Article 246.Parricide 1. People Vs Rabao, G.R. No. L-46530 April 10, 1939 The information filed by the acting provincial fiscal of said province charged the defendant with parricide for having killed his wife Salvacion Agawa on December 15, 1937, in the municipality of Naga, Province of Camarines Sur, which crime was committed with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. FACTS: On the morning of December 15, 1937, when the defendant was hardly awake after staying up late the previous night on account of the elections held in the municipality of Naga, he noticed that his wife was preparing water with which to give the child a bath. He told his wife not to bathe the child because it had a cold, but the wife insisted and a quarrel arose in the heat of which the accused punched his wife on the abdomen. She fell seated on a sack of rice nearby and immediately suffered an attack of which she died in spite of the aid rendered her by the accused himself and other persons who had arrived. ISSUE: WON the defendant is liable of the crime under article 246 or Parricide of the Revised Penal Code. Held: The Supreme Court held that the facts proven constitute the crime of parricide defined by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore, guilty of the crime of parricide and hereby sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Although,the SC recommended to the President of the Philippines, the commutation of the penalty imposed on the defendant in the said decision. 2. People Vs Pablo Villanueva, G.R. No. L-28201 February 8, 1928 This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding the appellant, Pablo Villanueva, guilty of the offense of frustrated parricide and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months, and one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, and requiring him to pay the costs. FACTS: The accused in this case, Pablo Villanueva, and the injured woman, Salvacion Tesoro, are husband and wife; and until June 23, 1927, they were living together in the municipality of Balasan, in the Province of Iloilo. For some time prior to the day mentioned, ill feeling had existed on the part of the accused towards his wife; and a few days before the incident now to be referred to, in the course of the matrimonial dispute, the accused exhibited a hatchet to his wife and told her that he had not bought it for the purpose of splitting wood but to use upon her body. On the date mentioned the wife had a wordy altercation with a younger sister of the accused, whereupon the accused intervened and said to the girl, "Leave her alone, sister, for lightning is going to strike soon, and there will be a cutting." Upon this, the sister retired, and the wife, Salvacion Tesoro, turned away. In a few minutes, however, the accused approached her with hatchet in hand struck her on the right occipital part of the head, making a gash that was not of a dangerous nature. Surprised at this aggression, Salvacion asked the accused why he had wounded her. Instead of answering, he placed himself in front of the woman and 1 aimed at her a second blow, which she parried with her right hand, at the cost of fracturing a bone in her wrist. Following upon this aggression, the accused attempted to give the woman a third blow, but she evaded the stroke by stopping, and at the same time gave the accused a push. As consequence the blade of the hatchet passed harmlessly in the air, and only the handle struck on the woman's left shoulder. At this moment another woman, who was the wife of a brother of the accused, stepped in and caught the accused by the shoulder, thereby causing to desist from the assault. ISSUE: WON the accused guilty of Frustrated Parricide? RULING: In the opinion of the court the proof of intention to kill in this case is lacking in certainty and convicting character. The trial judge defined the offense as frustrated parricide, but the majority of this court are of the opinion that this qualification of the offense is too severe, because it does not appear beyond a reasonable doubt either that the accused actually intended to kill his wife or that he performed all of the acts of execution which should have resulted in the woman's death and was only prevented from accomplishing this result by causes independent of his will. A fair interpretation of the evidence is, in our opinion, to the effect that the accused was somewhat of a blusterer and bully and that the threat implied in his statement, some days before the assault, that he had bought the hatchet to use on his wife, is at least partly explainable as having been prompted by a desire to intimidate the woman. Again, if the accused had really intended to kill his wife, it is difficult to see what there really was to prevent him when she was crouched helplessly on her knees before him. The judgment convicting the accused of frustrated parricide is therefore reversed, and judgment will be entered convicting the accused of the offense of lesiones menos graves and sentencing him to six months, arresto mayor, with the accessories appropriate to this penalty, and requiring him to pay all costs of prosecution, with proper credit of course for one-half the period of provisional confinement prior to the date when service of this sentence shall begin. So ordered. 3. G.R. No. 211062 ; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO For review is the June 28, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209 which affirmed with modification the August 18, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 6, convicting Manuel Macal y Bolasco (accused-appellant) of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. FACTS: Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the accused-appellant got married in March 2000 and that out of their union, they begot two (2) children. Angeles claimed that, at the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house located in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was entrusted to Angeles by her brother, Quirino Ragub, who was then residing in Canada. Angeles testified that at around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her children Catherine, Jessica, Auria and Arvin were walking home after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them so that they could all feast on the leftover 2 food prepared for the fiesta that was celebrated the previous day. Along the way, Angeles and her group met Auria's husband, the accused appellant. The latter joined them in walking back to their house. When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and the accused-appellant who went straight to their bedroom, about four (4) meters away from the living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter Auria shouting, "mother help me I am going to be killed.". Upon hearing Auria's plea for help, Angeles and the rest of her companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the door of the room locked. Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to Auria was the accused-appellant who was then trying to stab himself with the use of an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, on board a vehicle owned by a neighbor, but was pronounced dead on arrival. Angeles declared that the accused-appellant jumped over the fence and managed to escape before the policemen could reach the crime scene. ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime Parricide? RULING: All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and Proven by the Prosecution Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested. In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. As previously stated, the defense already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such admission was even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the prosecution produced a copy of the couple's marriage certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the original. Hence, the key element that qualifies the killing to parricide was satisfactorily demonstrated in this case. 4. G.R. No. 180496 April 2, 2014; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROY SAN GASPAR, Accused-Appellant. On appeal is the July 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00237, which affirmed with modification the January 29, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat in Criminal Case No. 2679. The RTC convicted Roy San Gaspar (appellant) of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 3 Facts: At around 11:30 p.m. of the same day and while Imelda and her two children Joramel and Cherme were already fast asleep, appellant returned home and pounded on their front door. The thudding sound roused the whole household. Apparently, appellant was mad because nobody immediately opened the door for him. He got even more furious when he entered the house and saw Imelda sleeping side-by-side with her grown-up children. Appellant thus kicked Imelda on the leg while she was still lying on the floor and this started a heated altercation between them.8 Appellant exclaimed, "What kind of wife [are you?],"9 to which Imelda retorted, "what kind of a husband is a person who just leaves his family behind without asking permission or informing his wife of his whereabouts"? Imelda also told appellant that her sleeping with Joramel and Cherme is without any malice as they are her children. Still enraged, appellant went upstairs and returned with a .12 gauge shotgun. He loaded it and lit a kerosene lamp which he placed near the door of their room.10 He then aimed the .12 gauge shotgun at his wife and in front of Joramel and Cherme, shot Imelda on the head.11 Appellant thereafter immediately ran away.12 Imelda was brought to Sultan Kudarat Provincial Hospital where she passed away. ISSUE: WON the accused liable of the crime parricide. Held: Elements of Parricide obtaining in this case; Factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, cannot be disturbed. "Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused."34 In this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that Imelda was shot and killed by appellant based on the eyewitnesses’ account. Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who shot and killed Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material details. Moreover, there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. On the other hand, appellant only offered his bare denial of the offense. However, "[t]he Court had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses."38 The Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. "It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect since trial courts have first-hand account on the witnesses’ manner of testifying and demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility."39 Furthermore, "in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo, and especially when the findings of the judge have been adopted and affirmed by the CA, the factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed." 4 5. People of the Philippines vs Tibon G.R. No. 188320, june 29, 2010 This is an appeal from the February 25, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406, which affirmed the August 2, 2005 Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 98-169605-06 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26 in Manila. The RTC found accused-appellant Honorio Tibon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of parricide. Facts: Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law wife Gina Sumingot (Gina) lived together as husband and wife. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert (Reguel). They lived together with Tibon’s parents and siblings on the third floor of a rented house. Gina went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s custody. After some time, Tibon heard from her sister who was also working abroad that Gina was having an affair with another man. After the revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two children. On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother and his siblings (Zernan and Leilani), went to Tibon’s room. They saw him with the two children who appeared to be lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies. When Tibon realized that his mother and siblings had seen the children lying on the floor he stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen knife and jumped out of the window of their house. At the hospital, accused-appellant survived and was treated however, the children could no longer be revived. In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he could not recall what happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could not remember being taken to the hospital. He said that he was only informed by his siblings that he had killed his two children, causing him to jump off the window of their house. ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS COMMTING PARRICIDE. HELD: The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this case. Under Article 264 Parricide is committed when: (i) a person is killed; (ii) the deceased is killed by the accused; (iii) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon was found guilty by this Court with the punishment of reclusion perpetua. Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy because of the revelation that his wife was having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity. DEFENSE of Tibon for his insanity is not applicable. Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval” is exempted from criminal liability. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears 5 the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Testimony or proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense. The medical records of Tibon with the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) is inapplicable for such refers to his condition to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately before or during the commission of the crimes. 6. People vs Calonge , G.R. No. 182793 july 25, 2010 Facts: On cross-examination, Melody fixed the time of the incident at 4:00 in the morning when she woke up to prepare food. However, she went back to bed because she knew that appellant was already awake. Her mother and sisters were still asleep. Appellant then started hacking, first her mother, who evaded the blow and was able to run outside to seek help from her grandmother and aunt. Returning to Melody, appellant hit her three (3) times before following her mother outside. At this point, Melody also recalled that her parents quarrelled on the night of November 30, 2001. Before they went to sleep, she saw her father sharpening his bolo. When she asked appellant what he was doing, he replied that he will kill Uncle Santy and his family. Melody said that she pretended to be still asleep when she woke up the next morning because she had seen appellant placed that bolo under his pillow. As to the exact time the quarrel took place, it can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes that Melody initially could not estimate with reference to the night before they slept, but she eventually declared that her parents quarrelled from 6:00 oclock until 7:00 oclock in the evening of November 30, 2001. Issue: WON the accused-appellant is liable for the crime parricide? Rule: Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the prosecution. ***In the killing of Dony Rose and Kimberly, the trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. ***As to the killing of Rosita, neither treachery nor evident premeditation was present considering that she was able to parry the first thrust of appellant and ran away outside the house, and there is no evidence proving that appellant determined to commit the crime. (STILL PARRICIDE) 6 ***as to melody- FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE. ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. The courts, in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the provisions of Article 50. 7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO GELAVER, G.R. No. 95357 June 9, 1993 Facts: The prosecution presented Randy Mamon, who testified that at 7:00 a.m. of March 24, 1988, he heard shouts coming from the house of Tessie Lampedario in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the appellant and a woman having a heated argument. Thereafter, appellant held the neck of the victim, dragged her and with a knife on his right hand, stabbed the latter three times on the breast. Appellant then went out of the gate and fled in the direction of the public market of Sto Niño. (TSN, June 27, 1988, pp. 7-10) Appellant Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he did so after catching her having carnal act with her paramour. Appellants version of the killing was that when his wife saw him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour immediately stood up, took a knife placed on top of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellant by hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab intended for the paramour. As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that his mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her paramour. Issue: is the accused guilty of the crime parricide? Held: Yes. Appellant's claim that on the day prior to his killing of the victim, his daughter Sheryl had confided to him that her mother was living with a paramour at the house in front of the Sto. Niño Catholic Church was belied by Sheryl herself. In her testimony, she stated that she did not know the house where the crime was committed and she had not gone to that place. She further testified that she had not seen her mother in any other house except that of her grandfather's. (TSN, January 17, 1989, p. 5) If there was a naked man with the victim, he would have had no time to get dressed because he was then under attack by appellant. There would then have been the spectacle of a man in the nude running in the streets. Case under Article 248- MURDER 7 8. G.R. No. 202124; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.IRENEO JUGUETA Facts: Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in their hut.7 When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.8 In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9 ISSUE: WON the accused committed murder as expressly provided in article 248 under RPC? Rule: yes. In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for 2 counts of the crime Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed. 9. G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant. Facts: 8 The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house. Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene. Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound. Issue: won the accussed guilty of frustrated murder? Held: No. We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies: Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner: 1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. 2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.20 In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. 9 In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident: 10. G.R. No. 191060 February 2, 2015; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR.,et al Facts: Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellants conspired to murder Agon. Vitan testified that onFebruary 21, 2004, he, the accused and appellants agreed to murder Agon. In accordance with their plan, they proceeded the next day, February 22, 2004, to the cockpit arena, a place which they knew that Agon would be at on that particular day. Upon their arrival thereat, the members of the group which included appellants positioned themselves according to their plan and waited for Agon to leave. Later on, Caballero signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman, accused Theo (Theo), that the target had left the arena and that his vehicle was already approaching their position. When Agon’s vehicle came, Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the back-ups, and the rest of the group then fled the scene of the crime. Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose among the members of "Black Shark," which include appellants in killing Agon. Conspiracy having been established, evidence as to who delivered the fatal blow is no longer indispensable. Hence, it is immaterial if Caballero’s role was merely to signal the gunmen and Alvarez’s, to act as back-up. Each of the offender is equally guilty of the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. Issue: won appellants are guilty of murder? Held: Yes. Each of the offenders is equally guilty of the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder. People of the Philippines vs Catalino Rambao G.R NO. L-46530 (Parricide) FACTS: Salvador agawa and Catalino rambao were married. On the morning, when the defendant was hardly awake after staying up late the previous night, he noticed that his wife was preparing which to give a chid bath. He told his wife not to bathe the child because it has a cold, but the wife insisted and a quarrel arose in the heat of which the accused punched his wife on the abdomen. She fell seated in a sack of rice and immediately suffered an attack which she died. 10 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused catalino rabao is guilty of the crime parricide under article 246 of the revised penal code? HELD: Yes. Catalino rabao is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Based on the facts proven in the case constitute a crime of parricide. The quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the defendant as a father to prevent his child which was then ill from being give a bath. People vs Villanueva G.R NO. L-28201 (Frustrated Murder) FACTS: Pablo Villanueva and Salvacion Tesoro are husband and wife.for sometime, ill feeling has existed on the part of the accused toward his wife. In the course of marital dispute, the accused approach her wife with hatchet in hand struck her on the right part of the head, he placed himself in front of the woman and aimed her for the second blow cause of fracturing the bone of her right wrist. Third blow, she evaded. ISSUE: Whether or not accussed Pablo Villanueva is liable for the crime committed? HELD: Yes. Accused Pablo is liable for frustrated parricide. Based on the facts of the case, it does not appear that the accused actually intended to kill his wife or that he performed all the acts of execution which should resulted the woman’s death. And it was only prevented from accomplishing this result by causes or independent will. PEOPLE VS MACAL G.R.NO. 211062 (PARRICIDE) FACTS: 11 Manuel macal and Aurie macal are husband and wife. The accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, having conceived and deliberated to kill his wife aurie, armed with improvised weapon stab said auria on the front portion of the body which caused her death. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred finding the accused guilty of the crime parricide? HELD: Yes. The accused is guilty of the crime parricide under article 246 book two of the revised penal code. In the case at bar, the accused willfuly, unlawfully and feloniously kill his wife by stabbing in the body of said auri which caused her death. And all the essential elements of the crime are duly established and proved by the prosecution. PEOPLE VS ANTONIO YU (RAPE WITH MURDER) FACTS: The accused Antonio YU, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of delia Abule, a 6 years old, against her will, with on occasion of the said crime of rape. The accused in order to silent the victim who was shouting, did then and there, with abuse of superior strength with intent to kill, attack, assault delia and as a result thereof the latter died. ISSUE: Whether or not the court finding the accused appellant is guilty of the crime of rape with murder? HELD: Yes. The court finding the accused is guilty of the crime of complex crime, considering the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information. Did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully having carnal knowledge of delia to satisfy his lust, against her will, with intent to kill with abuse of superior strength and as a result the latter died. PEOPLE VS PACHECO (RAPE) FACTS: 12 Mary jane is washing and rinsing clothes in the river while she was seated on a large stone. The appellant lunged at her and pushed her causing her to lie flat on the stone. Appellant pinned her down on his legs and held her by the neck with one hand. Forcibly kissed her on her lips and his other hand mashed MJs breasts. She pushed and kicked the appellant to free herself, despite her resistance the appellant succeeded in raising her dress. The appellant then used the same hand he had employed to remove her underwear and the appellant inserted his organ into her private organ. ISSUE: Whether or not Pacheco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under article 335 of the revised penal code? HELD: Yes. The accused Pacheco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime rape under article 335 book two of the revised penal code. The aboved-name accused appellant, motivated by lust and lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party who was then a minor, against her will. Appellant forcibly kissed her and inserted his organ into her private organ. Attended by special aggravating circumstances of relationship in the commission of offense, the complainant and offended party being sister in law and relative by affinity within third civil degree. PEOPLE VS LAB-EO (MURDER) FATCS: The above-named accused with intent to kill with evident premeditation, use of a sharp knife did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab segunda cayno, inflicting mortal stab upon the victim which caused her death. ISSUE: Whether or not the court find that the accused is guilty of the crime murder under the revised penal code? HELD: Yes. The above-named accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under article 248 book two of the revised penal code. Attended by aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, teachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault segundina cayno with the use of knife, stab the victim inflicting mortal wound which caused of her death. 13 PEOPLE VS SAMUYA (MURDER) FACTS: The above-name accused samuya. Conspiring, confederating and helping one another with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of night time. Did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gabriel samonte, inflicting fatal wound and massive bleeding resulted to his death. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused samoya is guilty of the crime murder under article 248 of the revised penal code? HELD: Yes. The above-name accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime murder under article 248 book two of the revised penal code. By wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Gabriel samonte, attended by aggravating circumstances with evident premeditation, treachery, use of superior strength and taking advantage in night time. Which caused massive bleeding and inflicting fatal wound and resulted to his death. CIRERA VS PEOPLE (FRUSTRATED MURDER) FACTS: That on or about 20th day of april 2000 in Quezon City. The Accused with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ violence upon Gerardo Naval, stabbing the latter with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at the left back of his body inflicting physical injuries which are fatal and mortal. Thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced a crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produced it by reason or cause, independent of the will of the perpetrator. Gerardo naval was able to seek medical attendance which save his life. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused cirera is guilty of the crime charged? HELD: 14 Yes. The Accused cirera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime frustrated murder. Did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, with treachery, attack, assault upon the victim with a sharp bladed weapon. Stab the victim hitting him at the left back of his body inflicting physical injuries which is fatal and mortal. Thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced a crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produced it by reason or cause, independent of the will of the perpetrator. PEOPLE VS SIRSO TIBBU (FRUSTRATED MURDER) FATCS: That on or about 6th day of December 2004, the above accused armed with unlicensed fire arm, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, disguise was employed at night time. Did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot Brian Villanueva twice but the second missed, thereby commencing the commission of murder, performing all the acts of execution which would have produced a crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produced it by reason or cause, independent of the will of the perpetrator. That the accused is poor shooter and the crime was committed in the dwelling place of the victim. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused sirso tibbu is guilty of the crime charged? HELD: Yes. The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime frustrated murder and attended by aggravating circumstances treacher, evident premeditation, disguise was employed at night time. Did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot Brian Villanueva twice but the second missed, thereby commencing the commission of murder, performing all the acts of execution which would have produced a crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produced it by reason or cause, independent of the will of the perpetrator. 21.PEOPLE VS. CAJUMOCAN FACTS: At 11:30 p.m. of September 30, 1999, while the deceased, Apolinario Mirabueno, was asleep beside his fourteen year old brother Leo inside their house in Sitio Waray, Barangay Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal, the latter was roused from his slumber by the rustling of 15 dried leaves outside the house. He saw a solitary figure walk toward their house, paused outside their room, and removed the fish net covering the window and looked inside the house. From the light of the fluorescent lamp inside the house, Leo recognized the man as appellant Cornelio Cajumocan, who drew a gun and shot Apolinario in the head, and thereafter ran away. Leo cried out to his older sister, Margarita and they brought Apolinario to a hospital in Morong, but he was declared dead on arrival. Appellant was charged with Murder before the RTC of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79, in the following Information dated October 4, 1999 which reads: That on or about 30th day of September 1999, in the Municipality of Tanay, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, and taking advantage of nighttime did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot (sic) with said gun, one Apolinario Mirabueno y Morao hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon the latter intracranial hemorrhage, which directly caused his immediate death. According to his report, the victims death resulted instantaneously.The cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the head. ISSUE: Whether treachery can be appreciated in the instant case to qualify the crime to Murder; Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Held: The court a quo correctly found the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the instant case. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Two conditions must concur for treachery to be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and; (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. In the case at bar, appellant took advantage that Apolinario Mirabueno was asleep when he shot the unsuspecting victim. The unexpected attack on the victim rendered him unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. The nature of the wounds and the testimony of the eyewitness sufficiently established that, first, at the time of the attack, the 16 victim was not in a position to defend himself, as he was asleep; and second, appellant consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack, armed and stealthily performed the criminal act at an unexpected time while the victim was asleep in his dwelling. Thus, there is moral certainty that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. As defined under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, Murder is the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or infanticide, and committed with any of the qualifying circumstances under the same article. Murder was evidently perpetrated when the appellant killed the victim, Apolinario Mirabueno, which was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The elements of Murder have been proven in this case, viz.: (1) A person is killed; (2) The appellant killed him; (3) The killing was attended by treachery; and (4) The killing is not parricide or infanticide. The killing was qualified to Murder by alevosia since the treacherous means employed to kill the victim was duly proven. The penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed. 22. PEOPLE VS. LEE AND RAMIL AQUINO, J.: This case is about the correctness of the sentence rendered by Judge German G. Lee, Jr., who imposed on Roman Amil, 57, a straight penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for homicide. He applied the rule in People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515,. involving a conviction for illegal possession of firearms which is punished by imprisonment for not less than five years and not more than ten years. Nang Kay was sentenced to five years and one day since an indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to him. It would lengthen his prison sentence. But the instant case is not a prosecution under a special law. It is a homicide case. The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory if the imprisonment would exceed one year. It would be favorable to the accused (People vs. Alvarez, 101 Phil. 516). Fiscal Servilliano Elvinia, Jr. objected to the straight penalty. Judge Lee found that the homicide was attended by the two generic mitigating circumstances provocation and voluntary surrender to the authorities. There was no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the penalty of reclusion temporal must be lowered by one degree or to prision mayor. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor minimum. By applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty has to be reduced by one degree or to prision correccional from which the minimum sentence has to be taken. 17 The certiorari resorted to by Fiscal Elvinia is proper because his purpose is to correct a manifest error of the trial court amounting to excess of jurisdiction and to favor the accused The proceeding did not place the accused in double jeopardy. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The judgment of the trial court is modified. The accused is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of three (3) years of prision correccional medium as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum. No costs. SO ORDERED. NOTE: FULL TEXT 23. VILLANUEVA VS. CAPARAS FACTS: On September 7, 2005, Edna filed a criminal complaint for murder against Villanueva. During the preliminary investigation, Edna submitted her affidavit; the affidavit of her neighbor, Fernando Gonzales, who witnessed the incident; and the autopsy report of the Philippine National Police-Central Police District Crime Laboratory.6Â Villanueva, for his part, submitted his affidavit; the affidavit of Joan Miguel, Villanuevas girlfriend and the niece of Edna; the affidavit of Lourdes Miguel, Renatos sister; and the affidavit of Jovita Caparas, Renato and Lourdes mother, who were all witnesses to the incident. Villanueva submitted as well as the opinion of Dr. Valentin T. Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Division (NBI opinion) as to the cause of Renatos head injuries. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for homicide8Â against Villanueva on October 3, 2006.9Â Villanueva sought reconsideration of the prosecutors resolution, but the prosecutor denied the motion on March 22, 2007. Before he could be arraigned, Â Villanueva filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice. The DOJ Secretarys Resolution On July 27, 2007, the Secretary set aside the prosecutors resolution and directed the prosecutor to move for the withdrawal of the information. The Secretary found the evidence against Villanueva insufficient to support a prima facie case. With the Secretarys denial of Ednas motion for reconsideration on January 4, 2008, Edna sought recourse with the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. The Ruling of the CA. The CA reversed the Secretarys resolution and ordered the reinstatement of the prosecutors resolution and the corresponding information. It held that the Secretary exceeded the functional requirements of a preliminary investigation in passing upon the validity of matters essentially evidentiary in nature; grave abuse of discretion intervened when he passed upon the merits of Villanuevas defenses, a matter best ventilated in the trial proper. The CA concluded that the facts and the pieces of evidence presented sufficiently supported the finding of probable cause to indict Villanueva for Homicide. ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of his jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to indict Villanueva for homicide and, pursuant to this conclusion, ordered the withdrawal of the resolution. 18 HELD: In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged, homicide in this case, should be present. Jurisprudence laid out the elements of homicide as: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. All of these elements are present in this case, as adequately shown by the affidavits of Edna and her witness, and by the autopsy report. We agree with the CA that the Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis-a-vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis-Ã -vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went into the strict merits of Villanuevas defenses. We note that the NBI opinion was procured at Villanuevas instance and was based on the documents and in response to the questions Villanueva posed, while Jovita was unable to recall the events that transpired relative to Renatos death when asked during the preliminary investigation. In sum, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set aside the resolution rendered by the Secretary with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the C A also did not err in ordering the reinstatement of the prosecutor's resolution of probable cause and its accompanying information. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals. 24. PALAGANAS VS. PEOPLE FACTS: On January 16, 1998, at around 11:00 in the evening, after a drinking session at their house, the brothers Melton (Tony), Servillano (Junior) and Michael (Boying), all surnamed Ferrer, occupied a table inside the Tidbits Caf and Videoke Bar and started drinking and singing. About thirty minutes later, Jaime Palaganas along with his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and friend Virgilio Bautista arrived at the bar and occupied a table near that of the Ferrers. After the Ferrers turn in singing, the microphone was handed over to Jaime Palaganas, who then started to sing. On his third song [My Way], Jaime was joined in his singing by Tony Ferrer, who sang loudly and in an obviously mocking manner. This infuriated Jaime, who then accosted Tony, saying, You are already insulting us. The statement resulted in a free for all fight between the Ferrers, on one hand, and the Palaganases on the other. Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand, was hit on the face and was chased outside of the bar by Junior and Boying Ferrer. 19 Ferdinand then ran towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric Palaganas, his brother, and sought the help of the latter. Rujjeric, stirred from his sleep by his brothers shouts, went out of his house and, noticing that the van of his uncle was in front of the Tidbits Videoke Bar, proceeded to that place. Before reaching the bar, however, he was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer brothers and was hit on different parts of his body, so he turned around and struggled to run towards his house. He then met his brother, Ferdinand, going towards the bar, so he tugged him and urged him to run towards the opposite direction as the Ferrer brothers continued pelting them with large stones. Rujjeric then noticed that Ferdinand was carrying a gun, and, on instinct, grabbed the gun from the latter, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat. Much to his surprise, however, the Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones and when (sic) the appellant was again hit several times. Unable to bear the pain, he closed his eyes and pulled the trigger. On 28 October 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty only of the crime of Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide. He was, however, acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him. In holding that petitioner is liable for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide but not for Murder and Frustrated Murder, the trial court explained that there was no conspiracy between petitioner and Ferdinand in killing Melton and wounding Servillano and Michael.According to the trial court, the mere fact that Ferdinand pointed to where the Ferrer brothers were and uttered to petitioner Araratan, paltog mo lara! (They are the ones, shoot them!), does not in itself connote common design or unity of purpose to kill. It also took note of the fact that petitioner was never a participant in the rumble inside the Tidbits Cafe Videoke Bar (videoke bar) on the night of 16 January 1998. He was merely called by Ferdinand to rescue their uncle, Jaime, who was being assaulted by the Ferrer brothers. It further stated that the shooting was instantaneous and without any prior plan or agreement with Ferdinand to execute the same. It found that petitioner is solely liable for killing Melton and for wounding Servillano and Michael, and that Ferdinand is not criminally responsible for the act of petitioner. Further, it declared that there was no treachery that will qualify the crimes as murder and frustrated murder since the Ferrer brothers were given the chance to defend themselves during the shooting incident by stoning the petitioner and Ferdinand.It 20 reasoned that the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims, was absent. In addition, it ratiocinated that there was no evident premeditation as there was no sufficient period of time that lapsed from the point where Ferdinand called the petitioner for help up to the point of the shooting of the Ferrer brothers. Petitioner was sleeping at his house at the time he heard Ferdinand calling him for help. Immediately, petitioner, still clad in pajama and sleeveless shirt, went out of his room to meet Ferdinand. Thereafter, both petitioner and Ferdinand went to the videoke bar where they met the Ferrer brothers and, shortly afterwards, the shooting ensued. In other words, according to the trial court, the sequence of the events are so fast that it is improbable for the petitioner to have ample time and opportunity to then plan and organize the shooting. In conclusion, the trial court held: WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows: Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9608, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment and to pay Servillano Ferrer the sum of P163,569.90 for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: HELD: On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is guilty of the crime of Homicide for the death of Melton in Criminal Case No. U-9610, and Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Servillano in 21 Criminal Case No. U-9608, we do not, however, concur in their ruling that petitioner is guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609. We hold that petitioner therein is guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide. In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present.However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) In Criminal Case No. U-9609, the petitioner is found guilty of the crime of attempted homicide. The penalty imposable on the petitioner is prision correccional under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Michael Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. (2) In Criminal Case No. U-9608, the penalty imposable on the petitioner for the frustrated homicide is prision mayor under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code. There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years 22 of prision mayor as maximum period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. In Criminal Case No. U-9610, the penalty imposable on petitioner for the homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Melton Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. The actual damages likewise awarded by the Court of Appeals is hereby reduced to P42,374.18. 25. WACOY y BICOL VS. PEOPLE In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows: That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one ELNER ARO y LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death thereafter. That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength. CONTRARY TO LAW. According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital. 23 At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation. The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his death. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. HELD: At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder. Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as follows: Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor. If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim. The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several 24 persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads: Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide. Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. 26. GUEVARRA VS. PEOPLE FACTS: Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and Philip went to. birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners’ compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with. bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners’ compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground. Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners’ house and damaged Rodolfo’s tricycle. They did not likewise destroy the petitioners’ gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners’ gate were saying, “Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out.”16 25 After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds. In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty on the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. HELD: The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an “accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present.”26 On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution’s theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin. In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre–trial that “the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordoñez would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance.” 27. People vs. Abella Facts: On the morning of 7 March 1992, the victims MARLON and JOSEPH had a basketball altercation with JOEY and his two companions; 26 Later that day, JOEY was caught bringing two pillboxes to Dalisay Street, where the victims reside; Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of 8 March 1992, JOEY and GENER, both members of the INC, threw stones at the Ronquillos house, attracting the attention of neighbors who in turn mauled them; Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of that same date, after the De los Santos brothers pointed at the victims, the appellants and their cohorts picked up and herded the victims into a Ford Fiera, which then sped away; At about 10:00 p.m. the victims, except the one lying in the vehicle who seemed either unconscious or dead, were brought to a so-called basement in the Iglesia compound in Punta, Sta. Ana. There, they were mauled, tortured and beaten by appellants, who were deacons of the INC, as well as by their cohorts, using steel tubes, lead pipes, guns and other blunt instruments. Thereafter, they were loaded into the van, which forthwith sped out of the compound; and Three days later, or on 10 March 1992, the victims bodies were found floating on the Pasig River, showing signs of foul play. These circumstances are sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. They constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty persons. ISSUE: Whether or not treachery was present in this case to qualify the crime to murder HELD: The court ruled that it is true that treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression. However, when the victim was first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present. In this case, it is enough to point out that the victims hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime without risk at all to their persons. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery and cannot be considered as an independent aggravating circumstance. It need not be alleged in the information, as treachery was adequate to elevate the killing to murder. 28. DE GUZMAN JR. VS PEOPLE 27 FACTS: n December 24, 1997, at aboutten o’clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest. Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination. Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and aboutone (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube toremove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face. The RTC convicted the petitioner. The court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. 28 HELD: The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements. The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him and Alexander.1âwphi1 He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown. The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention. 29 With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide. 29. CABILDO VS. PEOPLE FACTS: On March 19, 1999, at 11:00 p.m., a certain Joy Herrera was driving a tricycle bound for Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan. On board were students of St. Joseph Academy who just came from their schools Seniors Night. Upon reaching Poblacion, Cuyo in Barangay Tenga-Tenga, petitioner Cabildo, his co-accused Palao and Abian, and another companion, Rene Tamba, blocked their path. After confirming Herreras identity, petitioner and his group forcibly pulled Herrera from the tricycle and mauled him. Meanwhile, Rocky Daquer passed by the same road on board his own tricycle with passengers John Ryan Macula, Cris Magdayao, and Dary Puno. Daquer noticed the commotion, so he alighted from his tricycle and approached the group to pacify them. Instead, Palao turned his ire to Daquer and threatened: Putang-ina mo Rocky, papatayin kita! before drawing a fan knife from his waist. This prompted Herrera and Daquer to run away in separate directions. The group pursued Daquer and after covering about 10 meters, petitioner was able to grab Daquers jacket, causing the latter to fall down on one knee. While petitioner held on to Daquer by his jacket, Palao thrust his knife at the latter but missed. Palao stabbed again and hit Daquer at the lower left side of his back causing him to fall face down on the ground. Petitioner and his group then proceeded to maul Daquer until the police arrived. The responding police officers brought petitioner and his group to the police station. The knife recovered at the crime scene was turned over to the Office of the Prosecutor. On the other hand, the wounded Daquer was brought to the Cuyo District Hospital where he was 30 treated by Dr. Joselito Vicente. Medical findings showed that Daquer sustained an abrasion on his left knee and a stab wound at his left lumbar area which, barring unforeseen complications, would both heal in 15 days. On June 1, 1999, Cabildo, Palao, and Abian were charged with frustrated homicide. On appeal, the CA sustained the trial courts finding of conspiracy but modified the conviction of the accused to attempted homicide, noting that the wounds inflicted on Daquer were not fatal. ISSUE: Whether or not CA is correct the conviction of the accused to attempted homicide. HELD: The court likewise agree with the CA that the crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide. The stab wound sustained by Daquer was considerably superficial, hence, not life-threatening. This is clear from the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicente stating that the stab wound was only 2 centimeters long and 5 centimeters deep. The doctor also testified that no vital organ of Daquer was hit. The CA imposed the correct penalty. The imposable penalty for attempted homicide is prision correccional, which is two degrees lower than reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the imposable penalty of prision correccional, taking into account the modifying circumstances, if any. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty should be imposed in its medium period (Art. 64, Revised Penal Code). To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision correccional has to be reduced by one degree, which is arresto mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of arresto mayor in any of its periods. Hence, petitioner was correctly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. 31 30.GONZALES VS. CA RESOLUTION ROMERO, J.: On October 28, 1988, petitioner Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera was convicted for illegal possession of firearm, viz.: WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Reynaldo Gonzales beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for Attempted Homicide, he is hereby acquitted of the crime charged. With respect to the charged of illegal Possession of Firearms, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences him to a penalty ranging from 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 18 years, 8 months of Reclusion Temporal, without pronouncement as to costs. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision dated July 12, 1990. On November 13, 1990 petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision. While the case was still pending, Republic Act 8294 was enacted lowering the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. Thus, in our decision dated August 18, 1997 while affirming petitioners conviction, we modified the imposable penalty pursuant to the new law, the dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Since the petitioner has already served nine (9) years, nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days, which is well beyond the maximum principal penalty imposed for his offense, as well as the subsidiary penalty for the unpaid fine, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. SO ORDERED. 32 It must be noted that in determining the preventive detention of the petitioner, we computed the total period from the time the trial court convicted the petitioner which was on October 28, 1988 to the date of promulgation of our decision on August 18, 1997. However, on September 10, 1997, Action Officer Homobono R. Lachica, Jr. informed this Court that under the Bureau of Corrections records, which were not attached to the records of this case, petitioner has only one served one (1) month and twelve (12) days of preventive suspension. He explained that upon the promulgation of petitioners conviction and the forfeiture of his bail bond, petitioner could no longer be located until his arrest on September 16, 1993. Moreover, it was only July 4, 1997 that petitioner was committed to the Bureau of Corrections. ACCORDINGLY, we resolved to MODIFY the dispositive portion of the decision, viz.: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of simple illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Since it appears that petitioner has not yet fully served the indeterminate penalty imposed above for his offense, as well as the subsidiary penalty for the unpaid fine, the order for his immediate release dated August 27, 1997 is hereby RECALLED SO ORDERED. 33