UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus – TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. Facts: Respondent Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corp. (TitanIkeda for brevity) filed an action for rum of money against petitioner Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corp. (Uniwide Sales for brevity) before the RTC on the ground of Uniwide’s non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan-Ikeda after the 3 projects were completed. Thereafter, Uniwide filed a motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and that Titan agreed to the suspension of the abovementioned case to undergo arbitration. Titan-Ikeda’s complaint was refiled with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). The CIAC found out in the first agreement (Project 1) between Uniwide and TitanIkeda that the Warehouse Club and Administration Bldg. was finished less than 2 months of the agreed date of completion and was turned over to Uniwide. Further, the parties entered into the second agreement (Project 2) whereby Titan-Ikeda agreed to construct additional floor and to renovate Uniwide’s warehouse however, it was not made in writing. The project was then completed. Furthermore, the parties entered the third agreement (Project 3) for the construction of the building of Uniwide in kalookan City. Likewise it was completed and turned over to the latter. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered its decision. With respect to Project 1 and Project 2, Uniwide is absolved of any liability against Titan, for VAT payment and on counterclaim for defective construction but liable for the unpaid balance. Regarding Project 3, Uniwide is liable for the unpaid balance and for the payment of VAT. Uniwide alleged that the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of liquidated damages goes against the established judicial policy that a court should always strive to settle in one proceeding the entire controversy leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigations. Uniwide claims that the required evidence for an affirmative ruling on its claim is already on the record. It cites the pertinent provisions of the written contracts which contained deadlines for liquidated damages. Uniwide also noted that the evidence show that Project 1 was completed either on 15 February 1992, as found by the CIAC, or 12 March 1992, as shown by Titan’s own evidence, while Project 3, according to Uniwide’s President, was completed in June 1993. Furthermore, Uniwide asserts, the CIAC should have applied procedural rules such as Section 5, Rule 10 with more liberality because it was an administrative tribunal free from the rigid technicalities of regular courts. The CIAC and the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of Uniwide. Hence this petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the Rules of Court is applicable with the CIAC rules. delay. Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages in its memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. if Uniwide’s claim for liquidated damages was not raised as an issue in the TOR or in any modified or amended version of it. .‖ Further. As an arbitration body. the CIAC cannot make a ruling on it.Held: Arbitration has been defined as ―an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter. as noted by the Court of Appeals. the members of which are chosen by the parties themselves. especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts. The Rules of Court cannot be used to contravene the spirit of the CIAC rules. Titan was not given a chance to present evidence to counter Uniwide’s claim for liquidated damages. which parties freely consent in advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties had the opportunity to be heard. involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body. Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Thus. on the other hand. the delay. and is intended to avoid the formalities. the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. the CIAC can only resolve issues brought before it by the parties through the TOR which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. a party may not be deprived of due process of law by an amendment of the complaint as provided in Section 5.‖ Voluntary arbitration. In this case. Verily. The basic objective is to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to avoid the formalities. instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice. whose policy and objective is to ―provide a fair and expeditious settlement of construction disputes through a non-judicial process which ensures harmonious and friendly relations between or among the parties. expense and aggravation which commonly accompany ordinary litigation. with a total area of 288. The MAB issued the assailed Decision. It also reminded J.versus DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J. Realty. Respondents.G. It also argued that the POA cannot be considered as a ―court‖ under the contemplation of RA 876 and that jurisprudence saying that there must be prior resort to arbitration before filing a case with the courts is inapplicable to the instant case as the POA is itself already engaged in arbitration.G. Realty that there was no valid ground for the termination of the RAWOP. J. Realty allegedly refused to collect checks for the royalties due from Benguet. Benguet filed a Notice of Appeal with the MAB on docketed as Mines Administrative Case No. In response. through its President. Antonio N. Benguet’s Manager for Legal Services.G. However. Therefrom. Benguet filed the instant petition. .G. J.G. Tan. informed J. Hence. Realty as claim owner and Benguet as operator. Realty reiterated the above rulings of the POA and MAB. Realty and Mining Corporation (J.G. They entered in an agreement that mining claims were covered by MPSA Application jointly filed by J. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION. Petitioner. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. And that Benguet was excluded from joint MPSA Application.8656 hectares. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP with the Legaspi City Panel of Arbitrators (POA).G. R-M-2000-01. And that in 1994. Realty) entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) wherein the latter was the owner of the 4 mining claims: Bonito-I. Realty that it should submit the disagreement to arbitration rather than unilaterally terminating the RAWOP. J. such as RA 876. . Mendoza. respectively. Tachuling. answered to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP.G.G. Johnny L. Benguet.G. The POA issued a Decision that the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement was declared cancelled and without effect. 2000-01 and entitled J.G.G. Realty v. wrote J. On June 2000. Benguet then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision which was denied in the Resolution of the MAB. Benguet through its Executive Vice-President. Bonito-II. dwelling upon the issue of whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction over the case. DENR Case No. J. Reynaldo P. Bonito-III. and Bonito-IV. It argued that RA 7942 or the ―Philippine Mining Act of 1995‖ is a special law which should prevail over the stipulations of the parties and over a general law.BENGUET CORPORATION. Facts: Benguet Corporation (Benguet) and J. Any disputes. another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.01 Arbitration. a contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact promoted by the State.02 Court Action. 32 thereof that domestic arbitration shall still be governed by RA 876. availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by the par . be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members.G. one to be selected by BENGUET. Realty. Moreover. upon notice of one party to the other. RA 9285 or the ―Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with reference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be amicably settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative agency but shall. Held: The case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration before the POA. Such is not the case here. Benguet argues that the POA should have first referred the case to voluntary arbitration before taking cognizance of the case.01 and 11. except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators. Thus. To reiterate. Moreover. 11.Issue: Whether or not the controversy has first been submitted to arbitration before the POA took cognizance of the case. petitioner correctly cites several cases whereby arbitration clauses have been upheld by this Court. citing Sec. the contention that RA 7942 prevails over RA 876 presupposes a conflict between the two laws. 11. 2 of RA 876 on persons and matters subject to arbitration.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide: 11. No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabove stated. Secs. Clearly. Thus. the MAB ruled that the contractual provision on arbitration merely provides for an additional forum or venue and does not divest the POA of the jurisdiction to hear the case Regarding the allegation of J.‖ the Congress reiterated the efficacy of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution by stating in Sec. The Branch Sheriff later reported his finding that the enumerated machineries and equipment were not fully and properly installed. and that the latter was liable for damages. Pacific General filed a motion ―for inspection of things‖ to determine whether there was indeed alteration of the quantity and lowering of quality of the machineries and equipment and whether these were properly installed. could not be operated by Pacific General due to its financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials. Facts: Korea Technologies Co. The last payments made by Pacific General to KOGIES consisted of postdated checks which were dishonored upon presentment. It threatened to cancel the contract with KOGIES and dismantle the Carmona plant. . Issue: Whether or not the arbitration clause is contrary to public policy. According to Pacific General. being contrary to public policy as it ousts the local court of jurisdiction. The plant. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. Ltd. and PACIFIC GENERAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION.versus HON. [KOGIES]. The trial court denied the application for preliminary injunction and declared the arbitration agreement null and void. Respondents. LTD. Petitioner. KOGIES moved to dismiss the counterclaims for damages. The court also directed the Branch Sheriff to proceed with the inspection of the machineries and equipment in the plant.. after completion of installation. KOGIES initiated arbitration before the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board [KCAB] in Seoul. Korea and. The court dismissed the petition and held that an arbitration clause which provided for a final determination of the legal rights of the parties to the contract by arbitration was against public policy. commenced a civil action before the Regional Trial Court where it prayed that Pacific General be restrained from dismantling the plant and equipment. ALBERTO A. The court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the motion for inspection of things. a domestic corporation. Pacific General opposed the application and argued that the arbitration clause was null and void. and to initially operate the plant after it is installed. KOGIES filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals [CA]. Meanwhile. whereby KOGIES undertook to ship and install in Pacific General’s site in Carmona.. It also alleged that KOGIES was not entitled to the payment of the amount covered by the two checks. LERMA. KOGIES opposed the motion arguing that these issues were proper for determination in the arbitration proceeding. it stopped payment because KOGIES had delivered a hydraulic press which was different in kind and of lower quality than that agreed upon. a Korean corporation. .KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. at the same time. Cavite the machinery and facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders.. entered into a contract with Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corporation [Pacific General]. KOGIES also failed to deliver equipment parts already paid for by it. we declared that: Being an inexpensive. 876 was adopted to supplement the New Civil Code’s provisions on arbitration. Republic Act No. Juan Ysmael and Co. Provided such clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets. Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy.. arbitration has been held valid and constitutional. courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. It is thus regarded as the ―wave of the future‖ in international civil and commercial disputes. the question on what governs an arbitration clause specifying that in case of any dispute arising from the contract. especially of the commercial kind. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration. arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes. an order to arbitrate should be granted.. is not contrary to public policy. this Court had occasion to rule that an arbitration clause to resolve differences and breaches of mutually agreed contractual terms is valid. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward.Held: The arbitration clause which stipulates that the arbitration must be done in Seoul.‖ And in LM Power Engineering Corporation v. v. This Court has sanctioned the validity of arbitration clauses in a catena of cases. arbitration––along with mediation. we held that ―[i]n this jurisdiction. Korea in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the KCAB. Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods. Inc. Court of Appeals. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups.. speedy and amicable method of settling disputes. Inc. 1953 of Republic Act No. Even before the approval on June 19. 876. this Court has countenanced the settlement of disputes through arbitration. In the 1957 case of Eastboard Navigation Ltd. an arbitral panel will be constituted in a foreign country and the arbitration rules of the foreign country would govern and its award shall be final and binding. and that the arbitral award is final and binding. . conciliation and negotiation––is encouraged by the Supreme Court. In BF Corporation v. (OSCO) are sugar centrals engaged in grinding and milling sugarcane delivered to them by numerous individual sugar planters. -versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Sixth Division). 876 for Recovery of Equal Additional Benefits. HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO. Inc.. However. Attorney’s Fees and Damages. Facts: Petitioners Ormoc Sugarcane Planters’ Association. It was only the individual Planters.A. Respondents argued that there was no milling contract entered into. (ONDIMCO) are associations organized by and whose members are individual sugar planters (Planters) while respondents Hideco Sugar Milling Co. Petitioners filed 2 petitions with the RTC for Arbitration under R. In their contract specifically Article XX provides that all differences and controversies which may arise between the parties concerning the agreement shall be submitted for discussion to a Board of Arbitration.ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS’ ASSOCIATION. Petitioners. Respondents. INC. this petition. Hence. (OSPA). (UNIFARM) and ORMOC NORTH DISTRICT IRRIGATION MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. Inc. (Hideco) and Ormoc Sugar Milling Co. Inc. Inc. against respondents HIDECO and OSCO without impleading any of their individual members. (UNIFARM) And Ormoc North District Irrigation Multi-Purpose Cooperative. who may or may not be members of an association such as petitioners. the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. the relationship between the respondents and individual planters is governed by milling contract. and ORMOC SUGAR MILLING CO. INC. INC. They argued that respondents unduly accorded the independent Planters more benefits and thus prayed that an order be issued directing the parties to enter upon with arbitration in accordance with the terms of the milling contracts. (OLFAMCA). UNIFARM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE... Issue: Whether or not petitioners sugar planters’ association demand arbitration from respondents in their own name without impleading the individual Planters. consisting of five (5) members—two (2) of which shall be appointed by the centrals. According to petitioners. The RTC held that there was an existing milling contract and that the petitioners have the right to sue in behalf of the planters. OCCIDENTAL LEYTE FARMERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. Petitioners had no legal standing whatsoever to demand or sue for arbitration. and not petitioners. Unifarm Multi-Purpose Cooperative. Inc. INC. who had legal standing to invoke the arbitration clause in the milling contracts. (OLFAMCA). INC.. two (2) by the Planter and the fifth to be appointed by the four appointed by the parties. (OSPA). Inc. upon appeal of the respondents. Occidental Leyte Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative. usually stipulated upon in a civil contract . INC.. (ONDIMCO). Held: There are two modes of arbitration: (a) an agreement to submit to arbitration some future dispute. As mere agents.between the parties. Even if Section 4 of R. Article XX of the milling contract is an agreement to submit to arbitration because it was made in anticipation of a dispute that might arise between the parties after the contract’s execution. In an agreement for arbitration. 876 allows the agreement to arbitrate to be signed by a representative. the ordinary elements of a valid contract must appear. either in express language or by implication. including an agreement to arbitrate some specific thing. No. included as a stipulation in their individual milling contracts. and (b) an agreement submitting an existing matter of difference to arbitrators. Only eighty (80) Planters who were all members of OSPA were shown to have such an agreement to arbitrate. Assuming arguendo that all the petitioners were able to present milling contracts in favor of their members. Moreover.000) Planters in the district at the time the case was commenced at the RTC in 1999. termed the submission agreement. that respondents had an agreement to arbitrate with the petitioner associations themselves. they should have brought the suit in the name of the principals that they purportedly represent. and an agreement to abide by the award. .A. much less. it is nonetheless undeniable that under the arbitration clause in these contracts it is the parties thereto who have the right to submit a controversy or dispute to arbitration. The other petitioners failed to prove that any of their members had milling contracts with respondents. even assuming that petitioners are indeed representatives of the member Planters who have milling contracts with the respondents and assuming further that petitioners signed the milling contracts as representatives of their members. the principal is still the one who has the right to demand arbitration. In the case at bar. and known as an agreement to submit to arbitration. there were more than two thousand (2. petitioners could not initiate arbitration proceedings in their own name as they had done in the present case. Petitioners do not have any agreement to arbitrate with respondents. that the said contract bearing the arbitration clause was never consummated by the parties.. INC. Facts: Respondent was engaged in buying and selling of molasses and petitioner was one of its various sources from whom it purchased molasses. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages against petitioner Cargill Philippines. The RTC denied the motion of respondent and found that the arbitration clause in question contravened with the procedures. as seller. that the subject contract between the parties did not exist or it was invalid. the CA held that the case cannot be brought under the Arbitration Law for the purpose of suspending the proceedings before the RTC. considering that the requirements imposed by the provisions of the Arbitration Law had not been complied with. since in its Motion to Dismiss/Suspend proceedings. the parties agreed that instead of January/February 1997. SAN FERNANDO REGALA TRADING. And that respondent must first comply with the arbitration clause before resorting to court.. respondent argued that the arbitration clause relied upon by petitioner is invalid and unenforceable. they agreed that any dispute which the Buyer and Seller may not be able to settle by mutual agreement shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York before the American Arbitration Association. thus. Petitioner. wherein he alleged that the contract between the parties was never consummated because respondent never returned the proposed agreement bearing its written acceptance or conformity nor did respondent open the Irrevocable Letter of Credit at sight. the arbitration clause contemplated an arbitration proceeding in New York before a non-resident arbitrator (American Arbitration Association). that the arbitral award shall be final and binding on both parties. Respondent. to be opened by September 15. to be opened upon petitioner's advice. that sometime prior to September 15.000 metric tons of Thailand origin cane blackstrap molasses at the price of US$192 per metric ton.e. 1996. Petitioner. that the delivery of the molasses was to be made in January/February 1997 and payment was to be made by means of an Irrevocable Letter of Credit payable at sight. as one of the grounds thereof. Inc. despite demands from respondent. i. thus. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings and to Refer Controversy to Voluntary Arbitration. 1996. In their contract. vs. the RTC must either dismiss the case or suspend the proceedings and direct the parties to proceed with arbitration. the delivery would be made in April/May 1997 and that payment would be by an Irrevocable Letter of Credit payable at sight. failed to comply with its obligations under the contract. Respondent argued that the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for rescission of contract and could not be changed by the subject arbitration clause. The parties entered into a contract wherein they agreed upon that respondent would purchase from petitioner 12. petitioner alleged. Upon appeal. Inc.. INC. respondent San Fernando Regala Trading.CARGILL PHILIPPINES. Further. The Arbitration Award shall be final and binding on both parties. . . that the issue involved a question of fact that the RTC should first resolve. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. Arbitration is not proper when one of the parties repudiated the existence or validity of the contract.thus. Held: A contract is required for arbitration to take place and to be binding. it was proper that such issue be first resolved by the court through an appropriate trial. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between them. which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that this case cannot be brought under the arbitration law for the purpose of suspending the proceedings in the RTC. Submission to arbitration is a contract and a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of the contract and is itself a contract. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. 2007 JORGE GONZALES and PANEL OF ARBITRATORS.. and AUSTRALASIAN PHILIPPINES MINING INC.. Facts: Gonzales as a claimowner of mineral deposit. were consolidated since the cases are rooted in the same Addendum Contract.net Issue: issue raised in the Petition for Certiorari is whether it was proper for the RTC. Gonzales sought the nullity of the the Second Contract.1 of the Addendum Contract and also in accordance with Sec.1awphi1. Petitioner. Geo.. in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of BR. vs. G.A.R. CLIMAX-ARIMCO MINING CORP. Petitioners. 167994 January 22. No. 161957 and 167994. Thereafter. Nos.Respondents. the arbitration clause. Two cases. Respondent Climax-Arimco filed a motion to set the application to compel arbitration for hearing. Inmex and Aumex signed an Addendum Contract (Second Contract) allowing Armico to apply for FTAA. Third Contract. a petition to compel arbitration filed by respondent Climax-Arimco before the RTC on 31 March 2000 while the complaint for the nullification of the Addendum Contract was pending before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators. Gonzales. and CLIMAXARIMCO MINING CORPORATION. mine and exploit the mining claims of Gonzales. contained in the Addendum Contract is also null and void ab initio and legally inexistent. oppression and violation of the Constitution. (Inmex) giving Geo and Inmex 36 months (which was thereafter extended).x G.In the first case which is G. On the other hand. OSCAR B. vs. FTAA. 161957 January 22. No. No. PIMENTEL.1. 167994. entered into a jointventure via Production-Sharing Letter-Agreement(First Contract) with Geophil Inc. questioning the validity of the Addendum Contract containing the arbitration clause alleging that the it is void in view of Climax-Arimco’s acts of fraud. Thus. Armico.R. (Geo) and Inmex Ltd. Climax-Arimco had sent Gonzales a Demand for Arbitration pursuant to Clause 19. in the proceeding to compel arbitration under R. CLIMAX MINING LTD. Climax. operate. to develop. Clause 19. 5 of R. HON. The petition for arbitration was subsequently filed and ClimaxArimco sought an order to compel the parties to arbitrate pursuant to the said arbitration clause. 148 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of MAKATI CITY. to order the .R. Climax-Armico and Australasian then executed a Financial Accomodation Contract (Third Contract) and Assignment Accession Agreement (Fourth Contract) between Climax-Armico and Australasian and Memorandum of Agreement (Fifth Contract) between Climax-Armico and Australasian transferring the mining claim to Australasian. and Fifth Contract with preliminary injunction with the Mines and Geosciences BureauDENR (MGB-DENR). 2007 JORGE GONZALES. No. Fourth Contract. 876. Respondents. No. x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------.R. Gonzales filed an Answer with Counterclaim.G.A. 876. The adjudication of the petition in G. Thus. which was for the nullification . First. of the arbitration clause therein as well. No. The arbitration agreement is to be treated as a separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not automatically terminate when the contract of which it is part comes to an end. 161957. The resolution of both Climax-Arimco’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and/or Clarification in G. That is exactly the situation that the separability doctrine. Gonzales’s petition for certiorari should be dismissed.R. the arbitration clause/agreement still remains valid and enforceable. it should be clarified that the case referred to is the case actually filed by Gonzales before the DENR Panel of Arbitrators.A. The two pending matters shall thus be jointly resolved.R.R. enunciates that an arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract. 161957. Gonzales’s argument that the Addendum Contract is null and void and.R. We add that when it was declared in G. we now hold that the validity of the contract containing the agreement to submit to arbitration does not affect the applicability of the arbitration clause itself. No. the proceeding in a petition for arbitration under R. Hence. as well as jurisprudence applying it. No. There is reason. Irrespective of the fact that the main contract is invalid. the separability of the arbitration clause from the Addendum Contract means that validity or invalidity of the Addendum Contract will not affect the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate. or severability as other writers call it. No. No.R. therefore. also referred to as the "container" contract. consequently. No.46 The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to the determination of whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration clause. the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the main contract.parties to arbitrate even though the defendant therein has raised the twin issues of validity and nullity of the Addendum Contract and. 161957 that the case should not be brought for arbitration. This brings us back to G. to rule against Gonzales when he alleges that Judge Pimentel acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the parties to proceed with arbitration. 161957 and Gonzales’s Petition for Certiorari in G. seeks to avoid. 876 is limited only to the resolution of the question of whether the arbitration agreement exists. therefore the arbitration clause therein is void as well. Second. does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Indeed.R. 167994 effectively modifies part of the Decision dated 28 February 2005 in G. No. is not tenable. 167994 essentially turns on whether the question of validity of the Addendum Contract bears upon the applicability or enforceability of the arbitration clause contained therein. Held: The doctrine of separability. A contrary ruling would suggest that a party’s mere repudiation of the main contract is sufficient to avoid arbitration. CORONA. 169332 Present: PUNO. No. JJ.of the main contract on the ground of fraud. -versus- G.. Petitioner.J. as it had already been determined that the case should have been brought before the regular courts involving as it did judicial issues. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. AZCUNA and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. . C.R. Chairperson. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION. petitioner undertook to transmit the TFC programming signals to respondent which the latter received through its decoders and distributed to its subscribers. Respondent.[7] He held that petitioner gave its approval to respondent for the airing of WINS WEEKLY as shown by a series of written exchanges between the parties.WORLD INTERACTIVE NETWORK SYSTEMS (WINS) JAPAN CO. It alleged serious errors of fact and law and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator. attorney's fees and one-half of the amount it paid as arbitrator's fee. 81940. Branch 93. He also ruled that. Consequently. Q-04-51822. The arbitrator found that petitioner threatened to terminate the agreement due to its desire to compel respondent to re-negotiate the terms thereof for higher fees. 2002.. with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Ltd. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court or. It was docketed as CA-G. on May 9. By virtue thereof. He then allowed respondent to recover temperate damages. into the TFC programming from March to May 2002.. 2008 Facts: petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation entered into a licensing agreement with respondent World Interactive Network Systems (WINS) Japan Co.. CA . in the alternative. a weekly 35-minute community news program for Filipinos in Japan. respondent filed an arbitration suit pursuant to the arbitration clause of its agreement with petitioner. the same was seasonably cured. 2002.[4] petitioner notified respondent of its intention to terminate the agreement effective June 10. It contended that the airing of WINS WEEKLY was made with petitioner's prior approval. It also alleged that petitioner only threatened to terminate their agreement because it wanted to renegotiate the terms thereof to allow it to demand higher fees. petitioner should have terminated the same instead of sending a mere notice to terminate said agreement. He further stated that even if respondent committed a breach of the agreement.. on the other hand.[3] Petitioner claimed that these were ―unauthorized insertions‖ constituting a material breach of their agreement. LTD. Promulgated: February 11. Respondent. The arbitrator found in favor of respondent. a foreign corporation licensed under the laws of Japan. docketed as Civil Case No.R. Under the agreement. A dispute arose between the parties when petitioner accused respondent of inserting nine episodes of WINS WEEKLY. had there really been a material breach of the agreement. filed a petition for confirmation of arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. respondent was granted the exclusive license to distribute and sublicense the distribution of the television service known as ―The Filipino Channel‖ (TFC) in Japan. SP No. . Grounds for vacating award. directly in the CA. Held: RA 876 itself mandates that it is the Court of First Instance. or . vacating or modifying the arbitral award. or (c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown. It held that the only instance it can exercise jurisdiction over an arbitral award is an appeal from the trial court's decision confirming.[9] such as a petition to vacate an arbitral award. which has jurisdiction over questions relating to arbitration. or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy. It stated that as the TOR itself provided that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and unappealable and that no motion for reconsideration shall be filed. and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced. that one or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section nine hereof. fraud.rendered the assailed decision dismissing ABS-CBN’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.In any one of the following cases. It ruled that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over questions relating to arbitration. or (b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them. a petition for review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Issue: before us is whether or not an aggrieved party in a voluntary arbitration dispute may avail of. or other undue means. now the RTC. the court must make an order vacating the award upon the petition of any party to the controversy when such party proves affirmatively that in the arbitration proceedings: (a) The award was procured by corruption. It further stated that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper in arbitration cases only if the courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the facts of an arbitrator's award. Section 24 of RA 876 provides for the specific grounds for a petition to vacate an award made by an arbitrator: Sec. then the petition for review must fail. instead of filing a petition to vacate the award in the RTC when the grounds invoked to overturn the arbitrator’s decision are other than those for a petition to vacate an arbitral award enumerated under RA 876. 24. by alleging serious errors of fact and law (in which case a petition for review under Rule 43 would be proper) and grave abuse of discretion (because of which a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would be permissible). we sustain the dismissal of its petition by the CA. No. INC.[21] While a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction. vs. that is. or so imperfectly executed them. final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made. G. entitled ―alternative petition for review under Rule 43 or petition for certiorari under Rule 65. that a mutual. the issues clearly fall under the classification of errors of fact and law — questions which may be passed upon by the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED and SECURITY BANK CORPORATION.[22] Moreover. that is. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION. grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. issues calling for the CA's resolution were less the alleged grave abuse of discretion exercised by the arbitrator and more about the arbitrator’s appreciation of the issues and evidence presented by the parties. 2004 TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES. Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43 pertain to errors of fact. although petitioner’s position on the judicial remedies available to it was correct..‖ was wrong. respondents. law or mixed questions of fact and law. 146717 November 22. it cannot be availed of where appeal is the proper remedy or as a substitute for a lapsed appeal. The remedy petitioner availed of. petitioner. Therefore.R. .(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers. Nevertheless. Petitioner cleverly crafted its assignment of errors in such a way as to straddle both judicial remedies.