Crossing Borders International Migration and National Security

Crossing Borders International Migration and National SecurityAdamson, Fiona B. International Security, Volume 31, Number 1, Summer 2006, pp. 165-199 (Article) Published by The MIT Press For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v031/31.1adamson.html Access Provided by Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana at 04/30/11 5:39AM GMT Crossing Borders Crossing Borders International Migration and National Security Fiona B. Adamson nternational migration has moved to the top of the international security agenda. Increasingly, policymakers in the United States, Europe, and around the world are making links between migration policy and national security. Much of this discussion has focused on migration ºows as a conduit for international terrorism. The ability of nineteen hijackers from overseas to enter, live, and train in the United States in preparation for carrying out attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon could not but raise concerns regarding the relationship between the cross-border mobility of people and international terrorism. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the management of migration has become a top national security priority for the United States, with concerns about migration helping to drive the largest reorganization of the U.S. government since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.1 Even before the September 11 attacks, however, interest in the relationship between globalization, migration, and security had emerged both in the policy world and in some areas of the security studies ªeld.2 Migration was high on the European security agenda throughout the 1990s.3 The bombings in Madrid Fiona B. Adamson is Director of the Program in International Public Policy and Assistant Professor of International Relations at University College London. A version of this article was presented at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies workshop “Globalization and National Security,” on June 11–12, 2004, at Harvard University. The author thanks the organizer of the workshop, Jonathan Kirshner, and the workshop participants for their helpful suggestions. In addition, she is grateful to Nora Bensahel, Alexander Cooley, Peter Liberman, Pieter van Houten, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. Since March 1, 2003, immigration and border control have fallen within the purview of the Department of Homeland Security; in January 2004 the Department of Homeland Security rolled out the new US-VISIT program, which began to introduce biometric technology at all U.S. immigration and border control points. 2. See, for example, Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Immigration and the Politics of Security,” Security Studies, Vol. 8, Nos. 2/3 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999), pp. 71–93; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 91–126; Myron Weiner, ed., International Migration and Security (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); and Myron Weiner, ed., The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995). 3. Fiona B. Adamson, “Globalization, International Migration, and Changing Security Interests in Western Europe,” paper presented at the Ninety-ªfth Annual Meeting of the American Political International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 165–199 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I 165 International Security 31:1 166 on March 11, 2004, and in London on July 7, 2005, only reinforced alreadyexisting fears regarding the links between migration and terrorism in Europe. Earlier incidents, such as the 1995 bombings of the Paris metro system by Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and attacks in various Western European states in the 1990s by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, had already raised concerns regarding the relationship between migration and security. Some scholars have noted that the end of the Cold War and bipolarity has helped to transform both the nature and the function of national boundaries in ways that increasingly securitize migration and lead to a greater policing of national borders.4 In addition, concerns about the security impacts of massive refugee ºows and the roles that mobilized diasporas play in fueling violent conºicts around the globe were being discussed long before September 11.5 Moreover, migration and migrants have a long history of being viewed as closely linked to national security concerns. States have traditionally forged their national immigration policies in response to their security and economic interests.6 In the United States and other countries, migrants have all too often been viewed as national security threats during times of war or crisis because Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2–5, 1999; Sarah Collinson, Europe and International Migration (London: Pinter, 1994); Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5 (December 2000), pp. 751–777; Jef Huysmans, “Contested Community: Migration and the Question of the Political in the EU,” in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, eds., International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 149–170; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regional Orders: Security in Europe and Asia,” paper presented at the Thirtyninth Annual International Studies Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 17– 21, 1998; and Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre LeMaitre, eds., Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993). 4. Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld, 2000); Didier Bigo, Polices en réseaux: L’Expérience Européene (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996); Didier Bigo, “Security, Borders, and the State,” in Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott, and Wolf Dieter-Eberwein, eds., Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America (San Diego, Calif.: San Diego State University Press, 1997), pp. 81–104; and Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, eds., Policing across National Boundaries (London: Pinter, 1994). 5. Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conºict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Weiner, International Migration and Security; Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 72–111; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conºict and Their Implications for Policy,” Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 15, 2000). 6. Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of Migration,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 603–620. . each does suggest a particular analytical lens through which one can assess the security impacts of international migration ºows. The rest of this article is organized into four main sections.8 A focus on traditional national security interests does not imply that such interests should always trump other factors relating to migration. ed. 26. 2 (Fall 2001). Globalization is changing the overall environment in which states operate. 87–102. or that a state-centric framework is the only lens through which to view the relationship between migration and security. 8. The management of international migration ºows is one area in which policymakers are having to weigh the costs and beneªts of particular policies with an eye to their overall implications for international security.9 For the purposes of this discussion. To assess the implications of any particular set of migration policies for national security. the balance of power among states. Yet international security scholars and policymakers are ªnding it increasingly difªcult to ignore the relationship between migration and security in a highly interconnected world deªned by globalization processes. and the nature of violent conºict in the international system.. For discussion of these categories in relation to the broader phenomenon of globalization. it is ªrst necessary to understand the ways in which migration ºows can potentially help or hinder states’ security interests.7 Scholars in mainstream security studies have often dismissed such concerns as insigniªcant or as issues limited to matters of domestic politics and policy. however. the focus is restricted to the impact of migration ºows on the security interests of state actors. A prime example of this would be the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. see Roland Paris. Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge. In the ªrst 7. No. or the overall capacity and autonomy of state actors. pp. While human security and national security paradigms need not necessarily be diametrically opposed. This article provides a framework for thinking about the relationship between international migration and national security by surveying how crossborder migration ºows affect state interests in three core areas of national security concern: state sovereignty. in addition to their implications for other policy areas. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security. 2006). For an analysis of the human security paradigm. 9. such as social welfare and economic growth. including how they formulate their security policies. see Jonathan Kirshner. Vol.Crossing Borders 167 of the possibility that they may possess dual political loyalties or represent a “ªfth column” in a conºict. Migration and migration policies are also closely intertwined with issues relating to individual and human security. . The general impact of migration on national security therefore depends on the efªcacy of a particular state’s policy to shape migration ºows according to its overall national interests. David Goldblatt. Mittelman. and international terrorism.International Security 31:1 168 section.” in Walter Carlsnaes. James H. Simmons. third.. eds. and causes of contemporary migration ºows.: Princeton University Press. With regard to migration and the balance of power. 2000). see Malcolm Waters. and Cross-Border Mobility Migration is not a new phenomenon. providing a brief overview of the volume. International Migration. a discussion of their implications. I conclude with a summary of my overall ªndings derived from the analysis in each section. Anthony McGrew. The literature on globalization is vast and growing. however. and Culture (Cambridge: Polity. I discuss the relationship between globalization and international migration. N. types. and production.10 The globalization of trade. Finally. and the nature of violent conºict. Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage. military. The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton. David Held. I discuss the relationship between migration and three forms of security threats to states: internal conºicts. Economics. The second. the balance of power. 1999). and Beth A. and Jonathan Perraton. It is. and fourth sections of the article discuss the ways in which immigration may inºuence one of three dimensions of national security: state capacity and autonomy. I look at the inºuence of migration on states’ ability to exercise and project economic. To reach general conclusions regarding the impact of migration and human mobility on national security. in the section on the nature of violent conºict.J. I examine the various categories of phenomena that the terms “international migration” and “mobility of people across national borders” refer to. “From Interdependence to Globalization. Globalization (London: Routledge. more than ever before. In the section on state capacity and autonomy. a global phenomenon that is closely related to a number of other globalization processes in both its causes and its effects. Thomas Risse. the ability of states to maintain control over their territory and national purpose. and Michael Zuern. I examine the effect of migration on border control and national identity—that is. and the general trend toward greater global economic 10. it is necessary to ªrst acknowledge that people cross borders for a variety of reasons and that states generally devise immigration policies to encourage some forms of border crossing and not others. Global Transformations: Politics. and suggestions for further research. and diplomatic power. organized crime. ªnance. 2002). 1995). For useful overviews. Globalization. Held et al.” notes a 2003 report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Joaquin Arango. 14. Saskia Sassen. Kritz. “the rising tide of people crossing frontiers is among the most reliable indicators of the intensity of globalization.11 These economic processes are reinforced by cheaper and more accessible forms of transportation and communication technologies. and states that once declared that they were “not countries of immigration” have amended long-standing migration and citizenship policies to adjust to the realities of contemporary migration ºows. Migration to both Europe and the 11. 15. 1998). and the latter. International Migration Systems: A Global Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press. For an overview of theoretical approaches and regional applications. or almost 3 percent of the global population.12 “Like other ºows.”13 In the words of David Held and his coauthors. (London: Macmillan. 4.”14 States that were once countries of emigration have become migration-receiving states. that link national economies and undergird the formation of international migration networks. and Italy. for example. Graeme Hugo. The Globalization Syndrome. The number of people who migrate across national borders in any given year is between 5 and 10 million. and Hania Zlotnik. while creating stronger ties and networks among advanced industrial and developing economies that provide new avenues and opportunities for migration. approximately 180 million people live outside their country of birth. and Thomas Faist. whether ªnancial or commercial. p. Ali Kouaouci. The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. as well as an emerging global infrastructure of services. According to the IOM. 12. 13. ºows of ideas or information. Mittelman. which is not addressed here. Miller. up from 80 million three decades ago. Global Transformations. Edward Taylor. . 2003: Managing Migration: Challenges and Responses for People on the Move (Geneva: IOM. 1988). Massey. p. Lin Lean Lim. a vast body of literature on the causes of migration. Ireland.Crossing Borders 169 integration—all contribute to the emergence of new and more mobile pools of labor. Examples of the former include Greece. There is. 2003). 297. “There is now almost no state or part of the world that is not importing or exporting labor. 1992). See. 3d ed. If all migrants formed a single state. Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium (Oxford: Clarendon. Germany. 2000).. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Mary M. see Douglas S. Adela Pellegrino. The Volume and Dynamics of Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press. One out of every 35 persons in the world is a migrant. World Migration. International Organization for Migration (IOM). See also Stephen Castles and Mark J. of course. and J. it would be the world’s ªfth most populous country. 2003).15 An examination of some basic migration statistics offers an indication of the signiªcance of migration as one component of the larger process of globalization. 8. yet individual states have varying deªnitions of what constitutes a migrant.16 Many countries have signiªcant portions of their populations abroad and rely on them heavily as a source of foreign exchange. continuing levels of economic inequality among states. Hirst and Grahame Thompson. N. such as in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa. Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System (Ithaca. approximately 60 million people emigrated from Europe. 231. and 8 percent of Tunisians live outside Tunisia. 19.18 At the same time. 34. levels of global migration are still relatively low. Ten percent of Moroccans live outside of Morocco. 1999). 40 percent of all international migrants lived in Western industrialized countries. the loosening of emigration restrictions in other states. The United Nations deªnes a “migrant” as someone entering a country for twelve months or longer. In some of the Gulf states. 67 percent in the United Arab Emirates.: Cornell University Press. 17. Globalization in Question. 2d ed. and business 16. In 2003.International Security 31:1 170 United States has continued to increase over the past two decades. as cited in Paul Q.20 In addition. Some states measure migration ºows based on the number of border crossings. p. N. 16. 2000). commuters. including approximately 19 million in the European Union. and 65 percent in Kuwait. 70 percent of the labor force was composed of foreigners in Qatar. (Cambridge: Polity. The Age of Migration. for example. While 1 in 35 people is a migrant. IOM. were also characterized by high levels of international migration. 197. Aaron Segal. 5–6. Ibid. there are broader categories of temporary border crossers (e.J. as compared with other indicators of levels of globalization. 44. IOM.. Similarly. up to 70 percent of the labor force is composed of migrant labor. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton. World Migration.Y. 2003. contemporary levels of migration are not unprecedented in their volume. In the year 2000. During this period. in the economic life of states in the Middle East. 1993).: Princeton University Press.g. the growing ease of travel. state policies of forced migration. 10 million people emigrated from Russia.17 Among the factors contributing to these overall increases are declining transportation costs. and Rey Koslowski. 17. the fall of the iron curtain and the opening up of borders in the former Soviet bloc. World Migration. p. p. 20. Migration plays a particularly important role. others measure migration by country of birth. for example. 224. pp. pp. the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. . 365–366.. and the growth in human smuggling networks. 23. tourists. See ibid. such as China. 34 of 35 people in the world are not migrants. See also Robert Gilpin.. Castles and Miller. 18. 2001). 2003.19 Determining which categories of migrants to let in and which to keep out is a key challenge facing states today. refugee-generating conºict and violence. and 12 million Chinese and 6 million Japanese emigrated to other states in Asia. An Atlas of International Migration (London: Hans Zell. pp. p. Internal Displacement: A Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2003 (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council. including human slavery. the forced migration of Jews during the Russian pogroms and later during the Holocaust.21 In practice. Benny Morris.c. Nevertheless. the expulsion of indigenous Arab populations with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: UCL Press. The Age of Migration. 1985). or to be reunited with their families (family reuniªcation is a standard immigrant category in most industrialized states). 2004). Involuntary migration can stem from a variety of causes. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. 22. Marrus. forced migration. in which approximately 15 million Africans were transferred to the Americas prior to 1850. 1997).Crossing Borders 171 travelers) who cannot be counted as “migrants” per se. and Zolberg. migration by individuals who have left their homes of their own accord to pursue economic opportunities. the lines between various categories of border crossers and migrants are difªcult to deªne. it is useful to think conceptually about who crosses borders and why as a prelude to thinking about how this inºuences national security. Suhrke. Robin Cohen. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press. Many of the major migrations throughout history have occurred as a result of forced migration or expulsion. the ethnic cleansing that characterized the Balkan wars in the 1990s. This article does not deal with intrastate migration ºows. the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland following World War II.22 21. includes refugees and displaced persons. security. ethnic cleansing. the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey at the end of World War I. Michael R. for personal enrichment. voluntary versus forced migration Much of the general literature and political debate on migration has dealt implicitly with voluntary migration—that is. The formation of the Jewish diaspora after the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem in 586 b. and the coerced trafªcking of women in many parts of the world (especially Eastern Europe and East Asia) that has been referred to by many as a contemporary form of slavery—all are examples of largely involuntary waves of migration. and Aguayo. Particularly signiªcant for many countries’ ability to maintain their internal security are the 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) around the globe. Global IDP Project. but nevertheless are signiªcant for understanding the political dynamics surrounding migration. 1987). Castles and Miller.. the mass migration ºows that occurred during the transatlantic slave trade. A second category. 1947–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . and deportation. Escape from Violence. and border control. Immigration Policy.” International Studies Quarterly. 285–333.26 Economic migration can include unskilled and skilled labor. Vol. and existing migration networks.: Princeton University Press.International Security 31:1 172 The population ºows of refugees and exiles produced by forced migration have. pp. No.J. and Zlotnik. In practice. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy (Princeton. Economic migrants leave their countries in search of employment or other economic opportunities. Lin Lean Lim. and Faist. and slave labor. many instances of forced migration have been intimately bound up with the emergence of new states in the international system—a fact observed by Aristide Zolberg. or in many cases. Self-Determination. 205–242. who has characterized state making as a “refugee-generating process. pp. Refugees and asylum seekers leave to avoid the trauma of war or political persecution. 27. 389– 410. disentangling the political and economic factors that contribute to migration ºows is often difªcult. Ibid. “Openings in the Wall: Transnational Migrants. for example. 1 (May 1983).27 The 23. 49.25 Economic migrants can feel compelled to move because of the harsh conditions they face in their country of origin. International Migration Systems. pp. which can be inºuenced by such factors as economic opportunities. 2003). 25. Thomas. N. pp. 467. “Bogus Refugees: The Determinants of Asylum Migration to Western Europe. Leah Haus. Labor Unions.C. family ties. 24–38. 2 (Spring 1995). Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty. George J. The Global Syndrome..” International Organization. Vol. “The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the Kosovo Conºict. Kritz. as often as not. political. 30–33.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. 3 (September 2005). Md. asylum seekers or refugees may be able to exercise a degree of choice in their country of destination. guest workers. 26. Aristide Zolberg. ed.. “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process. temporary workers. Serbian leader Slobodan Miloševib.23 More generally. employed refugee ºows during the 1999 Kosovo crisis as a weapon of war in what was an asymmetric conºict with NATO. Much of the literature on international migration written primarily from an economic perspective has concentrated on one form of migration—voluntary labor migration.” in Raju G. a combination of both. Kelly M. for example.S. analyzing the global economy without taking into account global migration patterns and their relationship to the globalization of production would be exceedingly difªcult. 24.”24 economic versus political migration The impetus for an individual to migrate can be economic.: Lexington Books. pp. and Eric Neumayer. The Volume and Dynamics of Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Borjas. and U. No. No. Vol. 49. 1999). forced migrants such as trafªcked persons in the sex industry. been the product of state action rather than of nonstate or market forces. Indeed. Intervention (Lanham. See. Mittelman. Lim. Greenhill. “International Labor . International law deªnes “refugees” as those who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of race.Crossing Borders 173 postwar economic boom in Europe. 29. would have been impossible without massive amounts of labor migration—much of it organized via bilateral agreements between particular states. Progress in liberalizing the global market for labor has been mostly at the high end of the skills continuum. In the global economy. Ibid. International Migration Systems. and Sassen. for instance. the mobility of labor has not kept pace with the mobility of capital. Lim. Despite the sheer numbers and importance of labor migration. The economies of some countries. on the one hand. the ºow of labor across national borders is generally less liberalized than other factors of production and is subject to more state intervention. such as those of the Gulf states. 28. with provisions for increased mobility in the service sector or for highly skilled professionals built into broader economic agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Moving goods and services is inªnitely easier than moving labor. Hirst and Thompson. pp. 133–149. In a global economy. p. on the other. “A world market for labor just does not exist in the same way that it does for goods and services. p. 29. and the corruption of the asylum process. and Zlotnik. Most labor markets continue to be nationally regulated and only marginally accessible to outsiders. the relative immobility of labor distinguishes it from other factors of production. would collapse without foreign labor.29 International law distinguishes between political and economic migration by assigning categories to individuals who are seeking to cross borders to escape political persecution or violent conºict. although the ºow of labor across borders is still much more restricted than the ºow of goods and services in these agreements. such as Germany and Turkey.”28 In general. re- Movements: A Perspective on Economic Exchanges and Flows. it is partly due to the tight restrictions on labor migration that have emerged since the 1960s’ economic boom in Europe that one sees a blurring of the lines between political and economic migration.. . The Mobility of Labor. as opposed to those who cross borders in search of economic opportunities. Globalization in Question. whether legal or illegal migrants or professional recruitment.” in Kritz. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson note. states still exercise a great degree of control over whom they admit as migrants. 29. however. World Travel and Tourism Council. pp.8 million in 1980. what many traditionally think of as “immigration. World Migration. seasonal laborers. including those who are smuggled or trafªcked. .org/ publications/pdf/PandP2006-07. with approximately 4. 17. 98. 2006/7.” on the other hand. 97. 33.5 percent in Europe. recent decades have witnessed an increase in asylum seekers. In addition.3 percent in Africa. only a small percentage were by individuals eventually deemed to be legitimate asylum seekers.32 permanent versus temporary migration “Permanent migration” refers to the crossing of national borders leading to permanent resettlement.” “Temporary migration.33 30.” http:/ /www.wttc. contributing to the $6. 32. 923.pdf. combined with high levels of illegal migration. or who enter with either forged papers or none at all. contributes to the perception that states are losing sovereign control over their borders.000 people ªled asylum requests. up from 180. and 18. The IOM surmises that approximately 4 million people are smuggled across borders every year. In 2001. Numbers of illegal migrants are not counted in ofªcial statistics and are thus difªcult to establish.000 illegal border crossings every day. In 2001 there were approximately 12. 27. Altogether. millions of people cross borders for purposes of travel. or membership in a particular social or political group.0 million refugees in the world. IOM. Half of all illegal migrants have some interaction with smuggling or trafªcking networks—a global industry that generates approximately $10 billion per year. Ibid.000 in 1980.. 47. legal versus illegal migration Many immigrants enter states through formal. pp.5 trillion global travel industry.. as compared with 8. Asylum applications cost advanced industrial states approximately $10 billion per year. legal channels. In the United States alone. approximately 6 million asylum applications were ªled in advanced industrialized countries during the 1990s. this is ten times the annual budget of the Ofªce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Of these. 2003.International Security 31:1 174 ligion.30 Similarly. there may be as many as 12 million illegal migrants. 29. nationality. 58–61. 102. Ibid. pp. So-called irregular migrants make up 30–50 percent of all migration to Western industrialized countries.9 percent of all refugees in 2001 were concentrated in Asia.31 The number of false asylum seekers. others enter through illegal channels. “Progress and Priorities. includes so-called guest workers. 31. and students. Like other dimensions of globalization—whether ªnancial ºows or information technology or marketization processes—the intervening variable for understanding the relationship between migration and security is state policy. 1996). and military forces abroad—is less clear. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money (New York: New Press. “Anyone who thinks differently should try landing at Sydney airport without an entry visa or go to France and apply for a job without a work permit. Tourists enter a country and then proceed to stay and look for work. which assume a unitary national identity from which a set of national interests can be derived. This in turn calls into question traditional models of national security. and ideas—all challenge notions of the territorial state as a bounded entity with a clearly demarcated territory and population.Crossing Borders 175 The status of some border crossers—for example.”36 34. The Global Migration Crisis.35 As Gary Freeman has argued. Saskia Sassen. while attempting to keep other categories out—clearly a signiªcant challenge. students or businesspeople. and much of migration policy is about designing systems that allow some categories of immigrants in. See. 1998). migration-based. international civil servants working outside their country of origin. 35. for example. and the emergence of informal. Saskia Sassen. Yet this does not necessarily mean.34 thus jeopardizing the very basis of their security. members of organized criminal networks and international terrorist organizations are unlikely to mention such afªliations when they apply for visas. 36. and Weiner. for example. Impacts of Migration on State Capacity and Autonomy Some experts portray international migration ºows as overwhelming states’ capacity to maintain sovereignty across a number of areas. as some more sensational accounts claim. that large migration ºows are causing states to lose control. artists on tour. categorization of migrants Categories of border crossers are not always clear cut. Gary Freeman. goods. and may well have a legitimate pretext to enter a country as. political asylum seekers may leave one country for political reasons but then decide to relocate to another due to the existence of economic opportunities or family ties. increasingly multicultural populations. “The Decline of Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration Restriction in Liberal . Ever larger ºows of people across borders. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press. transnational networks that circulate capital. . regulating borders: migration and interdependence sovereignty The ability to control who has the right to cross the borders of a state is a key dimension of what Stephen Krasner refers to as a state’s “interdependence sovereignty.J.. such as maintaining control over their populations.37 States have always faced challenges to their sovereignty. are international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. and domestic sovereignty.: Princeton University Press. International migration arguably poses a challenge to two broad dimensions of sovereignty: interdependence sovereignty. have pointed to how nonstate actors. The ability of states to maintain control over their borders and to formulate a coherent national identity are arguably necessary preconditions for the maintenance of state security in other areas. such as airlines. The Wall around the West. pp. Gold. and Steven J. are assuming some aspects of border control activities.” in Andreas and Snyder. A failure to control territorial borders can precipitate serious security challenges. 93. and maintaining internal security. for example. Immigration Research for a New Century: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Russell Sage. N.”39 States have interests in controlling their territorial borders for a variety of reasons. Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon. which are less affected by migration ºows. “Comparative Perspectives on Border Control: Away from the Border and Outside the State. 2000). for example. p. In weak and failing states. . Some scholars. Ibid. 55–77. eds.” in Nancy Foner. Stephen D. Krasner. limiting access to labor markets and public goods. 39. Rubén G. See. Losing Control? 38. however. Gallya Lahav. “The Rise of Non-state Actors in Migration Regulation in the United States and Europe. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton. or the level of effective control a state exercises within its borders. Two areas in which migration inºuences state capacity and autonomy are border control and national identity. can overwhelm a state’s capacity to provide public services and can lead to conºicts over resources. a lack of border control signiªcantly jeopardizes their capacity across a number of areas. ed. however.38 All states are not equally able to manage the challenges posed by migration. 1999). and Sassen.” in Christian Joppke. The other two dimensions of sovereignty enumerated by Krasner.International Security 31:1 176 It is still states that have the primary responsibility both for regulating borders and for conferring citizenship rights and claims to membership in a political community. and those with high levels of institutional capacity are in a much better position to adapt to this new environment than are weak or failing states. States. 37. and the impact of migration ºows across borders is analogous to other instances in history in which states have had to respond to pressures arising from increased transnationalism. Rumbaut. or the ability of states to control transborder movements. Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press. Large-scale refugee ºows. 1998). “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conºict. pp. and Aguayo. Brown. and the uncontrolled ºow of refugees or other migrants across borders produces additional stresses on already weak state institutions. 43–71. Vol. 43. 1989. “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action. pp. 1996). “The German Revolution. See Stephen John Stedman. The world’s poorest states host most of its refugees. No. and Aguayo. Suhrke. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher. . porous borders in weak states can allow politically organized nonstate actors access to territory and population groups that can be used for political mobilization. Governments-in-Exile in Contemporary World Politics (New York: Routledge.” in Yossi Shain. Sarah K. the Great Lakes region of Africa provides just one example of the disastrous consequences that such dynamics can have on weak states. Lischer. the monopolization of the legitimate means of 40. and Zolberg. 41.” International Security.” New York Times Review of Books. Rubin.” p. 44. December 21. The International Dimensions of Internal Conºict (Cambridge. 275–278.. pp. the concern with maintaining secure borders is also signiªcant. The fall of the iron curtain began when thousands of East Germans escaped to the West through Czechoslovakia. 1 (Summer 1996).”42 Examples include the mobilization activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization in refugee camps in Lebanon in the 1970s. 21.41 Moreover. 42. Vol. pp. one of the characteristics of weak or failing states is the inability to control their territorial borders. No.: MIT Press. 28. See Timothy Garton Ash. and Barnett R. 79–109.Crossing Borders 177 The end of communism in Eastern Europe was symbolized by the loss of control over state borders and offers a dramatic example of the relationship between border control and state strength. Hungary. Escape from Violence. pp. See Zolberg. until the border between East and West Germany was ªnally declared open by East Germany on November 9. 14–17. 49. ed. heightens competition over scarce resources.40 Similarly. which in turn can lead to the emergence of “refugeewarrior communities.44 For advanced industrial states with very high levels of internal capacity and control. and Poland in 1989. “Conºict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Dowty and Loescher. and exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions.. “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action. Mass. Suhrke. “Political Exiles in Search of a State. and the emergence of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Ugandan refugee camps in the 1990s.43 Refugee ºows can act as conduits that regionalize and internationalize internal conºicts. the role played by refugee camps in Pakistan as sites of mobilization for Taliban-related groups in the 1980s.” in Michael E. Escape from Violence. pp. 1989. 1991). As John Torpey has pointed out. 235–265. ed. 1 (Summer 2003). 70–91.” International Security. “Globalization may be about tearing down economic borders. have been very high. 239–259. and John Torpey. 1999).S.46 As the earlier statistics on illegal migration demonstrate. even if states have formal control over migration processes. Cornelius. IOM. The number of 45. As Peter Andreas argues. 48. and generally militarized and securitized border crossings. however. p. “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-ªrst Century. The record shows. then the capacity of states is indeed under threat.”48 Throughout the 1990s. a number of nonstate actors—in particular. John Torpey.50 The human consequences of this strengthening. however. Citizenship. 50. The emergence of organized criminal networks around illegal migration can also pose a signiªcant challenge to state authority and control.International Security 31:1 178 movement of people across borders through the creation of the passport and accompanying bureaucracies has been a key feature in the development of modern nation-states. organized criminal networks and smugglers—are in competition with the state in this area. “Given the vast amounts of money involved. Wayne A. for example. as globalists emphasize. No. that many states are adjusting to these pressures. p. pp. The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance.S. the United States and Europe expanded the policing of their borders. such operations erode normal governance and present real challenges and threats to national sovereignty. they do not necessarily control all movement— just as they do not always have a monopoly over the means of violence. No. 31–54. 16. 46. 60. If migration pressures on states increase without the state adapting. pp.” in Andreas and Snyder. 2 (Fall 2003).” International Security.S. 47. 2003. but it has also created more border policing work for the state.”47 Globalization produces a situation that resembles a cat-and-mouse game between migration pressures and state control over borders. “Death at the Border: Efªcacy and Unintended Consequences of U. Immigration and Naturalization Service (since 2003. 49. At the same time as globalization is about mobility and territorial access. Peter Andreas. Citizenship and Immigration Service) has tripled. The Wall around the West. Im- . and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. states are attempting to selectively reinforce border controls. Vol. World Migration. “States and the Regulation of Migration in the Twentieth-Century North Atlantic World.49 Since 1993. the budget of the U.45 Although states are authorized to monopolize the legitimate means of movement. Andreas. John Torpey. and the number of agents in Border Control has doubled. 28. the U. Border Games. increased the use of technology to monitor and regulate these borders. 84. 3 (November 1998). Vol. “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement. As the IOM report mentioned above notes.’” Sociological Theory. bin Laden.” New York Times. . 60. The use of biometric technology to monitor entrants into the United States under the US-VISIT program..S. 2003. including the exchange of information through the Schengen Information System database. 52. IOM. No. a single external border in the EU has in effect been created. 51. it is harder now. World Migration. p. p. however. as cited in ibid. 4 (December 2001). “Risky Dream and a Rising Toll in Desert at the Mexican Border. a common interest in the regulation of migration migration Control Policy. On both the U. IOM. what’s his name. is one such example. May 23. border and the external borders of the European Union. Border Games. Strangers at the Gates..54 The EU has established a European-wide corps of border guards and a European entry visa linked to a computerized database. 2002. surveillance technology has been increasingly employed to deter illegal border crossings.S. Even here. This has been accompanied by measures to improve police and judicial cooperation.700 occurring during the second half of the 1990s—a 400 percent jump from 1996 to 2000. which was subsequently incorporated into the EU with the 1999 Amsterdam treaty. 65. 661. even though illicit migration ºows provide states with clear challenges. 53. which commenced in January 2004. because of the higher likelihood that migrants would be interdicted. Of course.”53 States are learning to employ technology in ways that reinforce their capacity. 2003. the control of U. January 30.S.-Mexican border has steadily increased. Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security following the September 11 attacks. with approximately 1. 66. There are more reinforcements now because America is afraid of terrorism. World Migration. Andreas. Quoted on National Public Radio. 2004. for states with very weak or low capacity. Ibid. Thus. it would appear that overall state capacity has been threatened by migration ºows to a much lesser degree than many of the more sensationalist accounts in the globalization literature had predicted. p. p.” Population and Development Review.55 With the Schengen agreement of 1985. 27. Vol.52 As a border crosser who was caught trying to enter the United States illegally after September 11 succinctly put it. 54. and Timothy Egan. One sees this particularly in the area of migration and border control. borders has become even more securitized.Crossing Borders 179 deaths at the U. monitoring borders will continue to be a challenge. 55.51 Smuggling fees from Mexico into Arizona in 2001 were 50 percent lower than what they were before the attacks. “Because of this bearded guy. 59 Even rationalist and realist perspectives on security. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. Europe. challenge states’ autonomy.g.58 reshaping national identity: multicultural states and diasporas State migration policies generally have two main objectives: regulating who enters (e. States may be able to rely on technology to control borders. Vol. Holliªeld. “The Emerging Migration State. “noºy” or “automatic selectee” lists used to screen passengers on international ºights entering the United States. In modern 56. 58.Y. it does create incentives for states to selectively relinquish dimensions of their autonomy so as to increase their capacity to control their borders. N. which. as it has basically managed to harmonize much of its border control policy. 3 (September 2004). 2001. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Ithaca. 38.. Katzenstein.S. . See Peter J..: Cornell University Press. March 22. however.57 International cooperation on migration and border control can be seen as essential to maintaining a state’s capacity to regulate population ºows. and deciding who is entitled to membership in a polity (e. 1996). technical.” International Migration Review. James F. pp. are derived from a state’s national identity. No. and is therefore a vital component of a state’s national security policy. is the most prominent example of this trend. and development assistance to weaker states for border control. 2000). Other examples include international coordination on U.. In Europe during the 1990s. 885–912. as they come to realize that effective border control requires increased levels of interstate cooperation in areas such as information sharing. but how do they respond to challenges to their national identity? Traditional conceptions of national security are based on national interests. of course.International Security 31:1 180 has prompted stronger states to earmark economic. for example. Thus.56 Migration does. which emphasize material interests over identity. Harvard University. approximately 50 percent of funds spent on technical assistance for the EU Phare programs to Eastern Europe were targeted at illegal immigration and border control in candidate states. ed. controlling borders).g.. António Vitirono. although international migration does not yet pose an insurmountable challenge to states’ abilities to regulate their borders. Bimal Ghosh. conferring citizenship or political membership in a community). 57. Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press. lecture. 59. ed. allowing for free movement within the Schengen area. as social constructivists and others have argued. acknowledge that models of the state as a unitary rational actor assume an underlying coherence in its collective identity. EU commissioner in charge of justice and home affairs. and Aristide Zolberg. Man. Decolonization. the rise of civil rights movements and multiculturalism. Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past (Ithaca. are still politically contentious: when established patterns of national identity formation are called into question. even highly institutionalized and liberal democratic states may experi60. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. the State. “Rationalism v. See. the “White Australia” policies that deªned Australian migration policies for much of the twentieth century. ed. Immigration Reconsidered: History.: Westview. and the automatic right to immigrate to Israel that is granted to Jews in the 1950 Law of Return. and James Fearon and Alexander Wendt. On international human rights norms and deracialization. 1994). 1959). Imagined Communities: Reºections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso.Crossing Borders 181 times. Handbook of International Relations.” in Carlsnaes.” in Wang Gongwu. “Global Movements. N. On the privileging of ethnic Germans. Mass.61 The spread of international norms of racial equality and universal human rights. and War (New York: Columbia University Press. for example. . Colo. Global Walls: Responses to Migration: 1885–1925. 175–176. Many states have historically incorporated national. pp. 1990). On discrimination against Asians in U. 1983). and Simmons. pp. 1983). which confers legitimacy on and brings cohesion to nation-states. Ernest Gellner. examples include racial restrictions on immigrants to the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 61. 62. ethnic. 52–72. immigration policy. 2002). and economic imperatives resulting from the changing global structure of production have increasingly delegitimized the use of ethnic and racial criteria in the formulation of immigration policy.. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. more generally. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Blackwell. pp. the discussion of nationalism and states as units in Kenneth N. On international human rights norms and ( citizenship. or racial criteria into their migration policies. 279–302.S.. Global History and Migrations (Boulder.: Harvard University Press. The challenge that migration ºows pose to unitary conceptions of national identity has deep historical roots and continues to provoke political debate. pp. and Anthony D. 1820s to 1920s. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge.” in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin. the favoring of ethnic Germans (or Aussiedler) by Germany in its post–World War II immigration policy. ed. 1989). see Rogers Brubaker. see Neta C.62 Debates surrounding the relationship between migration and national identity. 1997). 37–75. Representative literature on nationalism. Smith. Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics. Waltz. however. 1992). more generally.60 International migration processes call into question the cultural basis of a state’s identity and provide incentives for states to take up more liberal and expansive national identities. and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. see Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal. and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press. see Sucheng Chan. Sociology. “European and Asian Immigration into the United States in Comparative Perspective.: Cornell University Press. Crawford. includes Benedict Anderson. a coherent identity has been provided by the ideology of nationalism. Risse.Y. for example. and states such as Germany deriving their identity from ethnic nationalism. “Societal Security: The Concept. Some authors have tried to group states according to these criteria.: Harvard University Press. 65. 2004). that plays this role in many European countries. 27. No. Huntington. which has outlawed the wearing of headscarves in public schools. Migration.66 The relationship between migration ºows and national identity provides an example of the many ways in which market forces are challenging traditional state functions. may also help to account for this variation.International Security 31:1 182 ence some levels of internal instability and incoherence at the societal level— what Ole Waever has referred to as “societal insecurity. Mass. pp. 64. 17–40.. most states exhibit a mix of ethnic and civic nationalism. pp. with states such as France. and Brubaker.65 Despite Huntington’s claims. Additional factors. At the same time. States are increasingly using market criteria to make migration policy. it would help to explain why. Ole Waever. rather than a civic nationalism. a global “market” for the political loyalties of individual migrants and their descendents is emerging. . even after September 11. and the United States being classiªed as states deriving their identity from civic nationalism. Old models of incorporation or assimilation into a nation are giving way to new discourses of multiculturalism. Vol. For discussions. Identity. such as France.” Politics and Society. For an interesting discussion.64 Meanwhile.” in Waever et al. 66. 1 (March 1999). If this is the case. some have argued. and constitutional can be threatened by migration. neither Muslim immigrants nor Islam more generally is viewed as posing a cultural threat to American identity in the same ways that have been manifested in some European states. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. In reality. as they claim that liberal constitutionalism itself has its origins in a particular culture.”63 The problem is most acute for states that derive their identity and legitimacy from an ethnic version of nationalism. Samuel P. Samuel Huntington. and the New Security Agenda. and diasporic 63. see Aristide Zolberg and Long Litt Woon. civic. language is arguably the most salient symbol of national cohesion in the United States. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster. transnationalism. with economic skills largely trumping cultural and identity criteria in evaluating potential migration requests. 1992). whereas it is religious identity. some cultural conservatives argue that even states whose identities are primarily liberal. which he asserts is based on an “Anglo-Protestant” heritage. 5–38. Great Britain. “Why Islam Is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States. has made the argument that recent waves of immigration to the United States threaten to undermine its core identity. see Liah Greenfeld. such as differences in the origins and composition of Muslim populations in the United States and Europe. The Volume and Dynamics of Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Gabriel Sheffer. pp. Soysal.” International Organization. Some scholars have argued that the transnationalization of political participation and the existence of diaspora networks can impair a state’s ability to formulate a coherent foreign policy based on a uniªed national interest. and Cristina Szanton Blanc. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth. 3 (Summer 2003). Huntington and Tony Smith. new communication technologies. Pa. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects. Gabriel Sheffer. . foreign policy 67. argue that U.S. creates identities and political loyalties that challenge conventional notions of citizenship.”69 The literature on diasporas points to how the emergence of transnational organizational structures. such as diaspora organizations. and Cristina Szanton Blanc demonstrate in their work that migrants increasingly “live lives . for example. Vol. 4. “The establishment of diaspora organizations and participation in those organizations can create the potential for dual authority. 71. No.: Gordon and Breach.67 Yasemin ( Nuhoglu Soysal has observed that migrant communities in Europe engage in political activities at the supranational level.” Prime examples are the political activities of Jews in the diaspora directed toward politics in Israel or of Armenians vis-à-vis Armenia. Limits of Citizenship. . and the emergence of a global media infrastructure allow migrants to maintain ties with their homelands or even take part in wholly new transnational identity communities. 70. Linda Basch. 81. 68. Postcolonial Predicaments. Nina Glick Schiller. for example. 449–479. p. Factors such as the ease of travel. and can be used for a variety of purposes—including political mobilization. 69. Faist. are rich in social capital. Development of such fragmented loyalties often results in conºicts between diasporas and their host societies and governments. 1994). Migrants and their descendents can easily maintain dense social networks that stretch across national borders. 57. p. and De-territorialized Nation-States (Langhorne.71 Migrants and their descendents thus form contested constituencies that can be mobilized by a variety of actors. notes. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. “Diasporas and International Relations Theory. and consequently also for dual or divided loyalties or ambiguous loyalty vis-àvis host countries. in addition to the national level.Crossing Borders 183 identities—all of which challenge the notion of a unitary and territorially deªned national entity. pp. Nina Glick Schiller. stretched across national borders.68 And Linda Basch. . 2003). 96–123.”70 Members of diaspora groups are sometimes actively involved in the politics of their “home state. A prime example is Germany. 5 (January/February 1997). Cigler and Burdett A. 18. Culture. Most modern industrial states are increasingly identifying themselves according to civic forms of nationalism and are deªning themselves using liberal criteria. This challenges some of the claims in Brubaker.74 The adoption of liberal forms of national identity is indicative of the resilience of the state and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 73.73 Such changes to national identity are ultimately security enhancing rather than detracting. yet since 2000 has begun to consider jus soli criteria. . and Society. Interest Group Politics (Washington. Huntington. Mass.72 Interestingly. While banning the wearing of headscarves in public schools. Vol. 23.C. in addition to jus sanguinis criteria. pp. a state that has traditionally displayed an ethnic form of nationalism. European states are becoming increasingly multicultural in response to changes associated with migration. and Jack L. eds. and Tony Smith.: Harvard University Press.: Congressional Quarterly. Yet the overall effect this has on the core national security interests of states is debatable. No.” French Politics. on a par with the institutionalized representation given to Christian and Jewish communities—a process also taking place in other European states. “The Erosion of American National Interest. See also Eric M. 5–39. Vol. France is also working to institutionalize and incorporate Islam as an ofªcial religion.” International Security. Samuel P. Norton. Huntington makes the comparison between transnational ethnic groups and economic actors. 1991). 4 (Spring 1994). pp. “A Tower of Babel on Foreign Policy?” in Allan J. Loomis. 74. 75. Uslaner. 76. “From the Elysée Salon to the Table of the Republic: State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France. No. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge. illustrate how increased levels of marketization and pluralization can challenge a state’s ability to act coherently as a unitary rational actor in the area of foreign policy formulation. The spread of liberal and civic forms of nationalism across states ultimately enhances overall levels of international stability. 36–63. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. in deciding who can become a German citizen. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conºict (New York: W. Vol. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 2001). Jonathan Laurence. No.” Foreign Affairs.. and may in fact be more positive than negative. 28–49. pp. Snyder. 1 (Spring 2005). Both.W. D. in some sense.International Security 31:1 184 formulation in some areas can be inºuenced by skilled ethnic lobbying groups whose loyalties are to a real or imagined homeland.75 Although cultural conservatives may bemoan the loss of ho72. Global migration ºows may challenge some classical notions of national identity. as they help states to adjust to the demands of globalization and decrease the dangers posed by virulent and exclusionary forms of nationalism. pp. 2000). 299–318. such as multinational corporations. Stephen Van Evera. Purely on the level of basic demographics. 69–97. and Linda Wrigley. 129–131. and military strength. for example. Immigration and U. 77. “Migration circuits span the globe like a spider’s web.” international migration ºows can enhance. “Multicultural Foreign Policy. 4. 78. World Migration. 76. p. A country’s population is arguably its most important resource. See. for example.: Westview. pp. 1979). Charles B. more than 140. rather than detract from or compromise. Many advanced industrialized countries have aging populations and need younger workers if their social security systems are to function and if they are going to compete on the world market.” Foreign Affairs. the intervening variable between migration and national security is policy: if states have the capacity to design and implement effective policies that “harness the power of migration. 2003. Tucker. 4 (Spring 1981). highlighting the ability of interest groups to operate in plural societies.S. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill. Vol. and Robert W. No. pp. the United States and Great Britain can be viewed as a healthy indicator of the robustness of democracy in these states.76 International Migration and the Balance of Power The size of a state’s population. Likewise.000 economic immigrants entered Japan—a ªgure that was nearly 10 percent higher than in 2000. IOM. and diplomatic.. it must be mobilized.77 The distribution of power in the international state system may now be unipolar. p.. 975–998. 1990).” Foreign Policy.Crossing Borders 185 mogeneous national identities. for example. eds. Charles McC. Colo. The current world map of migration is therefore multipolar. rather than being seen as a threat to a unitary national interest. 59. In 2001. are the most basic measures of its power. see Kenneth N. Keely. but as the IOM report notes. Foreign Policy (Boulder.79 Migration and human mobility inºuence three core areas of state power: economic. Waltz. Yossi Shain. Here.”78 Migration policy can be a tool for states to exercise their national interests. territory. . Japan is a key example. economy. in addition to its natural resources. migration can make a difference to a state’s power. pp. 79. On counting poles and measuring power. 200. again. however. No. Ibid. to be an effective instrument of power. with the government institutionalizing various measures to encourage labor migration in the mid1990s. with complex ramiªcations and countless intersections. military.. most observers view the global trend toward a convergence in states deªning themselves according to nonracial and liberal identities as a positive and security-enhancing development. Mathias Jr. state power. 100 (Autumn 1995). “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy. the presence of ethnic and diaspora lobbies in. in an increasingly global economy. In the 1990s. economy. 149. p. The Globalization Syndrome.81 Highly industrialized countries are designing their immigration systems to harness the talent of skilled workers.83 The United States.org/ research/swe/2003/swe0306a. attempting to outdo one another in luring talent in what the IOM has referred to as a “human capital accretion ‘sweepstakes.germany-info. as the United States has reduced the number of visas issued to foreign students and increased the time it takes for 80. 6 (November/December 2003).” The United States continues to be a world leader in issuing student visas. and Mittelman. 85. IOM. especially computer specialists.S.” 81.000 students from China.stm. “Security and the Political Economy of Migration”. 2005. 2003. for example.86 In the wake of the September 11 attacks. a route that often becomes a fast-track for permanent migration. Britain was host to approximately 50.International Security 31:1 186 economic power: human capital in a globalizing world economy Some scholars argue that. program. http:/ /www. U. September 7.’”82 This trend is especially noticeable in the area of information technology and the knowledge economy. 82. see German Embassy. p.S. IOM.C.bbc. 84. http:/ /www.80 Immigration ºows are highly correlated with economic growth.co.dallasfed. For details. has encouraged highly skilled labor migration with the H-1B visa. Immigration and Economic Growth: Putting Policy on Hold. which brings people in to work temporarily in the information technology and communication sectors.” Southwest Economy. . are turning to overseas students as a source of revenue to stem the ªnancial crisis that has hit its education sector. “U. Washington.S. in 2005. D. Nick Mackie. for example. modeled on the U. migration ºows and an increase in the foreign-born labor force were largely responsible for spurring growth in the U. although other states are increasingly attempting to capture a greater share of this “market. “Chinese Students Drawn to Britain. “Security and the Political Economy of Migration. World Migration.S.85 Students are another group of sought-after “migrants. http:/ / news.html. Rudolph. No. 83. World Migration. leadership in attracting international talent has been called into question. states will inevitably see labor migration as a means of maximizing economic gains.html. 149. 2003. The postwar economic boom in Germany and other Western European countries would not have been possible without the inºux of migrant labor from Mediterranean countries in the 1960s.84 In 2000 Germany initiated a new “Green Card” program. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.” Universities in Great Britain.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/4219026. as a way of attracting highly skilled labor. 86.org/ relaunch/welcome/work/work.. which has become an integral component of state power. Rudolph. for example.” BBC News. Mittelman. “Migration’s New Payoff. May 6. In particular.88 According to estimates. 6. Segal. The Globalization Syndrome. Visas. IOM. “Science. an amount greater than the sum of all 87. this can contribute substantially to economic growth in ways that have advantages over other types of capital ºows. more than 20. 88. by 1988 the ªgure had increased to $30. 90. Yet the effects of emigration processes from the developing world to the developed world are multiple.000 Nigerian doctors practice in North America.91 In the mid-1990s global remittances were estimated at $66 billion. and in 2003 the South African economy had lost approximately $7. 89. World Migration. . 30. Perhaps the most signiªcant result of migration from developing countries is the capital ºows that are generated through labor remittances. 2004. Additionally. as cited in Hirst and Thompson. many parts of Africa continue to experience a brain drain of skilled labor. and developing countries also beneªt greatly from out-migration. there are winners and losers. and in the 1990s more than 5 percent of all Africans were estimated to be living outside their country of origin. universities has caused some to question the ability of the United States to maintain its leading edge in science and technology if such restrictions continue.000 professionals and university graduates leave countries in Africa every year with the aim of working in Europe or North America. which are measured as changes in the assets and liabilities of residents vis-à-vis nonresidents in a state.90 The size of remittances has been growing steadily since the 1970s. p. Globalization in Question. Whereas in 1970 global remittances were estimated at slightly more than $3 billion. however. 216–217. 150.” Economist. pp.87 In the global competition for highly skilled workers. In 1987. No.4 billion. If states are able to capture the developmental beneªts of remittances. 48–57. 70.Crossing Borders 187 students to acquire visas: an overall drop in foreign graduate student applications to top U. 45. An Atlas of International Migration. John McHale and Devesh Kapur. 139 (November/December 2003). pp. 91. 30 percent of Africa’s skilled workforce lived in Europe.8 billion in human capital due to emigration since 1997. and America: On the Turning Away. p.S. Unlike other categories of external capital ºows. 2003. 76. p. p.” Foreign Policy.89 The exit of highly skilled labor from developing economies contributes to the growing gap between the wealthiest and poorest members of the international state system. remittances tend to be more stable than other forms of private capital ºows across borders. many labor remittance ºows are technically transfers of capital from one set of nationals (living abroad) to another set of nationals. 2003. and Yemen. if effectively utilized. 2 (March 2003). providing technical and intelligence expertise (e. International Organization for Migration. World Migration.94 In both Egypt and Tunisia. and others who ºed National Socialism in Europe put their scientiªc expertise to work in developing the ªrst atomic bomb. Jordan.97 military power: immigrant skills.. Nicholas Van Hear. p. 1993 (New York: UNPF. United Nations Population Fund. Edward Teller. 92. can help to stimulate economic development. 224. 93. nuclear program in the 1930s. New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home (London: Routledge. p. as cited in IOM. is prioritizing migration management through the establishment of foundations that encourage the temporary return migration of skilled professionals.g. IOM. “Sustaining Societies under Strain: Remittances as a Form of Transnational Exchange in Sri Lanka and Ghana.. As such. pp.96 In the year 2000. for example. 45. 96. Nicaragua. 2002). See. for example. they total approximately $3. eds. “Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries. World Migration. “Facts and Figures on International Migration. they account for 51 percent of capital inºows. Eritrea. pp. and recruits Immigrants can also contribute to a state’s military strength by. The State of World Population. In Morocco.” in Nadje al-Ali and Khalid Koser. 225. 202–223. p. 2. 2003. it is also seeking to foster a core of elite émigrés who can further the country’s development and promote Moroccan culture abroad. No. Peter Gammeltoft. 2002). Morocco. more states are trying to harness the power of labor remittances. 17.95 Labor remittances can be put to use for a variety of purposes and. for example. 95. including El Salvador.International Security 31:1 188 state-sponsored foreign development aid programs. The Globalization Syndrome. labor remittances contributed more than 10 percent to the national economies of several developing countries.” Working Paper (Copenhagen: Center for Development Research. expertise.92 Estimates for remittances in 2002 ran as high as $100 billion annually in transnational ºows across national borders. 310. foreign language skills and analysis). p. Albert Einstein. as cited in Mittelman. 2003. 94. World Migration.3 billion a year. accounting for 83 percent of the trade balance deªcit. 1993). 97. . This is but one of many examples of the ability of states to harness the skills and expertise of immigrants for military ends. IOM.S.93 Labor remittances from migrants make up more than half of all total ªnancial inºows in a number of countries. Jamaica. An extreme example is the role that émigré scientists played in developing the U.” Migration Policy Issues. S. “U.mil/news/Feb2003/n02242003_200302243. military operations. NATO enlargement was helped along by the domestic lobbying activities of Americans of Eastern European descent. the recent increased use of private contractors in U. this is the ºip side of the earlier discussion regarding a state’s ability to maintain a coherent national identity.migrationinformation. In some respects. 2003). and Duncan Campbell. up to half of all enlistees do not have U. 2004. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou.941202. 2003.guardian.” Migration Information Source. they enjoy a certain number of limited facilities. and by sponsoring lobbying and public relations activities. . In fact. “Dying to Belong.: Cornell University Press. or 4 percent of all enlistees.defenselink. Army Trains Free Iraqi Forces in Hungary. see Jim Garamone.S. Prominent members of the Cypriot diaspora have acquired VIP status because.101 The Republic of Cyprus draws on its diaspora in the United Kingdom and elsewhere to represent its interests abroad in the Cyprus conºict. U. N.7792. 101.” European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming). 2005). 99. “Immigrant Voting Rights Receive More Attention. military recruiters regularly seek new recruits in immigrant communities. In some areas of California.”102 98. http:/ /www . Fiona B.S. For ªgures.W. http:/ /www.or/USfocus/ display. and ªve of the ªrst ten Californians who perished in the war in Iraq were noncitizens. “Reshaping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing.Crossing Borders 189 The state can also draw on immigrant populations when ªghting a war.” February 24.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0.S. joining the military is one way to expedite the naturalization process for noncitizens. in some respects. albeit.000 noncitizens were enrolled in the U. privileges and immunities.00. This endeavor. and P. April 22. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ron Hayduk and Michelle Wucker. military also attempted to mobilize recent immigrants or their descendents when it sought to create a separate division of approximately 3. Shain and Barth. 2003.Y.cfm?ID=265. http:/ / www.html. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca. In the United States.98 In 2004 it was estimated that 40. see Deborah D. Avant. military.S.co. On private contractors. Small states in the international system can involve their diasporas in diplomacy by drawing on emigrants and their descendents within a target country.html. was viewed as unsuccessful by many critics. “Diasporas and International Relations Theory. 100.000 Iraqi expatriates and exiles known as the Free Iraq Forces. for example.” 102. Armenia has a diaspora desk in its ministry of foreign affairs. The use of noncitizens mirrors. citizenship. November 1.99 The U. “much like honorary or career consuls. Singer.100 diplomatic power: migrants as ambassadors Migration can enhance a state’s ability to engage in diplomacy.S.” Guardian. pp. in the case of the United States. Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the United States and Their Homelands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.” in Michael S. No. one need only think of such prominent examples as Henry Kissinger. sought to “inºict a psychological blow on communism. What emerges in the context of globalization. 104. “From Invitation to Interdiction: U. and even by mobilizing diasporas living within them for foreign policy ends. migrants and diasporas can promote them by acting as unofªcial ambassadors who propagate American values in their home countries. that rather than hurting the United States’ national interests. 1995). however. in the process. .104 At the level of ofªcial policy.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs. for example. Zbigniew Brzezinski. pp. Threatened Peoples. has argued. Norton. Policy (New York: W. in particular.105 103. eds. Mainstream approaches to security. have traditionally assumed that states seek to protect themselves primarily against security threats from other states. and. Transnational Political Mobilization. by drawing on immigrant populations. Adamson. transnational diaspora populations have been an important source of national inºuence abroad. and Madeleine Albright. has been most signiªcant in reshaping the security environment facing state actors. Vol. for example. 123–124.”103 As in the economic and military realms. and relying on Palestinian Americans as negotiators in various rounds of Middle East peace talks.International Security 31:1 190 Powerful states in the international system can project their inºuence abroad by manipulating immigration policy.S. contrary to Huntington.and secondgeneration immigrants to assist in achieving particular foreign policy projects. Foreign Policy and Immigration since 1945. highly skilled immigrants can enhance national strength in the diplomatic sphere. Cross-Border Mobility and the Changing Nature of Violent Conºict The nature of violent conºict in the international system is arguably the area in which migration. states can mobilize ªrst. and globalization. “Globalization. 35–53. Threatened Borders: World Migration and U. During the Cold War. particularly realist and neorealist approaches. and Networks of Violence. Yossi Shain. 1 (April 2005). Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner. Aristide Zolberg. 1999). Yossi Shain. recent examples include drawing on Iraqi exiles in the process of postconºict reconstruction and nation building in Iraq. Fiona B. more generally. 105. the United States crafted a refugee policy that encouraged emigration and defection from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. is the proliferation of a number of security threats to states that emanate from nonstate actors. 18. In the post–Cold War world.. mobilizing highly skilled Afghan émigrés for nation building in Afghanistan.W.S. 107. organized crime can lead to much more serious consequences. Rapoport. combined with the availability of new technologies and media markets. N. employed political violence that challenged state security interests. however.106 Like many other aspects of the relationship between migration and national security. countries experiencing vi106. Studies have shown that diaspora funding played a key role in providing resources for violent conºicts during the 1990s. in turn. N. internal conflict: mobilized diasporas and refugees International migration processes. Organized crime. Scholars of international security. for example.J. may have to step back and examine pre–World War I dynamics in the international system to understand some of the post–Cold War and post–September 11 challenges facing states today.” in Charles W. The degree to which each of these factors affects a state depends on the level of its capacity. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca. see Vadim Volkov. presents itself as a law enforcement problem to highly institutionalized states. in the period of nineteenth-century globalization. who were particularly active in mobilizing within Irish immigrant communities in the United States. . Controls (Upper Saddle River. These transnational diaspora networks. as an academic discipline. for example. 36–59. ed. challenging. “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. For the case of Russia. 2002).Crossing Borders 191 Migration ºows can interact with other factors in three ways to exacerbate conditions that foment violent conºict in the international system: by providing resources that help to fuel internal conºicts. According to a World Bank study. such as the Fenians. by providing opportunities for networks of organized crime. has been heavily shaped by the experiences of World War I and World War II— and is. or even hijacking state institutions. but rather have been understudied by specialists in international relations and security studies. See. these factors are not all necessarily new. including in violent conºicts.: Prentice Hall. as well as various nationalist movements. corrupting. 2003). Examples include nineteenth-century anarchist and socialist networks. allow for migrants and their descendents to remain connected to their home country and co-ethnics through diaspora networks. there was also a plethora of political activity by nonstate actors who utilized migration channels and immigrant communities to mobilize transnationally and. The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics. For example. Kegley. and by providing conduits for international terrorism.: Cornell University Press. an intellectual response to these devastating events. can be used as a political resource.107 International relations. but for weakly institutionalized states. David C. which saw similar waves of migration. Causes.Y. to some extent. pp.. at times. Bruce Hoffman. International Response.” . p.International Security 31:1 192 olent conºict that had signiªcant diaspora populations abroad were six times likelier to experience a recurrence of conºict than states without such populations. 2003.110 Other examples include the conºict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Turkish state throughout the 1990s. and Daniel Byman. IOM. Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Collateral Damage. Lischer notes that “state-in-exile” refugees are more likely to be violence prone than “situational” or “persecuted” refugee populations. pp. ed.”108 A number of qualitative studies of diasporas in internal conºicts have echoed this observation. raised money in the diaspora to support the conºict. argued that “diasporas appear to make life for those left behind much more dangerous in post-conºict situations. New and Old Wars. Collier.” p. Adamson.. 111. and Transnational Cycles of Political Violence. 2004). The author of this report. as well as that between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan state. Khalid Medani. Calif.: RAND. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica.. Diaspora Mobilization. 113. pp. p. Kaldor. Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (Berkeley: University of California Press.” in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 2000). and David Brannan. 114. The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism. more generally. pp. 109. Southeast Asia. noted that it was Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora who created the Kosovo Liberation Army. for example. “Economic Causes of Civil Conºict and Their Implications for Policy. Suhrke. Lischer. The Kosovo Report: Conºict. 45–58. William Rosenau. 2001). 110. Paul Collier. Fiona B. 166–177. Independent International Commission on Kosovo. dilemmas are created on multiple levels. Peter Chalk. 58–74. and Aguayo. 206. “Displacement. Benedict Anderson. 115. as opposed to Arab states.114 Not all refugee populations are likely to become the targets of political mobilization activities. Zolberg.” in John Tirman. 1998). “Funding Fundamentalism: The Political Economy of an Islamist State.”113 A similar dynamic exists with regard to refugee populations and violent conºict. World Migration. but when they are targeted. eds.109 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo. and even utilized the diaspora to recruit ªghters. Maze of Fear: Migration and Security after 9/11 (New York: New Press. Just as political entrepreneurs can mobilize resources and political support for a conºict within diasporas in Western industrial states. Islamists drew upon migrant workers in Gulf states in the 1980s and 1990s to fund Islamic fundamentalist networks that were eventually able to take over the state in Sudan. refugee populations can also provide a base for political mobilization activities in conºicts. 6. diaspora mobilization appears to feed into “transnationalized cycles of political violence. Escape from Violence. in reaction to the politicization of Arab immigrant communities through mobilization activities by nonstate actors. 112.115 Humanitarian assistance operations that target refugee 108. states have shifted to recruiting labor from Asian.112 In many of these cases.111 In the Gulf. 45. and the World (London: Verso. 1997). for example. 60. Andreas has pointed out the extent to which transnational criminal networks provided the material basis for the Bosnian conºict. armed rebel organizations. The Wall around the West. 203–218. 118. Albanian smuggling groups operating in the Czech Republic during the 1990s.” in Andreas and Snyder. Ibid. cell phones with network cards. pp. 92–95.Crossing Borders 193 populations. Rey Koslowski. pp. 2003. p.000 from some countries in Asia to the United States.000 “clients” across the CzechGerman border. Smugglers command high prices for their services. was heavily involved in human smuggling as a way of both raising money for the conºict in Turkey during the 1990s and smuggling in supporters to engage in political activities in Europe. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Peter Andreas. smuggling networks have been able to take advantage of new technologies to achieve their goals..” . 119. were equipped with night-vision equipment. No.119 Similar arguments can be made for conºicts in Kosovo and Turkey. 29–51. 48. can fuel violent conºicts by providing material assistance. Koslowski. 117. Vol. Zaire) following the 1994 Rwandan genocide and in camps in Pakistan following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. support. for example. and terrorist networks is often difªcult to disentangle. “The Mobility Money Can Buy: Human Smuggling and Border Control in the European Union. 120.117 Like other nonstate actors. and other high-technology gear that were used to help smuggle some 40.116 organized crime: human smuggling and gray economy networks Perhaps the most obvious link between migration and organized crime is the global industry in human smuggling and trafªcking that has emerged to meet the demands of individuals seeking to cross national borders.” International Studies Quarterly. 1 (March 2004). ranging from $500 for passage from Morocco to Spain to as much as $50. “The Mobility Money Can Buy. and legitimacy to militants who are embedded in or linked to refugee camps and populations. This is what occurred in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (at that time.120 Global organized criminal networks are often deªned by a particular ethnicity and are able to operate transnationally by forging networks of solidarity 116. pp. This is an instance in which market-based mechanisms take over when the demand for opportunities to immigrate outstrips the supply provided by ofªcial channels in state migration policies. “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia.118 The nexus between organized criminal groups. for example. IOM World Migration. No.” in H. is also destabilizing at the global level. 203–222. “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State. pp. Mittelman. in states such as Colombia. as can be seen.” for example.123 Finally. Mittelman and Robert Johnston. it can have an impact on the security of the victims of its illegal activities—whether they are individuals who die in transit or under other circumstances. a local dependence on international networks of organized crime can develop. Chinese criminal networks. with faux Chanel perfume made in Mexico. organized criminal networks are not new. Louise Shelley. however. so too does it provide opportunities for criminal operations that rely on networks of individuals that stretch across national borders.” Transnational Organized Crime. Vol. James H. 27. “Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism. creating serious internal security problems.121 What is new. just as any legitimate business might do in a global economy. “Global Organized Crime. p.International Security 31:1 194 that take advantage of migration-based networks and migration circuits. Richard . Peter Lupsha. as well as engage in distributive and service-providing activities normally associated with the state. however. 2. Peter Lupsha details how contemporary “Chinese illegals in Naples produced counterfeit French perfume in bottles made in Spain. The emergence of transnational criminal networks that use migration strategically to pursue their interests can inºuence the national security interests of states in a number of ways. for example.” in Mittelman. the inºux of resources tied to international criminal networks can help to support maªa-like organizations that actually challenge the ability of states to maintain sovereignty over particular areas or that otherwise corrupt their authority.”122 Just as globalization provides opportunities for legal operations to transnationalize production structures.124 121. or “Triads. smuggled Chinese into California during the Gold Rush in the 1840s. and covered in gold wrappings and labels printed in Belgium. When criminal networks take over law enforcement functions and monopolize violence at the local level. 122. p. Organized crime. 124. Again. or who are touched by the violence that accompanies such criminal activities. The Globalization Syndrome. 208. leading to what James Mittelman and Robert Johnston term “the corruption of global civil society”—the same civilsociety channels and networks that help to produce an international public sphere also provide opportunities for increased levels of transnationally organized illicit activities. in states that are already weak or failing. At the most basic level. The Globalization Syndrome. 1 (Spring 1996). 123. is the globalization of ethnically based criminal networks and their ability to forge alliances with one another— organizing themselves internationally. He indentiªes two strategies for getting such access: the ªrst is the use of so-called hit squads that enter a state with the explicit aim of committing a terrorist act—this was the case in the attacks of September 11. Md. This is true not just in the United States but also in Europe and other states. 6. Gunaratna’s quotation is attributed to his presentation at the Nixon Center on December 1. Migration policies and migration networks. Leiken.: Nixon Center. eds. 25–52. Bearers of Global Jihad? p. 125.edu/mn/more. . whereas terrorist organizations view immigration from a strategic perspective—using all aspects of the immigration system to gain access to target states. 1999). pp. Robert S. “Immigration and terrorism are linked—not because all immigrants are terrorists but because all. groups already inside the target state that are activated at a particular point to carry out attacks. have utilized migrants. 11 (November 2001). just as they provide opportunities for states and other actors. Vol. surveillance has focused on uncovering the latter since September 11. for example. 2003. Robert Leiken argues that states tend to view immigration from an economic perspective. Leiken. argued that “the ªght against illegal immigration is also the reinforcement of the ªght against terrorism. http:/ /migration. p.Crossing Borders 195 terrorism: migration and transnational political violence Since the September 11 terrorist attacks.”125 A recent report published by the Nixon Center declares. 2004). all evidence suggests that the United States is more at risk from external inªltrators than from any form of domestic mobilization around radical Islam—a concern that is much more pronounced in European states such as France.127 Friman and Peter Andreas.” Migration News. The second strategy is relying on sleeper cells. do provide avenues for terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors to pursue their interests. however. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham. and Great Britain.”126 Such claims are sensationalist and highly problematic.: Rowman and Littleªeld. questions relating to migration and security are increasingly viewed through the lens of international terrorism. 127. Harmonization. Quoted in “EU: Terrorism. not the least because they do not take into account attacks by domestic groups in Europe such as the separatist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty.php?id?2488_0_4_0. 8. Germany. No. also known as ETA.. that is. terrorists in the West have been immigrants. 6. While internal U. D.C.” The same report goes on to cite Rohan Gunaratna’s claim that “all major terrorist attacks conducted in the last decade in North America and Western Europe.ucdavis. Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (Washington. 126. or nearly all.S. Foreign minister Josep Piqué of Spain. with the exception of Oklahoma City. the monitoring of Islamic charities.merip. the screening of potential border crossers. Like other dimensions of globalization. and increased cooperation with other states on such issues as the forgery of passports and other documents have all become tools in the war against terrorism. and facilitating the beneªts of maintaining relatively open borders. “Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Arab and Muslim Communities in the United States.128 The detention of Muslims and non-Muslim Arabs.” background paper for the Social Science Research Council project Reframing the Challenge of Migration and Security. the use of immigration lists for intelligence purposes. pp.html. Striking a balance between border control and intelligence gathering. “Social Capital: Rise or Decline in the Immediate Post–9/11 Environment.S. at Ashcroft’s Discretion. . Even more serious is the negative impact that surveillance activities have had on alienating Muslim and other populations within the United States.org/programs/gsc/ publications/gsc_activities/migration/Heydemannjamal. and the shutting down of money-transfer services that are thought to feed into the hawala system have all caused widespread resentment. Already. is a delicate task. For critical overviews of the impact of internal security measures on Arab and Muslim populations in the United States. on the one hand. Amaney Jamal and Steven Heydemann. One danger in making the link between migration and security with regard to international terrorism is that states may overreact. 129. see Louise Cainkar. http:/ /www. March 14. measures taken since September 11 appear to be deterring foreign students from studying in the United States. immigration policy and border control have become a front line in protecting the United States from further terrorist attacks. such as weakening incipient diasporic civil-society networks that could support bottom-up processes of political liberalization in the Middle East and damaging United States efforts at public diplomacy abroad. on the other. The reorganization and incorporation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into the Department of Homeland Security.ssrc. In addition to raising serious questions with respect to civil liberties and racial proªling. Maze of Fear. “Targeting Muslims. http:/ /www.” in Tirman. such actions contribute to other counterproductive outcomes.” Middle East Report. 2003. 215–239.pdf. and Louise Cainkar.International Security 31:1 196 U.129 Conclusion The management of international migration ºows is a key challenge facing states in a globalized international security environment. which may hurt its ability to lead in science and technology over the long run.org/mero/mero031403. many of the mechanisms by which migration ºows af128. On the one hand. could be the increasing divergence between state capacity and state autonomy as measures of state effectiveness: to manage cross-border challenges. current migration regimes. Yet states with high capacity have generally shown themselves adept at adjusting to the realities of increased human mobility. One impact of globalization on the state. contradictory.Crossing Borders 197 fect national security are not necessarily new. Based on the discussion in this article. Second. To address these more nuanced dimensions of the international security environment. tend to exacerbate already existing inequalities by widening the gap between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization and by contributing to problems such as a brain drain from developing economies to advanced industrial economies. First. the results are mixed. global inequalities are reinforced through the greater barriers and other obstacles placed on the mobility of labor across national boundaries as compared with the mobility of . by increased cooperation with other states in areas such as the formulation and enforcement of migration policy. which favor highly skilled workers. some globalization processes may be bringing about a more profound change in the relationship between state autonomy and state capacity. As two distinct components of state sovereignty. and diffuse ways than do traditional security threats. rather than threatened. and as such have been largely ignored by much of the literature in mainstream security studies. however. In addition. security specialists must move away from grand theories that focus on unitary state actors and begin to employ more conventional forms of policy analysis and evaluation. there are two broad ªndings. such as the threat of one state actor using military force against another. With regard to state capacity and autonomy. however. varies widely across states. the overall impact of international migration and human mobility on core national security concerns can be brieºy summarized as follows. this is because dimensions of globalization such as international migration inºuence state security interests in much more complex. but rather operate cumulatively and in combination with other factors. In part. state capacity is enhanced. migration ºows inºuence both the capacity and the autonomy of state actors: the extent to which they do so. Migration ºows can have serious security impacts on the capacity of states that are already weak or failing. autonomy and capacity are often viewed as going hand-in-hand. A ªrst step in devising migration policies that are appropriate to the contemporary international security environment is to assess the range of effects that cross-border ºows of people can have on the overall security interests of states. With regard to the impacts of migration on the balance of power among states. “do not present iron laws. as well as lead to greater levels of interdependence among states. it is how states respond to global migration ºows through policy formation and implementation that will determine the extent to which national security is enhanced or diminished by international migration. however. Ultimately. however— especially advanced industrial states—would be to overreact to these threats in ways that would unnecessarily curtail the many beneªts of international migration. can also beneªt from the effective mobilization of their overseas populations. Globalization and National Security. . like other globalized dimensions of the international security environment. however.”130 The challenge facing states is to adopt an 130. my analysis supports the general conclusion that international migration ºows do indeed provide opportunities for new forms of transnational action that are utilized by violent nonstate actors perpetrating civil wars in weak states. but rather they change the cost-beneªt calculus of various policy choices. and the nature of violent conºict—migration ºows change the environment in which states formulate policy.International Security 31:1 198 capital. and by international political movements that employ strategies of violence and terror to achieve their goals. the balance of power. Finally. there is also the potential for migration processes to promote development and technology transfer between states. over the medium to long term. migration generally enhances the ability of these populations to project power in a number of areas. International migration ºows provide conduits for the diffusion of network-based forms of political violence and instability. For strong states with the capacity to effectively mobilize the talents of migrant populations. with regard to migration and the nature of violent conºict. which could. by organized criminal networks that beneªt from the disjunction between the low supply of migration opportunities to advanced industrial countries and the high demand for such opportunities. help to temper levels of global inequality. In each of these areas—state capacity and autonomy. International migration ºows. Kirshner. including security policy. A signiªcant danger for states. Although populations in institutionally weak and economically less developed states suffer disproportionately from current migration regimes. including beneªts that enhance overall levels of state security and international stability. a challenge that harms weak states to a greater degree than strong states and that requires increased levels of interstate cooperation to meet. Economically disadvantaged states. taking into account the many beneªts of international migration and devising comprehensive migration policies that enhance overall levels of international security. . States that are best able to “harness the power of migration” through well-designed policies in cooperation with other states will also be the best equipped to face the new global security environment.Crossing Borders 199 expansive. long-term view of migration.