Today is Saturday, August 11, 2012Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-3090 January 9, 1951 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO LIMACO, defendant-appellant. Menandro Quiogue for appellant. Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for appellee. MONTEMAYOR, J.: This is an appeal to suspend the decision of conviction for the crime of triple murder sentencing the accusedappellant Ricardo Limaco to "life imprisonment at hard labor, without hope of any pardon or reprieve whatsoever, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Severa Envelino, Sofia Envelino and Matrina Amores in the sum of P6,000 each (People vs. Amansec, G.R. No. L-927, March 11, 1948)*, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs." After a review of the record of the case, we find the following facts to have been fully established. On June 30, 1948, Liberato Envelino, his wife and son left their house in Sitio Bunlas, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, to work on their clearing or kaingin several kilometers away. In the house were left his three daughters — Inacia, Severa, and Sofia, all surnamed Envelino and a niece Martina Amores, aged 15, 14, 5 and 3 respectively. According to the eldest daughter, Inacia, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant Ricardo Limaco came to the house and found the four girls in the kitchen. He asked her sister Severa to sell him a pig which he wanted to butcher. Severa told him that he better wait for her parents because she would not dare sell the animal in their absence and without their consent. Visibly disappointed and resenting her refusal to sell, he addressed Severa thus: "If you do not want to, it is better that you will be hacked because you are selfish." Almost simultaneously, he drew his bolo, Exhibit A, locally known as "talibong", from its sheath, Exhibit A-1 and attacked Severa with it, inflicting on her seven wounds, two of which were mortal; Sofia and Martina rushed to Severa and embraced her, but Ricardo in his fury also boloed them, inflicting on each four wounds, two of which were mortal. The three girls died on the spot. In the meantime, Inacia who witnessed the horrible slaughter drew back in terror, and fearing that her turn would come next, jumped down from the kitchen through an opening in the wall and hid herself in the bushes. After an hour and thinking that the accused had left, she ventured into the house and found the dead bodies of her two sisters and niece, sprawled on the very spot in the kitchen where she last saw them, covered with wounds. Later, in the evening her parents and brother arrived and she related the gory details. The authorities in Kabankalan were finally notified and the chief of police and one policeman and the president of the Sanitary Division went to the place and made the corresponding investigation. The accused was arrested by two policemen in his home in sitio Nabhang, municipality of Ayungon, and according to the policemen he admitted to them having killed the three girls, even surrendering the bolo, Exhibit A, with which he boloed them, with its corresponding scabbard, Exhibit A-1. During this detention in the municipal jail in Kabankalan, he made a written statement, Exhibit B, with its corresponding translation (Exhibit B-1) which was sworn to and subscribed by him before Justice of the Peace Garaygay on July 10, 1948. In this affidavit, the appellant states that early in the morning of June 30, 1948, he and his father Rufo Limaco and his step-mother went to sitio Carul-an, Ayungon, to make some purchases at the market there; that at about 8 o'clock that same morning, his father and stepmother returned to their home in sitio Nabhang but he remained and went to the cockpit; that in the afternoon he started for his home but passed by the house of Liberato Envelino in sitio Bunlas in order to ask him to catch a carabao of his father for he (defendant) intended to pasture it around his house to get rid of the tall grass growing there; that Liberato was employed by his father Rufo Limaco as a herder or caretaker of their carabaos; that upon reaching the house of Liberato he found the four girls already mentioned and inquired for Liberato, saying that he wanted him to catch one of his father's carabaos but that instead of giving a civil answer, Severa answered in anger. We quote a pertinent portion of Exhibit B-1: "Why, what is the meaning of asking where my father is; you are not giving us food for dinner or supper." I answered, "Not of course, but I have something to do with your father, to have him catch one of our carabaos." Then she answered me again saying, "Catch the carabao, none of your business to order us to catch your carabao, I will throw you with this piece of wood." Later on while we were exchanging hot words, she threw me with a piece of wood, but I parried it with my hand. Q. After Severa Envelino had thrown you with a piece of wood, what did you do? — A. Because I got mad at her for the pain I felt in my hand, I forgot everything and pulled out my "talibong" I had with me that time, and hacked Severa Envelino unconsciously, and later, I happened to include the two children who were her sister and niece, mentioned above, because they were hugging Severa Envelino at the time I was stabbing her and as a result of that three of them died inside the house in sitio Bunlas, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, on that time and date. Q. After killing the three of them, what did you do then? — A. I went home immediately to Nabhang, Oriental Negros where my father live and I did not tell anybody in the house what happened to me; and they came to know the incident on Monday of July 5, 1948 when I was arrested by the policemen from Kabankalan. Q. Where were the wounds in the bodies of Severa Envelino and the children whom you killed? — A. I do not know, I was not able to find out where, because I kept on hacking them and when all of them were dead I went down the house. Q. Who were the persons present there at the time you killed Severa Envelino and the other children? — A. There was no other person present, only the four of them, whom I have mentioned above. I was not able to stab Inacia Envelino, their elder sister because at the time I was hacking her sister she jumped out of the kitchen and hid among the bushes.. Q. Where is your "talibong" which you used in killing Severa Envelino and the two children? — A. It was now in the possession of the Chief of Police of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, because it was taken by the policemen from our house when they arrested me on July 4, 1948. In a confidential report prepared by the Chief of Police of Kabankalan for the Provincial Commander of Occidental Negros, dated July 15, 1948 (Exhibit H), the chief of police stated that appellant Ricardo Limaco admitted to him that he had killed Severa, Sofia and Martina on June 30, 1948, and practically repeated the details about the killing and the reason therefor as contained in the affidavit (Exhibit B-1). The chief of police also states in his report that he had examined appellant's father, Rufo Limaco, who told him that when Ricardo came home that day, June 30, 1948, he brought with him the meat of a rooster killed in the cockpit but was surprised to see blood smeared on his clothes and on the handle of his bolo or "talibong", and when he asked him about the blood stains Ricardo informed him that in cutting up the rooster while it was still alive it struggled and its blood spurted on him and stained his shirt and his bolo. We are fully satisfied that the appellant killed the three girls in the manner already described at the beginning of this decision. We are not impressed by the claim of the accused that he was ill-treated by the police in order to obtain from him his written statement, Exhibit B, and that he signed the same before the justice of the peace without knowing its contents. The alleged ill-treatment was denied by the police, and the justice of the peace on the witness stand told the court that he saw no marks of ill-treatment or torture on the body of the accused who signed the statement after the contents had been fully explained to him. But even without this affidavit, Exhibit B, we find the testimony of Inacia Envelino to be straightforward and sincere and sufficient on which to base the conviction of the appellant. At the trial, the appellant interposed the defense of alibi claiming that he could not have committed the crime in the sitio of Bunlas in the afternoon of June 30, 1948, because he never left his house in his barrio of Nabhang from the morning of that day until the day following. In this he was corroborated by his friend Ciriaco Batollo and his father Rufo Limaco. After analyzing the evidence for the accused on this point, and citing several authorities, the lower court rejected this defense, stating that Batollo was an interested witness "due to the bond of friendship existing between himself on one hand and the accused and his father on the other, or that he was a paid or fabricated witness who manufactured untold lies before the court." As to the father Rufo Limaco, the trial court said that his testimony of trial supporting his son's defense of alibi is belied by his testimony given at the preliminary investigation and by his affidavit, Exhibit I. We agree to the trial court's rejection of this defense of alibi. As a matter of fact, appellant's counsel abandoned this defense of alibi in his brief. Neither does he deny that the appellant is the author of the killing. He merely asks that the sentence be suspended and that his client be committed to the Psychopathic Hospital for mental observation. In our opinion, and considering was has transpired between the commission of the crime and the end of the trial, there is no reason for granting this request. In other words, there is no reason to believe that the appellant is now insane or did not have the use of his reason at the time he committed the crime. There is no evidence that in all his life he ever had attacks of insanity, lunacy, or epilepsy that should have deprived him of reason and discernment, even momentarily. On the contrary, he seems to be normal in every respect. We quote from the decision of the trial judge who had the opportunity to serve him on the witness stand: The Court had seen the defendant testify on his own behalf; if had observed his stern look from his pair of cold terrifying eyes. Cold and dry in his demeanor and answering in counsel's questions intelligently, the defendant impressed the Court as a man who was not insane at the time when he mercilessly hacked to death his three young victims, but was simply a plain blood-thirsty looking man in his early twenties. The trial court found the accused guilty of murder. That is correct. Attacking three weak and defenseless girls, two of them only five and three years old, suddenly and with a deadly weapon like a bolo, against which unexpected assault they could not defend themselves, clearly constitutes treachery which qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of murder. The trial court further found present the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, disregard of respect due to sex and age, and that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victims. The finding of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is also correct; not so however, with abuse of superior strength and disregard of respect due to sex and age. Said two circumstances may be regarded as included in that of treachery. On this point unfit to live in normal and peaceful society. However. Volume I. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. calling it hideous and gruesome. without hope whatsoever of any pardon or reprieve. namely. etc. that of dwelling. the trial judge states. qualified as such by treachery. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. Viada. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom. it is a duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. He does not deserve it. in his commentaries on the Penal Code. in this case. the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party. the trial judge indulges in unfavorable comments on the death penalty. if not in disharmony with the Constitution. taking advantage of the weakness of her sex and the tenderness of her age in order to perpetrate the same without risk to his person. There therefore remains only one aggravating circumstance. The aggravating circumstance of disregard to sex cannot be considered because it has neither been proved nor admitted by the defendant that in committing the crime he had intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim. citing Viada.. and regards the defendant as plain bloodthirsty. There should be a penalty for each of the three separate crimes caused by separate acts or blows committed and inflicted by the appellant. and as long as our criminal law provides for is imposition in certain cases. either by an insane or by a blood-thirsty criminal. page 329. Mangsant. he could legally be deprived of each and every one of them. in the opinion of the court. saying: "Considering that the trial court did not err in not considering against the accused the 20th aggravating circumstance of article 10. is just the right punishment for him. But strange to say. is it proper to consider the aggravating circumstance of disregard of respect due the offended party on account of her age?" The Supreme Court has resolved the same in the negative. 548. We notice that the trial court imposed only one penalty for the three murders. then we are constrained to state our opinion. inasmuch as this circumstance is inherent in the crime committed and his moreover absorbed by he treachery which. He should be put to death slowly but surely and. 1878. efficacy or morality of laws. in the opinion of the court. In this. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else. to apply them. The trial judge severely condemns the act committed by the appellant." (Decision of June 25. layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. We always respect the private opinions of trial judges tho highly debatable and even if they happen not to harmonize with ours on the subject. not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the courts. the trial court erred. resulting in an illegality and reversible error. 65 Phil. but only to execute his evil purpose in a treacherous manner. And for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we feel it . and that the trial court could send him to the electric chair without any compunction of conscience. In the murder of a girl of 14 years. But when such private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a conclusion and determination of a case or he penalty imposed. life imprisonment at hard labor. says: "Question III. and we quote: But a quick death would seem to be too sweet a medicine for him. Further. The only function of he judiciary is to interpret the laws and. says the following: . and goes on to say that if said defendant had three lives. published in the Gazette of August 25th. .the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. qualifies the crime as murder. because nothing appears in the judgement from which it may be presumed that in the commission of the crime.) Neither may the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength be taken into account just because of the fact that the defendant is a man and the deceased a woman. committed. . as long as that penalty remains in the statute books. Lopez Jaena. 1992 SULPICIO INTOD. were butchered and hacked to death. Moran. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.incumbent upon us to state while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as harsh. The crime committed in this case is truly shocking. Pablo. For lack of sufficient votes. they must apply it effect as decreed by the law-making body. JJ. either that he. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. apparently without any provocation. In the morning of February 4. No. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to . the penalty will be reclusion perpetua. J. C. its amendment. the decision appealed from.R. Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. While some members of this Court are for imposing the extreme penalty. we gathered the following facts. Feria. filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. Jorge Pangasian. Padilla. is hereby affirmed with costs. concur. Sulpicio Intod.. finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder. Reyes and Jugo. But this penalty is for each of three murders. thereby resulting in the imposition of the penalty in its medium degree. Pangasian. Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan. vs. Sulpicio Intod. a relatively ignorant man interpreted the refusal of one of the victims to sell a pig as an affront and thereby became obfuscated and lost his head. Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Three innocent girls. Oroquieta City. Mandaya and Intod. In that case. it being understood that the maximum period of imprisonment will not exceed forty years. two of tender age. With this modification. Tuason. and may recommend to the authority or department concerned. as long as said law is in force. Branch XIV. unwise or morally wrong.. CAMPOS. From the records. modification or repeal. Thereafter. this mitigating circumstance will compensate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Bengzon.: Petitioner. Paras. or that he lacks education and instruction for the reason that he did not finish even the first grade in elementary school. J.. petitioner. JR. still. respondents. 103119 October 21. 1979. others believe that the appellant is entitled to a mitigating circumstance. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property. but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises. The crime of murder was not consummated. 3. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime. the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. recognizes in the offender his formidability. Tubio and Daligdig. Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Further. . the crime is possible. not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred: xxx xxx xxx 2. employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. 6 The Revised Penal Code. Had it not been for this fact. 4(2). 2 After trial. Instead. in its Comment to the Petition. Mandaya. that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family.be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men. At the instance of his companions. that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed. 5 This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. No one was hit by the gun fire. arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan. Pangasian. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day. they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". otherwise. Petitioner. 3 Article 4. holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. not impossible. On the other hand. that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. Thereafter. 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate.. Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. Petitioner. Respondent alleged that there was intent. paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The court (RTC). Lopez Jaena. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: . No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. respondent pointed out that: . inspired by the Positivist School. and finally. he would also be killed. Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out. Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. however. it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced. the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. . all armed with firearms. would constitute . . Misamis Occidental. So long as these conditions were not present. Revised Penal Code). Petitioner contends that. . 4(2). Pangasian. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts. 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. although in reality. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon. that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. and further. 13 Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive. State. In the case of Strokes vs. 10 That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. On the other hand. desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law. renders it no less an attempt to kill. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. To be impossible under this clause. the victim was not present in said place and thus.a felony against person or against property. . even if completed. 18 the accused. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. with intent to kill. aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. Lee Kong. either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to . the court held him liable for attempted murder. . would not amount to a crime. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be. . It turned out. the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. however. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time. It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way. that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. 9 Under this article. (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act. It held that: The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was. The court explained that: It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. the criminal attempt is committed. (2) there is intention to perform the physical act. and where the bullet pierced the roof. 17 The case at bar belongs to this category. 14 The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category. factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. In People vs. One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. . Berrigan. 22 In U. The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. what was supposed to exist was really present or not. this court will not fashion a new nonstatutory law of criminal attempt. on the other hand. the victim was in another part of the house. unknown to him. However. no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. and thus. the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In the case of Clark vs. In disposing of this contention. where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed. In U. . expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. to wit: It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent. vs. in the United States. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder. 21 defendant. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be. following the principle of legality. commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm. the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision. is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". Wilson 23 the Court held that: . at that moment. Legal impossibility.commit the crime which fails to materialize. However. in the United States. intention will be carried out. in other words. State. it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.S. in said jurisdiction. in Article 4(2). Mitchell. Further. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes. Justice Bishop. factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. In the Philippines. the offender cannot escape criminal liability. In this case. we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket. the Revised Penal Code. is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. Whereas. He can be convicted of an attempt to . It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt. etc.. it said: Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place. fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation. the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard. 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. However. In disposing of the case. excite apprehension that the evil. vs. To restate. the court quoted Mr. with intent to kill.S. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. Furthermore. no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. In State vs. in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party. impossible crimes are recognized. such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. that the act is penalized. JJ. And under Article 4. On the other hand. will render useless the provision in Article 4. WHEREFORE. August 11." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment. this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property.. but an act penalized by itself. attempt. PREMISES CONSIDERED. the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. not as an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will. and to pay the costs. it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is. but as an attempt to commit a crime. there is no such thing as an impossible crime. lawphil Today is Saturday. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION . Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner. . paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. and 59 of the Revised Penal Code. Regalado and Nocon.J.commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. paragraph 2. the petition is hereby GRANTED. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. Narvasa. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense. the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Feliciano. The only reason for this is that in American law. Instead. respectively. This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction. is on leave. SO ORDERED. the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. . C.. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. It appears. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4. concur. together with the accessory penalties provided by the law. Furthermore. therefore. 000. representatives of Encarnacion offered to sell the property to private respondents Ramon and Teresita Acebo. Encarnacion executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the property in their favor. thousands of original copies of certificates of title. The deed was provisionally recorded in the Entry Book of the Register of Deeds as P. No. Quezon City with an area of 160 square meters. the decision of the trial court dismissing petitioners' (then plaintiffs) complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners failed to pay the purchase price of P120. a house was constructed on a 100 square meter portion of said lot by Deogracia la Torre. ENCARNACION and Sps.000. The house was eventually bought by Gloria A. The latter agreed to buy the property for P145. or up to 15 June 1988 to pay the contract price and for Encarnacion to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor.00. COURT OF APPEALS. Nos. fire hit the Quezon City hall and one of the offices badly burned was that of the Register of Deeds. meter portion occupied by Pablo's house stipulating a monthly rental of P24. CV No. SAMEDRA LACANILAO and PLUTARCO CADURNIGARA. Encarnacion agreed. Encarnacion) owned a parcel of residential land in Iriga St. where they established their residence. RAMON and TERESITA A. . 526-527 dated 25 November 1988 and duly inscribed on the dorsal part of the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. The Acebos paid P20.G. and paid the balance in full on 15 November 1988. J. Earlier. Encarnacion (hereinafter. Thereafter. respondents. Lacanilao and her common-law husband. ACEBO. In November 1987. by mid — May 1988. 121200 September 26.E. Since then petitioners Lacanilao and Cadurnigara have been in possession of the lot under contracts of lease with owner Encarnacion and had religiously paid rentals thereon up to November 1988. Consequently. on 11 June 1988.R. After months of negotiation.000. with the consent of Encarnacion. Since petitioners were not ready to pay the whole amount.00.R. petitioners. PADILLA.. EUSEBIO C.00 on 15 June 1988. 1996 GLORIA A. went into ashes. with modifications. Encarnacion agreed. 204536. Consequently. Meanwhile. Encarnacion had also leased the 60 square meter portion of his lot to petitioner Plutarco Cadurnigara.00 as earnest money to Encarnacion on 18 August 1988. On 12 September 1963.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.S. vs.000. The facts are not in dispute: Private respondent Eusebio C. Pablo Lacanilao and Encarnacion entered into a contract of lease over the 100 sq. 22952 dated 24 July 1995 which affirmed. Pablo. La Loma. Encarnacion offered to sell the lot to Lacanilao and Cadurnigara. Encarnacion's title included.00. they requested for an extension of one (1) month. In the 1950s. to sell the property to petitioners for P120. In their petition at bar.000.D. Encarnacion the sum of P10. Hence.000. 1517. 6. On the counterclaim. 2(e) of the Civil Code. through counsel. judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. P. . to pay the spouses Ramon and Teresita Acebo the sum of P10. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PAY THE PURCHASE PRICE TO APPELLEE .On 19 November 1988. WHEN IT HELD. Quezon City to annul the deed of sale executed by Encarnacion in favor of the Acebos and to compel Encarnacion to execute a deed of sale in their (petitioners) favor. Rollo. On appeal. the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.00 as and for attorney's fees. Decision. . unenforceable. 16) The evidence before the trial court show that Encarnacion denied having agreed to sell his property to petitioners. Q. however.00 as moral damages.00 as exemplary damages. .00 as moral damages and P5.000. After trial. Aggrieved. II . . to pay Eusebio C. After failing to secure any settlement of the controversy. petitioners offered only parole evidence to establish that Encarnacion "verbally agreed to sell the lot in question. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted the award of damages and attorney's fees in favor of private respondents.C. the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE. sent petitioners a notice to vacate informing them about the sale by Encarnacion of the entire property (lot) in their favor. the Acebos. plaintiffs are hereby ordered jointly and severally: a. the trial court ruled that even assumingarguendo that the parties (Encarnacion and petitioners) entered into a verbal contract to sell." Applying Articles 1358 and 1403 No. 7.00 as exemplary damages. petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred: I . petitioners filed a complaint with the barangay for alleged violation of tenant's right to purchase the lot under Sec. (RTC Branch 86. there is no basis to annul the deed of sale between Encarnacion and the Acebos. p. p. c.000.000. WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD THE DEFENDANTS SPOUSES ACEBO WERE NOT IN GOOD FAITH WHEN THEY BOUGHT THE PROPERTY BEING FULLY AWARE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST AND WERE IRREPARABLY PREJUDICE(D) BY THE SALE IN THEIR FAVOR. the contract is. and P5. On the other hand. petitioners stopped paying rentals on the lot and filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court. Branch 66. to pay the spouses Acebos the sum of P5. b. the same cannot be enforced so as to overrule a positive provision of law in favor of private respondents. (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion. It is well established that where the seller promised to execute a deed of absolute sale upon completion of payment of the purchase price by the buyer. THE SAID APPELLEE DID NOT AGREE TO THE SALE. 1 The petition is not impressed with merit. The general rule is that findings of fact of the lower courts (including the Court of Appeals) are final and conclusive and will not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. the agreement is a contract to sell. Hence. HENCE. on the basis of a verbal contract to sell by Encarnacion. The Court also notes that while the contract between petitioners and Encarnacion was unenforceable under Article 1403 2(e) of the Civil Code. 3 In contracts to sell. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. a court of law. in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee.000. It is readily apparent that petitioners are raising issues of fact in their petition. They could have obtained a right of first refusal in their contracts of lease with Encarnacion or could have consigned the purchase price in court when Encarnacion allegedly refused to execute the deed of sale in their favor. where ownership is retained by the seller until payment of the price in full. . failure of which is not really a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title in accordance with Article 1184 of the Civil Code. surmises or conjectures. the question of law is whether or not petitioners. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. absurd or impossible. 4 Article 1545 of the Civil Code also provides that "where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed." The Court upholds the findings of the Court of Appeals that private respondent Encarnacion verbally agreed to sell the lot to petitioners for P120. petitioners still failed to discharge the burden of presenting evidence to prove that they were ready to fulfill the condition (of full payment) imposed on the obligation to sell.00 to be paid on 15 June 1988 and that petitioners failed to pay on said date through no fault of Encarnacion who thereupon proceeded to extrajudicially terminate the oral contract. and (5) when the Court of Appeals. while aware of its equity jurisdiction. In a petition for review under Rule 45 only questions of law may be raised and they must be distinctly set forth.ENCARNACION. such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition. petitioners were allowed to prove its existence and to demand specific performance because private respondents did not invoke said law in their pleadings and even cross-examined petitioners on the existence of the verbal contract. such payment is a positive suspensive condition. is first and foremost. 2 In the case at bar. This factual matter has been amply resolved by the CA in favor of private respondents and can no longer be disturbed on appeal. while equity might tilt on the side of the petitioners. This Court. The Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioners have been occupying the lot as lessees for almost three (3) decades. obtained an enforceable right to buy Encarnacion's property superior to that of the Acebos who claim the same property by virtue of a deed of absolute sale in their favor executed by Encarnacion. But assuming arguendo that private respondents waived the operation of the statute of frauds. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. accused-appellant. plaintiff-appellee. J. testified that he and another policeman Renato Dizon were standing at the corner of Osusan and Martinez Streets. Kapunan and Hermosisima. August 11. is AFFIRMED in toto. a policeman of Kalookan City. concur. Bellosillo. premises considered. vs. 1993 (p. No.: This case involves the illegal sale of shabu. June 22. for lack of any reversible error. Vitug. 1997 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. The facts lucidly summarized and given credence by the trial court are as follows: 1 Prosecution witness SPO1 Antonio Paras. tsn. 1993). FRANCISCO. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. lawphil Today is Saturday. 3. They were conducting a buy-bust operation on the alleged drugs activity of the accused upon the instruction of police Chief Inspector Edgar Paulino when an informant told them that a certain . ROBERTO DE VERA Y SANTOS @ BOYET. the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals. 112006 July 7.R.. JJ. Kalookan City at 9:30 o'clock in the evening of March 1. Jr.. ]. He testified that at about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of March 1. tsn.). appellant interposes this appeal arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution had proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as well as in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. Consequently.). Upon instruction of the chief of office. the Court is convinced that the errors imputed to the trial court bear no merit. 9. he hid himself at the strategic place and Renato Dizon posed himself as buyer of shabu (id.00 in 2 pieces of P100.A. Kalookan City (p. "E" to "E-2") relative to the case. tsn. an informant approached and informed them that a certain "Boyet" was selling shabu [id. id. He was introduced by the informant to the accused as a buyer.]. id.). He was told by the accused to wait for a while and thereupon the latter left the place but he returned after the lapse of three to four minutes and handed to him a small sachet containing shabu (pp. 10-1 1. What appellant assails are fundamentally questions of facts and credibility. July 13. Kalookan City and surveilling (sic) the place which was reported to be drugs[-] infested area (p. 2 upon laboratory examination by the NBI. tsn. when supported by substantial evidence on record carries great weight on appeal absent any material facts or circumstances that were overlooked or disregarded by the trial court which if considered might vary the outcome of the case. 6. 1993). Thereafter. tsn. the shabu was in turn delivered by the accused to the poseur buyer. to wit: "I-Iscore ito" (pp. 9. He gave the buy-bust money in the amount of P200.00.]. 6which were the penalties prescribed by law at the time of the rendition of judgment a quo. appellant was charged with 4 and tried for the unauthorized sale of shabu in violation of Section 15 of R. When asked where the shabu came from.).). was found positive for the regulated drug of metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. tsn.).). tsn. id. Kalookan City [ id. 5 Over his defenses of denial and alibi. Hence. id. 4. Renato Dizon (id. the accused informed the two police officers that he only acted as a "runner-seller" of certain "Rene Pasay" and "Boy Tinga". 8-9. Consequently. by uttering the words in the vernacular.). id. the informant accompanied him and his companion to the place where the accused was conducting the alleged illegal activity of selling shabu (p. who was hiding nearby rush (sic) to him and helped him in arresting the accused (pp. The white crystalline substance taken from appellant which weighs less than one (1) gram. Renato Dizon handcuffed the accused and he (Paras) assisted the former in arresting the accused [id. The second witness.000. 4. He saw when Renato Dizon handed over the buy bust money to the accused (p. 2. 8 Likewise. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court. id. Edgar Paulino. "H" and "H-l") to the NBI with respect to the specimens (Exhs. tsn. PO3 Renato Dizon is a policeman assigned at the CIP of Kalookan City. 3 Thereafter. he held the right hand of the accused and his companion Antonio Paras.). 7 After examining the records. both of Maypajo. they proceeded at the corner of Martinez street cor Osusan street (p.). the appraisal and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses below is herein upheld not only because of the trial court's unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of . 1993. tsn. id. The accused was eventually brought to the headquarters where he gave his statement voluntarily (p.00 bill (p. tsn. He prepared the referral slip (Exhs. While standing thereat. 3. 9-10."Boyet" whose complete name is Renato de Vera was selling shabu [id. 6425. 1993 convicted appellant of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20. id). he was with SPO1 Antonio Paras at Martinez street corner Osusan street. id. The witness further alleged that upon reaching the place. located at Tanique Street. Dagat-Dagatan.]. tsn. After the lapse of three minutes. He likewise executed an affidavit (Exhs. the trial court in a decision dated August 10. "D" to "D-4") which were confiscated from the accused. if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. iiskur ito. the prosecution had presented evidence that established both elements by the required quantum of proof i. that he is aware of the prohibited transaction he is entering into and that he is not authorized to do so. Such positive identification prevails over appellant's lone. and b) that he must demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. and consideration. the object. guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. 12 His identity as the culprit cannot be doubted having been caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation conducted by the police. 16 His alibi is all the more weakened by the non-presentation of his alleged companion Marukot to corroborate his testimony regarding his whereabouts. 15 Appellant's contention that he and his friend Allan Marukot were attending the wake of a certain Vivian in Mabini Extension deserves the barest consideration since said wake. horrendous traders of illegal drugs conduct their business in the dark and sell their articles in a language vague to ordinary people but clear along the avenues of the markets in the underworld. a) that he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense. otherwise. is not an element of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. assuming it is true. is negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible 17 witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.the witnesses' deportment on the stand. No wonder why the informant's words "Pare. he would not have sold his contraband under the cloak of the night but instead exposed his business without apprehension of fear. which opportunity is denied to the reviewing court 9 but more so since the ulterior motives appellant ascribes on the part of the arresting officers are self-serving and deserve no weight. Besides. however. . 14 In this case.e. appellant failed to strictly satisfy the two-fold elements of alibi respecting time and place. like his alibi cannot be believed in the light of positive testimonies from credible eyewitnesses who are themselves active participants in the entrapment operation. appellant's other defense of denial. viz. Moreover. 10 Contrary to appellant's assertion. Appellant also contends that the prosecution had not proven that he knew he (appellant) is selling a regulated drug. The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller. baka mayroon ka?" 18 conveyed a clear idea that a poseur-buyer makes a complete offer to buy regulated drug at a certain quantity or price. Applicable herein is the rule that: Denial. the place where the illegal sale took place. The propinquity or short distance of the place of the wake to that of the crime scene does not foreclose the physical possibility that appellant could have easily moved to the latter place. Such knowledge. 11 Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution's eyewitnesses as the person who sold to the poseur-buyer a sachet containing white crystalline substance. When the seller accepts the offer or asks 'how much'. is only about 40 meters away from the corner of Osusan and Martinez Streets. uncorroborated and weak defenses of denial and alibi. it shows that he knew what is being bought from him. 13 Both defenses which are the common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act have been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor as they can be fabricated or concocted with familiar ease. as maximum. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.. since appellant had already served more than the maximum imposable penalty. 25 Notwithstanding the absence of any petition for a writ of habeas corpus or any similar judicial relief. J. WHEREFORE.19 Appellant after leaving the poseur-buyer at the crime scene for about three to four minutes. even made an admission to that effect. the white crystalline substance contained in the sachet is positive for the regulated drug of shabu. Aside from the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Jr. Martin Simon. to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. Melo and Panganiban. 22 the testimony of said witness who is a police officer carries more weight than the negative assertion of appellant. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the "buy-bust" transaction between the entrapping officers and appellant.00) for the drug. appellant's release from imprisonment is in order since he had already served the maximum of the imposable penalty. The buyer gave appellant Two hundred pesos (P200. the same has been established with certainty and conclusiveness. 7659 which is given retroactive application 23 being favorable to the accused and in accordance with the ruling laid down in People v. 24 the proper penalty for the sale of less than a gram of shabu would be prision correccional. he should be IMMEDIATELY DISCHARGED from confinement unless held for some other lawful cause. The Court cannot believe this excuse. 20 As shown in the laboratory examination. appellant's conviction is in order. Today is Saturday. 21 In a vain attempt to exculpate himself from his felonious act. SO ORDERED.J. as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Appellant.. the decision of the trial court convicting appellant De Vera of the crime charged is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that he shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. C. pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R. came back and handed to the latter the sachet containing the shabu. appellant argues that the prosecution witness (Dizon) who acted as the poseur-buyer was allegedly wrongfully motivated because the former fought with a certain person who was a nephew of the latter. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines . the life imprisonment and fine imposed on appellant by the trial court would have been correct. With the proof of sale and the presentation of the corpus delicti.A. the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. the imposable penalty for appellant in lieu of 'life imprisonment and fine' should be modified to an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor. However. August 11. As for the penalty.. 6425 as amended by Section 17 of R. JJ. However. as the maximum.. premises considered. Narvasa. took no part. concur. thru counsel. as the minimum. Davide.With respect to the corpus delicti of the crime.A. Her maidenhead was ruptured. The four of them entered this stall and. Our ruling is that it was he who erred. She related what Carlos had done to her. A certain Ben came later. Carlos de la Cruz gave money for the purchase of ESQ rum. 3 The complaining witness testified that on the night in question. vs. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. while walking back to where her mother was selling refreshments near the carnival. CARLOS DE LA CRUZ. she met her friends Biday and Aba. defendant-appellant. He pulled her down.SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. 78470 March 11. She reluctantly acceded but vomited the drink because she was not accustomed to it. Carlos asked Biday and Aba to leave. Sagadal. She went out and Ben and Carlos did too. She resisted and sat up. 1 This finding was based mainly on the testimony of the victim herself as corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses 2 and the medical evidence. and found with "fresh . that her mother found her by the seawall and took her home. he advised her to tell him if she should get pregnant so he could have the foetus aborted. Carlos suddenly pinioned her and. and while she was crying in pain and anger. 1979. in the evening of December 28.: The accused-appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to death by the regional trial court of Olongapo City on January 6. who asked her to join them. Her shorts were bloodied. the Court proceeded to examine his plea that the trial court had erred and that he was innocent of the charge against him. The case was appealed to this Court. forcibly removed her shorts. leaving Biday and Aba inside. The others drank the liquor and urged her to do so too. plaintiff-appellee. Necitas did not go home that night or the day after or the day after that. The deed done. She did. CRUZ. while she was struggling to free herself. Accordingly. Ben cautioned her not to as the two inside might get angry. When she moved to return to the stall. Romeo C. who told them to report the matter to the police. 1979. Suddenly she felt somebody embracing her in the dark and found it was the accusedappellant. The trial court found that the accused-appellant raped Necitas D. saying. No. in the public market of Subic. 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. which was asked to buy. Her mother immediately sought the counsel of the barangay captain. The police sent her to the Olongapo City General Hospital. feeling dizzy. "Walang ganyanan. the couple came out and suggested that they move to another stall where they could all sleep. After the abolition of the death penalty under the new Constitution. followed by the accused-appellant himself. 1980." Aba sidled up to her and advised her to consent because Carlos was a barangay tanod and the son of a policeman. Ben had left in the meantime. J. Confused and afraid. an 11-year old girl. she lay down. The group went inside the public market and into a vacant stall. It was only on December 31. Later. he kissed and fondled her and finally succeeded in violating her. He declared that he did. Alinea for defendant-appellant. where she was medically examined on January 1. 1987. Left alone with the complainant. Against her will. he was asked to manifest if he still wished to continue his appeal.R. there is no showing that the accused-appellant could not have gone back to the public market that night and committed the rape. Thereafter. 12 The Court wonders why he would want to "buy peace" if he was really innocent. Guidara Samar." 4 Regina Sagadal. upon the ravished child. After all. 10 This witness had some difficulty in explaining on cross-examination why he had to fetch Carlos and bring him home from the market. 1979. a full-grown man of twenty-six years. and how she found her three days later by the seawall disheveled and depressed. in accordance with Article 63 of the same Code. he fetched Carlos from the market at 6 o'clock in the evening of December 28. 5 There is no entry of such birth in the local civil registry of her supposed birthplace 6 but the prosecution presented a school record of Necitas where her date of birth is indicated as March 20. There is ample evidence of the force employed by the accusedappellant. who was not yet her teens at the time of the rape. followed by the meaningful admission that he was to make a settlement if only "to buy peace" except that the demand was too steep for him to meet. in San Jorge. On the contrary.e. According to Eligio de la Cruz. there is the assertion that the complainant was trying to extort money from him. Carlos retired to his own house on the next lot. death. Carlos testified that he was in his house when the rape was supposedly committed. None of the defense witnesses questioned Necitas's motives in accusing Carlos as the one who had raped her..1968. even if it be supposed that Necitas was already above twelve years old when she was deflowered.vaginal laceration. His father sought to bolster his son's testimony but did not succeed. In the brief filed by the accused-appellant. In fact. There is no authority for this increase . there is the positive Identification made by Necitas. but on crossexamination he said his house was some five hundred meters only from the public market. 9 This meant the scene of the crime could have been reached by him within minutes from the place where he was living. 8 In his defense. It having been established that Necitas was less than twelve years old at the time of the incident. he said he deserted his post that night so he could bring his son home with him. raised this penalty to the next higher penalty. i. the complainant's mother. The father testified he never saw Carlos again that night and it was only the following morning that his son returned to join him for breakfast. More important than this. who from the very start had pointed to Carlos as her attacker. 1968. 11 The alibi must fail because not only of the inherent weakness of this kind of defense but also of its inconclusiveness and unreliability. the crime would be deemed just the same to have been committed by Carlos. taking into account the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength. The rape committed in the circumstances above narrated is punishable with reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 7 The mother described how she searched for her daughter after she did not return on December 28. it is not necessary to prove that force had been exerted on her. Even assuming that the complainant had consented. testified that Necitas was born on March 20. As the municipal policeman assigned to guard the public market from 6 o'clock in the evening to 6 o'clock the following morning. although she was not sure ff her birth had been registered. and they went together to his house. the conviction would still stand as the theory of the law is that her age would not have given her the discernment to resist. considering that the latter was already twenty-six years old at the time. the trial court should have imposed it regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.1979. he was dealing not with an influential or powerful complainant but with a simple third grade 11-year old child helping her mother make a humble living by selling gulaman and samalamig. It simply is not believable And even assuming that the father really fetched Carlos and brought him home. where they had supper. he might have weakened the accused appellant's alibi. This being a single indivisible penalty. The Court cannot understand why the trial court instead. C. Curiously enough.00. The death penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced not because of Article III. concur.000. August 11. as in this case. but the Court for its part will not look the other way. She should have pondered the matter thoroughly before condemning the accused-appellant to death on the strength of her rash and erroneous reading of the law. HON. Costs against the accused-appellant.under the rules on the application of penalties in the Revised Penal Code. Section 19(l) of the Constitution but because the appropriate sentence is reallyreclusion perpetua. RAMON G. His conscience may not bother him. Teehankee.. Cebu . Narvasa. vs. Petitioner. lawphil Today is Saturday. CHERRY DAMOLE. SO ORDERED. the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED except that the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the civil indemnity is increased to P30. neither the defense counsel nor the Solicitor General noticed the serious mistake. JJ. especially where capital offenses are involved.J.. 2008 CYNTHIA LUCES. the law wig send him to prison for the rest of his life. At any rate. WHEREFORE. Regional Trial Court. Branch 19. Judge Esther Nobles Bans is sternly advised to be more careful in the determination of the applicable penalties. 150900 March 14. it now appears that the appealed judgment is not affected by the constitutional provision abolishing the death penalty as it is plainly not applicable in this case. CODILLA. Gancayco and Grino-Aquino.. For his despicable outrage of the virgin child. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. The explanation he has offered this Court is feeble and unacceptable as against the firm and conclusive evidence presented by the prosecution. The method employed by the judge is a strange and unlawful process.R. JR. Presiding Judge. What evil might have possessed the accused-appellant when he inflicted his lust upon his defenseless victim is a matter he must explain to his conscience if he has any. No. CR No. petitioner Cynthia Luces approached private complainant Cherry Damole at the latter’s place of work at the Robinson’s Department Store. once in possession of said PO slips. likewise. In July 1993. Petitioner was thus charged with Estafa in an Information dated March 3. through her lawyer. petitioner complied with her obligations. They agreed3 that petitioner would sell the PO cards to her customers and that she would get her commission therefrom in the form of marked up prices. and in spite of repeated demands made upon her by Cherry Damole to let her comply with her obligation.9 She contended that the resolution of the civil case is determinative of her culpability in the criminal case. with deliberate intent. to hold the same in trust for the latter.00 from Cherry Damole. It was docketed as Criminal Case No.City.R. 2001 and its Resolution2 dated November 20. which is the equivalent value thereof. the said accused. petitioner undertook to return the unsold PO cards. Private complainant thereafter instituted a civil case for collection of sum of money. and asked for Purchase Order (PO) Cards to be sold by her on commission basis. and COURT OF APPEALS.8 The Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was raffled to Branch 19. Cebu City. petitioner moved for the dismissal of the criminal case and/or suspension of the proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil case for collection filed earlier by the private complainant. 1995. and for sometime subsequent thereto. the said accused. the demand made by the private complainant. J. Initially. with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence and of defrauding Cherry Damole. Cebu City. 1995. but later she defaulted in remitting the proceeds. far from complying with her obligation.305. or to return the same to Cherry Damole.5 Lastly. with the obligation on her part to immediately account for and turn over the proceeds of the sale. FIFTH DIVISION. On April 27. Hence. 1993. METRO MANILA.00. but the same was unheeded. the accusatory portion of which reads: That sometime in the month of July. having received Purchase Order (PO) slips worth P412. misapply and convert into her own personal use and benefit the said PO slips. in the City of Cebu. if she would not be able to dispose any or all of them within the agreed date. if said PO slips are sold. petitioner received from the private complainant 870 PO cards with a total face value ofP412. CONTRARY TO LAW. with intent of gain. Respondents.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 30. in CA-G.00. and before such remittance.7 She.00. Philippines. located along Fuente Osmeña.4 Petitioner further agreed that she would hold the PO cards as trustee of the private complainant with the obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale thereof less the commission. 1993. did then and there misappropriate.305. The RTC initially suspended the case10 but on motion for reconsideration.305. filed a separate criminal complaint. or the amount of P412. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. to the damage and prejudice of Cherry Damole in the amount of P412. the court reversed itself and held that the outcome of the civil case would . DECISION NACHURA. on the petitioner.305. CBU-38420. she has failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so. Philippine Currency. with the agreement that she should sell out the said PO slips for and in behalf of Cherry Damole. 23412.6 As of September. 2001. 15 The CA. IV.13 On August 25. set the case for arraignment where the petitioner pleaded "not guilty. hence. private complainant suffered damage. however. the instant petition raising the following issues: I.12 By reason of such conversion and misappropriation. The appellate court fou nd that all the elements of estafa. II. In defense. but modified the penalty imposed by the lower court. petitioner claimed that her liability to private complainant is purely civil. OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONCLUSIONS ARE FOUNDED ON MERE SPECULATION. affect the criminal action. as minimum. 1997. The prosecution likewise proved that petitioner converted the PO cards to her personal use by using such cards herself and by letting the members of her family use them. Petitioner. in any way. the RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of estafa. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND DENYING DUE COURSE THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT. . were established. and that. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT. the prosecution established the existence of the trust receipt agreements. instead of that imposed by the RTC. however." During trial. likewise.14 On appeal. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT THE ISSUE OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION RAISED BY PETITIONER.not. Petitioner further claimed that no damage was ever caused to the private complainant as she continuously paid monthly amortizations. She also insisted that the civil case filed against her by the same complainant is a prejudicial question. thus.11 The court. the receipt by petitioner of the subject PO cards.16 Hence. in any way. imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. failed to pay. therefore. there was no misappropriation to speak of. be determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner. the criminal case should have been dismissed. to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. and stressed that the civil case for collection of sum of money would not. considering that the trust receipt agreements were in fact contracts of sale which transferred to petitioner the ownership of the questioned PO cards. and her failure to comply with her obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale and to return the unsold cards to the private complainant. the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction. SURMISE AND CONJECTURE. with abuse of confidence through misappropriation. contrary to their agreement. III. as maximum. testified that she was authorized to sell the PO cards on installment which she did by selling them to a certain Evelyn Tamara who. or by denying having received such money. petitioner agreed to hold in trust the following: the PO cards. it was established that petitioner received from the private complainant the subject PO cards to be sold by the former on commission. among others. as evidenced by their Trust Receipt Agreements (TRAs). That the TRUSTEE intends to give P. 20 In the instant case. goods. admitted by the private complainant during cross- . Tamara.O. for remittance to the private complainant. we ask the questions: Were the PO cards disposed of in accordance with their agreements? If so. or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same. That the TRUSTEE holds P. confirmed by Ms. the elements of estafa through misappropriation or conversion are: 1) that the money. for the purpose of selling them to different cardholders and returning to private complainant the cards unsold. and 4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. in storage as the property of TRUSTOR. or on commission. Also known as "swindling.22 By such terms and conditions. That TRUSTEE agrees that before remittance to TRUSTOR. with the right to sell the same for each for TRUSTOR’S account and to hand the proceeds thereof to the trustor less the commission mentioned above. The transaction was testified to by petitioner. fraud may be committed with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence in the following manner: (b) By misappropriating or converting. 3. goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust. money. or for administration.19 Specifically. if any. or for administration. in fact. or other property. And so. did petitioner remit the proceeds to the private complainant? The evidence shows that petitioner sold most of the PO cards to Ms.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT THE POSITIVE ASSERTION OF THE PETITIONER THAT SHE IS NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE BUT ONLY CIVIL.O. 3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. That the TRUSTEE is aware that her failure to remit the proceeds or return the P. when demanded by the TRUSTOR give rise to CRIMINAL LIABILITY and CIVIL LIABILITY. and the proceeds of the sale.21The Agreements contain identical terms and conditions as follows: 2.18 Petitioner was tried and convicted for violation of Article 315(1)(b) which states that. or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission. or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same. on due dates. if any. Tamara.O. even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond. to the prejudice of another. goods. 2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt. to different cardholders and received (sic) commission in a form of mark-up price but TRUSTEE assumes the responsibility of paying the amount due including penalty. 4. 5. she/he shall hold the sum in trust for the TRUSTOR.17 The petition lacks merit. and was." estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own.O. adding one year for each additional 10. because Ms. the prosecution sufficiently established that they were used by petitioner herself and her relatives as evidenced by the copies of the PO cards they actually used bearing their names. using or disposing by LUCES for her and her relatives’ own personal purpose and benefit of the said P. In fact. – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. to the prejudice of the owner. As regards the appropriate penalty. or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Accordingly. as the case may be. but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. Using the PO cards as owner is conversion. Tamara were not devoted to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Damage as an element of estafa may consist in 1) the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation. The failure of LUCES to account for them establishes the felony of estafa through abuse of confidence by misappropriation or conversion. there was no conversion since the PO cards sold to Ms. the PO cards were entrusted to petitioner for the purpose of selling them to cardholders. par. 1avvphi1 This notwithstanding. When she sold the cards to Ms. the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal.23 Private complainant clearly stated in open court that she was aware of the sale of the PO cards to Ms. There being no adequate explanation why she personally used and allowed her relatives to use the cards. if the amount of the fraud is over 12. 4103 with a face value of P33. 315. As to the PO cards covered by Trust Receipt No. the RPC provides: Art. Tamara. there is ample circumstantial evidence of estafa. that the proceeds of that sale could not be turned over to the private complainant. they should have paid the corresponding price. and that she personally received payment made by the latter through the petitioner. It appears. 2) disturbance in property right.examination.26 The essence of estafa under Article 315. and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code. but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right. and petitioner should have remitted the proceeds to the private complainant. cards. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage. we agree with the CA’s ratiocination in this wise: Thus. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received. the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period. Tamara failed to pay the purchase price of the subject PO cards. the private complainant agreed that the proceeds of the sale may be turned over to her in four installments. it is beyond cavil that private complainant was deprived of her right to enjoy the proceeds of the sale as a result of petitioner’s unauthorized use of the PO cards. Petitioner was at liberty to sell them either in cash or on installment. 28 Under the given circumstances. constitutes breach of trust.000 pesos. and if such amount exceeds the latter sum. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period.00. Technically. Tamara.000 pesos. petitioner is not free from criminal liability.000 pesos but does not exceed 22. unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence. . however. or 3) temporary prejudice. petitioner did so pursuant to their TRA. Swindling (Estafa).600. 24 To repeat. In such cases. 25Although there was no prohibition for petitioner to use or for her relatives to purchase the PO cards.27 The prosecution further showed that the misappropriation or conversion by petitioner caused prejudice to private complainant. then. 00 (P33. cards. A finding in the civil case for or against the appellant is not juris et de jure determinative of her innocence or guilt in the estafa case.30 The range of the penalty provided for in Article 315 is composed of only two periods. Article 65 of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the prescribed penalty into three equal periods of time. Here. 2001. Accordingly.O. eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor. the court a quo was tasked to determine whether or not the non-remittance of the proceeds of the sale of P.00-P22. Stated simply. and its Resolution dated November 20. the issue in the civil (MAN-2031) is DAMOLE’s right to recover from LUCES the amount representing the value of the P.00 = P11. 8 months and 20 days Maximum period – 6 years. dated August 30. to seven (7) years. was due to misappropriation or conversion.00. 23412. In contrast.31 The amount defrauded is in excess of P22. thus.000.O.O. The minimum period of the indeterminate sentence.600. are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.000. while we are disposed to impose six (6) years. Thus. eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional.00). should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime committed. eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days. we note with approval the appellate court’s conclusion. an additional penalty of one year should likewise be imposed.600. The Decision of the Court of Appeals. in the instant criminal case. cards and/or to return the unsold P. While the issue in the criminal case is whether LUCES’ failure to account for the proceeds of the sale of P. However. the penalty imposable should be the maximum period of six (6) years. on the other hand. as maximum. cards as DAMOLE’s trustee constitutes estafa under Article 315 par. eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor. CR No. the petition is hereby DENIED.600.29 the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which in view of the attending circumstances.32 WHEREFORE.000. in CA-G. Petitioner Cynthia Luces is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years. to get the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence. . The penalty next lower than prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.R. Thus. medium and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty are therefore: Minimum period – 4 years. the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be two (2) years. Lastly. cards or the return thereof by LUCES to DAMOLE. as to whether the civil case filed by the private complainant is a prejudicial question. the total number of years included in the two periods should be divided into three. 2001. we hold that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be seven (7) years. 5 months and 11 days to 6 years. eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor. The minimum. Article 315 also provides that an additional one year shall be imposed for each additional P10.O.O. forming one period for each of the three portions.Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 2 months and 1 day to 5 years. 5 months and 10 days Medium period – 5 years. premises considered. eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of the maximum period provided by the RPC. could be properly imposed" under the RPC and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense. thus: It is clear from the questioned civil case that the civil liability of LUCES to DAMOLE was founded on the former’s failure or refusal to remit to the latter the proceeds arising from the sales of P. cards allegedly embezzled by the latter.00. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. as minimum. the total amount of the fraud is P33. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape.: Two critical issues emerge in this case. l Today is Saturday. we affirm. J. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty. 2006 [Formerly G. No. should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua. While the Court had previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution. which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape. 158660-67] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.SO ORDERED.R. As a consequence though. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. DECISION TINGA. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. . August 11. Nos. The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in both scope and import. vs. appellant.R. 166401 October 30.1 we now find it necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic Act No. the victims being his then-minor nieces. ALFREDO BON. On that score. appellee. CCC. I. 6902-G.4 the daughters of his older brother. As she cried in pain. she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. This time. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina.First. their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were entered as documentary evidence. As appellant was holding a knife. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie down. the antecedent facts. After he took off his clothes. and regardless of the time of day. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife.10 It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother. also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother.12 Her mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. in 1997. removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina.5 All these cases were consolidated for trial. appellant poked a knife at her. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988. While alone in the house. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. During trial. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos.8 The following year. removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down. 6905-G. that she slept in the said house. when she was twelve (12). on the other hand. their uncle. 6903-G. 6906-G. 6689-G. she was raped again by appellant on several occasions.17 . charging him with the rape of AAA3 and BBB. appellant allegedly stopped.15 BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000. the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon.6 She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca. She added that although it was dark. she was raped in an outdoor clearing9 after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. and 6907-G. 7 AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999. While at the clearing." Thereafter. Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant. It was only three (3) years after. she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. again at the house of her grandmother. while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. she was raped by appellant for the third time.16 On that night. and both identified him as the man who had raped them.11 the brutish acts appellant had done to her. AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her grandmother. she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. 13 BBB. yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. 6899-G. testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old. she never slept in her grandmother's house again. she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was. appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. Quezon against appellant. Despite the pain she felt. Since then. and 6908-G. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA towards the door. She was then nine (9) years old.14 BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999. from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day. she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. However. CCC. she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. issued medical certificates for each child. AAA's labia majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. Prior to that. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000. was packing more than enough clothes. However. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times. her mother brought her to the police station and her statement was taken.25 The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. After the arrest of appellant. Five months earlier. Tullas). CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. testified that she was the one who examined BBB and AAA. BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her family. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping. it was only five months after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant.23 Only appellant testified for his defense. who would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family members. He further asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case was filed against him was that CCC. to dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. however. and thereafter. harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father. He denied having raped BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister. DDD.18 The third witness for the prosecution was the mother. he lived in the house of his parents which was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. there were no external physical injuries apparent on her body. his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces.21 The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination. CCC became concerned after observing that BBB. She testified that she only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. when asked on cross-examination.22 AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination. Tullas (Dr. Dr. Furthermore. two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred. Dr. Thereafter. there were no external sign of physical injury found on her body. She asked her other daughter. his relatives became angry at CCC. On direct examination. Dr.It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her examination. It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. On the other hand. she was brought to the hospital to be examined. Upon learning of the same. After examination. on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game. 19 CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. These medical certificates were presented in court. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital. and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then. Dr. Upon learning this. offering denial and alibi as his defense.24 He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA.26 The RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial and . Purita T.20 The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested. candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. According to the appellate court. the accused passed through a window. However. the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor. Moreover. BBB. On 29 December 2004. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were proved by the victims' candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to her and her sister. quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she answered in the negative. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001. Appellant. were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court.32 Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her rape on that day. in his Supplemental Brief31 before this Court. the records of the case were automatically elevated to this Court for review. this time she stated that on that night. We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. it could not find evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for consummated rape. when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002. Like the trial court. she said that appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing. these inconsistencies. as maximum. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA]. It was established with certitude that the accused on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. respectively. which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider material. In these two (2) cases.alibi as unconvincing. assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. precise and straightforward. As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences. in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People v. However. as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's). Particularly. thus: . her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant. entered their room and raped her again. Our observations in People v. to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal. Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive. the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant. deserve full faith and credit for being clear. appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January 2000. for attempted rape. it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000. It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001. thus: We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at least two (2) cases. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear. as minimum. citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.28 The appellate court ratiocinated. BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape.30 Accordingly.29 The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree. the inconsistency may be attributed to the wellknown fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions. the first she took the witness stand on June 6. After she testified on November 14. on an extremely intimate matter. in the presence of strangers.41 The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution has strong. appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of commission – accused's house or victim's house – is not an essential element of the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy. Gumaca. For alibi to prosper. which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. and then returned to his sister's house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence. minor. The lower courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification. appellant could have easily left his sister's house in the middle of the night. the first rape and many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. 2000. and he was moving while on her top then she felt something came out from him.They bear no materiality to the commission of the crime of rape of which accusedappellant was convicted. with respect to the last rape on January 15.40 In the case at bar. as regards the place of commission —house of her parents or house of accused. her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina. the public prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies. and the length of time he stayed on her top – 3 minutes or half-minute. which happened in her own house. which. 1998 and 1999. raped BBB. the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. for the separate charges of rapes in 1997.We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer. he must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. Quezon. Particularly in the Memorandum for the People 38 filed with the RTC. Further. 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony on June 6. we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of denial and alibi. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. The rape victim was testifying in open court. she was made to recall the last rape. is talked about in hushed tones. If we are to thread this line of reasoning.42 In this case. only to trivial. 2000. 2001. she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January 15. it is not surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused. thus: [BBB]'s testimony on July 3. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. 2001. minors and relatives of appellant. positively identified him as their rapist in open court. more often than not. the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on some points of her two testimonies. Under such circumstances.[34] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief. and insignificant details. both BBB and AAA. Villa Padua Ilaya. But she remained consistent in her declaration that on January 15. x x x 39 In addition. 2000. 2001. prevails over alibi and denial. at best."[36]37 Further.[35] "Moreover. . She was even confused about her age when she was first raped by her uncle. but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape. says that she has been raped. these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value. or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape. since when a woman. an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence against him. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit. allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth. 6906-G. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. as when she is threatened with death if she would report the incident. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law. unless the crime was in fact committed. In addition. she could have done so when the latter was still alive. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they were both minors when appellant raped them. we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. least of all a child. in open court.44 The weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. a relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity. 46 At the same time. to wit: . she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.43 Besides. Appellant.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. No member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family. This was evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001. no sane woman. considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. The minority of the victims and their relationship with appellant were aptly established in the lower court proceedings. the records show that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused. something would happen to her at the moment.It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. more so if she is a minor. The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated in this case. also admitted that that he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims' father. or even thereafter. Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father.47 In Criminal Case No. Furthermore. more specifically if such accusation is against a member of the family. but in the absence of such countervailing proof. CCC's father-in-law had died several years before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know anything about the allegations propounded on him. It has been held time and again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. would concoct a story of defloration. and thus. 48 [sic] AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. In Criminal Case No. Mam. [sic] xxxx Q – What did your Uncle do to you on June 11. [sic] xxxx Q – How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina? A – Many times. Mam. Q – I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6908-G.Q – Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you were eleven years old? A – Yes. Mam. Mam. 6908-G. When was the last time that this sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle? A – June 11. [sic] Q – Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina? A – No. [sic] Q – What year? A – June 11. Mam. what did he do to you? A – He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina. [sic] Q – Why? A – It was painful. 2000. also for Rape. [sic] Q – And after removing your clothes. Mam. [sic] Q – What was that? A – He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. Mam. [sic] xxxx Q – And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina? . Mam. 6906-G. 2000? A – He also removed my clothes. [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases. There is no basis then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. In the crime of rape. the penetration. what did your Uncle do. not pain. Campuhan. and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.A – Painful. However. before rape could be deemed consummated. the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. for there to be an attempted rape.49 [sic] In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty. There must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration. It is well-settled that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated rape since the slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. . Thus. the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended. is not completed. Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. Mam. if any? A – He did not pursue what he was doing. [sic] xxxx Q – And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina? A – No. the touching of the labias by the penis. 51 The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape.] which made the accused stop from further executing the act. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the victim's vagina (the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Act No. therefore. 9346. However. Mam. [sic] Q – And what did you do when you feel painful? A – I cried. the CA declared: It is carnal knowledge. [sic] Q – When you cried. From the testimony of private complainant. II. penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. x x x 50 It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. that is the element to consummate rape. however slight. the term "slightest penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female organ. We. in light of Rep. the act proved painful to [AAA. Mam. in People v. Mam. the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAA's vagina. there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. more accurately. take exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the child's vagina. for the attempted rape of AAA. the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v. 9346. Act No. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the enactment of Rep.53 III. but must. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts. 9346. Since the passage of Rep. Correspondingly. guardian. 9346. or life imprisonment when appropriate. titled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.—For the purpose of graduating the penalties which. the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. 51. x x x55 The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle. to "an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor. The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing the Court. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent." for each count of attempted rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. prescribes: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible. if the guilt of the accused is affirmed. 8353. relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. or as accomplices or accessories. stepparent. Rules of graduating penalties. to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. of this Code. 61.54 What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant. inclusive. Act No. Act No. impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua." Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty. Act No. Cabalquinto.56 . as minimum. which incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. ascendant. Tubongbanua52 and People v. is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony. the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony: ART. the following rules shall be observed: 1. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence. 71. for prisoners . which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. Graduated scales. the maximum term of which shall be that which. in view of the attending circumstances. Reclusion temporal 4." The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law. Arresto menor 9. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods. The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty: The courts. Public censure 10. in applying such lower or higher penalty. a medium and a maximum. and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. Prision mayor 5. the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty. 1 1. the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.xxxx Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention. Fine57 xxxx Following the scale prescribed in Article 71. — In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty. The provision reads: Art. shall observe the following graduated scales: SCALE NO. Death 2. At the same time. Reclusion perpetua 3. Prision correctional 6. Destierro 8. Arresto mayor 7. a minimum. In explaining that " reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery "if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present. if consummated. appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal. Act No. IV. Prior to the enactment of Rep. the death penalty was imposable under two different frames of reference. it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. and not "reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously. 9346. who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter. the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication.59 Hence. the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification." There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death. with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal. This was especially made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Before we proceed with the discussion."62 and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances enumerated under the law. Act No."67 In People v. the death penalty was provided for in two ways. as amended. our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will affect not only appellant. On the other hand." The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death.who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence. Such situations do not relate to the case of appellant. Act 9346 the penalty of death. who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape. was guilty only of attempted rape. However. the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted stage. 7659. Tolentino. and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower. the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law. of course would have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. If Rep. which.68 we ruled that the accused. the Court. Act No. With the elimination of death as a penalty. as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua. "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. For example.64 and treason. the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. or the Death Penalty Law.66 In contrast. explained: . 9346? If it so followed. Act No."61 destructive arson wherein "death results. or prision mayor. the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape. through then Chief Justice Davide.63 qualified piracy. including murder. 9346 on the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated.65 The imposition of the death penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Act No. as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death. or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on several crimes. Reference to those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death. 9346 had not been enacted."60 kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person.58 Thus. Under the Revised Penal Code." and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. but several classes of convicts as well. an indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum periods. which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress." In this case. as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. It was under Rep. our ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to death. TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.A. it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death. as amended by R. Thus. after the passage of the 1987 Constitution. with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Act No. In contrast.Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Act No." Hence. The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes. step-parent. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor." a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. xxxx The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal." . However. which is the penalty lower by two degrees than death. No. 7659. in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated. the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was " reclusion perpetua to death. 7659. As a result. guardian. that some commonly occurring crimes. ascendant. passed in 1993. Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible. The last paragraph thereof provides: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. Thus. the Court had no occasion. such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code. the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. the penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death. to consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. since [RT69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties … the penalty next lower in de gree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Generally. the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal. were penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent. if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty of death. 7659. the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution. such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom. for which the imposable penalty was death alone.70 This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code." Hence. as amended. V. If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination: Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred FiftyNine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346. Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty." We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper graduated penalty. On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muñoz,72 a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion. If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only. But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. VI. There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty. Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal. It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at all. Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice. Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so. Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death,"73 such as murder, which may be frustrated. Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death penalty.74 If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would now be prision mayor. It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from oversight. VII. The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated penalties. Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping. The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape. There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive" interpretation of Rep. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death? It can be recalled that the accused in Muñoz were found guilty of murder. and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress. One who would like to advocate that Rep."81 In so concluding. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete. VIII. Muñoz.Act No. that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. 9346.79 It is this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights. the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have remained. if this were indeed the intent of Congress. Act No. as to form a complete. 78The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. and thus penalized in the penalty's medium term. Act No. Act No. there being n o expression of "such a requirement… in Article III. Act No. 9346. that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. a divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]". Therein. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with. Act No. the Court made the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. coherent and intelligible system—a uniform system of jurisprudence. More precisely. Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been necessary had Rep. and for accessories and accomplices. we would have acknowledged. perhaps tacitly. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of penalties other than death.80 decided in 1989. the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies. as a means of effecting substantial justice. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying circumstance. Act No. Act No. Jurisprudence previous . would Muñoz as precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. consistent and intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasilegislative acts. carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Yet ultimately. It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71." 82 It is time to re-examine Muñoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself. as it is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws. dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.77 If the language of the law were ambiguous. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Section 1 of Rep. 9346. If that were to be the case. which under the Revised Penal Code. 9346 did not correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Admittedly.75 "Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. Most pertinently. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the . No such language exists in Rep. Six justices dissented from that ruling. Muñoz rejected this formulation. no provision in Rep. Act No. a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination of Muñoz. have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty. 9346. Rep.83 It would be disingenuous to consider Muñoz as directly settling the question now befacing us. especially in relation to Article 71. as applied in Article 71. Act No. the critical question is whether Rep. but the range of the penalties for murder. unless. Muñoz may have pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty. 9346. since the very provision itself acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. and as recently as 1997. for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Act No. Herein. for what was relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties. The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the Constitution evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. Act No." Muñoz and its progenies. In the same vein. The doctrine in Muñoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case. Act No. Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1). which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution. Act No. while herein." as Congress very well did just four (4) years after Muñoz. Act No. the correct query now being whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. 9346 provides a context within which the concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect. holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. as the legal premises behind Muñoz are different from those in this case. roundabout means indeed. the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty of death. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as a means of retaining "death" under Article 71. Muñoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the Constitution." Yet it was that express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. it would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1). It can also be understood and appreciated that at the time Muñoz was decided. one might try to construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty". and not the Constitution. Otherwise framed." with reclusion temporal maximum. Act No. the Congress hereafter provides for it. For purposes of legal hermeneutics. and the charter's effects on the other periods. 9346. Muñoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has unequivocally banned the same. 9346 on the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape.to Muñoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of reclusion temporalmaximum. which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. remain extant. as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our statutes. divided into two halves for that purpose. and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Article III. Unlike the Constitution. Act No. but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein. it would have been a most curious. we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muñoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder. Of course. 9346. Towards this conclusion. at bare minimum. which provided that "[n]either shall death penalty be imposed. and there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Article III abolished the death penalty. Act No. as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as "nothing but blather in search of meaning. 7650. 9346. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion. True. because the sovereign people. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty. Act No. or that previous sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muñoz were wrong. Act No. has also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. The amendatory effects of Rep."85 No longer. It must be asserted that today. Rep. IX. there is no question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others. Act No. we do not acknowledge that Muñozlacked legal justification when it was decided. Act No. It reawakened — then it died. 9346 was erroneous."84 In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty. such as the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes. might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Act No. that its application as precedent prior to Rep. or as a means of depriving liberty. the legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation. Act No. in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines. through Rep. through Rep. as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty. on due process grounds. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties.86 The categorization of certain crimes as "heinous". we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being "in a state of hibernation. Such reclassification under Rep. Muñoz properly stood as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. We have ruled. 9346. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1). It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Yet in truth. Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty. also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous. Act No. Article III.deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation. a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. As such. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Before that day. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes." for both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended. Following Muñoz. Act No. Since Rep. Hence. and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence. the sovereign people. whether as a means of depriving life. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so. Congress has reversed itself. 7659." within constitutional contemplation. Rep. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty. the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting. there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application. the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect. through the 1987 Constitution. banned the death penalty. We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". the penalties for . " Given that we have ruled that Rep. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. constitute a special category by themselves. 9346. the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty. Act No. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties." Hence. Rep. There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death. if consummated or participated in as a principal. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes. our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. 7659. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects. Act No. Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. who is not a habitual criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. if warranted.heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Hence. we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings. the application is immediate. As to sentences not yet handed down. Rep. We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. Accordingly. as we earlier noted. For example. but instead. hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. By reason of Rep. as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death." Indeed. However. what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes. we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. in the case of appellant. referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act." as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. as ruled by the Court of Appeals. Henceforth. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through that statute. except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]. There are remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners. the benefit of Article 22 has to apply. there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. he is spared the death sentence. Still. It should be understood that this decision does not make operative the release of such convicts. XI. Act No. Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office and nongovernmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so entitled by reason of this ruling. X. "death. Act No. Act No. but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. or affirmed with finality. and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his . 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes. favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Act No.prision mayor. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony. Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling. the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death."88 It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No." as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws." as utilized in Rep. "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. by their abhorrent nature. 6689. 6699. we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. Carpio.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape.000. concur. four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum.00 as civil indemnity. Chico-Nazario. JJ. C. Miranda. Quisumbing. 9346.00 as exemplary damages.00 as civil indemnity.00 as civil indemnity. Panganiban. Garcia. Sandoval-Gutierrez. P75. it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v..000. 6903. and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. P25.000. For the six (6) counts of rape. as to damages. lawphil Today is Saturday. appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts of P30. Lastly. we impose the new penalty of two (2) years. 6906 and 6908. Act No. pursuant to Rep. P25. Azcuna.00 as moral damages and P25.000. four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum.000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them. P50. Corona. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila . Sr. Ynares-Santiago.000.00 as civil indemnity.J. Consequently.00 as exemplary damages.000. the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years.000. Carpio Morales. in the amounts of P50. we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.00 as moral damages andP10. in light of the foregoing.000. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape.. Jr. 6905.00 as moral damages and P10. Austria-Martinez. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6902.000. the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence 90 in awarding to BBB and AAA P75. August 11.000. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape.00 as moral damages and P25.. In addition.000. to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. the Court awards AAA P30. and 6907. WHEREFORE. (Chairperson). Callejo. the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. and Velasco. For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. for each count of consummated rape. SO ORDERED.89 Separately. to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Puno. Cabusara filed a criminal complaint against petitioners for violation of B. After preliminary investigation. On appeal. through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo B. . Nolan C.860. Mandaluyong. (Ervine). respondents.R. an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 97). GARDS. vs. Inc. the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Blg. 1998 EDUARDO R.16 balance being partial payment for Ervine's outstanding account. petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10. 131714 November 16. This resulted in the filing of an information against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). 1989. The letter was received by Ervine on the same day. Inc. 1988. is the firm's purchasing manager. 1988. When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard. Alindaya. The check was drawn on the Associated Bank. on the ground that Ervine had already paid the amount of the check. petitioners issued a check for P10.000. 22 against petitioners. petitioners issued a check for P19. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. 1988. Blg." The facts are as follows: Petitioner Eduardo R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO. On April 13. No. 1997. Bldg.SECOND DIVISION G. petitioners. After trial. upon motion of the prosecution. On April 14. On September 18. However. filed another complaint for violation of B.: Petitioners seek a review of the decision. and Security. GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. 1988. On March 29. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International.P. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.2 of the Court of Appeals. dated December 2.16 to GARDS. the case was dismissed by the court on May 11. which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment. MENDOZA. petitioner Fernando Nieto.00 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance.000. 1996. but petitioners did not pay within the time given. while his son-in-law. 1988.860. The check was drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC). 1989. dated October 25.P. The check and the voucher were received by a GARDS messenger.P. 1 and the resolution.00 and the costs. otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law. on April 15. Pena. but GARDS did not return the dishonored check. On March 10. the P9. 22. affirming their conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for violation of B. The voucher accompanying it stated that the check was to replace the dishonored check. GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment in cash of the amount of the check within seven days from notice. J. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. 22. It subsequently denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Detection. P. Respondent Court gravely erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On May 28. petitioners gave GARDS a . drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank. By supplemental petition. Court of Appeals are different from those of the case at bar and that the affidavit of desistance of Dominador Santiago is of no moment. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. Petitioners contend: A. when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. 1998." Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or. Court of Appeals. 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check. 3 in which this Court reversed a conviction for violation of B. such affidavit having been made only after petitioners' conviction. Blg. First. petitioners submitted an affidavit of desistance executed by GARDS president Dominador R. 1998.Hence.P. 22 upon a showing that the accused had no knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. 4 The maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. ordered the bank to stop paymnent. 22 expressly provides: Sec. 22 are: (1) making. without any valid cause. B. this petition. Blg. 2. Blg. dated January 29. In this case. §2 of B. we find that petitioners' conviction for violation of B. The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. Blg. and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value. (2) knowledge of the maker. this time invoking the recent decision in Lao v. after being notified on March 29. or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. drawer. petitioners filed another supplemental petition. He contends that the facts of Lao v. or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.P. or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer. shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon. that the decision of the trial court be modified by sentencing each to an increased fine but without imprisonment. After due review of the decision in this case. 22 is well founded. in the alternative. 5 Thus.P. that the latter had not really suffered any damage as a result of the issuance of the check in question and. that GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the case. drawing. C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting petitioners on grounds of "mistake of fact" and "lack of knowledge. and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. The elements of the offense penalized under B. — The making. Santiago which states that the case arose from a mere "accounting difference" between petitioners and GARDS. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing conviction on the alleged weakness of the evidence of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution. the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied.00.930. complainants going so far as to file another complaint after their first one had been dismissed. Third. is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save them from punishment.16. 6 they should be acquitted because the preparation of checks is the responsibility of the company accountant and all they do is sign the checks. The accused was a mere employee who did not have anything to do with the issuance of checks for the company. Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds. are generally disfavored.000.P. one for the period of January 16 to January 31. While it may be true that it was the company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check. The claim that this case was simply the result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and petitioners and that the former did not really suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. 22 provides that "Where the check is drawn by a corporation. that they come from good families.P. or entity. 2 of B. In support of their plea. Sec. However. 22 §2. no notice of dishonor was given to her as required by B. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant. Blg. had merely been made by her employer. Premiere Investment House. 1988 — 15 days after petitioners had been notified on March 29. But even if such check was intended to replace the bad one. 1988 in the amount of P9.P. the accused. After prosecuting the case below with tenacity. will refuse to pay a due and demandable debt of only P10. They claim that this check had been intended by them to replace the bad check they had previously issued to the GARDS. Blg. as the Court found. however. that Eduardo Vaca is of advanced age (late 60s).08 and another one for the period of March 16 to March 31. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no more than passing mention. the Court of Appeals found that the check was actually payment for two bills. Petitioners pray that. the penalty be modified by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and. 1 of B. in the alternative. Petitioners claim that "with their family background and social standing there is no reason why they. We think so ourselves. the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act. Sec.860. It could thus rightly be concluded that the accused issued checks to apply to account not knowing that at the time of issuance funds were insufficient to pay for the checks. 9 The affidavit in this case. to countersign checks in bank.P. 22. Petitioners contend that. in lieu thereof a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them. It is precisely because of their founded belief that the subject obligation has been paid that they refused to be intimidated by a criminal charge. In the Lao case. we believe that they can be considered in determining the appropriate penalty to impose on . he instructed their company accountant to prepare a replacement check. She did not know to whom the checks would be paid as the names of payees were written only later by the head of operations. its issuance on April 13. and. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check. Blg. petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored. 22 requires that such check be given within five (5) days from the notice of dishonor to them. Blg. it is trifling with this Court for complainants to now assert that the filing of their case was simply a mistake. the fact remains that petitioners are the owners and officers of the company. Second." The Court of Appeals dismissed these allegations as irrelevant to the question of petitioners' guilt. Moreover. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B. Court of Appeals. It is for reasons such as this the affidavit of desistance. company. 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check — cannot negate the presumption that petitioners knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their previous check. in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. In fact. which was made after petitioners' conviction. They claim that they rely on the word of the accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to pay for the checks. like retractions. they allege that they do not have any record of prior conviction.check for P19. 1988 in the same amount. 7 This belies petitioners' claim that they had no hand in the preparation of checks 8 and shows that petitioners were in control of the finances of the company. WHEREFORE. 1992 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SO ORDERED Melo and Puno. Otherwise. MARIO JAYMALIN. they brought this appeal. JJ. Apparently. concur.. that they had not committed a violation of B." Petitioners are first-time offenders. Blg.R. the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a fine of P20. namely. 10 In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners. but not more than double. 22.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check.. B. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than. that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. Blg.P.000. defendant-appellant. 90452 October 19. although mistakenly. August 11. lawphil Today is Saturday. they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. 22. No. is on leave.petitioners. Martinez. or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court. the amount of the check which fine shall in no case esceed two hundred thousand pesos. vs.P. 1. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. par. believing in all good faith. par. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1. J. §1. plaintiff-appellee. . the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. It was then that Danao announced to the Jaymalin brothers that they were being arrested. hitting him in several parts of his body. Province of Ifugao. Mario's younger brother. The information against him read as follows: INFORMATION Undersigned accuses MARIO JAYMALIN of Kiangan. Daniel Kinakin and Patrolmen Catanglan. At about 7:30 that evening.. the INP Ifugao Command in Lagawe was informed of a planned sale of marijuana at Kiangan. with intent of gain. was immediately organized to conduct a surveillance of the place and to arrest the marijuana dealers. selling. Philippines. "Are you the contacted buyer of marijuana?" The answer this time was yes. They proceeded to the High School Boy's Department where he showed them a box containing marijuana. 1683. as amended successively by PD Nos. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.: This was not an ordinary buy-bust operation because a man was shot to death in the process.m. it was Mario he hit in the arm. Francisco's reaction was to fire at him. While they were haggling. known as Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. reported that the marijuana seller had agreed to meet the buyers at the St. Herman Kimmayong. Pedro Dulnuan. 44. Then the man asked. It was drizzling. Hearing the gunshot. Francisco surrendered. J. Francisco immediately ran and fired his gun. Dulnuan rushed to the scene and called on Francisco to stop. for the purpose of dealing. Ifugao. Two days later. satisfied that they were marijuana. 1675. At the trial. Cpl. Francisco Jaymalin. the prosecution sought to establish that on October 20. who was wearing a long black overcoat and had a rifle slung over his shoulder. Lt. But that killing is now before us. The man then invited them into the SJS compound. DID then and there wilfully. What concerns us here is the conviction of the accused-appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. "Are you Max?" Kimmayong said no. Danao and Kimmayong posted themselves in front of a store near the gate of the St. he died. Binuhe and Talasig. Ironically. from which dangerous and prohibited drugs can be manufactured. negotiated with the accused on the price. Dulnuan and his group met at Kiangan Central School for briefing. It was decided that Danao and Kimmayong were to pose as the buyers while the rest were to back them up. hitting him in the stomach. Cpl. The other team members then shot back at Francisco. a certain Max.m. Edgar Danao. the above-named accused. unlawfully and feloniously have under his possession and control. Joseph School. Municipality of Kiangan. eight (8) branches of marijuana buds of more or less seven and one-half (7 1/2) kilos. . Ifugao. Lt. disposing or pushing. The civilian informer. 179. 1983. Danao and Kimmayong inspected the contents of the box and. Joseph School's compound at 9:00 p. At around 8:30 p.. Pindongan. evening of October 20. committed as follows: That on or about 8:30 o'clock. 1708 and Batas Pambansa Blg. A team composed of Lt.CRUZ. approached them. a man with an umbrella (later established as the accused Mario Jaymalin) approached them and asked. 1983. of the crime of DRUG PUSHING defined and penalized by RA 6425. at Brgy. The three entered the school compound and crossed the playground. a shot rang out. Baguilat of the Regional Trial Court. who was supposedly one of the buyers in the "buybust" operation. Thus while initially declaring that he was not the one who prepared the rough and final sketch of the scene of the crime." According to the accused-appellant." Then. he took a short cut through the grounds of the St. (3) the participation of the civilian informer identified only as Max. It was then that Mario recognized the man in the black coat as his brother. Mario heard somebody shout.The box produced by Mario was taken to the Ifugao INP headquarters for safekeeping. The accused felt something hit his arm. in Soyung. Joseph School. He insists that the trial court erred in accepting the evidence for the prosecution. (2) the source. the testimony of Kimmayong. The accused-appellant also points to conflicting statements and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. he met two persons. the accused had a different story. "Saan ka nga agtaray. More confusion followed and then someone cried out that he was surrendering. As they approached one of the buildings.000. Mario Jaymalin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE OF P20. It was marked with the words "Champion" and "Magno" 1 Major Esteban initially inspected its contents and found them to the marijuana. a forensic chemist. one of who asked him if he knew where Francisco Jaymalin lived. amount and the handling of the entrapment money. which was near his parent's house. this Court finds the accused. To reach the place. he went to his parent's house thinking that she would be there. Judge Nicasio A. rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which declared: In the light of all the foregoing. Francisco. he later recanted and admitted that he in fact prepared the two sketches. His testimony was that in the evening in question. After taking his supper. which he says is vitiated with inconsistencies and contradictions that "are far too numerous to be merely ignored as trivial. This finding was confirmed by Captain Benjamin Rubio. a man in a dark overcoat and carrying a box came towards them. He said he did and even offered to lead them to his brother's house. Ifugao. specifically on: (1) the clothes the "poseur-buyers" wore on the night of the operation. After trial. Isabela." meaning "Don't run away. 2 As might be expected. Ifugao. At that point. Lagawe. Still the man did not answer but started to move back. One of the two men asked the stranger to identify himself but he did not answer. which should therefore have . His point is that their dissimilarities reflect on the credibility of the prosecution evidence. The question was repeated. followed by a rapid exchange of fire. after a laboratory examination he conducted at Camp de la Cruz. and found that his young daughter was still out.00 The accused-appellant now assails that decision. varies on some points with his previous sworn statements. he arrived home in Kiangan. and (4) the person who warned the Jaymalin brothers about the police. When he was near the main entrance of the school. Differences among witnesses in the recollection of details relating to the same incident may be expected. and have grown practically defiant. The argument must also be rejected. Laureta. Jr. Thus. Nevertheless. if not scornful. It is a rule that non-presentation by the prosecution of certain witness is not sufficient defense. of the law they are violating. then it was incumbent upon him or his counsel to summon T/Sgt.. in this instance. relying merely on his self-serving and bare contention. Ansing: 3 This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. it is on record that even before the laboratory testing done on the seized . Moreover. who seeks to dispute this presumption. Sec. . it never left official custody of the Police and PC offices concerned. the evidence custodian herein. it has not been proved at all that there is anything amiss or irregular in the procedure followed by the authorities herein. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. That this was not done casts serious doubt on the veracity of appellant's claim. that indeed the sample tested came from the evidence seized and kept in official custody. The Court has examined these inconsistencies and finds that they relate to minor matters and do not impair the essential integrity of the evidence for the prosecution. especially in isolated transactions like the one at bar. appellant has failed to do.been totally rejected by the trial court. (Rule 131.But this. . especially after more than a year has elapsed from the occurrence of the incident. The Court has held that "what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. There is thus here the presumption established by the Rule of Court that official duty has been regularly performed. As we said in People vs. [m]) Appellant. Yadang. (People v. and the presumption remains that the marijuana tested was part of the evidence seized and kept by the authorities. we sustain the following observations of the Solicitor General: . from the time said substance was seized from the Jaymalins. has the burden of proving his contrary contention. if indeed appellant had serious and substantial ground to support this contention. The accused-appellant also argues that he would not have been so reckless as to simply approach strangers and ask them outright if they were the contacted buyer as such conduct would not have been consistent with human behavior and experience. their respective declarations may not be rejected as totally untrue as long as there is basic agreement among them on the main points of the incident." 4 We have also observed that drug pushers have become increasingly casual about their activities. to testify concerning the case. 159 SCRA 256) Furthermore. 5 As for the accused-appellant's doubt on the identity of the marijuana presented in evidence against him. 1986. as to induce only disbelief. which was clearly overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. lawphil Today is Saturday. who was indefinitely suspended by this Court. TSN. not to say too loosely put together. 17 to 22.00 fine. including his failure to recognize his own brother. when the accused-appellant was arrested for possessing and selling marijuana. The fact that he did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the transcript of their testimonies does not for that reason alone render the judgment erroneous. Griño-Aquino. the proper penalty for the crime committed by the accused-appellant is life imprisonment plus the P20. since these officers were exposed to drug-busting operations for years. the trial having been conducted by then Judge Emilio L. concur. WHEREFORE. 2012 Search . and were totally acquainted with the look and the odor of marijuana. the accusedappellant is straining our credulity. The officers who conducted the buy-bust operation had not known him before that night and had no reason to concoct the drug-pushing charges against him. 1986. pp. 7 Under the Dangerous Drugs Act. the challenged decision as above modified is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED. pp. (TSN. The Court sustains the findings of the trial court on what actually happened that evening of October 20. 6 In asking us to believe that he was merely looking for his daughter when he was arrested without cause. is palpably inventive.marijuana. His own version of the disputed incident cannot stand against the positive evidence adduced by the prosecution.. J." We have held that the two penalties are not synonymous or interchangeable as reclusion perpetua carries accessory penalties that do not attach to life imprisonment. Medialdea and Bellosillo. the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were complete and were presumably examined and studied by Judge Baguilat before he rendered his decision. Padilla. 5 to 7) It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not heard the controversy at all..000. the same have been identified as such by the police officers-witnesses. 1983. August 11. The judgment must nevertheless be rectified insofar as it sentenced the accused-appellant to "reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment. Polig. is on leave. He seems to be suggesting that he was simply picked up although he was in fact helping the policemen locate his brother. Nonetheless. It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record.8 and it is here so imposed. as proved by their testimony. This is no trifling matter. JJ. It is so ordered. August 26. November 26. His version of the disputed incident. According to private complainant. Loida Pacampara could have hoped to have not only a lover but also a "stepfather" to her four (4) children by her late husband Telesforo. She was wrong. No. she could remember those that happened in March 1997 when she was only fifteen (15). Case No. By living with accused Onofre Galang as her common-law husband. Tarlac. she brought a Judas incarnate who deliberately betrayed her trust and affection in exchange for his insatiable lust for her only daughter Edlyn. Cases Nos. i. she was out in the yard that morning when the accused called her. While holding Edlyn’s legs wide apart. He then forcibly removed her shorts and panty. accused Onofre Galang y Mendoza was charged with having sexual intercourse on three (3) different occasions. 1386-99 (now G. held her by the chin and peppered her with lustful kisses.R. Thinking that Onofre had some errand for her. instead.. minor daughter of his common-law spouse Loida Pacampara who was living with them in Brgy. Nos. She tried to ward off his unwanted caresses but the accused. she went up the house. 150524 and 150525) he was sentenced to death in both cases. Cases Nos.R. In Crim. Thereupon. 1387-99 and 1388-99 which referred to the rape incidents of 2 April 1999 and 28 March 1999. According to her. Of these..R. Onofre ordered her to lie on the cement floor and kissed her on the lips. 1386-99 which allegedly took place in March 1997. appellant. She was left at home alone with Onofre. vs. 150523) he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. respectively. the accused mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. 150523-25 July 2. and then on 28 March 1999 and 2 April 1999 when she was seventeen (17). 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1387-99 and 1388-99 (now G.1 His conviction by the court a quo in the three (3) cases is now before us for review. She clarified that the accused was her "stepfather" being the live-in partner of her mother Loida Pacamara. while hissing threats to kill her family.e. The couple lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage since she was five (5). and in Crim. ONOFRE GALANG Y MENDOZA. PER CURIAM: ONOFRE GALANG Y MENDOZA was convicted by the court a quo of three (3) counts of rape. Bamban. i. She could only whimper faintly in protest. in Crim. Dap-dap Resettlement Area. Lourdes. Case No.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. appellee.e. In three (3) separate Informations. she was also sexually assaulted by Onofre several days earlier. against the will and without the consent of seventeen-year old Edlyn Galang. and she grew up with them. Nos. in the . Edlyn recounted that in the early morning of 2 April 1999 her mother left for work while her elder siblings went out to other places. and in Crim. Edlyn testified that Onofre sexually assaulted her several times. and. For him." "No woman would want to go through the process. Five (5) days later. He denied all the charges hurled against him by his live-in partner and dismissed them as mere rantings of a jealous woman. He removed her shorts and panty while hurling threats against her family. In his testimony. He added that Loida was also normally at work at that time. she left Edlyn at home because she did not want the accused to suspect that something was amiss and thus forewarn him of what they were planning to do. according to her. Loida berated her live-in partner and an argument followed. the trouble and the humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense unless she actually has been the victim of abuse and her motive is but a response to the compelling need to seek and obtain justice. she found the accused wiping his organ and Edlyn behind the door with her head bowed. while she and the accused were alone in the house. Edlyn also testified that she had been repeatedly victimized by the accused as early as March 1997. she told Edlyn to pretend as if nothing happened (‘wag magpapahalata) because she would ask assistance from her brother who was a police officer in Angeles City. Loida refused because. as an appliance repairman by vocation. (b) the testimonies of the complainant on the alleged incidents of rape on 28 March 1999 and 2 April 1999 did not prove his ." Accused-appellant assails his conviction on the following grounds: (a) the complainan t’s testimony clearly shows absence of any allegation much less detail on how the alleged rape of March 1997 took place. a high school student. went to the house of his wife’s sister to watch a VHS movie. Loida asked permission from him to go to Angeles City. Although he suggested to Loida that she take her daughter Edlyn along. The trial court seriously doubted the protestations of innocence by the accused. Confronted with the compromising scene. he was nevertheless certain that Edlyn and her mother were at home. the accused explained that although he could not recall where he was at that time. specifically in March 1997 because complainant. He remembered however that at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. In his defense. He however could not recall an occasion when he and Edlyn were home alone together. he would leave at different times whenever a customer would fetch him. Loida and some other relatives went to the Bamban police station to report the matter to the authorities. the alleged rape on 2 April 1999 could not have possibly happened because there was no instance that he and Edlyn were alone together since all the other members of the family were at home that day. "The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature. It viewed his guilt in this wise -2 In the course of the testimony of Edlyn. As to the rape which allegedly transpired on 28 March 1999. accused Onofre Galang denied the accusations while asserting that the supposed sexual molestations could not have taken place. the filing of the instant cases was but Loida’s way of venting her jealousy over him for his closeness to Edlyn who in turn might have been couched by her mother into testifying against him. According to Loida. According to Onofre. and thereafter feverishly kissed her on the lips. Loida became suspicious and asked what the two (2) were doing. Loida pulled her daughter aside and inquiringly asked if she had already given up her virginity. he affirmed that as soon as his wife left for Angeles City. Her attempts to free herself from his grasp proved futile as he succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. For his part. to which Edlyn nodded. was usually in school from 7:00 in the morning until about 3:00 or 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. When her mother Loida returned home and subsequently entered the room. She revealed that she could not refuse her "stepfather" every time he summoned her because she was afraid of him.afternoon of 28 March 1999. the rest of the family. including him and Edlyn. In the evening of 28 March. In a conspirational tone. she would be back soon enough. she was crying on her narration of the sad portions of the sexual abuses. He called her from inside the room. we declared that such statements would not suffice to establish accused-appellant’s guilt with the required quantum of evidence. sir. 1387-99 and 1388-99. we find that indeed the narration of private complainant on the alleged rape in March 1997 was miserably wanting in material particulars to establish beyond any pall of doubt that she was in fact a victim of sexual violence in the hands of her "stepfather. her testimony was simply "too general as it failed to focus on material details. As it was. accused-appellant argues that complainant’s testimony shows that the threat or intimidation he supposedly exerted on her was more apparent than real. Case No. accused-appellant contends that the trial court committed grave error in finding him guilty of the crime of rape in Crim. Pertinent portions of complainant’s direct examination on the 2 April 1999 rape incident amply illustrate the point Fiscal Capulong Q: A: At the time that he kissed you.3 we absolved the accused of two (2) counts of rape when upon inquiry as to what occurred on the evening of 25 August 1994. complainant passively allowed the alleged sexual abuse to take place. do not meet the quantum of evidence required by law to indubitably prove the crime charged." As correctly pointed out by the defense." In that case. After sifting through the evidence on record. Accused-appellant’s contentions deserve scant consideration. complainant merely replied that her father "did the same thing to her. The records are bereft of essential details to enable us to reconstruct with reasonable clarity the dreadful incident of that day and establish the attendant circumstances constitutive of the alleged rape. 1386-99 despite the failure of the complainant to make any narration with respect to the circumstances surrounding the rape incident supposedly committed in March of 1997. complainant only made a general assertion that she had been sexually abused by her "stepfather" from March 1997 up to April 1999. We further noted that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each act of rape charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the first assigned error. . Fiscal Capulong: Q: A: How was he threatening you? Because there was a bolo under the cabinet. In People v. The sweeping and general statements." In the opinion of the Court. the records are awash with indicia conclusively demonstrating that he raped Edlyn with the use of force or intimidation at the time and place and in the manner described by the victim. sir.guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Marahay. Supnad4 where the Court found the testimony of complainant grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant with complainant’s "simple assertion that her uncle had sexual intercourse with her twice in February and once in March. He insists that complainant should have put up an active resistance in order to repel the alleged sexual aggression considering that her life was not in imminent danger. Contrary to his assertion. according to accused-appellant. what did you do? I could not do anything because he was threatening me. More in point is People v." As regards the rape charges in Crim. according to him. Cases Nos. sir. Fiscal Capulong: Q: A: How was he threatening you? He told me that he will (sic) kill us. sir. "enough.Q: A: And where Is that cabinet? Inside the room. sir. Was he holding anything at that time? He was threatening me. sir. sir. . complainant described her attempt at resistance in this wiseFiscal Capulong: Q: A: What were you doing when he was inserting his penis on your private part? I was pushing him. Did he tell you anything when he inserted his penis in your private part? None. enough" (tama na po). sir. sir. sir.6 xxx Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: You did not do anything to close your legs? I was trying to put them together but I could not do so. When you told him. how were you positioned? You were standing or you were lying down or what? A: Q: A: Q: A: We were lying down.5 Then again: Q: Now at the time when he inserted his penis in your private part. You did not tell him anything? I told him. "enough. enough" had he inserted his penis into your vagina? Yes.7 On the 28 March 1999 incident. Since it is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. sir. to the libidinous incursions of accused-appellant it was more a reflection of the terror and fear in her young mind and the sense of futility of any form of resistance. How? How did he threaten you? Did he tell you anything? Yes. the court a quo observed that complainant wept while recounting her heartrending experience.Q: A: Q: A: Aside from pushing him did you do anything else? None anymore. meekly as it seemed. the response and conduct of the complainant amidst an overpowering sexual assault do not disclose any hint of voluntariness on her part to submit to accused-appellant’s lecherous advances. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation. to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. sir. the reaction of a mature or normal person could hardly be expected from her. Nor is it reasonable to demand that a greater degree of intimidation be present so as to warrant conviction. to say the least. it must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of th e crime. A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Why? Why did you not report the incident to your mother? I was afraid.9 As the above-quoted testimonies would attest. sir. Did you not cry? I cried. If she eventually submitted. Her . sir. under the circumstances. Where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof. In fact. The pronouncement of this Court in People v. What did he tell you? He will (sic) kill all of us. Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated or governed by hard and fast rules. something would happen to her at that moment. Pamor is instructive -10 Under the circumstances and considering her tender age. then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim’s participation in the sexual act voluntary. It would be extremely unreasonable.8 And still in the same testimonyQ. During the trial. sir. thereby rendering resistance futile. It includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening the victim with a knife or pistol. Why? Did he threaten you with any physical injury? He was threatening me. she gave a rather good account of herself in defending her honor and dignity by resisting her assailant with utmost courage and determination. sir. It is enough that it produces fear—fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused. coerce or compel the complainant to succumb to his lechery. is AFFIRMED. Cases Nos. 1387-99 and another death sentence in Crim. the prosecution miserably failed to establish the circumstances essential to constitute the crime of rape in March 1997. as regards Crim. Case No. it has been established beyond any iota of doubt that accused-appellant employed force and intimidation to threaten. 1387-99 and 1388-99.000. we cannot give our assent to its findings in Crim. As to damages.00 in Crim. Cases Nos. 28 March 1999.00 .000. Cases Nos. As discussed earlier. 335 of The Revised Penal Code. in Crim. 1386-99 where accused-appellant was found guilty of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Be that as it may. we hold that if the rape was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty.15 P75. complainant was still a minor at the time the three (3) instances of rape occurred in March 1997. In addition.000.12 which shows that she was born on 26 January 1982. However. As evidenced by complainant’s certificate of live birth.000. amending Art. stepfather. Pursuant to current case law14 however. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent. 1387-99 to 1388-99 alleged that she was seventeen (17) at the time the rape incidents occurred on 2 April 1999 and 28 March 1999. 1387-99 and 1388-99 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer two (2) death penalties for both cases.tears were a tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of the man she hoped would take the place of her departed father. Cases Nos.11 The Information in Crim. 1388-99 is in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.00. Case No. the same to be imposed without need of proof other than the fact of rape. this does not detract from the fact that he exercised some measure of moral ascendancy over the victim. Case No. accusedappellant is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence or that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 1386-99 alleged that Edlyn Galang was a minor child of sixteen (16) at the time the alleged rape in March 1997 happened while those in Crim. the civil indemnity shall be P75.00 as civil indemnity in Crim.000.000. we affirm the two (2) death penalties imposed upon him by the trial court. accused-appellant Onofre Galang y Mendoza is further ordered to pay the offended party. guardian.00 as civil indemnity and another P50. ascendant. the lower court justified the imposition of the death sentence in Crim.00 in each case. Case No. he is not the stepfather of the complainant but only the common-law spouse of her mother. the trial court should have also awarded moral damages in the amount of P50. The lower court also found that accused-appellant was not legally married to complainant’s mother. WHEREFORE the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant ONOFRE GALANG Y MENDOZA in Crim. 1388-99 pursuant to Art. 266-B of RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997). 1387-99 and 1388-99.13 Thus the trial court’s award of P75. Case No. Nonetheless. which now provides The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/ qualifying circumstances: 1. Strictly speaking therefore. Along the same vein. or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim x x x x In view of the concurrence of both the minority of the victim and her filial relationship to accused-appellant. 1386-99. While we agree with the findings and conclusions of the trial court in Crim. relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Edlyn Pacampara Galang. The crying of the victim during her testimony was evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity borne out of human nature and experience. Case No. and 2 April 1999. and pursuant to the above-quoted provision of RA 8353. 1387-99 and another P75. Case No. respondent. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Vitug. concur. No. Bellosillo. 93028 July 29. Davide. Austria-Martinez.. Quisumbing. 83 of The Revised Penal Code. JJ. lawphil Today is Saturday.. plaintiff-appellee.. Sandoval-Gutierrez. Callejo. 25 of RA 7659. . on leave. on official leave. Puno. J. Panganiban. J. SO ORDERED.. upon the finality of this Decision. Corona. 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.as moral damages in each case. C.R.J. let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of her pardoning power. and Azcuna. Jr. amending Art. August 11. vs. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.Sampang for accused-appellant. CarpioMorales. Ricardo M. Carpio. In accordance with Sec. Sr.. Costs de oficio. Ynares-Santiago. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA. instead of "one" and "40". he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members. J. Pampanga. Article II of Republic Act No. that is.00 as payment. to information and to counsel. 1988 with a violation of Section 4. He was likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent.REGALADO. admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp. Capt. Cristo. When they reached the place. Cristo. San Fernando. under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22. 6425. Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two". were found positive for marijuana. instead of "20". with Sgt. claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. around two hundred meters away from his companions. when subjected to laboratory examination. the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. 2 he pleaded not guilty. However.00. I The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant. as amended. later identified as a NARCOM operative. 7 . He did not actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities andbarangay officers thereof. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that. He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.00. 4 Pfc. Francisco Bustamante. which tea bags. originally. 1989. upon returning shortly thereafter. of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. for his part. at Barangay Sto. informed the police unit at Camp Olivas.: Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10. all members of the same unit. Domingo Pejoro. Pampanga. handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40. After securing marked money from Bustamante. Pejoro as the investigator. Thereupon. declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team. Villaruz. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference. together with their informant. the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. orally waived his right to counsel. Pampanga. after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas. Appellant. however. who was the head of the back-up team. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. Appellant then left and. 1988. Pfc. the team. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation. San Fernando. 6 Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G". 1 Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2. Domingo Pejoro. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40. arrested appellant. proceeded to Sto. Pampanga where he was temporarily detained. 5 Sgt. and the team closed in on them. Lopez then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away. what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20. Guagua. Buenaventura Lopez. Guagua. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. later. Calara. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain.m. he was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons. and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. after weighing the evidence presented. it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.Dr. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. 8 As expected. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer. but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. Article II of Republic Act No. he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of gastro-intestinal pain. whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Dr. 15 In view thereof. In the afternoon. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas. In the course of the examination. When they finally reached the camp. which causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. Pampanga where he was confined for three days. of the day after the latter's apprehension. contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up". 6425. at around 4:30 p. he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer.00 or the dried marijuana leaves. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest. Guagua. (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence. While on board. Pedro S. he consulted a quack doctor and. he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca. except for the gastro-intestinal pain. After escaping. reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p. and the results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment.m. 16 . appellant boarded a jeep with them. Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession. a medical officer at Camp Olivas. the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. Pejoro. He denied knowledge of the P20. when he refused. 12 Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court. and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein. claiming that on the day in question. at San Matias. There. abrasion or contusion on his body. to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. 10 Also. the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4. as amended. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury. the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant. the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves. and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bienvenido Sunga. 13 At the outset. his physical condition remained normal. 1989. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas.. Dr. examined appellant at 5:30 p. Moreover. he was ordered to sign some papers and. Norberto Simon. testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca.m. 14 the latter not being in any way connected with the sale. The next day. he proceeded to the house of his uncle. 9 Appellant's brother. a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital. appellant came back with the same complaint but. 11 On December 4. appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts. 25 Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 19 Nonetheless. as such. 27 Besides. Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana. To top it all. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3. in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs. appellant was caught red-handed delivering prohibited drugs. 1988. be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. 22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant. a forensic chemist therein." he signed it as the one who seized the same. aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. we are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. Even. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties. When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination. he does not appear to have plausibly done so. 20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them. 26 Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. Next. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant. who acted as the poseur-buyer. the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness. As between the straightforward. 18 It must. on October 22. as follows: . harassment. whether for money or any other material consideration. 24 Thus. Lopez. such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and. but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated. and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge. in open court. but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit. Foremost. 21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. 23 confirmed in her Technical Report No. extortion and abuse. neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty. there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant. Lopez. the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony. is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since. 17 To sell means to give. positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant. as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake. should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed. Marlyn Salangad. did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations. 28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. according to him.8 grams of marijuana. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way. such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more entitled to credence. therefore. for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. P/Cpl. In the same manner. distribute. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 32 states. the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto. or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. the receipt for the seized property. we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who. The foregoing explanation aside. Moreover. appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits. there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. sir. Likewise. which identification can be supplied by other species of evidence. 35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him. 31 These are absurd disputations. give away to another. unless authorized by law. the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect. be witnessed by a relative. Crime Laboratory. deliver. that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves. Again. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. xxx xxx xxx Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P. a barangay official or any other civilian. as well as the office of NICA? A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that powder 29 because they. the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. either verbally or in writing. shall sell. administer." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's signature. to be valid. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. sir. during and after his arrest. he was not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police authorities.C. there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. CIS. On the contrary. themselves. hereinbefore mentioned.Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object? A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking that kind of material in our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that. contrary to appellant's contention. was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him. are using that in their own work. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure. 36 Besides. we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure. 33 However. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged." 30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes. 34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel. appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his . is not allowable in evidence. He decries the lack of pictures taken before. inter alia. These. and the events earlier discussed. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger. the final act needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody. if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas. this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt. when done on a small scale as in this case. Two doctors. saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person. 49 Significantly. abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. 51 Premeditated or not. 43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion. one for the prosecution 45 and the other for the defense. 13. 38 In the present case. appellant's arrest was only the culmination.predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. 41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 48 Furthermore. The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed. 8 and 9 of Art. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. as amended. 46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury. soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all costs. are to this effect: Sec. Sections 3. 7. are hereby amended to read as follows: . as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion. 47 His own brother even corroborated that fact. Finally. was further amended by Republic Act No. Accordingly. 39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing. 7659 effective December 31. this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. time and place. pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar. 1993. we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering even before his arrest. 42 While there may be instances where such sale could be improbable. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication. 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now resolve. 6425. as amended. Republic Act No. 4. and in light of the preceding discussion. 6425. belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. II The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law. known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. However. II of Republic Act No. 5. it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction 37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Article IV of Republic Act No. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code. can sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: xxx xxx xxx 5. 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14.8 grams and. 4. shall sell. give away to another. 1. administer. Administration. the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No.. 6425 was enacted as a special law. the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. 4. unless authorized by law. et al. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. hurto. Application of Penalties. the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder.. as amended. Moran. ante. in fact. known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana xxx xxx xxx Otherwise. estafa or falsification. declaring the retroactivity of . pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. deliver. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. distribute. albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code. Although Republic Act No. if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities. 55 Since. obviously. Sale. 6425. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3. . 53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.xxx xxx xxx Sec. 54 The execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries. 7. at the present stage. Delivery. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags. 17. 20. xxx xxx xxx Sec. a corollary question would be whether this court. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case. robo. 14-A. thus: . Section 20. Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. . . is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 59 Accordingly. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. prision correccional. It would. deliver. as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams. the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. that is. .000. the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. Section 4 of Republic Act No. distribute.000. administer. the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that. 6425. as in this case. then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty. In such a situation. and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. 57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. as now modified. procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus. Thereby. give away. just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty. If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. with the lightest of them being the minimum. 56 2.penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony. and reclusion temporal. Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved. that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction. shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana.00 to P10. is its specific mandate.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell. and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law. as shall hereafter be explained. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder. therefore. according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law. and not reclusion perpetua. if the quantity involved is less. imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500. the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3. As applied to the present case. as now further amended. irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20. thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.prision mayor. that is.000. above quoted. 58 Ordinarily. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug.8 grams. the next as the medium. and the most severe as the maximum period. In other words. the Code provides that each one shall form a period. the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty shall be imposed on the accused. an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law. Probably through oversight. Where. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused. 3. That penalty. would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. then practice. however. hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20. otherwise. 7659. there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition. it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum. correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. or a prohibition in the special law against. the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three. since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof.unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation. those special laws. again. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and. as provided in Article 10 of the former. necessarily. 7659. as amended by Republic Act No. the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional. as in this case. For the nonce. is prision correccional. At this juncture. just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins. to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. Originally. there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance. the presence or absence of mitigating. the law involved speaks of prision correccional. with the resulting quotient. such supplementary application. if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams. This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws. we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. reclusion temporal. aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account. in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws. and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. 4. in its technical sense under the Code. We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that. provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations. which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional. 6425. reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder. 5. cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of. from 250 to 499 grams. Thus. medium or maximum periods. prision mayor. 60 Now. and 500 to 749 grams. with its duration. More on this later. a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary. When. the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but. Parenthetically. it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws. the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed. such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division into . however. as a divisible penalty. and double or treble the same. is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law. considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar. another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved. it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The situation. the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. however. sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein provided. and life imprisonment to death. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor toprision mayor. and Presidential Decree No. The rules on penalties in the Code. reclusion temporal. in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws.periods or any technical statutory cognomen. as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code. therefore. a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. Commonwealth Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to death. reclusion perpetua or death. when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. paragraph four. On the other hand. While these are special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied . or force upon things. Inceptively. Subsequently. Republic Act No. In this type of special law. the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 4. the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code. The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example. have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. when the owner. the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. the legislative intendment is clear. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal. shallprima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen. 303 62 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein. Besides. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American regime. cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms). provided: Sec. special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. for instance. 6539. 63 Thereafter. With respect to the first example. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this Act. where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code. the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor. driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. 1612 and 1866. 64 Presidential Decree No. when committed with violence against or intimidation of any person. not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code. we have this more recent pronouncement: . . 533 is a special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code.) More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. (Emphasis supplied. under paragraph 5 of Article 64. to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature. we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits. the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code. Also.) Under the aforestated considerations. Article 64 of the same Code should. In such case. or even more. . 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code. the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances. 1623. Likewise. These provisions of Articles 64(5). which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws. there is no room for the application of the provisions of the Code . . the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the "deep legal 66 thought and centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws. can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees.legislation. .D. paragraph 5. in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 6425. 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. the intent seems clear that P. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . as amended by P. the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. . While not squarely in issue in this case. 6425. it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64. are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71. likewise. otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974). Prefatorily. . . but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances. . this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense. of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 6425. In People vs. 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. No. 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. which could never have been the intendment of Congress. Macatanda.D. Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws. contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. . However. be applicable. in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code." (Emphasis ours. as provided in Articles 67 and 68. . what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty. . . 533. We said therein that — We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P. when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.D. . except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained. considering the vintage of Act No. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law. which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us. Hence. There could.destierro and arresto mayor. when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent. and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent. in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. although provided for in a special law." as is the rule for felonies therein. of course. 68 The more important aspect. that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment. is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. such that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law. prision correccional. to determine the minimum. only to the first and last examples. 6425. for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence. since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale. 6. hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. that is. as discussed in the preceding illustrations. Such offense. the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence. If this rule were to be applied. has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms. since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death. as now amended by Republic Act No. There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code. 4103 as earlier noted. 69 We repeat. provided. the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. then one degree lower would be arresto menor. is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained. Furthermore. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty. therefore. which must each likewise consist of three penalties. It is true that Section 1 of said law." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code. and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. In fact. Correlatively. Apparently it does. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. hence with their technical signification and effects. or even reduce the penalty by degrees. 7659. however. Republic Act No. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided. be no further reduction by still one or two degrees. that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties. this rule applied. the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. however. after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code. prision mayor and reclusion temporal. and would still apply. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The Court rules. paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof. we have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. states that "if the offense is punished by any other law. this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.Thus. we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the . What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition. therefore. to six (6) years of prision correccional.J. Vitug. this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot. but with the MODIFICATION that he should be. considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court.. Fortunately. as a matter of grace and not of right. ACCORDINGLY. his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof. which could thereby even involve only one day.. Kapunan and Mendoza.." (Emphasis ours. Melo. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. JJ. concur. Thus. or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds. In fact. the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor. 70 and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment". Bellosillo. as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation. . sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. and not before. For. the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which. Bidin. under all the foregoing premises. 71 The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion. and of structural interpretation. the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties." we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law. instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. No. as he hereby is. could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code. Padilla. J. of historical interpretation. That minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. in view of the attending circumstances. and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. or its amendments. with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.) A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. with fealty to the law. SO ORDERED. as the minimum. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws. is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation. Romero. C. 72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which. It is thus both amusing and bemusing if. in the case at bar. Cruz. as the maximum thereof. the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED. is on leave. The difference. Narvasa. even if he has served the minimum sentence. which is the best mode of interpretation. Puno.Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. and ordering them to pay the heirs of the deceased Cipriano Manuel the sum of P12. accused-appellant. ROLLO GARCIA. August 11.000. 1972 with Cipriano Manuel as the victim. convicting the said defendant-appellant and one of his co-accused. Romulo Garcia. L-40778 January 26. PARAS.R. vs. . Romulo Garcia and Alfonso Militante with the crime of homicide allegedly committed on May 7. ARCILLO MANLOLO. Manikan & Associates for accused-appellant. 2012 Search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. J.: This is an appeal by defendant-appellant Arcillo Manlolo from the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The information alleging conspiracy. sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No.00 jointly and severally. charged defendant-appellant Arcillo Manlolo. accused. Branch XXX (Pasay City) (now known as the Regional Trial Court [RTC]) in Criminal Case No. 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 990-P.lawphil Today is Saturday. plaintiff-appellee. Montesa. of the crime of homicide with two (2) aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band. decided the case on the basis solely on what appeared on the record.) The Motion to Reconsider. may the aggravating circumstance of band be appreciated? . 1974. 1. 1974. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief) Because of this Order for a new trial for Romulo Garcia. Set Aside Decision and/or to Reopen the case was granted by the trial court on December 20. appellant Arcillo Manlolo filed a notice of appeal (p. Let the date of hearing be set. Is defendant-appellant Manlolo criminally liable for the fatal stabbing of Cipriano Manuel? 3. One of the three accused.Trial was conducted by Judge Santiago Ranada who. 256. and/or Reopen the Case" on the following grounds: (a) That the evidence is insufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused.examination of said witnesses at the hearing for retaking their testimonies. Alfonso Militante. It is understood that their former testimonies shall not in any case be taken into account during the direct or cross. Romulo Garcia filed a "Motion to Reconsider. 258. Record). On December 12. Campos. the instant case concerns only the appeal of Arcillo Manlolo on the following issues. Set Aside Decision. May the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated although it was not shown that it was purposely sought to secure advantages? 4. On December 19. the motion is well taken. which therefore proceeded against defendant-appellant Manlolo and accused Garcia only. the decision dated November 13. who substituted for Judge Ranada. died before judgment could be rendered in the case. Wherefore. Rec. in an order which reads as follows: Finding the reasons for the motion to set aside the decision and reopen the case. Jr. was at-large and was never brought to trial. SO ORDERED. 1974 is withdrawn and set aside and the case is reopened for the purpose of re-taking of the testimony of witness Severino Perito and Felicito Mediona. (pp. and it appearing that the case was tried by the former presiding Judge of Branch XXVII and raffled to this court rendering the decision and finding merit in the allegation that the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses are conflicting. however. In the absence of clear evidence that more than three armed men acted together. Judge Jose C. (b) That circumstances exist that necessitate clarification by witness so that the interest of justice may be subserved (p. 1974.. Has conspiracy been established under the evidence of record? 2. 34. In the meantime. San Juan. M. This is a case wherein the two (2) defendants were accusing each other as the perpetrator of the crime and pointing to each other as the person who stabbed the deceased. Upon his release from the operating room. 98100. denied having stabbed Manuel. the accused Romulo Garcia. 2 Manlolo). At the same time. Salvador. The Necropsy Report No. It has been proved during the trial that all the accused were together as a group near . May aggravating circumstances provide at the trial but not alleged in the information be considered to qualify the killing to murder? 7. Upon seeing Manuel fall down. Should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied where the imposable penalty isreclusion temporal? The trial court found that: In the evening of May 7. Perito and Mediona fled and ran towards the church to get a vehicle. at about 5:30 in the morning. took down the statement of Severino Perito (Exh. Felicito Mediona and Cipriano Manuel went to Villaruel Street. When they were about to ride a jeep. it is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. At about 11:30 in the evening of the same date when the three were on their way home. but the two. stated as cause of death: shock secondary to stab wound of the chest. Perito and Mediona immediately reported to the policemen and the mobile unit proceeded to the scene of the crime and apprehended some of the accused. stabbed Manuel hitting him on the chest. On May 8. upon reaching the corner of Villaruel and Harrison Streets. One of these. In spite of the medical assistance given at the PGH. Manuel died the next day. Severino Perito. at about 6:45 in the morning. who took an autopsy on the body of the deceased Cipriano Manuel. Let Us now examine the facts to determine whether or not the accused or assailants were animated by one and the same purpose. a group of five persons coming from behind the police outpost rushed at the trio. (pp. Would it be correct to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of homicide simply because of the concurrence of two aggravating circumstances? 6.5. on the occasion of the local community fiesta as quests of Baltazar Manuel. Appellant denies conspiracy. Manuel was given by the attending physician a 50-50 chance to live. someone threw a big rock at the group. NBI. same investigator took down the statement of Felicito Mediona (Exh. Rollo) Both defendant-appellant Manlolo and accused Garcia did not deny their presence at the scene of the crime. an investigating officer at the Pasay City Police Department. Orlando V. N-72-885 issued by Dr. The stone hit Perito on the head and as his companions came to assist him. a mobile unit of the Pasay City Police Department arrived. another person stabbed Perito and hit him on the right thigh. 1972. Medico-Legal Officer. Sgt. 1-Manlolo). According to appellant simultaneous action does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of wills nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals and it is not enough that the attack be joint and simultaneous. Pasay City. Perito and Mediona brought the wounded Manuel at the Philippine General Hospital where he was operated on and treated. a cousin of Cipriano. while the others started throwing rocks at the trio. Earlier. who did not deny being with the group that assaulted the victim. tsn. Bautista (28 SCRA 184) that there is an intention to cause death if the accused throws a stone at the victims. the group of the accused threw stones at the victim and his companions. 1973). He and his group followed the victim and his companions when they retreated. the others were throwing rocks and stones at their victims. It is therefore evident that the aggravating circumstances of band and abuse of superior strength were present in the commission . 18-24. Zea 130 SCRA 77). they are guilty of conspiracy. and their acts. On the other hand. February 21. Neither did they deny having been with the group that assaulted the victims. tsn. some of the companions of the appellant continued throwing stones at the victim and his companions (pp.. Mediona and Manuel as they were walking along the street... 37. 318). the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses. Apropos to this. appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective strength to overpower their relatively weaker victims who were not armed. 11. Such testimony was corroborated by the testified of the other accused. and Severino Espiritu (pp. 7 and 19. 28-29. concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.. that when Manuel and Mediona approached Perito to assist him. When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object. Where the accused cooperated with the other co-accused in bringing about the death of the victim and the evidence showed that by their very acts during and after the commission of the crime. 1973. Romulo Garcia. In following the victim. Severino Perito and Mediona then "rushed" Manuel away from the scene but the appellant and his companions followed the victim and his group. 1973) attacked the victim and his companions by stabbing them (pp.. who also testimony fled that it was the appellant who stabbed the victim (pp. 57 SCRA 308.. 18-19. pp.the police outpost at the corner of Villaruel and Harrison Streets. The most damaging evidence was the testimony of Matilde Dalida. wherein the act of one is the act of all. February 21." Both accused did not deny their presence at the scene of the crime. though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative. it was shown by the evidence that more than five (pp. February 22. Cortez. February 21 1973) established that appellant stabbed the victim. tsn. with Garcia and Manlolo armed with knives.12. who unerringly pointed to the appellant as the one who stabbed the victim on the chest (pp. that one of them threw stones at the trio composed of Perito. 13-14. 1973). tsn. with a view to the attainment of the same object. Being superior in number and armed with knives and stones. the court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in conspiracy (People vs. that at the same time that Garcia and Manlolo were assaulting Manuel and his companions. The evidence established that appellant was one of the five persons who simultaneously rushed and surrounded the victim and his companions. We now come to appellant's next assignment of error. The evidence also shows that after Cipriano Manuel was stabbed. August 20. 11. tsn. 19-20. tsn. p. indicating closeness of personal association. 1973). We held in the case of People vs. he fell. While We fully concur that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is not present. that one of the stones thrown by the group of the accused hit Perito on the head. 39. (People vs.. February 2.. 1973). 1973). tsn. February 27. February 21. February 2. Furthermore. and they fled together from the scene of the crime after pursuing the victims. 1973. 1973) or about ten persons (pp. tsn. We however find that the aggravating circumstances of band and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. tsn. Noteworthy is the fact that previous to this. and 44.. Appellant was one of those who stabbed the victim. the Court declared that "it had found that the two accused were participants in the assault and they were with the group that assaulted the victim. a defense witness. one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it. February 21. they were acting in concert. Felicito Mediona (pp. 18 and 43. tsn. It has not been shown that accused or his companions purposely sought nighttime to better accomplish their purpose. thus including stone under the term arms in the phrase "more than 3 armed malefactors acted together". the group rushed at the trio.. While the lower court did not state in its decision who stabbed the victim. 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. and considering further the Indeterminate Sentence Law. appellant also claims that "the Court . The Lawphil Project . Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson). SO ORDERED.. Padilla.Arellano Law Foundation . JJ.. For the crime of homicide. Sarmiento and Regalado. 64 par. considering however the presence of two aggravating circumstances. In another assignment of error.000.00 conformably with established precedents. We find accused-appellant Arcillo Manlolo GUILTY.. the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of reclusion temporal (Art. (Art. 249. and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P30. WHEREFORE. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances. Manlolo the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in the crime of Homicide and in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.' We find merit in his contention. erred in imposing upon defendantappellant. 6 Revised Penal Code).of the crime. concur. We hereby imposed an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years. the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law in its maximum period. Revised Penal Code).