ELS: Consti 2Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 1 1. People v. Escaño 323 SCRA 754 FACTS: During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As a result, other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized. Are checkpoints illegal? HELD: As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search. c. Prohibited Article in Plain View / Custodial Investigation 2. Stonehill v. Diokno 20 SCRA 283 (1967) Concepcion, CJ Facts: 1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises. 2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises). 3. CENTRAL BANK v. MORFE FACTS: First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization encourage savings among its members and extend financial assistance thru loans. Central bank said that the Organization and others with similar nature are banking institutions and that the Org have never been authorized. CB applied for SW because of the Org’s illegal receipt of deposits of money for deposit, disbursements…without compliance with RA 337. The SW includes articles such as book of original entry…and others. They said that the SW is general in its terms and that the use of the word “and others” permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation to any specific criminal act. HELD: SW is upheld. – Depending on the circumstances, while in one instance the particular wording of the warrant may make it assume the character of a general warrant, in another context it may be considered perfectly alright. – SW only for one offense, if issued for more than two, it is void. Scatter shot warrant. – In illegal possession of shabu, marijuana, paraphernalia- one SW ok! – SW may be partially void – Undetermined amount of marijuana ok! ELS: Consti 2 – Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 2 Purpose of Particularity of Description: Readily identify the items to be seized, thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items Leave officers with no discretion regarding articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizure – Not required that technical precision of description be required – “narcotics paraphernalia”, “any and all narcotics”, and “a quantity of loose heroin”- ok! – “and the like”- not necessarily general warrant – Where should the requisite description appear- in the caption or body of the warrant? Body sufficient. – What if there’s discrepancy between the address in the caption and in the body? Not sufficient to invalidate. It is sufficient as long as you can identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. 4. Qua vs. Deportation Board / Kishu v. Deportation Boar FACTS Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased $130,000.00 without the necessary licensing from the Central Bank and having clandestinely remitted the same to Hong Kong. After the filing of the deportation charges, a warrant of arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et al. pending investigation. They were granted provisional liberty upon their filing of a surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for P10,000.00. Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the ground, among others, that such charges are not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not jurisdiction over such charges. The motion to dismiss was denied. Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. TIRAL COURT: Upheld the validity of the delegation by the President to the Deportation Board the power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court also sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens. ISSUES/HELD [1] WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such power is validly delegated to the Deportation Board. –YES. [2] WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order the arrest of such aliens. –YES. BUT only when there is already an ORDER OF DEPORTATION. RATIO [1] Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the power to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners, but such power was not intended to be delimited to the Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code, although not expressly conferring such power, lays down the procedure for such deportation proceedings for the President. Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways: By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan are not enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations, which is tantamount to economic sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. [2] ELS: Consti 2 Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 3 Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in order to secure their appearance. However, the same did not authorize the arrest of the alien pending investigation. It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board. However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the Constitution: “...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce...” Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — to any public officer who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation. QUA VS. DEPORTATION BOARD 6 However, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in EO69. DISPOSITIVE Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancel. ELS: Consti 2 Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 4 Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged, together with other aliens, with having committed certain irregularities in violation of the Central Bank Rules and Regulations before the Deportation Board in a complaint filed by a Special Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. Acting on the complaint, the Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest against Dalamal pursuant to the authority given to said Board by Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398. On August 5, 1958, Dalamal was accordingly arrested, but he was subsequently released upon filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00. Considering that the warrant for his arrest issued by the Deportation Board is illegal because it was issued in violation of Section l-(3), Article III, of our Constitution, Dalamal interposed the present petition for habeas corpus seeking the annulment of the warrant of arrest as well as the cancellation of the bond filed by him for his provisional liberty. Question: Is the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the Chairman of the Deportation Board valid? Explain. 5. Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal Facts:Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, stating in his application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." Upon that application the said judge, on the same day, issued a search warrant. Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was rentingthe bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and hissubordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized other articles such as opiumliquid, empty opium containers, opium pipe and the like. Furthermore, officers seized books, papers, etc.A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and a preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable cause for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons responsible therefor. Petitioners herein filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private papers, books and other property" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground that they had been soseized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Petitioners contend that the search was illegal and therefore asking for the return of the items seized. Issue: WON the opium may be returned to the petitioner WON the books,papers, etc may be returned Held:In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant,to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not require another search warrant.3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which haveno inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their assistants or successors, be, and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., namely, the articles described in items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the sheriff's return (Exhibit 3, reproduced at the top of page 3 of this decision 1) and they are hereby ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners. So ordered 6. Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968] Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a ELS: Consti 2 Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 5 reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined bythe court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed undercustoms and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty ELS: Consti 2 Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 6 of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila. 7. Valmonte vs. De Villa Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the PhilippineGeneral Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of theNational Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners avert that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988 ,Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizuresHeld: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights.The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. 8. Posadas V. CA Facts: Pat. Ursicio Ungad and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting surveillance along Magallanes Street Davao City. While they were within the preemies they spotted petitioner carrying a buri bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two. They checked the bag and found one caliber and two ammunitions. Issue: Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest Ruling: ELS: Consti 2 Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 7 Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure is not applicable because at the time the police officers identified themselves and apprehended petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed or actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he is hiding something. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such exercise may prove to be useless, futile and mush too late. 9. US v. Ocampo Facts: On November 5, 1908, an information was filed in the court of first instance of the city of Manila, charging plaintiffs in error, with others, as editors, proprietors, owners, directors, writers, managers, administrators, printers, and publishers of the newspaper 'El Renacimiento,' with publishing in that city a libel against Dean C. Worcester, then a member of the Philippine Commission. The information was subscribed and sworn to by the acting prosecuting attorney, and appended to it, and likewise sworn to by him, was the following declaration: 'A preliminary investigation has been conducted under my direction, having examined the witnesses under oath, in accordance with the provisions of § 39 of act 183 (Manila charter), as amended by § 2 of act 612 of the Philippine Commission.' Both affidavits were made before the judge of the court of first instance, who thereupon issued warrants of arrest, pursuant to which the parties accused were on the same day brought before the court. The information was read to them, and the court allowed them until November 7th to answer. Their attorney, being present, asked that they be furnished with a copy of the information, which request was granted, and a copy was delivered to each of the accused. Thereafter, and on November 7th, before entering any demurrer or answer, they moved to vacate the order of arrest, upon the ground that it was made without any preliminary investigation held by the court, and without any tribunal, was probable cause to believe the defendants having first determined that the alleged crime had been committed, and that there was probable cause to believe the defendants guilty of it. Issue: Whether or not the arrest of defendants-appellants' arrest was without a preliminary finding of probable cause, and therefore in violation of rights secured to them by the Philippine Bill of Rights Held: No. The provision that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation is a provision in the Philippine Bill. The question whether "probable cause" exist or not must depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. It does not mean that particular facts must exist in each particular case. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged. No rule can be laid down which will govern the discretion of the court in this matter. If he decides, upon the proof presented, that probable cause exist, no objection can be made upon constitutional grounds against the issuance of the warrant. His conclusion as to whether "probable cause" existed or not is final and conclusive. If he is satisfied that "probable cause" exist from the facts stated in the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima facie evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed "probable cause" for believing that the person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime charged. There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that "probable cause" exist from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge or magistrate. ***Ocampo v. US (different opinion regarding probable cause on the same case, in case ELS: Consti 2 Cases 11-27-15 Twenty19 8 itanong ni dean) It is insisted that the finding of probable cause is a judicial act, and cannot properly be delegated to a prosecuting attorney. We think, however, that it is erroneous to regard this function, as performed by committing magistrates generally, or under General Orders, No. 58, as being judicial in the proper sense. There is no definite adjudication. A finding that there is no probable cause is not equivalent to an acquittal, but only entitles the accused to his liberty for the present, leaving him subject to rearrest. It is expressly so provided by § 14 of General Orders, No. 58, as it is by § 2 of act 194, above quoted. Such was the nature of the duty of a committing magistrate in the common-law practice. In short, the function of determining that probable cause exists for the arrest of a person accused is only quasi judicial, and not such that, because of its nature, it must necessarily be confided to a strictly judicial officer or tribunal. By § 9 of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 695, chap. 1369), Congress enacted: 'That the supreme court and the courts of first instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the government of said Islands, subject to the power of said government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as may be hereafter enacted by law;' etc. Here we find clear warrant for modifications of the practice and procedure; and since § 5 of the same act (quoted above) does not prescribe how 'probable cause' shall be determined, it is, in our opinion, as permissible for the local legislature to confide this duty to a prosecuting officer as to intrust it to a justice of the peace. Consequently, a preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, under act No. 612, and upon which he files a sworn information against the party accused, is a sufficient compliance with the requirement 'that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.' 10. Aquino v. Enrile 59 SCRA 183 FACTS: The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law. ISSUES: 1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and 2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law? HELD: 5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.