately for the petitioner. the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. To the mind of the Court. Like the Court of Appeals. this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified. but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines. clearly excludes the protection of property rights. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay. it is. Bluntly stated. As already discussed above. In the case at bench. in fact. petitioner was. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner. d. which defines the scope and extent of the writ. Direct evidence of identity. much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. c. so as to make a prima facie case. Second. whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. when obtainable. able to include in her Offer of Exhibits. an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. petitioner’s claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. in order to aid the court before making a decision. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition. matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself." which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. nevertheless. An . With nothing else but obscure observations to support it. the Supreme Court are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds. The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the inspection order is equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition. because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity. petitioner failed to do. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. This.Page 27 of 39 and affiliation of the perpetrators. as was shown above. In an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. In her petition before the RTC. Rule 103: Change of Name: Jurisdiction and Sufficiency of Evidence ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a. 2006 FACTS: A petition for change of name was commenced by respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante on October 18. 2. reports. That she is a Filipino. only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. Bolante and Paula B. Abra. of legal age. at least by substantial evidence. her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name. documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy. 2000. the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form. respondent alleged. This.Page 28 of 39 inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are. Abra. in themselves. particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. born to spouses Floriano B. was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence. it was not proven to have. In view of the above considerations." appears to be devoid of any legal basis. i. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself. an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing.e. the petitioner failed to do. No. unreliable and doubtful. as far as she can remember. most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. Bangued. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. G. married. keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA. e. in the first place. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar. of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life.a. July 20. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that. clearly. 160597. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. .. in the case at bench. liberty or security of the victim. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE G. among other things. Needless to state. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued.k. the following: 1.R. UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE. Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case. what actually would be the initial hearing was. and 4. Rule 103 of the rules of court with respect to the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication in Petition for Change of Name. The trial court ordered respondent. issued a notice for a July 18. to prevent confusion. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. through the OSG. At that session. IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES. On June 5. YES. 3. II. She also categorically stated she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present correct name. the trial court issued an Order giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26. acting upon the trial court's express March 26. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY. 2001. 2001 initial hearing. There is a substantial compliance with Sec. At the scheduled February 20. and set the hearing on February 20. 2001 directive for a resetting. respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents without any objection on the part of petitioner Republic. the branch clerk of court. the Republic. 2001 and actually held. went to the Court of Appeals and the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. scheduled on September 25. thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. 3. On January 23. 2002. Following another resetting. to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication.Page 29 of 39 3. Ms. represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). 2001. the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records. Thus. after notice. respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the name she has always carried and used. On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that. ISSUES: I. RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A QUO. she wanted to secure a passport and wanted that the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not have filed the petition was it not for the passport. On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the petition is her realization that there will be a complication upon her retirement. . RULING: I. In time. as petitioner. Bolante-Marbella. 2001 hearing. 2001. 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3. and shall set forth: (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing. shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof. the Solicitor General. . the court. 2001.Page 30 of 39 Sections 2 and 3. the initial hearing for several times. The Court. 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier. (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought. (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks. publication is valid if the following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published. as the court shall deem best.If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance. SEC. Likewise. that the trial court. by an order reciting the purpose of the petition. and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province. 2000. It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name. as an agency of the people. The government. Rule 103 of the Rules. Counted from the last day. The notice of hearing was published in the November 23. any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. must emphasize. (Underscoring added. 2. Rule 103 of the Rules. represents the public and. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. who appears on behalf of the government. As it were. effectively represents the public. …. the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government. with due notice to all concerned. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. 2001. the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling. however. 3. the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18. and 30. Hon. as did the CA. December 7. . citing pertinent jurisprudence. the initial hearing scheduled on February 20. Order for hearing. the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province. SEC. 2000 and December 7. evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month limitation. therefore. In Republic v. (c) The name asked for. . of publication of the Order. or some other person on his behalf. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the hearing.A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed. Contents of petition. In the context of Section 3. and. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu. In this case. 2000 and set for hearing on February 20. finally settling for September 25. non-compliance with these requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change of name.) As gleaned from the records. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification. but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. and that changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. authenticity. is sufficient to grant the Petition for change of name. during the September 25. while perhaps apropos. professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission. As it were. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous. II. including that of her driver's license. The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefore rests on the sound discretion of the court. Furthermore. (b) when the change will avoid confusion. Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. such as NBI clearance and Police clearance. and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC. (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name. Accordingly. dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing. respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification. YES. unsupported by any other evidence. (d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest. be a convincing norm of one's good moral character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil . In a very real sense. as well as records in government offices. Surely. she has. all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. since she started schooling. and was unaware of alien parentage. But beyond practicalities.Page 31 of 39 Accordingly. the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo. The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration. or any compelling reason which may justify such change. a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause. With the view we take of the case. therefore. Her scholastic records. to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court. used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa. albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. 2001 initial hearing which. it need not be the best evidence available. as the OSG suggests. The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. Respondent's bare testimony. the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness.cannot. In view of these observations. PANIQUI. the Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod were made to explain why these petitions for change of name and/ or correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without the required hearing. The audit team noticed that there were no special proceedings case records presented. The trial court also adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default and the court renders judgment based on the pleadings filed by the plaintiff. They further averred that these petitions were filed before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions. the trial court considered the same procedure. Branch 67. A. TARLAC. The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.M. 2007 Facts: A judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the RTC. RULE 108 Authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. they explained that these petitions may be covered by RA 9048 which authorized city or municipal registrar to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. then presided by Judge Cesar M.Page 32 of 39 motive or fraudulent intent. H. RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE RTC BRANCH 67. Issue: Whether trial court still have jurisdiction over petitions on change of name and correction of entries. or should the proceeding under Rule 108 be followed. Upon inquiry. Held: . In their answer. Since RA 9048 allows correction of entries without hearing and publication. Respondent's open court testimony. 9048 should be adopted in cases filed before the courts. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006. Tarlac. Whether the summary procedure prescribed in RA No. The audit team observed that almost all of the petitions have no hearings conducted and that the date of filing indicated in the docket books and the date of the decision was so near that it will be improbable to comply with the publication requirement under the Rules of Court. given under pain of perjury and for which she was cross-examined.No. that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered name or under her present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of the bona fides of her request for change of name.06-7-414-RTC October 19. Paniqui. the Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod asserted that most of these cases are for Petitions for Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry and gave the audit team copies of the decisions. as observed by the Office of the Court Administrator. Q-0863058. 2011 FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9. the procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. there is nothing in RA 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before the court even for purposes of expediting the resolution of said petitions.R. was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG. not exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname. Moreover. 1972. however. there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if RA 9048 were not enacted at all. 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG) G. docketed as SPP No. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registry has primary. No. The petition." and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his . There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. Since RA 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceedings before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. Thus. as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied with.A. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who. respondent filed on July 22. it was clear that the local civil registrar is given the authority to act on petitions for corrections of entries and change of first name or nicknames. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M." In support of his petition. yet there was no mention that such petition can no longer be filed with the regular courts. In other words.Page 33 of 39 During the deliberation. Claiming. that his parents were never legally married. February 2. Magpayo Jr. The promulgation of rules of procedure for court of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. When civil status affects the changes in the entry in civil registry.K.” Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng. adversarial proceedings applied – Jurisdictional and Notice are essential REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. 189476. contracted marriage on March 26. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENGMAGPAYO (A. 1972. respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings. 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth]. In the 1998. 2001 and 2004 Elections. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG".Page 34 of 39 surname. Delete the entry "March 26. it. and November 14-20. November 7-13. thru the OSG. hence. (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous. 2. Jr. (in favor of the Republic) 1. 3. 2008.L. ISSUE: 1. 2008. 2009. 2009. an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte By Decision of January 8. Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name. respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo. 2. and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is . respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M. (c) when the change will avoid confusion. COSETENG. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar ofMakati City to: 1. and 4. HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. and was unaware of alien parentage. capitalization in the original) The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2. No opposition to the petition having been filed. lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law. 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6." On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC. 2008. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate. (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage. dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20. all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody. . the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Ruling in her favor. recognized grounds. Republic of the Philippines. SEC. and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. . Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. however. It reads: SECTION 1. the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. In the present case. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. the court shall.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought. 3. Parties. Estrella Alfon. *** Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of." ******** Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. –Upon the filing of the petition. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the . fix the time and place for the hearing of the same. In Alfon.Page 35 of 39 no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto. are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . 4. with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. Notice and publication. . Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . Who may file petition. and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. italics and underscoring supplied) 2. SEC. however. Labayo-Rowe v. adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. the Court allowed the therein petitioner. to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. however. the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname. by an order. order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register. Rule 108 applies. (emphasis. respondent denies his legitimacy. or analogous to. event.—Any person interested in any act. As earlier stated. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. DAISYLYN STO. Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition.Page 36 of 39 RTC shows. and to be enforceable. Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Tomas. an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar. he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Two years after. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3. Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out Change of Status: Alien Spouse failed to comply on the Jurisdictional Requirement GERBERT CORPUZ VS. On. neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. 186571. Jan. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved. Aside from improper venue. also above-quoted. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer. Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. with the RTC. 2000. he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case. Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. August 11. such as creditors. The purpose precisely of Section 4.R. In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiancée. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5. Despite its registration. . Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Due to work and other professional commitments." Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors. TOMAS G. No. 18 2005. the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippine court. which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). Hurt and disappointed. 2010 FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on Nov. RA 9048: Distinguished REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.A." Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). No. HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. 9048.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. 186027. I. sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment. the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case. the RTC granted the petition and ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. 108. 2010 FACTS: On June 6. refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by R. . without judicial order. the RTC issued an order. No.R. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens. however. dated June 10.Page 37 of 39 RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. Evelyn M. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City. 2005. Oga (Oga). 9048. Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera). may be annotated in the civil registry.A. RULE 103. the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. No. represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. December 8. MERLYN MERCADERA G. for the hearing of said petition. 9048. Under R. In its September 28. Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 2005. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor. authorizing the cancellation or correction. 2005 Decision. " From the allegations in her petition." The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. or both. HELD: Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname. events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons. the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. that is. "MERLYN. 2009. In its December 9. 2009. the OSG filed the present petition. the rest of the community. Rule 108. 2008 Decision. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say. the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. Thus. In petitions for correction. only on grounds provided by law. typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. On behalf of Mercadera.Page 38 of 39 The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. spelling. this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103. there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. To correct simply means "to make or set aright. the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed its Comment on July 3. or with regard to." also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN. and not Rule 108. The CA was not persuaded. On March 6. For the OSG. . on the other hand. the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC order. implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Essentially. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others. to remove the faults or error from. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted." and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to. only clerical. pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2. his legal position in. Rule 108 also includes "changes of name. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. In the case at bench. which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103. the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name "is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights". For the OSG. Wherefore. the December 9. it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. . 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so.Page 39 of 39 What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.