Chia Khin Sze v MB Selangor [1958] MLJ 105Issues Whether the Constitution gives a right to be defended by Counsel in this case? Facts This was a case under the Restricted Residence Enactment to be allowed representation by counsel. Witnesses were called at an inquiry to be held under that Enactment. The respondent in exercise of the powers in section 2(i) of the Enactment had issued a warrant for the arrest and detention of the applicant, and he deemed a further inquiry to be necessary. The form of the further inquiry was one to be held in camera without the person concerned being represented by counsel. Held The court held that such the fundamental liberty envisaged under the Constitution “was intended to be merely declaratory of existing laws and not mandatory right. A right to be defended by counsel presupposes a right to be heard. The respondent was under no obligation to hold an inquiry, therefore the applicant had no right to be heard, and he could not have the right to be defended by counsel; In this case, as the fundamental liberty under the Constitution Article 5 was intended to be merely declaratory of existing law. Article 5(4) of the Constitution is intended to apply to arrests under the Criminal Procedure Code and not to arrests under the Restricted Residence Enactment. Similarly, clause (3) of Article 5 of the Constitution does not apply to cases under the Restricted Residence Enactment. Surinder Singh Kanda v Govt of Malaya [1962] 1 MLJ 169 Issues Whether the hearing by adjudicating officer was vitiated by Insp. Kanda not being given any opportunity of correcting or contradicting the report? Facts The plaintiff, who was an Inspector in the Royal Federation of Malaya Police Force, first appointed on probation in 1951 and permanently appointed to the rank of Inspector on June 1, 1953. He was dismissed by the Commissioner of Police On July 7, 1958. Having exhausted his departmental rights of appeal, he commenced these proceedings on October 1, 1959. He asked for a declaration and other consequential reliefs stating that his purported dismissal on July 7, 1958 was void and inoperative and of no effect and that he was still a member of the said Police Force as it was effected without him being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard (at the board of inquiry held by the Police Force) and that this was Contrary to art. 135(2) of the Constitution and natural justice. Held The court held that in art. 144(1), the words "subject to the provisions of any existing law" meant only that the Police Service Commission shall operate pursuant to existing laws which are not in conflict with the Constitution. In case of conflict between existing law and the Constitution the latter must prevail and as such it is necessary for the Court to modify the existing law under the authority of art. 162. The Police Service Commission was the authority to appoint an officer of appellant's rank; therefore under art. 135(1) it was the authority to dismiss him. The Commissioner of Police was without such authority. The right to be heard carries with the right of the accused to know the case made against him and he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them. The dismissal was void. Whether the power to detain has been exercised mala fide and in consequence the grounds for his arrest are not reasonable? Fact This is an application by Aminah binti Haji Mamat.Aminah v Superintendent of Prison [1968] 1 MLJ 92 Issues 1. or alternatively of getting the latter to visit the prison amounts to “other sufficient cause” for the detainee himself not filing the affidavit in support of an application for habeas corpus. the detainee a few hours after his arrest he was fully informed by the police and knew the reasons for his arrest. Whether the detention is non-compliance with article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution in that the detainee had not been informed “as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest”? 2. this satisfied the requirement of article 5(3) of the Constitution which applies to arrest made under any law including Restricted Residence Enactment in this case. Kelantan. who is at the moment being detained at the Pengkalan Chepa Prison. . Haron bin Jaffar. Held The court dismissed the application for 2 reason. Firstly. Secondly. the inconvenience and possible delay in either getting him before a commissioner of oaths. Thus the applicant in this case failed to discharge the onus cast upon her which is to prove the detention order was exercised improperly. for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of her husband. Assa Singh v MB Johore [1969]2 MLJ 30 Issues 1. Whether the Enactment is contrary to the Constitution and. In addition. therefore its provisions are not inconsistent with article 9 of the Constitution. if so whether it is void? 2. The court also held that the delegation by the Minister of his powers under the Enactment is a valid one and the Mentri Besar can therefore validly exercise all the powers and duty of the Minister under section 2 of the Enactment. Johore under section 2(i) of the Restricted Residence Enactment in exercise of the powers purported to be delegated to him by the Minister of Interior and Justice. the Enactment does not have provisions similar to those of clauses (3) and (4) of article 5 of the Constitution but this does not make it unconstitutional. but it must be applied with such adaptations as may be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution. Held The Court dismissed the application and held that Restricted Residence Enactment is a law relating to public security. despite such inconsistency with the Constitution the Enactment is in force. 1968 in pursuance of a warrant issued by the Menteri Besar. . It was argued in this case that the Enactment has no provision thus it was submitted that the provisions of the Enactment were inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 and 9 of the Constitution. Whether the power of Minister to make order on subjective belief can be delegated? Fact The applicant was arrested on and has been under detention since 1st September. Article 4 does not come into operation to strike down a law as being void upon the ground of being inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Whether the court may apply the pre-Merdeka law with modification to bring that provision of the pre-Merdeka law into accord with the Federal Constitution? 2. Furthermore. Section 133 to 136 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be declared to be null and void. The applicable provision is Article 162(6) of Federal Constitution which requires the court to make modifications to the law to make it accord with the Federal Constitution. The applicant applied for questions of constitutional law to be referred to the High Court. the court also held that since the Criminal Procedure Code is a preMerdeka law. The magistrate ordered the summons be issued against the applicant whereby he was charged for an offence under Section 352 of the Penal Code. which term includes amendment.Datuk Seri Samy Vellu v S Nadarajah [2000] 4 MLJ 696 Issues 1. . Held The court held that the mere fact that the Criminal Procedure Code is a preMerdeka law does not mean that it is necessarily inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. adaptation and repeal as may be necessary to bring the provision of the pre-Merdeka law into accord with the Federal Constitution. The court may apply the pre-Merdeka law with such modifications. Whether pre-Merdeka law which is inconsistency with the Federal Constitution can be declared null and void? Facts The respondent made a complaint on oath before the magistrate against the applicant. Thus. it is a pre-Merdeka provision. The second defendant was a public limited company in the business of road construction. were settled peoples. The way in which Section 12 of Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 is to be brought into conformity with the Constitution is to make it yield to Article 13(2) of the Federal Constitution. That is achieved by not reading the words ‘the State Authority may grant compensation therefor’ as conferring a discretion on the State Authority whether to grant compensation or not. The first defendant acquired the land and the defendants evicted the plaintiffs from the land. Held As regards to the Section 12 of Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 . in Bukit Tampoi (‘the land’). Whether the Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 as pre-Merdeka legislation must be interpreted in a modified way to fit in with Federal Constitution? 2. Therefore. the court was dealing with the nature of customary title and the plaintiffs had been occupying the lands for at least 210 years until the state government acquired them. the court held that it must be interpreted in a modified way so that it fits in with the Federal Constitution.Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v Sagong bin Tasi & Ors [2005] 6 MLJ 289 Issues 1. Part of the land settled upon by the plaintiffs was gazetted as Aboriginal land under the Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 (‘the 1954 Act’). The plaintiffs were aboriginal peoples of the Temuan tribe. The defendants appealed. The High Court granted the plaintiffs compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (‘the 1960 Act’) for loss of part of land which the judge found to have been held under customary title. The first defendant was the State Government of Selangor. For otherwise it would render Section 12 of the Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 violative of Article 13(2) of Federal Constitution and . who by their customand tradition. A large strip across all this land was excised for the purpose of an expressway which the second defendant was to construct. The third defendant was the Malaysian Highway Authority. Whether acquisition of aboriginal lands must be adequately compensated according to Land Acquisition Act 1960 ? Fact In this case. . the court held that adequate compensation should be done on the basis of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 because the Land Acquisition Act 1960 by definition applies to the plaintiffs’ case.the modification is complete .. The learned judge by adopting a liberal interpretation was merely giving full effect to Article 8(5)(c) of the Federal Constitution which sanctions positive discrimination in favour of the aborigines . Furthermore. the relevant the words ‘(State Authority) may (grant compensation)’ in Section 12 of Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 should be read as ‘shall’ and by introducing ‘adequate’ before compensation. Therefore.void because it will be a law that provides for the compulsory acquisition of property without adequate compensation. Since the state law is invalidated to the extend of any inconsistency therein with a federal law by article 75. Besides that.as the case may be. Held The court held that the law was null and void as refer to article 75 of Federal Constitution which states that any state law that is inconsistence with the Federal Constitution shall be void up to is inconsistency and federal law shall prevail.City Council of George Town v Government of Penang [1967]1 MLJ 169 Issue Whether Federal Court has jurisdiction on declaring state enactment void? Facts The subject argue that the laws made by Government of Penang. . which are City Council of George Town Order 1966 and Municipal (Amendment) Enactment 1966 contravene to the Local Government Enactment Act 1960 (Act 11/1960) of the federation.An application was made on behalf of the respondents for an order to dismiss the petitions on the ground that Federal Court has no jurisdiction in the matter.Article 128 (1) (a) of the Federal Constitution gives Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine any question whether a law made by Parliament or the legislature of a state is invalid on the ground that it makes provision with respect to a matter to which Parliament.notwithstanding even that the state law maybe within the competency of the state legislature.an order will be made to invalidate the inconsistent state enactment.the legislature of a state has no powers to makes law. Thus Section 418 A of Criminal Procedure Code as it is worded and as it stands is therefore unconstitutional and void by the virtue of provisions of Article 8 of Federal Constitution and equally so the certificates issued by the public prosecutor for the transfer of the case is accordingly no effect.the punishment will be greater than in Session Court. . In this case the accused have been prejudiced as if they are tried in High Court.Counsel of accused contented that the provisions violated the Article 8 (1) of Federal Constitution and was therefore void and unconstitutional.[1977] 1 MLJ 180 Issues Whether Section 418 A of Criminal Procedure Code is unconstitutional and void? Facts The case was transferred from Session Court to High court on the certificates issue by Public Prosecutor under the provisions of Section 418 A of Criminal Procedure Code.While the public prosecutor cannot in exercising his discretionary power discriminate at will and infringe the provisions of Article 8 of Federal Constitution. Held In this case Section 418 A of Criminal Procedure Code conferred discretionary power on the authority without laying down the any policy or disclosing any tangible or intelligible purpose and thus conferred unguided and arbitrary powers enabling the authority to discriminate which violated the Article 8 of Federal Constitution.Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun Idris [1976] 2 MLJ 116. Teng Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458 Issues 1. Whether Attorney General’s decision to prefer charges under Internal Security Act unconstitutional? Facts On June 13. 1 Ordinance authorizing the continuation of the exercise of the rulers law – making powers lapsed when Parliament sat on February 20. the defendant was found in Penang in possession of a revolver and ammunition. The unlawful possession of firearms was also an offence contrary to the Arms Act 1960. the provisions of the No. 1976. 1971. the Security Cases Regulations were ultra vires the constitution and void and the defendant’s trial was a nullity. The unlawful possession of fire arms and ammunition if in a security area was a security offence contrary to section 57 (1) of the Internal Security Act 1960. Malaysian Bar v Government of Malaysia [1986] 2 MLJ 225 . He was convicted and appealed. and the ruler had no power after that date to alter criminal procedure code. The Attorney General in his capacity as public prosecutor decided to prosecute the defendant under the Internal Security Act 1960 and the defendant was charged accordingly and tried by special procedure provided for by the Security Cases Regulations. and that. Held The Federal Court allowed the appeal on the grounds that the ruler had power under article 150 (2) of the constitution to legislate in an emergency only while parliament was not sitting and that although by the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1964 Parliament had validly delegated to the ruler a power to make a emergency laws it had done so only in respect of the 1964 emergency which had been impliedly revoked by proclamation of the 1969 emergency. therefore. that. accordingly. Whether ruler’s emergency law making power self – extendable? 2. 1978 is ultra vires Article 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing freedom of association and therefore void under Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution. one of the objects of section 46A of the Legal Profession Act 1976 is clearly stated that the affairs of the Bar be managed by members of the Legal Profession who are not only professionally independent but appear to the outside world. 1978. Whether the question of freedom of association arise when prevent a lawyer from being member of the Bar? Facts The fact of the case was about the declaration sought by plaintiff in the originating summons: a) That section 46(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act. 1976 as introduced by the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act. the court says that it also seems to be the object of section 46A of the Legal Profession Act 1976. Hence the provision that lawyers who are members of Parliament or any of the State Legislatures or local authorities or hold office in any trade union or political party or organizations of a political nature are disqualified from holding office in the Bar Council or Committees. Whether there are discrimination about the disqualification of the lawyers who are members of Parliament or any of the State Legislatures or local authorities or hold office in any trade union or political party or organizations of a political nature? 2. . b) That section 46A(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act. For the second issue. Whether there are discrimination against junior lawyer in the management of bar? 3. 1976 as introduced by the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act. unreasonable and if there is no nexus between the law and the objects of the amending act. The provisions (Section 46A(1)(b) and (c) in Legal Profession Act 1976) apply to all lawyers and are therefore not discriminatory.Issues 1. is ultra vires Article (1) of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing equality before the law and equal protection of the law and therefore void under Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution. For the first issue. Held The court held that it is common ground that a law is bad if it is discriminating. Menon v Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 642 . 1976. The powers and functions of the Bar Council and State Bar Committees as provided by the Act must clearly be exercised by senior members of the profession and the disqualification from membership of these bodies by junior members is not unreasonable. is not ultra vires Article 10(1)(c) and therefore not void under Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution. nowhere in section 46A is there a provision to prevent a lawyer from being a member of the Bar.For the last issue.to ensure that the management of the Bar is in the hands of senior members of the profession. Moreover. The question of freedom of association therefore does not arise. The words "or of any committee of the Bar Council or a Bar Committee" appearing in the section in so far as it affects paragraph (a) thereof is ultra vires Article 8(1) and is therefore void under Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution but the remaining provisions are not ultra vires or void under the Federal Constitution. Section 46A(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act. [2008] 1 MLJ 277 Issues . in so far however as section 46A(1) applies to any Committee of the Bar Council or a Bar Committee the provision has gone more than a little too far and is unreasonable. Held The court dismissed the appeal of respondent and held that there can be no doubt that s 1(2) of the Pensions Adjustment Act 1980 is discriminatory against foreign-resident pensioners. but the classification between foreign and local resident-pensioners is founded on an intelligible differentia. India. Whether there are discrimination from s1(2) of the Pensions Adjustment Act 1980 against foreign-resident pensioner? 2. the residential qualification imposed by the Act constitutes a permissible discrimination and therefore does not violate the equality provision of art 8(1) and as such it is not null and void under art 4(1) of the Federal Constitution. Public Prosecutor v Datuk Yap Peng (1987) 2 MLJ 311 Issue .1. He is a pensioner receiving pension from the Malaysian government and he is aggrieved by the residential qualification imposed by s 1(2) which excludes him and his dependants from the additional benefits conferred by the Act. Whether the permissible discrimination violates the equality provision of Article 8? Facts The fact of the case was the respondent. Mr VR Menon is an Indian citizen residing in Madras. Besides. He brought an action against the government of Malaysia seeking a declaration that he be paid his pension in accordance with the Act as any other resident pensioners in Malaysia and for other consequential reliefs. The intelligible differentia has a rational nexus with the object to be achieved by the 1980 Act which is to ameliorate the financial position of pensioners in Malaysia due to the depreciating value of the ringgit and the rise in the cost of living in Malaysia. The Supreme Court by a majority agreed with the decision of the High Court that Section 418A CPC was unconstitutional. the deputy public prosecutor tendered a certificate issued by the public prosecutor under Section 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).Whether section 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code was unconstitutional? Facts The accused was charged with criminal breach of trust in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court on Dec 19. the public prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court. his counsel argued that the transfer was unconstitutional and that Section 418A violated Articles 121(1) and 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. Mamat Bin Daud & Others Vs. He held that the power to transfer cases is an exercise of judicial power. 1987. requiring the case to be transferred to the High Court. Held Section 418A was unconstitutional because it contravenes Article 121(1). Aggrieved by that decision. When the accused was subsequently charged in the High Court on Jan 6. When the case was mentioned on Dec 29. Government Of Malaysia (1988) 1 MLJ 119 Issue . 1986. Khatib and Imam at a Friday prayer in Kuala Terengganu without being appointed under the terengganu Administration of Islamic Law Enactment. when in pith and substance it is a law on the subject of religion with respect to which only the states have power to legislate under Articles 74 and 77 of the Federal Constitution. They were alleged to have acted as an unauthorized Bilal. The respondent contended that the Section was valid because it is a law passed by Parliament on the basis of Public Order. internal security and also criminal law according to Article 11 clause (5) and items (4) of List 1 of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. Thus.Whether the said section which was enacted by the Parliament in ultra vires Article 74(1) of the Federal Constitution. Nordin Bin Salleh v Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan [1993] 3 MLJ 344 Issues . Held Section 298A of the penal code is a colourable legislation in that it pretends to be a legislation on the public order. 155. there must be a declaration that Section 298A of the Penal Code is a law with respect to which Parliament has no power to make law and a declaration that section 298A of the Penal Code is invalid and therefore null and void and of no effect. since religious matters are reserved for the state legislatures and therefore beyond the legislative competency of Parliament? Facts The petitioners were charged for an offence under section 298A of the penal code for doing an act which is likely to prejudice unity among persons professing the Islamic religion. The applicant sought leave to file proceedings for declarations that s 73 of the Kelantan Council of Religion and Malay Custom Enactment 1966 (‘the Enactment’) was invalid. the validity of the legislation was also to be challenged on the grounds that it dealt with a matter with respect to which the state legislature had no power to make the law. The court was also satisfied that the applicant had an arguable case in that the application was not frivolous. Whether leave of judge of Supreme Court is required? 2. the leave of a judge of the Supreme Court was not required.1. Furthermore. The Enactment was a post. Whether the provisions made by legislature of the state of Kelantan were beyond their power? Facts On 3 March 1993. the applicant was served with two separate summons sent by the Chief Kadi of Kelantan charging him pursuant to s 73 of the Enactment with insulting a mosque official. The two prayers were not merely grounded on the impugned law being inconsistent with the Constitution.Merdeka legislation and the intended challenge was on the competency of the Kelantan state Legislature to enact the legislation. As such. Held The court held that High Court has jurisdiction over the matter of seeking declaration that s 73 of the Enactment as void on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the provisions of article 10 (1) (a) of the constitution and not on the grounds that it dealt with a matter with respect to which the Kelantan legislature had no power to deal with. Faridah Begum Bt Abdullah v Sultan Of Pahang [1996] 1 MLJ 617 Issue . leave of a judge of the Supreme Court was required under Art 4 (4) and the applicant should be allowed to canvass his case before the full court on the constitutionality and validity of the section in the said Enactment. who was a Singaporean. If Singapore were to amend its Constitution to allow a Malaysian to sue the President on Singapore. Parliament’s legislative power was subject to the special provision of Article 155 of the Constitution. In this case. As under Singapore Constitution. Article 155 rendered Article 182(3) void to the extent that it purported to allow a non-citizen to sue a Ruler in the Special Court. the Malaysian Parliament might confer a Singaporean a similar right or privilege to sue a Ruler in Malaysia. even if Parliament were to confer the right on a Singapore citizen to sue a Ruler. to sue ruler in the latter’s personal capacity. Both parties agreed that the court should first determine a preliminary issue raised by the defendant. a Singapore citizen. Thus. sued the Sultan of Pahang in his personal capacity for alleged libel and for damages in the Special Court established under Article 182 of the Federal Constitution. Nhuang Chan Sdn Bhd v Public Prosecutor [2001] 2 MLJ 129 Issue Whether Section 28B(3) of the Trade Description Act 1972 was ultra vires Article 145 of .Whether plaintiff had the right to sue Sultan of Pahang in his personal capacity in Special Court Facts The plaintiff. a Malaysia citizen could not sue the president of the republic in any Singapore courts. Article 182(2) of the Federal Constitution did not entitle the plaintiff. such conferment was illegal and ultra vires Article 155 of the Federal Constitution. Held The court dismissed the plaintiff claim as it is in the nature of a libel suit and held that Article 74(3) of the Federal Constitution provides that the powers of the Parliament is restricted and was subject to any conditions imposed with respect to any particular matter by the Constitution. Fact A complaint was lodged by an assistant controller of trade descriptions. Section 380(ii)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) (prior to the amendment in 1998) is unconstitutional as it sought to oust the powers of the Attorney General under Section 376(1) of the CPC to control and direct all criminal prosecutions and it stands in the face of his general powers under Article 145(3) of the FC. and that the prosecution conducted was null and void. A complaint lodged by the assistant controller could be said that he did institute the proceeding.the Federal Constitution and was void to that extent. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd V Kekatong Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 MLJ 2009 Issues 1. Held The court dismissed the appeal by the respondent and allowed the cross-appeal by the appellant. the magistrate transmitted the record of proceedings to the High Court and placed before it for determination of whether Section 28B(3) of the Act which allows proceedings to be conducted by an assistant controller of trade descriptions is ultra vires Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. Section 28B(3) of the Act is ultra vires Aritcle 145(3) of the Constitution. Whether defendant can succeed in its claim under 85 Suit ? . Whatever action he took would still be considered under the ‘supervision’ of the controller which would be ‘subject to the general direction and control of the minister’ and therefore in direct conflict with Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. Before the trial was concluded. Whether a registered proprietor can caveat its own land ? 2. Therefore. void. the defendant applied in the 85 Suit for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the plaintiff and Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd from dealing with the said lands until disposal of the 85 Suit. The plaintiff now desires to have them removed. As an interim measure. Held Although the 85 Suit concerned the said lands. Whether the vesting certificate is a serious issue to be tried in this court ? 4. An order for sale was obtained by BBMB on the said lands. and of no effect. Basically. Whether the party involved can raised issues of limitation ? Fact The defendant was the registered owner of four pieces of land ('the said lands') charged to Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd ('BBMB') by way of a third party charge for a loan facilities granted to Kredin Sdn Bhd ('Kredin'). Before any success could be achieved at the public auction. the caveats were never an issue raised therein. the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Kredin failed to repay the loan to BBMB. Though without the injunction. This resulted in BBMB foreclosing on the said lands after initially issuing to the defendant the statutory notice of demand which was not satisfied.3. this action sorts to nullify the rights of these two parties over the said lands for reason that their rights are statute barred and that the vesting certificate is null. the plaintiff still faces the caveats placed by the defendant on the said lands. This motion was dismissed by the judge of first instance but on appeal. the plaintiff acquired the loan granted to Kredin and the security over the said lands from BBMB under a vesting certificate permitted under the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 ('the Danaharta Act'). the defendant filed a motion to set aside the order for sale on the ground that Form 16D of the National Land Code ('the NLC') was not served on the defendant's registered address. On the 7 May 1999. It is only when the caveats are specifically raised or made an issue then under O . it would be more appropriate to proceed by way of summons in chamber. [2008] 1 MLJ 1 Issues 3. Moreover. The registered owner of land could not enter caveat on its own land and defendant could not bring a claim of limitation against the plaintiff based on the circumstances of the case because limitation was merely a defence to an action and could not be a cause of action. Public Prosecutor v Koh Wan Kuan [2007] 5 MLJ 174 . there were other factors not considered by the Court of Appeal which now appear in the instant application in deciding whether there was a serious question to be tried.32d of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Federal Court discharged the injunction granted by the Court of Appeal must be viewed as having accepted a ruling that there was no serious question to be tried and that the Court of Appeal's ruling of there being one was erroneous. The plaintiff fell within the category of an aggrieved party under s 327 of the National Land Code since the presence of the caveats had wrongfully affected the plaintiff's title to the said lands and the plaintiff would suffer loss as the lands with caveat were less attractive in the property market. Whether doctrine of separation of powers is definite and absolute? . Whether constitutional provision may be struck out on the ground that it contravenes the doctrine of separation of powers? 5. He was ordered to be detained during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong pursuant to s 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 (Act 611) ('the Child Act'). The amendment to art 121(1) should by no means be read to mean that the doctrines of separation of powers and independence of the Judiciary are now no more the basic features of the Federal Constitution. Dissenting with regard to the view that the High Court's powers and jurisdiction are solely prescribed by federal law. The Deputy Public Prosecutor appealed to the Federal Court. Similarly. A provision of the Constitution cannot be struck out on the ground that it contravenes the doctrine. The extent of its application varies from country to country. The amendment did not . He appealed to the Court of Appeal which upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence imposed on him on the ground that s 97(2) of the Child Act was unconstitutional. Whether the powers and jurisdiction is prescribed solely by federal law? Facts The fact of the case was the child respondent in this appeal was convicted in the High Court for murder punishable under s 302 of the Penal Code. judgments from other jurisdictions. The court held that the doctrine of separation of powers is not definite and absolute. depending on how much it is accepted and in what manner it is provided for by the Constitution of a country. while they are useful comparisons. contains features which do not strictly comply with the doctrine. To what extent the doctrine applies depends on the provisions of the Constitution. The Malaysian Constitution has features of the doctrine of the separation of powers and at the same time. The doctrine is not a provision of the Malaysian Constitution even though it influenced the framers of the Malaysian Constitution. Held The court allowed the appealed. even though it may be inconsistent with the doctrine.4. Similarly no provision of the law may be struck out as unconstitutional if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. should not be treated as if they are binding on the Malaysian courts. cause the courts to become servile agents of a Federal Act of Parliament and to only perform mechanically any command or bidding of a federal law. Public Prosecutor v Syarikat Tekala Sdn Bhd [2007] 6 MLJ 500 Issues 4. Whether s 68 of the Employment Provident Fund Act 1991 and s 380(ii)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code were ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and were void to that extent? Facts . All the charges related to offences alleged to have been committed before 1 April 1998. Held The court dismissed the appeal. At the close of the respondent's case. the proceedings instituted and conducted by the EPF in the magistrate court was null and void. . Section 373 of the CPC came into force on 1 April 1998. The prosecution's authority to institute and conduct the proceedings against the respondent in the magistrates court in the instant appeal were governed by s 380(ii)(b) of the CPC prior to its amendment by Act A1015 and s 68of the Act prior to its deletion by Act A1080. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. four additional charges were preferred against the respondent and the respondent also claimed trial to these additional charges. a summons was issued by the magistrate and three charges were preferred against the respondent. The magistrate held that the institution of the proceedings against the respondent for offences under the Act and the conduct of the prosecution was invalid and struck off the proceedings. The respondent claimed trial to the charges. The appellant appealed to the High Court. An EPF officer conducted the prosecution of the case with a letter of authorization issued by the deputy public prosecutor pursuant to s 373 of the Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC').The fact of the case was a complaint was made against the respondent in relation to offences under s 43(2) of the Employment Provident Fund Act 1991 ('the Act'). The High Court upheld the decision of the magistrate and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter. Therefore. The two provisions were ultra vires or inconsistent with art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and hence by virtue of art 4(1) of the Federal Constitution were void to the extent of their inconsistency. failure by an employer to pay monthly EPF contributions in respect of or on behalf of an employee. Pursuant to the complaint. a preliminary objection was raised that the prosecution of the case was ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and was null and void on the grounds that officers of the EPF do not have the authority to institute and conduct the proceedings.