THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS B.Articles 124-133: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State FELICIANO GALVANTE v. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, et al. G.R. No. 162808, 22 April 2008, THRID DIVISION (Ynares-Santiago, J.) The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. FACTS: Private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic withserial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999. Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Pending resolution of Criminal Case, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, and a criminal case, for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas, He immediately went down of the jeep but before he could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked his way. That the four policemen were (private respondents) PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire. He raised his arms and heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing his waistline when he raised his T-shirt. His other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements. While we were raising our arms (private respondent) SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant. That after a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the petitioner’s jeep and asked for the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to them, He searched his wallet and gave the asked document. He further alleged that he was detained by Police Chief Rocacorba for two days having been released only after posing a bail. Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining the private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct even if they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. The RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the other hand, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against private respondents for lack of probable cause. 1|Page THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS B. Articles 124-133: Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State Thus, the petitioner assailed herein Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices which dismissed the criminal complaint for arbitrary detention, illegal search and grave threats for lack of probable cause the and Ombudsman Order which denied his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed against the private respondents. HELD: Yes. Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search, which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance. 2|Page THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order VICENTE P. LADLAD, et al. v. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELACO, et al. G.R. No. 172070-72, 01 June 2007 (Carpio, J.) By its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. Mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. FACTS: Beltran Petition: On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a “State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The corresponding information was files with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors. The inquest was based on two letters from Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a “tactical alliance.” DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause. Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was void. The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati. The Information was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino). Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him. Before the motion could be resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya). Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran. Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltran’s motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re- raffled, issued an Order denying Beltran’s motion. In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony. 3|Page Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion. Consequently. Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? HELD: On the Beltran Petition The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. who was the prosecutor. The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting. Whether or not the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? 2. Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence. To repeat. During the preliminary invesitigation. the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case. Maza. when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion. and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. and not for Rebellion. et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion. who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. they contend that the preliminary investigation was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3. for Inciting to Sedition. Thus. the crime of Rebellion. 4|Page . CIDG presented a masked man. later identified as Jaime Fuentes. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit. the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. maintaining. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. without a warrant. considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated. in their presence. gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings. The basisi of the preliminary investigation was tge results of the CIDG investigation. Velasco. Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? 3. they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. ISSUES: 1. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. or heading a Rebellion. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order Ladlad and Maza petitions: Ladlad. Furthermore. culled from the Beltran inquest. sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. with its attachment. subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed – [B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws. or. in their absence or unavailability. prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments. Thus. after receiving the complaint. and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the 5|Page . Indeed. Further. If there is none. by its nature. PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112. On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted With Irregularities.” Here. or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents attached to the CIDG letters. must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for rebellion. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation. before a notary public.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG. the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof. mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. naval. Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor. must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses.” During the investigation. which Beltran does not acknowledge. of any of their powers or prerogatives. by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners. or any body of land. wholly or partially. otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents. Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP. Here. after receiving the CIDG letters. The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which. he shall dismiss the case. then it’s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x. Respondent Secretary of Justice. the day of the preliminary investigation. that. This clearly shows pre-judgment. Hence.” Petitioners raised this issue in their petition. SC granted the petition and set aside the rulings of RTC Makati branch 146 and branch 150 as well as the Orders of the respondent prosecutors. respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order charges against them. but respondents never disputed the veracity of this statement. 6|Page . who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors. “We [the DOJ] will just declar eprobable cause. stated in an interview on 13 March 2006. the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary investigation. On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality The SC found merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent prosecutors’ impartiality.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause. they filed this petition for prohibition praying that the respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with the said violation. and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military service from the government. Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination that the offense for violation of Article 96 is not service-connected. illegal sale of arms and ammunitions to the enemies of the State. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed by the same. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV. J. Led by Navy Lt. the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction and thus. The 7|Page . They were likewise charged under the Articles of War. FACTS: On July 27.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. as well as her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.A. violation of Art. The President issued Proclamation No. 96 is serviceconnected. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order LT. 2003. The lower court ruled that the cases before the military tribunal were not service-connected but rather absorbed in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat. After investigation. When they were charged under Art. et.) The charge against the petitioners concerns the violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. GEN. They also declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President. more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of Oakwood Apartments in Makati. the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the “Magdalo” faction of the Katipunan. RPC. specifically Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. hence. Petitioners filed a motion with RTC Makati where the coup d’etat case was pending to take over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with the military tribunal following the doctrine of absorption. Such violation caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. corruption in the Military. al. V. 164007 August 10. No. within the jurisdiction of the RTC. dismissal from the service. imposable only by the military court. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. The delineation of jurisdiction by R. No. 96 of the Articles of War. After negotiation.R. 427 declaring a state of rebellion followed by General Order No. that is. The OSG contended that under RA 7055. 2006 (SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES. Petition DISMISSED. within the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. They then announced their grievances against the Arroyo Administration. The charge has a bearing on the professional conduct and behavior as military officers. NARCISO ABAYA G. they were charged with coup d’ etat penalized under Article 134-A. the group finally laid down their arms. HELD: No. it mandates that they be tried by court-martial. It applies also if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. imposable only by the military court. Sec.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C.A. Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed by the same. 1. Section 1(2) of R. that is. and vests upon the military courts jurisdiction. RA 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses. The doctrine only applies to crimes punished by the same statute. Anent the issue of absorption. 1 of RA 7055 specifically specifies what are considered as serviceconnected offenses or crimes. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. not where the crimes are punishable by different statutes. dismissal from the service. 7055 bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order military justice system is disciplinary in nature. In fact. No. including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Sec. The charge has a bearing on the professional conduct and behavior as military officers. 8|Page . Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character. The offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. the examination yielded positive results for the presence of shabu. The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. each containing ‘shabu’. illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constituted such complex crime. as amended by RA 8294. the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. As he noticed their presence. Nos. Appelant’s guilt was established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness . On the ground floor. 1997. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault. two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. in the presence of Punong Barangay. who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase. When the policemen were about 10 meters from the main gate of the house. 136149-51. including the time of the raid.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. He was also convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866. At the second floor. 9|Page . The records show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or been given authority to carry a firearm outside of his residence. WALPAN LADJAALAM G. where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant.” Furthermore. provided that the person arrested committed “no other crime. September 19. an offense for which was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms. one policeman saw 3 M14 rifle magazines and 316 rifle magazines with live ammunition in the magazines. they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. With respect to the crystalline substances. It found that the act of the accused of firing an M14 rifle at the policemen. he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den. more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of appellant Walpan Ladjaalam and his wife to serve the search warrant.) RA No. if the person is held liable for murder or homicide.R. but not a separate offense. FACTS: In the afternoon of September 24. Hence. That appelant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. J. 2000 (PANGANIBAN. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms after using said firearm in the commission of another crime. After gaining entrance. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. the other policemen found on top of a table a pencil case with 50 folded aluminum foils inside. Hence. and (2) maintaining a drug den. Moreover. the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily. there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. 10 | P a g e . Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case. appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. “unless no other crime was committed”. not a separate offense. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order HELD: No. illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder. if the “other crime” is murder or homicide. Accordingly. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime. if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In this case. appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized. The appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon. Furthermore. no other interpretation is justified. illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense. 8294 . 170562 June 29.e. In each one of these cases. ISSUE: Did the court err in denying the Motion to Quash? HELD: No. G. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge whereas he filed a Motion to Quash to the illgegal possession charge contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms (R. the proviso does not yet apply. there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. therefore. . the proviso does not yet apply." in consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez that "all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder.: "In sum. . As accusation is not synonymous with guilt. of some other crime. ." 11 | P a g e . the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their commission. Pangilinan. Almeida.. petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. . violation of gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R. is not one of those enumerated under R. SR. . . this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that "the other offense charged [i.R. it should have expressly said so.” The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that "the other offense charged ." The denial was affirmed on appeal. 8294 x x x. sedition or attempted coup d'etat. 2007 CARPIO MORALES. Hence this petition. vs. 8294) ." FACTS: Two separate informations were filed before the RTC charging petitioner with violation of the gunban and illegal possession of firearms. Ladjaalam. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order ANGEL CELINO. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. Garcia. as stated earlier. ET AL. and Bernal is.A. Petitioner’s reliance on Agote. however. .A.A. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Evangelista. where petitioner contends that the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. COURT OF APPEALS.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts. Consequently. provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested.In the present case.Consequently. 8294 are involved x x x. No. when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R. misplaced. insurrection. 8294.A. J. as shown by their conviction. More applicable is Margarejo where. or absorbed as an element of rebellion. 8294. or absorbed as an element of rebellion. any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense.A. Conversely. when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R. insurrection. 8294. sedition or attempted coup d'etat.A. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order In sum. then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R. 12 | P a g e . either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. kidnap and detain her and forcibly brought her at the Town and Country. Sta." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder. if the "other crime" is murder or homicide. J. Hence. but only rape qualified with the use of a deadly weapon. Mesa.R. not a separate offense. Quezon City. the present petition. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO. rape. Petitioner. Moreover. this City. as it did in the third paragraph. it should have expressly said so. ISSUE: Wether or not the accused maybe prosecuted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms as a separate offense. G." FACTS: Private complainant [AAA] were on her way to her work. driven by the accused who was then plying his route at Bocaue Toll Gate going to Cubao. In People v. for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Manila. Respondent. penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.: "The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. vs. and upon reaching EDSA corner New York Street. two charged were filed against the accused. In this case. such judgment must be set aside.e. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Hence. CSV. appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with 13 | P a g e . illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance. there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. we laid down the correct interpretation of the law and ruled: x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime.606. appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. The petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of firearms. CA affirmed with modification By pointing out that the crime committed was not kidnapping with rape. On appeal. Verily. We find that he can no longer be held liable for such offense since another crime was committed.. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case. Accordingly. 2012 PERALTA. i. HELD: No. where accused had carnal knowledge of her by force and intimidation against her will and without her consent. one for the crime of kidnapping with rape and the other was illegal possession of firearms to which the Trial Court found the accused as guilty to both charged. no other interpretation is justified. 187229 February 22.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Cubao. Moreover. provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested. Ladjaalam. No. boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure with plate no. the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. accused suddenly poked his gun at her. neither should we. we affirm petitioner's conviction for the crime of rape. since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. All told. as it did in the third paragraph. Moreover." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder. where the law does not distinguish. illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested. petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of firearms is set aside. 14 | P a g e . Verily. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order attempted homicide. it should have expressly said so. However. Upon arraignment. the defense’s versions of the facts are as follows: The petitioner denied that he was in possession of a firearm during the April 3. while he was delivering his speech therein. charging him for violation of Section 261 (q) of BP 881 (Election Gun Ban) and Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P." Facts: The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations that were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City. 192727. as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). however. On May 23. with the loaded firearm in hand.) No. Jr. COURT OF APPEALS. 2013. went to the table occupied by his political rivals. Thereupon. a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. Respondents. and may no longer be modified in any respect. a kagawad. 1995 fiesta celebration in Barangay Biasong. ESCALANTE. a group of people were shouting insults at him. in the process. a shot was accidentally fired. Thereafter. the petitioner cut short his speech and. J. the prosecution’s versions of the facts are as follows: The petitioner. In the trial of the case. the RTC rendered a judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. Maglana and thereafter fired a shot upwards. G. and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. went back to his table. Samar. v. Towards the end of the program. causing the crowd to scamper for safety. the emcee called on the petitioner and Ina Rebuya to crown the fiesta queen. Not wanting to aggravate the situation. 2003. After the crowning ceremony. Thereupon. January 9. the petitioner went to fetch Ina Rebuya who was seated together with Atty. However.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. The group. Maglana) and the other members of the rival political party. CEBU CITY. (Atty.D. The petitioner’s bodyguards immediately took hold of his hand to prevent him from firing another shot. On the other hand. It was then that Atty. The following morning. he tried to take the firearm away from PO3 Unajan and. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THEHONORABLECOURTOF APPEALS. FORMER SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION and EIGHTEENTH DIVISION. Petitioner. the mocking continued.1866. Samar entered the incident into the police blotter as an "accidental firing". Samar against the petitioner. When the petitioner saw this. the petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges. 1995. No. went back to his table.) "Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment. even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. Consequently. thereafter. He then returned the firearm to PO3 Unajan. together with PO3 Unajan. the petitioner delivered a speech. Felipe Maglana. the Chief of Police of Almagro. then the Municipal Mayor of Almagro. The 15 | P a g e . Maglana noticed that the petitioner had a firearm tucked on his waist. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order RAUL B. disarmed the petitioner. Ali Prudenciado. the petitioner abruptly ended his speech and went to the group to ask them not to disturb the festivities. Shamed by the insults hurled at him. He then stared at Atty. This caught the ire of a group of supporters of the rival political party who then shouted invectives at the petitioner. continued to mock the petitioner. was the guest of honor during the fiesta celebration in Barangay Biasong that was held on April 3.R. a former policeman and then. the petitioner was able to take hold of the firearm and. He claimed that. prompting PO3 Conrado Unajan (PO3 Unajan) to draw his firearm from his holster to pacify the unruly crowd. FIRST DIVISION (REYES. stating that he had never won at Barangay Biasong in any election. the petitioner. The two cases were consolidated and jointly tried by the RTC as the crimes charged against the petitioner arose from the same incident. 2010 to file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. the petitioner received a copy of the CAs May 5. The petitioner committed a serious procedural faux pas by filing before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Decisions. i. thus. the petitioner averred that the case for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions should be dismissed pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Agote v. Judge Lorenzo which declared that an accused is not liable for illegal possession of firearm if the firearm was used in the commission of an offense such as a violation of the election gun ban. regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved. the CA found no reason to reverse the conviction of the petitioner for violation of election gun ban. Additionally. 2009. Here.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order petitioner appealed to the CA. the petitioners failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within the reglementary 16 | P a g e . may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review under Rule 45. he only had until June 4. maintaining that the prosecution failed to substantiate the elements of the crimes charged against him. The period to file a petition for review on certiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 2010 Resolution. 2010. This he failed to do. The CA ruled that under prevailing jurisprudence there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearm if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime. 2008 Decision of the CA. which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and. the CA issued a resolution which partly granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration. "The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Considering that the petitioner was convicted of violation of election gun ban. asserting that the RTC erred in convicting him for the crimes charged since the prosecution failed to establish the following: (1) the existence of the firearm which is the corpus delicti.e. on May 20. hence. final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case."Thus. On March 4. when the proper remedy should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Despite the fact that one of the essential elements of the offense of violation of COMELEC gun ban is absent. Issue: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF COMELEC GUN BAN IS ABSENT. unappealable. Nevertheless.. which denied his second motion for reconsideration. and (2) the absence of a license or permit for the firearm. the CA held that he can no longer be convicted for illegal possession of firearm. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the June 24. Held: Petition is DENIED. 2009 Resolution. that the lower courts erred in imposing the applicable penalty against the petitioner. In any case. However. the petitioner asks this Court to overturn the factual findings of the RTC and the CA for alleged misapprehension of evidence. the Court may no longer modify the penalty imposed by the lower courts no matter how obvious the error may be. and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. 2008 Decision. considering that the CAs June 24."Only established or admitted facts can be considered. the RTC and the CA erred in imposing a straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment against the petitioner. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 2009 Resolution had already attained finality on account of the petitioners failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45. the imposable penalty for violation of the election gun ban should have a maximum period. Basically. "Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment. the petition would still be dismissed. even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. which shall not exceed six (6) years. Nevertheless." 17 | P a g e . 2008 Decision and March 4. the RTC imposed upon him the straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment. "it is settled that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. The Court notes. as modified by its March 4. however. a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. final and executory.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS C. Articles 134-159: Crimes Against Public Order period rendered the CAs June 24. and may no longer be modified in any respect. Accordingly. assuming arguendo that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. Finding the petitioner guilty of the offense of violation of election gun ban. and a minimum period which shall not be less than one (1) year. 1969. Q-9783. Held: Petition is DENIED. However. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.) Hence. OF FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT. all of them except petitioner died during the pendency of the appeal. Petitioner finds it incredulous that the CA believed the testimony of Cruz with respect to “Exhibit AA-1” but not Cruz’s testimony with respect to “Exhibits G. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY. All of the accused who were convicted appealed the consolidated decision of the CFI to the CA. the CA merely applied a well-settled rule. AS A PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT. Branch V. the CFI found petitioner and his co-accused Pedro Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public documents under Articles 217 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In holding that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses must be left to the trial court as the agency in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor on the witness stand. After trial. Mendoza [did] not establish with moral certainty the culpability of the accused-appellant for the falsification of the subject travel expense vouchers” 18 | P a g e .”(Treasury warrants which were issued pursuant to travel expense vouchers subjects of Criminal Case Nos. of falsification of a public document. The CA acquitted petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9784 and Q-9788. 2008. No. Q-9784 and Q-9788 after it found “That the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses. A person may be induced to commit a crime in two ways: (1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise and (2) by using words of command. Q-9783. I. W.) The power of supervision or control over another does not preclude inducement. petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding him guilty. FIRST DIVISION (CORONA. Quezon City against petitioner and nine others. subject of Criminal Case No. four separate informations for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents were filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI). H. Q-9787 in exchange for receiving a share of the proceeds of the claim even if he was not entitled thereto. conduct and attitude under grueling examination because he has the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand. Q-9784. J. JR. as a principal by inducement. X.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D.. based on the testimony of state witness Henry Cruz that petitioner induced him to sign the travel expense voucher (Exhibit AA-1). September 3.R. We find no reason to rule otherwise. Facts: On October 8. The factual findings of the appellate court are also given great weight especially if in complete accord with the findings of the lower court. CA held that petitioner was a principal by inducement. Q-9787 and Q-9788. Henry Cruz and Tolentino C. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. The credibility of a witness is left primarily to the judgment of the trial judge. Q-9783. 167671. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest RICARDO S. X1 and X2. SANTOS. He is in a vantage position to assess the witness’ demeanor. v. and (2) that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. In this case. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest This pronouncement did not state that Cruz lied. Petitioner was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Lands. Both the CFI and the CA found that petitioner asked Cruz to sign the falsified voucher on the promise of a share of the proceeds. he took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the travel expense voucher in question. Petitioner claims that he could not have induced Cruz to falsify the travel expense voucher because he did not have the power of supervision or control over Cruz. That promise was the inducement for the falsification. Q9784 and Q-9788. The second element was likewise there. While the CFI did not state in its decision that petitioner took advantage of his position in the government in committing the crime. The Court disagreed. Article 172 in relation to paragraph 2. Finally. petitioner was found by both the CFI and the CA to have offered Cruz a share of the proceeds in exchange for his act of falsification.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. The CA merely stated that Cruz’s testimony was insufficient or inadequate to sustain petitioner’s conviction for falsification in Criminal Case Nos. The power of supervision or control over another does not preclude inducement. Petitioner’s functions as disbursing officer did not include the duty to make. The first element for the crime under paragraph 1 of Article 172 of the RPC was present. A person may be induced to commit a crime in two ways: (1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise and (2) by using words of command. prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the falsified travel expense voucher. 19 | P a g e . of public. the CA found Cruz’s testimony in relation to “Exhibit AA-1” sufficient to prove that petitioner committed the crime of falsification of public documents under paragraph 1. Q-9787 however. His function was only to pay payees of treasury warrants and other cash vouchers or payrolls. We see no reason to depart from the findings of the CFI and CA. private or commercial documents. Nonetheless. He was a public official. the CA made a more definite pronouncement to this effect. official or commercial document. Article 171 of the RPC. In Criminal Case No. even if Cruz was not entitled it. (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171. Falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172 refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position. and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public. Q -9783.” Its requisites are: (1) that the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or proceedings. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position. Petitioner allegedly committed the crime by “causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. the parties never disputed the finding that the travel voucher was a public document. 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel. However. According to the complainant. during his JBC interviews. Regional Trial Court (RTC). no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses. No. RTJ-08-2138 August 5. respondent. SAMSON vs. integrity. on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija). Caballero. respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Cabanatuan City.. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Caballero is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of official document. deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. The Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his Personal Data Sheet. carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest OLGA M. Thus. 20 | P a g e . Dishonesty. the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating “No” to the question “Have you ever been formally charged?” in his March 21. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23. JUDGE VIRGILIO CABALLERO A. being in the nature of a grave offense. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence.M. She disclosed that. respondent insisted that those cases were already dismissed before the interview. Branch 30. complainant Olga M. as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence. FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Nueva Ecija. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. However. she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority. Inc. probity and independence and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case. In her complaint. 2009 The making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. 2003. HELD: YES We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. According to her. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest Respondent’s act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered “No” to that very simple question posed in the PDS. and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. However. carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits. given the phraseology of the question “Have you ever been formally charged?. complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent on March 21. and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. Dishonesty. Mendoza-De Castro. charged at anytime in the past or present. To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent. respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction. the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS.[15] we held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant. It recommended respondent’s dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits.” meaning. 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division. On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties. To make matters worse. his negative answer in the PDS. and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service. to say the least. 21 | P a g e . he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed. In Ratti v. thus. except accrued leave credits. being in the nature of a grave offense. Atty.A. No. CA affirmed the conviction. The trial court convicted Ursua for violation of Sec.” HELD: NO An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority.” On appeal. FIRST DIVISION (BELLOSILLO. J. dishonesty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger. counsel for petitioner. 142.R. No.) The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C. COURT OF APPEALS G. as amended by R. 1 of C. 142.A. No. No. Cotabato. April 10. had to attend to some personal matters. 1996. 112170. ISSUE: Whether or not Ursua should be held liable violation of C. The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C. Atty. Francis Palmones.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. as amended by R. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases.” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought 22 | P a g e . 142 as amended. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest CESARIO URSUA. No.A. wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner.A. No. Upon learning that the person who introduced himself as “Oscar Perez” was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua.A. abuse of authority by the petitioner. An investigation was conducted on a complaint for bribert. vs. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez.A. 6085. otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors’ logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. This is so in the case at bench. FACTS: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan. 142 as amended. otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases. No. Oscar Perez. 6085. such matter was reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. mischievous. and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right. For.A. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.A. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C. even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman. indefensible. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Indeed. 142 as amended. which will avoid all objectionable. such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him 23 | P a g e . While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law. wrongful. evil and injurious consequences. No. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. . Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was then created to try. an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. B. that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB under the account name "Jose Velarde" 24 | P a g e . the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder. and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada. was likewise filed against Estrada. Nos. J) On April 4. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada. or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The Amended Information in Crim. as summarized by the Sandiganbayan. Crim. judicially or administratively. illegal use of alias. who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her. Case No. 2000. Case No. hear. 164368-69. the above-named accused. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias charge. this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. too. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN G. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. 26558 and 26565. taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office. in the City of Manila.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Estrada opened a numbered trust account with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents. CONTRARY TO LAW. 2 April 2009. This was later consolidated. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4. Case No. willfully. with Crim. did then and there. in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. At the trial. consisted of: A. Still another Information. and perjury. being then President of the Republic of the Philippines. without having been duly authorized. Cases No.e. i. Case Nos. unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name. 2001. in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines. 26565. A separate Information for illegal use of alias. Case No. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 26905. EN BANC (Brion. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan. Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.R. docketed as Crim. among other accused. 26565 reads: That on or about 04 February 2000. was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time. His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Manuel Curato. 1405.A. 6085 (CA 142).A. 9160.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. No. Section 2. The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. the application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved – the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R. read: Section 1. Ms. television. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the ground that the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. the Sandiganbayan noted.14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R. or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided. as amended. and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. only two (2) witnesses. ISSUE: Whether Estrada may be made liable for illegal use of alias based on the evidence the People presented HELD: The petition has no merit. No. 25 | P a g e . as amended by Republic Act (R. and his pseudonym.) No. they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde".A. with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry. later on. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. or in case of an alien. In Estrada’s case. as amended. The judicial authority for the use of alias. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary. his immigrant's name. 142. the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry. if an alien.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry. as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized. cinema. Case No. in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were made to the savings account of Jose Velarde Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence. testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000). if he has such names other than his original or real name. 142. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest (2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and. Court of Appeals. if different. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice. No. he was the President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name. for purposes of applying CA No. Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estrada’s position in the government. should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. on one hand. rightly or wrongly. any distinction we make based on the People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada. as shown by the title of the present petition. claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. 142. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be. 142. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary. as follows: The enactment of C. In any case. and the President of the Republic. at the time of the commission of the offense.A. this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. No. 53). 142 as applied to Estrada. in other words. he will not be known by such name. In the first place. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name. 142. C.A.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. Close adherence to this ruling.A. 2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the Information. that would justify a differential treatment. 142 as amended. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias – "a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. which name he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. CA No. unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. Otherwise.20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No.. on the other. as a penal statute. in the words of Ursua. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street." There must be. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following tenor: The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. 1993 ed.19 Following the doctrine of stare decisis. The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused. on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada. Additionally. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who. a "sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth … [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C. 142. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]). expressly or impliedly. is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. the law does not make any distinction. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. the amended information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI 26 | P a g e . The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. 142 may be committed. p.21 The mode of violating CA No."18 Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in character. First. resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecution’s case.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" 27 | P a g e .26 Perez v.R. No. the leading case in the application of CA 142. In this case. Says Perez: The Decision in CA-G.22 The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability – a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter. and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest. The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his real name. and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. We find no merit in this argument for two reasons.27 albeit a civil case. the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. Under these differing views. the People also argues in its petition that Estrada’s case is different from Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada". a case. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused. In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect. the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. the principle of res judicatacannot be applied in this case. of or particular matters in. and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted. In other words. the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order – a ruling denying a motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole. in the earlier motion to quash. (2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua. instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Court of Appeals.28 Second. the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua – when Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates CA No. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements. Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence. as it deals a fatal blow on the People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. To our mind. For. 142. Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. as amended. In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed positions. The issues of publicity. prepared his defense. 2000. and Ursua. 1405. R. with no iota of intention of publicity.A. 142 and the terms of Ursua. Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. No. and the application of CA No. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. (2) OR before February 4. as this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and. particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias. to our mind. 142. we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual. In relation to Estrada. What is the coverage of the indictment? We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information. the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. 2000. in the City of Manila. Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. on this basis. The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law. 2000.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. 9160. 142.A. as it was also shown or established that Estrada’s use of the alias was public." as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. Thus. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy. No. (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez. Broken down into its component parts. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. the allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4. 28 | P a g e . and R. assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President. numbered accounts. If the People fails to discharge this burden. We do not decide here whether Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal. the rule of law requires that we so declare. 29 | P a g e . Articles 161-187: Crimes Against Public Interest In finding the absence of the requisite publicity.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS D. his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. We do so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling. As with any other accused. as they did fail in this case. we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. we simply determined. as the Sandiganbayan did. whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. by pretending that he was in need of shabu. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. preceded his arrest. Philippines. 171019.041 gram.R. instigated or induced him to violate the anti-dangerous drugs law. ISSUE: Whether Sta. He would make much of the fact that the transaction between him and the police informant occurred on November 27. Branch 20. appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged.C. Maria y Indon from the Decision1 dated November 22. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. To appellant. In his Brief. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 HELD: Petition is without merit. which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5. province of Bulacan. The indicting Information. trade. without authority of law and legal justification. FIRST DIVISION (Garcia. 00802. unlawfully and feloniously sell. 2002. Duly arraigned on January 23. CR-H. He maintains that instigation. the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. 2005. give away. while the buy-bust operation took place on November 29. J) Under consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Contrary to law. In a decision dated May 5. During trial. Maria is liable under Republic Act No.R. 2002. and accordingly sentenced him. 2007.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. Instigation It is appellant’s submission that what transpired on that fateful evening of November 29. 2004 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. RAFAEL STA. the CA promulgated the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal and affirming that of the trial court. 2002. did then and there willfully. 9165. deliver. 3364-M-2002. 2004. 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. denying his earlier appeal from and affirming the May 5. in the municipality of San Rafael. not entrapment. MARIA y INDON G. No. He also faults the appellate court in not finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. the informant. the prosecution and the defense gave different versions of what transpired. 9165. February 23. appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. No. On November 22. docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. alleges: That on or about the 29th day of November. dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine hydrochloride weighing 0. 2002 was instigation and not a valid buy-bust operation. the above-named accused. 2003. Entrapment vs.3 Article II of Republic Act No. He adds that the prosecution was not able to prove that at the time of 30 | P a g e . Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. or his/her representative or counsel. Without more. states: 31 | P a g e . and that were it not for the inducement of the informant that the latter would buy shabu. the earlier agreement and the subsequent actual sale suggest that appellant was habitually dealing in illegal drugs. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal. Instigation does. Section 21 of the IRR. the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan.Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. If at all.8 Here. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. 2002. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. and himself becomes a co-principal. is of no moment. Pertinently. Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. controlled precursors and essential chemicals. the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense. As here. Section 21 of the law provides: SEC. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed. the means originates from the mind of the criminal. as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated. 2002. plant sources of dangerous drugs.A. for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall. physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized. renders the evidence against him inadmissible. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. In entrapment. 2002. In entrapment. immediately after seizure and confiscation. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated. Regrettably. and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. 9165 Were Complied With Appellant demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and insists that anything short of the adherence to its letter. he would not have produced the same on November 29. while the buy-bust operation was conducted on November 29. seized and/or surrendered. On Whether Sections 21 and 86 of R. and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs the police surveillance. It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way. it does not prove that said informant instigated appellant into committing the offense. 21. In instigation. he was indeed looking for buyers of shabu. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs. the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant for the purchase and sale of illegal drugs was made on November 27.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. the pertinent implementing rules. In instigation. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. Seized. because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. To recapitulate. Indeed. 32 | P a g e . that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs Section 21. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. albeit made without the participation of PDEA. However. the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. he must so state in the form of objection. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown. did not violate appellant’s constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. the challenged buy-bust operation. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. It is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 was not fatal. xxx Provided further. when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered. Moreover. a. as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. It did not render appellant’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 4. PRINGAS DOLERA v. SEPT. 2007 GR 180693. PEOPLE GR 175928.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. 31. 2009 33 | P a g e . Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs PEOPLE v. AUG. PO1 Espares then marked all the seized items including the plastic sachet containing the substance subject of the sale. G. ISSUE: Whether or not the corpus delicti was duly established under the chain of custody rule. however.9165 Appellant. with PO1 Espares as poseur-buyer. advanced the defense of frame-up. On the instructions of SPO3 Matias. he was detained and subsequently charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plants source of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each stage.J) . for his part. Appellant was brought to the police station wherein the confiscated items were surrendered to an investigator Appellant was then charged with illegal sale of 0.A. SPO3 Matias received information from a concerned citizen that a certain alias "Nick. Pasig City. He failed to pay. which he headed. PO1 Espares and PO1 Mapula proceeded to. 179213 September 3. and PO1 Mapula and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara) as members. he was exonerated of the charge of illegal possession of paraphernalia. FACTS: While on duty at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Force. hence. 34 | P a g e ." later identified to be appellant. However. and surveilled. The team thereafter went to the target area and met with a confidential asset who was to assist them in the operation. Appellee. vs. The trial court convicted appellant of illegal sale of shabu. SPO3 Matias thus formed a buy-bust team. During the operation. he was simply told to explain at the police station. Four armed men in civilian clothes immediately entered. No. On asking them what his offense was. the buy-bust team yielded a pair of scissors. was peddling shabu in Barangay Palatiw. the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence.He was thereafter brought to the Pariancillo police precinct where a police officer showed him a plastic sachet and threatened that a case would be filed against him unless he paid P20.R. an unsealed plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance. NICOLAS GUTIERREZ y LICUANAN Appellant. respectively of R.000. handcuffed and frisked him. He asserted that he was at home having dinner with his wife Josephine. and the final disposition. 2009 SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. the area and confirmed the information. and confiscated his wallet. daughter Jennifer and her husband when someone kicked open the door of their house. and five empty plastic sachets from appellant.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and destruction.05 gram of shabu and illegal possession of paraphernalia "fit or intended for smoking or introducing any dangerous drug into the body" under Sec(s) 5 and 12. Such record of movements and custody of the seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item. The totality of the prosecution evidence does not meet this standard. Such want of explanation bares a significant gap in the chain of custody of the allegedly seized item. were entered into during pre-trial only in order to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist and abbreviate the proceedings. The nagging question. 35 | P a g e . and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof. in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received. remains whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court is the same object allegedly seized from appellant. and that it tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride has no bearing on the question of chain of custody. That the defense stipulated on these matters. therefore. no explanation was given regarding its custody in the interim – from the time it was turned over to the investigator to its turnover for laboratory examination. No. These stipulations. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs HELD: Petition GRANTED. That such is the intention of the parties is clear from the additional stipulations that the forensic chemist had no personal knowledge as to the source of the alleged specimen. The Court also notes another lapse of the members of the buy-bust team – their failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21. Paragraph 1 of Article II of R. the records do not show. that a forensic chemist examined it. Coupled with the failure to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted. and that the defense was reserving its right to object to the pieces of evidence marked by the prosecution. The Court made it clear in Malillin that the chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain. While alleged poseur-buyer PO1 Espares testified on the marking and eventual turnover of the allegedly seized sachet of substance to the investigator. the stipulations do not cover the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left her possession. that a request has been made by the arresting officers for examination thereof. the buy bust team’s disregard of the requirements of Section 21 is fatal. from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence. the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. which merely affirm the existence of the specimen. There was likewise no explanation offered for the non-observance of the rule. viz: that the specimen exists.21 Clearly. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the shabu allegedly confiscated from appellant. where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession.A. 9165 with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. And what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the chemist to the investigator and its presentation in court.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. The Court finds that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the allegedly seized shabu. 9 From the testimonies given. The two men. appellant Laylo and his live-in partner. Ritwal. PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. This was further corroborated by his three neighbors. “Dos (P200. July 6. appellant G. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying. dragged them to their house. despite protests and claims that the drugs were planted on them. ROLANDO LAYLO Y CEPRES. two men grabbed them. Ritwal. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. While the police officers were in front of a sari-sari store .) The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller. the police officers placed two plastic sachets in each of their pockets. respectively. “Bakit mayroon ka ba?” Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers. both wearing civilian clothes. approached them and asked. were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations in Binangonan. Once inside.” Upon hearing this.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E. who they later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor. on his part denied the allegations against him and testified that while he and his common-law wife.192235. The RTC found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165. ISSUE: Whether or not Rolando Laylo and Melitona Ritwal guilty of violating Sec 26(b) and Sec 11 of R.No. HELD: Petition DENIED The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller. they were arrested and charged.02 grams of shabu. tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her. they were brought to the police station where. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were 36 | P a g e . “Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?” PO1 Reyes replied. hence this appeal. on the other. were walking on the street. J. Afterwards. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 9165. The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet containing 0.9 FACTS: PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.A. appellee vs. Laylo. 2011 Second Division ( Carpio.00) ang isa. and the consideration. Ritwal. and the consideration. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. the police officers introduced themselves as cops.R. Rizal. the object. the object. for such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated. However. Thus. the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus. the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs In addition. it was held that allegations of frame-up and extortion by police officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous drugs cases. Even the consideration of P200. 37 | P a g e . The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti. They are viewed by the Court with disfavor. Crimes Relative to Opium & Other Prohibited Drugs found to be positive for shabu. Further.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS E.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police officers. the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established by evidence. Thus. AUG. 2011 38 | P a g e . Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers ACEJAS III v. PEOPLE TORRES v. JUNE 27. PEOPLE GR 156643. 31. 2006 GR 175074.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. R. Haron (Disbursing Officer II) without the required disbursement vouchers. Purchase Request and Inspection Report of the items supposedly purchased. Candao and Abas A. all saying that it was SOP to issue checks for the purpose of "peace and order campaign. number and amount of the check involved in each case. committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria A.. 1993. Villarama.045. etc. as in fact the alleged disbursement vouchers did not indicate any detail as to the nature of the expense/s such as purchase of equipment. October 19. It is worthy to note that the disbursement vouchers for the amount in question surfaced. it was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel B.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G.64 and submit his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours together with the official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in acknowledgment of such restitution. 1998. They were charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. On April 17. In the Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 2011 The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable." However. Banaria of the Commission on Audit (COA) constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor. travel. 1993. The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners’ claim that the subject checks were covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted and received by the COA Central Office on October 29. shall beprima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. It said that had those vouchers really existed at the time of the 52 withdrawals petitioners made from December 29. 186659-710.: Chairman Pascasio S. meals. 93-25 as submitted by the audit team. Nos. petitioner Haron could have readily produced them when required to do so by the special audit team on August 24. and there were no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of Voucher. but only during the proceedings at the Sandiganbayan. Abas A. J. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Several witnesses were presented by the defense. Haron (Disbursing Officer II). it was clear that the way that the funds totalling over 21 million pesos were disbursed was highly irregular. People of the Philippines G. Santiago (Cashier). 39 | P a g e . Subsequently. upon demand by any duly authorized officer. Candao (Regional Governor). The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances intended for “peace and order campaign” were spent for public purposes. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Candao v. Candao (Executive Secretary) and Pandical M. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. as amended. filed in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds against the following ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao who were likewise sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the check in each case. 1993. under several informations with identical allegations except for the varying date. Chairman Banaria demanded from petitioner Haron to produce and restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full amount of P21. the Office of the Special Prosecutor. as amended. 1992 to March 30. Jr.570. services. Israel B. Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORG-ARMM). 2. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers On whether the petitioners are liable under Article 217 of the RPC THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. Malversation of public funds or property –Presumption of malversation. . by reason of the duties of his office.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G.Any public officer who. The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases: 1. is accountable for public funds or property. if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. 4. In all cases. If the amount exceeds the latter. That he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. shall suffer: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. 40 | P a g e . 217. if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. shall beprima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. 3. That the offender is a public officer. or through abandonment or negligence. shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property. 2. or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable. wholly or partially. as amended. if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. provides: Art. the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. shall appropriate the same. upon demand by any duly authorized officer. they misappropriated and used the said funds for their personal benefit.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. through abandonment or negligence. 41 | P a g e . All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this case. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable. permitted another person to take them. took. That he appropriated. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers 3. misappropriated or consented or. and 4. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that with the Disbursing Officer’s (Haron) failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when demanded by the COA. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry.00 as her travelling expenses. or in this case from the date of cancellation of the trip.) No.349. petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair. Peralta. Nellie R. Apolonio. 1998. Petitioner. so that the purpose of the government is achieved. 6713 for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities. to ensure an adequate supply of affordable. she was paidP139. for being a member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board equated to Board Member II with a salary grade 28 and as such. was enacted into law. no action was forthcoming from the petitioner. 8047. No. in accordance with government accounting and auditing rules and regulations. quality-produced books for the domestic and export market.R. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act (R. Sandiganbayan G. she was again appointed to the same position and for the same period of one (1) year. then the Executive Director of the NBDB. filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and properties. September 11.: Republic Act (R.) No. 25867. On September 29. Dr. and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. During that time. the charge for violation of R. 1997. Nos. On September 14. Dr. is accountable for not liquidating the cash advance granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to 42 | P a g e . 3019 before the Sandiganbayan which was docketed as Criminal Case No. through the active participation of the private sector. dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Javier v. the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds. Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.A. she was also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). failed to do so. Based on her itinerary of travel. She averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip. It. or "Book Publishing Industry Development Act". Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. 1997. J.A. Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector representative for a term of one (1) year. She was issued a Summary of Disallowances from which the balance for settlement amounted to P220. No.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. She was on a hold-over capacity in the following year. however. No. however. Resident Auditor Rosario T. the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government. as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.A. as amended. petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival. 6713. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R. 2009 Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB. 147026-27.A. she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12.00. Unfortunately.A. 3019.199. Despite said notice. Meanwhile. As such. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. to wit: first. the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. from the government. the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. THE COURT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICER. The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law. is to obtain priority status for the book publishing industry. the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government. either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power. even nominal. petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative. she was being charged under two (2) informations. Hence. she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the crime charged and recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her. she was the President of the BSAP. whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation. she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. for a given period. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. She advanced the following arguments in support of her petition. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Spain. Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB. authority and duty. R. by which. permanent or temporary. which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees. Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. A public office is the right. No. To substantiate her claim. In this case. 8047. a book publishers association. stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4. one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board. During the conduct of the preliminary investigation. and second. and in turn. pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law.A. which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy. The individual so invested is a public officer. she is not a public officer.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. 43 | P a g e . The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry. created and conferred by law. an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government. petitioner was required to submit her counteraffidavit but she failed to do so. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. so that the purpose of the government is achieved. Thus. PETITION DISMISSED. On whether the petitioner is a public officer. agent. verily. shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands. 44 | P a g e . of any rank or classes. during her tenure. subordinate official. by direct provision of the law. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain. No. 8047. she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee. agent. of any rank or classes. popular election. Where. popular election or appointment by competent authority.A. shall be deemed to be a public officer. or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who. petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R. or subordinate official.A. petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R. as in this case. No.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. In fact. 8047. Reyes made a re-computation of the judgment award in favor of Abraham Mose in accordance with the Supreme Court ruling covering a period of only three (3) years from the date of dismissal. Plaza Hotel/Apartments filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking the reconsideration of the above Order of the Petitioner.462. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Ariel Santos vs. vs. Flores issued a Report of Examiner rendering the computation of Abraham Mose’s backwages and benefits for a period of three (3) years from July 1979 for a total amount of P16. Mose vs.360.908. Encarnacion. Pursuant to the above Labor Decision. Supreme Court denied the appeal filed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments and with finality. J.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Plaza Hotel/Apartments filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the MOLE Region 3. owned by Conrado L. This recomputed award amounted to P19. without however indicating any particular amount. where the monetary awards for illegally dismissed employees should only cover a three (3) year-period from the time of dismissal. While the appeal was still pending before the Court. Tiu to pay his former employee.537. Plaza Hotel/Apartments. however. Abraham Mose through counsel filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of the Order.56.) The Petitioner’s act of issuing the two writs of execution without first resolving the pending motion for reconsideration and despite the existence of a TRO was clearly tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private complainant. ordering Conrado L. SECOND DIVISION (Garcia.R. Thereafter. Manansala increasing the award from P16.50.56.462. The Petitioner however ignored all the abovesaid Motions and pleadings filed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments.50 to P63. backwages and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of his reinstatement. Without however acting on the Plaza Hotel/Apartments’ Motion for Reconsideration and the Opposition to Motion for Execution.46 to a skyrocketing P178. During the pendency of the Plaza Hotel’s Motion for Reconsideration. This sudden increase of judgment award prompted Plaza Hotel/Apartments to file an objection to the Report of Examiner Philip Manansala. FACTS: Labor Arbiter Andres Palumbarit of the Ministry of Labor and Employment of Region 3 rendered a decision in the case entitled Abraham M. This computation was contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. After the above incidents. Abraham Mose.360. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan G. He issued an Order which increased the judgment award from P19.908. the Petitioner took over the above Labor Case. NLRC Region 3 through Norma G. 161877.76 which now covered backwages and benefits from July 1979 to May 1987. This appeal was. NLRC Corporate Auditing Examiner Maria Lourdes L. The Order of the petitioner included the order for the issuance of Writ of Execution. the Petitioner issued a Writ of Execution to implement his Order to collect the amount of P178. seeking for the reversal/reconsideration of the above stated Labor Decision. Plaza Hotel/Apartments filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration. No. 45 | P a g e . Plaza Hotel/Apartments raised their appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court. Tiu. This was opposed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments. another Report of Examiner was rendered by Examiner Philip A. 23 March 2006. dismissed.46. citing among others: a) Supreme Court rulings that the maximum backwages to be paid should only cover three (3) years from dismissal. The Sandiganbayan adjudged petitioner guilty as charged. to wit: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative. However. GUILTY OF MANIFEST PARTIALITY The Court agrees with the findings and disquisitions of the Sandiganbayan that petitioner exhibited manifest partiality towards Abraham Mose in issuing the two Writs of Execution. under which petitioner was indicted and convicted. ISSUES: 1. hence. Despite the TRO. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Conrado L. or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits. this petition. 3019.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. judicial or official functions. Tiu of a cash or surety bond equivalent to the judgment award. the NLRC imposed as a condition the posting by Conrado L. In Jacinto vs. The Petitioner contended that he deemed not to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Plaza Hotel/Apartments because he felt there is no necessity to resolve it. or giving any private party unwarranted benefits. including the Government. including the government.) No. . Sandiganbayan.A. as amended. the Petitioner issued an "Alias Writ of Execution" reiterating the enforcement of his previous Writ of Execution. 2. Tiu to the NLRC Sheriffs. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality. That his action caused any undue injury to any party. In order to implement the TRO.11 the Court en banc enumerated the essential elements of the crime punishable under the aforequoted statutory provision. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.A. Hence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the Petitioner with the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R. No. and 3. reads: SEC. The NLRC issued the TRO enjoining the Petitioner from enforcing his Writ of Execution. advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Did the Private Complainant suffered undue injury? (since judgment for which he was held liable to pay backwages whether for that limited period of 3 year or continuing backwages until actual reinstatement has never been satisfied) HELD: Petition DENIED. He must have acted with manifest partiality. this was not enforced due to the TRO presented by Conrado L. ministerial for his part to implement and enforce the same. as amended. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Section 3(e) of R. Tiu was then compelled to file a Petition for Injunction before the Department of Labor and Employment with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order [TRO]. Was the Petitioner guilty of manifest partiality in issuing the writs of execution subject of the Information? 2. Corrupt practices of public officers. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party. 3019. evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. 46 | P a g e . 3.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. since the decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit has become final and executory. THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. in haste. His reason that there is no longer a necessity to resolve the motion for reconsideration because the Decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit has become final and executory is untenable and a very negligible statement. 47 | P a g e . Furthermore. to apply for injunctive relief and then pay for the supersedeas bond to stay the implementation of the writ of execution in question. incumbent upon him to resolve first the pending motion for reconsideration before pursuing with the implementation of the said Order and instead of issuing the writ of execution. it is clearly evident that he had exercised manifest partiality or bias on Abraham Mose in impetuously issuing the two writs of execution.462. causing damage and injury. PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SUFFERED INJURY Petitioner also maintains that Plaza Hotel did not suffer damage or injury consequent to his having issued the two writs of execution. he issued the corresponding writ of execution. Pressing the point.46 to P178. The issue raised in the motion for reconsideration is not the Decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit. the issuance of the writ of execution and regarding the hulking increase of the amount of backwages to be paid to Abraham Mose from P19. and despite the pendency of the said Motion. The contention is untenable. 3019. Plaza Hotel incurred damages rendered necessary by the illegal or improper acts of petitioner. All told. it is incumbent upon him to exercise prudence and probity in the exercise of his functions. Due to the issuance of the Petitioner of the two writs of execution despite the issuance by the NLRC Proper of a TRO. he also states that what Plaza Hotel paid by way of attorney's fees and premium for the supersedeas bond it posted to enjoin the enforcement of the alias writ of execution is not the damage or injury contemplated under Section 3(e) of R.908. and despite the existence of a TRO was clearly tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private complainant Conrado L. No. that the elements of the offense charged had been duly established beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner. Tiu. which are not merely negligible to Plaza Hotel/Apartments. Plaza Hotel was within its right to secure the services of counsel and. discharges quasi-judicial functions. His act of issuing the two writs of execution without first resolving the pending motion for reconsideration of his Order. as did the Sandiganbayan. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers As a Labor Arbiter. Petitioner again issued an alias writ of execution. arguing that neither was ever enforced.56. the Court rules and so holds.A. In net effect. He knew that there was a pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by Plaza Hotel/Apartments contesting his order ordering. thus. but Petitioner's Order and thus. despite issuance of a temporary restraining order by the DOLE-NLRC. By these acts of Ariel Santos. and a lawyer at that. being a labor arbiter of the NLRC. this time. 111. Bernaldo. 888. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan G.R. Navotas. Abella.00 as publication fee. in addition to the award price. No. vice-chairperson.917. Gonzales issued an Invitation to Bid which also contained the conditions of the sale of the vessel. 3019 must likewise be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. including the charges of the sale. Amiana M. These were transmitted to Bureau Director Gonzales. BFAR created a Disposal Committee in order to facilitate the disposal of M/V Malasugui. Caugma asked the committee members if the lone bid of the Corporation could already be opened and they all agreed. Villa J. FACTS: Way back. and Meynardo Geralde. Rosauro M. the vessel has to be repaired more frequently. premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) had acquired eight vessels from Japan under the RP-Japan Reparation Commission Agreement. The vessel sustained leaks on her forward hull while docked at Pier 4. Due to old age (27 years). and via private individuals to commit the crime under Section 3(e) of Rep. COA Auditor/Representative as member. Martinez.111.. et al vs. recommending that it be sold at public auction at the appraised value of P86.60. The Disposal Committee submitted its Report on the appraisal of the vessel. Chief of the Finance Division as chairperson. cost of publication of the bid. Fishing Port. 7 April 2006. Caugma.) The prosecution is burdened to prove the factual basis and amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty. BFAR engaged the services of V/L Shipyard Corporation (Corporation) for which BFAR was billed a total amount of P103. He revised the proposed procedural guidelines of the Committee (Condition No.” Pursuant to E. 8 of the Invitation to Bid) to provide that the “bidder agrees to pay.400. inter se.40 for services rendered including repairs and berthing fees evidenced by Invoice Nos. 1529 and 1589. Jr. Courts cannot simply rely on speculations. the Corporation submitted its sealed bid – P13. It was recommended to the Bureau Director that the vessel should be disposed of considering that it could no longer serve its purpose due to “old age and deteriorating superstructure.O. 1529 and 1589 showing that the Corporation had billed the Bureau the total amount of P103. J. 167048.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Conspiracy or collusion by and among public officers. During the publing bidding.00 or 10% of its bid price as required by the invitation to bid as well as copies of Invoice Nos. Act No.40 for various services rendered on the vessel. BFAR Representative as member. taxes. conjectures or guesswork in determining the fact and the amount of damages. The publisher billed the BFAR P2. SR. Among the committee members were Marietta T. Caugma. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Marietta T.” The invitation to bid was published in the Times Journal for three consecutive days. Nacua did not interpose any objection because she believed in good faith that it was in 48 | P a g e . Supply Coordination Office representative. No. and levies which may be imposed by law. etc. duties and other costs such as berthing fees.890. one of which is the “M/V Malasugui”. as member.. FIRST DIVISION (CALLEJO. the Committee members resolved to recommend to the Bureau Director that the sale of the vessel be awarded to the Corporation for final approval.O.40. hence. Baltazar claimed.917.917.00 broken down as follows: P2. 888. 888.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. The matter was referred to the COA.60 instead of its appraised value as required by Section 6.00. Baltazar thereafter filed a Manifestation with the Ombudsman requesting the inclusion of Caugma. P2. No.400. Caugma opened the bid and receipted the P13.60 for the appraised value of the vessel.00. No. The Sandiganbayan further declared that Caugma had knowledge of the fact that the berthing fee was P103.000.900. Caugma was aware of this condition in the invitation to bid.40 since it was clearly indicated in the invitation to bid.O.890.900. per COA regulations. 8 of the invitation to bid. the Committee should have declared a failure of bid. only those bidders who had agreed to pay no less than the appraised value of the vessel. under Condition No. P86.00. Regional Director of the COA directed Villa Bernaldo (then BFAR Auditor) to conduct a discreet inquiry regarding Baltazar’s complaint. It was claimed that the second bidding should not have proceeded because the lone bidder offered to purchase the vessel for only P33.60. broken down as follows: publication fee. The Sandiganbayan ruled that.40. and Section 3. excluding taxes.388.D. the minimum acceptable selling price was P190. should have been considered by the Committee.00 and that this amount surpassed the appraised value of P86.111. a former BFAR Chief Technologist filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Ombudsman against Director Felix Gonzales for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for the leaks of the vessel while berthed at Navotas. P33.O. 888. berthing fee of P103. Antonio B. the accused conspired 49 | P a g e .00 for publication fee. Gonzales after a thorough investigation was authorized to award and sell the vessel to the Corporation for P138. publication of the bid and levies which may be imposed by law).60. No.. Amiana Abella and Rosauro Martinez of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. Baltazar.60. Metro Manila.388. paragraph 1 of E. Bernaldo concluded that the vessel’s appraised value of P86. Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the four (4) accused of the crime charged. Ombudsman filed an Information charging Eddie S. No. She further declared that to comply with E. that Gonzales had failed to file an insurance claim on the vessel from the Government Service Insurance System. 1445.917. charges on the BFAR. Marietta Caugma. Considering that this bid price was not reached after the second bid. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers accordance with COA rules and regulations. P103. paragraph 3 of E. Bernaldo.111.60 was not met xx. pursuant to Section 79 of P.900. and P86.917. berthing fee. among others. in evident bad faith. Galler.00 representing 10% of the bid price of P138.400. Believing that the bid price for the vessel was P138. 3019.111. the vessel should have been sold through negotiation for a price to be fixed by the Commission. Thus. duties and other costs (such as berthing fees. and Martinez as respondents. Jr. Abella. Jr.40.900. and 3.60. short by P53. The essential elements of violation of the provision are as follows: 1. evident bad faith. Act No.60 would be remitted to the BFAR. this petition. after deducting the publication fee of P2.00.917. P86.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality. judicial or official functions. including the Government.388. including the government. (NO) HELD: Petition GRANTED. That his action caused any undue injury to any party.00 of the appraisal value of the vessel. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative.400. Section 3(e) of Rep. The Sandiganbayan concluded that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Disposal Committee gave unwarranted advantage and preference to Galler. since the act of bad faith must in the first place be evident. advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers together and awarded the vessel to the Corporation for P138.529. which the graft court denied. 3019 provides: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. It must be stressed that mere bad faith is not enough for one to be liable under the law. or gross inexcusable negligence.529. Hence. evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence.00 and the berthing fee of P103. 2. causing injury to the government to the extent of P53.388. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official. or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits.00.00.529. 50 | P a g e . the government realized only the net amount of P33. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision.. He must have acted with manifest partiality. or giving any private party unwarranted benefits.111. of which only P33.60. ISSUES: Was the prosecution able to prove that the petitioners acted in evident bad faith in awarding the sale of the vessel to the Corporation (NO) Did the Government suffer damage/injury in the amount of P53. The only evidence presented is the Corporation’s bid and the Report of Villa Bernaldo.00 in the sale of the vessel. Thus. Collusion by and among the members of the PBAC and/or contractors submitting their bids may be determined from their collective acts or omissions before. Ocampo: Collusion implies a secret understanding whereby one party plays into another’s hands for fraudulent purposes. the government may declare a failure of bidding. neither was it committed when the award was made by the BFAR Director to the Corporation. 3019 must likewise be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.111. Act No.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G.60. there is no evidence on record that. Act No. the BFAR Director declared that the vessel was sold to the Corporation for P138. during and after the bidding process. Conspiracy or collusion by and among public officers.900. thus insuring the award to a favored bidder. P103. 3019 was not committed when the Committee conducted the bidding and resolved to recommend to the Minister.40 was applied by way of set-off against Bureau’s account to said Corporation for Bill Nos.529. P138.111. as full payment of the vessel. 1529 and 1589 by way of set off.00. after the Corporation had remitted the P138. inter se.00. The crime would have been committed if the Corporation had remitted to the National Treasurer the P138. and the P103. The government receipted the amount “as proceeds of the sale” of the vessel.40 thereof was applied to the Bureau’s account under Bill Nos. premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. through the BFAR Director. they may be held administratively liable for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the government service.00. Collusion may also ensue between contractors and the chairman and members of the PBAC to simulate or rig the bidding process. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the government lost P53. to award the sale of the vessel to the Corporation. the full amount of the bid price. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers Undue injury has been interpreted as synonymous to actual damages which is akin to that in civil law. This is so because there was as yet no evidence that the government sustained a loss of P53. the responsible officials may be dismissed from the government service or meted severe administrative sanctions for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the government service. On the other hand. The prosecution is burdened to prove the factual basis and amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty. For such acts of the chairman and the members of the PBAC. The SC agrees with petitioners’ contention that the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. 1529 and 1589.00.529. This was the ruling of the Court in Desierto v. The complainants are burdened to prove such collusion by clear and convincing evidence because if so proved. conjectures or guesswork in determining the fact and the amount of damages.900. Courts cannot simply rely on speculations. in which case. which the Corporation remitted to the 51 | P a g e . It may take place between and every contractor resulting in no competition. The Prosecution offered no competent and sufficient evidence to prove the actual damages caused to the government. to the prejudice of the government agency and public service. and via private individuals to commit the crime under Section 3(e) of Rep.900.900. which accepted and remitted the amount to the national treasury. To reiterate. 3019. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers national treasury was intact. petitioners were prosecuted and convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. 52 | P a g e . yet.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Act No. the Court holds that the travesty which had been committed must be undone. In fine then. 00 was shown to have been released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the newly nationalized high schools located within the region. PALATTAO et al. evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the essence in making the purchases and if not done before the calendar year 1990. After due trial. That the injury to the government as quantified was the result of the non-observance by the accused of the COA rules on public bidding and DECS Order No. the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Petitioner Nava was subsequently charged with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. series of 1985. The Commission on Audit (COA) Report recommended the filing of criminal and administrative charges against the persons liable. 53 | P a g e . the prices of the [SLTDs] as purchased exceeded the prevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1. CJ To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.175% based on the mathematical computation done by the COA audit team. In other words. G.60. Region XI to its Division Offices. August 28. The report concluded that the government lost P380. the provision on the conduct of a public bidding was not followed. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government. FACTS: COA conducted an audit of the 9. 160211.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund.36 million allotment which was released in 1990 by the DECS. including petitioner. accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities for the calendar year 1990.013. only petitioner was convicted. the law provides that the same shall be done through a public bidding pursuant to Circular No. 100 suspending the purchases of [SLTDs]. a meeting was called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). Instead the purchase was done through negotiation.R. Indeed. 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. instead of referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities. Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. RODOLFO G. NAVA vs. while all the other accused were acquitted. Nevertheless. and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. In the Audit Report. PANGANIBAN. the amount of P603. 2006. No. 3019. In the purchase of the school materials. it must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer. But in the instant case. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers VENANCIO R. Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava.265. As disclosed by the audit report. In the hurried purchase of SLTD’s. 85-55. the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Further. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Nava guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. Republic Act No. as purchased. 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. the SBN denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. 8555A. it must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer. Indeed. in the purchase of the Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTDs). the purchases in question had been done in the interest of public service. 3019. HELD: Petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan (SBN) said that.175 percent. sufficiently established that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors (not grave abuse of discretion) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(g). the prices of the SLTDs. this Petition. that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No. namely. 3019. it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence presented warranted a verdict of conviction. Hence. the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. exceeded the prevailing market price from 56 percent to 1. To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. or entering on behalf of the government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter. that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. In its assailed Resolution. based on the mathematical computations of the COA team. petitioner had argued that the said COA Circular was merely directory. 85-55A. whether or not the public officer profited or would profit thereby. ruled the SBN. Petitioner is a public officer. From the foregoing. not mandatory. and COA Circular No. We must emphasize however. petitioner Nava had not conducted a public bidding in accordance with COA Circular No. which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury. In his defense. 100. who approved the transactions on behalf of the government. Lack of public 54 | P a g e . Those acts. Section 3(g). 3019. It held that the series of acts culminating in the questioned transactions constituted violations of Department of Education. As a result. as seems to be stated in the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for Reconsideration. there can be no other conclusion other than conviction. all the elements of a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government. it must be because there is solid evidence to pin that person down. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. In this case. Indeed. If the accused is to be sent to jail. the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Indeed. 3019 should be established to prove the culpability of the accused. 55 | P a g e .THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. Thus. there is a clear showing that all the elements of the offense are present. not because of the omission of a procedural matter alone. Nevertheless. however. No. The burden of proof is on the prosecution. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers OFELIA C. when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers. and 4. a Special Audit Team audited selected transactions of Parañaque City for the calendar years 1996 to 1998. After trial. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The court. MARQUEZ vs. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudic ed mind.A. 3019. Thereafter. Curiously. the audit team located. guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R. 3019. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local government officials of Parañaque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R. these were occupied by other business establishments. NACHURA. Nos. There was glaring overpricing in the purchase transactions. including the walis tingting purchases. 3. et al. The purchase of walis tingting was divided into several purchase orders and requests to evade the requirement of public bidding and instead avail of personal canvass as a mode of procurement. All. the audit team made a report which contained the following findings: 1. after having marshaled the facts and circumstances. Nos. In criminal cases.) No. along with Silvestre de Leon and Marilou Tanael. five (5) informations were filed against Marquez and Caunan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. CAUNAN vs. 3019.A. reach a moral certainty as to the accused’s guilt. the five (5) Informations against petitioners. Otherwise. and purchased from. J. Parenthetically. to ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998. were filed before the Sandiganbayan. In addition. September 2. the audit team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the named suppliers of Parañaque City. the accused must be acquitted. Consequently. along with four (4) other local government officials of Parañaque City charging them of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R. where there is reasonable doubt. Based on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team that there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions of Parañaque City. The purchase of walis tingting was undertaken without public bidding. 182020-24. the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez. were reluctant to provide the team with signed quotations of purchase prices for walis tingting. must. / JOEY P. as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence. The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: 56 | P a g e . No.A. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. As previously adverted to. the audit team made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of Parañaque City.R. 2009. the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. to justify a conviction. FACTS: In March 1999. 2. The gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. in ascertaining the guilt of an accused. a lone supplier that sold walis tingting. The purchase of walis tingting through personal canvass was attended with irregularities. 181999 & 182001-04 / G. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers 1. 2. Both petitioners insist that the fact of overpricing. Marquez and Ofelia C. and Parañaque City had not been afforded the best possible advantage for the most objective price in the purchase of walis tingting for failure to observe the required public bidding. had not been established by the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. the Sandiganbayan found reason to reconsider her conviction. manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same. and 3. is inadmissible against them.. moved for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan decision. and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Marquez and Tanael. No. Corrupt practices of public officers—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. In addition. The Bids and Awards Committee was not properly constituted. proof beyond reasonable doubt. For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (g) Entering on behalf of the Government. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in finding the petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R. consisting of the report of the Special Audit Team and the testimony thereon of Bermudez. No. as such. On the whole. petitioners asseverate that. were denied by the Sandiganbayan. into any contract or transaction.A.A. constitutes hearsay and.e. upon which the charge against them of graft and corruption is based. (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. 3019. However. 1997. 97-012 dated March 31. the accused did not abide by the prohibition against splitting of orders. whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. as the overpricing was not sufficiently established. No. All the motions filed by Marquez. i. In all.A. as well as Caunan’s motion. Petitioners maintain that the evidence of overpricing. the last criminal element of Section 3(g) of R. 3019 provides: Section 3. petitioner Marquez points out that the finding of overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as required by COA Memorandum No. the transactions undertaken were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Caunan are ACQUITTED. 3019 — a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government — was not proven. HELD: Petitioners Joey P. the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer. Hence. Section 3(g) of R. Caunan.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. 57 | P a g e . with respect to Tanael. The contracts for procurement of walis tingting in Parañaque City for the years 1996-1998 were awarded to pre-selected suppliers. necessarily. these separate appeals by petitioners Marquez and Caunan. No. Otherwise. Thus. purchased from a non-supplier of Parañaque City. must. In fact. 3019. should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. would merely indicate the present market price of walis tingting of a different specification. and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Piñas City. the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA’s finding of overpricing which was. even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Parañaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. and the price of walis tingting purchases in Las Piñas City. in ascertaining the guilt of an accused. the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. the threshold question we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government. The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is specious and off tangent. (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service. the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 3019. based on the special audit team’s report. Effectively. (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers. however. the accused must be acquitted. 58 | P a g e . i.A. proof beyond reasonable doubt. The audit team’s conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers. to justify a conviction. In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. where there is reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the prosecution. However. Notably. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Parañaque City’s walis tingting transactions. We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R. we grant the petitions. in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners. at best. the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence. the evidence presented by the prosecution. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R. reach a moral certainty as to the accused’s guilt. in turn.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G.e. At the barest minimum. the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Parañaque City. The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing based on documents which. No. the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In criminal cases. after having marshaled the facts and circumstances. Hence. Given the factual milieu of this case. (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting.A. The court. and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out. in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing.. Sandiganbayan. . Apelado (being then the Provincial warden of Eastern Samar. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. At the pre-trial. did then and there wilfully. 3. thus petitioner in the performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G.. with deliberate intent. they reason that it was justified by imminent threats upon his person by Adalim’s sister Atty. Loste.. thus contrary to law. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides: Section. No. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of the detainee. had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held. Ambil. First Division found petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. committing an offense in relation to office. to the Office of the Ombudsman. conniving and confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other . including the Government. This provision shall 59 | P a g e . jr and Alexandro R. Ambil. petitioners admitted the allegations in the information. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality.. JULY 6. David B. Jr.: FACTS: The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. vs. unlawfully and criminally order and cause the release of Adalim by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the RTC-Branch 2 eastern samar and allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at petitioner Ambil’s residence for a period of 85 days which act was done without any Court order. who was a mayor. by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act. an accused in a murder case from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner. both having been public officers. 2011 Prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.A. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers AMBIL JR. then Governor Ruperto A. manifest partiality and evident bad faith. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 175457. praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim. or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits. petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail. Corrupt practices of public officers. On arraignment.J. Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. president of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. However. Adalim-White. Hence. VILLARAMA. the present petition. JR. Juliana A. Sometime around September 1998. HELD: YES.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. First. including the government. a public officer charged with murder. WHEREFORE. R. Jr. it appears that petitioner Ambil. the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim. the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer. Jr. and Alexandrino R.’s residence. (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality. and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party. Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the “provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses. they accorded such privilege to Adalim. We find petitioners Ruperto A. as regards his first contention.A. No. R. likewise. 3019. Ambil. Apelado. Petitioner Alexandrino R. No. No. not in his official capacity as a mayor. 3019. Jr. but as a detainee charged with murder. or gave any private party unwarranted benefits. permits or other concessions” and he is not such government officer or employee. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e). Sr. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil. of our ruling in Mejorada v. In order to hold a person liable under this provision. by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil. for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e). negates the applicability of Section 3(e). Adalim was a private party. Thus.” With regard to his second contention. is. In the case at hand. Jr. However. R. judicial or official functions. eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. if he is not altogether unaware. the following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative. Apelado. 3019 in this case on two points.A.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.A. Petitioner Ambil. advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Sr. Jr. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. the consolidated petitions are DENIED. 60 | P a g e . Second. sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years. Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is “charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. has obviously lost sight. through checks made payable to themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above named private persons. 1999 Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade “27” or higher PARDO. Organo. The crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. Quezon City. advantages and benefits. misusing and/or malversing said public funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury. Consequently." Republic Act No. Lilia B.. Enriquez and Luis S. this petition. conspiring. under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. converting. Teopisto A. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers ORGANO vs. Jr. as amended by Republic Act No. Jose dP.565. 7659. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 133535. Se. enacted on February 5. unlawfully and criminally amass and acquire funds belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to the government of the Philippines. was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until otherwise provided by law. 7080. 6758). being then public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction. to their own personal gains. Hence. Marcelo. Reynaldo S. J. did then and there wilfully. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction. Erencio. 1997 is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed in Republic Act No. to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount. 61 | P a g e . SB then issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash for lack of merit. confabulating and confederating with one another. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for the reason that she should first surrender to the Court before she may file any further pleading. Petitioner filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction contending that SB no longer had jurisdiction over the case under RA 8249.079. 7080. entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for. Region 7. 6758) in relation to their office. 8429.: FACTS: Dominga S. Manalili.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. thereby succeeding in misappropriating. 9.64) without proper authority. even though none of the accused occupied positions with Salary Grade “27” or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. then withdraw therefrom (P193. Sapitula. consisting of revenue tax payments. SB without first resolving petitioner’s motion issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused. and Gil R. we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher. ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case HELD: NO. SEPT. dated November 20. 1997. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers WHEREFORE. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith refer the case to the court of proper jurisdiction. 24100. and April 28.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. in Criminal Case No. 62 | P a g e . the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. 1998. friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. not vicarious . The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed. The Information was amended and the arraignment of the accused was set.A. petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. February 26. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion. Petitioner then filed a “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion”[2] alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. 148965. and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.A.R.” Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s “Motion to Quash and Suspend” and “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.) Whether or not R. No. In the alternative.) Whether or not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality. [G.A. it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a “series or combination of overt or criminal acts” as required in R. Metro Manila. No. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers JOSE “JINGGOY” E. No. then President of the Republic of the Philippines. 2001. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face 2. 7080. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada. No. and with alleged conspirators. with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected . R. his associates. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION). ISSUES: 1. Petitioner filed a “Motion to Quash or Suspend” the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law. The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his coaccused. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of “not guilty” for him. petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner.contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal. petitioner. On July 9. then mayor of San Juan.results in the denial of substantive due process. 2002] FACTS: As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada. On its basis. is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. 3. five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family. 63 | P a g e . ESTRADA. 7080.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. respondents.) Whether or not sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses. not vicarious . in conspiracy with former President Estrada. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. directly or indirectly. is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling.” The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. Contrary to petitioner’s posture. the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling “on several instances. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge. therefore.000.” The phrase “on several instances” means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series.contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal. money in the aggregate amount of P545. In the case at bar. is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase “several instances” is to indulge in a twisted. that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax. Petitioner’s premise is patently false. There is no denying the fact that the “plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy” is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. therefore. with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected . 2.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS G. petitioner. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection of the laws. agreed to participate. the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass.) Not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality.) Sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses. in the amassing. 64 | P a g e . accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. and with alleged conspirators. Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of “receiving or collecting.A. 3. share.” In this subparagraph (a). In the crime of plunder. nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift. rather. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. different parties may be united by a common purpose. No.) Petitioner contends that R. kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. nay. directly or indirectly. that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale. by their individual acts. on several instances.000. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt. accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. “pretzel” interpretation. percentage. gifts and kickbacks. Articles 203-245: Crimes Committed by Public Officers HELD: 1. it is that each of them.results in the denial of substantive due process. Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and ordered Princess Joy to get some water. Toy. There was likewise blood on Leah’s right ear. they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of her body. She died on August 22. Armando instructed Francis to inform his colleagues at the police headquarters that he would be unable to report for duty because his wife accidentally slipped and had to be brought to the hospital. Armando told them that their mother was brought to the hospital. vs. Princess Joy and Ezra John. When they woke up the following day. Leah was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. or on August 16. Francis went back to the house. Francis noticed that there were lumps on his mother’s face as well as bruises on both her arms. Armando and Francis carried Leah to the house. he saw her lying on the bed. a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to the Bacolod City police station. Even as Leah was already lying posthaste on the ground.” Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the house of Felisa.When Francis visited his mother in the hospital. Francis and Princess Joy rushed outside the house to see what was happening. In the process. Despite their mother’s condition. During lunchtime. The trial court appreciated the 65 | P a g e .” Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor. her face badly swollen. the children heard their parents quarreling. Francis went home and saw that Leah’s condition had not improved. They had three children: Francis. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG y CUSTODIO. Armando continued to beat her up. She poured water on the face of her mother but the latter did not move. was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. After laying down her head on the bed. Felisa Horilla or “Tia Feli. Armando told Francis to get some hot water. between her breasts and on her thighs. When the children came home in the afternoon after their classes. Armando then washed his wife’s face with lukewarm water. 2003] FACTS: Armando Dalag. Princess Joy looked for her parents but could not find them. When Francis finally went to sleep. She did.m. Armando angrily told them not to interfere and that he will later beat them up as well. his mother was still unconscious. they decided to go to school. Francis and Princess Joy pleaded to their father to stop maltreating their mother.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Armando herded Leah back to the house. He grabbed Leah’s hair and banged her head on the wall. When Princess Joy went outside of the house. The trial court rendered judgment finding Armando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide for killing his wife and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the meantime. Thereafter. They were horrified when from a distance of three meters.. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Armando stepped on a nail. appellee. He saw the lumps and bruises on the different parts of her body. Princess Joy was awakened when she heard her mother crying. At around 8:00 p. I will find some medicine for your wound. she saw her mother being pushed by her father. The kids sensed that some object was being banged on the wall. appellant. She fell to the ground. Leah never regained her consciousness. Francis and Princess Joy noticed that their mother remained unconscious. Armando then tried to revive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. She decided to go back to their house to sleep. [G. 129895.R. 1996. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness. she told him “Toy. 1996. April 30. they heard their mother cry. punching her on the different parts of the body. No. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband. Leah’s forehead directly hit the wall. HELD: It is axiomatic in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses. In this case. 66 | P a g e . ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of witnesses and their testimony should be given probative weight. the trial court declared that the children. or unless it has overlooked some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which. if considered. 1996 involving their parents without any trace of bias. describing in detail what they saw and heard in a manner characteristic of witnesses who are telling the truth. an appellate court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported by evidence. would affect the result of the case. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and “one analogous to passion and obfuscation” in favor of Armando. Francis and Princess Joy. impelled by no other motive than to bring justice to their mother’s senseless death. candid.” The Court finds no reason to deviate from these findings as the records fully support the same. testified “in a logical. the principal prosecution witnesses.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. The children recalled the sordid events that happened in the evening of August 15. The rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. and straight-forward manner. THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSENDO REBUCAN G.R. No. 182551 July 27, 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J.: According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246... There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves... FACTS: Rosendo Rebucan worked in Manila. While in Manila, the victim, Felipe Lagera, went to their house and placed himself on top of Rebucan's wife, Marites, who was lying down. The incident was seen by Raymond Rance, Rebucan's step-son and his younger daughter who were sleeping next to Marites. Marites succeeded in driving Felipe out of their house. Thereafter, Marites left for Manila. When Rebucan returned to their house, Raymond told him about the incident. Rebucan went to the house of Felipe with a long bolo (sundang). Felipe was carrying his grandson, Ramil Tagpis, Jr., 1-year old. Carmela, his granddaughter, eyewitness, was also with them playing in the house. Carmela recounted that she saw Rebucan enter the house suddenly, without any word and hacked Felipe on the face, left arm and right arm and Ranil on the forehead. Felipe was still able to walk outside the house but fell on the ground afterwards. Subsequently, Rebucan immediately ran outside the house. On the part of the defense, Rebucan testified that he went to the house of Felipe because he needed to buy kerosene. He saw Felipe feeding chickens and confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe got angry and threw the cover of a chicken cage at Rebucan but the latter was able to parry it with his hand. Rebucan drew his bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side as the latter was running towards the house. Rebucan followed since he thought that Felipe might get a weapon. As Rebucan was about to deliver the second blow, Felipe held up his grandson, Ramil, as a shield which caused Rebucan to hit Ranil on the forehead. Rabucan became angry as Felipe walked outside of the house. Rebucan followed and delivered another blow to Felipe on his right arm. He ran and voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chariperson. The RTC convicted Rebucan of the complex crime of double murder. It elucidated that the manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victims was a premeditated decision and executed with treachery. he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court in automatic review but the SC ordered to transfer the case to the CA for appropriate disposition. The CA modified the RTC judgment. Rebucan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder for the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex crim of double murder. The court subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing of the victims were attended by treachery and evident premeditation. Rebucan filed a Notice of Appeal to the SC. 67 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons The contention of the accused is there is no treachery because there was no witness whi stated that he attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving them of any means to defend themselves. ISSUE: Whether or not Rebucan was guilty of murder by committing the crime with treachery. RULING: APPEAL DENIED. The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA. The evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder. According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves. The SC respected the resolution of the RTC in giving weight to the testimony of Carmela that she categorically pointed to Reburca as the person who hacked Felipe and Ramil. She also stated in her testimony that the attack was not preceded by any altercation between Reburca and Felipe. Without any provocation, Reburca suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived of an opportunity to defend himself. As Felipe was carrying Ramil, the child suffered the same fatal blows. Treachery may be properly considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one intended by the defendant to kill if it appears that neither of the two could put up a defense against the attack or become aware of it. Furthermore, the killing of the child is characterized by treachery for the weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused. 68 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE VS. CECILIA LAGMAN G.R. No. 197807 April 16, 2012 Velasco, Jr., J.: In order that treachery may be properly appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. FACTS: 2 Informations were filed against Cecilia Lagman (Lagman). The first Information was for the Murder of Jondel Santiago (Santiago), that Lagman killed Santiago with the use of a knife by stabbing him and hitting his neck and trunk thereby inflicting fatal wounds resulting to his immediate death. The second Information was for Attempted Homicide of Violeta Sicor (Sicor) by stabbing her in the middle of her buttocks with a knife. The prosecution presented Donna Maniego (Maniego), daughter of Sicor, PO3 Ricardo Alateit (Alateit) and Sicor as witnesses. Based on Maniego's tetestimony she was with Sicor riding a side car when without any warning Lagman punched Maniego on the face then turned to Sicor and stabbed the latter in the middle of her buttocks with a knife. She asked for help in the barangay hall but the Barangay Chairman was not around. She then went to check on her common-law spouse, Santiago, she saw Lagman stab Santiago. Lagman then flee the scene of the crime while carrying her knife. Maniego rushed to Santiago and saw that he was seriously hurt, they proceeded to a hospital where Santiago died. Maniego also testified that she was a close friend of Lagman but the latter got angry with her when Santiago eloped with Maniego. Sicor corroborated with Maniego's testimony. PO3 Alateit testified that while he was riding his motorcyle on his way home, it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident. He headed toward the area where a crowd was causing a commotion and saw a Lagman running towards him with a bloodied head. He was informed that Lagman stabbed someone. While he was arresting Lagman, a sharp object fell from the woman's waist. He confiscated the sharp object and brought her to the police station. For the part of the defense, they offered the testimonies of Lagman.She claimed that she confronted Maniego if it was true that the latter was spreading rumors that Lagman was insane to which Maniego affirmed. Lagman slapped Maniego and left, Santiago and Sicor ran after her. Santiago hit her with a lead pipe. She denied that she killed Santiago, that the knife was not hers and she only had an argument with Maniego. The RTC convicted Lagman of the crime of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The CA found the presence of treachery. In the CA's decision, it stated that the Santiago was caught off guard when the Lagman, without warning, stabbed him 4 times leaving him no chance to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself. Thus, there is no denying that Lagman's act of suddenly stabbing Santiago left the latter with no room for defense is a clear case of treachery. CA ruled that the totality of the prosecution's 69 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused failed to show any ill-motive on the part of the witnesses of the prosecution to falsely testify against her. Hence, Lagman appealed. Accused argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the killing of Santiago was attended by treachery, it was not proved that she deliberately adopted her mode of attack. The encounter was preceded with an argument between the accused and Maniego. The accused was followed by victims, thus, the stabbing incident should have been considered as a spur of the moment occurence. ISSUE: Whether or not the killing was attended with treachery RULING: Appeal Denied. The killing was attended by treachery. The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; (4) that the killing is not parricide nor infanticide. The prosecution clearly established that it was Lagman who killed Santiago as there was an eyewitness to the crime. The killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of Treachery. Treachery is defined as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend to directly insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might take. In order that treachery may be properly appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. These elements were present when Lagman stabbed Santiago to death. Lagman's method of inflicting harm ensured that she would fatally wound Santiagi without any risk to herself. The alleged advantage of Santiago in terms of height was of no use to him as Lagman employed treachery in killing him. He was not given the oppotunity to defend himself due to the accused's sudden asudden stabbing him repeatedly with a knife. 70 | P a g e There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons. around ten o’clock in the evening. at about nine o’clock in the evening while the victim Warlito Raguirag was having dinner at home. deliberate. Upon arraignment. qualifying it as murder.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. The accused then went willingly with the police officers to the police station. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the crime was aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling and illegal possession of firearm. ISSUES: 1. For treachery to be considered. ARNOLD T. or forms in the execution. Beatriz informed them that Arnold Agcanas was the assailant. The accused pointed a gun at the back of the left ear of the victim and shot him point-blank. the award of damages was modified based on prevailing jurisprudence. Ilocos Norte.R. 2. who was the son of her cousin. unarmed. On intermediate appellate review by the Court of Appeals. 174476. the conviction was affirmed. Under the 50-watt light bulb and with only a meter between them. and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. thus. who was actually residing in Barangay San Miguel. trial ensued. 11 October 2011. Beatriz Raguirag (hereinafter Beatriz). the wife. Sarrat. FACTS: The provincial prosecutor of Laoag City charged the accused with murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). EN BANC (SERENO. and unexpected manner. No. Thereafter. HELD: Decision AFFIRMED. was able to identify the accused. The trial court found that on 4 May 2000.) For treachery to be considered. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift. affording the hapless. when the police officers arrived. without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the use of an illegally possessed firearm. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Around 9:15 in the evening. two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate. Thereafter. Whether the crime was committed with treachery. However. herein accused Arnold Agcanas entered the former's house through the kitchen door. Laoag City. the accused pleaded not guilty. and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. methods. J. Alejandro Agcanas. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. the police found the accused in the house of his brother. AGCANAS G. employing means. two 71 | P a g e . Branch 16. which tend directly and specially to insure its execution. The victim was then eating his dinner. With the suddenness of the attack. The aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm was likewise properly appreciated. Beatriz Raguirag testified that she saw the accused holding a gun and then heard a gunshot. the accused entered through that door and shot the victim in the head. the victim could not do anything. except turn his head towards the accused. In the case at bar. It has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate. without provocation or reason. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. even though the firearm used was not recovered. As this Court held in People v. Thus. and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. seated with his back to the kitchen door. causing the latter's instantaneous death. Suddenly. Taguba. The post-mortem examination also showed that the accused died of a gunshot wound.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. The trial court was also correct in ruling that dwelling was an aggravating circumstance.11 the actual firearm itself need not be presented if its existence can be proved by the testimonies of witnesses or by other evidence presented. the presentation of the actual firearm was not indispensible to prove its existence and use. 72 | P a g e . This allowed Dion to catch up to her. BBB thereafter called Dion’s father and their Barangay Chairman. Dion then removed his own short pants and briefs then climbed on top of her. also charges the accused of rape committed sometime on April of 2001. the RTC rendered its Decision. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her. Dion forced her on her back and removed her undergarments.) In statutory rape. No. in April 2001. but admitted that in AAA’s case. CCC. Dion came out from behind some trees. Once again.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. time is not an essential element. Dion was already inside their house. ISSUE: 73 | P a g e . 10 years of age. Romero-Fernandez. threats and intimidation against the complainant. While Criminal Case No. During trial. Following the sound he had heard. while she was getting water from their kitchen. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision. after she had finished throwing garbage at the "bakir" or garbage pit11 located some 300 meters from the back of their house. beckoning her to approach him. 4 July 2011. a minor. Dion had just finished his deed and was about to go home when AAA’s uncle. CCC found Dion hiding in a corner in the kitchen. even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. otherwise he will cut her neck or tongue. Dr. Instead of going to Dion." After trial.R. J. who conducted the medico-legal examination. and he was calling her. Criminal Case No. AAA described how Dion made the "push and pull movement" after he inserted his penis into her vagina. she "could not surmise or definitely say that those lacerations could have been caused by sexual abuse. FACTS: Accused-appellant Noel Dion y Duque (Dion) was charged with two counts of statutory rape in two separate criminal complaints filed directly before the RTC. Regarding the second incident of rape. Dion gave the same threats to AAA before raping her as he did previously. and he then pulled her toward an area covered with tall grasses. CCC immediately collared Dion and woke up BBB. FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. 181035. She testified that all of a sudden. elaborated that a number of factors could cause lacerations to the hymen. After threatening AAA that he will cut her tongue and neck if she shouted. 4354-R charges the accused of rape committed on 16 June 2001 by means of force. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. but she tripped and fell to the ground. Dion entered a plea of not guilty to the two charges. 4355-R. AAA started to run to their house. 2001. finding Dion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. NOEL DION G. he stood up and again warned her not to report the incident to anyone. AAA claimed that when Dion had finished. AAA averred that at around ten o’clock in the evening of June 16. she heard knocking at the door. arrived. AAA’s grandmother. Upon arraignment. AAA inquired who it was but received no response. AAA alleged that at around three o’clock in the afternoon. This Court has time and again held that alibi is one of the weakest defenses. date the purported rape was committed. Furthermore. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is well-settled that denial. Lastly. For in rape. even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable. is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The medical examination of the victim or the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape as the testimony of the victim alone. the former deserves more credence. Denial cannot prevail over the positive. he was not able to intelligently prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him. The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina of the victim does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the mere touching of the labia of the female organ by the penis is already considered as consummated rape. time is not an essential element. candid and categorical testimony of the complainant and as between the positive declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant. Dion proffered the defense of alibi and denial. is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. if credible. but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check out or rebut. In statutory rape. or at least the approximate. his alibi was discredited by the testimonies of his own witnesses. HELD: Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In fact. in refuting AAA’s testimony. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. it is not ejaculation but penetration that consummates the sexual act. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Whether or not the accused is guilty of two counts of rape as charged. Dion has failed to show us that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime in April 2001.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state the exact. The presence of sperm is not a requisite for rape. Dion insists that the findings in the medical certificate cast serious doubts on AAA’s claim of being raped. 74 | P a g e . 1992. Almonte in observance of the feast of Sto. Branch 2. 1999 decision. He then forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. could hardly urinate. waking up AAA. the prosecution charged the appellant at the Regional Trial Court (RTC). and AAA lived in a house in Barangay Marcos. ISSUE: WON the guilt of the Accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD: We affirm the appellant’s conviction. No. the appellant restored AAA’s panty and returned to his mosquito net. AAA disclosed to her what the appellant did to her.: FACTS: On June 9. AAA could not push him away. BBB confronted the appellant who denied the allegations and threatened to slap AAA. BBB wanted to go out to ask for help. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons G. and spontaneous testimony that pointed to the appellant as the person who raped her. alleged that BBB fabricated the charge due to his rejection of her sexual advances.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. straightforward. Upon inquiry. Mora. of January 15. Due to the extreme pain and numbness in her legs. Dr. Teonesto K. Libertad.182237 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. and to extort money. and removed her panty. found that her hymen was no longer intact. Agusan del Norte. interposing denial as a defense. BBB. AAA noticed blood in her private parts. VS TERENCIO FUNESTO y LLOSPARDAS. The RTC found the appellant guilty of statutory rape in its May 4. AAA.R.m. and felt extreme pain in her abdomen. who medically examined AAA. When BBB returned from the prayer service (held at the residence of a certain Edna M. BBB brought AAA the following day to the Cabadbaran Emergency Hospital because AAA could not stand. a child below 12 years old. Specimen taken from her genitalia also tested positive for the presence of human spermatozoa. but the appellant threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. with rape committed on January 15. 75 | P a g e . then nine years old. At around 9:00 p. her mother (BBB). The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. APPELLANT. Butuan City. After satisfying his lust.[6] In the trial that followed. Magallanes. Mora (Medical Officer at Cabadbaran District Health Office) testified on the details of the crime. and Dr. DECISION BRION. 1992 against AAA. He also noticed the reddish discoloration of her labia minora. The appellant. while BBB was at a prayer service. and that she had an anterior vaginal laceration. 1992. J. she noticed blood at the hemline and at the back part of AAA’s dress. the appellant approached the sleeping AAA. Niño). APPELLEE. The appellant. The CA affirmed the RTC’s appreciation of AAA’s clear. 5. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. Thus. b. we see no reason to disturb the RTC’s appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony. 2. c. the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code. similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. authentic document. and was properly sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. 76 | P a g e . It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. his findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court when affirmed by the CA. the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually violated. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old. or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age. In People v. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. the testimony. the Court set out the following guidelines in appreciating age. Neither did the appellant expressly admit AAA’s age. 6. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old. if clear and credible.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. 3. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: 1. of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40. We differ from the lower courts’ conclusion that AAA’s minority can be appreciated to qualify the crime as statutory rape since her minority was not proven by independent evidence. In the present case. Pruna. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Based on the records before us. 4. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. BBB. Appellant. Branch 11.R. and pulled up her blouse and bra. 77 | P a g e . and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag. 178321. After raping AAA.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Bulacan. Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal. Her uncle. At that point. Suddenly. on the other hand. and his nephew. AAA testified that at around six o’clock in the evening of June 6. she and her friend. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. denied the charges against him. AAA passed out. 2000. NO. Rey Laog. While AAA was in such defenseless position. she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe. the rape victim who was 19 years old at the time of the incident. she waved at him for help. The two cases were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident. Bulacan. Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. With him were his children. 2000. Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. Jay. The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA. FACTS: Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). and her neighbor CCC. She later learned that Jennifer had died. CONRADO LAOG Y RAMIN G. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the scene of the crime. Dr. Without warning. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. San Rafael. Jr. sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. appellant pulled down her jogging pants. appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. Oliver and Conrado. he left his house to have his scythe repaired. When Jennifer saw this. He then went on top of her. She crawled until she reached her uncle’s farm at daybreak on June 8. He claimed that in the evening of June 5. 2000. When arraigned. However. knocking her down. appellant also covered her with grass. An hour later. of Malolos. were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc. he was not able to do so because that was the time when he “went wild” after seeing his wife with another man. He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB. waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Ronnie. Appellant then turned to AAA. it was nighttime and raining hard. appellant. When she saw him. AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven o’clock. Ivan Richard Viray. 2011. OCTOBER 5. When AAA regained consciousness. who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe. removed her panty. Finally. treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual 78 | P a g e .A.” This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the offenses charged HELD: The appeal lacks merit. we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question. the original intent of appellant. paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales. we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating. appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. as their other companions surrounded them. Here. The CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s judgment. and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA. as amended. the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. a special complex crime provided under Article 266-B.) No. Salvatierra. provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is “a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts” and “absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions. Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant. we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. including one not raised by the parties. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons After trial.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. rather than qualifying. 8353. In People v. However. as amended by Republic Act (R. While we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer. circumstance. Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away. The facts alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code.[ Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. the RTC rendered a Joint Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. 79 | P a g e . Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but. unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim.[50] It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon. Clearly. as generic aggravating circumstance. as personally witnessed by AAA. In this case. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons commission of the complex crime. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ISSUE: Whether the accused appellant is guilty of consummated rape. short pants. This circumstance – coupled with the victim’s declaration that she was resisting the appellant’s attempt to insert his penis into her vagina – makes penile penetration highly difficult. on the floor of her sister’s room. Campuhan. September 05. Afterwards. Held: CARNAL KNOWLEDGE NOT PROVEN WITH MORAL CERTAINTY. From the foregoing. J. 2012. the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. AAA. The appellant put his clothes back on. Thereafter. when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. The appellant stopped when AAA’s cry got louder.) Simply put. AAA’s Sinumpaang Salaysay also disclosed that the appellant was holding the victim’s hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. we find it clear that the appellant’s penis did not penetrate.R. the Court laid down the PARAMETERS OF GENITAL CONTACT in rape cases. We convict him instead of attempted rape.” Without any showing of such penetration. The appellant removed AAA’s clothes. No. the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Significantly. In People v.. was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew. The appellant went on top of AAA. nothing in the records supports the CA’s conclusion that the appellant’s penis penetrated.e. accompanied by her brother and sister went to the Women and Children’s Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station and reported the incident. “rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. at most. AAA resisted. In fact. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. it can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. After trial. and held her hands. AAA cried. if not improbable.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Significantly. and narrated to her what had happened. the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled “filling materials” at his house. there can be no consummated rape. 188979. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA Y VELASCO G. 13 years of age. the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime of rape. on the day of the incident. as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the victim’s vagina. For his defense. In his brief. Facts: The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that AAA. BBB. and held that a slight penetration took place when the appellant’s penis touched AAA’s vagina as he was trying to insert it. “naidikit”) AAA’s private part. as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. It explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape. We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. sister of the common law spouse of appellant. he then took off his short pants and briefs. and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. the victim’s female organ. and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. thus: 80 | P a g e . but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. and underwear. however slightly. but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs. AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister. but merely ‘touched’ (i. SECOND DIVISION (Brion. i. The appellant. lying on top of her. holding her hands and parting her legs.” Without any showing of such penetration. etc. at most. “rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated. In People v. Aside from AAA’s testimony. the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile penetration. Publico. In the present case. which are required to be "touched" by the penis. the appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape. The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ. labia majora. and is instantly visible within the surface. and not merely stroked the external surface thereof. In the present case.g. the vaginal orifice. the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape. In the absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration. at most. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty. touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact. failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance..e. the clitoris.. labia minora.e. however slight. states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. e. The totality of the appellant’s acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim’s private parts. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented. and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities. or the mons pubis.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. there can be no consummated rape. as in this case. Simply put. to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface. if not acts of lasciviousness. a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina. a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. 81 | P a g e . removing his clothes and briefs. attempted rape is committed. AAA’s testimony did not establish that the appellant’s penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. the hymen. while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Thus. the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAA’s nape and neck. the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis. there can be no consummated rape. hence. strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. as amended. the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape. to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. it can only be attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.. the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion. could confirm whether there indeed had been penetration. “ In rape cases.” As earlier discussed. we ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. undressing her. for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. mons pubis. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. otherwise. stroking or grazing of organs. the victim's loud cries and resistance. As the labias. such as a medico-legal report. and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ. it can only be attempted rape. however. of the victim’s labias. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. i. Thus. no other evidence on record. and we find appellant Christopher Pareja y Velasco GUILTY of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE. 82 | P a g e . Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2012 FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. to his surprise. She also confided to her aunt. he was arrested by police authorities and was detained at the Talisay City Jail for having raped his own daughter. c. the trial court convicted appellant of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness both in relation to Republic Act No. threat or intimidation. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. that failure to present relevant evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed committed by appellant because he himself admitted. According to the accused. The next day. Issue: Whether the victim’s minority has been sufficiently proved. touched her genitals and inserted his fingers into her vagina causing her to feel pain. She felt pain in her private organ. J. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. on the other hand. She related the incidents to her mother who simply gave her father a fierce piercing stare but did nothing. Through force. 181202. In the Court’s view. the prosecution may have been unable to present AAA’s birth certificate or other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial. Rape. – Rape is committed – 1. 83 | P a g e . Their daughter never returned to their house since he and his wife separated. December 05. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. d. who brought her to a doctor for medical examination and to the police station to report the matter. accused-appellant made her hold his penis. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. After trial. Held: Petition DENIED Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code which deals with the offense of rape provides: Art. Her mother was not around as it was only her and her father who were home. He. herein accused-appellant raped her. When and How Committed. EDGAR PADIGOS G. albeit reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. b. 9346.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. He undressed her and removed her panty. however. No. the present charges were merely fabricated by his wife as they have been estranged from each other because she was cohabiting with another man prior to the incidents complained of. this admission from appellant. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. The death penalty was imposed by the trial court because it found the appellant guilty of qualified rape. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. sister of her mother. His wife prevented their daughter/victim herein from returning to their house. A few days hence. 2002 when her father. that AAA was below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. taken with the testimony of the victim. 266-A. Facts: The evidence for the prosecution discloses that “AAA” who was then only six-years old was sleeping inside their house on August 26. He also took off his pants.) In the case at bar.R. in his counter-affidavit which formed part of the evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open court. sufficiently proved the victim’s minority. 7160. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40. 4. After a careful review of the records of this case. In People v. sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old. As cemented in jurisprudence. authentic document. relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. which is the subject of this case. however. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old. is considered as statutory rape in this jurisdiction. albeit reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. the prosecution may have been unable to present AAA’s birth certificate or other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.” It would appear from the death penalty imposed by the trial court that it found appellant guilty of qualified rape. In the absence of a certificate of live birth. the elements of rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim. under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof. 3. Thus. In the case at bar. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons 2. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. if clear and credible. and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation. the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed “when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent. The Pruna guidelines are as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. or any instrument or object. 6. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. According to the sixth paragraph of Article 266-B. shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice. c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. stepparent. ascendant. or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. 5. Pruna. or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age. we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases. or when the victim is under 12 years of age. guardian. 2. the testimony. 9346. into the genital or anal orifice of another person. we are persuaded that appellant is indeed guilty of qualified rape. By any person who. that failure to present relevant evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed committed by appellant because he 84 | P a g e . or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. that AAA was below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In view of the foregoing. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons himself admitted. in his counter-affidavit which formed part of the evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open court. Further. taken with the testimony of the victim. this admission from appellant.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. sufficiently proved the victim’s minority. he is to suffer the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals which is reclusion perpetua. In the Court’s view. 85 | P a g e . we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant for qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness. the same sack that he saw when they are still inside the house of Villaflores. they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. Both witnesses narrated that at about 10:00AM on July 2. (Bersamin. On July 2. B a s e d f r o m t h e s e circumstances. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Villaflores carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy. FACTS: Accused Appellant Edmundo Villaflores also known as “Batman” in their neighborhood and known to be a drug-addict was charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide of a four-year old girl named Marita. carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. threat.R. No. Villaflores said it was nothing. As such. indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2. Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides: Article 266-A. ) Under Article 266-A. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE v. but the witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house. Rape. 1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under their house and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack. FIRST DIVISION. Marita’s Certificate of Live Birth disclosed that she was born on October 29. even though none of the circumstance mentioned above be present. c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. they found Marita’s lifeless body covered with blue and yellow sack five houses away from their home. When her mother noticed that she was missing. It was only on 3:00PM that they heard cries of a child. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction. – Rape is committed 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force. J. Based on the testimony of the mother of the victim. EDMUND VILLAFLORES G. The result of the postmortem examination showed that the child was raped and the cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation . and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. when she confronted his husband who was on drugs. 184926.Two (2) witnesses pointed Villaflores as the culprit. or intimidation. 1994. When and How Committed. the three used shabu for a while. Marita was last seen to be playing at the rear of their residence. The crime is commonly called statutory rape. The accused appealed and argued that both RTC and CA erred in convicting him of a composite crime of Rape with homicide. 11 April 2012. 1999. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of July 2. the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with homicide holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. she called her husband who rushed home to find their daughter. Decision of Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. At noon. 1999. 1999.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of Rape with Homicide? HELD: No. xxx 86 | P a g e . b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. 1999. because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. At 6:00AM of July 3. supra. 1994. were seen as “strands which create a pattern when interwoven. or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape. because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. In both composite crimes. became evident. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. To understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.” and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores.” according to the CA. and the latter with death. the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape. We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. 1999. Xxx When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. The crime is commonly called statutory rape. the offense the offender originally designed to commit. In contrast. 8353. was guilty of rape with homicide. because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. As such. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide. 87 | P a g e . the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after. indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons Article 266-B. rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. the penalty shall be death. each of said composite crimes is punished with a single penalty. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape. both the RTC and the CA considered several circumstances. homicide is committed. In resolving to convict Villaflores. the former with reclusion perpetua to death.xxx The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. Under Article 266-A. Yet. Penalties. the situation is not always hopeless for the State. during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Marita’s Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29. for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. Indeed. the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. which when “appreciated together and not piece by piece. where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape. to the exclusion of all others. As can be noted. The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons JOJIT GARINGARAO vs. He was supported by the testimony of the nursing aide. who for money. Section 5. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the argument he had with AAA’s father about the administering of medicines. AAA was admitted at the hospital for further observation. assuming the charges were correct. In his defense. there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such. AAA testified that. 20 July 2011. During the trial. her father and mother left the hospital to process AAA’s Medicare papers and to attend to their store. 16 years of age. is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. PEOPLE G. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness. leaving AAA alone in her room. whether male or female. The doctor allowed them due to AAA’s insistence but instructed her that she should continue her medications. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAA’s private part and only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period.) The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. entered her room to check her medications and if she was still experiencing pains. . Garingarao. Garingarao further alleged that. The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and insisted that he was only examining her. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. The RTC found Garingarao guilty as charged and gave credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingarao’s denial. When her father returned to the hospital. indulge in 88 | P a g e . The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H.R. respectively. FACTS: AAA. was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. SECOND DIVISION. The next day.Children. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. the accused testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines and check her vital signs. They inquired from the nurses’ station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day. Article III of RA 7610 provides: Section 5. AAA told him that she wanted to go home. he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. the lone testimony of the offended party. there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. J. which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the accused liable under RA 7610? RULING: YES. profit. Morante. Decision of CA is AFFIRMED. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. They went back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. At home. (Carpio. 192760. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. No. An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. syndicate or group. AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. Tamayo. if credible. or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAA’s objections. breast. or the introduction of any object into the genitalia. there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. groin. are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. lascivious conduct is defined as follows: [T]he intentional touching. Garingarao insists that. In this case. or buttocks. masturbation. is below 18 years of age. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610. of any person. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. with the intent to abuse. assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. The child. whether of the same or opposite sex. harass. of the genitalia. he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only once. anus. the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610. 89 | P a g e . The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. bestiality. This argument has no legal basis. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5. and 3. 7610. or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Article III of RA 7610 are the following: 1. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her. inner thigh. either directly or through clothing. whether male or female. Hence. In this case. Under Section 32. the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610. The Court finds Jojit Garingarao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. anus or mouth. 2. degrade. humiliate. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. that is. "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. The latter. Therafter. However. to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. No. After the rape.00 as civil indemnity. they saw her boyfriend. the Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Private complainant AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. Article III R. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish. as maximum. AAA. PERALTA. amended. for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each case.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. The cooperation must be indispensable. In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. Before going to the said wake. The appellant Dulay brought the case to the CA. 7610. they went to Sto. When they reached the Kubuhan. Dina suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting.R. Dina and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. but since he was not there. Thereafter. "Speed" and Dina told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. trial on the merits ensued. Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter informed their mother about it. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P 50. as minimum. RTC found appellant Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. for which she is sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal. on August 4. an Information was filed. Held The appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. Dina convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dina and heard "Speed" tell her to look for a younger girl. filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. but she did not do so. the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station. promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a modification on the award of damages Issue Whether Dina Dulay Is guilty of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. Afterwards. September 24. without which the commission of the crime would not have been accomplished. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. the CA. AAA.A. her sister and mother. Thus. AAA went to San Pedro. Niño at Don Galo. AAA asked for Dina's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped. J. they went to a casino to look for Dina's boyfriend. . Thereafter. 2010. x x x 90 | P a g e . appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 193854. ratiocinated: To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. 2012. THIRD DIVISION. her boyfriend was also not there. but of violating Section 5 (a). Parañaque City. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous understanding. DINA DULAY y PASCUAL G.000. AAA's sister introduced Dina Dulay to AAA as someone who is nice. However. Thereafter. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: (a) Those who engage in or promote. Exploitation and Discrimination Act. indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court. a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. However. since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof. while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation. but are not limited to. as he did. who for money. delivered the victim to him. Thus. she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R. It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which is different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. the following: 91 | P a g e . by inducement. or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult. as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape. one must participate in the criminal resolution. or by indispensable cooperation. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. and then after receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and intimidation. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. – Children. profit. Under the Revised Penal Code. this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse. It must be remembered that in the Information. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. as well as in the testimony of AAA. from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA. thereafter.A. which states that: Section 5. whether male or female. facilitate or induce child prostitution which include. convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan. are not indispensable in the crime of rape. she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting. 7610. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons xxxx The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited example. an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation. syndicate or group. she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant. The events narrated by the CA. In this light. Accused-appellant cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by acts without which the crime would not have been consummated. she was raped by "Speed. 2. or e. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute. under paragraph (a). (2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means. cruelty. or (5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution. c. the child is abused primarily for profit. 3. offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law. exploitation and 92 | P a g e . neglect. Thus. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse. (4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute. Children. (3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute.21 The elements of paragraph (a) are: 1. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute. appellant facilitated or induced child prostitution. but not limited to. are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. promotes. the following means: a. In other words. to go with her and thereafter. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. facilitates or induces child prostitution. giving monetary consideration. the accused engages in. is below 18 years of age. indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. d. or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult. As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute. the child. syndicate or group. who for money.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. the act of apellant in convincing AAA. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and 4. whether male or female. who was 12 years old at that time. goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution. profit. the act is done through. b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute. Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. whether male or female. Articles 246-266: Crimes Against Persons discrimination. cruelty. 7610 in its body. The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R. The Information partly reads: x x x the herein accused Dina P. to accused alias "Speed. It must be noted that in the Information. exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.A. It must be remembered that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R. did then and there willfully.A.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS H. neglect. as amended by R. 1 (a) of the RPC. No. it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape under Article 266A. and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 93 | P a g e . but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information." who with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent x x x Undoubtedly. the appellant acting as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. However.A. 7610. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA. we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse. 7610. they may be conclusions of law. 12 year old minor. and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain.A. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30. CORONA. 2001. the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. left and came back after several minutes with Christopher. True enough. they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place. Worse. The following day. EN BANC. 2001. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. Manila. As their continued search for the child was futile. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. However. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher. Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7.Upon seeing her son. in the afternoon of the same day. Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. No. At around 8:30 a. Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. Binondo. Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. 2008. two women came. At about 3:00 p.. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher.m. July 28. pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery. Mamantak turned to Taurak. on December 13. Teresa cried and embraced him. Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. 2001. RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK G.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia. Manila. they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. 2001. Several hours later. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato.000 in exchange for the boy. J. Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St. the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao. when Teresa went there. On April 7. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. He no 94 | P a g e . to no avail. Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4. Taurak relented.m. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. On February 25.Together with the PAOCTF team.R. the child was unmoved. Shortly after Teresa took her seat. however. On March 27. supposedly the cousin of Bato. Despite the publicity. Teresa received no word about Christopher’ s whereabouts. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet. Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. 1999. 174659. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Lanao del Norte.. the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30. except when the accused is any of the parents. When asked who he was. with a modification of penalty. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom. In a decision dated March 31. Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained. 95 | P a g e . under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Issue Whether the accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping for ransom.000 as a demand for ransom. or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty. 3. The trial court rendered a decision on November 30. even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname. 2. 4. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another. Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak. At this juncture. Held We affirm the Court of Appeals. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. female or a public officer. the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. 1. Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor. as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659: ART. Thereafter. Inside the jeepney. 2006. Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty. or if threats to kill him shall have been made. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. Thus. PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. 267. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.. The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo. the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. Manila and was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan. At such a very tender age. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. Mamantak’s actions (e.000 in exchange for his return to his mother. 96 | P a g e . He had no means. he was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4) in the commission of the offense. the maximum penalty shall be imposed. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. On the other hand. specially his mother. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers. Lanao del Norte. the duration of his detention is immaterial. And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. (b) it is committed by simulating public authority. go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. On the other hand. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped. opportunity or capacity to leave appellants’ custody and return to his family on his own. any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother. The Court of Appeals considered the demand for P30. If the victim is a minor. or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence. he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family. the trial court deemed the amount as too measly. not either of the parents of the victim7 or a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person. female or a public official. She demanded P30. her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. Likewise. (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor.g. (2) he kidnaps or detains another. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. without eligibility for parole. price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. 97 | P a g e . While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua.") Ransom means money.000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. the payment of P30. One final point of law. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. Pursuant to this law. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging. Thus.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom. RA 9346 has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. In this case. 98 | P a g e . Jr. Bokbok. Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon. so he left.R. One of the armed men. While two policemen approached the Pajero. The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. No. They were convicted by the trial court of the charge and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals." Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. At around 5:30 in the morning of December 3. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who turned out to be Muit.). Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site. a relative of Ferraer. Morales. alias Tony. poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground. Hermano. They then started the Pajero and drove away together with the victim. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. Nasugbu. except the driver and the front passenger who managed to escape. Morales. al. Ferraer saw on the news the Pajero riddled with bullets. J. He thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the group. 181043. Orestes Julaton. five other men came and they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit. At this point. the driver of the Pajero. After the site inspection. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get would be shared equally among them. 08 October 2008 SECOND DIVISION (Tinga. Pancho. and Muit then commuted to the construction site. The crime of carnapping was also committed in this case when the victim's Pajero was forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site. Pancho. all the policemen present at the scene fired back. 1997. (Pancho. introduced Romeo to Ferraer as the informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. alias David and alias Puri. The incident was reported to the authorities and who later proceeded to set up a barricade. Right after Supt.) The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty. Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. arrived at the latter's house in Kaylaway. and the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs. while waiting for his boss.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Udon. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. On the other hand. Muit. Jr. Hermano however told Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers. MILLANO MUIT et. That night. Morales handed to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton which contained guns. At around two o'clock in the afternoon of the same date. Sr. their line of work is kidnap for ransom. They were later charged with kidnapping with homicide and carnapping. Manuel. Later. 1997. When policemen flagged down the Pajero. three armed men surrounded the Pajero. Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting place but did not find Hermano's group there. Bokbok and the victim. the personal driver of the victim. They forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero. after the assailants carried their plan into action. Batangas with Sergio Pancho. died. Pancho. That evening. the group received a call from Romeo informing them that the victim was already at the construction site. The totality of the prosecution's evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. the driver and front passenger opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. the instant petition. Morales. Hence. the Pajero was spotted. the driver stopped the vehicle. Roger Seraspe (Seraspe). Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez (Chavez). G. (Julaton). Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade. the warehouseman of ILO Construction. Dequillo and four other men to convince him to use his house as a safehouse for their "visitor. Jr. On December 2. Manuel. Sr. drove a blue Pajero carrying Engr.. All the occupants of the Pajero. Pancho. They planned the crime in Ferraer's house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on December 2. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of them were killed. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty. Seraspe and Chavez.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting place. 1997 informing them that the victim was already at the construction site. Sr. On the other hand. any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. or the Anti-Carnapping Act. or by using force upon things. Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties. but was apprehended by the police. Mission. and (d) in the commission of the offense. (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another. and so they went there to carry out their plan. as amended. The crime was committed in this case when the victim's Pajero was forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site. of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent.. After getting the keys to the Pajero from Seraspe. Ferraer. or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty. Jr. At the construction site. The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct testimony of Ferraer. Pancho. with intent to gain. coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. 99 | P a g e . as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez. or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. Muit and the other members of the group pointed their guns at the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out. Jr. The totality of the prosecution's evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. 6539. (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal. The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and carnapping HELD: Petition DENIED. Supt. defines "carnapping" as the taking. Republic Act No. and Pancho. and that Muit was arrested by the police. they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. Pancho. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. ) Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. She got pregnant after some time. During her detention. but she refused. Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back. While Sajiron was undressing AAA. 4 February 2010 THIRD DIVISION (Peralta. Sajiron abused her twice every night. They tried to run away. which was tucked in his waist. R. The mother of AAA and Inon Dama later decided to go to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. Sajiron claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their elopement. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. I will shoot you. AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention. the maximum penalty shall be imposed. When Inon Dama left the place. AAA’s mother came to the house of Egap to get her but Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Malitub. running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). 179570. Maron stood guard and watched them. and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. No. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. covered her mouth with a piece of cloth. There. AAA did not try to escape. suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. Sajiron's father. A fifteen-year-old minor AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Brgy. she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. and brought her to the forest. but Sajiron overtook them. J. Palawan when suddenly. After the marriage. If you will not go with me. where she was detained in a room. children and mother-in-law. the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. but Sajiron tried to hack her. but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire. or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document. The defense denied having committed the crimes charged. When AAA refused. she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. together with the latter's wife. and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. she pleaded with him not to abuse her. Sajiron arrived.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Out of fear of losing her daughter.” Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. In a special complex crime. They left the forest in the morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap. leaving only her bra on. No. The RTC rendered a 100 | P a g e . which she was not able to read. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron. where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. pointed it at Inon Dama and said. While detained. because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive. or is raped. AAA was untied and undressed. SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM v. you go with me. I will kill you. AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. Upon learning of the incident.A. She was sexually abused three times on the ground. Luckily. As earlier mentioned. Sajiron then drew his gun. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security EGAP MADSALI. Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. Bataraza. Nine days after the abduction upon instruction of Egap. He held the hair of AAA and told her.R.” Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue. Maron. “If you will not go. her life would be spared. “Sara. and the like to show that. but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial. thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman. The “sweetheart theory” hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence. courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired. defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has been raped unless that is the truth. as in this case. hence. this principle holds true. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was the act of rape. gifts. Neither is the Court convinced of the “sweetheart theory. it appears that the crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape. the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. such as love letters. AAA vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house. the instant petition. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the information. by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and marriage. as alleged.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true. pictures. the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape. was not with lewd designs. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security Decision finding Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. (b) that the abduction is against her will. and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs. considering not only their relative vulnerability. Clearly. because the taking. However. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention. or reputation. would readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible abduction. The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him was his failure to pay the P10. A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 101 | P a g e . Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the crime of forcible abduction. civil status. he and the victim were sweethearts. which consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16.” the defense of the accused. including one not raised by the parties. Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. regardless of her age. Even in these modern times. The “sweetheart theory” proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused of the crimes charged HELD: Petition DENIED.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. if their accusation were not true.000. indeed. for abduction with rape. In the case at bar. 12281. regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought. forcibly took and dragged AAA. on the occasion thereof. In the case at bar. 48. and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. threat. was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA. For fear of losing her life.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. nor be treated as separate crimes. or a public officer. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention. the word take. a minor. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security Although the information does not specifically allege the term “kidnap or detain. thus. she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty. Sajiron and Maron. or control by force or strategem. the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus. any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days. because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth. to the forest and held her captive against her will. or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority.” the information specifically used the terms “take” and “carry away. who are private individuals. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused. The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty. the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.had carnal knowledge of AAA.by means of force. as alleged in the information. to “take” is to get into one's hand or into one's possession. In People v. but shall be 102 | P a g e . violence and intimidation -. female. it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure. power. the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest. Larrañaga. the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual.” To“kidnap” is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away. coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault. although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place. For there to be kidnapping. Consequently. or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor. Sajiron succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. and. The last paragraph of Art. or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made. plus the accompanying phrase carry away. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty. and (4) in the commission of the offense. In the present case. Sajiron -. (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal. Whereas. the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime: “This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes. or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. No. and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from leaving. As earlier mentioned. the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. testified that on July 2. or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. From the very start of her detention on July 2. the Court also finds Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. She did not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted to flee. the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA. Thus." Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses.A. In fine. a female and a minor. after she was raped in the forest. AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife. Egap directed Sajiron to guard her. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention.A. or is raped. 267. the Court holds that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 7659. 1994. the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping would cause her not only her own life. the maximum penalty shall be imposed. as amended by R. but also the lives of her loved ones. 1994. 12309. In a special complex crime. upon the latter's instruction. 12281. No. In Criminal Case No. 103 | P a g e . Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. Even the two sons of Egap. R. and shoot her if she attempted to escape. G. Mirandilla. Upon passing the cathedral. four counts of rape. Held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells 3. leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. Jr. FACTS: AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla. which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA. Jr. He was Felipe Mirandilla. 4. Felipe Mirandilla. Minutes later. she recognized the man’s face – she was certain it was him. in the company of three others [conferrers]. In his defense. and force 104 | P a g e . It was eve of the fiesta. no less. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals. While making her way back through the crowd.. where they boarded a waiting tricycle. At the plaza. 186417 27 July 2011 SECOND DIVISION (PEREZ. * She only came to know the man’s name after her escape. Mirandilla and his gang epeatedly detained her at daytime. They slipped through crowd. moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights and was raped repeatedly. employing force and intimidation.. she found a road and followed its path.. After hours of walking. Another man joined and went beside her. they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis where AAA was first raped. the others alighted. AAA whom he claims to be his live-in partner RTC’s Ruling: Mirandilla guilty of kidnapping. they reached a hotel. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v FELIPE MIRANDILLA. AAA was dancing with her elder sister. put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while employing intimidation. J) The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. She was allegedly raped 27 times One afternoon. his arm wrapped her shoulders. No. Finally. instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. while two others stayed at her back. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated in diferrent cities and towns 5. with a knife’s point thrust at her right side. AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store.R. threats. Carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times. held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife. drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. one of whom had a gun. Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards. He told her not to move or ask for help. Mirandilla said that he could not have kidnapped and raped the victim. Jr. It was the RTC. a man grabbed her hand. JR. Once. at the police station. she rushed outside and ran. kidnapped AAA 2. walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. and one count of rape through sexual assault Reasons : 1. leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion. AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped. however. ISSUE: Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.A. it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Notably. the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs. otherwise. 7659. HELD: The appealed decision is DENIED.A. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped. no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. like in the present case. rejected Mirandilla’s defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual Reason: Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain his defense.[ It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof. the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. As the Court explained in People v. we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security CA’s Ruling: Affirmed with modification. for the crime of kidnapping with rape. We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. or in any manner deprive him of his liberty. No. In People v. the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Larrañaga this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. Article 267. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another. R. guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. However. 105 | P a g e . shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Garcia. 1. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape. and one count of rape by sexual assault. as amended by R. Mirandilla. No. In a way. or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. there is only one crime committed – the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. xxx Emphatically. four counts of rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R. he raped AAA several times. the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. the maximum penalty shall be imposed.A. as in this case. She ran. appellant went inside the house then returned with a piece of rope. 106 | P a g e . It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention. female While on her way home. but appellant refused. No. He even told her not to turn left. she noticed that Jacalne was following her.R. but refused and told him that her mother would be angry. FACTS: The prosecution established the following facts: The victim then seven (7) years of age. the four left. which he answered in the negative. or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JERRY JACALNE y GUTIERREZ G. The victim held on to a post. 168552 3 October 2011 THIRD DIVISION (PERALTA. The latter pleaded that she be released because her mother would be worried. After telling them that he was not aware of the incident. Appellant also threatened her not to tell anybody of what happened or else he would kill her. Marissa reported the incident to the barangay and had it blottered. but appellant eventually caught up with her. She did not tell her mother Marissa Rosales (Marissa) about the incident because of fear. Jomarie reached home around noon then took her lunch. Thereafter. CA’s Ruling: Affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo ISSUE: Whether or not the accused appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention HELD: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. until after three days. she would not be able to reach home. painting a tricycle. while in his house. They likewise mentioned to him about an incident whereby a child was tied and raped. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. the victim and her mother Marissa. After more or less one hour. but appellant dragged and forced her to go to his house at which is 100 to 150 meters away. otherwise. he placed her at the back of the steel gate of his fenced residence. When they reached Jacalne’s house.Jacalne untied victim’s hands and instructed her to walk straight toward the road. Jacalne told her that she should go with him. RTC’ s Ruling: Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. coupled with the intent of the accu sed to effect it. and two others approached him then asked if he is familiar with a nipa hut or a house surrounded by plants. Jacalne denied the accusation against him. He used the rope in tying the hands of the victim. He explained that.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. J) The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty. and because she did not know her way back home. after more or less one hour. (b) it is committed by simulating public authority. It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor. to his house after the latter refused to go with him. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. the duration of his detention is immaterial. Appellant dragged the victim. coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. released the victim and instructed her on how she could go home. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant. and (4) in the commission of the offense. it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS I. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention. or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. he tied her hands. 107 | P a g e . a minor. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty. Records show that the prosecution established the above elements. or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty. Articles 267-292: Crimes Against Personal Liberty & Security The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual. or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor. Upon reaching the house. he refused. any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days. when appellant tied the hands of the victim. she was then and there deprived of her liberty. Although the victim only stayed outside the house. the former’s intention to deprive the victim of her liberty has been clearly shown. Moreover. For there to be kidnapping. Because of her tender age. (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal. female or a public official. (2) he kidnaps or detains another. it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. When the victim pleaded that she be allowed to go home. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Teofilo Bayugan (Bayugan) guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. 187733. The eyewitness accounts of the prosecution witnesses are worthy of belief as they were clear and straightforward and were consistent with the medical findings of Dr. In People v. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. he casually walked away from the store but Calixto grabbed him. the two accused acted in concert to attain a common purpose.R. Ebet. Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation. during or after the robbery. Vladimir Villaseñor. the killing may occur before.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. The records show that after John Doe robbed the WT Construction Supply store. whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were committed at the same time. the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the lower court explaining that in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. No. The RTC based their decision on the witnesses testifying that they saw Bayugan shot Jun Calixto when he and another person (John Doe) robbed the WT Construction Supply store. 2012 (Brion. an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing. On appeal. Immediately after. (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery. as affirmed by the CA. or. the Bayugan suddenly appeared from behind and shot Calixto on the head. The RTC also gave credence on the testimonies of witnesses saying that they saw Bayugan shot Police Officer 2 Arsenio Osorio while the latter was chasing him. as long as the intention of the felon is to rob. February 8. Hence. both the Bayugan and John Doe ran towards the Hilltop Road going to the direction of the Hangar Market. Clearly. TEOFILO BAYUGAN G. (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot. (d) to eliminate 108 | P a g e . we explained that homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if its commission was (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit. an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing. this petition before the Supreme Court. While John Doe and Calixto were grappling with each other. J. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayugan is not guilty of the complex crime robbery with homicide HELD: Petition DENIED. Their respective actions summed up to collective efforts to achieve a common criminal objective. we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. In the present case. whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were committed at the same time.) Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation. John Doe. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property witnesses in the commission of the crime. the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. the Bayugan clearly shot Calixto to facilitate the escape of his robbercompanion.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. 109 | P a g e . and to preserve the latter’s possession of the stolen items. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide. Under the given facts. After the men took their possessions.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. WILLY SUYU. 170191. There. hence. On appeal. Willy. while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The credibility of complainant's testimony is a primordial consideration in rape cases for the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim. Cainglet and Macarubbo (appellants).R. The trial court found Clarissa's testimony to be consistent. August 16. she was ashamed to admit in front of her boyfriend that she had been abused. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are not guilty of the crime of robbery with rape HELD: Petition DENIED. they saw a beam of light. Willy Suyu (Willy) entered the truck and took Ferrer’s wallet. sincere and could have only come from the mouth of a victim. The other 3 served as look out. 2006 (Callejo. Macarubbo and Willy Suyu held her by the arms. The men dragged Angeles to a hilly place and brought her to the house of Rodolfo Suyu (Rodolfo). The CA reviewed Clarissa's testimony and found the same to be clear. thus they transferred to the top of the hill. the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. FRANCIS CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARUBBO G. Willy clubbed Ferrer and dragged him out of the truck. the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. she remained steadfast in her testimony that she was raped. she declared that there was merely an attempt to rape her. believable. provided it is credible. RODOLFO SUYU. Rommel Macarubbo (Macarubbo) appeared in front of the truck and declared a hold-up. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found them guilty of the crime robbery with rape. 110 | P a g e . who tried to rape her. Another man which is Francis Cainglet (Cainglet) took Angeles’ jewelries. convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. natural. During the grueling cross. FACTS: Clarissa Angeles (Angeles) was eating with her boyfriend William Ferrer (Ferrer) inside a pick-up truck in a parking lot when they were approached by men. After. In robbery with rape. Hence. Angeles filed a complaint for robbery and rape against Rodolfo. No. they released Angeles. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. However. At that time.examination conducted by three separate counsels of appellants. the Rodolfo and Cainglet succeeded in raping Angeles while the remaining 2 served as lookouts.) The intent to rob must precede the rape. this petition. is worthy of full faith and credit. and credible. They gave Angeles to Rodolfo. J. Ferrer then took the chance and escaped and went immediately to the police station to report the incident. At the police station. Cainglet raped the victim. nonetheless. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes place. the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The said argument is. which bolsters Clarissa's recount that she was dragged. one of the investigating officers was her townmate. victims would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private than reveal their shame to the world. the fact that she was raped. however. thus. Also. She was in a state of trauma.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. and raped. for during the examination. The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration. without merit. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. she. later revealed the true events that happened on that fateful night. the rape is deemed consummated in either case. Further. The intent to rob must precede the rape. paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. at the time. Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the victim. considering that her boyfriend was present when she made her first statement before the police investigator. her deportment was not of that of a rape victim and the examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible assault. Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Oftentimes. impelled by her natural instinct to put out of her mind such a painful and disturbing experience. the fear of social humiliation prevented Clarissa from revealing. forced to lie down. Appellant Suyu. Understandably. Dr. Pintucan does not conclusively suggest that Clarissa was raped. appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ. In robbery with rape. Nevertheless. 111 | P a g e . the details of her defilement. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what really transpired. while at the police station. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. We note that aside from raping the victim. Indeed. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was raped after the robbery. aside from Rodolfo Suyu. In her desire for justice. 8353. there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape. committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article 266-A. Clarissa was reluctant to reveal. guilty of (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder.R. as in this case. G. Jr. Jr. Winner ended up winning the game. however. On their way home. leaving their companions behind thinking that they were dead. JUAN CABBAB. so long as the intention of the felon is to rob. Quindasan told them that it was Cabbab and Calpito who ambushed them and took Winner’s winnings Quindasan died the following day. When the group returned to the scene with the police. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident. Both accused interposed the defense of alibi – that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed. hence. however. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. that the courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of attempted murder for the shooting of Belmes. the present automatic review. the fiesta had already ended. Felipe Abad and Police Officer William Belmes was supposed to attend a fiesta. testified that he conducted an examination on the paraffin cast on Cabbab but the test came out negative.) In Robbery with Homicide. The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under Article 294. In Robbery with Homicide. Again on their way home. the killing may occur before. together with Eddie Quindasan. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). As RTC sentenced Cabbab of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 173479. the group met Juan Cabbac. The unwounded group members reported the incident to the police.. Cabbab and Calpito. gunshots were suddenly fired and Belmes saw that Winner and Quindasan got hit. FIRST DIVISION (Garcia. or that two or more persons are killed. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery. No. is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery. J. during or after the robbery. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play Pepito. Forensic Chemist of the NBI. the killing may occur before. George de Lara.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. so long as the intention of the felon is to rob. Issue: Whether or not Cabbab is criminally liable for robbery with homicide Held: The decision subject of automatic review is AFFIRMED. 112 | P a g e . they saw that Quindasan was still alive. during or after the robbery Facts: Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. 12 July 2007. however. the case was transmitted to SC on automatic review but the SC transmitted it to CA instead. or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery. The Court feels. RTC acquitted Calpito of the crime for lack of but held Cabbab. JR. were charged with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery before the RTC. ) When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery. 10 October 2012. barged into the home of. we are NPA" (New Peoples Army) and continued to say. "Don’t worry. which means. "Huwag kayo matakot. five (5) men entered their house with gun pointed to her younger brother. (b) unlawful taking. At least five (5) people. J.) All of them were terrified seeing the armed men with their guns and a hand grenade. the accused seeks recourse through the present appeal. She was asked if that was her only money and she answered in the affirmative. 113 | P a g e . On automatic review by CA. One of them announced and said. pera lang ang kailangan namin". (Do not be afraid. Under Article 296 of the same Code. 189820.) "Hindi kayo maano. (c) personal property belonging to another. The accused bought Emelie to the bedroom and there she was divested of money and jewelries. Issue: Whether or not the accused are criminally liable for the crimes of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for Ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention Held: The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) intent to gain. it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. CA reduced the penalty. Accused themselves made their intent to gain clear when they assured their victims that they were only after the money." All of the foregoing elements had been satisfactorily established herein.R. and (d) violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things. No. carrying guns and a hand grenade. Accused were charged with Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for Ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention. we only need money. and forcibly took pieces of jewelry and other personal properties belonging to the spouses. BASAO alias "Dodong. RTC convicted the accused of the crimes charged in the information and sentenced the accused to death penalty for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. The accused then asked for 3Million pesos but for failure to produce it.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Crisologo Lopio. et al G. ALBERTO M. it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.". hence. Facts: Emelie Hashiba testified that as she was preparing supper for her family." (You will not be harmed. "when more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery. the accused kidnapped Emilie’s husband but was later on released. FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro. the police arrested Hipona. physically manhandled and strangled. Jr. 114 | P a g e .000. it reduces it to P25. A word on the amount of exemplary damages awarded. AAA’s necklace with two heart-shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing. No.000 exemplary damages excessive. Hipona's mother executed an affidavit that her son-appellant had told her that "Mama. was found dead on the morning in her house in ICagayan de Oro City. I did it because I did not have the money. 185709. Seva. On the basis of BBB’s information. robbery was the main intent of Hipona. Ruling: Petition DENIED From the evidence for the prosecution. Following Article 294(1)16 and Article 62(1)117 of the Revised Penal Code. Jr.R. Hipona. 18. together with Romulo Seva. He was at the time wearing AAA’s missing necklace. aunt of Michael Hipona. In the presence of the media.". which eventually led to her death.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property People vs Hipona G. Hipona argued that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the complex crime of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" Issue: Whether the charge "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" against Hipona was correct. in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. I’m sorry. rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead. Hipona confessed to the killing then implicated his co-accused Romulo B. 2010 Robbery was the main intent of Hipona. BBB. She was raped. and AAA’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. was charged with Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) for the rape and subsequent death of (AAA) who is Hipona's the aunt. The RTC convicted Hipona of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" and the CA affirmed the decision. Feb. and one John Doe. (Seva) alias "Gerpacs" and a certain "Reypacs. As the Court finds the award of P100." On the basis of the confession. and AAA’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery Facts: AAA. they took several jewelries. The CA affirmed the decision. intent to gain was sufficiently proven. and brought her to the living room. and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand. While inside. (2) the property taken belongs to another. bags and cameras. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take. they herded all the other members of the household whom they caught and bound their hands and feet. Whether the accused were properly convicted of Robbery with Rape 2. (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi. placed masking tapes over their captives’ eyes. There. band is considered as an aggravating circumstance. warned her to keep quiet. Appellant and his co-accused barged into the house of the victims armed with a handgun and knives and tied the hands and feet of the members of the household. personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. is an internal act. the first three elements of the crime were clearly established. hence. 115 | P a g e . Atilano Agaton and Noel Malpas forcibly entered the inhabited residence of BBB and CCC. Joseph Evangelio. To be convicted of robbery with rape. and thereafter.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. the prosecution established that appellant and his three co-accused took the pieces of jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and CCC by means of violence and intimidation. Whether dwelling and commission of a crime by a band can be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance Ruling: Petition DENIED 1. appellant and one of the robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and removed her panty. wallets. Intent to gain. The accused were charged and convicted in the RTC with robbery with rape. the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery. AAA was brought by the appellant inside the comfort room and thereat.[29] In the case at bar. AAA resisted and fought back but they slammed her head twice against the concrete wall. presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the appellant. causing her to lose consciousness. it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. In this case. as an element of the crime of robbery. with intent to gain. the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. or animus lucrandi. Issues: 1. The four men accosted AAA. BBB and CCC's servant. Facts: Edgar Evangelio. With her eyes partially covered by the tape. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property People vs Evangelio In the crime of robbery with rape. Thus. . robbery with violence was committed in the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In this case. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property 2.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. while the other three had knives when they committed the crime The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was also attendant in the present case. In the crime of robbery with rape. the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. 116 | P a g e . In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons. The prosecution established that one of the accused was armed with a handgun. He who goes to another’s house to hurt hi m or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. band is considered as an aggravating circumstance. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of the commission of a crime by a band and dwelling. The above-named accused with Marlon Mallari (Mallari). On their way to lugawan. When Valderosa reported the robbery to the police. informed his older brother of his involvement in the said robbery. they were having videoke session near UE. The next day.000. However. and before going home.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. al. on their part. they did not report the incident to the police or barangay authorities. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. v." It clearly established Bernardo’s participation in the conspiracy in that he. They said that on the day of the incident. The RTC ruled that Mallari’s personal identification of petitioners and Benzon. they decided to eat lugaw. the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302. Mallari confessed to Valderosa. who served as look-out during the incident. destroying the door lock of the stall of one Sonia Valderosa by using a lead pipe. denied the same. even if uncorroborated. et. Roy Bernardo (Bernardo). The total value of these stolen items was approximately P42. will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of a deliberate afterthought. the petitioners raised that the trial court should not have given credence to Mallari’s testimony because he is not a credible witness and that the trial court erred in ruling that there was conspiracy since the participation of Bernardo in the alleged robbery was vague.R. FACTS: Ricky "Totsie" Marquez (Marquez). J.00. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the prosecution. and his narration of their individual participation in the robbery were sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. however.) "The testimony of a co-conspirator.” "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling. and when they were on their way home they saw the store was already opened. together with another petitioner. It stressed that the place petitioners claimed to be in was a mere walking distance from the site of the burglary. 3 December 2012 (Del Castillo.No. On appeal. The CA held that while Mallari was a co-conspirator and his testimony was uncorroborated. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property RICKY “TOOTSIE” MARQUEZ. a blender and food items. The petitoners." and not Article 299 of the RPC. they saw Mallari standing in front of the store. The trial court disregarded the petitioners’ denial and alibi considering that it was not physically impossible for them to be in the crime scene or its vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. Jomer Magalong (Magalong) and Ryan Benzon (Benzon) were charged with the crime of Robbery. since the owner lived in a separate house. entered the store and carried away all the items inside it which consisted of rice cookers. Mallari. carried away from the 117 | P a g e . 181138. same was still sufficient to convict petitioners since it "carries the hallmarks of honesty and truth. among others. which refers to robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. When committed in an uninhabited place or a private building with the circumstance. sufficient to establish petitioners’ commission of the crime charged. alibi is the weakest defense since it can easily be fabricated and difficult to disprove. even if uncorroborated. or outside door or window has been broken. the defenses of denial and alibi can only prosper if there is evidence that the accused were not only in another place at the time of the commission of the crime. 118 | P a g e . will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. while petitioners denied being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. since the owner lived in a separate house. shall take any personal property belonging to another by using force upon anything. HELD: Mallari’s positive identification of petitioners as the perpetrators of the robbery and the absence of any ill motive on his part to testify falsely against them prevail over petitioners’ denial and alibi. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of denial and alibi of the petitioners should be disregarded and the petitioners should be convicted of the crime of Robbery based only on the uncorroborated testimony of Mallari."there is. however. with intent to gain." as in this case. but also that it was physically impossible for them to be within the immediate vicinity. they testified that they were in a place only about 15 meters away from the scene of the crime. the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302. Here. even if uncorroborated. robbery is committed by any person who. Thus. His recollection of the events was detailed and candid such that it could not have been a concoction from a polluted mind. Moreover. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property store all the stolen items. floor. Thus. Robbery with force upon things in an uninhabited place under Article 302 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) Under Article 293 of the RPC. "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling." and not Article 299 of the RPC. finding the petitioners guilty of the crime under Article 299 of the RPC. A review of the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of Mallari showed that same was sincere since it was given without hesitation and in a simple manner.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. As repeatedly held. Hence as a rule. deserves full weight and credence and. Mallari’s testimony. they failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be in the store at the time of the robbery. the same is penalized under Article 302. therefore. roof. "the testimony of a co-conspirator. while the Court is well-aware of the general rule that "the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by evidence. In fact. Hence. that any wall. an exception. 92. occupation or appropriation FACTS: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the holder of a legislative franchise to render local and international telecommunication services under Republic Act No.: The term “personal property” as used in Art. Yuji Hijioka. and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined”. 155076. operate. US v Tambunting. US v Genato*). tangible or intangible. PLDT opposed the motion to quash alleging that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. Hon. Zeus Abrogar. PLDT is authorized to establish. The court declared that. maintain and purchase telecommunication systems. is that it be subject to appropriation. J. namely. RPC should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to P20. xxx. Laurel moved to quash the complaint for theft as the property (service/business) contemplated by PLDT is not the one embraced in ART 308 of RPC nor any special law for that matter. including transmitting. it held that while business is generally an activity 119 | P a g e . were charged of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly taking. RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Quash the Amended Information. Under said law. SR. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Luis Marcos Laurel v. manage. GR No.any personal property. Lacson and Villegas. so long as the same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code. for both domestic and international calls. The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft. The appellate court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not the proper remedy of the petitioner. Consequently. 7082.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. a member of the board of directors and corporate secretary of Baynet. The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession. although there is no law that expressly prohibits the use of ISR..308. antennae. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court. receiving and switching stations. and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) – “a method of outing and completing international long-distance calls using lines. On the merits of the petition. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES& PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY. and the other members of the board of directors of said corporation. Yasushi Ueshima. cables. Makati City.651. the facts alleged in the Amended Information "will show how the alleged crime was committed by conducting ISR. 13 January 2009 CALLEJO." to the damage and prejudice of PLDT. lease. capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos. corporeal or incorporeal. Branch 150. stealing.370. Laurel. Mukaida. 308. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property which is abstract and intangible in form. the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property. The CA opined that PLDT’s business of providing international calls is personal property which may be the object of theft. Moreover. He opined that a "business" or its revenues cannot be considered as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. As gleaned from the material averments of the amended information. not the Court. and (3) refers to transactions. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. the annual or periodical rents. which is to define a crime. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows: Art. penal laws are to be construed strictly. The Regional Trial Court is directed to issue an order granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended Information. And only when the congressional purpose is unclear that court my rule on its lenity. it is nevertheless considered "property" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be guilty of theft. interests. not its business.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. HELD: Petition is granted. the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.– Theft is committed by any person who. Who are liable for theft. against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things." On the other hand. profits. shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. The assailed decision of RTC and CA is hereby reversed and ser aside. since a "business" is "(1) a commercial or mercantile activity customarily engaged in as a means of livelihood and typically involving some independence of judgment and power of decision. It is Congress. and ordain its punishment. or issues of any species of real or personal property." ISSUE: Whether or not the property contemplated by PLDT falls within the ambit of ART. Thus he filed a motion for certiorari before the SC alleging the following: the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information. the RTC failed to distinguish between the business of PLDT (providing services for international long distance calls) and the revenues derived therefrom. (2) a commercial or industrial enterprise. with intent to gain but without violence. he was charged with stealing the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT. dealings or intercourse of any nature. The rule is that. 308 of RPC. the term "revenue" is defined as "the income that comes back from an investment (as in real or personal property). The court finds that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders. meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property 120 | P a g e . But the words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. at some particular amount.Neither asportation nor actual manual possession of property is required. Such rights or interests are intangible and cannot be "taken" by another. Business may also mean employment. or equipment comprising his business. is not the subject of theft or larceny. only movable properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft." If it were otherwise.It is not necessary that the property be actually carried away out of the physical possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape with it. An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property. the mere "breath" of the Congress. If it was its intention to include "business" as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Constructive possession of the thief of the property is enough. good will or an interest in business. wares or merchandise. there would be no juridical difference between the taking of the business of a person or the services provided by him for gain. right to produce oil. (c) the taking be done with intent to gain. in the context of the Penal Code. vis-à-vis. the taking of goods. Business. like services in business. or the right to engage in business. 121 | P a g e . attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit. The general rule is that. However. Thus. Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated. they are not proper subjects of theft or larceny because they are without form or substance. or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. must have obtained complete and absolute possession and control of the property adverse to the rights of the owner or the lawful possessor thereof. not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The taker. only those movable properties which can be taken and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. are not proper subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be "taken" or "occupied. Business is also defined as a commercial activity for gain benefit or advantage. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that. One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone. Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with business or services provided by business entrepreneurs to the public. (b) the said property belongs to another. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property which intent is apart from and concurrently with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus). and (d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation of person/s or force upon things. According to Cuello Callon. So is the credit line represented by a credit card. and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal property even if for a short time. clearly. although are properties. the Philippine Legislature should have spoken in language that is clear and definite: that business is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. There is "taking" of personal property. Business is referred as that which occupies the time. credit or franchise are properties. Business does not have an exact definition. although it may be very valuable to the person who is entitled to exercise it. occupation or profession. It embraces everything that which a person can be employed. as claimed by the respondents. covers both tangible and intangible properties and are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. A naked right existing merely in contemplation of law. merely intercepts. ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. Baynet Card Ltd. PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities and equipment.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J.. 122 | P a g e . much less. for that matter. occupation or appropriation by the respondent PLDT or even the petitioner. through its operator. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession. reroutes the calls and passes them to its toll center. The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession. THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. FACTS: Petitioner Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club.R. then boarded the vehicle. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket.” Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot.00. 2007. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD VS. petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended. The determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. a supermarket. a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Hence the present Petition for Review. En Banc. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. by Lorenzo Lago. emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Lago saw petitioner. The Regional Trial Court convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. COURT OF APPEALS G. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.090. 123 | P a g e . and three (3) additional cases of detergent. All these acts were eyed by Lago. HELD: Petition denied. ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be convicted of frustrated theft rather than consummated theft. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. Petitioner then left the parking area and haled a taxi. one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic. where Calderon was waiting. but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 160188. and the stolen merchandise recovered. Tinga.” hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known “Tide” brand. who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. who was wearing an identification card with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU). J Theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent. June 21. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi. The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. and after five (5) minutes. Before the Court of Appeals. the goods with an aggregate value of P12. such rulings cannot be applied. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property The following are elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment. as the SC is not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators. the SC can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property. Synthesis of the 3 decisions is in order. (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. For such reasons. With such considerations. Theft is already “produced” upon the “taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent. In those cases. v. (2) that said property belongs to another. in support of its conclusion that the theft was consummated. conflicting as they are. given that there has been no reaffirmation by the SC. whether the Spanish cases or authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion.” Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether theft had been consummated. even if it were only momentary. to accept that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective. the Spanish cases/ authorities cannot be considered. Accordingly. the criminal actors had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. Even if such were offered.” U. theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Adiao apparently supports that notion. where. and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor “to freely dispose of the articles stolen. 124 | P a g e . (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain.S. Laureola presented a microfilm of the checks. She was assigned to handle twelve (12) VideoCitystore franchise accounts. Taking advantage of Tan’s constant absence from the country.00 would require only Tan’s signature. petitioner was able to gain from taking other peopl e’s property without their consent. Tan pre-signed checks to cover the store’s disbursements and entrusted them to petitioner. 125 | P a g e . J As long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover.60. 2012. or even a thief of the property.R. Inc. the encashed checks and deposit slips. including those of Tommy Uy. Mesa. There was also an existing agreement with the bank that any disbursement not exceeding P20. The prosecution. The pre-signed checks by Jefferson Tan were from a current account maintained jointly by VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI Family Bank. petitioner was the accounting clerk and bookkeeper of VCCI and Viva. It was only after petitioner went on maternity leave and her subsequent resignation from the company in May 2002 that an audit was conducted since she refused to turn over all the financial records in her possession. (Viva) were sister companies which managed a chain of stores known as VideoCity. Mesa Branch. First Division. there was no doubt that the personal property taken by petitioner does not belong to her but to Jefferson Tan and his joint venture partner VCCI. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Wilma Cheng.000. One of her duties was to disburse checks for the accounts she handled. Sta. petitioner was able to use Tan’s joint -venture bank account with VCCI as a clearing house for her unauthorized transfer of funds.187. 1998 to May 2. the assistant manager/acting cashier of BPI Family Bank. RTC held that petitioner took advantage of her position with VCCI and her access to the checks and its bank accounts. While CA held hat contrary to petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to show who was the absolute owner of the thing stolen. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ANITA MIRANDA v. He also presented the bank statement of VCCI which showed the encashment of forty-two (42) checks from the account of VCCI and Jefferson Tan amounting to P797. Thus.187.759. were engaged in the sale and rental of video-related merchandises. Inc. As regards the franchisee Jefferson Tan. who was out of the country most of the time. in proving that petitioner had unlawfully withdrawn P797. These stores.85 for her own benefit. (VCCI) and Viva Video City.. Villarama. Jefferson Tan and Sharon Cuneta. FACTS: Video City Commercial.85. January 25.877. Petitioner deposited VCCI checks coming from other franchisees’ accounts into the said bank account. 2002. The audit was made on all the accounts handled by petitioner and it was discovered that she made unauthorized withdrawals and fund transfers amounting to P4. 176298.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Both the RTC and CA found petitioner guilty of qualified theft. NO. it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner. a mere possessor. During the period of April 28. Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. presented as its witness Jose Laureola. Sta. some company-owned while others were operated in joint ventures with franchisees. and withdrew the funds by writing checks to her name using the checks pre-signed by Tan. 126 | P a g e . (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence. she maintains that Jefferson Tan’s signatures on the checks were not identified by any witness who is familiar with his signature. mail matter or large cattle. (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery. earthquake. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property HELD: Petition denied. it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner. She likewise stresses that the checks and vouchers presented by the prosecution were not original copies and that no secondary evidence was presented in lieu of the former. vehicular accident or civil disturbance. Here.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J.85 taken does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCI’s consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 310 is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant. a mere possessor. Hence. or any other calamity. as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover. (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain.187. or even a thief of the property. typhoon. Further. the subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property. and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire. (2) that said property belongs to another. Petitioner insists that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the prosecution failed to prove the private complainant’s absolute ownership of the thing stolen. (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner. As correctly held by the CA. volcanic eruption. The bank account was merely the instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer VCCI. the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797. (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle. Rebecca hired appellant to work in her office as legal secretary and liaison officer. Rebecca and her children established a close relationship with appellant to the point that they treated her as a member of their family. Rebecca entrusted to appellant cash in considerable sums which were liquidated through appellant’s own handwritten statements of expenses. No. In the course of appellant’s employment. It noted that the relationship between the two as employer-employee was not an ordinary one. as well as to the fact that personnel processing the documents could not be bribed. FACTS: Private complainant Atty. appellant suddenly abandoned her job.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. appellant gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Rebecca when she pocketed the money entrusted to her for processing the clients’ land titles. However. theft [becomes] qualified when it is. And as a cover up. REMEDIOS TANCHANCO y PINEDA G. and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. transfer tax and other expenses intended for the transfer of the titles of properties from their previous owners to Rebecca’s clients. Upon inquiry. (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain. During this period. However. (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner. or vigilance. One of appellant’s tasks as liaison officer was to process the transfer of titles of Rebecca’s clients. Rebecca noticed that the completion of the transfer of titles was taking longer than usual. she presented to Rebecca either fake or altered receipts which she did not even deny during trial. she discovered that the latter betrayed her trust and confidence on several occasions by stealing sums of money entrusted to her as payment for capital gains tax. Rebecca Manuel (Rebecca) knew Remedios Tanchanco (appellant) for more than 25 years. And when Rebecca reviewed appellant’s unfinished work. (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another. 127 | P a g e .R. documentary stamp tax. J. 2012 DEL CASTILLO. 177761 April 18. The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. appellant attributed the delay to the cumbersome procedure of transferring titles. committed with grave abuse of confidence. among others. Because of this trust and confidence. Under Article 310 of the [RPC]. The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property. ISSUE: Whether Tanchanco is guilty of qualified theft. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Rebecca took appellant’s word for it. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. guardianship. The trial court found Tanchanco guilty of qualified theft because it found the existence of a high degree of confidence between Rebecca and appellant. appellant was being considered a part of Rebecca’s family. x x x The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence. The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property. Here. it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family. and worse. she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any paper to evidence her receipt thereof. (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another. And as Rebecca trusted appellant completely. (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner. the intentional failure by appellant to properly and correctly account constitutes appropriation with intent to gain. guardianship. With regard to the fifth element. (3) the appellant admitted that she often received money from private complainant for payment of capital gains and transfer taxes. unfinished. (2) her duties included the payment of taxes for the transfer of title from previous owners to new owners/buyers of the property. As to the first and second elements. and by reason of her being the liaison officer. the ‘official’ receipts she submitted to private complainant were fake. The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence. and (6) conceding her guilt. the Court gave weight to the circumstances established by the prosecution which constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant took sums of money that were entrusted to her by the private complainant. (5) upon verification from banks and government agencies with which the appellant transacted in relation to her tasks. committed with grave abuse of confidence. between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. (4) the appellant was given a free hand in liquidating her expenses in her own handwriting. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property HELD: The appeal is DENIED. same is manifested by the fact that it was only after appellant abandoned her job that Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money. and entrusted to. to wit: (1) the appellant was the only person working for the private complainant during the period when she was hired as legal secretary and liaison officer. among others. It thus becomes clear that it is because 128 | P a g e . With regard to the third element. it is clear from the facts that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain. the private complainant discovered that what the appellant submitted were handwritten ‘padded’ liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than what she actually spent. theft [becomes] qualified when it is. and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. By reason of this. or vigilance. appellant.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. the appellant suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks. Under Article 310 of the [RPC]. This included the safekeeping of important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebecca’s clients. all matters essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by. Anent the fourth element pertaining to Rebecca’s lack of consent. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer. To conceal this. Hence. 129 | P a g e .THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebecca’s confidence in her when she appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose. she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed payment. all of which form part of the records as evidence. The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse of confidence. appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property of the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. It was learned that they failed to settle their accountabilities with the MTFSH.00. Placido. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning. Petitioner advised the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the hardware store. He had hoped to obtain his share of the partnership income. With the said arrangement. Alarmed over the sudden turn of events. 163437 February 13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. a certain Boy Candido. Wilson and Placido. Although there is misappropriation of funds here. to facilitate the release of their payment. offered the duo the use of his credit line with the Mt. Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner). Placido. Placido lodged a complaint for theft against petitioner. The RTC rendered a judgment CONVICTING the accused of the crime of theft. with express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them. which affirmed the trial court’s disposition. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH). petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract. FACTS: Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) entered into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner. Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a net income ofP130. They assured Boy that the matter of the unpaid obligations to MTFSH has been resolved. After the completion of the project. No. Placido. ACL management informed Placido and Wilson that the final payment for the work that they have done would be withheld.T. petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft.. were able to secure an assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract. Not all misappropriation is estafa. Boy acceded to the request and proceeded to release the final payment due to Placido and Wilson. ISSUE: What is the crime committed by Pideli.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ERNESTO PIDELI vs. 2008 REYES. Wilson and petitioner made representations with the accountable ACL personnel. estafa or theft? 130 | P a g e . brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to Placido. Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. Consequently. The following day.000. Despite repeated demands. J. Petitioner appealed to the CA. ACL summoned all its subcontractors to a meeting. R. petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier. Wilson and petitioner were in attendance. with the assistance of petitioner. Unexpectedly. At the meeting. They agreed to undertake the project in favor of ACL Construction (ACL).R. it is jurisprudentially settled that intent is a mental state. however. The intent to gain is presumed from the taking of property appertaining to another. hence. Accordingly. There is. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things. the elements of theft are as follows: 1. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the crime of theft as committed by any person who. Appellant’s argument that since the money belonged to the partnership. In an effort to exculpate himself. The CA correctly debunked petitioner’s postulation in the following tenor: We likewise find no merit in appellant’s contention that the money did not belong to the private complainant as the latter was only claiming for his share. Under the terms of their agreement. That said property belongs to another. petitioner posits that he cannot be held liable for theft of the unaccounted funds. Appellant was not complainant’s partner but his brother. He. 2. As for his alleged acting in good faith and without intent of gain. The monies subject matter of the complaint pertain to the partnership. That there be taking of personal property. and that appellant as their agent acted in good faith and without intent to gain. settle the account with the supplier. the existence of which is made manifest by overt acts of the person. he had only physical custody of private complainant’s money. here. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner. which was supposed to be applied to a particular purpose. failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract. cannot be the object of the crime of theft as between the partners.e. We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that appellant had but the material/physical or de facto possession of the money and his act of depriving private complainant not only of the possession but also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the 131 | P a g e . and 5. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. 4. Complainant’s share manifestly belonged to and was owned by the private complainant. a confluence of the elements of theft.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property RULING: The appealed decision is AFFIRMED. 3. Appellant’s failure to do so or to return the money to the private complainant renders him guilty of the crime of theft. i. shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. holds no water. That the taking be done with intent to gain. petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. When appellant received the disbursement. v. there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. Aquino. Chief Justice Ramon C. but if he has the juridical possession of the thing. succinctly opined: The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) orde facto possession of the thing.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code. As early as U. De Vera. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property money such that he (the appellant) could dispose of the money at will constitutes the element of "taking" in the crime of theft.S. the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. 132 | P a g e . However. his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft. Although there is misappropriation of funds here. petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property. (4) the taking was done with intent to gain. J. With the pad of official receipts in his hands.000 collection from the company’s client. and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz should be convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft HELD: The RTC correctly convicted Cruz of the crime charged. he was obliged to turn it over to the company since he had no right to retain it or to use it for his own benefit. 176504. This incident came to the knowledge of the Chief Executive Officer. Cruz received from Hemisphere the amount of P15. the CEO demanded that Cruz return the collection.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Although he was not an authorized person to receive cash and issue receipts for Porta-Phone. (2) the property belongs to another. THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario. Cruz refused to turn over the amount and said that he would return the amount only upon his receipt of his reimbursements from the company. beyond the shadow of doubt that Cruz took and kept the P15. Cruz went to Porta-Phone and returned the pad of receipts. Cruz proceeded to his client. Thus the CEO invited Cruz to a meeting. The People of the Philippines G. Hemisphere. The collected amount belonged to Porta-Phone and not to Cruz. (2) the property belongs to another. As he had kept it for himself while knowing that the amount was not his. took hold of a pad of official receipts from the desk of PortaPhone’s collection officer. When he received the same. The prosecution established. theft is qualified when it is. a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone which is a domestic corporation engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other communication equipment. (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner. among others. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code. but failed to deliver the cash he received from Hemisphere. (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner.R. committed with grave abuse of confidence.000. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Ferdinand A. Cruz v. because the amount was a refundable deposit for the communication items leased out by Porta-Phone to Hemisphere. (4) the taking was done with intent to gain. In the meeting. No.00 as refundable deposit for the equipment. and delivered articles of communication equipment. and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things.) The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property. This prompted PortaPhone to file a criminal complaint for Qualified Theft against Cruz. the presence of the element of unlawful taking is settled. 133 | P a g e . The next day. FACTS: Cruz. 3 September 2008. THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. In the meeting held. in which it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of asportation. In this case. Ferdinand made use of his position to obtain the refundable deposit due to Porta-Phone and appropriate it for himself. Clearly. it was apparent that the reason why Cruz took the money was that he intended to gain by it. the taking was done with grave abuse of confidence. 134 | P a g e . As a marketing manager of Porta-Phone. The lack of consent by the owner of the asported money is manifested by the fact that Porta-Phone consistently sought the return of the same from Ferdinand in the meetings held for this purpose and in the various letters issued by the company. Cruz admitted having received the amount and kept it until his reimbursements from the company would be released to him. He could not have taken the amount had he not been an officer of the said company. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information. the CA found him guilty of robbery. S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely grabbed the firearm and ran away with it. S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling. Briones v. On the other hand.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. 5 June 2009. (2) the property taken belongs to another. the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. being mauled by four (4) individuals. To show that robbery was committed. two (2) of whom were later identified as Briones and his brother. the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another. while on appeal to the CA. the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. we can only convict Briones for the crime of theft for taking S/G Molina’s firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to gain. and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Thus. (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain.38 caliber revolver (firearm). A criminal information for robbery was filed against Briones. it was at this point that S/G Molina lost his firearm to Briones. No. Thus. Vicente Briones (Vicente).R. Parañaque. in the course of his employment with the security agency. the following elements must be proved: (1) the taking of personal property be committed with violence or intimidation against persons. While S/G Molina and S/G George Gual (S/G Gual) were manning a gate of BF Homes. the elements constituting the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property. They noticed a homeowner. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Rommel C. 156009. and (3) the taking be done with animo lucrandi. FACTS: S/G Dabbin Molina (S/G Molina) is a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services. S/G Molina was issued a . 135 | P a g e . J. The RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft. (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner. (2) that said property belongs to another. People of the Philippines G. ISSUE: Whether or not there was accompanying violence or intimidation in the taking of firearm HELD: We agree with the RTC that only the crime of theft was committed in the case as S/G Gual's testimony does not show that violence or intimidation attended the taking of the firearm.) The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another. SECOND DIVISION (Brion. it elaborated on the existence of the elements of abuse of confidence and misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused. In its decision. 136 | P a g e . or to deliver the proceeds of the sale. 152065. an Information for estafa under Article 315.) Disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. Uy lodged a criminal complaint against Real before the City Prosecutor of Batangas. One day. Real selected seven pieces of jewelry for which Uy prepared a receipt (entitled “Katibayan”) and handed the same to Real. FACTS: Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. Now.” since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding of Real’s daughter. Hence.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. if unsold. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The receipt reflects the obligation of Real to return the said pieces of jewelry. 1 (b) of the RPC. Because Real is his “kumadre. The trial court found Real guilty of the said crime. but still remained unheeded. Uy entrusted to Real pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time. However. J. No. if sold within ten days from receipt. HELD: Petition DENIED. 29 January 2008. Further. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Real arrived at Uy’s house and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she had a buyer at that time. On several occasions. accused did not comply with her obligation. Thereafter. 315. because of the fact that Real reached third year college and was Uy’s sales agent for quite a time. Thereafter. par. 1 (b) of the RPC was filed against Real.R. par. Uy agreed. ISSUE: Whether or not the presence of damage or prejudice caused to the private complainant exists. FIRST DIVISION (Azcuna. so as to constitute the crime of estafa. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property BELEN REAL vs. Real posits that the RTC decision’s total silence on the presence of damage or prejudice caused to private complainant Uy reveals the absence of the same. A final demand letter was sent. Uy patiently returned to Real’s house for several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him. the RTC did not give credit to Real’s denial of the Katibayan and allegation that she was made to sign in a blank piece of paper. Real told him that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but requested for an extension of the date of payment because the payment tendered to her was in the form of check. when Uy inquired about their transaction. and because Real was his agent for quite a time. Ten days thereafter. Uy. (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt. 315. and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. In this case. disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. not only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. 315. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Certainly. par. who is a businessman. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property The elements of estafa under Art. or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same. To assert his legal recourse. 1 (b) of the RPC. goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust. or for administration. 137 | P a g e . it cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that Real’s refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. par. or on commission. Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money. Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private complainant Uy. Also. (Equicom) the invoices. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ELISEO R. is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card companies. was the only one tasked to convert the Equicom reports sent through electronic mail from its original ARJ Text Format to the Amipro Format used by Bankard. vs. an Information charging petitioner Francisco with estafa defined under Article 315. then employed as the Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor of Bankard. Inc. the latter was unable to use such amount. Mastercard or Visa debits Bankard for the amount due to other credit card companies or banks which acquire the invoices where the credit card used for the purchase is issued by Bankard. Solidbank.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. FRANCISCO. Equicom transmits through electronic mail the reports on the transactions to Bankard. Thus. THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario. Petitioner Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial. Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of the settlement of transactions between the issuing banks from the time of the crediting of the amount to petitioner Francisco’s credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged back to Solidbank. 177720. ratiocinating that as a result of the fictitious credits which the accused caused to be posted in his credit cards. fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. the credit apparently being a reversal of charges from four establishments. credit advances and other documents relevant to encoding and posting. one of the companies which issues credit cards. One time. J. 138 | P a g e . Mastercard or Visa pays Bankard for the amount Bankard has paid the commercial establishments for the invoices it acquires. Bankard was unable to recover the amount which petitioner Francisco fraudulently credited to his AIG Visa Card. With this. 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the RTC of Pasig City. An amount of money was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco. par.) The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) does not require that the false pretense. Bankard suffered damages because the latter was made to pay the same to Solidbank and AIG Visa. Since there were no original purchase transactions charged against petitioner Francisco’s credit cards.. 18 February 2009. Bankard transmits to Equicom Computer Services. relayed to Bankard that there were four questionable transactions reflected in a Solidbank Mastercard account under the name of petitioner Francisco. Procedurally. On the other hand. during the time the amount was charged against Bankard. The CA affirmed the conviction. As a result of these fraudulent acts by petitioner Francisco. Inc. The investigation conducted by Bankard confirmed that there were indeed anomalous reversals of charges and crediting of sums of money to petitioner Francisco’s credit cards. JR. The RTC found petitioner Francisco guilty of the crime charged. Another amount was also credited to petitioner Francisco’s AIG Visa Card based on another supposed credit advance. Solidbank again charged back Bankard for the said amount. instructions for debiting. which the RTC denied.R. No. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. FACTS: Private complainant Bankard. Petitioner Eliseo Francisco Jr. Thereafter. these credits appeared to be fictitious. thus. It does not require that the false pretense. such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a). fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party.and (4) as a result thereof. directed to the credit card companies. this petition. or falsely pretends to possess power. (Emphasis supplied. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Hence. business or imaginary transactions. that is. fraudulent act or fraudulent means. fraudulent act or fraudulent means. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of estafa requires that the fraudulent act should have intentionally been directed to the offended party. fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. (2) such false pretense. (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense. property. influence. the offended party suffered damage. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him. contrary to the contention of petitioner Francisco. HELD: Petition DENIED. Bankard also suffered damages by reason of his fraudulent acts. CA correctly held that. or employs other similar deceits. The following are the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(a) of the RPC as held by the Supreme Court in several cases: (1) the accused uses a fictitious name. where petitioner Francisco contended that his lack of privity to the business deal between Bankard and the credit card companies (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa). Thus. 139 | P a g e . qualifications. could not have induced Bankard to part with its money or property because of any false pretense. he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J.) The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense. agency. even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. making Bankard a proper party to bring an action against him. Moreover. in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa). fraudulent act or fraudulent means. fraudulent act or fraudulent means committed by him. credit. but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof. Lo introduced them to Grace Calimon who represented herself as a sub-agent of Axil International Services and Consultancy (AISC) a legitimate recruitment agency. Lo persuaded the complainants to apply for a job in Italy through the services of the accusedappellants. 175229. Agramon. accused-appellant Calimon contends that she was also an applicant for overseas employment and that she was also recruited by Lo together with private complainants. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GRACE CALIMON FOR ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA AND AIDA COMILA FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ONE (1) COUNT OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. She likewise denied having received any money from the private complainants and that it was her co-accused Comila who received the money. FACTS: Accused-appellants Grace Calimon and Aida Comila were charged with illegal recruitment and estafa penalized under paragraph 2(a). J. In this case the deceit consists of the accusedappellants' false statement or representation made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of money by the complainants. HELD: Petition is DENIED The Accused-appellants' acts of deliberately misrepresenting themselves as having the necessary authority to recruit the private complainants for overseas employment and collecting money from them but failing to deploy them and to return the money despite several demands clearly amounts to estafa through false statement of fraudulent misrepresentation. To convict for this type of estafa the element of deceit must be present.) To convict for this type of crime. It is necessary that the false statement or representation was the very cause or the only motive which induced the complainant to part with a thing of value.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Thereafter. the POEA filed the criminal charges against the accused-appellants. and Daisy Devanadera. et al. Accused Lourdes Lo was not apprehended and remains at large. 140 | P a g e . it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. Article 315 of the RPC. Through these misrepresentations the accused-appellants were able to defraud the private complainants certain sums of money. The RTC of Manila found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against them. Comila on the other hand denied having known Lo. Private complainants upon verification with the POEA discovered that the accused-appellants were not employees of AISC. LOURDERS LO. In their defense. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. According to the private complainants. According to the information filed against them. In the course of their business transactions accused-appellant Calimon introduced the complainants to Aida Comila who also misrepresented herself as an employee of AISC. Lucila C. G.R. the accused-appellants confederating and working together with a certain Lourdes Lo defrauded the private complainants Fe Magnaye. She also maintained that it was Lo who received the money from the complainants. No. 29 January 2009. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF NOVATION IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE HELD: Petition is DENIED The acceptance of partial payments without further change in the original relation between the complainant and the accused does not result in novation. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property CRESENCIO C. 188726. In this case the acceptance of MPI of the checks were merely intended to secure the return of the 2 million due from Milla. the checks also bounced thus unable to satisfy his liability. In the information filed against him. Additionally. Milla misrepresented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation and offered to sell to MPI business properties in Makati owned by Spouses Farley and Joseline Handog. the estafa involved here was not simple misappropriation but was committed through Milla's falsification of public documents. Lopez then demanded the return of the amount of 2 million paid by MPI.R. 141 | P a g e . In his appeal Milla contends that his payment of the checks representing the amount paid by MPI resulted in the extinction of his criminal liability due to novation. The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of contract. (MPI). MILLA vs. for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own conation. As proof of his authority Milla presented to Lopez a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title of the property and a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the Spouses. J. Milla then issued to Lopez a notarized deed of absolute sale allegedly executed by the spouses Handog in favor of MPI and an original Owners Duplicate Copy of the property. Lopez after verifying the documents with the Register of Deeds found out that said Owner's Duplicate Copy submitted by the Milla were fraudulent and that there was no transfer of property by the spouses Handog.) The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of contract. Even then. FACTS: Petitioner Milla was convicted of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. MPI then purchased the property for 2 million and gave checks to Milla as payment.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own conation. 25 January 2012. No. For novation to exist there must be proof of the intent to extinguish the original relationship and such intent cannot be inferred from the acceptance of payment of the amount due. Milla then issued two checks worth 1 million each representing the amount paid by MPI for the properties however said checks were later dishonored for having been issued against insufficient funds. Inc. SECOND DIVISION (SERENO. the liability for which cannot be extinguished by novation. The RTC of Makati found Milla guilty of the charge which was later affirmed by the CA. Thereafter. the respondent Carlo Lopez the Financial Officer of Marker Pursuits. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. This being said. 315. She claimed she signed the checks albeit the space for the date. 2(d) of the RPC? HELD: Petition DENIED. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: 142 | P a g e . (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check.) The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d). 2011. These checks were dishonored when presented for payment for the reason that the account was closed. She admitted her imprudence in issuing the checks but according to her such simple imprudence does not equate to criminal liability. she claims that no transaction has ever occurred between her and Solis. and (3) damage to the payee.000. she confronted Galope and the latter told her that the money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. Solis demanded from Montaner the satisfaction of the obligation but to no avail. She also informed Galope that the checks were not funded. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued. Paragraph 2(d). VIRGINIA BABY P. August 31. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. amount and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. The RTC found Montaner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. No. J. Hence. this petition. The total value of the 10 checks amounted to P50. the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC. each in the amount of P5. She further claimed she was not aware of the notice of dishonor and that it was her husband who had notice thereof but left for abroad and returned only after a year. par. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315.R. MONTANER G. Upon learning of the estafa case filed against her. which were misrepresented to be fully funded when in fact they were not.000 and all of them were postdated. 184053. Swindling (estafa). FACTS: An information was filed against Virginia Montaner charging her of defrauding Reynaldo Solis by means of issuing in favor of the latter 10 checks. FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro. – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x: xxxx 2. Montaner denied the allegations stating that the 10 checks she issued in favor of Solis were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money to secure a loan.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks.000. Verily. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property xxxx (d) By postdating a check. (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit. which is an element of the crime of estafa. 143 | P a g e . the prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d).00. without knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan. appellant’s assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience. and (3) damage to the payee. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. Appellant wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on them.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13.000. The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d). or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. As for appellant’s claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks imprudently. constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d). Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis’s clear and categorical testimony. the Court views such statements with the same incredulity as the lower courts. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. each in the amount of P5. 1996 which was received by appellant’s husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank. in his house in exchange for their cash equivalent.00 or a total of P50. In the case at bar. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued. The building located in La Loma. 159950. On the other hand. it is worth noting that the Physical Science Report stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. that is. He also denied that he had a quarrel with his aunt the night before the fire started. One tenant testified that he heard Gonzales Jr. the accused. ignite a flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where Gonzales Jr. He further moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 144 | P a g e . and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. JR. this petition. Thereafter. Quezon City was owned and occupied by one Carlos C. February 12. HELD: Petition DENIED.’s room and that Gonzales Jr. he smelled gas. of said date of occurrence.R. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson. feloniously and deliberately set fire to an inhabited two-storey residential building which [was] partitioned into dwellings rented out to tenants. When Canlas was called to the witness stand. v. Canlas. Gonzales Jr. SECOND DIVISION (Quisimbing. They tried to put out the fire but to no avail. On his way to the room rented by Gonzales Jr. GONZALES. He avers that both the trial court and the appellate court failed to consider the Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. Jr. Hence. he testified that at about 9:30 p. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the RTC's decision. 1997. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property JOEL P. J. he was watching television in his room when his daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an adjacent room. Gonzales Jr. was laughing while the building was burning. The police officers who arrived at the crime scene testified that Gonzales Jr. The RTC of Quezon City found Gonzales Jr. Petitioner seeks to discredit the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses for being self-serving and illmotivated. and his aunt quarreling before the fire. admitted responsibility for the fire. averred that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring. Two tenants were also presented as witnesses.. Jose P. He reported the incident to the Barangay Hall but he hurriedly went back to his place when he was informed that his house was on fire. He saw Gonzales Jr. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.s' aunt told Simpao that her nephew was to blame. The other witness testified that he saw the fire coming from Gonzales Jr. fire quickly spread on the building. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzales Jr.. had also placed an LPG tank. 2007. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson. No. He said he heard Gonzales threatened to burn the house down. proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti. FACTS: On June 26. Furthermore. willfully unlawfully.m. When he was awakened by the heat of the fire he shouted for Canlas' help.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Gonzales.) In prosecution for arson. a fire because of criminal agency. this Court will not reverse their findings of fact. 145 | P a g e . is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In Physical Science Report which stated that no flammable substance was found in the specimen ashes. the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate. constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial evidence coupled with the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness. The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court. When these are present. the only issue is the credibility of the witness. the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court. the findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence and taken together with the bare denial of petitioner. supported only with testimonies of relatives. the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. In arson. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court. petitioner claims that although he had in the past threatened to burn the house. Likewise. As a general rule. sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries. that is. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness. In prosecution for arson. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Finally. without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. a fire because of criminal agency. he never really meant it. in our view. proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti. corroborated and complemented his affidavit. if credible. In this case.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated Canlas’s testimony. when the findings of both courts are in agreement. The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. Furthermore. 1613. the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. The acts committed under Art. it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson – for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x 146 | P a g e . civilized and ordered society. However. which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just. 163938. The RTC found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arson. punishable by prision mayor. and not for burning of an inhabited house. Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child when she heard some noise. She shouted for help. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty up to reclusion perpetua RULING: The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire." On the other hand. When she went out. 2008. acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present. In other words. odious and hateful offenses and which. While the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous. Hence. Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present course. the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple form Dissatisfied. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS v. acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty.) The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender FACTS: Adelina B. the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social. According to the appellate court. No. by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness. political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. but the petitioners fled. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused congregating in front of her hut. J.R. economic. March 28. viciousness. THIRD DIVISION (Reyes. to be imposed in any of its periods. the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full. The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. to the penalty. WHEREFORE. which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense. We sustain it. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses." [Emphasis supplied] Now. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. the petition is DENIED. were razed by fire. the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional. 147 | P a g e . Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: 148 | P a g e . direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court and agreed that the circumstantial evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had set the houses on fire. but Mario did not heed appellant’s call. All of you will die. J) In arson. ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence is enough to convict the appellant of the crime of Arson RULING: In the prosecution for Arson. Appellant was accusing Mauro of putting a curse on the latter’s father. appellant supposedly uttered: "I will burn you all. if credible. In arson. no direct evidence was presented. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness. Mauro saw a big fire on the second floor. FACTS: Mauro Camacho (now deceased) was lying in bed inside his bedroom on the second floor of his house when he heard gunshots. He then heard appellant Benjamin Bravo calling for him to come down. September 24. and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti. SECOND DIVISION (Perez. if credible. On his way down the stairs. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness. After trial.” Subsequently.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. but M auro remained tight lipped prompting appellant to turn around. is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. the charred bodies of the two fire victims and testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court relied on circumstantial evidence to convict appellant of Arson. is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. The occurrence of the fire was established by the burnt house. As to the identity of the arsonist. the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. hence the latter went up the stairs and pointed a gun at Mauro and demanded that he bring out the akusan an object used in witchcraft. 185282. a fire because of criminal agency. However. 2012. that is. appellant was found guilty by the Trial Court of Arson. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v BENJAMIN BRAVO y ESTABILLO GR No. the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused As to the penalty. WHEREFORE. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Section 4. under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. when sufficient. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty. We likewise affirm the award of damages. In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when death results.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. 149 | P a g e . and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. the appealed decision finding appellant BENJAMIN BRAVO y ESTABILLO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.─ Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance. 1613. partly granted the petition thereby reducing the penalty of imprisonment.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Taguinod accelerated the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them.66 as his participation. 12 October 2011. No. The CRV was ahead of the queue. Lazo and Engr. hence.) FACTS: On May 26. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ROBERT TAGUINOD v. to alight from the CRV and confront the Taguinod. The prosecution presented the testimony of private complainant. Jr. While they were returning to the car.R. 185833. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara). praying for the reversal of the decision of the RTC. in its Decision. when they were about to queue at the corner to pay the parking fees. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit. Jason H. This prompted the Ang’s wife and daughter. 150 | P a g e . respectively. Ang was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. The insurance company shouldered the said amount. The MeTC. namely. an Information was filed in the MeTC of Makati City against petitioner for the crime of Malicious Mischief as defined in and penalized under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). but the private complainant paid P18. presented the testimonies of Mary Susan Lim Taguinod. the award of moral damages and the attorney’s fees. Jules Ronquillo. THRID DIVISION (Velasco. J.66. the Ang instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the CRV. having been overtaken by the Vitara. in its Decision. The CRV. the respective vehicles were edging each other. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. found petitioner guilty of the crime Malicious Mischief.191. took another lane. The case was appealed to the RTC of Makati City. the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the front bumper. On the other hand. after Taguinod filed a motion for reconsideration. the wife of petitioner. but the Vitara tried to overtake. Undaunted.464. Susan and Mary Ann. Jojet N. Taguinod pleaded Not Guilty during his arraignment. the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp. petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. Taguinod appeared to be hostile. 2002 at the parking area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Thereafter. the repair of which amounted to P57. The defense. As a result of the collision. on the other hand.. affirming the decision of the MeTC. the SC reinstated the present petition and required the Office of the Solicitor General to file its Comment. The CA. the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper. Taguinod filed with the SC a petition for on certiorari which was denied. San Miguel. However. which rendered its Decision. which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime Malicious Mischief. 2. Whether or not the award for moral damages and attorney’s fees was proper. HELD: 1. Obviously, the first issue raised by petitioner is purely factual in nature. It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. This doctrine is premised on the undisputed fact that, since the trial court had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand, it was in a position to discern whether or not they were telling the truth. Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. It is apparent in this present case that both the RTC and the CA accorded respect to the findings of the MeTC; hence, this Court finds no reason to oppose the other two courts in the absence of any clear and valid circumstance that would merit a review of the MeTC's assessment as to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it. 2. The private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the New Civil Code because the injury contemplated by the law, which merits the said award, was clearly established. Private complainant testified that he felt bad and lost sleep. The said testimony is substantial to prove the moral injury suffered by the private complainant for it is only him who can personally approximate the emotional suffering he experienced. However, anent the award of attorney's fees, the same was not established. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorney’s fees. This present case does not contain any valid and factual reason for such award. 151 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents. G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010 CORONA, J.: "The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest." FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, the accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, who was already then blind and 79 years old, to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City. The accused moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance. The trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case. On Appeal, the. Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial's Court decision and denied the motion for reconsideration of the prosecution. Hence, the present petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the fact of death of Zenaida extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita which warrants the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1). 2. Whether or not the Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability Is applicable to The Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents HELD: 1. the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit steprelatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. 152 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. 2. The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document. Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest. The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the of the absolutory cause under Article 332. 153 | P a g e D. 126397 . the passengers of a Philippine Rabbit Bus travelling on the North Expressway on its way to Manila were victimized in a hold-up committed by four men who boarded the bus as it was approaching the Tabang tollgate. G. ISSUE Whether or not the above accused were liable for violation of P. Jimboy Cerbito and John Doe. intended or preconceived victims. Confronted with contradictory declarations and statements. February 1. They insisted that they were in some other place when the crime was committed. 154 | P a g e .D." The robbery must be directed not only against specific." The robbery must be directed not only against specific. we resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction. but against any and all prospective victims.m. Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. HELD: YES After a careful examination of the entire evidence. extortion or other unlawful purposes. A policeman who was a passenger in the bus shot one of the holduppers. Vicente Avedera. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The accused raised the defense of denial and alibi. intended or preconceived victims. FACTS: On the 3rd day of September 1992 at around 2:20 p.R. No. 532 (otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery Act). Alibi has generally been regarded with disfavor by the court because it is easily fabricated and we have no reason to deviate from this rule. extortion or other unlawful purposes. We agree with the trial court's rejection of the defense of alibi for the reason that said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the two eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution. 2000. or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means. 532 (otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery Act). for violation of P.D. committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.D. All the above elements were established. 532 entitled "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he seizure of any person for ransom. THIRD DIVISION (Gonzaga-Reyes J. An information was filed against Daniel Cerbito. and whose credibility has not been placed in doubt. committed by any person on any Philippine Highway. DANIEL MENDOZA CERBITO et al. but against any and all prospective victims.) Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P. or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means.D. The policeman was shot in turn by another holdupper. the trial court cannot be faulted for giving greater weight to the positive testimonies of the witnesses who have not been shown to have any motive to falsely implicate the accused-appellants. Northern Samar. Two passengers of the bus were presented by the prosecution. all of Laoang. the policeman died. 532 (otherwise known as the AntiHighway Robbery Act). 532 entitled "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he seizure of any person for ransom. The trial court convicted them for violation of P. PEOPLE 351 SCRA 100. 2001 155 | P a g e . Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property TAN v.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. PEOPLE 500 SCRA 183. 30. FEB. AUG. 2. 2006 WONG v. The appellate court said that the maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his check. Hence. ordered the bank to stop payment. 139292. In exchange. Petitioner filed a demurrer to the evidence. this petition. The lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. the demurrer was denied by the trial court. Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. MR was also denied.P.P. without any valid cause.) The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored. and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer. J. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks. the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand. an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK. deposited. Blg. When the checks were.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J.” The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at her office. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Josephine Domagsang vs. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan. in time. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines G. The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making. ISSUE: Whether or not a written demand to pay necessary for the crime of violation of B. 5 December 2000. to ask for financial assistance. with leave of court. the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: “Account closed. 22 (YES) HELD: Petition GRANTED. petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. 156 | P a g e . The law does not require a written notice of the dishonor of such check. CA predicated the conviction of petitioner on the supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal notice when the complainant had called her up by telephone informing her of the dishonor of the checks and demanding payment therefor. or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.R. 22 before the RTC Makati. (Vitug. No. Opposed by the prosecution. FACTS: Petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia. drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value. A Criminal Case was lodged against petitioner for Violation of B. premised on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals of the loans obtained by petitioner. drawer. (2) the knowledge of the maker. THIRD DIVISION. drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker. Blg. While. actually offers the violator `a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action.’ In this light.” Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. indeed. drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank.P. but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check. making and issuing a bum check. 22. The Court agrees. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored.e. procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.. however. the Court explained: “x x x. i. with Section 3 of the law. In Lao vs. "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank. without incurring any criminal liability. taken in conjunction.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. “It has been observed that the State. the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a `complete defense. Blg. when the maker. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing. Accordingly." a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing. Section 2 of B. The presumption does not hold. however. Court of Appeals.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness require – that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B. there must also be a showing that. Section 2 of B. within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. under this statute.P. such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal.’ This was also compared `to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government.P. and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. 157 | P a g e . The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. . in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard. not by petitioner. this petition. has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law HELD: NO.P. this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B. Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard. to be given at a specific date. 22 against petitioner. When Lincoln Gerard. Griffith. with more than one million pesos to spare. ISSUE: WON petitioner Geoffrey F. the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision. The Bouncing Checks Law “was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. Inc.. in Administrative Circular No. The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B. However. issued checks. in Criminal Cases Nos. “This is final and irrevocable”. Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the company’s inability to fund its checks. Inc. But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75.: FACTS: Phelps Dodge Philippines. Inc. On appeal. Griffith.P. 1986. The checks were signed by petitioner. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to “best serve the ends of crim inal justice. incurred rental arrearages. J.P.[26] Noteworthy. The MeTC.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J.” It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. Noteworthy. Still. according to the note that was written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge. found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B. in Administrative Circular No. per a note on the voucher attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30. 12-2000. COURT OF APPEALS 379 SCRA 94 MARCH 12.P.”[25] It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to “best serve the ends of criminal justice. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check that the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard. 22. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate Court hence. 41678 and 41679. through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerard’s properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property GRIFFITH vs. this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B. 2002 The Bouncing Checks Law “was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. 12-2000.” QUISIMBING. the president of Lincoln Gerard. The checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard. Inc. Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals but was denied.” 158 | P a g e . Geoffrey F. president of Lincoln Gerard. Inc.000. Phelps Dodge deposited the checks. the checks would be presented for payment. we find merit in this petition. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment. sold Lincoln Gerard’s property for cash amounting to P1. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property Moreover. 159 | P a g e . We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B. 22. 22 two years after said collection. While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B. WHEREFORE. is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal offense under B.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. In sum. while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties for retribution. (When the reason for the law ceases. This is especially so in this case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. Ratione cessat lex. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations of B. through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid. Further. such retribution should be aimed at “actual and potential wrongdoers”. the law ceases. the petition is hereby GRANTED. considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed. we should not apply penal laws mechanically.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life.P. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals. et cessat lex.P. 22.P.540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge. via auction sale. or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner. Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner.[35] We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee.120.P. No. The policemen contacted Santiago City PNP to inquire about Biag. In the course of the commission of the crime. and (4) that the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. policemen found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag's wallet with documents to prove that Biag owned the tricycle. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The accused pleaded not guilty but subsequently made admissions about the commission of the crime. to wit: (1) That there is actual taking of the vehicle. or the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. Moreover. Palalay further claim he was maltreated while under police custody to make the admissions.: The records of the case show that all the elements of Carnapping are present and proven during trial. During the search. there were no documentary evidence to support their admissions. there was no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle.R. The accused admitted to the commission of the crimes and led the policemen to where they dumped the body of Biag. the prosecution had nothing else. they allegedly attacked Biag with a knife thereby inflicting upon him 5 stab wounds which directly caused his death. It held that the elements of Carnapping were all present. The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to convict them by reason of the fact that aside from the admissions they made. Furthermore. J. the accused failed to explain as to how they came into possession of the tricycle. It held that the prosecution established enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the crime.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. the murder weapon was not found and no eyewitness was presented aside from the policemen who testified that they were in the possession of the tricycle at the time they were arrested. It was later found out that Biag did not return home. 2011 Leonardo-De Castro. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Carnapping qualified by the killing of Biag. (3) that the taking is without consent of the owner thereof. Policemen caught the accused in possession of Biag's tricycle loaded with stolen palay which they intended to sell in the palay station. (2) that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender. The accused ran immediately when they say the policemen approaching them. 160 | P a g e . FACTS: Renato Lagat and James Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping for mutual helping each other and with intent to gain in a Yasuki tricycle owned by Jose Biag. the CA was convinced that circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution supported the conviction. or by using force upon things. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified Carnapping RULING: Petition Denied. RENATO LAGAT and JAMES PALALAY G. 187044 September 14. The accused claimed that the admissions they made were not voluntary because as their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were interrogated for hours without counsel. Accused argued that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. (2) that the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender. The tricycle was ascertained to belong to Biag as shown by the registration papers found in the accused possession.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. or by means if violence against or intimidation of persons. or by using force upon things. (3) that the taking is without consent of the owner thereof. Lagat and Palalay failed to give an explanation as to how they came into possession of the tricycle. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal the tricycle. Unlawful taking is the taking of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner. When a person is killed in the course of the Carnapping. Their unexplained possession raises the presumption for unlawful taking of the tricycle. or the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Intent to gain is an internal act. and (4) that the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. or by using force upon things. the crime of Carnapping is qualified. presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. 161 | P a g e . it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the things. to wit: (1) That there is actual taking of the vehicle. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property The records of the case show that all the elements of Carnapping are present and proven during trial. Lagat and Palalay's intent to gain was proven as they were caught in a palay buying station on board the stolen tricycle used to transport the palay they stole and were going to sell in the station. together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara.00. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. bearing a suspicious plate number. The RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. ISSUE: The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner. The deed of sale gave the vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife. He reported the carnapping to the TMG. Rodriguez Avenue. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property MEL DIMAT. G. For his part. Sonia. which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. Samson Delgado. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision. although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number. vs. He also claimed that.. January 25. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. Respondent. 162 | P a g e . After stopping and inspecting the vehicle. bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850. Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla.R. The Facts and the Case The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law1 before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25. No. Jose Mantequilla. 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. 181184.000. Quezon City.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818. Petitioner. 2012 FACTS: This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery. On March 7. they were not actually the same vehicle. 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Tolentino had no documents to show. the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him. someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25. conceals. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt. acquires. Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850. Of course. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and.00. keeps. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. 163 | P a g e . Here. the vehicle having been carnapped. Still. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. or buys and sells. therefore. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis. had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. Articles: 293-332: Crimes Against Property HELD: The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed. on the other hand. or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. requiring no proof of criminal intent. Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. But this certainly could not be true because. receives. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. But Dimat’s defense is flawed. 1998. "buys. the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. Two years later in December 2000. (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS J. Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. sells or disposes. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. 2) the accused. possesses. Based on the above. First.000. its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum. evidently. when stopped on the road and inspected by the police. who took no part in the robbery or theft. J. nevertheless. Petitioner contended that he cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair.) While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel. it should stand to reason. Jacutin offered complainant a job where she would be the subject of a "research" program. 140604. Jacutin asked her if she has taken a bath. employee. Petitioner then fondled her breast. eventually. by his words and actions. Then Petitioner pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. Thinking that it was part of the research. Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. 7877. that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. 7877? Held: Yes. manager.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. accused directed her to raise her foot and lower her pants so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her legs. telling him angrily that she was through with the research. influence 164 | P a g e . Sandiganbayan found Dr. Indeed. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Facts: Petitioner Dr. then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing went to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. JACUTIN v. raised it up to her navel.PEOPLE G. supervisor. On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research will be conducted. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity DR. teacher. Before she alighted from the car. No. petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. trainor. an impression that he could facilitate Ju liet’s employment. Inside the car.A. 6 March 2002. education or trainingrelated sexual harassment is committed by an employer. by his words and actions. Work. or any other person who. Rico Jacutin is the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City. Yee. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. Still inside the car.R. Complainant Juliet Q. RICO S. Indeed. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps.00 for her expenses. She hesitated for a while but. (Vitug. she did as instructed. She explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. In appeal. Shocked at what petitioner did. Petitioner interposed the defense of alibi saying that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards when the incident happened and added that only the City Mayor had the power to appoint city personnel. 3. she agreed to go with the accused. Indeed. an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. professor. she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself. THIRD DIVISION. petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juli et had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. instructor. Rationale: Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides: “SEC. petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed. having authority. coach. Dr. – Work. Rico Jacutin guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment. agent of the employer. He then handed over to her P300. petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as defined and punished under R. Dr. by his words and actions. by his words and actions. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment. petition er himself would appear to have conveyed. that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed. or in granting said individual favorable compensation. petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. a newly graduated nurse. promotions. demands. sexual harassment is committed when: “(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment. but finding no opening suitable for her in his office. Indeed. While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel. “(a) In a work-related or employment environment. deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other. a position he held when complainant. re-employment or continued employment of said individual. an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. Indeed. it should stand to reason.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed. or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting. request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project. nevertheless. 165 | P a g e . He did try to show an interest in her plight.” Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City. regardless of whether the demand. her father being a boyhood friend. or privileges. segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate. conditions. terms. saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. Mamenta. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire – it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. “Wait for a while. They all then went out of the courtroom and proceeded back to the staff room. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity JOCELYN S. the designated judge was not around. he got mad. he asked the utility aide to buy him four bottles of beer. hostile.I.)” Thereafter. She testified that she went to the court. Mamenta. PAISTE v. She immediately prepared the necessary form and. Respondent followed her and continued uttering unsavory remarks: “Bullshit ka! Vulva of your mother! Why did you take the client there and even raised your voice? (Bullshit ka! Okinnam nga babai! Apay ta innalam dagita kliyente idiay sanak to rinayawan!)” She replied that her parents taught them not to answer back at older people. No strings attached. 01 October 2003 EN BANC (Per Curiam) The acts of Mamenta. MAMENTA. Instead. agpipinnadas tayo. They told him they want to post bail and he asked for the records of the case. P-03-1697. they could not find Mamenta. He abused the power and authority he exercises over them. She afterwards tried to free her hands off his but he would not let her. In A. Why. No. A. This situation started. trivial mistakes. No. constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating. “As if you are my father. who was sitting at the judge’s chair. he 166 | P a g e . complainant Paiste is the owner of JCP72 Insurance Agency. This kind of incident happened at least ten more times. got angry and threw his cards. she was told to sit in one of the chairs in front of the judge’s table. Once inside. He did not sign the clearance. When she asked him to sign the document. Complainant Goltiao is a Stenographer I of the MCTC of Tayug-San Nicolas. has transactions with the MCTC Tayug-San Nicolas. came to their office seeking clearance. went to see respondent in the courtroom to obtain his signature. After examining the records. P-03-1697 (formerly OCA I. when she told him to stop courting and sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. as if he wanted to shake her hands. and as its proprietor. which are an affront to women. When they arrived. he told her. 01-1196-P). He shouted at her: “Why did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court?” She responded that such was not her intention and reminded him of his requirement that he must first see the applicants before he sign their clearance. is that okay? Tell me that you love me too. which is the gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment. She related an incident which happened early one morning when he asked her to see him inside the judge’s chamber. No. to post bail. sent then out and shouted “Bullshit ka!” at her thrice. who was at that time playing tong-its at the lawyers’ table with unnamed individuals. At that time.” He easily gets mad at her even for small.M. She noticed that he was mad.M. “You just go ahead upstairs. She reciprocated by extending her hands and jokingly put his hands on her forehead (agmanmano).” She retorted.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. Pangasinan since 1997. and offensive working environment for his female subordinates. according to her. APRONIANO V. She testified that a representative from the Plaridel Insurance Co. He still shouted: “Vulva of your mother! I wish you will die now! Whom are you bragging of? We will try each other.” Spurned. An employee named Marilyn accompanied then to one of the rooms at the hall of justice where the Mamenta was holding game cards and playing tong-its with some people. I love you. Marilyn called his attention telling him that somebody wants to post bail. could you not wait?” They went ahead and Mamenta followed fifteen minutes after. together with the representative. then extended his hand to her. Goltiao declared that her working relationship with Mamenta is “sometimes good and sometimes bad because of his ill temper. (Okinnam nga babai! Matay ka koma itattan! Apay sinno aya ti paglaslastog mo? Sige. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. Mamenta retorted.P. together with a client. JR. I would just like to tell you something. she sent one of her staff to get the receipt. Hence. After investigation. courtesy and cooperation. and to provide then with a healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with respect. must be the paragon of propriety and good behavior. He told them to go to the court and get it the following Monday.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K.00) they paid him corresponding to the amount of the JDF. there was no reason for him to unleash to her a fury of this kind. She added that this is not the only time that he failed to issue her a receipt. so that in the end public interest will be benefited. to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with the rules and regulations of the civil service and the judiciary.00) to Mamenta. an officemate and a client again went to the MCTC in Tayug-San Nicolas to post bail in connection with Criminal Case No.00).000. who accompanied them to the judge’s house. he 167 | P a g e . This is especially true for a clerk of court like Mamenta. the investigating judge rendered a Consolidated Report and Recommendation finding Mamenta guilty of serious misconduct and accordingly proposed that he be sternly reprimanded and fined ten thousand pesos (P10. it is incumbent upon him to set an example to his coemployees as to how they should conduct themselves in office. Later.400. In other cases. this Court have emphasized that court officers. They returned the next day. He did this in the presence of so many employees and clients of the court. Paiste. circumscribed with heavy responsibility. verbally abused her and even disrespected her mother. The report was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). a Saturday. In fine. they handed three thousand pesos (P3. after completing their documents. “You go to Rosales! That is not our work!” He also became angry when they followed him. She was merely asking him to sign a clearance form and to examine the applicant pursuant to his specific instruction that he should first see the applicant for the clearance before he sign the form. but the latter reported to her that he did not issue one.400. On April 20. he also neglected to do so even after she has paid the mandatory JDF fees. The truth is. They then demanded an official receipt for the two thousand four hundred pesos (P2. “Paano naman yung sa akin?” They understood that to mean that he was expecting some form of compensation as he accompanied them outside the office on a non-working day. Mamenta failed to measure up to these standards. the instant petition. He shouted profanity at her. two thousand four hundred pesos (P2. Mamenta instructed them to go to the house of Judge Pastor. After evaluating the report and the records. Worse. the OCA proposed that a stiffer penalty must be imposed on Mamenta and recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year having been found Guilty of various offenses including the Grave Offenses and disgraceful and immoral conduct. They came from the court where they met Mamenta. As a ranking officer of the court. she was just doing her job.000. ISSUE: Whether or not the offender is guilty of the offenses charged HELD: Time and again. 7461. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity slammed it and said. 2001. The judge approved the surety bond. His use of offensive language towards complainant Goltiao reflects his impoliteness and lack of decorum.00) of which was for the JDF.00) after he asked them. They gave him the remaining six hundred pesos (P600. That Monday. They went there as told but the judge rejected their papers. Like a hunter out on the prowl. 7461. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances. constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating. the Court finds Mamenta guilty of sexual harassment. P-03-1697 to hold respondent administratively liable for his failure to issue official receipt after receiving court fees and for discourtesy. Undoubtedly. which is the gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment. he preyed on them as he took advantage of his superior position. complainant Paiste gave to the respondent the amount of two thousand four hundred pesos (P2. He would then beseech her to say the same things to him. While professing one’s amorous intention is not something that usually causes a hullabaloo. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees. 2001. He abused the power and authority he exercises over them. The evidence shows that on April 21. Many times. Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity got mad at her out of his fear that the client she brought along might report him to this court when they caught him in flagrante delicto gambling. hostile. No. he declared his feelings for her and handed her love notes. 7461 reveals that no copy of the official receipt appears on file indicating that no receipt was ever issued to complainant Paiste. It appears too that the complainant was not the exclusive object of respondent’s advances. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire – it is about power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. She sent an office representative that Monday as told but respondent did not issue any receipt. thus: “Why did you bring then with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court?” The undue advances Mamenta made to complainant Goltiao betrays his twisted sense of propriety. His severely outrageous acts. It generates unwholesome consequences on the gambler as it diverts his attention from the more important responsibilities of his job.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. they were married and they were young enough to be his daughters. it becomes indecent and improper in this case considering he is complainant Goltiao’s superior and both of them are married. He proposed to have dinner dates with her at Jollibee. Further verification from the records of Criminal Case No. Respondent himself was very much aware of this prohibition and this is exactly the reason why he castigated the complainant for approaching him while he was playing cards. His failure to do so is a violation of the National Accounting and Auditing Manual 168 | P a g e . His dissoluteness told itself when he went to the extent of calling her at her mother’s house and persuading her not to tell her husband about these incidents. which are an affront to women. he told her to get it the following Monday at the court. he victimized other female workers unabashedly professing his alleged feelings for them in utter disregard of the fact that they were his subordinates.400.M. When she asked for an official receipt. Gambling is illegal and is absolutely forbidden at court premises during office hours. Witnesses Marilyn de Leon and Glenda Ramirez testified that they also received love notes and invitations for dinner from him. and offensive working environment for his female subordinates. respondent should have issued an official receipt when he received the sum of money from complainant Paiste.00) as bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. There is likewise sufficient evidence in A. There were times that he cornered her at the judge’s chamber and unnecessarily held her hand. Under the circumstances. Similarly objectionable is Mamenta’s penchant for playing tong-its (a card game) and gambling with other employees of the court. in acknowledgment thereof. Even if he argues that he could not issue an official receipt to the complainant Paiste as the transaction transpired on a Saturday and outside court premises.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS K. still. It bears emphasis that there is no valid reason for his non-issuance of a receipt. his failure to issue a receipt the following Monday is totally unjustified. 169 | P a g e . Articles 333-346: Crimes Against Chastity which mandates that no payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an official receipt. No. the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. BONGALON G. Finally. “there is in effect no marriage at all. On one of her vacations here in the country. ISSUE: Whether or not Cenon is not guilty of the crime of Bigamy HELD: Petition DENIED. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage. FACTS: Cenon Teves (Cenon) married Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) in Muntinlupa.R. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit.) It is evident therefore that Cenon has committed the crime charged. Hence. contracted another marriage with Edita Calderon (Edita). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. the second or subsequent marriage of Cenon with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Cenon claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void. the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of Cenon. his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. Articles 347-352: Crimes Against Civil Status CANON R.” He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio. J. Thus. this petition. Thelma filed a complaint for bigamy against Cenon. 188775. After the marriage. She obtained a copy of the marriage certificate of the 2 from the National Statistics Office. Thus. On appeal. Caloocan City. 170 | P a g e . August 24. Cenon was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. rendered its decision finding Canon guilty of the crime of bigamy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. for the same purpose. During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy. 2011 (Perez. rendered a decisiondeclaring the marriage of Cenon and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. At the time of his second marriage with Edita. she was informed that her husband Cenon. Cenon has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage. the Regional Trial Court. Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines for vacation. and thus. Branch 130. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS L. TEVES vs. need not be judicially determined. The Regional Trial Court (RTC). Bulacan. there is no bigamy to speak of. However. where the criminal case is pending. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan. the instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage. such as in this case. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. If Cenon’s contention would be allowed. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. even assuming that a complaint has been instituted. The crime of bigamy was committed by Cenon on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information. and from that instant. liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Articles 347-352: Crimes Against Civil Status It is evident therefore that Cenon has committed the crime charged. Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense. We note that in Cenon’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. Following Cenon’s argument. the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS L. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. 171 | P a g e . Cenon’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter. in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Such cannot be allowed. Plainly. in marrying his second wife. shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. to the latter’s house in Taguig. She subsequently learned that Nollora Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. Geraldino. The RTC convicted Nollora of Bigamy and the CA affirmed the decision. 1992. that is. He. did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact. Subsequently Jesusa Nollora filed a bigamy charge against her husband. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. Metro Manila. heard rumors that her husband. yhere is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority. indicating his criminal intent. Nollora. Atilano O.. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. There are requirements that the Shari’a law imposes. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora. Nollora. Rowena P. while working in a hospital in Saudi Arabia. What is clear. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second. even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. Upon arrival in the Philippines. proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment” 172 | P a g e . Jr. Geraldino. said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. Issue: Whether Nollora's prior conversion to Isalm absolves him of criminal liability for Bigamy Ruling: Petition DENIED Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages.] being open to several interpretations. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora. therefore. Geraldino. It is axiomatic that “(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages. In his converting to the Muslim faith. has another wife. However. co-accused Rowena P. he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. she learned that her husband indeed contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. is insufficient[. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS L. Nollora. the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Articles 347-352: Crimes Against Civil Status Nollora vs People Facts: Jesusa Nollora... Jr. claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10. before so doing. Jr. Jr. however. Nollora. Jr. he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages. Geraldino. a second marriage with Jesusa Pinat. third or fourth time. Jr. Atilano O. Binay and others including some unidentified government officials discussed operation "Dirty Fingers" after the ASEAN Summit Meeting. In the course of the press conference. about five (5) feet in height. Atty. intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor ROBERTO BRILLANTE v. tagged as a hitman in the group of Dr. These reports are: 1. 118757 & 121571 November 11. or any act. has been specifically assigned to assassinate Mr. the use of public school teachers." xxx xxx xxx 3. On December 14. met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with. Prudente. Augusto "Bobby" Syjuco. Binay. then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination of Mr. a certain Emilio Anecito. He further accused Binay of terrorism. status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt. now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race. a Major Rafael Nieva. Brillante accused Jejomar Binay (OIC Mayor and a candidate for the position of Mayor in Makati) of plotting the assassination of Augusto Syjuco. On December 8.R.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. J An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay. Second Division. president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP). Tinga. 173 | P a g e . whether real or imaginary. another candidate for Mayor of Makati. Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente. Prudente. held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. the threat to kill or hurt political ward and precinct leaders not supporting or opposed to Atty. sporting a mustache. fair complexioned curly haired. Dr. the mobilization of "marshals" who will bring firearms and to ferry hitmen to target points. xxx xxx xxx 4. He is said to be a silent person and supposedly has a perfect score in hit missions assigned to him. 1987. We have received reports that Atty. among others. omission. Subject of the meeting was "Winning the Election at all Costs. The operation involves terrorism. Atty. a Commander Luming. The "marshals" will also be used as "pointers" and to shelter the hitmen after accomplishing or performing their missions. the planting of his squads in places close to potential targets. or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 1987. and a commander Francis Baloloy. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. condition. and fairly built bodily. and to use these as samples to show rivals that his group is capable of doing so. Aniceto has been described as Iranian mestizo looking. Nos. 2005. 1987. On December 17. FACTS: Brillante. the possession of a vice or defect. Syjuco. The pertinent portions of the open letter read: 4. According to Brillante. real or imaginary. or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor. his statements and utterances were privileged communication because he made them public out of a legal. There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar. moral and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of the elections to be held on January 18. Nieva’s background report is that he: xxx xxx xxx c. d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his employer can control or stop him. it was reported that Major Rafael Nieva had been assigned to work with Mr.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Aniceto. the possession of a vice or defect. condition. Brillante’s statements during the January 7. malice cannot be presumed from them. whether real or imaginary. the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another. and to avoid the unnecessary loss of life. status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt. ISSUE: Whether Brillante is guilty of libel. or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime. 1988. such as the use of goons to threaten Binay’s opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjuco’s assassination. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor xxx xxx xxx 5." To be liable for libel.6 Both the RTC and CA found Brillante guilty of the crime of libel. 1987. HELD: Petition denied. discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person. and (d) existence of malice. 1988 press conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay. 174 | P a g e . or of a vice or defect. or any act. Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime. condition. or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Since his statements were privileged communication. or any act. (c) identity of the person defamed. Was hired by Dr. status. On December 10. Prudente as security officer and personal bodyguard. (b) publication of the charge. omission. Prudente and their associates. omission. People’s Journal. Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer. the determination of Brillante’s culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether his statements were made with malice. Prudente and their associates as the persons who participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination of Syjuco not only in his open letter but also during the press conference. 2004 consisting of the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner. The Court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the Decision dated October 19. It was also published in several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made known to the general public. *A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Roberto Brillante (Brillante) assailing the Decision of the Court dated October 19. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. Further. Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay. namely. i. 2004 which affirmed his conviction for the crime of libel but reduced the amount of moral damages he is liable to pay. There is publication if the defamatory material is communicated to a third person. it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. a person other than the person to whom the defamatory statement refers. although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino. Balita.. In the cases at bar. Thus. moral or social duty to be privileged.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M.e. and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to be published in several newspapers. such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor The element of publication was likewise established. the communication thereof was not limited to her alone. 175 | P a g e . News Today. The law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal. In the cases at bar. but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent to a 176 | P a g e . The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication. “inutile”. Atty. had an interest to protect. or social duty to make the communication. even if it be true. (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board. for the law already presumes that Buatis’ imputation is malicious (malice in law). In his defense. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. 142509. It was indicated in the letter that it was copy-furnished to several other people. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. 24 March 2006. However the presumption was not successfully rebutted by Buatis. either verbal or written. Pieraz sent a letter to Mrs. “carabao English”. moral. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel. Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis. Buatis argued that communication. even if it be true. and “satan”. or at least. Quingco a demanding her to vacate the premises owned by the Rodriguez Estate. Quingco. and. or superior. No. if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. J. Buatis. casts aspersion on the character. While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads. and who has the power to furnish the protection sought. every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. having some interest or duty in the matter. Pieraz is defamatory. “stupidity”. FACTS: Atty. if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS v. when the imputation is defamatory.R. and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. “You may proceed then with your stupidity”. the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of Buatis (malice in fact). the atty-in-fact of Mrs. Pieraz contained the following phrases: “This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter addressed to our client. The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication. In using words such as “lousy”. Under the general rule laid down in Article 354. answered in response. as it was written. by a lawyer under obligation to defend his client’s cause is a privileged communication ISSUE: Whether or not the imputation is defamatory and malicious HELD: The words used in the letter sent by Buatis to Atty. the letter. using carabao English”.) Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. The letter of Buatis to Atty. FIRST DIVISION (Austria-Martinez. which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made. JR”. “Yours in Satan’s name JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. “stupidity”. the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal. a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. however.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. moral or social duty to be privileged. such statement must be communicated only to the person who have some interest in the matter alleged. which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs.i. Quingco’s right over the premises. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation. While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent. Moreover. The letter merely contained insulting words. and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. “lousy” and “inutile letter using carabao English”. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent’s client.e. and “satan”. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor member. 177 | P a g e . In the alleged article Diaz wrote of the sexual experiences of an actor named Philip Henson with a certain woman which he named Miss S. Thus. In this case the last element that the victim is identified or identifiable is not present in the libelous article. it must be given publicly. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ARTICLE IS LIBELOUS HELD: Petition is GRANTED For an imputation to be libelous under article 353 and 355 the following requisites must be present: a. According to him Phillip Henson was the source of the article. Hence. According to respondent Bagay she was the Miss S pertained in the alleged article. 25 May 2007. it is essential that the victim be identifiable. In order to maintain a libel suit.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. In his defense Diaz admitted that he indeed wrote the alleged article but denied that he knew Florinda Bagay or Miss S. b. Absent one of these elements. 159787. Petitioner Diaz is acquitted of the crime charged. c. FIRST DIVISION (SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. 178 | P a g e . Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor OGIE DIAZ vs. the present petition by Diaz seeking to reverse the judgment.s FACTS: Petitioner Ogie Diaz (Ogie Friaz in real life) was charged with libel by Florinda Bagay. The RTC of Manila found petitioner guilty of the crime charged which was later affirmed by the CA. the respondent Florinda Bagay alleges that the accused Diaz as the Managing Editor and writer of the newspaper Bandera allegedly wrote a malicious article intended to destroy her reputation. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to. or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. No. The libelous article while referring to "Miss S" does not give a sufficient description or indication of the identity of "Miss S. the victim must be identifiable." The said article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one the same person.) In order to maintain a libel suit. In the information filed against him. a case for libel will not prosper. J. Respondent then narrated her brief stint in show business in which she adopted the screen name Patricia Santillan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. it must be defamatory. although it is not necessary that the person be named. It was also during this brief stint that she met and had a romantic relationship with Philip Henson. having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R. set aside the latter’s resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. PONCE and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. 179 | P a g e .R. submitted to the investigating prosecutor a newsletter purporting to be a belated annex to the affidavit. 156183. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor NICASIO I. It was prefaced with the quotation “For every extraordinary fortune. VICENTE C. (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati Prosecutor’s Office and (3) the newsletter could not be considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to the said affidavit but had given it thereafter. J. including one for Estafa. ALCANTARA v. The Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the information. Ponce after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit.) FACTS: Respondent Vicente C. there is a great crime” and the text a) Overshipment of log b) Land grabbing c) Corruption of public office d) Corporate grabbing The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. No. This reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged communication. 2007. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints against petitioner Nicasio Alcantara and his family. Bautista as an intended annex to respondent’s sur-rejoinder. Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice who reversed the Resolution of the prosecutor. where Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of the shares of Floro Cement Corporation. 2507 where Ponce accused the Alcantaras for defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation Alcantara filed a complaint for libel against Ponce in connection with the aforesaid newsletter. However. CA found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication which would exempt it from libel HELD: Petition is DENIED. He claimed that: (1) the statements therein were defamatory. Prosecutor Saulog issued a Resolution finding probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of Information with the RTC. In the preliminary investigation. FIRST DIVISION (Corona. February 28. According to the Special Fifth Division of the CA: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. condition. The inclusion in the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the "newsletter" discussing the alleged "corporate grabbing" by petitioner will tend to support private respondent’s case of estafa against petitioner insofar as such alleged "corporate grabbing" will highlight or manifest petitioner’s propensity for dishonest dealing or fraudulent machinations. in the discharge of his or her official duties. Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation. in People vs. Applying this rule by analogy to the present case. or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor.S. sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers. Aquino. and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or damages.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. omission. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor The subject "newsletter" is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa. or any act. As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent Judge adopted. (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person. our Supreme Court has emphasized that "it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally construed to favor the writer. 97-39547 to Prosecutor Bautista who was then conducting the preliminary investigation in said case. courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings.” The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime. There is therefore no doubt that the subject "newsletter" is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa. who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication. and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or damages. vice or defect. as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code. does not amount to publication for the reason that the sending of such material was made specifically for the purpose of including the same as evidence in the preliminary investigation. dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. status or circumstance. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant. and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. such communication does not amount to publication. private respondent’s submission of the "newsletter" intended as an annex to his Sur Rejoinder Affidavit in I. The crime of estafa involves deceit. The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy. (3) malice. While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of absolute privilege extends 180 | P a g e . discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Our Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer. No. Thus. it was vested with a privileged character. real or imaginary. the "newsletter" containing the defamatory statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa then under preliminary investigation. The crime of libel. (2) publicity or publication. . and were disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint. the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint against petitioner. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor to statements made in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial. . albeit for other. WHEREFORE. case of Borg v.S. made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded. the instant petition is hereby DENIED 181 | P a g e . (Emphasis ours) Furthermore. these statements were still relevant to the complaint under investigation because. Furthermore. although it contained [in]criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. Liberally applying the privileged communication doctrine. the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation. separate acts involving greed and deceit.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Boas18 makes a categorical declaration of the existence of such protection: It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature have been given absolute privilege." Here. like the averments therein. the U. the newsletter qualified as "a communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest . they also involved petitioner’s alleged rapacity and deceitfulness. as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required. and Bogs Tugas. Petitioner posits that. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel. Petition DISMISSED. BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA. No. but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article. if the accused has been specifically identified as “author. proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required. NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA” On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eddie Gutierrez. discredit. real or imaginary. FACTS: Cristinelli Salazar Fermin. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor CRISTINELLI S. A LIBEL is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime. The trial court in its Joint Decision found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Therefore. publisher. status. if the accused has been specifically identified as “author. to wit: “MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES. The appellate court affirmed the conviction of petitioner.) Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published. 157643 March 28. two criminal informations for libel were filed against Fermin and Tugas before the RTC Quezon City. but also the person who prints or publishes it. or 182 | P a g e . Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. Therefore. 2008 (NACHURA. editor. or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication. hence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. FERMIN V. MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE” “IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DU’N. to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. or any act. 1995 the following material. editor. or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor. this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. J. omission. Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid print and circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14. but also the person who prints or publishes it.R. HELD: Yes. condition. or of a vice or defect. or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication. it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. Thus. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business. unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Articles 353-364: Crimes Against Honor contempt of a natural or juridical person. or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures. as it tends to cause dishonor. it would certainly prick one's conscience. the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them. media people. petitioner cannot. The victims were identified and identifiable. or contempt of the complainants. as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign. whether in broadcast media or in print. or against public figures on matters of public interest. Verily. Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. not only was there malice in law. If the utterances are false. the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. To say that the article. 183 | P a g e . Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties. or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. the article being malicious in itself. or vices or defects for being fugitives from the law. It can be gleaned form her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments. the article reeks of malice.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS M. malicious. including gossip and intrigue writers such as petitioner. such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. The attribution was made publicly. In determining whether a statement is defamatory. in its entirety. More importantly. discredit. by simply making a general denial. and of being a wastrel. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation. but there was also malice in fact. is not libelous disturbs one's sensibilities. Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because allegedly. convince us that there was no malice on her part. about their personal lives. the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before Judge Palattao's court. considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Branch 71 (MeTC).A. and EVANGELINE PONCE. with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. In an Order dated 2 February 2006.C. petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004. Without acting on petitioner’s motion. Branch 71. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration. No. No.C. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.) Reckless Imprudence is a single crime. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO.A. HON. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. 184 | P a g e . Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. the RTC dismissed S. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner. November 17. cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.C. petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. invoking S.C. the motion remained unresolved.C. No. Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Pasig City. in a petition for certiorari (S. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. Ponce. 2803). its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty.A. Article 365: Criminal Negligence JASON IVLER y AGUILAR. 2803. without reaching the merits of S. 172716. because of petitioner’s absence.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. Seven days later. No. Prior conviction or acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Branch 157 (RTC). Invoking this conviction. Article 48 does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. No.A. No. v. the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and. 2803. The MeTC refused quashal. 2010.A.R. J. this petition.C. and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S. Thus. G. Meanwhile. Hence. the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. including the arraignment on 17 May 2005. Petitioner contested the motion. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. No. 82366. SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO.A. finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. On 7 September 2004. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition. Petitioner. Respondents. respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S. 82366. THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence Issue: (1) WHETHER PETITIONER FORFEITED HIS STANDING TO SEEK RELIEF IN S.C.A. 2803 WHEN THE METC ORDERED HIS ARREST FOLLOWING HIS NON-APPEARANCE AT THE ARRAIGNMENT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 82366; (2) IF IN THE NEGATIVE, WHETHER PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE BARS FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 82366. Held: Petiton is GRANTED. The Court held that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. With respect to the first issue, the mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post -arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing. Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition. On the second issue, Reckless Imprudence is a single crime; its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller that "reckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double 185 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in long line of jurisprudence. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied) 186 | P a g e THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Article 365: Criminal Negligence EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J) Edwin Tabao (petitioner) seeks reconsideration of our Resolution, dated June 8, 2009, denying his petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals (CA) decision to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual issues. The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts: At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez’ speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over Rochelle’s body. Bystanders — armed with stones and wooden clubs — followed Mendez’ car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez’ car, sat beside him, got his driver’s license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelle’s body inside Mendez’ car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital,where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries. The defense presented a different version of the incident. The petitioner narrated that at around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street when his car ramped on an island at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its two rear wheels had been elevated. He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were approaching his car. He again alighted from his vehicle and saw a person lying on the road. He looked at his left side and saw a car that was “running fast like a wind” pass by. He approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez’ car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car. Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the UST Hospital. Mendez, for his part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he left his girlfriend’s house in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street on his way home, he saw a vehicle that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like object fall from the car that overtook him, and stopped when he realized that what had fallen was a person’s body. When he moved his car backwards to help this person, many people approached his car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had happened. The people replied that someone was run over; some of them 187 | P a g e causing her to be thrown into the road on her back. essentially. Mendez was driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid running over her as her body lay prone on the street. therefore. Article 365: Criminal Negligence pointed to him as the culprit. coordinate and reciprocal. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. He is bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his own. As a result. The petitioner even testified that his car had to be towed. coupled with the traffic island’s alleged newness. he admitted that all four wheels of his car. and that Mendez’ car ran over her as she was lying down. He puts the blame for the ramping and. Manila. not just the two rear wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony. found that it was “very clear that both accused are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete. ended up on top of the island divider. Later. lost contact with the ground. Thereafter. he did not notice the island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. in its decision dated September 15. the two of them brought the victim to the UST Hospital The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and thereafter charged the petitioner and Mendez with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). 2003. to wit: the petitioner was not attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island divider and bumped Rochelle. the fact that the petitioner’s entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island divider strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident. ISSUE: Whether accused Tabao is criminally negligent based on the evidence HELD: The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is mutual. We are not persuaded by the petitioner’s rather simplistic account that mere darkness. It held that the two failed to observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their respective vehicles. 1993.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. Branch 39. during cross-examination. The entire vehicle. The vehicle could not have ended up in that condition had the petitioner been driving at a reasonable speed. it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others as well as for his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez’ car. his failure to notice the island on the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island. He denied having run over the victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way home from work on January 21. the petition. It found that the petitioner’s car first hit the victim. The RTC. caused his car 188 | P a g e . To our mind. Hence.” and convicted the two (2) accused of the crime charged. his car ramped on the island so that both its rear wheels became “elevated” from the road and he could no longer maneuver the vehicle. That the petitioner’s entire vehicle landed on top of the traffic island — body. among others. whether as pedestrians or as motorists. that the petitioner was driving his car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an intersection. the ramping of his vehicle demonstrably indicates to us that the petitioner failed to observe the duty to maintain a reasonable speed. stop at the shortest possible notice. We thus find the trial court to be correct when it held that the petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of the incident. chassis. The CA even pointed out that the vicinity is near residential areas. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. The facts show. Article 365: Criminal Negligence to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover. The record shows that pedestrians were present in the vicinity at the time of the incident. four wheels and all — sufficiently indicates his speed at that time. A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered. We therefore believe Victor’s testimony that the petitioner was speeding when he bumped the victim. Ultimately. to enable him to keep the vehicle under control and. if needed. at the very least. The fact that the petitioner was driving near the Governor Forbes Street and G. at a speed that would have prevented his car from climbing entirely on top of the island divider. The force that propels an entire car off the street and on top of a traffic island could only have been inordinate speed. the island divider should have received the petitioner’s due attention. whenever necessary. Otherwise. The petitioner’s admission that he did not notice the traffic island is in itself an indication of his failure to observe the vigilance demanded by the circumstances. however. His bare allegation that the island lacked markers or reflectorized marks is likewise not persuasive. Tuazon Street is adjacent to the vicinity of the incident. it shows the criminal recklessness for which he has been convicted. As the trial court correctly observed. or at least speed beyond that of a motorist coming from or going to an intersection. 189 | P a g e . many other vehicles passed the same road that night but only the petitioner failed to notice the island divider. In short. to keep and maintain his vehicle under control so he can. We are likewise not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim that darkness and the traffic island’s alleged newness justify his failure to notice the island. Tuazon Street intersection gives rise to the expectation that he would drive at a speed that anticipated — or would have anticipated — that other persons are on the road. Newly constructed or not. while we pointed out its proximity to an intersection. A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty. to say nothing of slowing his car down. The darkness and these circumstances should have caused the petitioner to be more alert and more vigilant. It has not escaped our notice that the intersection of Governor Forbes Street and G.THE REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO AND RELATED SPECIAL PENAL LAWS N. to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. he should have been able to put his vehicle to a complete stop or.