Based on the Syllabus of Justice YapRevised Penal Code – Book Two Title One to Title Four G. Mata, CPA 11-18-2017 TITLE ONE – CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY & THE to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea. LAW OF NATIONS On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 People vs Tulin nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" THIRD DIVISION anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer [G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001] the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30,1991. DOES, accused-appellants. On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the DECISION transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride." MELO, J.: On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001. for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in P40,426,793,87. was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island. proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused- The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the in Metro Manila. use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused- called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident. paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows: of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila. to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs. b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air evade arrest. Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City. cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed 1 On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused- addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the appellants, as follows: parties. The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows: Changco, Jr. That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride." against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law. of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone CONTRARY TO LAW. operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma." (pp. 119-20, Rollo.) The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, ensued. proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some vessel. inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary tons. 2 On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]r., and of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal personal card. Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00 March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company. Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, the transfer. Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore. and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha costs against all the accused. Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A SO ORDERED. person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco (pp. 149-150, Rollo.) himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by may be summarized as follows: NBI agents. Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads: court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres of their constitutional right to procedural due process. Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. 3 of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information witnesses for the accused. with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory. the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants. of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights, The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused- the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates. committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the Cheong San Hiong crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge and territory? that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, him. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that that the vessel and its cargo were pirated. "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the 4 assistance of counsel." By analogy , but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused- the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]). to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads: valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and them. independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with except in writing and in the presence of counsel. the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals - (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall ...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and be inadmissible in evidence against him. members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, and their families. with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991... that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. xxx The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made xxx voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more xxx stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on of counsel. board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the 5 mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated. of the pirates. It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is xxx accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to xxx observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a xxx certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]). Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its, destination, which and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need turned out to be off the port of Singapore. not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act (pp. 106-112, Rollo.) or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime design. (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused- appellants. long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)." approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity .Besides, Loyola and Emilio a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and 6 its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person. including a Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be large. considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied). piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a January 1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders or not, any person is covered by the law. who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide: keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty of reclusion crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist of its complement or passengers. harmoniously as separate laws. (Underscoring supplied.) As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads: person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, being a member of its Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential (Underscoring ours) Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides: committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood, as follows: cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole in Philippine waters. or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle 7 applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]). 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage Decree No 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]). that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, 2 of said law? Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing: quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in (a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. 1992, pp. 133-134). Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by which provides: Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or Pride" could not have been effected. receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused- benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the Penal Code. firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio 8 Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid $150,000.00 but Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end. order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo. not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions. First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto. Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any SO ORDERED. participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never People vs Catantan bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T FIRST DIVISION Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met [G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997] for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine TAYONG, accused-appellant. vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted DECISION with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he BELLOSILLO, J.: was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused- acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation - and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice. [1] to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined. Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and 9 sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. [2] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front appealed. part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke.The jolt threw In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532. pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore. The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied). had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied. On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene something against his will, whether it be right or wrong." asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential bodily harm instead. that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other point of a tres cantos [4] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat. place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything. simply committed grave coercion and not piracy. On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion between the two, or I will kill you." [5] Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan. the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening - 10 Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened? pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining A: Yes. witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was? his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon. of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat. The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the that pumpboat? Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the A: Four. marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to did they do that? submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the the pumpboat (underscoring supplied). succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree - Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat? Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are A: Only one. still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat? and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social supplied). progress of the people; Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you? Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway xxxx robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied). by the penal statutes of all countries; and, COURT: Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from Q: To whom did he aim that revolver? perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, A: He aimed the revolver on me. with the end inview of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ: and community progress of the people. Q: What else did he do? The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat. sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces Q: What did he do with his revolver? of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye. townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do? deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place. purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and Q: To what place did he order you to go? community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another A: To Daan Tabogon. [6] pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters not be ascertained. was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As 11 While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils of violence against or intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their and feloniously seize by boarding a passenger sea vessel M/V J & N Princess, owned boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their by one Nelson Uy and under the complement of Gervacio Uy and Saturnino Gaudicos pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that with 19 officers and crew members and while on board said vessel, seized its radio would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" and subsequently demanded and divested them and its passengers cash in the pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency and valuables and equipments worth Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities. P350,000.00, Philippine currency or in the total amount of Five Hundred Fifty The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced Thousand Pesos (P550,000.00), Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it piracy, accused committed the crime of physical injuries on the person of Ernesto again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation Magalona, the quarter master; to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters. in the above stated total amount. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 123 of the Revised Penal Code, as of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy amended by PD 532.[2] penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is Accused Titing Aranas alias Tingards, Angelo Paracueles, Juan Villa alias Juantoy, AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant. Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas remain at large. Hence, this case proceeded SO ORDERED. only against appellant Elmer Manalili who was arrested on January 21, 1993 in Cebu Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. City. When arraigned on August 23, 1993, appellant Manalili pleaded not guilty.[3]He also People vs Aranas waived his right to pre-trial. Thereafter, trial ensued. SECOND DIVISION The prosecution presented the following testimonial evidence: [G.R. No. 123101. November 22, 2000] Prosecution witness Gervacio Ong Uy, 62, operations manager of the cargo- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TITING ARANAS @ passenger vessel M/V J & N Princess, testified that at 9:40 in the evening of December TINGARDS/RONNIE, ANGELO PARACUELES, JUAN VILLA @ JUANTOY, ELMER MANALILI, 15, 1992, Tuesday, he boarded said vessel. The vessel plies the route between Ubay, ET AL. accused. Bohol and Cebu (and vice-versa) every other day or every Sunday, Tuesday and ELMER MANALILI, accused-appellant. Thursday. It leaves the port of Ubay, Bohol at 10:00 o clock in the evening. About DECISION twenty minutes after departure on said date, he went down to urinate at the lower DE LEON, JR., J.: deck. After urinating, two persons were standing behind him; one was pointing a gun Before us is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, at his back and the other was holding his collar. They ordered him to go upstairs to 7th Judicial Region, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City finding accused-appellant Elmer Manalili the third or upper deck. Arriving there, they told him to open the radio room, and guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified piracy and sentencing him they destroyed the radio. They also ordered that all lockers of the room be to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify certain individuals. opened. They told him that they were military men looking for firearms and shabu. He The Information indicting appellant reads: opened all lockers except that of quartermaster Ernesto Magalona, who was not That on or about the 15th day of December, 1992 in the seawaters of the municipality around as he was hiding. The crew members looked for him, and when he appeared, of Ubay, Province of Bohol, Philippines, which is part of the Philippine waters and the pirates scolded and hit him with an armalite. He was about 3 meters away from within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, Magalona. Magalona opened his locker but the pirates were not able to find anything confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means 12 inside. When the locker was opened, he saw that the left hand of one pirate had a bulging at his waist, but he did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying. He could tattoo with the initials G.V.[4] identify the two armed men who escorted Uy, because he was about three to four The pirates took from Gervacio Uy P30,500.00 in cash and his wristwatch worth meters away from them and the place was well illuminated with fluorescent lights. He P1,500.00. From an inventory made by the purser, the pirates divested from the identified one of the said armed men by pointing to a person inside the court room passengers P200,000.00 in cash, and P300,000.00 worth of personal belongings who, when asked his name, answered that he was Elmer Manalili. He declared that including radio and jewelry.[5] the other man carried a long firearm. Describing the manner Uy was escorted, he said After the robbery, the leader of the pirates told the quartermaster to stop the engine that the man holding the armalite was also holding the collar of Uy and pushing him of the vessel, then there was a gunshot, which was apparently a signal for the get- while appellant followed. Uy and the two armed men eventually reached the third away pumpboat. Before the pirates left, they told Uys group not to go back to Ubay, deck where the armed men destroyed the radio. He came to know that the radio was but to proceed to Cebu, otherwise the boat would be strafed.Nevertheless, they destroyed because the purser who came from the third deck looking for him told him proceeded to Talibon, Bohol in order to report the incident to the police. They arrived so. He tried to cover his face with his malong, but ultimately a pirate saw him and in Cebu at 5:00 o clock in the morning of December 16, 1992.[6] struck him with his gun hitting his right ear so he was forced to stand up and go with Gervacio Uy declared that he identified the two persons who initially pointed a gun them to the third deck. When he was at the third or upper deck, Uy was on his way at him through pictures. The one who pointed an armalite at him was about 56 in down to the second deck escorted by appellant. Immediately after his locker was height, regular in built, brown complexion, with straight hair and between 25 to 28 opened, he was instructed to return to his cot and ordered to lie down.[9] years old. The second man was older, about 42 years old, 53 or 54 in height, medium Magalona said that there were about eight (8) pirates. He could only remember and built with brown complexion and black hair; he was carrying what looked like an uzi identify the two armed men who escorted Gervacio Uy because the movements of gun. From pictures presented by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS) when he was the pirates were so fast and coordinated. He could remember Elmer Manalili because investigated, he identified the two as Titing Aranas and Paracueles, all at large. When he was facing him and he saw him frontally. The pirates divested the passengers of appellant Elmer Manalili was presented during the preliminary investigation before their belongings. His wallet containing P1,000.00 was taken.[10] the municipal judge of Ubay, he told Municipal Judge Napuli that his face was familiar On cross-examination, Magalona stated that when the robbers announced a hold-up, among the eight pirates. However, quartermaster Magalona and Boiser, a passenger, he was lying down. They were ordered to remain lying down, face down for less than identified him as one of the pirates.[7] an hour. The robbers were in pairs stationed at the lower deck, second deck and third On cross-examination, Gervacio Uy said that out of the 20 pictures presented to him deck while the other two made rounds of these decks.When the passengers were for identification by the CIS, he only positively identified Titing Aranas and Angelo divested of their belongings, operations manager Uy was at the third or upper deck Paracueles. He saw Elmer Manalili for the first time when he was presented before escorted by the two armed men, one of whom was the appellant. He was positive Judge Napuli for investigation.[8] that from the start, the two armed men escorted Uy from the comfort room at the Prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, 39, quartermaster of M/V J & NPrincess since lower deck to the second deck and then the third or upper deck where the radio room 1991 to the present, testified that on December 15, 1992, he was on board the said was located. They did not separate from Uy but always followed him, and he had a vessel which left the port of Ubay, Bohol bound for Cebu at 10:00 o clock in the good look at them when they passed by the second deck.[11] evening. He was off-duty then. At the time of the robbery, he was on the second deck After the incident, Magalona saw the appellant at the office of the chief of police in of the boat. He was lying on his cot near the passage way leading to the upper deck Ubay, Bohol and then during the investigation at the office of the municipal judge. He when someone shouted, Ayaw paglihok kay duna miy pangitaon nga shabu ug armas also saw the appellant from pictures of suspects shown to him at the office of the nga uzi, meaning, Do not move, we are searching for shabu and uzi gun. Then he saw chief of police.[12] their manager Gervacio Uy being escorted by two armed men. One was armed with Prosecution witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes, a member of the Philippine National an armalite pointed at Uy. The other man was also armed because something was Police (PNP), Ubay, Bohol, testified that on December 15, 1992 he was a passenger 13 of M/V J & N Princess bound for Cebu. He was asleep when the boat left the port of Basak, Mandaue and stopped working with Mr. Chua about the end of January Ubay, but was awakened by a gunfire. Then he saw a pirate aiming an armalite rifle, 1993.[18] and another one, about 16 years old, aiming his carbine rifle, at him. Another pirate According to Perandos, when they started working at La Guardia, he and Reynaldo got his bag, and taken therefrom was his service revolver, a caliber .38 Smith and Cardona slept at appellants house. On December 14, 1992, he, appellant and Wesson, issued by the Chief of Police. The gun had twelve (12) rounds of Reynaldo Cardona started painting the house of Mr. Chua at 8:00 o clock in the ammunition. After the incident, he went to the PNP in Bohol, and from pictures that morning and stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon.Then they proceeded were shown to him, he identified the pirate who got his bag as Angelo Paracueles. He to the house of appellant together with Reynaldo Cardona and ate supper there at did not see the appellant during the incident.[13] 8:00 o clock in the evening. Appellants wife was not around because she was working Due to fright suffered at the time of the incident, SPO2 Reyes asked for moral as an entertainer in a karaoke bar. Thereafter, they had a drinking spree, and then damages of P50,000.00, and actual damages of P50,000.00 for the loss of the gun, slept in appellants house. The next day, December 15, 1992, they went to work at the and P288.00 for the 12 rounds of ammunition.[14] Chuas residence early in the morning and stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the Prosecution witness PO3 Saul Pino Cuyno,[15] a member of the PNP, Ubay, Bohol, afternoon. They proceeded to appellants house and arrived there at 6:00 o clock in testified that in the evening of December 15, 1992, he was also a passenger of M/V J the evening. Appellants wife was still around and they ate supper with her. She left & N Princess. The pirates took from him P80.00 in cash and his watch for work at 6:30 in the evening. Appellant was left to take care of their child. After worth P4,000.00 The armed men mentioned by SPO2 Reyes were the same men who supper, he, Reynaldo Cardona and appellant were drinking until 10:00 o clock in the aimed their guns at him. From pictures that were shown to him after the incident, he evening.Appellant slept ahead of them at 11:00 o clock that night.[19] identified one of the armed men as Angelo Paracueles.[16] Perandos stated that appellant was working continuously at the Chuas residence On the other hand, appellant Elmer Manalili denied that he was involved in the piracy from the first week of December until his arrest at about 7:00 o clock in the evening committed on board M/V J & N Princess in the evening of December 15, 1992 in the of January 21, 1993. He knew of the arrest because appellant was arrested at the side seawaters of Ubay, Bohol inasmuch as he was in his residence in Cebu City at that of his house. At that time, appellant went to his house in order for them to borrow time. money from a close friend, money lender Cecilia Cupta.After the arrest, he visited Defense witness Jeffrey Dadula Perandos, 26, single, third year high school,industrial appellant at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City and asked why he was painter, testified that he knew appellant since they were neighbors at Cabantan St., arrested. Appellant said he was only a suspect.[20] Mabolo, Cebu City. Appellant started to live there when he was eight (8) years old On cross-examination, Perandos said that he was asked to testify by appellants wife, and stayed with his elder brother Junior Manalili. He does not know appellants father Cherry Mae, and appellant himself in a letter handcarried by Cherry Mae. In said because the latter died in Camotes Island before appellant transferred to Mabolo, letter, appellant also asked Reynaldo Cardona, his neighbor, to testify for Cebu City. In 1989, appellant married Cherry Mae Elimino from Lutopan, Cebu. After him. Appellants wife paid for his fare.[21] their marriage, they stayed in Lutopan for a while, and resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu Defense witness Reynaldo Cupta Cardona, 21, single, elementary graduate, painter, City in October or November 1992.[17] and a resident of 55-B Cabantan Street, Barangay Mabolo, Cebu City, testified that Perandos said that he has been working as an industrial painter since he was 15 years appellant resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. He knew appellant since they worked old. In December 1992, he was hired to paint the house of Mr. Chua in La Guardia, together in painting the house of Alfonso Chua at La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. Aside Lahug, Cebu City. His companions were appellant, Reynaldo Cardona, Ernesto Dadula from appellant, his other companions were Jeffrey Perandos, Ernesto Dadula and and master painter Nicomedes Baguio who was the head of their group. They started Nicolas Baguio. They started painting in December 1992 and finished the work in painting the house of Mr. Chua sometime during the first week of December, but he February 1993. However, appellant was arrested on January 21, 1993 so only four of did not finish painting the house because he transferred to another painting job at them finished the painting job.[22] 14 Cardona stated that on December 14, 1992, he, appellant and Jeffrey Perandos She stated that on December 14, 1992, Perandos and Cardona were still staying with started painting the house of Mr. Chua at 7:00 o clock in the morning, and stopped them. When she left for work at 7:30 in the evening, her husband was at home taking working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon. Then they proceeded to the house of care of their child. On December 15, 1992, she left for work at about 8:00 o clock in appellant where they slept to save on fare. They ate supper at 6:00 o clock in the the evening. Her husband, their son, Perandos and Cardona were left at home. She evening together with appellants wife Cherry Mae, who did not work as it was her arrived home at about 1:20 in the morning after their Christmas party. It was her day-off. Appellant went to bed at past 7:00 o clock in the evening, and slept with his husband who opened the door of their house; their child, Perandos and Cardona were child. He and Cherry Mae talked about her work, while Jeffrey Perandos still sleeping.[28] listened. They all slept at 10:00 to 11:00 o clock that night. The following day, According to Cherry Mae, Perandos and Cardona stayed in their house from December 15, 1992, they went to work at Mr. Chuas residence at 7:00 o clock in the December 7, 1992 to January 21, 1993. They left when her husband was arrested. At morning. They stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon, then proceeded to the time of his arrest, she was in Lutopan, Toledo City as she attended the burial of appellants house. They ate supper at 6:00 o clock in the evening with Cherry Mae as her grandmother on January 20, 1993. It was Perandos who informed her that her it was still her day-off. Appellant slept ahead because he had to make his child husband was arrested at 7:00 o clock in the evening of January 21, 1993 in Mabolo, sleep. They conversed with Cherry Mae after they cleaned the house, and slept at Cebu City. He was in Mabolo at that time because he wanted to borrow money.[29] past 10:00 o clock that night. The following day, December 16, 1992, he woke up Appellant Elmer Manalili y Pogio, 24 years old, testified that he was a painter by ahead and prepared his baon at 5:50 in the morning. Appellant and Jeffrey Perandos profession. He does not know the co-accused Titing Aranas, Angelo Paracueles, Juan woke up at the same time.Appellant played ball with his child. They left for work at Villa, Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas. He denied that in the evening of past 6:00 o clock in the morning, and started working at 7:00 o clock. His companions December 15, 1992, he was at the wharf of Ubay, Bohol.[30] were appellant, Jeffrey Perandos, Nicolas Baguio and Ernesto Dadula.[23] He is married to Cherry Mae Elemino who is employed as a disco karaoke entertainer On cross-examination, Cardona said that appellants wife requested him to testify in in Cebu City. They got married in 1989, and then lived with his in-laws in Lutopan for this case, and gave him P70.00 for fare. On December 3, 1993, she gave him and about a year in 1990 before transferring to Lahug, Cebu City.[31] Jeffrey Perandos more than P200.00.[24] Appellant stated that in December 1992, they resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. In On re-direct examination, Cardona clarified that while they were staying at appellants the morning and afternoon of December 15, 1992, he was working as a painter in the house when they were then painting the house of Mr. Chua, they contributed money house of Mr. Chua in La Guardia, Lahug. In the evening, he was at home with his wife for their food.[25] and child, Reynaldo Cardona and Jeffrey Perandos. That night, his wife left after 7:00 Defense witness Cherry Mae Manalili declared that she was appellants wife.In o clock in the evening and attended a party given by her employer at the X-O Karaoke December 1992, her husband was a painter. She knew Jeffrey Perandos and Reynaldo Bar.[32] Cardona since the time they had a painting job together with her husband at the He was arrested at 7:00 o clock in the evening of January 21, 1993, at Cabantan Street, Chuas residence in La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. At that time, her family consisting of Mabolo, Cebu City by policemen without a warrant of arrest.He was in Mabolo to her husband and one-year-old child, was residing at Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. They borrow money from the spouses Cupta, who were neighbors of Jeffrey Perandos. At rented a room and kitchen from one Nang Ason in the middle of November. She was that time, his wife was in Lutopan as she attended the burial of her then working at the X-O Karaoke Bar. Her work was from 7:30 in the evening to 2:00 grandmother. After his arrest, he was brought to Camp Cabahug, Cebu City and then o clock in the morning. In June 1993, she transferred to Steves Karaoke Bar where brought to Bohol on January 24, 1993 and detained at Camp Dagohoy in Tagbilaran she is presently employed.[26] City until September 10, 1993. He was later transferred to the Bohol Detention and Cherry Mae said that while working with her husband at the Chuas residence, Rehabilitation Center.[33] Perandos and Cardona lived with her family at Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City since December According to appellant, while he was in the municipal jail of Ubay, Bohol, about 30 7, 1992 to minimize travel expenses. They contributed money for their food.[27] people, whom he did not know, came to see him at his prison cell. Two of them were 15 prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto Magalona. It was Magalona who 3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages. asked him, Who is Elmer Manalili? He answered that he was the one. There were four But without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. inmates then inside the prison cell. Uy did not talk to him, but just took a good look Without pronouncement as to Costs. at him. Magalona pointed at him as one of the pirates and said mao mao, which SO ORDERED.[38] means, looked like one of the pirates.[34] Appellant Elmer Manalili ascribes to the trial court the following errors: Appellant denied that he was in the vicinity of Ubay, Bohol in the evening of I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE TESTIMONIAL December 15, 1992. He went to Bohol for the first time when he was brought to EVIDENCES BOTH FOR THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE; Tagbilaran City after he was arrested by the police in Cebu City.[35] II. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE Although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy testified that one of the pirates who EVIDENCES FOR THE DEFENSE REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED ELMER opened the locker of the quartermaster had a tattoo with the initials GV on his left MANALILI, RESULTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[39] hand, the court found no such tatoo mark on appellants left hand.Moreover, The appeal is meritorious. appellants height is 5 feet 7 and 1/2 inches.[36] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the testimonial evidence The trial court found that prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto Magalona of both the prosecution and defense which led to his conviction. He argues that the identified appellant as one of the pirates. It held that the defense of alibi could not prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was one of the pirates prevail over said positive identification.[37] On September 2, 1994, the trial court in this case. rendered judgment against appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads: We agree. A careful review of the records shows that about twenty minutes after the WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, this Court finds accused ELMER vessel M/V J & N Princess left the port of Ubay, Bohol bound for Cebu on December MANALILI GUILTY of Qualified Piracy beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences 15, 1992, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy, the operations manager of the vessel, him to a penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, accused Elmer urinated at the lower deck. After urinating, two persons were standing behind him; Manalili is ordered to reimburse and pay complaining witnesses the following: one pointed a gun at his back, while the other held his collar. He was ordered to go Complaining witness Gervacio Ong Uy: upstairs with them to the third or upper deck where the radio room was located, and 1. P30,500.00 - representing cash taken from him by the pirates: they then destroyed the radio.[40] When asked whether he could identify the two 2. P1,500.00 - value of his Seiko watch; armed men who initially pointed a gun at him, Uy replied in the affirmative, and stated 3. P4,000.00 - value of his diamond ring; that he had identified them through pictures presented by the CIS as Titing Aranas 4. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages. and Angelo Paracueles. This is reflected in the records thus: B. Complaining witness Ernesto Rodriguez Magalona: FISCAL: 1. P1,000.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his wallet; Q. You said that initially there were two persons after they pointed a gun at you, if 2. P10,000.00 - representing cash taken from him togetherwith his wallet; you can see these persons, can you still identify them? C. Complaining witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes: A. Yes, I identified them thru the pictures. 1. P200.00 - cash taken from him together with his wallet; Q. Could you describe to this Honorable Court the description of these two persons? 2. P15,288.00 - value of the government issued firearm and live bullets taken by the A. The one who pointed an armalite he was about 56 in height, regular in built, brown pirates; complexion and his age is between 25 and 28 years old. 3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages. The second suspect is older, I think about 42 years old, 53 or 54 in height , medium D. Complaining witness PO3 Saul Cuyno Pino: built, brown complexion. 1. P80.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his wallet; Q. How about the hair? 2. P4,000.00 - value of his Seiko watch; A. The hair is straight. 16 Q. How about the second? beyond a reasonable doubt.[46] In the case at bench, there is no positive identification A. Black hair and he was carrying like an uzi gun. of the appellant inasmuch as prosecution eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona Q. You said a while ago that you were showed pictures, where? contradicted themselves on the identity of the alleged offender. A. There were pictures presented by the CIS when I was investigated. Moreover, although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy stated that one of the pirates Q. And did you identify those pictures? who opened the locker of Ernesto Magalona had a tattoo on his left hand with the A. I positively identified two, one is Titing Aranas and the other Paracuellos, all at initials GV, the trial court did not see any tattoo mark on the appellants left hand.[47] large.[41] Further, witness Uy declared that he saw appellant for the first time during the On the other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, quartermaster of the investigation before the municipal judge of Ubay.[48] He told the municipal judge that same vessel, testified that while he was lying on his cot at the second deck near the appellants face was familiar among the eight seajackers, but Magalona identified passage way to the upper deck, someone shouted, Do not move, we are searching appellant as one of the pirates.[49] Compared with the identification made by for shabu and uzi gun. Then he saw their manager, Gervacio Uy, being escorted by Magalona, Uys statement that appellants face was familiar among the pirates is two armed men. One was armed with an armalite pointed at Uy; the other was also characterized by uncertainty. His identification of appellant in the trial court based on armed but he did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying at his waist. He could the aforementioned statement retained its doubtful tenor. identify the two armed men who escorted Uy because he was three to four meters Significantly, the passenger named Boiser who allegedly identified the appellant as away from them and the place was well illuminated with fluorescent lights. He one of the pirates before the municipal judge of Ubay was significantly not presented identified one of the armed men as appellant. He said that the other man holding as a witness by the prosecution. The records show thus: the armalite was also holding the collar of Uy while pushing him, while appellant FISCAL LIGASON: followed fast. Uy and the two armed men eventually reached the third or upper deck I would like to made (sic) manifestation, Your Honor, that I did not present Ms. Alma where the armed men destroyed the radio as reported to him by the purser who Casil and Melecio Boiser, they were listed, but after I confronted them that they did came down looking for him from the upper deck.[42] Of the eight pirates, he could only not identify this accused, so that I did not present them, because there are others remember and identify the two armed men who escorted Uy, because their who can identify.[50] movements were so fast and coordinated.[43] He stated that from the start the two From the foregoing, it appears that the prosecution failed to prove beyond armed men, one of whom he identified as the appellant, escorted Uy from the reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the eight men who committed qualified comfort room at the lower deck to the second deck and then proceeded to the third piracy in the instant case. or upper deck where the radio room was located. They did always followed Uy, and Appellants defense of alibi is generally considered a weak defense.However, it he had a good look at them when they passed by the second deck.[44] assumes importance when his identification as an alleged offender in the crime From the foregoing, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy identified the two armed men, charged is inconclusive or unreliable.[51] Appellant asserted that at the time of the who initially pointed a gun at him in the comfort room at the lower deck, and who piracy in the seawaters of Ubay, Bohol, he was in his residence in Cebu City, and which ordered him to go with them to the radio room at the third or upper deck, as Titing alibi was corroborated by Jeffrey Perandos, Reynaldo Cardona and his wife, Cherry Aranas and Angelo Paracueles. On the other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto Mae Manalili. Although alibi can be fabricated, it is not always false and without Magalona who saw Gervacio Uy and the two armed men as they passed by the second merit, and when coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the deck on their way to the third deck, identified one of those two armed men as prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi deserves merit.[52] appellant Elmer Manalili. Besides, the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital question, such as the identity accused.[53] When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not of the offender, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly even offer evidence in his behalf.[54] In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the disregarded.[45] The identity of the offender, like the crime itself must be proven offender or offenders must be established by proof beyond reasonable 17 doubt.[55] There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused- The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly would mean exoneration for accused-appellant.[56] It is our view, therefore, and we taking into account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include one of the pirates who committed the crime charged. Hence, the appellant must be conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of acquitted. conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of appellant Elmer Manalili is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to cause the immediate release of appellant to be understood, however that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court powers of the executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect accordingly within ten (10) days from notice hereof. for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times. SO ORDERED SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur. following provisions of the Revised Penal Code: a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine RA 9372 – Human Security Act of 2007 Waters); b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection); Republic of the Philippines c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons; Congress of the Philippines d. Article 248 (Murder); Metro Manila e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention); Thirteenth Congress f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under Third Regular Session 1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson); Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of February, two 2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control thousand seven. Act of 1990); Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007 3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968); AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM 4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law); Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in 5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); Congress assembled: and, SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security 6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal Act of 2007." and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives) and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of nations. of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as rights and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution. amended. 18 SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the crime Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment. lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the commit the same. authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the and record communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17) years, the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment. enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall acquiring such evidence. not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The written order descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling to extend or renew the same, the original application of the applicant, including his within the provisions of subparagraph (a). application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti- SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. - Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers, notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The written order of the discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words terrorism. are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) 19 communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person interception and recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law who fails to notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including and recording as specified above. the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement SEC. 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs, and organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, of Appeals, including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or or memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing division the authorization shall be used or carried out. of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any SEC. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. - Any authorization granted by the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of his team. (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official. required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said team named in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) shall execute with the members of the team that required affidavit. days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or renewal, copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext the Anti-Terrorism Council. whatsoever. In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day among the members of the team named in the original written order of the to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or SEC. 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police or of the law renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law enforcement official and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as this Act. the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and 20 memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. - The and (d) the date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism written application with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down, envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its classified of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the Court of contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to, Appeals. intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using or copies of the whole or any part of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals. therewith) as evidence. It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section. notify as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed of imprisonment. in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted, and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope or sealed package written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning, Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, hearing. revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. - Any the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the Council to file the application with proper written notice the person whose crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or written words have an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open, years of imprisonment. reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other evidence. offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to imprisonment and the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer public office shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment. maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen 21 to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message, reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided, That moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the maliciously procured said authorization. time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office. SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. - Any Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph. Regional Trial Court. SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti- regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism however, That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose connection must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately. under Section 27 of this Act. SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the Three Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the period of three days. 22 SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The moment a person charged relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit physician at any time of the day or night without any form of restriction. The logbook terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and address of by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or physicians who right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to examined him physically and medically; (d) the state of his health and physical have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person condition at the time of his initial admission for custodial detention; (e) the date and cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance purpose; (f) the date and time of his return to his cell; (g) the name and address of unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). the physician or physicians who physically and medically examined him after each It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical findings on the detained contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his family legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names and addresses of of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time of each of such visits; presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel (1) the date and time of each request of the detained person to communicate and and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to communicate confer with his legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or with his and time of each departure of his legal counsel or counsels; and, (n) all other nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to avail of the important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding the treatment of the service of a physician or physicians of choice. detained person while under custodial arrest and detention. SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement aforementioned lawyer or lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person under custody or his or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of the logbook relative to the shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring any fees to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. whatsoever including documentary stamp tax, notarial fees, and the like. This Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee certified true copy may be attested by the person who has custody of the logbook or or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the the police officer or hear or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the certified true copy is made. detainee at the time the violation was done. The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. - The police or preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. - No threat, terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared as a public torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the detained person, which document and opened to and made available for .the inspection and scrutiny of the shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his or her family or the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the 23 evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat, notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to intimidation, or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable moral, or psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing. declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation and (3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, Interrogation of a Detained Person. - Any person or persons who use threat, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment. accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written of the infliction on him of such physical pain or torment, or as a consequence of the order of the Court of Appeals. infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological pressure, the penalty shall SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment. order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits, SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of a person charged with or person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel the same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be granted by the outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that effect deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court. to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or place of residence. affirmation of the applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits, computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged with or residence until otherwise ordered by the court. suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion persons; or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons. of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused. SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the Examination of SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted by the authorizing Records. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the 24 same, the original ex parte application of the applicant, including his ex parte In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti- application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: among the members of the ream named in the original written order of the Provided, That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period the legality of the interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of identify of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or this Act. conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially enforcement official shall immediately notify in writing the person subject of the bank declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and may be. whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of examined or the information to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official Institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are who fails to notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will conduct the said of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records. examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to the authorization shall be carried out. notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain Information on eight years of imprisonment. Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The authorization issued or granted by the SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after Examination of Deposits, authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to examine or cause the examination of Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - All information, data, excerpts, and to freeze bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records, or to summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents gather information about the same, shall be effective for the length of time specified obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of enforcement official. any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within forty-eight (48) The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing authorization for another period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration to another thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That of the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the application for envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council. actually conducted the examination of said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records. 25 SEC. 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the identifying only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the records examined; (b) the identity and address of the bank or financial institution Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party concerned not later maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and than three days before the scheduled opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and use the records discovered, examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of each of contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence. such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts, Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the eight years of imprisonment. authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the original written SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The written application, with authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex notice in writing to the party concerned not later than three days of the scheduled parte Application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, opening, to open the sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of purpose and reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for the original written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using the classified Appeals; and (g) that the items Enumerated were all that were found in the bank or information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination. and documents as evidence. The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any information, data, information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents and documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, acquired from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, trust accounts, assets and records have been made, or, if made, that all such assets and records of: (1) a person charged or suspected of the crime of terrorism or duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals. terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and organization, association, or group of persons, which have been secured in violation information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, of the provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence assets and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing. whatsoever, SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a Financial Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys Institution. - Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or sealed package and crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information and the organization, association, or group of persons, without being authorized to do so by sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents shall not be the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted 26 In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel, who interest of the State. maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to examine the deposits, The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) needed by the monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit and his or her family's medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or group of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 33 of this Act, the party aggrieved reason. by such authorization shall upon motion duly filed be allowed access to the sealed Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen authorization. deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. - An regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of his/her property that has been employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending institution, who refuses to allow the examination of the deposits, placements, trust shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of accounts, assets, and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime imprisonment. of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such Accounts, Assets and Records. - The seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons in said placements, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or bank or financial institution, when duly served with the written order of the charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall deemed as property held in trust by the bank or financial institution for such person suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. and the government during the pendency of the investigation of the person SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material suspected of or during the pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of Fact in Joint Affidavits. - Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of the said crimes, as the case may be and their use or disposition while the case is material fact in the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually are pending. the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances, Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. - If the person suspected of or charged with the placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after his investigation, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and to be innocent by the investigating body, or is acquitted, after his arraignment or his other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any case is dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the seizure, person suspected of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the crime sequestration and freezing of his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially and records shall forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by the declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a competent court, as the case may be, and his bank deposits, placements, trust member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized, accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such seizure, 27 sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay by the court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the bank or financial institution concerned without any further action on his part. The detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a filing of any appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not state the release of said competent court. funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing. SEC. 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The provisions of If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the contrary is convicted by a final judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered notwithstanding, the immunity of government witnesses testifying under this Act and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: Provided, automatically forfeited in favor of the government. however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to witnesses under Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the said Republic Act No.6981. amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500.000.00) a day for the period in which SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. - The penalty of his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid to him on the concept of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken from the appropriations of the police upon any person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the enumerated charges against who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or him/her. form any classified information under this Act. SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized, SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Evidence. - The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of Records. - Any person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy under this Act. to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial. and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under the SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized, Sequestered Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years included in the offense charged under this Act. and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon acquittal, any person who SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who has is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of direct custody of a detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who by his Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against the twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released 28 within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of subject to such security classifications as the Council may, in its judgment and damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the people, the security of the accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for Republic, and the welfare of the nation. charging him with the case of terrorism. The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the Council. Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to The Council shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the National Intelligence release the amounts awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as Coordinating Agency as Secretariat of the Council. The National Bureau of directed in the paragraph immediately preceding shall suffer the penalty of six Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil Defense, the Intelligence months of imprisonment. Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Anti-Money Laundering Council, If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the Philippine National Police needed to complete the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations intelligence and investigative elements shall serve as support agencies for the for intelligence, emergency, social or other funds of the Office of the President. Council. In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and or law enforcement agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and the appropriations of the said agency for the coming year. eradicate terrorism in the country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism. SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the Informant. - The police Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the Anti-Terrorism Council to or law enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority. was first revealed shall record the real name and the specific address of the SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the previous Section, informant. the Council shall have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name people as mandated by the Constitution and pertinent laws: and address to their superior officer who shall transmit the information to the 1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and Congressional Oversight Committee or to the proper court within five days after the acts of terrorism in the country; suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were sequestered, seized or frozen. 2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act; be unnecessarily revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have 3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained been terminated. for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of Book I of the punishable under this Act, and monitor the progress of their cases; Revised Penal Code shall be applicable to this Act. 4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on terrorism, SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred to, terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations; for brevity, as the "Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are: (1) 5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and the Executive Secretary, who shall be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice, who records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary conspiracy to commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; (6) the as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended; Secretary of Finance; and (7) the National Security Advisor, as its other members. 6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council shall conviction of person or persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy keep records of its proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be to commit terrorism; 29 7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of his or her testimony is needed for terrorist related police investigations or judicial other nations in the struggle against international terrorism; and trials in the said country and unless his or her human rights, including the right against 8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by the requesting country and and Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case transmitted accordingly and approved by the Department of Justice. may be, to handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing terrorism and all matters incident to said crimes. The Secretary of Justice shall assign treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law a team of prosecutors from: (a) Luzon to handle terrorism cases filed in the Regional of preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual Trial Court in Manila; (b) from the Visayas to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) persons who commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act within the from Mindanao to handle cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City. terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the Philippines; (2) SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the shall give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and and political rights of persons in relation to the implementation of this Act; and for punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual this purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have violated the civil and commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or conspiracy to commit terrorism. diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby created a Grievance official capacity; (5) to individual persons who, although physically outside the Committee composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or undersecretary from the Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the evaluate complaints against the actuations of the police and law enforcement officials commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although physically in the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold office in Manila. The outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be respectively headed by the Philippine government. Deputy Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The subcommittees shall SEC. 59. Joint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a Joint Oversight respectively hold office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three Assistant Committee to oversee the implementation of this Act. The Oversight Committee shall Solicitors General designated by the Solicitor General, and the regional prosecutors be composed of five members each from the Senate and the House in addition to the of the DOJ assigned to the regions where the Deputy Ombudsmen hold office shall Chairs of the Committees of Public Order of both Houses who shall also Chair the be members thereof. The three subcommittees shall assist the Grievance Committee Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership of the in receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints against the police and other law Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority members. enforcement officers in the implementation of this Act. If the evidence warrants it, The Joint Oversight Committee shall have its own independent counsel. The Chair of they may file the appropriate cases against the erring police and law enforcement the Committee shall rotate every six months with the Senate chairing it for the first officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by the complainants, decisions six months and the House for the next six months. In every case, the ranking or judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of other cases based on the opposition or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice Chair. Upon the same cause or causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance Committee expiration of one year after this Act is approved by the President, the Committee shall or its branches. review the Act particularly the provision that authorize the surveillance of suspects of SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or convicted of the or persons charged with the crime of terrorism. To that end, the Committee shall crime of terrorism shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country unless summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members of the Anti- 30 Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions from the members of provisions of this Act shall be automatically suspended one month before and two Congress and to submit a written report of the acts they have done in the months as after the holding of any election. implementation of the law including the manner in which the persons suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism have been dealt with in their custody and from Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council the date when the movements of the latter were subjected to surveillance and his or her correspondences, messages, conversations and the like were listened to or EN BANC subjected to monitoring, recording and tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting other reports, the Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of DECISION Congress. The report may include where necessary a recommendation to reassess CARPIO MORALES, J.: the effects of globalization on terrorist activities on the people, provide a sunset Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. clause to or amend any portion of the Act or to repeal the Act in its entirety. The 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, courts dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the President a otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law on March 6, report every six months of the status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with 2007. them starting from the date this Act is implemented. Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for not affected thereby shall remain and continue to be in full force and effect. certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations or petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), amended, or modified accordingly. represented by their respective officers[3] who are also bringing the action in their SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law by capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. the President, the Act shall be published in three newspapers of national circulation; 178554. three newspapers of local circulation, one each in llocos Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cebu, lloilo and The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cagayan de Oro, (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Davao and General Santos city. Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, shall be aired everyday at primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng three national television and radio networks; three radio and television networks, one Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of each in Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in five radio and television networks, one each Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato City and Zamboanga City. The (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for publication in the newspapers of local circulation and the announcements over local Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,[4] and joined radio and television networks shall be done in the dominant language of the by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, community. After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. take effect two months after the elections are held in May 2007. Thereafter, the Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and 31 Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581. The petitions fail. On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear: On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or as G.R. No. 179157. with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,[7] and the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007a petition for certiorari and modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581. supplied) Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same. except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting Calderon. requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10] Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti- essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements. Petitioners lack locus standi 32 While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State constitutional questions.[11] and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12]summarized the rule on locus standi, thus: Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. claim that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.[14] [A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372. result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the following the procedure under the law.[15] The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 179461 pleads the same allegations. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas individual Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and as citizens and taxpayers. authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can 33 be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA jurisdiction of the trial court; or(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the 9372. knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of policy statement of the Aquino Administration[21] of resuming peace talks with the particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations. dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea.That no Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three Sayyaf Group. years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminenceof their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them. The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and NPA. They fail to In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of in direct injury to their organization and members. Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both classified Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26] Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU 34 The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered. the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29] Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged. Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27]The IBP failed to sufficiently Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. controversy. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown courts as may be established by law. even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the pinpointed. Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy actualities. has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of 35 An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the threat to any constitutional interest decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32] suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient factsto enable the Court to Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC[33]cannot be more intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38] emphatic: Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In seeking relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real (1),[41] proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared by the and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that substantial controversyadmitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a such organizations. hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as controversy.[42] it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.[34] Similarly, apetition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35] protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one. The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From Elections,[37] to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code its function.[43] and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners goes on ad infinitum. intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44] 36 for testing the validity of penal statutes.[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51] present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52]the Court abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject enforceable. election offense[53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.[54] A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition crime of plunder. of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge. He basically standard to measure the prohibited acts. postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads: overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute. expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48] by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad The Court clarifies. statutes. At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate 37 against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made chances as in the area of free speech. without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if detailed statutes, . . .ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.) In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as- service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the appliedchallenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as and cognate rights). applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial on the same plane. invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning in its entirety. and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a 38 governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58] hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge that behavior, even though some of it is protected.[59] against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge. opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extantfacts that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause underscoring supplied) others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.[60] It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal litigants. statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63] particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their may not be allowed.[64] own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that 39 motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the the speech of those third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the supplied.) petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least penal statute, unlike in the present case. two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their analysis of its validity terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable protected expression.[71] under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the alimited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them give in to an unlawful demand. While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizesspeech, operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression in its entirety.[72] It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due protected by the free speech clause. process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant.[73] The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve speech. the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific factsof the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any the most important guarantees of liberty under law.[75] attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech. 40 In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading White the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes speech rather than conduct. future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making SO ORDERED. the element of coercion perceptible. PD 532 – Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 [I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances MALACAÑANG brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an MANILA abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974 language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.[79] (italics and distributing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic underscoring supplied) and social progress of the people; WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned merely evidence a prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved here, the Court by the penal statutes of all countries; and, cannot heed the call for a facial analysis. WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as and community progress of the people; they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to proclamation No. statute on its face and in its entirety. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973 and General 41 Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as part of the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the law of the land the following: seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway death shall be imposed. Robbery Law of 1974. b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be understood, as period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or follows: on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to, temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed. waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or one place to another through Philippine Waters. It shall include all kinds and types of receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any vessels or boats used in fishing. benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway and bridges piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within thePhilippinesused by persons, or principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or Revised Penal Code. transportation of goods, articles, or property or both. It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be modified accordingly. considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval. hereinafter provided. Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or hundred and seventy-four. other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things of other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway. RA 6235 – An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course or as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competents court be punished by: destination of an aircraft of Philippine registry, or to seize or usurp the control a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall thereof, while it is in flight. An aircraft is in flight from the moment all its external be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the doors are closed following embarkation until any of such doors is opened for occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder disembarkation. or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the 42 It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign registry to limited to dynamites, firecrackers, blasting caps, black powders, bursters, land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof while it is within percussions, cartridges and other explosive materials, except bullets for firearm. the said territory. (2) "Flammable" is any substance or material that is highly combustible and self- Section 2. Any person violating any provision of the foregoing section shall be igniting by chemical reaction and shall include but not limited to acrolein, allene, punished by an imprisonment of not less than twelve years but not more than twenty aluminum dyethyl monochloride, and other aluminum compounds, ammonium years, or by a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty chlorate and other ammonium mixtures and other similar substances or materials. thousand pesos. (3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which The penalty of imprisonment of fifteen years to death, or a fine of not less than through chemical reaction wears away, impairs or consumes any object. It shall twenty-five thousand pesos but not more than fifty thousand pesos shall be imposed include but not limited to alkaline battery fluid packed with empty storage battery, upon any person committing such violation under any of the following circumstances: allyl chloroformate, allytrichlorosilane, ammonium dinitro-orthocresolate and other similar materials and substances. 1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger of the aircraft; (4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal drug, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reactions kills, injuries or impairs a living 2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or explosive to organism or person, and shall include but not limited to allyl isothiocyanate, destroy the aircraft; or ammunition (chemical, non-explosive but containing Class A, B or poison), aniline oil, arsine, bromobenzyle cyanide, bromoacetone and other similar substances or 3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious physical injuries materials. or rape. Section 6. Any violation of Section three hereof shall be punishable by an Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry imprisonment of at least five years but not more than ten years or by a fine of not in any passenger aircraft operating as a public utility within the Philippines, and less than ten thousand pesos but not more than twenty thousand pesos: Provided, explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material. That if the violation is committed by a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the manager, representative, director, agent or employee who violated, or Section 4. The shipping, loading or carrying of any substance or material mentioned caused, directed, cooperated or participated in the violation thereof: Provided, in the preceding section in any cargo aircraft operating as a public utility within the further, That in case the violation is committed in the interest of a foreign corporation Philippines shall be in accordance with regulations issued by the Civil Aeronautics legally doing business in the Philippines, the penalty shall be imposed upon its Administration. resident agent, manager, representative or director responsible for such violation and in addition thereto, the license of said corporation to do business in the Philippines Section 5. As used in this Act shall be revoked. (1) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid, mixture or single Any violation of Section four hereof shall be an offense punishable with the minimum compound, which by chemical reaction liberates heat and gas at high speed and of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. causes tremendous pressure resulting in explosion. The term shall include but not 43 Section 7. For any death or injury to persons or damage to property resulting from a Republic of the Philippines violation of Sections three and four hereof, the person responsible therefor may be SUPREME COURT held liable in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Manila SECOND DIVISION Section 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft G.R. No. 198694 February 13, 2013 which are for hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON, Petitioner, cargoes in the presence of the owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if vs. present; in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative refuses to have the DECISION same opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: loading thereof. Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the June 30, 2011 Decision2 and September 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 32544 which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision4 of the shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-358669 and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez (Ramon) of materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the crime of possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article II of the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous the air carrier. Drugs Act of 2002.’’ The Factual Antecedents Section 10. The Civil Aeronautics Administration is hereby directed to promulgate At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 within one month after the approval of this Act such regulations as are provided in Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who Section four hereof and cause the publication of such rules and regulations in the wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, for three consecutive weeks. Such regulations shall take effect fifteen days after Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo! publication in the Official Gazette. Limangdaannabaito?" Forpurportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace, Section 11. This Act shall take effect after the publication mentioned in the preceding the man, later identified as Ramon,was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. section. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to Approved: June 19, 1971 beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where the former markedthe item with the latter’s initials, "RMG." There, Police TITLE TWO – CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF Superintendent Ferdinand RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante) prepared a request for laboratory examination which, together with the specimen, was brought by PO2 THE STATE Soque to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Martinez vs. People Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal (PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe specimen which contained 0.173 gram of white 44 crystalline substanceand found the same positive for methylamphetamine is in possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by hydrochloride (or shabu). law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.6 Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an 11(3), Article II of RA 9165 throughan Information dated January 3, 2008 which states: incident of alawful warrantless arrest for breach of the peace which he committed in That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said the presence of the police officers, notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the accused, without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then peace)subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute. and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain of custody of the prohibited custody and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO drug wassufficiently establishedfrom the time PO2Soque took the sameup to its POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of white crystalline substance containing actual presentation in court. methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug.5 Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon’s claim of extortion as his In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the incident. He asseverationsfailed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, whilewalking the police officers’ official duties. alongBalingkit Street to borrow a welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in The Issue civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually introduced Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs. himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) wherethe said The Ruling of the Court officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still The petition is meritorious. brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soquepropositioned Ramon Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted intrusions and asked for ₱20,000.00 in exchange for his release.When Ramon’s by the government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the ₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soquehad asked (Constitution) states that: for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings. Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and The RTC Ruling effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime of possession of purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue dangerous drugs as charged, finding all its elements tohave been established through except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after the testimonies of the prosecution’sdisinterested witnesses. In this relation,it examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may alsoupheld the legality of Ramon’s warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time of his things to be seized. apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects imprisonment oftwelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) secured by government authoritiesin contraventionof the foregoingarerendered years and four (4) months as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Aggrieved, inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section Ramon elevated his conviction to the CA. 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that: The CA Ruling 2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramon’s appeal and thereby affirmedhis Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. conviction. Itupheld the factual findings of the RTC which found that the elements of Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not, the crime of possession of dangerous drugs were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused however, an absolute and rigid one.7 As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches,8 searches of moving vehicles,9seizure of evidence 45 in plain view,10 consented searches,11 "stop and frisk" measures12 andsearches lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is the disruption of incidental to a lawful arrest.13 This last-mentioned exception is of particular communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition. be established that the apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried the police officer that a public disturbance is being committed. out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court 14 which In this regard, PO2 Soque’s testimony detailed the surrounding circumstances leading requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to to Ramon’s warrantless warrant, viz: arresta person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure,the term probable cause has DIRECT EXAMINATION: been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by ASST. CITY PROS. YAP: circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol? PO2 Soque: that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.15Specifically A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on top of his voice with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a telling "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" pointing to his right front pocket, sir. reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was the shouting came by the person sought to be arrested.16 In this light, the determination of the existence from? or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents. A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir. Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said? the Manila City Ordinance which provides as follows: A: About ten (10) meters, sir. Sec. 844. – Breaches of the Peace. – No person shall make, and, countenance, or assist Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows? in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault, A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a man, sir. beat or use personal violence upon another without just cause in any public place; or Q: Who was that man? utter any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibit or A: Goco, sir. display any emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case? instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir. to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case? for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir. lawful assembly.1âwphi1 Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded immediately, when you PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or fine not more than saw a man? Two Hundred pesos (PHP 200.00) A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir. As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinancepenalizes the following acts: (1) Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted? making, countenancing, or assisting in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, A: Yes, sir. or breach of the peace; (2) assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other cooperatives? another without just cause in any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous, A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity of the place, sir. threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibiting or displaying any Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting? emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or A: Past 9:00, sir. thing; and (4) doing any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending to Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted? disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for A: Me, sir. any unlawful purpose, or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with Goco? 46 A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming near the place, sir, clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed they scampered in different directions. and took him away.19 Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you approached the In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances could not have accused? engendereda well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had been committed A: They followed me, sir. by Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. All told, noprobable Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused therein Goco? cause existedto justify Ramon’s warrantless arrest. A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir. Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable x x x x17 discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the CROSS EXAMINATION: decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent xxxx purpose of suspending his liberty,20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical ATTY. AMURAO: manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw enforcers, it Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated? PO2 Soque: is largely expectedof them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation A: Yes, sir. at hand. The determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold Q: And there are many people outside their houses? liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between A: Yes, sir. legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also? other. In this respect, it must be performedwisely and cautiously, applying the A: Yes, sir. exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether? constitutionally guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the duty to determine probable A: They were talking casually. cause should be clothed with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a x x x x18 higher sense of public accountability. Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable cause Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless when the police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon. search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the with many people conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of poisonous tree as mandated by the above discussed constitutional provision. In this the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. regard, considering that the confiscated shabuis the very corpus delicitof the crime Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach charged, Ramon's acquital should therefore come as a matter of course. of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another; WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and September and, the words he allegedly shouted – "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" –are not 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 are REVERSED slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was ACQUITTED of the crime charged. still teeming with people and alive with activity. SO ORDERED. Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested member Galvante vs Casimiro of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was Republic of the Philippines merely standing in front of the store of a certain MangRomy when a man in civilian SUPREME COURT Baguio City 47 THIRD DIVISION In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008 how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus: vs. 1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 for policemen; VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT,respondents. 2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with DECISION Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before I Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way; of Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution1 of the Office of the Deputy 3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices - Office of the Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante2 (petitioner) Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the release of the safety Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal lock; search and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order3 which denied 4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG his motion for reconsideration. IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, The facts are of record. "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing my waistline In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del when I raised my T-shirt; Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza Receipt dated September 2, 1999.5 who came down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements; Information6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to 6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. they have any search warrant; Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private 7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB- asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still 020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the asked [sic] document; Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG);7 and a criminal case, docketed 8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, anything bringing with them the firearm; before the Ombudsman.8 9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I 48 asked the police officers including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him 3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28, also; 2001 after we have already affixed our signatures thereon.13 10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with armed civilian person so I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be the disarming was done; prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases.14 11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond; suspension only. The IAS noted however that private respondents were merely being 12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 15 Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.9 Warrant of Arrest.16 The RTC granted the same in an Order17 dated August 17, 2001. Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion Percival Plaza. to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who conducted the interposed the following defenses: warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property." 18 Officer- Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said recommendation.19 the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint- The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order20 dated January 16, Affidavit;11 and 2003. Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even though he Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman was not armed with a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, plain view, was committing a violation of Comelec Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328 the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit: by carrying a firearm in his person. After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit any of the offenses charged against above-named respondents. dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of private respondent The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the Conde, viz: complaint, it appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a valid 1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit of desistance by the among other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante armed with a complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt, handgun/pistol tucked on his waist;" especially so since it merely exculpated some but not all of the respondents. These 2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said circumstances, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of handgun was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team duty, negates any criminal liability on the part of the respondents. leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the above- searching the same; and captioned case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.21 (Emphasis supplied) 49 Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy Ombudsman Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved the October 30, himself.29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their 2003 Resolution.22 separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004.30 In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the The petition lacks merit. Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal,24 which are accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution declaring the information with the appropriate courts.31 The Court respects the relative autonomy warrantless search legal. of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy the latter offered "no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the reversal Ombudsman,32 except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of or modification"25 of its October 30, 2003 Resolution. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.33 Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents) the following acts of perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment grave abuse of discretion: rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public respondents found that the incident upon charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave which petitioner's criminal complaint was based stemmed from a valid warrantless threats. arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the fact that: The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private respondents warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of the instances of valid Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of warrantless searches. searches: B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was arrested and Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those detained by the private respondents. legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 dated January 20, 2004, public respondents denied the petitioner's motion for pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. 26 search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same. respondents acted within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02- Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its 0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee and confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other enforcing the law against illegal possession of firearms and the Comelec ban against belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or the carrying of firearms outside of one's residence. in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality. 50 Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit- The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC. the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds.41 The second The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by civil,35 under Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 36 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, private respondent Conde in his Comment42 and Memorandum,43 petitioner himself which provides: identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it.44 There was, therefore, following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against damages: private respondents. xxxx Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against out that the same is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private unreasonable searches and seizures; respondents aimed their firearms at him.45 Such bare allegation stands no chance xxxx against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function.46 The IAS itself adjudicated. observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their "enthusiasm and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975.37 in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 47 Petitioner expressed the same view To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may have for damages with the regular courts38 or an administrative case with the been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him. PNP/DILG,39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing criminal action with the Ombudsman. the criminal complaint against private respondents. Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore No costs. proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint SO ORDERED. are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur. search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his People vs Flores complaint.40 Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal FIRST DIVISION complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal [G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001] offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AARON FLORES @ RONITO, criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ SULPING and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accused- Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their appellants. finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under DECISION the circumstance. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 51 Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade detailed at The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision, namely, Aaron prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias Sulping and Edgar Villeran y to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court proceeded Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros to determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree of their Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.The Information participation in the commission of the offense charged. charged as follows: The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that Samson Sayam was That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar the above-named accused, armed with high powered firearms conspiring, Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial confederating and helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, court held that the three accused were responsible for the formers disappearance. did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic), three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the latter to their Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against his will, without proper mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in bringing Samson authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then up to the Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the present. place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment CONTRARY TO LAW.[1] Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive was attributed All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as facts to be undisputed. to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at armed with an Armalite rifle,[3] Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros short firearm.[4] Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of the were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson table. Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992,[5] the original towards the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni, dated October the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid 21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.[2] That was the last mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits merely time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayams mother and mentioned an unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine Army, assigned at Brgy. relatives, he has not been found. Tabu, detachment. At the time of the execution of the affidavits, the witnesses could It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was the commander hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner in which detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial courts mind.[6] prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged. portion of which states: 52 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar 1. That the offender is a private individual. Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the his liberty. Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion 3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal. Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to 4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are pay him jointly and severally, or, in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand present: (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of (a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit. (b) That it is committed simulating public authority; The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused detained or threats to kill him are made; or ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with (d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.[8] Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court. Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of SO ORDERED.[7] Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants raised the following errors: were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality.[9] It was 267, REVISED PENAL CODE. composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they were SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR individuals.[10] SAMSON SAYAMS DISAPPEARANCE. The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused- III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable joint appeal based on the sole error that: for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed against KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we grounds, detains a person.[11] Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence them. adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized under accused-appellants. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,[12] it was held that in the crime of illegal or elements of the offense are: arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of 53 the person of the offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved,[13] just explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home,[18] instead of doing anything to help as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be Samson Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to the established by indubitable proof.[14]1 In the more recent case of People v. authorities.[19] More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Fajardo,[15] this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering that there actual confinement or restriction. were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is Carlito Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any Manlangits statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty.[16] A careful review of the records headquarters with any or all of the accused.[20] In fine, Carlito Manlangits testimony of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty. detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that detachment headquarters. Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses, namely, Carlito he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.[21] Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangits testimony was offered to The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and brought clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw Samson evidence,[22] which has no probative value.[23] In summary, Jerry Manlangits Sayam talking to the accused.[17] testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to prove the stated detention. purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled, four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument, the accused and Samson Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accused- headquarters. He said that the accused were holding and pulling Samson Sayam appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not towards the road. Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being by rapid firing.[24] apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically 54 On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument.Rather, he detention.[28] said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although Nelson The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial, Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.[25] circumstances: Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs testimony. First of 1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellants, all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a heated argument. liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was 2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where holding and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is puzzling that witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson. Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if 3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to Brgy. Tabu. corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez. 4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material detachment followed by rapid firing. points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative 5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from.[29] evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez. As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.Although the combination of all these circumstances would still not be able to produce a conviction findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of these circumstantial evidence substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of the case do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the appellate that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged. court.[26] And where it appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation of the For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the trial court may be circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants reversed.[27] are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent.[30] Thus: After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the sufficient for conviction if: evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the fact a) There is more than one circumstance; of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no reasonable doubt.[31] proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be a purposeful complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force, accused.[32] It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused- appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there was a heated 55 argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the Sayam to the road and brought him towards the direction of the detachment exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant testimony. purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who testified that guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the center of the interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some distance from the upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such as one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every direction. An ordinary others, as the guilty person. person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the exact location where the Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be attributing expertise on proved. In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the such matters to the prosecution witnesses. prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrary guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that committed. accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him, then bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed arbitrarily detained him.[33] by accused-appellants.[38] It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of with that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an accused-appellants alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence.[34] An merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when for the defense.[39] Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt of the evidence itself is in serious doubt.[35] The prosecution was not able to prove a accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that innocent one.[40] accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason, accused- Court must acquit the accused.[36] appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons is In the recent case of People v. Comesario,[37]3 we had occasion to rule that: DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision. evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is SO ORDERED. more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur. proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction Kapunan, J., on leave. beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of 56 TITLE THREE- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.[8] Chavez vs Gonzales DECISION 3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul PUNO, C.J.: Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti- A. Precis Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt committed or was being committed in their presence.[9] to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it. 4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations found to have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v. caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged COMELEC,[1] Burgos v. Chief of Staff,[2] Social Weather Stations v. wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 COMELEC,[3] and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.[4] When on its face, it is clear national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network, because exercise of speech, it must be nullified. by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents B. The Facts of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, I [have] asked 1. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned. [10] local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the 5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: [11] opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections STANDARDS (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire- tapping.[5] Later, in a Malacaangpress briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two xxx xxx xxx versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, doctored or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed Taking into consideration the countrys unusual situation, and in order not to the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. [6] It unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits subsequently made a retraction. [7] issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use [their] stations for the 2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the possession of alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of 57 the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of 6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of election laws. the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal expression, and of the press, and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP wiretapping operations. issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: [12] Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information could it be said at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful on matters of public concern. KBP & its members have always been committed to the representation of what was recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the exercise of press freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television of fairness and honesty. stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of television stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false press freedom or censorship. The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned restrict the interview of members of the opposition or free expression of views. radio and television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to responsibly. the said companies. KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program and public affairs programs. These include verification of sources, non-airing of standards to be observed by radio and television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular materials that would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion. 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that all radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is act or scene or other matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to made in the treatment of news or commentaries. disseminate false information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition. The foregoing directive had been The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, responsibly giving due consideration to the process being undertaken to verify and prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to validate the authenticity and actual content of the same. broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts. C. The Petition The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, praying for the issuance of the writs erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators. of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void 58 proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the of authority by the respondents.[13] Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [19] Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public of concern,[14] petitioner specifically asked this Court: these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure. [20] Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and [F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing made since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the publics rights to freedom and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest,[21] in of expression and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial taped conversion of not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. making of such issuances, and orders by respondents. [15] Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22]we therefore brush aside petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition,[23] seeing as it the validity of the fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information issued pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only industry.[17] It was also stressed that most of the [television] and radio stations the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed abridge freedom of speech and of the press. upon between the NTC and KBP. [18] But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom D. THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD: LEGAL STANDING of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar. vagaries of motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint, the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of the right to free content-neutral and content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the recipients of the press review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints between statements have not come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that to call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press. broadcast media. It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having E. RE-EXAMINING THE LAW ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS 59 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. [33] redress of grievances.[24] Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self- democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation by the people in social, substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified including political, decision-making; and of maintaining the balance between stability by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First and change.[34] As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence American decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest of republican institutions and the complement of free speech.[26] This preferred latitude for this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should be uninhibited, now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.[27] robust, and wide-open. [35] In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. [28] This right was elevated to existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public own lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an consequence.[36] When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.[37] The right indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom.[29] Moreover, our belongs as well -- if not more to those who question, who do not conform, who history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the differ.[38] The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is only when the people have unbridled access freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and view induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, ignorant. or even stirs people to anger.[39] To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. [40] E.1. ABSTRACTION OF FREE SPEECH The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. freedom.[31] What is embraced under this provision was discussed exhaustively by the The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, [32] in which it was held: issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. 60 categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelous speech; afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic as instructive or informative. Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights v. Dans,[41] this Court stated that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are of assembly and petition. [47] entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the balancing of interests lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and will be subsequently discussed. individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of E.2. DIFFERENTIATION: THE LIMITS & RESTRAINTS OF FREE SPEECH situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom. For freedom of and the degree of imminence extremely high. [50] expression is not an absolute, [42] nor is it an unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency freedom. doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to danger test. [51] some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or E.3. IN FOCUS: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS society.[43] The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical importance, though, is and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of more easily grasped. It is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the speech. [44] We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It and obscene speech, as well as fighting words are not entitled to constitutional is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, protection and may be penalized.[45] their aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to each category, either administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm consciously or unconsciously. [46] A study of free speech jurisprudencewhether here wrote in United States v. Bustos:[52] or abroadwill reveal that courts have developed different tests as to specific types or 61 The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public which to evaluate. men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience. of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[56] Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes of writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary. Persons who interfere or governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication are permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials. privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation E.4. ANATOMY OF RESTRICTIONS: PRIOR RESTRAINT, CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS censorship. [57] Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior and remedy can be had at the courts. restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; [53] (3) freedom of access to information; [54]and (4) freedom of circulation.[55] Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, [58] and Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents press statement constitutes any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should a form of impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, be greeted with furrowed brows, [59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral) speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the regulations. Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against. At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the never had any issue of whether the governmental act or issuance actually constituted restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about whether the restraint of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well was justified by the Constitution. defined standards;[60] or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. [61] The cast of Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with. impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint. And in its application When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.[62] Because regulations basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject 62 to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approachsomewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.[63] The test is the furtherance of that interest. [70] A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an invalidated. [71] The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. [72] expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner: Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. [74] expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [64] Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content- press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one objecta specific invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present content fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression. Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media will be struck down.[66] With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be media. We next explore and test the validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by invoked to validate a content-based restriction on broadcast media. hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.[67] As formulated, the question in every The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and regulatory schemes. degree.[68] The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free Amendment protection,[75] and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from the expression. [69] application of the strict scrutiny standard that they would otherwise apply to content- 63 based restrictions.[76] According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which had been broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies summarily closed on grounds of national security. Although the issue had become by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print moot and academic because the owners were no longer interested to reopen, the medium may be limitless]; [77] (b) its pervasiveness as a medium; and (c) its unique Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the case and made formulations to serve as accessibility to children.[78] Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions. precisely the same approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media, nor go so Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered in far as to demand that such regulations serve compelling government cases involving broadcast media. Thus:[84] interests,[79] they are decided on whether the governmental restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,[80] or the intermediate test. xxx xxx xxx As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show thatas we have deviated freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that words with the American conception of the Bill of Rights[81] we likewise did not adopt en are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints. a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in test. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test, is not imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a applicable to all utterances in all forums. compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among national security or the electoral process. qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to traditional broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper print or broadcast media. and print media. The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[82]wherein it was held that [a]ll radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule[83] lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited 64 from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust out. accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public Similar considerations apply in the area of national security. officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. [Citations Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and omitted] magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also jurisprudence to justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity, pervasiveness becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or and accessibility to children), but only after categorically declaring that the test for regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule, within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the for all forms of media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a close reading of the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to above-quoted provisions would show that the differentiation that the Court persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, national security, seditious and inciting speech), predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers or to validate a licensing or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, broadcast frequencies, which is absent in print media. Thus, when this Court declared and reject the utterance. in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was somewhat lesser in scope (5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media, it was not as to what test circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations- should be applied, but the context by which requirements of licensing, allocation of whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech. [85] thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v. The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the Katigbak,[86] that the test to determine free expression challenges was the clear and listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize present danger, again without distinguishing the media. [87] Katigbak, strictly a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion pictures. Although the issue have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for involved obscenity standards as applied to movies,[88] the Court concluded its existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach would be used utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion pictures: varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity (6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike this Court was already stressing that. motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full home where there is a set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of the discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public 65 programs therein shown..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens channels. Digital technology will further increase the number of channels available. patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent watching More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear and the print media normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to issues that involve preserve pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main threat to free freedoms of speech and of the press.[89] expressionin terms of diversitycomes not from government, but from private corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a reexamination of the This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation. [94] to all cases that involve the broadcast media.The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that The emergence of digital technology -- which has led to the convergence of infringes on free speech, expression and the press. Indeed, in Osmena v. broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry -- has likewise led to COMELEC,[90] which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to apply the the question of whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of appropriate in the converged environment.[95] Internet, for example, remains largely advertising of political advertisements because the challenged restriction was unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, [96] and the content-neutral.[91] And in a case involving due process and equal protection issues, rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Internet.[97] Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the COMELEC[92] treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable government agencies regulating media must agree to regulate both, regulate neither condition for the grant of the medias franchise, without going into which test would or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the differential apply. treatment. [98] That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over F. The Case At Bar broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a British author: Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its application to the case at bar. To The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech differ in a number of respects, but have a common historical basis. The stricter or of the press based on content is given the strictest system of controls seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the their particular impact on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media do equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible sources of harm.[93] This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these satellite television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and 66 present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law. formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse press. effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all misinterpretation. means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolving on uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent State. invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them 67 down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response too late. to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition and CotabatoCity to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, Mindanao. and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted SO ORDERED. authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ Fortun vs Macapagal-Arroyo of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. EN BANC PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN G.R. No. 190293 Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, vs. Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO or in writing of her action. ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless DOES acting under their direction and control, men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The Respondents. President described the scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality of the rebels weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions, DECISION the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, ABAD, J.: tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized PNP/Police markings. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action. But, law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days. Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. The Facts and the Case Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, The essential background facts are not in dispute. On November 23, 2009 heavily 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting 68 Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its of a call. constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse. xxxx Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of Congress. Thus: constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[1] must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is 1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days; unavoidable. The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two 2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in reasons: person or in writing to Congress; One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of 3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. The pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state: 4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of deems warranted. the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its and public safety requires it. express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a 69 political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the did not delegate and could not delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to hands of the Court. determine the factual basis for the presidential proclamation and suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the RTC of Quezon City passed upon Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of the same evidence that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the had in her possession when she issued the proclamation and suspension. petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.[2] however intellectually challenging these are.[5] This is especially true, said the Court Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have Education,[6] where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any avoidance becomes evasion. The Courts duty is to steer clear of declaring law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department, given the Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were assumption that it carefully studied those acts and found them consistent with the arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.Indeed, fundamental law before taking them. To doubt is to sustain.[7] no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of amply armed government presence. the writ of habeas corpus. Thus In Lansang v. Garcia,[3] the Court received evidence in executive session to determine The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the if President Marcos suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971 sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension had sufficient factual basis. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[4] while the Court took judicial of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must notice of the factual bases for President Marcos proclamation of martial law in 1972, promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied) it still held hearings on the petitions for habeas corpus to determine the constitutionality of the arrest and detention of the petitioners. Here, however, the More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to annul Court has not bothered to examine the evidence upon which President Arroyo acted Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted for a in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely because it felt no need to, the proclamation default as was its duty, the question having become moot and academic. having been withdrawn within a few days of its issuance. Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the President and Congress respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that no probable cause exist that the of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as sequential or joint, it would be accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since the prosecution failed impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it. to establish the elements of the crime.But the Court cannot use such finding as basis for striking down the Presidents proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court 70 But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill SO ORDERED. its duty without pre-empting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of RA 10591 – An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on Firearms and such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene Ammunitions and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof without need of a call within 24 hours following the Presidents proclamation or Republic of the Philippines suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court Metro Manila sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the Fifteenth Congress proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance. Third Regular Session Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the thousand twelve. proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can REPUBLIC ACT No. 10591 step in, hear the petitions challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day Congress assembled: period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The ARTICLE I settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS terminated. Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act". The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the policy of the State to maintain peace and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in and order and protect the people against violence. The State also recognizes the right just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took of its qualified citizens to self-defense through, when it is the reasonable means to off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become repel the unlawful aggression under the circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards moot and academic. this end, the State shall provide for a comprehensive law regulating the ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture, dealing in and importation of firearms, Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would ammunition, or parts thereof, in order to provide legal support to law enforcement have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for agencies in their campaign against crime, stop the proliferation of illegal firearms or the exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation of martial law and the weapons and the illegal manufacture of firearms or weapons, ammunition and parts suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar thereof. Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an Section 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act: actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power. (a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm which may enhance or increase the operational efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not constitute any of the major WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the or minor internal parts thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser scope, telescopic sight same have become moot and academic. and sound suppressor or silencer. 71 (b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder, posting or assignment and the authorized bonded firearm custodian for the juridical cartridge case and primer or loaded shell for use in any firearm. entity to whom such firearm is turned over after the lapse of the order. (c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm which was manufactured at least (l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable weapon, whether a small arm or light seventy-five (75) years prior to the current date but not including replicas; (2) firearm weapon, that expels or is designed to expel a bullet, shot, slug, missile or any which is certified by the National Museum of the Philippines to be curio or relic of projectile, which is discharged by means of expansive force of gases from burning museum interest; and (3) any other firearm which derives a substantial part of its gunpowder or other form of combustion or any similar instrument or implement. For monetary value from the fact that it is novel, rare, bizarre or because of its association purposes of this Act, the barrel, frame or receiver is considered a firearm. with some historical figure, period or event. (m) Firearms Information Management System (FIMS) refers to the compilation of all (d) Arms smuggling refers to the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, data and information on firearms ownership and disposition for record purposes. movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, from (n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is subject to forfeiture by reason of court or across the territory of one country to that of another country which has not been order as accessory penalty or for the disposition by the FEO of the PNP of firearms authorized in accordance with domestic law in either or both country/countries. considered as abandoned, surrendered, confiscated or revoked in compliance with (e) Authority to import refers to a document issued by the Chief of the Philippine existing rules and regulations. National Police (PNP) authorizing the importation of firearms, or their parts, (o) Gun club refers to an organization duly registered with and accredited in good ammunition and other components. standing by the FEO of the PNP which is established for the purpose of propagating (f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or responsible and safe gun ownership, proper appreciation and use of firearms by its business entity duly licensed by the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) of the PNP to members, for the purpose of sports and shooting competition, self-defense and engage in the business of buying and selling ammunition, firearms or parte thereof, collection purposes. at wholesale or retail basis. (p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business (g) Authorized importer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of repairing firearms business duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of importing and other weapons or constructing or assembling firearms and weapons from ammunition and firearms, or parts thereof into the territory of the Republic of the finished or manufactured parts thereof on a per order basis and not in commercial Philippines for purposes of sale or distribution under the provisions of this Act. quantities or of making minor parts for the purpose of repairing or assembling said (h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, or firearms or weapons. partnership duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of (q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a firearm, or other device that is so manufacturing firearms, and ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of sale or substantially similar in coloration and overall appearance to an existing firearm as to distribution.1âwphi1 lead a reasonable person to believe that such imitation firearm is a real firearm. (i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that is taken into custody by the PNP, (r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino who complies with the qualifications set forth National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), in this Act and duly issued with a license to possess or to carry firearms outside of the and all other law enforcement agencies by reason of their mandate and must be residence in accordance with this Act. necessarily reported or turned over to the PEO of the PNP. (s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to corporations, organizations, businesses including (j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm deliberately made incapable of security agencies and local government units (LGUs) which are licensed to own and performing its main purpose of firing a projectile. possess firearms in accordance with this Act. (k) Duty detail order refers to a document issued by the juridical entity or employer (t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles wherein the details of the disposition of firearm is spelled-out, thus indicating the and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns not exceeding name of the employee, the firearm information, the specific duration and location of caliber 7.62MM which have fully automatic mode; and Class-B Light weapons which 72 refer to weapons designed for use by two (2) or more persons serving as a crew, or department, agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation a firearm rifles and machine guns exceeding caliber 7.62MM such as heavy machine guns, covered by the long certificate of registration. handheld underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, (dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended to be or primarily designed for individual portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and use or that which is generally considered to mean a weapon intended to be fired from rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a the hand or shoulder, which are not capable of fully automatic bursts of discharge, caliber of less than 100MM. such as: (u) Long certificate of registration refers to licenses issued to government agencies or (1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be fired from the hand, which includes: offices or government-owned or -controlled corporations for firearms to be used by (i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm having a chamber integral with or their officials and employees who are qualified to possess firearms as provider in this permanently aligned with the bore which may be self-loading; and Act, excluding security guards. (ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm with a revolving cylinder containing (v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm, chambers for individual cartridges. firearm which has been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered (2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or designed to be fired from the shoulder that firearms in the possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with can discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of loading, which revoked licenses in accordance with the rules and regulations. may be classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading; and (w) Major part or components of a firearm refers to the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, (3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made and intended to fire a number of ball cylinder or the bolt assembly. The term also includes any part or kit designed and shots or a single projectile through a smooth bore by the action or energy from intended for use in converting a semi-automatic burst to a full automatic firearm. burning gunpowder. (x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts of the firearm other than the major (ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a defensive, precision or practical sport parts which are necessary to effect and complete the action of expelling a projectile shooting competition duly authorized by the FEO of the PNP. by way of combustion, except those classified as accessories. (ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm refers to any firearm whose serial (y) Permit to carry firearm outside of residence refers to a written authority issued to number or other identification or ballistics characteristics have been intentionally a licensed citizen by the Chief of the PNP which entitles such person to carry his/her tampered with, obliterated or altered without authority or in order to conceal its registered or lawfully issued firearm outside of the residence for the duration and source, identity or ownership. purpose specified in the authority. (gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a battery operated, uncooled thermal imaging (z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a written authority issued to a licensed citizen device which amplifies available thermal signatures so that the viewed scene or entity by the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP Regional Director which entitles such becomes clear to the operator which is used to locate and engage targets during person or entity to transport a particular firearm from and to a specific location within daylight and from low light to total darkness and operates in adverse conditions such the duration and purpose in the authority. as light rain, light snow, and dry smoke or in conjunction with other optical and red (aa) Residence refers to the place or places of abode of the licensed citizen as dot sights. indicated in his/her license. ARTICLE II (bb) Shooting range refers to a facility established for the purpose of firearms training OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS and skills development, firearm testing, as well as for sports and competition shooting Section 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own either for the exclusive use of its members or open to the general public, duly and Possess Firearms. – In order to qualify and acquire a license to own and possess registered with and accredited in good standing by the FEO of the PNP. a firearm or firearms and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino citizen, at least (cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP twenty-one (21) years old and has gainful work, occupation or business or has filed for a government official or employee who was issued by his/her employer 73 an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year as proof of income, profession, shall possess all the qualifications required of a citizen applying for a license to business or occupation. possess firearms. In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by Other corporate officers eligible to represent the juridical person are: the vice appropriate authorities attesting the following: president, treasurer, and board secretary. (a) The applicant has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in this category of licensed holders but (b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test administered by a PNP-accredited shall be subject to additional requirements as may be required by the Chief of the psychologist or psychiatrist; PNP. (c) The applicant has passed the drug test conducted by an accredited and authorized Section 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National Government. – All firearms owned drug testing laboratory or clinic; by the National Government shall be registered with the FEO of the PNP in the name (d) The applicant has passed a gun safety seminar which is administered by the PNP of the Republic of the Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from all duties or a registered and authorized gun club; and taxes that may otherwise be levied on other authorized owners of firearms. For (e) The applicant has filed in writing the application to possess a registered firearm reason of national security, firearms of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which shall state the personal circumstances of the applicant; Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies shall only be reported to the FEO (f) The applicant must present a police clearance from the city or municipality police of the PNP. office; and Section 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business. – A permit (g) The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending to carry firearms outside of residence shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP or criminal case before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of his/her duly authorized representative to any qualified person whose life is under more than two (2) years. actual threat or his/her life is in imminent danger due to the nature of his/her For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before profession, occupation or business. the courts of law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that his/her life is under actual threat The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing fees as may be provided in the by submitting a threat assessment certificate from the PNP. implementing rules and regulations of this Act. For purposes of this Act, the following professionals are considered to be in imminent An applicant who intends to possess a firearm owned by a juridical entity shall submit danger due to the nature of their profession, occupation or business: his/her duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP. (a) Members of the Philippine Bar; Section 5. Ownership of Firearms and Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical (b) Certified Public Accountants; person maintaining its own security force may be issued a regular license to own and (c) Accredited Media Practitioners; possess firearms and ammunition under the following conditions: (d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers; (a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange (e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams; Commission (SEC); (f) Physicians and Nurses; (b) It is current, operational and a continuing concern; (g) Engineers; and (c) It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the SEC; and (h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking, are exposed to (d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of high risk of being targets of criminal elements. Internal Revenue. ARTICLE III The application shall be made in the name of the juridical person represented by its REGISTRATION AND LICENSING President or any of its officers mentioned below as duly authorized in a board resolution to that effect: Provided, That the officer applying for the juridical entity, 74 Section 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief of the PNP, through the FEO of the For purposes of this Act, registration refers to the application, approval, record- PNP, shall issue licenses to qualified individuals and to cause the registration of keeping and monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the firearms. type of license issued to any person under Section 9 of this Act. Section 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. – Subject to the requirements set forth in this Section 12. License to Possess Ammunition Necessarily Included. – The licenses Act and payment of required fees to be determined by the Chief of the PNP, a granted to qualified citizens or juridical entities as provided in Section 9 of this Act qualified individual may be issued the appropriate license under the following shall include the license to possess ammunition with a maximum of fifty (50) rounds categories; for each registered firearm: Provided; That the FEO of the PNP may allow more Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of two (2) registered ammunition to be possessed by licensed sports shooters. firearms; Section 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture or Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of five (5) registered Any person desiring to manufacture or deal in firearms, parts of firearms or firearms; ammunition thereof, or instruments and implements used or intended to be used in Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of ten (10) registered the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition, shall make an firearms; application to: Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of fifteen (15) (a) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) in registered firearms; and the case of an application for a license to manufacture; and Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a certified gun collector, to own and possess (b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a license to deal in firearms and firearms parts, more than fifteen (15) registered firearms. ammunition and gun repair. For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container secured by lock and key or other The applicant shall state the amount of capitalization for manufacture or cost of the security measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required. purchase and sale of said articles intended to be transacted by such applicant; and For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply with the inspection and bond the types of firms, ammunition or implements which the applicant intends to requirements. manufacture or purchase and sell under the license applied for; and such additional Section 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. – Only small arms may be registered by information as may be especially requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the Chief licensed citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed of the PNP. carry. A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP, The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP may approve or disapprove such the PNP and other law enforcement agencies authorized by the President in the application based on the prescribed guidelines. In the case of approval, the Secretary performance of their duties: Provided, That private individuals who already have of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP shall indicate the amount of the bond to be licenses to possess Class-A light weapons upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be executed by the applicant before the issuance of the license and the period of time deprived of the privilege to continue possessing the same and renewing the licenses by which said license shall be effective, unless sooner revoked by their authority. therefor, for the sole reason that these firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall Upon approval of the license to manufacture or otherwise deal in firearms by the be required to comply with other applicable provisions of this Act. Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, the same shall be Section 11. Registration of Firearms. – The licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity transmitted to the FEO of the PNP which shall issue the license in accordance with shall register his/her/its firearms so purchased with the FEO of the PNP in accordance the approved terms and conditions, upon the execution and delivery by the applicant with the type of license such licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity possesses. A of the required bond conditioned upon the faithful compliance on the part of the certificate of registration of the firearm shall be issued upon payment of reasonable licensee to the laws and regulations relative to the business licensed. fees. 75 Section 14. Scope of License to Manufacture Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope minor parts of firearms, accessories, spare parts, components, and reloading of the License to Manufacture firearms and ammunition shall also include the machines, which shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP. following: Section 17. License and Scope of License for Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths (a) The authority to manufacture and assemble firearms, ammunition, spare parts shall allow the grantee to repair registered firearms. The license shall include and accessories, ammunition components, and reloading of ammunitions, within customization of firearms from finished or manufactured parts thereof on per order sites, areas, and factories stated therein. The Secretary of the DILG shall approve such basis and not in commercial quantities and making the minor parts thereof, i.e. pins, license; triggers, trigger bows, sights and the like only for the purpose of repairing the (b) The license to deal in or sell all the items covered by the License to Manufacture, registered firearm. The license for gunsmiths shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP. such as parts, firearms or ammunition and components; Section 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and Competitions. – A qualified individual shall (c) The authority to subcontract the manufacturing of parts and accessories necessary apply for a permit to transport his/her registered firearm/s from his/her residence to for the firearms which the manufacturer is licensed to manufacture: Provided, That the firing range/s and competition sites as may be warranted. the subcontractor of major parts or major components is also licensed to Section 19. Renewal of Licenses and Registration. – All types of licenses to possess a manufacture firearms and ammunition; and firearm shall be renewed every two (2) years. Failure to renew the license on or (d) The authority to import machinery, equipment, and firearm parts and ammunition before the date of its expiration shall cause the revocation of the license and of the components for the manufacture thereof. Firearm parts and ammunition registration of the firearm/s under said licensee. components to be imported shall, however, be limited to those authorized to be The registration of the firearm shall be renewed every four (4) years. Failure to renew manufactured as reflected in the approved License to Manufacture. The Import the registration of the firearm on or before the date of expiration shall cause the Permit shall be under the administration of the PNP. revocation of the license of the firearm. The said firearm shall be confiscated or A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also entitled to import various reference forfeited in favor of the government after due process. firearms needed to test the ammunition manufactured under the License to The failure to renew a license or registration within the periods stated above on two Manufacture. A licensed manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is entitled to (2) occasions shall cause the holder of the firearm to be perpetually disqualified from import various firearms for reference, test and evaluation for manufacture of similar, applying for any firearm license. The application for the renewal of the license or types of firearms covered by the License to Manufacture. registration may be submitted to the FEO of the PNP, within six (6) months before the An export permit shall, however, be necessary to export manufactured parts or date of the expiration of such license or registration. finished products of firearms and ammunition. The Export Permit of firearms and Section 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized ammunition shall be under the administration of the PNP. representative shall require the submission of reports, inspect or examine the Section 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured and Imported Firearms. – Local inventory and records of a licensed manufacturer, dealer or importer of firearms and manufacturers and importers of firearms and major parts thereof shall register the ammunition during reasonable hours. same as follows: ARTICLE IV (a) For locally manufactured firearms and major parts thereof, the initial registration ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS, ABANDONED, DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE shall be done at the manufacturing facility: Provided, That firearms intended for FIREARMS export shall no longer be subjected to ballistic identification procedures; and Section 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms (b) For imported firearms and major parts thereof, the registration shall be done upon and ammunition may only be acquired or purchased from authorized dealers, arrival at the FEO of the PNP storage facility. importers or local manufacturers and may be transferred or sold only from a licensed Section 16. License and Scope of License to Deal. – The License to Deal authorizes the citizen or licensed juridical entity to another licensed citizen or licensed juridical purchase, sale and general business in handling firearms and ammunition, major and entity: Provided, That, during election periods, the sale and registration of firearms 76 and ammunition and the issuance of the corresponding licenses to citizens shall be Regional Office, and such firearm or ammunition shall be retained by the police allowed on the condition that the transport or delivery thereof shall strictly comply custodian pending the issuance of a license and its registration in accordance, with with the issuances, resolutions, rules and regulations promulgated by the this Act. The failure to deliver the firearm or ammunition within six (6) months after Commission on Elections. the death or legal disability of the licensee shall render the possessor liable for illegal Section 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving possession of the firearm. in the Philippines who is legally in possession of any firearm or ammunition in his/her Section 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who possesses an antique firearm shall country of origin and who has declared the existence of the firearm upon register the same and secure a collector’s license from the FEO of the PNP. Proper embarkation and disembarkation but whose firearm is not registered in the storage of antique firearm shall be strictly imposed. Noncompliance of this provision Philippines in accordance with this Act shall deposit the same upon written receipt shall be considered as illegal possession of the firearm as penalized in this Act. with the Collector of Customs for delivery to the FEO of the PNP for safekeeping, or ARTICLE V for the issuance of a permit to transport if the person is a competitor in a sports PENAL PROVISIONS shooting competition. If the importation of the same is allowed and the party in Section 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. – The question desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the same should be undertaken unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as in accordance with the provisions of this Act. If no license is desired or leave to import follows: is not granted, the firearm or ammunition in question shall remain in the custody of (a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any the FEO of the PNP until otherwise disposed of in-accordance with law. person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm; Section 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon Departure from the Philippines. – Upon (b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three the departure from the Philippines of any person whose firearm or ammunition is in (3) or more small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully acquired or possessed the custody of the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon timely request, be delivered by any person; to the person through the Collector of Customs. In the case of a participant in a local (c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any sports shooting competition, the firearm must be presented to the Collector of person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light weapon; Customs before the same is allowed to be loaded on board the carrier on which the (d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall, person is to board. unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon; Section 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a (e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in registered firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or any Police Regional Office for this section shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any safekeeping. Reasonable fees for storage shall be imposed. firearm under any or combination of the following conditions: Section 25. Abandoned Firearms and Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition (1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine; deposited in the custody of the FEO of the PNP pursuant to the provisions of this Act, (2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the owner or his/her authorized target such as thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like; representative if he/she failed to reclaim the same within five (5) years or failed to (3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer; advise the FEO of the PNP of the disposition to be made thereof. Thereafter, the FEO (4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and of the PNP may dispose of the same after compliance with established procedures. (5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic bursts. Section 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. – Upon the death or legal disability of the (f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any holder of a firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next of kin, nearest relative, person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a small arm; legal representative, or other person who shall knowingly come into possession of (g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any such firearm or ammunition, to deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm or Class- 77 A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense. violation shall be absorbed by the latter; Section 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum (h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any to prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the owner, president, person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-A light weapon; manager, director or other responsible officer of/any public or private firm, company, (i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any corporation or entity who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding section, or willfully or with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former knowingly allow any of them to use unregistered firearm or firearms without any legal violation shall be absorbed by the latter; authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. (j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any Section 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of Residence. – The penalty of prision person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-B light weapon; correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon and any person who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall carry the registered firearm (k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any outside his/her residence without any legal authority therefor. person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light Section 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation, Sale or Disposition of Firearms or weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged Ammunition or Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used or Intended to be with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Parts Thereof. – The penalty violation shall be absorbed by the latter. of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose shall unlawfully engage in the manufacture, importation, sale or disposition of a firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised firearm or ammunition, or a major part of a firearm or ammunition, or machinery, Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating tool or instrument used or intended to be used by the same person in the circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm manufacture of a firearm, ammunition, or a major part thereof. is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the manufacture in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal of firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by any person whose business, possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime employment or activity does not lawfully deal with the possession of such article, shall charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose be prima facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful or firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that illegal manufacture of firearms, ammunition or parts thereof. imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period to prision mayor in its medium of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for period shall be imposed upon any laborer, worker or employee of a licensed firearms the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which dealer who shall unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms or he/she is found guilty. ammunition which the company manufactures and sells, and other materials used by If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the the company in the manufacture or sale of firearms or ammunition. The buyer or crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be possessor of such stolen part or material, who is aware that such part or material was absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup stolen, shall suffer the same penalty as the laborer, worker or employee. d’ etat. If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this section shall be imposed upon 78 the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein who knowingly Section 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The penalty of prision mayor in its and willingly participated in the unlawful act. maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall willfully and maliciously Section 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed insert; place, and/or attach, directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act, any upon any person who shall engage or participate in arms smuggling as defined in this firearm, or ammunition, or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the Act. immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating or Section 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration of Firearms Identification. – The incriminating the person, or imputing the commission of any violation of the penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be provisions of this Act to said individual. If the person found guilty under this paragraph imposed upon any person who shall tamper, obliterate or alter without authority the is a public officer or employee, such person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including the name of the perpetua. maker, model, or serial number of any firearm, or who shall replace without authority Section 39. Grounds for Revocation, Cancellation or Suspension of License or Permit. – the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its individual or The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized representative may revoke, cancel or peculiar identifying characteristics essential in forensic examination of a firearm or suspend a license or permit on the following grounds: light weapon. (a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the firearm, ammunition, of major The PNP shall place this information, including its individual or peculiar identifying parts thereof; characteristics into the database of integrated firearms identification system of the (b) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or any offense where the penalty PNP Crime Laboratory for future use and identification of a particular firearm. carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) years; Section 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An imitation firearm used in the commission (c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any parts thereof through negligence; of a crime shall be considered a real firearm as defined in this Act and the person who (d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof outside of residence committed the crime shall be punished in accordance with this Act: Provided, That or workplace without, the proper permit to carry the same; injuries caused on the occasion of the conduct of competitions, sports, games, or any (e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof in prohibited places; recreation activities involving imitation firearms shall not be punishable under this (f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case of government official and employee; Act. (g) Commission of any of the acts penalized under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise Section 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the pendency of any case filed in violation of known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002″; this Act, seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tools or (h) Submission of falsified documents or misrepresentation in the application to instruments shall remain in the custody of the court. If the court decides that it has obtain a license or permit; no adequate means to safely keep the same, the court shall issue an order to turn (i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements; and over to the PNP Crime Laboratory such firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, (j) By virtue of a court order. machinery, tools or instruments in its custody during the pendency of the case and Section 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten to produce the same to the court when so ordered. No bond shall be admitted for thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any licensed firearm holder who the release of the firearm, ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or fails to report to the FEO of the PNP that the subject firearm has been lost or stolen instrument. Any violation of this paragraph shall be punishable by prision mayor in its within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of discovery. minimum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person Section 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The imposition of penalty for any violation holding a valid firearm license who changes residence or office address other than of this Act shall carry with it the accessory penalty of confiscation and forfeiture of that indicated in the license card and fails within a period of thirty (30) days from said the firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument in favor of transfer to notify the FEO of the PNP of such change of address. the government which shall be disposed of in accordance with law. 79 Section 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer Section 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential possession of any firearm to any person who has not yet obtained or secured the Decree No. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8294 and all other necessary license or permit thereof. laws, executive orders, letters of instruction, issuances, circulars, administrative The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall orders, rules or regulations that are inconsistent herewith. violate the provision of the preceding paragraph. In addition, he/she shall be Section 46. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or any part hereof is held disqualified to apply for a license to possess other firearms and all his/her existing invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise firearms licenses whether for purposes of commerce or possession, shall be revoked. affected shall remain valid and subsisting. If government-issued firearms, ammunition or major parts of firearms or light Section 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its weapons are unlawfully disposed, sold or transferred by any law enforcement agent publication in a newspaper of nationwide circulation. or public officer to private individuals, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be Approved, imposed. Any public officer or employee or any person who shall facilitate the registration of a RA 8294 – Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, firearm through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or submission of falsified Manufacture Dealing in Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, documents shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional. Ammunition or Explosives ARTICLE VI Republic of the Philippines FINAL PROVISIONS Congress of the Philippines Section 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of the PNP shall be the sole repository of Metro Manila all firearms records to include imported and locally manufactured firearms and ammunition. Within one (1) year upon approval of this Act, all military and law Tenth Congress enforcement agencies, government agencies, LGUs and government-owned or - controlled corporations shall submit an inventory of all their firearms and Republic Act No. 8294 June 6, 1997 ammunition to the PNP. Section 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in possession of unregistered firearms and AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS holders of expired license or unregistered firearms shall register and renew the same AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, through the Final General Amnesty within six (6) months from the promulgation of MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, the implementing rules and regulations of this Act. During the interim period of six AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF (6) months, no person applying for license shall be charged of any delinquent FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR payment accruing to the firearm subject for registration. The PNP shall conduct an CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES." intensive nationwide campaign to ensure that the general public is properly informed of the provisions of this Act. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within one hundred twenty (120) Congress assembled: days from the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP, after public hearings and consultation with concerned sectors of society shall formulate the necessary rules Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act to be published in at least amended to read as follows: two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. 80 "Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of Section 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further firearms or ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period amended to read as follows: and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess "Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of explosives. – The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, That no other crime was committed. dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm injury or death to any person. which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered "When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such violation "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such attempted coup d'etat. violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat. "The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, "The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs." company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow Section 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be amended to read as follows: carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. "Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial number. – The penalty of prision correccional "The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor." erase the serial number of any firearm." 81 Section 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further PD 90 – Unlawful Rumor Mongering and Spreading False Information amended to read as follows: MALACAÑANG Manila "Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the composition of lawfully manufactured explosives. – PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 90 January 6, 1973 The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall DECLARING UNLAWFUL RUMOR-MONGERING AND SPREADING FALSE INFORMATION unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured WHEREAS, a primordial objective of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, explosives." 1972 is the early restoration of peace, order and tranquility throughout the country; WHEREAS, one of the most insidious means of disrupting such peace, order and Section 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm tranquility is the utterance, publication, distribution, circulation and spread of shall include: rumors, false news or information and gossip that cause divisive effects among the people, discredit of or distrust for the duly constituted authorities and/or that 1) firearms with expired license; or undermine the stability of the government and the objectives of the New Society and, therefore, inimical to the best interests of the State; 2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. WHEREAS, to attain the aforesaid primordial objective of Proclamation No. 1081, it is imperative that such acts be curbed and penalized; Section 6. Rules and regulations. – The Department of Justice and the Department of NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief the Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue, within ninety (90) days after the of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 approval of this Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the dated September 21, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any person who shall administrative aspect of the provisions hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public offer, publish, distribute, circulate and spread rumors, false news and information Order and Security and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of both Houses and gossip, or cause the publication, distribution, circulation or spreading of the of Congress copies of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days from the same, which cause or tend to cause panic, divisive effects among the people, discredit promulgation hereof. of or distrust for the duly constituted authorities, undermine the stability of the Government and the objectives of the New Society, endanger the public order, or Section 7. Separability clause. – If, for any reason, any Sec. or provision of this Act is cause damage to the interest or credit of the State shall, upon conviction, be punished declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sec.s or provisions thereof which by prision correccional. In case the offender is a government official or employee, the are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. accessory penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification from holding any public office shall be imposed. Section 8. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or hundred and seventy-three. modified accordingly. Section 9. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its TITLE FOUR – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. People vs Go Approved: June 6, 1997. 82 Republic of the Philippines any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on the loan documents were SUPREME COURT falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much less Manila being granted, a loan by OCBC. SECOND DIVISION The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014 loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, released in the form of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta vs. International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents. savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were DECISION automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks DEL CASTILLO, J.: issued by him earlier. The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru great caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended Falsification of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is of Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans of acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding probable of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and Informations5 against the private respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand. Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila. This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 30, 2009 Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial was conducted. the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara et al., Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. Respondents," as well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents the assailed judgment. filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Factual Antecedents Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the private respondents’ Motion for Voluntary The following facts appear from the account of the CA: Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch. The case was On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge.6 issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007, Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence7praying for the dismissal of effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance withits mandate the criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653. establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. xxxx On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal OCBC’s past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all of the accused in these cases. immediate settlement oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of On July20, 2007, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00- OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained 187319 moved for a reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was a loanof [P]10 Million each. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted denied by the respondent RTC judge in an Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10 83 Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the authority to file a Corporation (OCBC) depositors’ money appear to have been lost – which must have Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who can file a contributed to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no motion for petition for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order granting respondents’ demurrer to the Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 evidence was filed by the handling public prosecutor, Manila Prosecutor Marlo B. and the failure of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before Campanilla (Campanilla). Only complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation September 1, 2007 made the order of the trial court final. (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the same lacked Campanilla’s approval As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this and/or conformé; the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the matter in the case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows: RTC11 does not bear Campanilla’s approval/conformé; instead,it indicates thathe was "In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private merely furnished with a copy of the motion by registered mail.12 Thus, while the complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liabilityarising therefrom. prosecution’s copy of PDIC’sMotion for Reconsideration 13 bore Campanilla’s Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a subsequent approval and conformity, that which was actually filed by PDIC with the reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain the public prosecutor’s written approval and/or legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made conformity. only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through Ruling of the Court of Appeals the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect ofthe case. However, the (OSG), filed anoriginal Petition for Certiorari14 with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such Order of the trial court. Itclaimed that the Order was issued with grave abuse of dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure that the prosecution was deprived of its day in court; and that the trial court the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly showed that respondents reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a committed the crime of estafa through falsification ofcommercial documents. petition for certiorarior mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an decretal portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."16 this case is hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders of the respondent RTC judge are In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial AFFIRMED and deemed final and executory. court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was SO ORDERED.15 denied its day in court; that on the contrary, the prosecution was afforded every Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July 2, opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents committed 2007 Order of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move for the crime charged. the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. The CA declared The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could testify, thus – based on personal knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by the More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact that respondents; that the prosecution should not have relied on "letters and unverified the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court has already attained finality. This Order was ledgers," and it "should have trailed the money from the beginning to the end;"17 that received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the while the documentary evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan documents Private Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for were falsified, it has not been shown who falsified them. It added that since only two Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not seek for the of the alleged 13 manager’s checks were being questioned, there arose reasonable 84 doubt as to whether estafa was committed, as to these two checks; instead, there is 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy of the Order only on July 5, an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made in the preparation of the 2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in filing the motion should not prejudice the two questioned manager’s checks since these checks were made out to the names of interests of the State and the People. different payees and not in the names of the alleged applicants of the loans."18 The Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required appellate court added – Motion for Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in the filing of the Petition x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went after for Certiorariwith the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs the Court to excuse they were deposited to the checking account of the private respondent Jose C. Go. its mistake in the nameof public interest and substantial justice, and in order to There is only a vague reference that the money was used to fund the personal checks maintain stability in the banking industry given that the case involved embezzlement earlier issued by x x x Go. The petitioner should have gone further and identified who of large sums ofdepositors’ money in OCBC. were the recipients of these personal checks and if these personal checks were Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding that negotiated and honored. With all the resources of the public prosecutor’s office, the demurrer was proper. It claims that it was able to prove the offense charged, and it petitioner should have done a better job of prosecuting the cases filed against the has shown that respondents were responsible therefor. private respondents. It isa shame that all the efforts of the government will go for In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court granting naught due to the negligence of the public prosecutors in tying up the chain of respondents’ demurrer was null and void to begin with, and thus it could not have evidence in a criminal case.19 attained finality. It adds thatcontrary to respondents’ submission, the private As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of evidence, prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration contained the public prosecutor’s written these are mere errors of judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction – which may no conformity, and that while it may be saidthat the public prosecutor’s motion was two longer be reviewed lest respondents be placed in double jeopardy. days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof and passed upon its merits; by The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public prosecutor’s action of adopting the the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted. private prosecutor’sMotion for Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it Issues should therefore besaid that the prosecution’s resultant Petition for Certiorariwith In the Petition, it is alleged that – the CA on January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-day period, counted THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT – from November 5, 2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial court’s (a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE October 19, 2007 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available remedy (b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT WAS NOT against the assailed Orders of the trial court, since the granting of a demurrer in CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and is thus immediately final and (c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND NOT OF executory. It adds that the denial of its right to due process is apparent since the trial JURISDICTION.20 court’s grant of respondents’ demurrer was purely capricious and done with evident Petitioner’s Arguments partiality, despite the prosecution having adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for that they committed estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Petitioner Reconsideration of the assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court granting thus prays that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. respondents’ demurrer – that is, by "joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the 00-187318 and 00-187319 be reinstated for further proceedings. latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless,it admitted that while Respondents’ Arguments it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration, it had only until Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela Rosa July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it received the order on July (Dela Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in Criminal Case 85 Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 – argue in their Comment22 that the trial court’s grant Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under Article of their demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent prosecution 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have been established; specifically, it has not for the same offense would thus violate their constitutional right against double been shown that Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds, and that a demand was made jeopardy. They add thatsince the public prosecutor failed to timely move for the upon him for the return thereof. reconsideration of the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order, it could not have validly filed Our Ruling an original Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Nor can it be said that the prosecution The Court grants the Petition. and the private prosecutor jointly filed the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of Reconsideration with the trial court because the public prosecutor’s copy of commercial documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in 1997, PDIC’smotion was merely sent through registered mail. Therefore if it were true that fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. – the public prosecutor gave his approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only were approved, after which two manager’s checks representing the supposed afterreceiving his copy of the motion through the mail, and not at the time the private proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different prosecutor actually filed its Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court. entities – Philippine Recycler’sInc. and ZetaInternational – without any documents Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. assigning grant of their demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of the supposedloan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter, these two manager’s the facts and evidence bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution checks – together with several others totaling ₱120,819,475.00 24 – were encashed, failed to meet the quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go. Then, of respondents. They argue thatthere is no evidence to show that OCBC released loan several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account to his proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 which were then used to fund Go’s these loan proceeds were then deposited in the account of respondent Go. Since no previously dishonored personal checks. loans were granted to the two borrowers, then there is nothing for Go to The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that OCBC, a misappropriate. With respect to the two manager’s checks issued to Philippine commercial bank, was ordered closed by the BSP sometime in October 1998. PDIC Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International, respondents contend that these may not was designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s affairs, assets and beconsidered to be the loan proceeds pertaining to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile liabilities, records, and collected the bank’s receivables. Mills, Inc.’s loan application because these checks were not in the name of the alleged During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. as payees. Besides, these two demand letters to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc. and checks were never negotiated with OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit, since Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of ₱10 they did not bear the respective indorsements or signatures and account numbers of million each, and which apparently remained unpaid. In response to the demand the payees; thus, they could not be considered to havebeen negotiated nor deposited letters, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans from with Go’s account with OCBC. OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc., through its designated representative, claimed that while it is Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged loan true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no longer pursued the application after it was proceeds in Go’s OCBC account is questionable, since under banking procedure, a granted a loan by another bank. When the OCBC loan documents were presented to cash deposit slip may not be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it has not been shown Timmy’s, Inc.’s officers, it was discovered that the signatures therein of the corporate who prepared the said cash deposit slip. Respondents further question the validity officers were forgeries. In their defense and to clarify matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s and authenticity of the other documentary evidence presented, such as the corporate officers executed affidavits and furnished official documents such as their Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof,23 Schedule of Returned Checks and Other Cash Items passports and the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation containing their (RTCOCI), etc. respectivesignatures to show PDIC that their purported signatures in the OCBC loan 86 documents were forgeries. After its investigation into the matter, PDIC came to the It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go conclusion that the signatures on the Timmy’s, Inc. loan documents were indeed from his personal OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling falsified.25 ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.37 After Manager’s Check On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc. Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, along with several other manager’s checks, were vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded encashed and the proceeds thereof deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. that the AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover, PDIC discovered 00810-00108-0 withautomatic transferfeature to his OCBC Current Account No. 008- other bogus loans in OCBC. 00-000015-0, funds were automatically transferred from the said savings account to Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed of Go, the current account, which atthe time contained only a total amountof who was likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President, ₱26,332,303.69. Go’sOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 was credited with or SVP, and Chief Operating Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu – ₱120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account registered a balance of approved a ₱10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmy’s, Inc. After ₱147,151,778.69. The seven previously dishonored personal checks were deducting finance charges, advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net loan thenpresented for clearing, and were subsequently cleared that sameday, or on proceeds amounting to ₱9,985,075.00 covered by Manager’s Check No. February 5, 1997.38 Apparently, they were partly funded by the 000000334727 dated February 5, 1997.28 The face of the check bears the notation ₱120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include Manager’s Check Nos. "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to the 0000003340 and 0000003347. purported loan of Timmy’s, Inc.29 However, the payee thereof was not the purported During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28, 1998, borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a certain "Zeta International". Likewise, on even date, Go issued and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director Manager’s Check No. 000000334030 for ₱9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its face is of the Departmentof Commercial Banks, specifically requesting that the BSP refrain indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-477", which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to from sending any communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among the purported loan of AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was others. He manifested that he was "willing to assume the viability and full payment"of made payable not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc., but to "Phil. Recyclers Inc." the accounts under investigation and examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February 5, AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts. 1997, it appears that the two checks – together with other manager’s checks totaling Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the ₱120,819,475.00– were encashed; on the face ofthe checks, the word "PAID" was effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, stamped, and at the dorsal portion thereof there were machine validations showing whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring thatManager’s Check No. 0000003347 was presented at 6:16 p.m., while Manager’s challenges the sufficiencyof the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in Check No. 0000003340 was presented at 6:18 p.m.32 passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required After presentment and encashment, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 – which among to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the others included the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc. loan and indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the supposed Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan – was frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch, legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. apparently on instructions of respondent Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission Cash Deposit Slip34 dated February 5, 1997, with the corresponding machine of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the validation thereon indicating that the deposit was made at 6:19 p.m.35 The funds accused."41 Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate were credited to Go’s savings account.36 whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.42 87 "The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave erred in affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s abuse of such discretion."43 As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with banking industry and public interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the prosecution grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction."44 When grave has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void. through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents, which not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving Laguio, Jr.: the issues. By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special Revised Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal property is civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of received by the offender in trust oron commission, or for administration, or under discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of that there be misappropriation orconversion of such money or property by the dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the offended party to the offender."49 part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return its consequent order of acquittal void.45 the same; thus, the term "demand deposit." Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must Civil Code on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal savingsx x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able toclearly creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived depositor on demand. x x x50 of its authority to dispense justice."46 Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to nature of banking."This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may observe ‘high standards ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed written into every require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking wrong or to do substantial justice."47 88 requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is family."51 evidence of misappropriation or conversion."54 Thus, strictly speaking, demand is not In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with an element of the offense of estafa through abuse of confidence; even a verbal query respect to the bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration for satisfies the requirement.55 Indeed, in several past rulings of the Court, demand was the bank’s benefit. From this, it may beinferred that when such bank president makes not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa through abuse of confidence, it appear through falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in orunder paragraph 1(b).56 fact such individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the loan On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial document proceeds and converts the same, estafa is committed. under Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is Check Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s funds committed ina commercial document."58 As to estafa through falsification of public, which clearly belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then deposited in Go’s OCBC official or commercial documents, it has been held that – Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although he was not the The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of named payee therein. Next, the money was automatically transferred to Go’s OCBC committing Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 and used to fund his seven previously-issued defraud another, the crime of Falsification has already been consummated, damage personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48, which checks were dishonored the day or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, before. Simply put, the evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already his own personal use and benefit. "The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of Estafa, devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.59 every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. x x x In proving the Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other credit documents – by arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.Thus, the they did not in fact so participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting merepresumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude thata or signatures constitute falsification of commercial and public documents. probable cause exists for the indictment x x x."53 As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the it to state that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced; the falsification. The fact that previously, his personal checks totaling the bank has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’ money is no longer ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored, and the day after, the amount of under their unimpeded disposal. ₱120,819,475.00 was immediately credited to his account, which included funds Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 or the demanded the return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is loan proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, not an element of the felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in his possession falsified documents complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay be convicted ofthe felony under Article [which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved arises."60 misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of 89 x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven a duty enjoined by law. to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his savings to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and at the height of the bank’s inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish x x personal hostility. x x x66 x involvement in the falsification.61 On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of Manager’s Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and OCBC SVP and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the Timmy’s, Inc., respectively, but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta purported Timmy’s, Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC International, and there are no documents drawn by the borrowers assigning the loan Disclosure Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions proceeds to these two entities, then it cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds to deposit the proceeds of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, released to these borrowers. The trial court added that it is doubtful that the two among others, in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for deposit in Go’s savings account, Branch.63 Finally, she was a signatory to the two checks.64 since theydo not contain the required indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for Corporate of the tellers and individuals/payees who received the checks and the proceeds Accounts – Account Management Group, among others prepared the Credit Approval thereof, and the respective account numbers of the respondents; and the checks Memorandum and recommended the approval of the loans.65 were presented beyond banking hours. The trial court likewise held that the fact that In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order – a cash deposit slip – and not a check deposit slip – was used to allegedly deposit the concluded that based on the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have checks raised doubts as to the truth of the allegation that the manager’s checks were falsified the loan documents pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. deposited and credited to Go’s savings account. since the individuals who assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted of were not presented incourt to testify on such claim; that the prosecution witnesses – mere "letters and unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there was an Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made" in the preparation and OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch – were issuance of Manager’s CheckNos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two not present when the loan documents were executed and signed, and thus have no checks are claimed to be just a few of several checks – numbering thirteen in all – the personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged falsification; and rest of which werenever questioned by the receiver PDIC. The appellate court added as high-ranking officers of OCBC, respondents could not be expected to have that the prosecution should have presented further evidence as to where the money prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise; it shows went after being deposited inGo’s savings and current accounts, identifying thus the that respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. recipients of Go’spersonal checks. The loan documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is evident in What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds the record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of ended up in the personal bank accountsof respondent Go, and were used to fund his justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so patent personal checks, even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative ofestafa, as may be seen from the afore-cited Sorianocase. 90 The bank money (amounting to ₱8million) which came to the possession of petitioner Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume the was money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity viabilityand full payment" of the accounts under examination – which included the as the President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others – is an offer of owner of the ₱8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not Revised Rules on Evidence.70 the case here. According to the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be for another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when infact he ("Enrico Carlos") as an implied admission ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.71 did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial court, converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner any dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s should merit appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent ignorance of fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or procedure, if not indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case – conversion in his hands.67 becomes unnecessary. It is conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable to conforméto PDIC’s Motion for Reconsideration should have rendered the trial court’s entities other than the alleged borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s checks assailed Ordersfinal and executory were it not for the fact that they were inherently themselves indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc.’s and null and void; Campanilla’s irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day in Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through the alpha numeric codes specifically assigned court and their right to exact justice and retribution, not to mention that they could to them that are printed on the face of the checks; the connection between the have caused immeasurable damage to the banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void checks and the purported loans is thus established. In the same vein, the CA’s judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. supposition that there is an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in inthe preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks" is absurd; even so, the any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any bottom line is that they were encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds thereof steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used to fund his ignored."72 More appropriately, the following must be cited: personal checks. x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot the recipients of Go’s personal checks be identified. For purposes of proving the confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; crime, it has been shown that Goconverted bank funds to his own personal use when it is likewise a court of justice. they were deposited in his accounts and his personal checks were cleared and the To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify funds were debited from his account.1âwphi1 This suffices. Likewise, the Court the public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the agrees that the prosecution’s reliance on the supposed loan documents, subsidiary standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and other documents was proper. They are the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue both public and private documents which may be received in evidence; notably, in law.73 petitioner’s documentary evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.68 With Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should respect to evidence consisting of private documents, the presumption remains that x x x be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the "therecording of private transactions has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the course of business has been followed."69 wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the 91 private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank. although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right Respondents Jaime T. Dee and Edwin So signed the two deeds of real estate mortgage against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and as witnesses; respondents Ramon S. Miranda and Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench xx x." 74 the deeds of real estate mortgage signed by the petitioner in his own behalf and for WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision and January the corporation, respectively. The signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the 22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2, other hand, appeared in the deeds of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila.2 Based on these deeds, Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said Metrobank foreclosed the two properties securing the 3A Apparel Corporation’s cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings. loan.3 SO ORDERED. After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati (city prosecutor) charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of Shu vs Dee public documents. The NBI supported the complaint with the Questioned Documents Republic of the Philippines Report No. 746-1098 (questioned documents report) issued by its Questioned SUPREME COURT Documents Division. The questioned documents report states that the signatures of Baguio City the petitioner which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the SECOND DIVISION standard sample signatures he submitted to the NBI.4 G.R. No. 182573 April 23, 2014 The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right RAY SHU, Petitioner, to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never required them vs. and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND comparison.5 The findings contained in the questioned documents report only EDWIN SO,Respondents. covered the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared DECISION with the signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage. An BRION, J.: examination of the signatures of the petitioner which appear in several documents in We resolve the Rule 45 petit10n for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ray Shu Metrobank’s possession revealed that his signatures in the questioned deeds are (petitioner) seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated genuine.6 The respondents also argued that the examination of the documents was June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008. These assailed CA rulings conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate annulled the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause for mortgage. falsification against the respondents. The Ruling of the City Prosecutor THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS In a resolution dated June 25, 1999, the city prosecutor found no probable cause The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint against the respondents and, consequently, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. before the National Bureau of Investigation (NB!) charging the respondents of The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned documents report is not conclusive falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank evidence that the respondents committed the crime charged. It only proves that the and Trust Company (A4etrobank). Both deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly sample signatures which were submitted solely by the petitioner are different from signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A the signatures appearing on the questioned deeds. The pieces of evidence presented Apparel Corporation. before the city prosecutor, which were not made available to the NBI and which the petitioner does not dispute prove that the same person executed the questioned 92 deeds.7 The city prosecutor found that the similarities in the sample signatures In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the submitted by the respondents and the signatures on the two deeds of real estate complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present mortgage are so striking that even a layman could see that they were written by one countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the and the same person. petitioner.17 Furthermore, the documents appended to the respondents’ counter-affidavit show In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not that the petitioner availed of the credit line and benefited from its proceeds. furnished with the petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even Sufficient consideration also supported the execution of the two deeds of required to file their answer nor to comment.18 mortgage.8 The city prosecutor also concluded that the petitioner used his passport The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and personally involved in when he executed the questioned deeds before the respondents-notaries public the investigation of the case, like the NBI investigating agent and the city prosecutor, Magpantay and Miranda, without informing these notaries that the passport had were convinced that the evidence were not sufficient for purposes of filing charges already been cancelled. This finding presumed the regularity of the performance of against the respondents. The recommendation for the filing of the complaint came duty of a notary public.9 from the NBI chiefs and the Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor’ resolution to the Secretary of Justice.10 the case.19 The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice The CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor as he had the opportunity to The Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutor’s findings. She ruled that the city examine the documents submitted by the parties, including the respondents’ prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of the NBI evidence which the NBI did not consider. The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for questioned documents experts. This NBI finding is entitled to full faith and credit in reconsideration;20 hence, the present petition. the absence of proof of irregularity in the performance of the experts’ duties.11 The Petitioner’s Position According to the Secretary, the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that The petitioner assigned the following errors: he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of First, the CA sweepingly relied on the respondents’ allegation that they had been the loan, all tended to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. The denied due process in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice despite their complainant’s evidence is more credible and suffices to establish probable cause for active participation in the proceedings through the filing of a motion for falsification, as against the respondents’ questionable and flawed supporting reconsideration.21 documents.12 Second, the CA erred in giving credence to the findings of the investigating NBI agent In addition, the finding of the city prosecutor that the petitioner’s ‘credit line’ with and the city prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice is the ultimate authority who decides Metrobank is sufficient consideration for the execution of the questioned deeds, even which of the conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be if not palpably erroneous, is still gratuitous and conjectural.13 given weight.22 The Secretary of Justice denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration Third, an NBI expert’s examination of certain contested documents at the request of prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The respondents alleged a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination made. Its purpose is to that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack assist the court exercising jurisdiction over the case in the performance of its duty to or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution.14 correctly settle the issue related to the documents.23 The ruling of the Court of Appeals The Respondents’ Position The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of In the respondents’ Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their argument Justice.15 that they were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the NBI and According to the CA, the respondents were denied their right to due process in the the Secretary of Justice, resulting in the denial of their right to due proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice.16 process.24 Moreover, the questioned documents report issued by the NBI was one- 93 sided, thus, casting doubt on its veracity and reliability; thus, it deserves no weight We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank and credence.25 The Secretary of Justice erred in giving more weight to the were submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and questioned documents report and the petitioner’s self-serving denials.26 eventually of the Secretary of Justice during the preliminary investigation In addition, the respondents argued that there was no evidence pointing to them as proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to examine these signatures. the perpetrators of the forgery, if indeed there had been any. The expert opinion, The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI disclaimer of the petitioner and the alleged lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds issued the questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that of the loan could only support a finding that the petitioner did not execute the the signatures appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioner’s submitted sample questioned deeds or obtain loans from the bank. Too, there was no evidence that the signatures were not written by one and the same person. 30 Notably, there was no respondents would gain pecuniary benefits from the commission of the crime. 27 categorical finding in the questioned documents report that the respondents falsified The Court’s ruling the documents. This report, too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s We find the petition meritorious. investigation at the petitioner’s request for assistance in the investigation of the The respondents were not denied their right to due process alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent the We find no merit in the respondent’s claim that they were denied due process when respondents from securing a separate documents examination by handwriting they were not informed by the Secretary of Justice of the pendency of the petitioner’s experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s questioned documents appeal. report does not directly point to the respondents’ involvement in the crime charged. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of the parties during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process for purposes of finding probable cause – the action that the Secretary of Justice exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for undertook in the present case. reconsideration.28 The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well- Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed thereof.31 of. It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI the crime charged should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Thus, probable cause implies granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes than evidence that would justify a conviction.32 investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a accordance with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible. 29 official position; (2) he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the 171 of the RPC; and (3) the falsification was committed in a public, official or respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still commercial document.33 subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. 94 In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the Secretary of Justice evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary are more in accord with the duty to determine the existence of probable cause than investigation level.34 The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in the findings of the city prosecutor. a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or Contrary to the respondents’ assertions, the Secretary of Justice did not just merely disproved.35 The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and give credence to the questioned documents report and the petitioner’s self-serving exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.36 Simply put, in determining probable allegations.1âwphi1 The Secretary of Justice made a holistic review of the parties’ cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the rules submitted pieces of evidence in ruling that "the expert evidence, the disclaimer of of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical knowledge.37 the petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be Also, the finding in the assailed resolution that the ‘credit line’ of the petitioner with determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities Metrobank is sufficient consideration for him to have executed the deeds is with the genuine signature.38 The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature gratuitous and conjectural." rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered sufficient itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section evidence showing that falsification might have been committed and that the 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make respondents might have been responsible therefor. The NBI’s questioned documents a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as report states that the questioned deeds of mortgage and the sample signatures genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be submitted by the petitioner were not written by one and the same person. It was also genuine."39 shown that the respondents Dee, So, Magpantay and Miranda signed and Read in this light, the respondents' defense that there are striking similarities in the participated in the execution of the two deeds of real estate mortgage and the specimen signatures they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter respondent Macillan signed and submitted these documents to the Office of the of evidence whose consideration is proper only in a full-blown trial. In that proper Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. The petitioner also submitted forum, the respondents can present evidence to prove their defense and controvert evidence that the passport used in notarizing the documents was a cancelled the questioned documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities in passport. Furthermore, as the Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not the conduct of the examination. show that the petitioner received the proceeds of the loan. The Secretary of Justice has the power to review the findings of the city prosecutor The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but We also find that the CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutor's findings should be should be threshed out in a full-blown trial given more weight than the findings of the Secretary of Justice. In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents report issued by The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the NBI. He concluded that the documents submitted by the respondents showed the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The that even a layman could see the striking similarities of the alleged signatures of the prosecutor's ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative petitioner in the questioned deeds and in the documents submitted by the authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's respondents. He also concluded that the petitioner misrepresented to the determination.40 respondents-notaries public Miranda and Magpantay that the passport used in It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to notarizing the questioned deeds was not yet cancelled. interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion In arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into the merits of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; when he grossly misapprehends facts; the respondents’ defense. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and when he acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and 95 duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court the contemplation of law.41 (RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651, Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of abuse the exercise of her discretion in reversing the findings of the city prosecutor. Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008. documents.3 SO ORDERED. Antecedents Zafra vs People The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows: Republic of the Philippines Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue SUPREME COURT (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his Manila duties was toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer FIRST DIVISION while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer. G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014 Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner, name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of vs. the MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA). DECISION The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the BERSAMIN, J.: real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: documentary stamp tax paid. through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the central office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled. of the appellant. The Case Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance promulgated on August 16, 2006,1whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the Division of the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the 96 RORs issued to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit: (PNB). A comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to 18 RORs with the same serial number, i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as (c) 1513718, (d) 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments 2023438, (j) 2023837, (k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew 3096955, (p) 3097386, (q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name of Aberin and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of corresponding RORs. To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the Fernando, La Union, it was a female BIR employee who received the payment and CARs and PNB’s RORs. issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to 1994, testified that when he made the payments to the same BIR office, it was not The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos. appellant who received the payments nor issued the corresponding receipts but 1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and 2023438 totalled another unidentified BIR employee."5 Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of Decision of the RTC Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the receipts. petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents,6 decreeing as follows: Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837, 2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and 4534412, WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet, charged in: appellant’s MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a difference of Php499,491.15. 1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). The MRA contains, among special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00; others, the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as well as those issued by him for a certain month. 2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccionalas minimum In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount up to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual reflected in the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is Ph₱615,493.93, while only special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱4,869.00; Php1,342.00 was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to COA and in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, 3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public funds through falsification special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90; of public document against him."4 97 4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40; 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00; 12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 5) Criminal Case No. 4638 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45; and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20; 13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱47,902.60; and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86; 14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 one day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱52,740.66; 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00; 15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76; years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55; 16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47; years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88; 17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 perpetual special disqualification; and to pay fine of ₱45,330.18; 18) years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer Criminal Case No. 4651and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97; penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer 11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05; penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 And to pay costs. 98 SO ORDERED. remittances of the taxes collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation, made him liable for Judgment of the CA malversation. The audit team’s demand letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie presumption that he put to his personal use the missing funds.12 On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows: The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC it had been his assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and issued the FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BASED ON THE RORs, he was nonetheless liable,13 because his duty as an accountable officer had PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS been to strictly supervise his assistants;14 and that by failing to strictly supervise OFFICIAL DUTIES. them he was responsible for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance of the actual amounts collected.15 II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE AND PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO COULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMMITTED THE After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution16 promulgated CRIMES CHARGED. on January 11, 2007, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on certiorari. III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES Issues CHARGED ARE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE. The petitioner claims that the CA erred: IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.7 I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS]. conviction of the petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC,8 observing that he had committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A and had tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and COA;9 that he was presumed to COMPLEX CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH be the forger by virtue of his being in the possession of such public FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. documents;10 and that he had certified to the MRAs and had actually issued the tampered receipts.11 III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17 Anent the malversation, the CA opined: The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the documents on the basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated collection clerks, performance of his duties as Revenue District Officer;18 that the acts imputed to him hecollected taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax payments made by did not constitute negligence; and that he could not be convicted of intentional taxpayers. He was accountable for the proper and authorized use and application of malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time. 19 the blank RORs issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for the tax payments received in the performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his Ruling 99 We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit. collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the auditors."20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz: The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial her examination to determine the discrepancies in the Official Receipts listed by the court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now accused therein, bore only the typewritten name of the accused without any binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution signature. However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed that those sufficiently established that the petitioner had beenthe forger of the falsified and individual pages were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had particular month, and she showed that the last pages of the related reports were been necessary to committhe malversations of the collected taxes. duly signed by the accused. Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages of the questioned monthly reports and demonstrated to the Court the sequence of Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the the pagination and the last pages ofthe monthly reports bearing the signature of taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly accused Zafra x x x. By these the prosecution demonstrated that the individual ruminated: pages of the Monthly Collection Report which listed receipts for lesser amounts were part of official reports regularly submitted by the accused in his capacity as x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were Collection Agent of the BIR in San Fernando City, La Union. While counsel for done by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by accused called attention to the absence of accused (sic) signatures on Exhibit "A", the accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this accused did not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits as he chose to remain presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss.21 (Italics silent. supplied) In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention Accountabilities (Exhibit "D") which the accused, as Collection Officer submits on the that he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is first week of the following month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria grossly misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he Domagas establishes that the questionable receipts were within the series of had beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse receipts accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The testimony of on the legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was notthe State Auditor Domagas established the link of accused accountable receipts, with basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to the receipts numbers reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the divert attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, receipts issued to the taxpayers. Thereby prosecution showed that while the indeed, that the RTC did not give any weight to his position. receipts issued to the taxpayer were not signed by the accused, these receipts were his accountable forms. Such that the use thereof is presumed to be sourced from Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the him. Even the defense witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the office same tenor as that of the RTC’s,22and later on even went to the extent of opining of the accused. that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence.23 But such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24 the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number appearing in public documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the the State’s evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was of public funds through falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on 100 findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our 2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in thousand pesos. his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be 3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public temporalin its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving involved is morethan twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or was duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification equal tothe total value of the property embezzled. x x x x of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public petitioner, therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. 25 Prision penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in its Penal Codeare not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27 the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled, to wit: Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. The tabulation public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate of the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person Code follows, to wit: to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall TABLE 1 suffer: 1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not Misappropriated prescribed Medium exceed two hundred pesos. 101 Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion ₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months ₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 its and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day medium to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to days maximum to to 18 to 20 and 6 months 4 years, to 6 years. period to reclusion years years maximum and 20 9 months reclusion perpetua and periods days and 10 perpetua 8 months days More than ₱200 Prision 6 years 6 years 7 years, 8 years, Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is pesos but not mayorin its and and 4 months 8 months imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.28 The exceeding minimum 1 day to 1 day to and 1 day and 1 day maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after ₱6,000.00 and 10 7 years to 8 years to 10 considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the medium years and and 8 years range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor periods 4 months Months the offense committed. More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years, The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which ₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a less than maximum to 14 to 11 and 21 and 11 complex crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the ₱12,000.00 period to years years, days to days penalty for each count is the maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for reclusion and 6 months 13 years, to 14 the count dealt with in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the misappropriated temporal in 8 months and 20 1 month years amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the corresponding penalty for malversation as its days and and stated in Table 1 was prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, minimum 10 days 8 months because such penalty for malversation was lower than the penalty of prision mayor period imposable on falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period that was More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years, applicable. ₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11 and to 20 to 16 days to On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should maximum years years, 18 years, come from the penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the periods. 5 months 2 months Revised Penal Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower and 10 and is prision correccional in its full range, to wit: days 20 days TABLE 2 18 years, 2 months< and 21 days Penalty prescribed Penalty next Range of minimum term to 20 years/td> under Art. 217 lower in degree 102 sion Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the reccionalin its maximum 4 months accused totaling ₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and period to prision maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the ximum periods correccional in penalty is that prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more serious its minimum offense. period In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the sion mayor in its Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under nimum and correccional in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. dium its medium and iod maximum It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts periods despite the maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the sion mayor in its Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable ximum period its minimum and in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its being the higher penalty. medium periods lusion mporal in The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit: minimum iod TABLE 3 lusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and Amount Indeterminate sentence mporal in its maximum 8 months misappropriated medium and period to Minimum term Maximum term ximum periods. reclusion temporal in its ₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days minimum period prision mayor of reclusion temporal lusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty to be imposed₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of mporal in upon the accused in already reclusion correccional prision mayor29 maximum perpetua iod to ₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days lusion perpetua mayor of reclusion temporal nalty prescribed Penalty next Range of minimum term ₱17,419.00 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days der Art. 171 lower in degree mayor of reclusion temporal sion mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years ₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of correccional mayor prision mayor 103 ₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mayor prision mayor mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the ₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, ₱38,878.55 - Reclusion perpetua whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his ₱20,286.88 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if mayor of reclusion temporal there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has ₱42,573.97 - Reclusion perpetua been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas ₱40,598.40 - Reclusion perpetua did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the ₱42,140.45 - Reclusion perpetua authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. ₱47,902.60 - Reclusion perpetua We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that ₱52,740.66 - Reclusion perpetua the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine ₱75,489.76 - Reclusion perpetua the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office ₱54,984.47 - Reclusion perpetua of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious ₱45,330.18 - Reclusion perpetua in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect ₱37,842.05 - Reclusion perpetua them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised waived.31 Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts accused in each count shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil finality of this decision until full payment by the accused.1âwphi1 liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated in this decision. 104 ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on 7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is hereby AMENDED to read as perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00; follows: 8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer reclusion WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55; charged in: 9) Criminal Case No. 4642 and sentences him to suffer the 1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as m inimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88; reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00; 10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer reclusion 2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97; indeterminate penalty from two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; 11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer reclusion and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00; perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40; 3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the 12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer reclusion indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45; mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90; 13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60; 4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision 14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66; reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00; 15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion 5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76; indeterminate penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of 16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer reclusion reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20; perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47; 6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the 17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer reclusion indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱45,330.18; mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86; 18) Criminal Case No. 4651 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05; 105 In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of Judge Guray recounted that in the past, her office had also received an anonymous ₱614,268.73, plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this letter about respondent's conduct and referred the matter to Presiding Judge Joselito decision until full payment, by way of his civil liability. DJ Vibandor of Branch 199, RTC of Las Piñas City, the branch where respondent rendered service. Respondent then submitted a letter-explanation dated November The accused shall further pay the costs of suit. 17, 2010 to Judge Vibandor, wherein she begged for the indulgence of the court, explaining that she was then heavily stressed due to her marriage annulment and SO ORDERED. burdened with serious health issues at that time. 3cralawlawlibrary OCA vs Hernandez The OCA then sent a 1st Indorsement dated July 7, 2011, directing respondent to THIRD DIVISION comment on the Report of Executive Judge Guray finding her liable for A.M. No. P-13-3130 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3668-P], September 22, 2014 dishonesty.4cralawlawlibrary OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, v. MAY F. HERNANDEZ, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 199, LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent. Respondent submitted her Comment dated July 25, 2011 and therein, she readily RESOLUTION admitted her wrongdoing, stating that she had actually been tardy for the months of PERALTA, J.: September and October 2010.5She also attached the previously mentioned letter For Resolution is the administrative complaint against respondent May F. Hernandez, dated November 17, 2010 to the Presiding Judge. Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Piñas City, charging her with dishonesty. Thereafter, the OCA proceeded to determine whether respondent was liable for the The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous letter reporting charge of dishonesty, and issued the present Administrative Matter for Agenda. An the conduct of respondent May F. Hernandez, Clerk III, Branch 199, Regional Trial examination of the records and applicable rules would reveal that the OCA correctly Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. The letter sender alleged that respondent would arrive observed, thus: late for work, but to make it appear that she arrived on time, she would insert her No less than respondent Hernandez herself admitted tampering with her entries in name right above or almost on the same line as the series of “X” marks in the court's the court's attendance logbook by inserting her name barely above or almost inside attendance logbook, which is the dividing line between the list of names of people the “X” bar that separates those who arrived on time from those who arrived late. who arrived on time and those who were already tardy. Respondent had allegedly The falsified entries were carried over to respondent Hernandez's Daily Time Record been doing this for more than a year and her actuations had started to affect the (DTR), thus making said DTRs a product of forgery as well. morale of other employees.1cralawlawlibrary The actuations of respondent Hernandez amount to a violation of OCA Circular No. The OCA then referred the matter to Executive Judge Elizabeth Yu-Guray of the RTC 2-2003 (dated 9 January 2003) which in part reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of Las Piñas City for discreet investigation and report. In a Report dated January 24, 2011, Executive Judge Guray stated that she issued a Resolution reprimanding In the submission of Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy respondent.2 The OCA, finding the Executive Judge's action to be insufficient, directed Cards by Judges and court personnel, the following guidelines shall be Executive Judge Guray to conduct a more thorough investigation. observed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1. After the end of each month, every official and employee of each court shall Thus, in a Report dated March 22, 2011, Executive Judge Guray held that evidence on accomplish the Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy Card, indicating record shows that respondent Hernandez may be held liable for dishonesty. Executive therein truth fully and accurately the time of arrival in and departure from the office x 106 x x. (Emphasis supplied.) the proper penalty. xxxx In previous cases, the Court accorded some measure of compassion to erring Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil employees. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Magbanua,10 the Court found Service, promulgated on 19 November 2011, falsification of official document such Process Server Magbanua guilty of dishonesty for making false and inaccurate as an employee's DTR is classified as a grave offense that is punishable by dismissal entries in his DTR and yet only imposed a fine equivalent to one month salary. The from the service. As such, it carries the penalty of dismissal from the service with Court ratiocinated that the law is concerned for the working man, and respondent's forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual unemployment would bring untold hardships and sorrows on his dependents. In disqualification from reemployment in government service. 6chanrobleslaw addition, the Court regarded as mitigating circumstance, the fact that Magbanua had been an employee of the court since 1985. Also, in Leave Division, Office of Based on the foregoing, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez III,11 the Court dishonesty and meted the penalty of suspension for a period of six months without only imposed the penalty of a P5,000.00 fine for therein respondent's falsification of pay, effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or his DTR, since he readily admitted his wrongdoing and it was the very first time that similar acts shall be dealt with more severely by the Court. 7cralawlawlibrary an administrative case was filed against him in the five years that he had been in government service. The Court agrees with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. Respondent readily admitted that she tampered with the court's There are also reasons to exercise leniency in this case. Respondent readily attendance logbook by inserting her name above the series of “X” marks to make it admitted her offense, explaining that she had been going through some very appear that she was not tardy. In Rufon v. Genita,8 the Court categorically difficult marital problems at the time, and even became ill with bronchopneumonia, pronounced that for which she was taking medication that caused lethargy.12Respondent likewise Falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as showed remorse for her wrongdoing, assuring the Court that she would work with “the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; “utmost commitment to punctuality.”13 Such circumstances are sufficient for the lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and Court to impose a lower penalty on respondent. However, the penalty to be straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”9chanrobleslaw imposed on her should be heavier than those meted on respondents in the above- mentioned cases since, by her own admission, she falsified her DTR for the entire Such conduct of making it appear that she always reported for work on time two months of September and October 2010. although, in fact, she was often tardy, is deplorable and falls way below the standard set for employees of the Judiciary. WHEREFORE, May F. Hernandez, Clerk III, Branch 199, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, is found GUILTY of DISHONESTY, and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, six (6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the promulgated on November 18, 2011, states that falsification of official document, commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. such as an employee's Daily Time Record (DTR), is a grave offense that is punishable by dismissal from the service. Under the circumstances, however, the Court does SO ORDERED. not believe that such extreme penalty should be imposed on respondent. Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. that the disciplining authority may consider mitigating circumstances in imposing 107 Pagaduan vs CSC Tuzon (Tuzon), whom the Board of Directors of VWI had granted full management, Republic of the Philippines direct supervision and control of VWI's logging operations. She explained that her SUPREME COURT namedid not appear in the employees' payroll because Tuzon's office was Manila independent from VWI's original staff.5 SECOND DIVISION Subsequently, on October 19, 1994, Pagaduan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in G.R. No. 206379 November 19, 2014 Cities, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City(MTCC), a criminal charge against Salvador for CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, falsification of public documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the vs. Revised Penal Code in making false statements in her PDS, which was docketed as CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents. Criminal Case No. 15482. DECISION On May 22, 2000, a decision6 on the administrative complaint was rendered by the MENDOZA, J.: CSC-RO II, holding Salvador liable only for Simple Misconduct and imposing the Subject of this disposition is the petition for revievv' on certiorori filed under Rule 45 penalty ofone (1) month suspension, after ruling that her act was a mere error of of the Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012 judgment. Amended Decision1 and the February 20, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals Unsatisfied, Pagaduan filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208, involving a complaint for falsification and denied. She then appealedto the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which found the misrepresentation. appeal to be without merit, ruling that she had no standing to file the appeal as she Initially, the Court denied the petition in its July 10, 2013 Resolution3 for failure of the was not the party aggrieved by the CSC-RO II decision. The CSC also approved petitioner to show any reversible error in the challenged amended decision as to Salvador's qualification as Municipal Budget Officer because her experience in VWI warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. (Rollo, p. 101.) was a "related field."7 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and on October 23, 2013, the Court Pagaduan ceased her pursuit and did not move for a reconsideration or appeal. Thus, granted the said motion and set aside the July 10, 2013 Resolution. In the same on January 21, 2002, the CSC-RO II issued the order, stating that its May 22, 2000 October 23, 2013 resolution, the Court reinstated the petitionand required the decision had attained finality. Salvador then served the penalty of one (1) month respondents to file their comments thereon. On January 23, 2014, the private suspension.8 respondentfiled her Comment. On February 7, 2014, the petitioner filed her Reply to Later, on October 22, 2008, the MTCC rendered a decision9 in Criminal Case No. Comment. (Rollo, p. 110) 15842, finding Salvador guilty of falsification of public documents. Salvador did not The Facts: appeal and then applied for probation. Her application was granted and she was On May 14, 1992, petitioner Cecilia Pagaduan (Pagaduan) filed a notarized complaint placed under probation for a period of one (1) year. with the Civil Service Commission-Regional Office No. 2 (CSC-RO II)in Tuguegarao City, Thereafter, Pagaduan filed a second administrative complaint against Salvador, this Cagayan, against respondent Rema Martin Salvador (Salvador), newly appointed time for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Salvador Municipal Budget Officer at that time, charging her with the administrative offenses submitted the required counter affidavit, raising the defenses of res judicata, forum of falsification and misrepresentation. Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not actually shopping, and double jeopardy on account of the finality of the decision in the first possess the necessary budgeting experience required by her position; and that administrative complaint for falsification. After finding a prima faciecase in the second although she indicated in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS)that she performed book administrative complaint, Salvador was formally charged. To answer the charges keeping and accounting functions for Veteran's Woodworks, Inc. (VWI) from August against her, she adopted her defenses inher counter-affidavit and submitted 1, 1990 to February 15, 1992,she was never in fact employed by the said documents to support her cause. entity.4 Salvador on the other hand, claimed that she had been employed by Alfonso 108 On January 12, 2010, the CSC-RO II rendered a decision,10 finding Salvador guilty of SO ORDERED.19 the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because Salvador then filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2012 CA of her conviction for falsification before the MTCC, and imposing the penalty of Decision.20 On August 31, 2012, in a turn-around, the CA granted her motion and dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. Thus: issued the assailed Amended Decision,21 reversingand setting asideits previous WHEREFORE, premises considered, REMA MARTIN SALVADOR is hereby declared decision and reinstated the March 1, 2011 CSC decision. It agreed with the findings guilty of CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE and is meted the ofthe CSC that the act of falsification committed by Salvador did not involve moral penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES.11 turpitude as it was a mere error of judgment on her part. The dispositive portion of Aggrieved, Salvador moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Salvador the Amended Decision reads: appealed to the CSC, which rendered a decision12 on March 1, 2011 reversing and WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is setting asidethe decision of the CSC-RO II and exonerating her of the charge. She was GRANTED, such that Our Decision dated 28 February 2012 is hereby REVERSED and sternly warned to be more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents. SET ASIDEand in view thereof, the Decision and Resolution of public respondent Civil The CSC ruled that the criminal offense of falsification of public document did not per Service Commission dated 01 March 2011 and 01 June 2011 respectively, are se involve moral turpitude, following the Court's pronouncement in Dela Torre vs. REINSTATED. COMELEC,13 citing Zari vs. Flores.14 The CSC stated that since the liability of Salvador SO ORDERED.22 in the first administrative complaint was lowered to Simple Misconduct, the crime Hence, this petition. ascribed to her could not be said to have been attended with inherent baseness or ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS vileness or depravity.15 The dispositive portion of the March 1, 2011 CSC Decision I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE reads: ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review (appeal) filed by Rema Martin Salvador is hereby IT FINALLY EXONERATED RESPONDENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE OF GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated January 12, 2010 issued by Civil Service CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE BY FINDING THE Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. II finding her guilty of Conviction of a Crime FALSIFICATION COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN HER PERSONAL DATA SHEET AS Involving Moral Turpitude and meting upon her the penalty of dismissal from the ONLY A SIMPLE MISCONDUCT WHICH DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MORAL TURPITUDE. government service with all its accessory penalties is hereby REVERSED and SET II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ASIDE. Thus, appellant Rema Martin Salvador is EXONERATED of the charge of DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude levelled against her. She is STERNLY IN NOT APPLYING IN THE INSTANT CASE THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF WARNED to be more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents.16 TEVES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN WHICH SPECIFICALLY CATEGORIZED THE CRIME OF Pagaduan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on June 1, 2011. FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS CONVICTED Hence, an appeal was made to the CA which ruled that following precedents, a AS A CRIME WHICH INVOLVES MORAL TURPITUDE. conviction for falsification of public document constituted the offense of conviction III. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE of a crime involving moral turpitude.17 The gravity of Salvador's falsification was OF ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE CSC- highlighted by her commission of the same in her PDS, which was no ordinary ROII WHICH DISMISSED FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF contract.18 Thus, on February 28, 2012 the CA disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE, THE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.23 premises considered, the Decision of the Commission dated 1 March 2011 and its In this case, the substantive issue for resolution is whether or not Salvador was Resolution promulgated 3 June 2011 affirming the same are hereby REVERSEDand convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the procedural SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision ofthe Civil Service Commission Regional Office issues of res judicataand forum shopping were raised by the respondent. No. 2 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, dated 12 January 2010, is hereby AFFIRMED. The Ruling of the Court 109 As previously recited, this petition arose from the second administrative complaint was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue filed by Pagaduan against Salvador. The first administrative complaint was for the in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to offenses of falsification and misrepresentation, where the CSC-RO II found her to be consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact ofconviction of a crime liable for simple misconduct only. The CSC decision affirming the said CSC-RO II involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative decision became final and executory, and Salvador served the penalty of one (1) complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct month suspension. from each other and entailed different sets of facts. Meanwhile, the October 22, 2008, MTCC decision24 in the criminal case filed by Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is that Pagaduan against Salvador, finding the latter guilty of the crime of falsification of for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same public document, attained finality as Salvador did not appeal. By reason of the said essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject conviction, Pagaduan filed the second administrative complaint for the offense of matter, and issues.28 It exists where the elements of litis pendentiaare present, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same Before discussing the substantial aspect of the case, the issues on the procedural interests in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, aspect shall first be addressed. the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two In her Comment,25 Salvador invoked res judicataand forum shopping in arguing that preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, the second administrative case was already barred by the prior administrative case regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicatain the against her. It was her contention that both cases involved the same parties, the same other.29 Since no res judicata exists, no forum shopping either exists in this case. facts and issues, although with different causes of action.26 Now on the substantial issue, Pagaduan avers that Salvador was convicted of a crime The principle of res judicatais applicable either by way of "bar by prior judgment" or involving moral turpitude - a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service. by "conclusiveness of judgment." Here, Salvador's defense was res judicataby On the other hand, Salvador argues that the falsification she committed did not conclusiveness of judgment. In Borra v. Court of Appeals,27the Court stated that: involve moral turpitude. In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or a crime involving moral turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary: question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a (1) the conviction of a crime, which conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.The fact or question settled by final for which the accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them to the first element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other. or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice, order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or modesty, or good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,30 contrary to future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in- the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31 Not every criminal same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of [Emphasis supplied] falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful Contrary to Salvador's contention,however, there appears to be no identity of issues statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful and facts in the two administrative cases.1âwphi1 The first case involved facts intent.33 While Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self- second one involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby other independent 110 evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated: employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with the promotion to a She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose Tuzon is the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI. prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.40 However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith: As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a 1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits "G", lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-markings; found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public 2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L"; documents. Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña,42 the said lawyer was 3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI; disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime 4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused; involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public 5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan; documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under 6. Accused never had any VWI identification card; Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court reiterated 7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally, that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and 8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI. good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44 These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good for such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to merely committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element involved. Their position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the first administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one. persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of documents,the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the falsification of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public CA strayed away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a insist that Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the second administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.36 the trial court found otherwise. Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public probation which was granted.1âwphi1 It has been held that an application for document is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein probation is an admission of guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a probation, she admitted the making of an untruthful statement in her PDS. In crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to Lumancas v. Intas,38 the Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances. Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful presents another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would 111 defeat the purpose of the Probation Law45 which was to erase the effect of conviction In Re: Decision (05/20/2008) in GR 161455 vs Atty. Pactolin and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the EN BANC penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The RE: SC DECISION DATED A.C. No. 7940 reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannotjustify his retention in the MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 government service.46 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE accused, and not his administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case RULES OF COURT of Samalio vs. Court of Appeals47 that: vs. Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative Respondent. Promulgated: case had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation.As April 24, 2012 petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is separate and distinct from the x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of DECISION the case, not its administrative dimension.48 [Emphases supplied] All told, if there is no compelling reason to deviate from what has already been PER CURIAM: established, settled principles and jurisprudence should be respected. To do otherwise would only create confusion and instability in our jurisprudence. As a final note, it must be borne in mind that a PDS is a public Document 49 required This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a of a government employee and official by the CSC. It is the repository of all crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from information about any government employee or official regarding his personal the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. background, qualification, and eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil Service rules to properly and completely accomplish their PDS, 50 in The Facts and the Case accordance with the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, thereby enjoining all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree or In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.51 Only those who can live up to such wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of OzamisCity, requesting financial assistance for exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. 52 WHEREFORE, his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the August 31, 2012 Amended Decision 53 and Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city the February 20, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208 council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 28, 2012 Decision of the Court of away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team. Appeals is UPHELD and REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of 112 Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement the IBP was factually infirmed[3] and contained factual exaggerations and patently of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what erroneous observation,[4] and was too adventurous.[5] he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement. To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.[1] On November 12, 2003 the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties falsification.[6] of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the Court held that in disbarment Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has conviction.[2] Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint become final. The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court. against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and a case without authority so to do. Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.[8] Moral The Issue Presented turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification. and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9] The Courts Ruling Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin? In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification 113 As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most Works and Highways Secretary, Petitioner, severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative vs. reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, Respondent. of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[10] Yet this Court has DECISION also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for PERALTA, J.: conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.[11] Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Orlando C. Casimiro, as Acting Ombudsman, and Rogelio L. Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that Singson, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not (DPWH), assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 4, 2012 and yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he its Resolution2 dated March 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP 120708. The CA nullified and set falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal aside the Order3of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), dated July 18, 2011, and profession.[12] reinstated its Order4 dated April 29, 2011, both in OMB-C-A-05-0123-C. The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are Sometime in 2005, the General Investigation Bureau-A of the OMB (GIB-A-OMB) most sacredly bound to uphold the law.[13] The privilege to practice law is bestowed conducted a lifestyle check on respondent Josefino N. Rigor, then the Regional only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally Director of the DPWH-National Capital Region (DPWHNCR). Thereafter, the GIB-A- important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially OMB filed a complaint against Rigor charging him criminally and administratively in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity before the OMB for alleged unexplained wealth and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) in a manner beyond reproach.[14] No. 30195 and R.A. 1379.6 Said complaint was mainly based on certain irregularities on Rigor’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), allegedly failing to WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his declare therein several properties, business interests, and financial connections. Its name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to administrative aspect asserted that Rigor committed Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of and Falsification of Official Documents. the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts The complaint alleged that Rigor failed to declare in his 1999 SALN the following: in the country. 1) Fourteen (14) parcels of land located in Barrio Maluid, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 223271 to 223284, which were all issued by SO ORDERED. the Registry of Deeds for Tarlac province on August 21, 1989 in the name of Josefino Rigor, married to Abigail S. Rigor; Casimiro vs Rigor 2) Seven (7) parcels of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered Republic of the Philippines by a single title, TCT No. T-240955 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Tarlac Province SUPREME COURT on September 6, 1991 in the name of Josefino Rigor, married to Abigail S. Rigor; Manila 3) A parcel of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered by TCT THIRD DIVISION No. T-240956; G.R. No. 206661 December 10, 2014 4) A two-storey commercial/residential building at 1722 G. Tuazon St., Sampaloc, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Acting Ombudsman, Office of the Manila covered by TCT No. 229634 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Manila and Ombudsman; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, in his capacity as Department of Public 114 was purchased from Jose N. Reyes for Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos 2) The two-storey commercial/residential building at1722 G. Tuazon St., Sampaloc, (₱950,000.00) on July 18, 1996; Manila covered by TCT No. 229634; 5) A Toyota Rav 4 Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) with License Plate No. XPT-816 3) The Toyota Rav 4 Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) with License Plate No. XPT-816; registered under Land Transportation Office (LTO) MV File No. 1336-115201 and sold 4) The Dodge Ram Road Trek 1995 model with license number UBA-898; by Toyota Shaw, Inc. on December 18, 1999 to Anastacia Corpuz Rigor, Rigor’s wife; 5) Business interest in Jetri Construction Corporation; 6) A Dodge Ram Road Trek 1995 model with license number UBA-898 registered 6) Business interest in Disneyland Bus Line, Inc.; under the name of Rigor’s wife, Anastacia C. Rigor. The same was sold by Anastacia 7) Business interest in Kontrata Construction and Development Corporation; only on May 16, 2003 to George Mamonluk for ₱1,050,000.00; 8) A parcel of land situated in Barrio Tibag, Tarlac City covered by TCT No. 249517 in 7) Business interest in Jetri Construction Corporation which was incorporated in the name of Rigor’s son; and November 1989 under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Reg. No. 171720 9) Six (6) lots situated in San Sebastian Village, Tarlac City covered by TCT Nos. with an authorized capital stock of ₱8,000,000.00 which was primarily incorporated 330183, 327448, 326965, 326966, 326964, and 325284. for construction business, in defiance ofa possible conflict of interest with Rigor, being On July 28, 2006, the OMB issued a Decision finding Rigor guilty of Dishonesty, the a ranking DPWH official. Rigor’s wife, as one of the incorporators, has the biggest dispositive portion of which reads: number of shares worth ₱600,000.00; she made payment of ₱150,000.00 worth of FOREGOING CONSIDERED, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) Rule IV of the Uniform Rules capital stocks and was the elected Treasurer of the Corporation; and on Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936), dated August 31, 1999, 8) Business interest in Disneyland Bus Line, Inc. which was registered on March 30, respondent JOSEFINO NACPIL RIGOR, Regional Director, DPWH-NCR, 2nd St., Port 1994, primarily intended to operate as a transportation business with an authorized Area, Manila, is hereby found guilty of DISHONESTY and is meted the corresponding capital stock of ₱10,000,000.00. Of the ₱2,500,000.00 subscribed capital stocks, Rigor penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, including all its accessory penalties of subscribed to ₱1,125,000.00 while his wife subscribed to ₱750,000.00. Both amounts cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual of subscribed shares were wholly paid up. disqualification for reemployment in the government service and without prejudice In 2000, Rigor allegedly failed to declare the following in his SALN: to criminal prosecution. 1) Fourteen (14) parcels of land located in Barrio Maluid, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Pursuant to the Memorandum Circular No. 01 dated April 11, 2006 issued by the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 223271 to 223284; Office of the Ombudsman, the Honorable HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., Secretary, 2) Seven (7) parcels of land locatedin San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered Department of Public Works and Highways, is hereby directed to immediately by a single title, TCT No. T-240955; implement this Decision, with the request to inform this Office of the action taken 3) A parcel of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City under TCT No. thereon and promptly submit to this Office a Compliance Report thereof. 132066 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Tarlac Province on September 7, 1976 in SO ORDERED.7 the name of Josefino Rigor; and Subsequently, Rigor moved for a reconsideration, which the OMB granted on April 4) A parcel of land located in San Roque and San Rafael, Tarlac City covered by TCT 29, 2011. It thus ruled: No. T-240956. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Lastly, he failed to include in his 2001 and 2002 SALNs the following properties, respondent is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated September 23, 2010, finding business interests,and financial connections: respondent JOSEFINO NACPIL RIGOR guilty of the administrative offense is hereby 1) Four (4) parcels of land in San Sebastian Village, Tarlac City covered by TCT Nos. MODIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent is adjudged GUILTY of Simple 356610, 356611, 356612, and 356613, all in Rigor’s name and purchased from Allan Negligence and is hereby fined the amount of One Thousand Pesos, with a warning M. Manalang; that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more strictly. 115 The Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways is hereby directed to Thereafter, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied for lack implement this Decision within Ten (10) days from receipt hereof. of merit. Hence, the OMB and the DPWH filed the instant Petition for Review. It SO ORDERED.8 asserts that the CA gravely erred in giving due course to Rigor’s petition despite using The DPWH Secretary then filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), an the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, instead of Rule 63, Omnibus Motion (for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration), of the Rules of Court. They likewise maintain that the DPWH could still intervene praying for its intervention in the case to be allowed. The DPWH argued that there before the OMB and question the April 29, 2011 OMB Order which found Rigor guilty existed strong and compelling reasons for the reversal of the April 29,2011 OMB of mere Simple Negligence and reduced the penalty to a fine of only ₱1,000.00. They Order. On June 7, 2011, the OMB directed Rigor to filehis Comment on said Motion. aver that there is sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for On July 18, 2011, the OMB issued an Order with a decretal portion that states: Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 May 2011 is Petitioners present the following arguments: GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated 29 April 2011 finding JOSEFINO N. RIGOR I. guiltyof Simple Negligence and imposing upon him the penalty of Fine in the amount THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT A PETITION FOR of One Thousand Pesos (Ph₱1,000.00) is hereby SET ASIDE. CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL RESPONDENT’S JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, Regional Director, DPWH-National Capital Region, is hereby DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE. found GUILTY of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents. The II. penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE is accordingly imposed against him THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DPWH CAN NO pursuant to Section 52-A, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative LONGER INTERVENE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ASSAIL THE Cases in the Civil Service, as amended, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of APRIL 29, 2011 ORDER FINDING RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE ONLY FOR eligibility, forfeiture of all benefits, except leave credits, and the perpetual SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE. disqualification for reemployment in the Government service. III. This Order is immediately executory pursuant to Ombudsman Memorandum Circular THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DPWH CAN NO No. 01, Series of 2006, in relation to paragraph 1, Section 27 of R.A. 6770, and Section LONGER INTERVENE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DESPITE THE 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the PRESENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO HOLD RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY Ombudsman, as amended, and in accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court LIABLE FOR SERIOUS DISHONESTY AND FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. 11 in Ombudsman vs. Joel Samaniego. Accordingly, let a copy of this Order be furnished There is merit in the petition. to the Honorable Secretary Rogelio L. Singson, Department of Public Works and The Court shall first delve on the procedural issues of the case. The OMB contends Highways (DPWH), for the implementation thereof against JOSEFINO N. RIGOR. that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for Certiorari for being an improper SO ORDERED.9 remedy. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the OMB Aggrieved, Rigor brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 should be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Court. Rule 43 prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-judicial agencies, such as excess of jurisdiction on the part of the OMB. On July 4, 2012, the appellate court the OMB, and was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate sustained Rigor and rendered the herein assailed decision. Thus: procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Rigor, in support of his petition for certiorari, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged Order dated 18 July 2011 of argues that there was no other plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy available to the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the him. But it is settled that certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 Order dated 29 April 2011 is hereby REINSTATED. is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and SO ORDERED.10 certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.12 And even if the 116 special civil action of certiorari were to be allowed, Rigor still failed to show that the (e) all business interests and financial connections. OMB committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the intervention of x x x16 the DPWH. Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or Under Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the OMB is authorized to defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or probity in principle; promulgate its own rules of procedure. As such, it likewise holds the power to amend lack of fairness and straight forwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It or modify saidrules as the interest of justice may require.13The emerging trend of is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt on one’s ability to perform duties with the jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of procedural integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. The requirement rules. Nonetheless, rules of procedure still exist to ensure the orderly, just, and of filing a SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency in the civil speedy dispensation of cases;to this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. service and serves as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every government official from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose or employee must make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth of justice requires it.14 in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable accumulation of wealth. The Here, the records clearly show compelling and justifiable reasons for the OMB to importance of requiring the submission of a complete, truthful, and sworn SALN as a allow the Omnibus Motion of the DPWH and, consequently, hold Rigor measure to defeat corruption in the bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure administratively liable. Rigor alleges that the business interests in the Jetri of wealth in the SALN is necessary to particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, Construction Corporation, the two-storey building in Sampaloc, Manila, the Toyota the opportunities for official corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in the RAV 4 SUV, and the Dodge Ram Road Trek were all separate properties of his second public service. Through the SALN, the public can monitor movement in the fortune of wife, Anastacia, that was why he never included the same in his SALNs. Section 8 of a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed R.A. No. 6713,15 however, requires him to declare under oath eventhe assets, properties and wealth. The failure to file a truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts liabilities, and financial interests of his spouse, thus: the integrity of the officer and normally amounts to dishonesty.17 Section 8. Statements and Disclosure.- Public officials and employees have an In the case at bar, Rigor deliberately and wilfully omitted his wife’s business interests obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has in the Jetri Corporation, the two-storey building in Sampaloc, the Toyota RAV 4, and the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business the Dodge Ram Road Trek in his SALNs for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, despite being interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen required by law to do so. Anent his wife’s alleged business interests in Disneyland Bus (18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities Line, Inc., and Kontrata Construction & Development Corporation, his belief that he and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve was no longer under obligation to declare the same as they had already become dead in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under corporations, deserves scant merit. He and Anastacia had paid-up capital stocks in oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business the bus line amounting to₱1,125,000.00 and ₱750,000.00, respectively, and Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried ₱100,000.00 and ₱330,000.00 in the construction firm, respectively. Since the bus children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. line was incorporated in 1994 and the construction firm in 1995, Rigor should have The two documents shall contain information on the following: nonetheless declared in his SALNs their interests therein, until the time the (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair corporations have been dissolved. While said corporations may be considered as market value; dead corporations, dissolution and liquidation are still necessary. Also, Rigor’s SALN (b) personal property and acquisition cost; for 1999 has two (2) versions. Though it appears that both SALNs contain the same (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and property values and liabilities, his networth in the SALN which he submitted to OMB- the like; (d) liabilities, and; Luzon is substantially higher than that in the SALN submitted to DPWH-Region 1, on 117 account of the declared accumulated depreciation in the amount of ₱5,898,181.00. Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. True, no liability can be attributed to him for submitting two (2) different SALNs for a It amounts to dishonesty.1awp++i1 Both falsification and dishonesty are grave calendar year, as his real purpose behind it cannot be ascertained with accuracy, but offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense, with such act still manifests Rigor’s predilection to misrepresent a fact. Since there are two forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual (2) versions of a SALN which appear to have been subscribed on the same date before disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act of falsifying an the same administering officer, it cannot, therefore, be determined which of these official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on two versions represents his real networth. government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates Rigor, moreover, alleged that he had no obligation to declare the fourteen (14) fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service parcels of land in Victoria, Tarlac because these properties were actually owned by regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, Riya corp Piggery Form Incorporated, a family corporation which his parents but both may be committed in one act, as in this case. The constitutionalization of owned.He was merely authorized to mortgage these properties and was never the public accountability shows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven owner of the same prior to the subsequent transfer to Metrobank, the present into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust, which owner. However, the annotations on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of the titles embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency. showed that said properties were the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of the Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our society Associated Bank way back in 1987. The ownership over these properties was also has consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be demanded and consolidated in the name of said bank in the same year and new TCTs were enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to apply these principles to consequently issued. Thus, in all likelihood, the owner of the properties prior to Rigor bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public service.18 was Associated Bank and not Riyacorp, and the latter could not have possibly Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule," meaning authorized Rigor to mortgage the properties. This proves that Rigor was, in fact, the a finding of guilt in an administrative case may and would issue if supported by owner of the lots and not merely Riyacorp’s authorized mortgagor. As such, he was substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the under obligation to declare the same from 1989 to 2000, before the consolidation of complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant ownership in favor of Metrobank in 2001. evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, Lastly, as to the twenty-nine (29)copies of his SALNs from 1972 to 1998, he knew that even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Its the Administrative Division did not have file copies of his SALNs because of the fire absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence, direct or that gutted the DPWH Legal Office where its employees’ SALNs were kept. Instead of circumstantial, on record. Here, the pieces of evidence met the quantum of evidence admitting and informing the Administrative Division of DPWH-Region 1 that copies of required in administrative cases to justify Rigor's dismissal from service.19 Not only his old SALNs were no longer available, here constituted them and made it appear did he fail to declare in his SALN the separate properties of his wife, as required by that said reconstituted SALNs were the very same documents which he executed law, he likewise failed to satisfactorily explain the other glaring irregularities involved from 1972 to 1998. He even put the blame on the fact-finding investigators of the with his SALNs. These facts certainly constitute sufficient and relevant evidence which OMB for maliciously forcing him to reproduce his SALNs by virtue of a subpoena. He a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sustain a finding of guilt against Rigor could not, however, justify his misrepresentation by this assertion as the one who for Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents, for which the penalty was actually directed by the subpoena to reproduce the SALNs was the Chief of the of Dismissal from Service is imposed pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Revised Administrative Division, DPWH-Region 1. In addition, Rigor’s SALNs do not have Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, as amended. markings or stamps of receipt as proof of filing and give an impression that these had WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the all been accomplished on a single occasion. These facts indubitably show that Rigor Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2012 and its Resolution dated March 27, 2013 in CA- should likewise be held liable for Falsification of Official Documents. G.R. SP 120708 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Office of the 118 Ombudsman dated July 18, 2011 in OMB-C-A-05-0123-C finding Josefino N. Rigor importation and exportation. Specifically, Chua was tasked to process trust receipts, guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents, and ordering his accept trust receipt payments and issue the corresponding receipts for these Dismissal from Service, is hereby REINSTATED. payments.[4] SO ORDERED. In response to a complaint of a bank client regarding the non- application of his Chua vs People payments, an internal audit was conducted. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine Republic of the Philippines (29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus foreign remittances were Supreme Court discovered. The audit led to a finding that these remittances were not supported by Manila the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign bank concerned. Two of these remittances were with instructions to credit specified amounts to Savings Account THIRD DIVISION No. 1000-209312 which turned out to be under Chuas name. RICHARD CHUA, 1. Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 29 October 1984 in the amount Petitioner, of ₱16,729.96: - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Kindly credit & advi[s]e immediately SA# 1000-209312 of R. CHUA representing Respondent. proceeds of remittance by order of Amado Roque under TT ref. BKT/1752/25 dated X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X 10-26-84. DECISION 2.Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 6 August 1984 in the amount of ₱16,024.70: MENDOZA, J.: Please credit & advi[s]e immediately SA# 1000-209312 of R. Chua representing This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set aside the proceeds of remittance from San Francisco by order of Linda Castro for US$899.75 @ February 21, 2008 Decision[1] and June 2, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of 17.822 less charges.[5] Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 29051, modifying the October 6, 2004 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 21499 entitled People of the Philippines v. Richard Chua, for Estafa thru Falsification of Meanwhile, the accounts payable or the excess payments made by two clients of the Commercial Document. Bank, ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries and Unidex Garments, were used to cover up the discrepancy created as a result of the crediting of the foregoing amounts to Chuas account. It was made to appear that the said amounts were refunded to the The Facts: same clients although they were not. Debit Tickets were even accomplished to justify the act of crediting the subject amounts to Chuas account. Afterwards, when the In 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired Richard Chua as a general clerk same had been credited to his account, Chua withdrew them on different dates.[6] in its International Banking Division which processed the opening of domestic and international letters of credit, domestic and international remittances as well as 119 On December 17, 1985, Chua was charged with Estafa through Falsification of denied having prepared the withdrawal slips, much more, the cash withdrawals Commercial Documents before the RTC. The Information reads: corresponding to the subject amounts.[9] That on or about May 18, 1984 and October 24, 1984 and for sometime prior to and In the assailed decision dated October 6, 2004, the RTC found Chua guilty beyond subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means documents and was sentenced accordingly.[10] of deceit and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Allied On appeal, the CA modified the RTCs judgment of conviction by holding Chua liable Banking Corporation in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, as General for falsification of commercial documents only. The CA reasoned out that Chua, being Clerk of the said complainant and taking advantage of his position as such, received a mere general clerk of the bank, did not acquire both material and juridical from clients of the bank, Unidex Garments and ATL Plastics Manufacturing Industries, possession of the subject amounts. He was likened to a bank teller whose possession the respective sums of P16,024.70 and P16,729.96 for the purpose of applying the over the money received by him is possession by the bank itself.[11] Be that as it may, same to the payment of the excess indebtedness of said clients with the complainant the CA, still under the same indictment/information and pursuant to this Courts ruling bank but the accused instead made it appear that said amounts were to be credited in Gonzaludo v. People,[12] held Chua liable for falsification of commercial to the current account of the client by executing an advice of credit which the said documents as defined in Articles 172 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] accused, however, did not forward to the Cash Department of the complainant and, The CA wrote: instead, he prepared a fictitious inward foreign remittance advice of credit by falsely making it appear therein that there existed dollar remittances of a certain Linda In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to prove that the subject Inward Castro and Amado Roque in the U.S. dollar equivalent of said amounts which the Foreign Remittance Advices of Credit which were used to transfer the excess accused credited to his personal account with the bank; and the accused, once in payments made by ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries and Unidex Garments to the possession of said funds, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appellants account in the guise of remittances, were fictitious since there were really appropriate and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage no Linda Castro or Amado Roque who sent the same. It adduced two documents, i.e., and prejudice of the complainant, Allied Banking Corporation, in the total amount the Advices of Credit and the Debit Tickets, which were merely used to cover up the of P32,754.66.[7] fictitious remittances. It is true that there is no direct proof that appellant was the author of the falsification. However, since he benefited from the fictitious transactions in question, the inevitable conclusion is that he falsified them. It is an Records show that the case was ordered archived on March 31, 1986 when Chua established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified evaded arrest after the courts issuance of an arrest warrant. He was finally arrested document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that on September 10, 1999, after 13 years, but was released on bail the following day. such person is the forger. On this score, the prosecution convincingly demonstrated When arraigned, Chua entered a plea of not guilty.[8] that appellant withdrew the subject amounts on different dates.[14] For his defense, Chua denied that he prepared the subject Debit Tickets. He insisted Chuas defense of forgery failed to impress the CA. As it was his burden to establish on their regularity as these were duly signed and approved by two of his immediate his defense, it was not enough for him to submit just any specimen of his signature. supervisors. Chua likewise denied having prepared the Advice of Credit documents The NBI requested him to submit additional documents containing his signatures for that covered the questioned foreign remittances. He pointed out that these the years 1983 and 1984 but he failed to meet its requirements. Thus, the CA gave documents were likewise approved for final processing by his supervisors. Finally, he 120 no value to his defense. The dispositive portion of its February 21, 2008 Decision Chua claims that the CAs statement, It is true that there is no direct proof that reads: appellant was the author of the falsification,[17] absolves him from criminal liability even for the lesser offense of falsification of commercial documents. According to WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 6 October 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati Chua, the CA was merely speculating when it held that he was the author of the City, Branch 132, is MODIFIED. Appellant RICHARD CHUA is hereby ACQUITTED of the falsified commercial documents because he allegedly benefited from them. He complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. However, further argues that the prosecution failed to show other facts and circumstances from he is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents and is which it may be reasonably and logically inferred that he committed the crime of SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto falsification.[18] mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. Likewise, he is ORDERED to PAY a fine of P5,000.00. Chua is obviously clutching at straws when he argues that the CAs judgment of conviction was based merely on speculation. He apparently misread the CA decision. No Costs. First of all, the CA never abandoned or set aside the factual findings of the RTC when it ordered the modification of the judgment of conviction. The modification was SO ORDERED.[15] merely on the RTCs conclusion as to the crime actually committed. In its appealed decision, the CA pointed out that an essential element in the complex crime of estafa Chua sought partial reconsideration but his motion was denied by the CA on June 2, through falsification of commercial documentswas lacking, thus: 2008. Still not satisfied, Chua now comes to this Court raising the following Evidently, in the case at bench, appellant did not acquire juridical possession over the ISSUES: subject payments which were made by two of Allied Banks clients, i.e., Unidex Garments and ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries. It must be borne in mind that I appellant is a mere general clerk of Allied Bank. As part of his duties, he received payments from clients. His position therefor may be likened to the position of a bank Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of teller whose possession over the money received by him is possession by the bank the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents considering that it has itself.[19] categorically ADMITTED that there is no direct proof that petitioner was the author of the falsification in the case at bar. The CA never disturbed, categorically or otherwise, the RTCs factual findings with regard to (a) the discovery of fictitious payments purportedly from equally fictitious II foreign remittances; (b) the fictitious debit or refund to the banks clients although in truth there were none as indicated in the banks History of Daily Transactions, and was Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not applying the paramount instead credited to the account of Chua; (c) authenticity of his signature in the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner in view of its explicit withdrawal slips as testified to by the banks signature verifier; (d) his denial that he admission that there is no direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the ever knew the two persons named above who allegedly remitted the subject amount falsification.[16] to him; (e) his own admission on cross examination that the subject amounts were indeed credited to his savings account with the bank; and (f) his admission that after The Court finds no merit in the petition. the subject incident with the bank, he filed a notice of leave and never came back.[20] 121 The absence of a direct proof that Chua was the author of the falsification is of no A conviction coming from the heels of an acquittal in a complex or a more serious moment for the rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession falsified crime is nothing new. The CA was merely following the Courts lead in the case documents and uttered or used the same for his advantage and benefit, the of Gonzaludo v. People,[26] where it was held: presumption that he authored it arises. The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of X x x. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so public document. It is settled doctrine that closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence fails to forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. support the charge on one of the component offenses, can defendant still be separately convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered in In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a the affirmative. In United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog,[27] the Court has ruled forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.[21] to be legally feasible the conviction of an accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via false remittances to his savings to hold the accused of the other charge.[28](previous citations omitted) account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight at the height of the banks inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2008 Decision and June 2, 2008 Chuas involvement in the falsification. Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29051 are AFFIRMED. The evidentiary bases of the RTC were the very same bases relied upon by the CA SO ORDERED. when it instead found Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of commercial documents. The facts are the same. The elements of the crime as found Delos Reyes vda. Del Prado vs People in paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC, are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the Republic of the Philippines offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and 3) Supreme Court the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.[22] Manila Applying this to the present case, all three elements are undeniably present (i) Chua is a private individual; (ii) he used fictitious inward foreign remittance advice of credit to cause the funneling or transfer of the two named bank clients payments into his SECOND DIVISION own account,[23]squarely falling under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code[24]; and (iii) the falsification was committed in two commercial documents, namely, inward foreign remittance advice of credit and the debit tickets.[25] Without doubt, his subsequent conviction to a lesser crime was not unfounded. 122 NORMA DELOS REYES VDA. G.R. No. 186030 DEL PRADO, EULOGIA R. The Factual Antecedents DEL PRADO, NORMITA R. Present: DEL PRADO and RODELIA This petition stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation R. DEL PRADO, CARPIO, J., to Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners Norma Petitioners, Chairperson, Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado BRION, (Eulogia) and Rodelia[3] Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of PEREZ, Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly committed as follows: -versus- SERENO, and REYES, JJ. That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Promulgated: Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified, Respondent. March 21, 2012 execute[d] and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the late Rafael Del Prado, and all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF SUCCESSION to claim ownership and x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x possession of the land mentioned in the DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice. DECISION Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[4] REYES, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial which seeks to assail and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals conference, trial on the merits ensued. (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and Rodelia R. Del Prado The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private v. People of the Philippines": complainant in the criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado (Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late 1) the Decision[1] dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the Rafael married Norma with whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio, decision and order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia. in Criminal Case No. L-8015; and The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter 2) the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse and representative of the Decision of September 15, 2008. of their five minor children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate 123 of Rafael Del Prado to cover the distribution of several properties owned by the late Rafael, including the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and invoking the P-22848, measuring 17,624 square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong, provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the parties hereto do by these Lingayen, Pangasinan. presents, agree to divide and partition the entire estate above[-]described and accordingly adjudicate, as they do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves, Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the herein below specified to wit: land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she x x x[5] executed with Norma. Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several never registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The petitioners new titles were issued under the names of Corazons co-heirs. When Corazon instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint against now petitioners Norma, Rafael, Jr. and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto themselves the property Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before the filing covered by OCT No. P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized by of said complaint. Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part: Among the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July 1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died intestate in the request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of the City of Dagupan, leaving certain parcel of land, and more particularly described succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared and signed the document and bounded to wit: before him. For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848 having appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon was not a daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only later knew A certain parcel of land (Lot No. 5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen Cadastre, situated in that a deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although she admitted Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of Luzon.Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. having executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank 5522, 5515; and 6287; on the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516, 5517, 55 and Road; on the SW., over portions of the subject parcel of land already covered by the new titles. by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521, 5510, and 5520; and on the NW., by Road; x x x containing an area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (17,624) The Ruling of the MTC Square Meters, more or less. Covered by Psd-307996 (LRC), consisting of two lots. Lot No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B. The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any participation in the execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the benefited from the property after its transfer in their names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent; the court rendered its decision[6]finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to xxx suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor as 124 minimum to two years and four months and one day of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its resolution[11] dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime, she petition for review with the CA. was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus payment of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. The Ruling of the CA All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00 On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its decision[12] dismissing the petition and as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit. affirming the RTCs ruling, with modification as to the imposable penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads: Unsatisfied with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision material evidence. To prove that they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the dated August 10, 2007 and Order dated October 31, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, estate of the late Rafael, the petitioners cited their recognition of Corazons right to Branch 38, Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015 the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition, confirmation of subdivision, deed of are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del exchange, joint affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia, Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and Normita R. Del Prado are hereby sentenced to suffer Antonio and Normita, which they had earlier executed.[7] Again, the petitioners an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as denied having signed the deed of succession, and instead insisted that their minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision signatures in the deed were forged. correccional, as maximum. The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution[8] dated December 21, 2006, SO ORDERED.[13] prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC. The Ruling of the RTC The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in its resolution[14] dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners appealed from On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[9] affirming the MTCs decision, with the decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review modification in that the case against Rodelia was dismissed in view of her minority at on certiorari[15]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. the time of the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the decision reads: The Present Petition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their petition: modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del Prado as the case against her is hereby DISMISSED on account of her minority at the time of the commission of the offense. A. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE SO ORDERED.[10] LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO. 125 The petition is bound to fail. B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 PETITIONERS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT MS. CORAZON DEL of the Rules of Court. PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR WITH CORRESPONDING SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO. First, the questions being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that are C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FAILING TO not proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that in APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART. Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that D. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION OF function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN OVERCOME BY THE respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE. of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[17] This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides: E. WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CASE IS PURELY CIVIL ONE[,] NOT CRIMINAL.[16] Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and contents of whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for the several documents which they had presented before the MTC, including the deed review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979, injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the guardianship must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies proceedings for the minor Del Prado children filed by Norma, in which documents by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late pendency. (Emphasis supplied) Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent. The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a In sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain the petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of the probative value defense that they never intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On the other hand, there estate of the late Rafael. is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, This Courts Ruling considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific 126 surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence probabilities of the situation.[18] on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual conclusion.[20] After a consideration of the petitioners arguments, this Court holds finding on Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to reconsider its that the present appeal does not fall under any of these exceptions. contents and those of the other documentary evidence which they have submitted with the court a quo, all of which involve questions of fact rather than questions of There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners since they knew of the law. In their assignment of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual basis for untruthful character of statements contained in their deed of succession. the courts finding of their guilt. However, as we have explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.:[19] Even granting that the present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent reason Petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals grossly disregarded their Exhibits A, to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime B, C, D and E, in effect, asks us to re-examine all the [evidence] already presented and of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 evaluated as well as the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. Thus, in Sotto thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said elements are as v. Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation of evidence is within follows: the domain of the Court of Appeals because its findings of fact are not reviewable by this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988] (a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration and a long line of cases). of facts; (b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over by him; and again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been (c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[21] committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]). These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: There are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of petitions for review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, xxx (7) when the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are 4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts; based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact xxx 127 deprived of her right as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty would rely on the land titles issued on the basis of the deed. of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: We cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good faith because several documents prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in deed of succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an heir, because despite knowledge any other kind of commercial document; and of said fact, they included in the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful 2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such intent to injure Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a desire to damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land.Corazon was unduly enumerated in the next preceding article. deprived of what was due her not only under the provisions of the law on succession, but also under contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners. xxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are dated July 19, 1991, the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds and other hereby AFFIRMED. government agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of several new titles in its stead. The first and third elements were committed by the SO ORDERED. inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, (w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest People vs Estrada are the children of the decedent.[22] The untruthfulness of said statement is clear from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their EN BANC defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas petition for PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents Petitioner, is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael. - versus - The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA was transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE public, required only truthful statements from the petitioners. It was a legal SANDIGANBAYAN, requirement to effect the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the Respondents. issuance of new titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to titles over properties x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x brought under the coverage of land registration, to the injury of Corazon who was 128 DECISION Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the BRION, J.: Sandiganbayan issued. The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the on Certiorari[1] to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution dated July Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.[3] evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.[2] At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove THE FACTS the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was consisted of: filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly reads: declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the Fernando Chua were present on that occasion; above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, the account name Jose Velarde on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL receipts duly marked in evidence): TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. MMMMM) registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. LLLLL) PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. NNNNN) d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. OOOOO) CONTRARY TO LAW. e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. PPPPP) f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. QQQQQ) g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. RRRRR) Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. SSSSS) another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. TTTTT) filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. UUUUU) Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565. k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. VVVVV) 129 l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. WWWWW) (2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that President when Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were made to presented the following arguments:[12] the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5. 1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant is being Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.[4] The prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302; accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;[5] the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.[6] The 2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7] misplaced; After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a 3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the demurrer to evidence in these cases.[8] In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient 2004,[9] the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. evidence in this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury). 4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and not absorbed in plunder. 26905.[10] His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds[11]: Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply 1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) Opposition. witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde; THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING 2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are: dated 11 October 2001; First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only 3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential Information i.e., the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C- and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures; and 163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive or between on or about 04 February 2000 and sometime prior or 4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder. subsequent thereto means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 130 could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore conjunctive was simply the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any covered by the indictment. variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date on or about the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel; 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The Sandiganbayan ruled additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and that the use of the disjunctive or prevented it from interpreting the Information any is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be other way. construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication to a Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be non- the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that actionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such Estrada committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme said: Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.[13] It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being absolutely confidential, case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple the witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved same law cannot be considered as public as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,[14] and prior to the enactment of said that movant intended to be known by this name in addition to his real Republic R.A. No. 9160.[15] name.Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs: Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde: Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by a. Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings with Dichavez and this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended. imputed to Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in known by the name Jose Velarde is shown by the nature of a numbered account a several transactions, standing alone, violates Estradas right to be informed of the perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase and use and employ the impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No. said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities.[16] Reading CA name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute entities. Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than those mentioned obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account (such Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities specified in the as the name he used to open it). 131 Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The Sandiganbayan said that 3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142; acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition 4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper; 2000 another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000. 5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000; in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed in a way 6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use forcing its application to the instant case. of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage THE COURTS RULING into law of R.A. No. 9160. The petition has no merit. THE PETITION The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling The People filed this petition raising the following issues: Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other 1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with alias Jose Velarde was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000; he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been 2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry under Commonwealth Act No. 142; of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. 132 Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of criminal liability under CA No. 142. name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the time of if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential local civil registry. treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias a name screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, or names used by a person or intended to be used by any distinction we make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.[21] The mode of authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be. indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.[18] dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the tenor: enactment of CA No. 142, as follows: The use of the term alias in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term alias tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the means otherwise known as (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully 53). The charge of using an alias logically implies that another name has been used maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, the amended information adverts to several transactions and signing of documents unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above- the civil register.[19] mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused. Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance 133 without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and by this name in addition to his real name.[22] was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua. the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling. In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan argues in its petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash[23] that reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias Jose cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded Velarde in addition to the name Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was case.[24] The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud in business transactions which effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.[25] It is the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use of the alias and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before was public. final judgment.[26] Perez v. Court of Appeals,[27] albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez: In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory use of an alias. order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the What is the coverage of the indictment? fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main resolved when the restraining order was lifted.[28] transaction one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there were other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the specifically referred to several transactions with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and corporate entities. To the People, the restrictive finding that the phrase prior to or did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer subsequent thereto is absorbed by the phrase on or about 04 February 2000 134 drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents signed name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the and the place where the offense was committed.[29] As to the cause of accusation, the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto, on the other. It argues that the aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto into a useless necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and route. aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The the constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an actual date of its commission.[31] allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability material ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[32] In that when the time given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was complaint or information of the charge/s laid. committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04 February 2000, or turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] willfully, unlawfully abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause prior to or subsequent and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND thereto; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other claims that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent Estrada from corporate entities. properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance. We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the We see no merit in these arguments. Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly states At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to be informed of that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior the nature and cause of the accusation against him.Under the provisions of the Rules or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is as Jose Velarde in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by and/or other corporate entities. 135 and R.A. No. 9160. Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues. plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the thereto would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the bank documents as Jose Velarde amounted to a public use of an alias that violates CA on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent No. 142. thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that referred back On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to separate the provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most, phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly based on the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already Information. prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged, were subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142. actually alleged in the Information. On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it deals a gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde No. 142s coverage.Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason related with one another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua. harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they each deal with a different The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, different class of persons,[33] and there was no need to force their application to one 136 another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule not obtaining in the present case. in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A reasons we cited above tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more trust account, according to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered does not create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become operations are treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under authority, and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended). To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the transaction and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent interpretation publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other people, consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and use of the that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua. Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias no iota of intention of publicity. before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The of a trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the Legislature to be in nature.[34] We previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,[35] the Peoples used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes and cannot be so nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied so that right transactions, when we said: and justice would prevail. The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in We see no merit in these arguments. R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship 137 between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written the term deposits used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in the bank. cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1: The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give of deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the to deposits in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need country. (Underscoring supplied) to add the phrase or invested. Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.[36] If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor- debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.[37] Given economic development of the country. the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit, even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the placement or investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that intent to use the alias publicly. could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law. The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term deposits was anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed intended to be understood broadly: by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the constitutional Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.[38] Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked 138 We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various CARPIO, J.: laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the The Case offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the This is a petition for certiorari[1] of the Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the Order requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is dated 19 June 2000 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The 4 April 2000 Resolution significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that dismissed for lack of probable cause the complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P. the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable Acua against respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie Turla. The 19 June 2000 Order expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. denied the motion for reconsideration. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there The Facts is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires Petitioner Celsa P. Acua (petitioner) is a former teacher of the Angeles City National harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read Trade School (ACNTS) in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent Pedro Pascua together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a (respondent Pascua) was ACNTS Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source (respondent Turla) was a member of its faculty.[2] or an influencing factor in his indictment. On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut (Yabut), another ACNTS teacher, together with other school personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua on some In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of unspecified matter. Respondent Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde vis-- place on 16 July 1998. Respondent Turla attended the meeting upon respondent vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estradas use of an alias Pascuas directive. Petitioner, whom Yabut apparently invited, also attended the when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we meeting. simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998 meeting, petitioner charged offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other respondent Pascua with misconduct (OMB-ADM-1-99-0387) and with violation of accused, his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt Article 131[3] of the Revised Penal Code (OMB 1-99-903) before the Office of the that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, Ombudsman (Ombudsman).[4] In his sworn counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99- as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now 0387, respondent Pascua alleged, among others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is a in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of fact of an administrative case Sandiganbayan ruling. pending with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which petitioner and Yabut earlier filed against him and (2) Yabut had no authority to invite WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. to the 16 July 1998 meeting a non-employee of ACNTS like petitioner considering that he (respondent Pascua) was the one who called the meeting.[5] Respondent Pascua SO ORDERED. also submitted a sworn statement of respondent Turla confirming that respondent Pascua and not Yabut called the 16 July 1998 meeting.[6] Acuna vs Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon The Ombudsman dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and OMB 1-99-0903. FIRST DIVISION Contending that private respondents perjured themselves in their sworn statements [G.R. No. 144692. January 31, 2005] in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with perjury (OMB CELSA P. ACUA, petitioner, vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and 1-99-2467) before the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (public RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), respondents. respondent). Petitioner alleged that private respondents were liable for perjury DECISION because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua before the 139 Civil Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was not the same as her dialogue and not Mrs. Yabut, thus I never gave any authority to anyone to invite any complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent Pascua person who was not a member of the school faculty or an employee thereof. who called the 16 July 1998 meeting.[7] Clearly, the letter of Ms. Yabut and the aforequoted counter-affidavit of respondent Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the dismissal of the Pascua belie the commission of perjury since there was no deliberate assertion of complaint.[8] falsehood on a material matter. The Ruling of the Public Respondent Respondent Ronnie Turla could not likewise be indicted for the crime charged. Since Public respondent dismissed petitioners complaint in his 4 April 2000 it was respondent Pascua who called him to that meeting, it would be truthful of him Resolution,[9] thus: to state that way. There was also no willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on Upon careful evaluation of the case record, we find no evidence to indict respondents the part of respondent Ronnie Turla.[10] for perjury. Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her motion in the 19 xxxx June 2000 Order. It could not be established by the evidence on record that it was Erlinda Yabut who Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner contends that public respondent called the meeting on July 16, 1998 and invited complainant. Annex B-1 xxx of the committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable complaint is the letter of Erlinda Yabut to Dr. Pedro Pascua, dated July 13, 1998, which cause.[11] shows that Ms. Yabut was requesting respondent to have a dialogue (sic). The letter Public respondent, in his Comment, maintains that he did not commit grave abuse of states: discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint in OMB 1-99-2467.[12] We, the undersigned would like to request your good office to allow us to have a In their Comment, private respondents claim that petitioner filed this petition out of dialogue on Thursday, July 1[6], to once and for all ventilate our time. Hence, this petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits, private complaints/observations and also listen to the rebuttal of the other side. respondents submit that public respondent correctly dismissed the perjury charge It is the desire of everybody who attended the meeting last time that whatever is the against them.[13] outcome of this confrontation will be the basis of the next appropriate step. In her Reply, petitioner counters that she timely filed her petition for certiorari under We would like to request the incoming Administrator or somebody from the DECS to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65).[14] act as moderator. The Issues Pursuant to such circumstance, respondent Pascua stated, among others, in his The petition raises these issues: counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that: 1. Whether petitioner filed the petition on time; and 5. Be that as it may, I vehemently deny the charge that I prevented Complainant Celsa 2. Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Acu[]a from testifying against Mrs. Amelia Yambao on July 16, 1998 the truth of the the complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause. matter being that there was no hearing or investigation conducted or called by the The Ruling of the Court undersigned on said date but a dialogue among the teachers of Angeles City National The petition, while filed on time, has no merit. Trade School which I previously headed. Mrs. Acu[]a at that time was not a teacher The Petition was Filed on Time to attend the said dialogue, thus I stated openly on said occasion that I will not start Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this petition beyond the ten-day the meeting if there are outsiders, and Mr. ROGELIO GUTIERREZ asked herein period provided in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.[15]Section 27 states in part: Complainant to step out of the room so we could start the dialogue, xxx; Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. xxxx 6. I also deny the charge that she was invited by Mrs. Erlinda Yabut, co-complainant In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of of hers in the DECS Administrative case, because I was the one who called for that the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, 140 directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied) innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in force because this Court by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much in Fabian v. Desierto[16] declared it unconstitutional for expanding the Courts the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be jurisdiction without its consent in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting Constitution. Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to appeals from rulings of the attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from by a private complainant. the Ombudsmans rulings in criminal cases such as the present case.[17] The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to deviate from this long-standing The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is policy. to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we held in Tirol, Jr. Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in v. Del Rosario:[18] dismissing her complaint for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention is The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from untenable. Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party [in administrative cases] is given the mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[21] The elements of aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding perjury under Article 183[22] of the Revised Penal Code are: probable cause to indict accused persons. (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent Ombudsman xxx is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack [or] officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she filed this petition for a legal purpose.[23](Emphasis supplied) for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that public respondent gravely abused his Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and third elements are absent here in discretion in dismissing her complaint against private respondents. Under Section 4 that private respondents statements in their counter-affidavits in OMB-ADM-1-99- of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner had 60 days from her receipt of the 19 June 2000 0387 were not material to that case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner received a copy of the 19 June 2000 assertion of falsehood. Order on 13 July 2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000 within which to On the Element of Materiality file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11 August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed this In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the main fact which was the petition on time. subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact xxx. [24] To The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse hold private respondents liable, there must be evidence that their assailed His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467 statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in that case. We reiterate this Courts policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of Petitioner has presented no such evidence. The records are hardly helpful, as his constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.[19] We explained the reason for petitioner did not furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387. such policy in Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman:[20] What is before the Court is a portion of respondent Pascuas counter-affidavit in that The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers case as quoted by public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution. Admittedly, some granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as inference is possible from this quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioners 141 complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent Pascua prevented her from WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The Resolution dated 4 April 2000 and the taking part in the 16 July 1998 meeting. However, it would be improper for the Court Order dated 19 June 2000 of respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon are to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established by AFFIRMED. evidence and not left to inference.[25] SO ORDERED. At any rate, petitioners complaint for perjury will still not prosper because respondent Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Pascuas statement that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as petitioners and Yabuts administrative complaint against respondent Pascua before the DECS is Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. vs Gomez immaterial to the inferred issue. On the Element of Deliberate Assertion SECOND DIVISION of Falsehood COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 154491 The third element of perjury requires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert (CCBPI), Naga Plant, a falsehood. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense.[26] Here, the Court finds Petitioner, that respondent Pascuas statement in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 Promulgated: that he called the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of - versus - falsehood. While it was Yabut and some unidentified ACNTS personnel who QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. KITGOMEZ November 14, 2008 requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was respondent Pascuas consent to and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. their request which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent Pascuas DANNY GALICIA, statement in question is not false much less malicious. It is a good faith interpretation Respondents. of events leading to the holding of the meeting. x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Regarding respondent Pascuas allegation in his counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99- 0387 that petitioners complaint was a mere rehash and duplication with a slight DECISION deviation of fact of the DECS administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why this is false. Petitioner again did BRION, J.: not furnish the Court a copy of her and Yabuts complaint with the DECS. Respondent Turlas statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that respondent Pascua called Is the hoarding of a competitors product containers punishable as unfair competition the 16 July 1998 meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent Pascua told him. under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293) that would Consequently, it was correct for public respondent to hold that since respondent entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder? This is the issue Turla merely repeated what he heard from respondent Pascua, he could not be held we grapple with in this petition for review on certiorari involving two rival liable for making a false and malicious statement. multinational softdrink giants; petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) There is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in arbitrary or despotic accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi), represented by the respondents, of manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as hoarding empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage its to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or operation in Bicolandia. to act at all in contemplation of law.[27] No such conduct can be imputed on public respondent. Public respondent disposed of petitioners complaint consistent with BACKGROUND applicable law. The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below. 142 On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Miral and Rene Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook, Coke empty bottles in Pepsis yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly Lirio did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001. penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the respondents.[1] In support of the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn search warrant. They contended that no probable cause existed to justify the statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he issuance of the search warrant; the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and was informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi their Naga plant was in urgent need of the shells. compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large quantities of Coke Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime, bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security of warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsis yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw and that the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases.[2] marked bottles, boxes, and other similar containers. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after THE MTC RULINGS taking the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01[3] to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsis Naga On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order[6] denying the twin yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.[4] The local police seized and motions. It explained there was an exhaustive examination of the applicant and its brought to the MTCs custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke witnesses through searching questions and that the Pepsi shells are prima bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168 Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12 facie evidence that the bottles were placed there by the respondents. ounces) empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the quashal of the Naga a complaint against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in warrant as the MTC did not conduct a probing and exhaustive examination; the relation to Section 170 of the IP Code.[5] The named respondents, also the applicant and its witnesses had no personal knowledge of facts surrounding the respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E. hoarding; the court failed to order the return of the borrowed shells; there was no Galicia (Galicia)and its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez). crime involved; the warrant was issued based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure of the shells was illegal because they were not included in the warrant. In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included them in their return to make up On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the second for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the assailed order,[7] explaining that the issue of whether there was unfair competition return of empty Coke bottles as they simply received what had been delivered; the can only be resolved during trial. presence of the bottles in their yard was not intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Regaspis statements are hearsay as they had no personal knowledge of the alleged Revised Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on the crime; there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of empty bottles; ground that the subject search warrant was issued without probable cause and that and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal nature, must be construed the empty shells were neither mentioned in the warrant nor the objects of the strictly against the State and liberally in their favor. Pepsi security guards Eduardo E. perceived crime. 143 Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 168.3(c) of the IP Code does not limit the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning THE RTC RULINGS of unfair competition to include other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another. The inherent On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non- element of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large quantities commission of the crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws may of a competitors empty bottles is necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that have been violated by the respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of its Bicol bottling operation was prejudiced by the respondents hoarding and discretion on the part of the issuing MTC judge.[8] Thus, destruction of its empty bottles. Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by the Honorable The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was improper Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders because it complied with all the essential requisites of a valid warrant. The empty issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga City dated September 19, bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to prevent discovery while they were 2001 and November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The City systematically being destroyed to hamper the petitioners bottling operation and to Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed to return to the undermine the capability of its bottling operations in Bicol. Petitioner the properties seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs. The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted his own examination, he gravely erred and abused his discretion when he ignored the rule on SO ORDERED.[9] the need of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause; satisfactory and convincing evidence is essential to hold them guilty of unfair competition; the In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not cause actual or probable deception and petitioner stressed that the decision of the RTC was contradictory because it absolved confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged criminal acts do not show Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant, but at the conduct aimed at deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use the empty bottles same time nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have dismissed the petition or pass them off as the respondents goods. when it found out that Judge Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle hoarding, as Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this petition for review the acts penalized must always involve fraud and deceit. The hoarding does not make on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the decision of the them liable for unfair competition as there was no deception or fraud on the end- RTC. Essentially, the petition raises questions against the RTCs nullification of the users. warrant when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the issuing judge. THE ISSUE THE PETITION and THE PARTIES POSITIONS Based on the parties positions, the basic issue submitted to us for resolution is whether the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the respondents seizure of the empty Coke bottles from Pepsis yard for probable violation of Section petition for certiorari because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the MTC in 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This basic issue involves two sub-issues, namely, the issuing the search warrant. The petitioner further argues that the IP Code was substantive issue of whether the application for search warrant effectively charged enacted into law to remedy various forms of unfair competition accompanying an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code; and the procedural globalization as well as to replace the inutile provision of unfair competition under 144 issue of whether the MTC observed the procedures required by the Rules of Court in probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the application for search the issuance of search warrants. warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath or affirmation the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in writing and under OUR RULING oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit. We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive and We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our agreement is procedural aspects. Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of the more in the result than in the reasons that supported it. The decision is correct in requirements and, hence, treated them separately; it approved of the way the MTC nullifying the search warrant because it was issued on an invalid substantive basis the handled the procedural aspects of the issuance of the search warrant but found its acts imputed on the respondents do not violate Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For action on the substantive aspect wanting. It therefore resolved to nullify the warrant, this reason, we deny the present petition. without however expressly declaring that the MTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the warrant applied for. The RTCs error, however, is in the form rather than The issuance of a search warrant[10] against a personal property[11] is governed by Rule the substance of the decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for the reason 126 of the Revised Rules of Court whose relevant sections state: the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave abuse of discretion was Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions below will show. except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts searched.[12] Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an underlying offense personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together must, in the first place, exist. In other words, the acts alleged, taken together, must with the affidavits submitted. constitute an offense and that these acts are imputable to an offender in relation with whom a search warrant is applied for. Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged alleged to to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in be hoarding of empty Coke bottles constitutes an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of the form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis supplied] the IP Code. Section 168 in its entirety states: To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and his or her witnesses. This is the substantive 168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he requirement in the issuance of a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or 145 not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said include other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner business or services of another. Allegedly, the respondents hoarding of Coca Cola as other property rights. empty bottles is one such act. 168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good We do not agree with the petitioners expansive interpretation of Section 168.3 (c). faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or Unfair competition, previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in relation with who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair R.A. No. 166 and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now covered by competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor. Section 168 of the IP Code as this Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No. 166, and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition: Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and general rule on the definition of unfair competition. The law does not thereby cover every unfair act (a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of committed in the course of business; it covers only acts characterized by deception or goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the any other means contrary to good faith in the passing off of goods and services as wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words those of another who has established goodwill in relation with these goods or thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to services, or any other act calculated to produce the same result. influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his provides specifics of what unfair competition is without in any way limiting the scope legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor of protection against unfair competition. Part of these particulars is provided under engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose; Section 168.3(c) which provides the general catch-all phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase, a person shall be guilty of unfair competition who shall (b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of goods, business or services of another. another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or (c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of goods, business or services of another. deceiving the public. It formulated the true test of unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his 168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis purchases under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the particular trade to which mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 166a) the controversy relates.[13] One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before the The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection right to recover can exist.[14] The advent of the IP Code has not significantly changed on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to these rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its 146 entirety provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key technology, and to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in elements that must be present for unfair competition to exist. the Philippines. (n) The act alleged to violate the petitioners rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding Intellectual property rights have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the which we gather to be the collection of the petitioners empty bottles so that they can Code to consist of: a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; be withdrawn from circulation and thus impede the circulation of the petitioners c) Geographic Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs bottled products.This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith a (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g)Protection of Undisclosed Information. conclusion that, if true, is indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents. The critical question, however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what Given the IP Codes specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question is critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of the petitioner. property as defined in the Code. If it does not, then coverage by the Code may be negated. We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within the contemplation of the IP Code. A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an intellectual property right as defined above, is whether it falls under the general unfair competition The petitioners cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that refer to a concept and definition under Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The question very specific subject intellectual property. Aside from the IP Codes actual substantive then is whether there is deception or any other similar act in passing off of goods or contents (which relate specifically to patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names, services to be those of another who enjoys established goodwill. service marks, copyrights, and the protection and infringement of the intellectual properties that these protective measures embody), the coverage and intent of the Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory Code is expressly reflected in its Declaration of State Policy which states: construction giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. The State recognizes that an generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in particular. Under the principle of noscitur effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of a sociis, when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts foreign susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and investments, and ensures market access for our products. It shall protect and secure specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to their associated.[15] intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such periods as provided in this Act. As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person who has earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the State shall to protection under the Code, with or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as promote the diffusion of knowledge and information for the promotion of national previously discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section development and progress and the common good. 168.3, on the other hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the appearance of the goods It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of registering of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that his or her goods or services patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on the transfer of are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3 being a catch all clause whose coverage the parties now dispute. 147 As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a measure that may Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the hoarding - as defined and overlap or be affected by the provisions of Part II of the IP Code on The Law on charged by the petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names. What is certain is that the IP Code has Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or not expressly repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to have specific reference to a service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without special type of registrants the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda water, proper authority from the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, fraudulently passing off their products or services as those of the petitioner. The boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers who are given special respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or protection with respect to the containers they use. In this sense, it is in fact a law of misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the petitioner specific coverage and application, compared with the general terms and application with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of unlawful use of act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as containers and even of the unlawfulness of their wanton destruction a matter that alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the oppositions sales by escapes the IP Codes generalities unless linked with the concepts of deception and depriving it of the bottles it can use for these sales. passing off as discussed above. In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the No. 623 covers, to wit: parties did not consider at all in the search warrant application. The petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its search warrant application since the one specific offense SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling or that the law allows and which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, with of the present case is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the their names or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support the stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent. description of the names or are used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense, the ruling of regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks. this Court penned by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly instructive: SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully registered the marks of cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for the particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in section shall be punished by a fine or not more than one hundred pesos or petitioners Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both. search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.[16] 148 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the petitioners search warrant should properly be quashed for the petitioners failure to show that the acts imputed to the respondents do not violate the cited offense. There could not have been any probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant because no crime in the first place was effectively charged. This conclusion renders unnecessary any further discussion on whether the search warrant application properly alleged that the imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a hoarding in bad faith aimed to prejudice the petitioners operations, or whether the MTC duly complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly, we confirm that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City, is NULL and VOID. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. 149