Consti II Midterm Digest USC

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIRM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 1 - POLICE POWER - WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER? GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005 MMDA vs. GARIN FACTS:  Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver‘s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver‘s license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver‘s license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? HELD:  The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.  Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same.  There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to ―enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.‖ It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People‘s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature. LAWS GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 BALACUIT vs. CFI FACTS:  Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes ―any person group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.‖  The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.  Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court but was later on denied. ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalid exercise of police power. HELD:  (A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.  The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.  Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.  WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory. 146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ FACTS: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. HELD:  The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.  The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 2  The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989 DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON FACTS:  This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein the Supreme Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto.  The said law requires the use of generic terminology or generic names in writing prescriptions by medical, dental, and veterinary doctors. Government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies are likewise obliged to use generic names ―in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines‖. Certain penalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of the law. ISSUE: WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing Administrative Order No. 62 are unconstitutional. HELD:  The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost"(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).  There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. 152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987 TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ FACTS:  The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.  Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: "SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."  The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x x x (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;‖  Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.‖  MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.  The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 3 the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.  MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.  WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007 CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL FACTS:  Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the ―Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.‖ On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;  The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.  The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.  The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.  Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount. ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1. HELD:  The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.  The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.  The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as ―the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.‖ It is ―[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.‖ CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 4 ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES 20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA FACTS: Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice- Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void. HELD:  A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.  Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.  It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. 123 SCRA 569 (1983) CRUZ vs. PARAS FACTS: Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed on November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction. They contended that the enforcement of Municipal Ordinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of licenses to operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has no power to prohibit a lawful business and that such ordinance is violative to their right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in the name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses HELD: Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted that the municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. 120 SCRA 568 (1983) VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS FACTS: Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinic CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 5 separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To prevent immorality which might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional. HELD: Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such law is a police power measure. This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. 234 SCRA 255 (1994) MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES FACTS:  On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayan de Oro City and to this end leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties. Upon announcement of the opening of the casino, several organization in the said area objected, including Cagayan de Oro‘s sangguniang panglungsod who later enacted Ordinance no. 3353. Such ordinance was entitled, AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Less than a month from the passage of such ordinance, the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro adopted a sterner ordinance no. 3375-93 which was an AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFORE.  Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervener and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before the court in this petition for review. ISSUE/S: 1. WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. 2. WON the Local Government Code should prevail over and above an existing statute (in this case PD1869) HELD:  First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.  Although it is true that local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it should be understood that, obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.  On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.  Lastly, The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.  WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997 ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES FACTS:  15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside the city from 1993-1998.  22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It authorized officers to inspect cargoes containing live fish and lobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose of the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayor‘s permit issued by their office.  19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 yrs.  he respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all the fishermen, marine merchants, and shippers of the entire province of their only means of livelihood.  The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC arguing as follows: 1. It deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, violating Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor‘s permit could be granted or denied; ie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the permit. 3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways.  The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the Provincial Government‘s power under the general welfare clause (Sec. 16 of the LGC). The Ordinance, they argued, only covered live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and excluded those not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 years. The court must also distinguish between catching live fish and selling it live and those who have no intention at all of selling it live. ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of powers under the LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment are a valid exercise of the police power of a municipal corporation. HELD: Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.  Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC ―shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community.  The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees, or charges for their use.  The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 6 welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants.  The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to this is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. The term ―municipal waters‖ includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r] LGC).  Two principal objectives of the Ordinances: 1. Establish a ―closed season‖ for the species of fish covered therein for 5 years (This falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters); 2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the province from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities (this falls within the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate there to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which harm the environment. G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005 CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. FACTS:  Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.  On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the lower court praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8  MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community."  The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns, massage parlors, beer houses, nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area.  MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: 1. The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments 2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions 3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected 4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment 5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and 6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.  Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.  Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power.  Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private respondents and declared the Ordinance null and void.  Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 31 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.  Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. 34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a valid exercise of police power. HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the operation of motels and inns within the Ermita-Malate area.  The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.  The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges.  It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.  Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not even under the guise of police power. G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO. FACTS:  Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 7 1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller. 2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.  Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal. ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power HELD: Yes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power.  EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. 201 SCRA 13 PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION FACTS:  A complaint for specific performance was filed by respondent against Teofilo & Rollo Almendras (both deceased and substituted by petitioner) for violating a Bel-Air Subdivision restriction that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes, and for non-payment of association dues to BAVA (respondent)  Deceased petitioners were the registered owners of the property while Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of ―Hot Pan de Sal Store‖ located in the same address.  The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent which was affirmed by the CA  Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. WON the ruling of respondent CA is in accordance with a recent consolidated decision of the SC which applies in the case at bar in favor of the petitioner 2. WON the ruling of the CA adjudging the petitioner solidarily liable together with the Almendrases (deceased) to pay the alleged unpaid association dues is patently contrary to the evidence and facts 3. WON respondent court adjudging petitioner solidarily liable to pay attorney‘s fees is without any legal or factual basis Note: During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V. Lacson. HELD:  The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt with in the consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgated on December 22, 1988 Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court, etc.  Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court.  The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner.  But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary.  With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55, the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic.  The demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual basis.  Petition granted. GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004 PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CA FACTS:  Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name of its successor, the Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into two parcels  LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate  CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into three phases and secured a locational clearance for the project from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC  CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Project but the project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction  The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of their farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of the property  In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals  Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI  CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are farmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River  According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activities would convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural land, thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancy rights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the bulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or a status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same. ISSUES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 8 1. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); 2. whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent; 3. whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit; 4. whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners- members of the PBFAI; and 5. whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363. HELD:  The contention of the petitioners has no merit.  Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non- agricultural or residential land.  With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members.  Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof and for damages.  When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven (37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same.  Petition denied. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES & REGULATIONS 127 SCRA 329, 1984 BAUTISTA vs. JUNIO FACTS:  This prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution as it was provided in LOI 869 that the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday."  It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the fact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 ― the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is constitutional HELD:  'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.'  It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them.  In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked.  Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.  Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, this Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality.  Petition dismissed. 119 SCRA 597, 1982 TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT FACTS: On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 phasing out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify Memorandum Circular 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a ―Manifestation and Urgent Motion‖, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same Board a ―Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition‖ praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 9 with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON the implementation and enforcement of Memorandum Circular 77-42 violates the petioner‘s constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. HELD:  Regarding the and Substantive Due Process, Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. In fact, the same is also implemented in Cebu City. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.  The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society may also regulate property rights the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 MIRASOL VS. DPWH FACTS:  Petitioners filed before the trial court a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of Department Order (DO) 74, DO 215 and the TRB Regulations contravene RA 2000. Petitioners also sought to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) unconstitutional.  Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities. Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila- Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways). DO 123, as petitioner contends, is violative of equal protection clause of the constitution.  Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003. ISSUE: WHETHER or not AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. HELD:  Under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.  Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void. DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.  Furthermore, the assailed portion of AO 1 states that on limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle not motorized. Petitioners attacked this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers. The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.  AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 10 certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules.  The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways.  However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" are arguments reserved for the Legislature‘s discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case to be so.  AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners‘ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one‘s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way.  Petitioners‘ reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced. Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be conclusively justified by research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the government‘s act is reasonable and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no government will be able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up conducting studies.  A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law. Petitioners‘ attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail. Petitioners‘ contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is not prohibited.  A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As explained by Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio: x x x To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.  The real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four- wheeled vehicle. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.  Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to travel.  A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.  The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.  Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone. 11/30/09  Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver‘s license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver‘s license issued by the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles.  Therefore, the petition was partly granted. DOs 74, 215 and 123 of the DPWH and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board were declared void AO 1 of the DOTC valid. 124 SCRA 494, 1983 ANGLO-FIL TRADING VS. LAZARO FACTS: 23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services, Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 11 Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service, Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc. [PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May 1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management and Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs‘ policy of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which, among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by the President‘s memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18 April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contract for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among the existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to award an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided, among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980, the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders ―in view of the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the countervailing public interest involved.‖ On 1 September 1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice to the Court‘s resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to the lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSI‘s holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at South Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations implemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of property rights. HELD: From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard the parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after hearing the parties‘ evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating merely on ―hold-over‖ permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permits were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI‘s and Anglo-Fil et.al.‘s authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact. G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE INC. (CISAI) FACTS:  Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857 and is tasked to implement an integrated program for the planning, development, financing, and operation of ports and port districts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, and porterage business, including cargo handling and hauling services in Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since 1976, CISAI had been granted permits to operate the cargo handling operations in Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-year contract to CISAI to pursue its business endeavor. Upon this time, PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for the awarding of cargo handling services through public bidding.  Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able to continue with its business by virtue of hold-over permits given by PPA. During this time, another administrative order PPA AO No. 03-2000 took effect which amended PPA AO no. 03-90 expressly provided that all contract for cargo handling services of more than 3 years shall be awarded through public bidding. CISAI initiated an action for specific performance, injunction with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, contending that PPA‘s action was I derogation of their vested right over the operation of cargo handling enterprise. The lower court granted CISAI‘s prayer for a temporary restraining order. PPA filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial court setting aside the injunctive writ. CISAI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and the CA granted the petition, ordering PPA to desist from conducting the scheduled public bidding for cargo handling operations in the port of Dumaguete. Thus, this instant appeal. ISSUE: WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handling operations at the Dumaguete Port. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 12 HELD:  Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargo handling operations because the continuance of their business was due to hold over permits given by PPA, and such may be revoked anytime by the granting authority. As held in the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits are merely temporary subject to the policy and guidelines as may be implemented by the authority granting it. Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the state‘s police power, therefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may have acquired must necessarily give way to valid exercise of police power. PPA, being created for the purpose of promoting the growth of regional port bodies, it is empowered to make port regulations. With this mandate, the decision to bid out cargo holding services is properly within the province and discretion of PPA. As for CISAI‘s claim that PPA AO No. 03-2000 violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it to state that all contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Wherefore, Petition is granted. G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE FACTS:  Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the ― Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of Firearms Outside of Residence‖ issued by PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence (PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines. Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his constitutional right to life and to protect life as he, being a law- abiding licensed gun-owner is the only class subject to the implementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF, hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched. Petitioner also averred that ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected property rights which cannot be taken away without due process of law. ISSUES: 1. WON the citizens‘ right to bear arms is a constitutional right 2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of right to property 3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Police power HELD: 1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision on bearing arms as a constitutional right. The right to bear arms, then, is a mere statutory privilege unlike in the American Constitution which was the law invoked by petitioner. Right to bear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by the laws passed to regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importation of firearms; it cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. 2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. A license is merely a privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the granting authority and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor does it create a vested right. Such license may be revoked anytime when the authority deems it fit to do so, and such revocation does not deprive the holder of any property, or immunity. 3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus:  The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and  The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to disturb the peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of guidelines is the interest of the public in general. Such means of revocation is, thus, a valid exercise of police power.  Petition is hereby dismissed. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 13 - EMINENT DOMAIN - WHO EXERCISES THE POWER? GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919 CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY FACTS:  The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said City raying that certain lands described therein, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contend that there are other parcels of land offered for such improvement proposed by the City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel of land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents also averred that the City of Manila will have to spend a great deal amount of money in the relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres, tombstones and monuments of those affected by the expropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery. The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. The City of Manila appealed contending that under the law, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire and neither the court not the land owners can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning the necessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved. ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation? HELD:  Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that ― the govt. of the Phil islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec. 242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned together with the interest of each defendant separately.). Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that when the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public; and 2.whether the land is public or private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St. through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will answer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then, still being under care and maintenance of the living should be spared from such expropriation where there are other lands offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve the same purpose. The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed. 268 SCRA 368 (1997) MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:  On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities."  In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."  The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.  On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.  Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. Petitioners' motion for recon was denied by the trial court. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for recon.  Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: 2 wooden structures, and one made of concrete. ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the right to eminent domain, since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89. HELD:  On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from further constructing any building on the land subject of this petition.  Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order.  Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan.  Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 14  The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are those available lots.'" Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the CA.  Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.  The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.  Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. ― (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.  (2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.  Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.  As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.  The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.  After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.  WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED. GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006 MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG FACTS:  Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.  In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.  Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."  On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."  In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner‘s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."  Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners.  On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and on May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.  Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the trial CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 15 court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. On October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.  Petitioner‘s Motion for Recon was denied. ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. HELD:  Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.  In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.  The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus: "SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property."  Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.  The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that "necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit."  Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner‘s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the basis for the passage of the Ordinance authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non- profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner‘s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.  WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig, is DISMISSED. GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004 LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA FACTS:  In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then CFI.  On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and on June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners.  After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that squatters already occupied it. Thus, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The MTCC, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC‘s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.  However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor‘s request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.  On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 16 unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.  In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes. ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws. HELD:  Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160: SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. － A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).  Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners‘ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.  There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute.  The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners‘ property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners‘ property as the site of a socialized housing project.  RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide: SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. － Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).  SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. － The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).  In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the above- quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.  We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners‘ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners‘ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners‘ right to due process.  It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners‘ lot. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.  For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.  Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate: first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160; second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance; third, the fact that petitioners‘ small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 17 reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances. G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005 JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property. FACTS:  The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho.  On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality‘s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a  complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged that it already notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion.  The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff‘s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.  In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.  JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiff‘s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it.  The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.  The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of- way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle portion of the petitioner‘s entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.  During the trial, the plaintiff presented witnesses, who were residents of the town, testifying that it was they who requested for the construction of the road.  The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents who counterclaimed that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos Street.  On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.  Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.  In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The appellate court upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks.  Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article 33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which regards the ―construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks‖ as public use, purpose or welfare. ISSUE: WON the subject property which is intended to be used for public purposes may be expropriated by the respondent. HELD: No, the subject property, although intended for public cannot be expropriated by the Municipality of Pasig.  The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner‘s property and not elsewhere.  As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified.  The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. In this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.  IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007 SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of the Philippines) FACTS:  The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and were part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5 September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government.  Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 18 cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933- B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant- appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.  On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant- appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because it was not its lawful owner.  In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation  On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that SRRDC's ownership is borne out by the original owner's title to Lot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees‘ respective titles all of which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and did not indicate the Republic's favorable lien. It also found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties.  Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute ownership over the subject properties grounded on the following: (1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civil Case No. 781; (2) the ruling of this Court in Valdehueza v. Republic and (3) the expropriated properties, including Lot No. 933, are devoted to public use.  The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject properties and thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further held that laches and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its failure from 1940 to register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to record the decree of expropriation on the title. Accordingly, the CA found no necessity to rule on the applicability of Valdehueza v. Republic in the case.  Hence, the instant petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent, claiming its right to eminent domain, was the dutiful owner of the subject property, despite failure to register it. 2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues.  Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State‘s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.  From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners.  Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for the recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit: SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. – The record of the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)  From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.  Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer in good faith.  The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should be imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation.  An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.  In the instant case, the Republic‘s adverse claim of ownership over the subject properties may have given SRRDC‘s predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subject properties. However, we stress that prior to SRRDC‘s acquisition of the subject properties, Lot No. 933 had already been subdivided and covered by separate titles of the subsequent transferees. These titles, including the titles to the subject properties, had not been voided at the time of the sale to SRRDC in 1994. As such, SRRDC acquired good title to the subject properties, having purchased them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller‘s defect of title, if any.  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The August 15, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSEDand the August 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. TCT Nos. 128197 and 128198, in the name of petitioner San Roque Realty and Development Corporation, are upheld and declared valid. OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969 RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY FACTS:  Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.  The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1958.  Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 19 and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.  On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents.  On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter- connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.  The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission.  On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.  PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its part to execute a contrary of services with the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues.  After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims.  Both parties appealed. ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsory rendering the company to provide inter-connectivity services, despite its objection. HELD:  The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).  But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.  While the defendant telephone company is a public utility corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.  WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs. G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919 THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL. FACTS: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] opposed the expropriation alleging that the Chinese cemetery has for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement for other routes were available which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead. The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. The City of Manila then appealed the trial court‘s decision. ISSUE: WON the Chinese Cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila. HELD:  The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 20 with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.  The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public.  It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighbourhood. Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. The cemetery in question is used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. The petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.  For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000 RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR FACTS:  Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."  The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.  Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos? HELD:  An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation thus RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over expropriation case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;…‖.  If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.  In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public useHence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. The subject matter of an expropriation suit is the government‘s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. REQUISITES OF TAKING G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974 RP vs. CASTELVI FACTS:  The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease. It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the annual contracts entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi and the Republic of the Philippines. It is undisputed, therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy .On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these expropriation proceedings.  The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease.  Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain requires two CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 21 essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." ISSUE: WON the ―Taking‖ of properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action. (What are the requisites of ―Taking‖ of property of eminent domain?) HELD:  It is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.  Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court).  To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease.  The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.  In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY vs.HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA FACTS: The city government of Quezon tried to enforce Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" through the passing of a resolution wchich reads: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. But Respondent Himlayang Pilipino questioned the validity of the ordinance specifically its sec9 w/c provides that ―At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.‖ . respondent alleged that this is contrary to law and further contended that contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property and stressed that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. After the examining the facts, respondent court ruled that ―The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit‖ and declared the ordinance null and void. ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in declaring the ordinance null and void? HELD:  SC ruled that ―police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.  It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.‖  WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed. TAKING: DEPRIVATION OF USE 104 PHIL 443 (1958) RP vs. FAJARDO *no digested case submitted* 193 SCRA 1 (1991) NAPOCOR vs. GUTIERREZ FACTS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 22  Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, planned to construct 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines but the lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit and filed an eminent domain proceedings against the defendants.  The defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 by the court after NPC deposited the amount upon filing the complaint. The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties. the court appointed three commissioners in determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants.  With the reports submitted by the three commissioners and on the evidence adduced by the defendants as well as the plaintiff for the purpose of proving the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated, the lower court rendered a decision that National Power Corporation has to pay defendant spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez the sum P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to the said spouses and that decision was affirmed by the court of appeals. ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES HELD:  ―While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property……………n the case at bar, the easement of right-of- way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use………For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation  WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO FACTS:  The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned- and-controlled corporation created to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power and the production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.  For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria executed a Right of Way Grant# in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon.  The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion.  On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their report,# recommending as payment for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment,# declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair market value of the residential and agricultural property? HELD:  The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows: (1) P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565 sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept the recommendation of majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account the evidence of the parties, in tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of the commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to disturb the same.  The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners that the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of their lot will affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to buy the remaining portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation. 328 U.S. 256, May 27, 1946 UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY FACTS:  Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil Aeronautics Board. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their house  United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-motored CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 23 heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have been several accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place  The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et seq. Under those statutes the United States has 'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country. the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate.  The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'be taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holds today that the Government has 'taken' respondents' property by repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents' land at a height of eighty-three feet where the light and noise from these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their chickens to be killed ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes. HELD:  The Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control all navigable airspace. Congress has already acted under that power. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that 'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256, 272] air space (over) the United States.' navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.  The contribution of courts must be made through the awarding of damages for injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by the granting of injunctions to prohibit their flying  The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with this opinion. 244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995 PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC FACTS:  Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one- half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.  Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. HELD:  The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate ―Comelec space‖ amounts to ―taking‖ of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001 CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. FRANCISCO FACTS:  The petitioner sought to expropriate the three (3) adjoining land with and area of 1,847 sq. meter registered under the name of the defendants namely Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, Rodulfo, Antonio, and Virginia wherein they constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had leased out to tenants until the present. In 1983, the lots were classified by the Board of the Housing and Urban Development Council as an Area of Priority Development for Urban Land Reform under Proclamation Number of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants offered to purchase the lots but the respondents refused to sell. On November 1996, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject land adopted a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a letter to the respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3, 000.00 per sq. meter; respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of P3, 000.00 per sq. meter.  The respondents except Eusebio Aguilar who died in 1995, claimed that they did not received a copy of Mayor Abalos letter to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. On 1997, Petitioner filed an amended complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia Aguilar and at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his five (5) heirs. Petitioner also reduced the area sought to be expropriated to 1, 636 square meters. The Trial Court‘s decision was in favor of the respondents, dismiss the amended complaint and declared respondents as ―small property owners‖ whose land are exempt from expropriation under RA 7279. Also found out that the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 24 expropriation was not for public purpose for petitioner‘s failure to present evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless. ISSUES: 1. W/N the respondents are qualified as small property owners and are thus exempt from expropriation under RA no. 7972. 2. W/N the subject property is the only real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small property owners. HELD:  The acquisition of lands for socialized housing are governed with several provisions of the law. Thus, Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279 provides for the priorities in the acquisition of lands and enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy in their acquisition, and the modes of land acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing, respectively.  Under Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.  There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately- owned and therefore last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also provides that lands within the declared APD's which have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the order of priority. According to petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition.  Also, Lands for socialized housing under Section 10 are to be acquired in the following modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.  These means that the types of lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes authorized under Section 10.  Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. The Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property did not even state whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section 10 of the law. The law expressly exempted "small property owners" from expropriation of their land for urban land reform.  Under Section 3 of RA 7279, ―Small-property owners" are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real property other than the same.  In the case at bar involves two (2) residential lots Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized City. The lot totalled 1, 636 square meters was issued in the names of the herein five (5) respondents. The respondents are co-owners of the said lot. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest, except as to purely personal rights. He may also validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property. The partition in 1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the respective undivided shares of the co-owners. The rights of the co-owners to have the property partitioned and their share in the same delivered to them cannot be questioned for "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." The partition was merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership; and absent any evidence to the contrary, this partition is presumed to have been done in good faith. Upon partition, only Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 sq. meters more than the maximum of 300 square meters allowed by law set by RA 7279 for small property owners. However, after Eusebio died, his five heirs became co-owners of his 347 square meter portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4 square meters of the land subject of litigation. The share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A. 7279.  The second issue is whether the subject property is the only real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small property owners which Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on the subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila. Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's testimony. Respondents claim that the subject lots are their only real property and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore do not own any other real property in Metro Manila.  Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants from the land in question. GR No. 155746, October 3, 2004 LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA * repeated case * GR No. 152230, August 09, 2005 JIL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG * repeated case * PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION 284 SCRA 716 (1998) FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 25 Filstream is the registered owner of the subject land which filed an ejectment suit against the occupants of the parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The MTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioner and ordered private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to the petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed this decision. It was at this stage that respondent City of Manila approved an Ordinance authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchased and other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of the petitioner then occupied by private respondents. The said properties were to be sold and to be distributed to the qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. The Trial Court issued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila complies with the conditions under RA No. 7279 when it expropriated petitioner Filstream properties. HELD:  The court found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of Manila complied with Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279. Under Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.  The provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation. Private lands rank the last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. Expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards on securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.  Petitioner Filstream‘s properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 of R.A. no. 7279 have proved futile. There was a violation of Petitioner Filstream‘s right to due process which must accordingly be ratified. The state has the paramount interest in exercising his power of eminent domain for the general welfare considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. But we must not lost sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such rights are also entitled for protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. PUBLIC USE G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 , October 26, 1983 HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES FACTS:  This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners.  The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.  The defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution. They further alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purpose. ISSUE: Whether expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of sports and hotel complexes constitutes expropriation for public use. HELD: YES.  The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987 SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO FACTS:  The National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.  Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."  Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied.  Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 26 ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes ―public use‖ for purposes of expropriation. HELD: YES.  This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use". As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use  In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:  This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.  Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.  The Province of Camarines Sur then filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, but the San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.  The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession.  The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied.  In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.  In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.  Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.  The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non- agricultural land.  Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of property intended for the establishment of a pilot development center and housing project of the Province of Camarines Sur is in consonance with the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. HELD: YES.  The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would insure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare." 252 SCRA 412, 1996 MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled ―Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.‖) Wherein, Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. Thus the assailment of this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the ―public use‖ requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (―NHI‖) as a national historical landmark. HELD:  The term ―public use,‖ not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 27 thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that ―public use‖ is strictly limited to clear cases of ―use by the public‖ has long been discarded.  Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: ―The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.‖  Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that ―is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically‖ so as to enable it ―to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store.‖ Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as ―public welfare. Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court‘s order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila. Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound.  All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. GR No. 137285, January 15, 2001 ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA FACTS:  On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.  More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose.  In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court reconsidered the Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, private respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.  Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering two (2) proposals, namely: 1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with respect to Lot 1406-A I consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and lass of income for the possession of said lot by private respondent. 2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot.  Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the compromise agreement was signed by private respondent through its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said compromise agreement 9 dated January 4, 1993 is quoted hereunder: 1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quit claim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by person of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. 2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. 3. That the swap arrangement recognized the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the state of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. 4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trial court approved the compromise agreement.  However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993."  In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA moved 13 for its reconsideration. The same proved futile since the trial court denied reconsideration in its Order 14 dated November 3, 1997.  On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner, corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to petitioner.  On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 28 court. Petitioner filed its Comment 17 on January 16, 1998. ISSUE: The petition anchored on the following assignment of errors: 1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in giving due course to the special Civil Action filed by respondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 46112 when it was made substitute for lost appeal in clear contravention of the Honorable Court‘s ruling in Sempio v. Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) and Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 703) . 2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special Civil Action of Certiorari is proper, the Court of Appeals nevertheless wrongly interpreted the phrase ―Original Demand‖ contained in Article 2041 of petitioner estate is the return of the subject lot (Lot 1406-B) which sought to be expropriated and not the determination of just compensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if the interpretation of the court of appeals or the import of the phrase in question is correct, it is Article 2039 of the Civil Code and not Article 2041 which is applicable to compromise agreements approved by the courts. HELD:  This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in interpreting "original demand" to mean the fixing of just compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of private respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406- A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the only subject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993. Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to receive respondent's Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.  This court holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero 41 , this Court has ruled that, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.  We have rules that the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said expropriated lot. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot, however, grant the petitioner's prayer for the return of the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become final and executory.  In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to the petitioner.  WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT No. T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch. GR No. 147511, January 20, 2003 REYES VS. NHA FACTS:  In 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey of DasmariÒas, Cavite belonging to the petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and docketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero 2 and which became final on November 26, 1987.  On February 24, 1989, the expropriation court (now Branch 18, Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City) issued an Order 4 the dispositive portion of which reads:  "WHEREFORE, and resolving thus, let an Alias Writ of Execution be immediately issued and that: (1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby ordered to transfer, in the name of the plaintiff National Housing Authority, the following: (a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing an area of 79,167 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal, DasmariÒas, Cavite; (b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55702 containing an area of 20,872 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal, DasmariÒas, Cavite; (c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639 and RT-4641 covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and 6199 with an aggregate area of 159,985 square meters also situated in Barrio Bangkal, DasmariÒas, Cavite. (2) Plaintiff National Housing Authority is likewise hereby ordered, under pain of contempt, to immediately pay the defendants, the amounts stated in the Writ of Execution as the adjudicated compensation of their expropriated properties, which process was received by it according to the records, on September 26, 1988, segregating therefrom, and in separate check, the lawyer's fees in favor of Atty. Bobby P. Yuseco, in the amount of P322,123.05, as sustained by their contract as gleaned from the records, with no other deduction, paying on its own (NHA) account, the necessary legal expenses incident to the registration or issuance of new certificates of title, pursuant to the provisions of the Property Registration Law (PD 1529); (3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay the corresponding capital gains tax on the subject properties, directing them CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 29 additionally, to coordinate with the plaintiff NHA in this regard, in order to facilitate the termination of this case, put an end to this controversy and consign the same to its final rest." ISSUE: The petitioners raise the following assignment of errors: 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided a question of substance not in accord with justice and equity when it ruled that, as the judgment of the expropriation court did not contain a condition that should the expropriated property be not used for the intended purpose it would revert to the condemnee, the action to declare the forfeiture of rights under the expropriation judgment can not prosper; 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of substance not in accord with jurisprudence, justice and equity when it ruled that the non-payment is not a ground for forfeiture; 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the judgment of expropriation forfeited in light of the failure of respondent to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose." HELD:  The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.  Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."  The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.  The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.  Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. 11 The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that:  "SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.  To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments."  THEREFORE, The appealed judgment is modified as follows: 1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay petitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have been fully paid; 2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and 3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National Housing Authority the owners' duplicate certificates of title of the expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation. 268 SCRA 368 MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS *repeated case* GOVVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003 NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO FACTS:  On February 23, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu City, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against respondents. It alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the claimant of a Lot located in Banilad, Cebu City; that defendant Engracia Urot was the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the same area; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were claimants of lots in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are in the urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing project.  On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Guivelondo filed a Manifestation waiving their objections to petitioner‘s power to expropriate their properties. Thus the RTC issued an order to that effect. Thereafter, the RTC appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the just compensation of the properties of respondents. The Commissioners submitted their report recommending the just compensation be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter, which was favored by the RTC.  Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible because the value of the land sought to be expropriated was too high, and the intended beneficiaries cannot afford. The Motion was denied since the prior case was decided on already.  After petitioner‘s appeal was denied by the CA, the Landbank executed garnishment proceedings against the funds of NHA. ISSUES: 1. WON THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED BY THE COURTS TO CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; 2. WON JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT; 3. WON WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE. HELD:  There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. The second is concerned with the determination by the Court of the just compensation.  The outcome of the first phase is final since it disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase fixes the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are however, appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.  In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the RTC, which declared the lawful right to expropriate the properties hence the Order became final.  Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The need to CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 30 provide housing to the urban poor was not lost by fact that the land cost more than petitioner had expected. The public purpose of is not diminished by the amount of just compensation the court has fixed.  On the issue of the garnishment against petitioner‘s funds, there is a need to determine if it is a government entity. Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings.  However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCC with a personality of its own, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.  Hence, it is clear that NHA is not exempt from garnishment.  WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. GR No. 106804, August 12, 2004 NPC & POBRE vs. CA FACTS:  Petitioner NPC is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to exercise the right of eminent domain.  Private respondent Pobre is the owner of property located in Tiwi, Albay.  In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort- subdivision, which he named as ―Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.‖  On August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property. The commission found it suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use.  NPC then became involved with Pobre‘s Property in three instances.  First was on February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots frof the subdivision. Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property. On 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPC‘s payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While the first case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. It altered the topography o the Property. No action was done on Pobre‘s complaints, dumping continued. Third was on September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case. NPC needed more lots for the construction and maintenance of a Well Site. NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot upon the trial court‘s issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.  Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint and claimed that NPC damaged his Property. He prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected.  On April 1987, the trial court decided in favor of Pobre, ordered the whole property to be paid off by NPC.  NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the trial courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the trial court‘s decision and denied NPC‘s motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: WON, CA erred: 1. In holding that NPC had ―taken‖ the entire Property of Pobre; 2. In not excluding from the Property portions of which NPC had previously expropriated and paid for; 3. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 1979 until fully paid, is just and fair; 4. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25/sqm only as what had been previously agreed upon; HELD:  Even before the first case, Pobre had established his property as a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the property that it made it uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision. Questions of facts are beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for review may only raise questions of law. NPC points out that it did not take Pobre‘s 68,969 sqm property. NPC argues that assuming that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that it had successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been excluded from the 68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPC had damaged.  It was clearly established that the property originally had a total area of 141,300 sqm. Pobre identified the lots forming the 68,969 sqm property that comprised the undeveloped area. NPC had the opportunity to object to the identification of the lots, but failed to do so. Thus, the trial and appellate courts‘ finding on the total land area NPC had damaged cannot be disturbed.  When possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is not anymore convenient or feasible to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.  In this case, the property is no longer habitable as a resort- subdivision. The Property is worthless is now only useful to NPC. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre‘s property rights.  Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for Pobre‘s 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.  The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen‘s property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements.  WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. RECOVERY OF EXPROPRIATED LAND GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005 ATO vs. GOPUCO FACTS:  Respondent was the owner of lots consisting of 995 sqm located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. The airport had been turned over by the U.S. Army to the Philippines sometime in 1947 through the Surplus Property Commission. In 1947, the Commission was succeeded by the Bureau of Aeronautics, which was supplanted by the National Airport Corporation (NAC). The NAC was then dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).  Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the various lot-owners surrounding the Lahug Airport, including respondent, that the government was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners sold their properties on the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used by the airport. Others, including respondent, refused to do so.  Thus, on April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance (CFI) for the expropriation of the lots, which the CFI decided in favor of CAA. No appeal was made.  Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport began operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then President Aquino. On March 1990, respondent wrote the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offered to return the money previously paid. This letter was ignored. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 31  On 08 May 1992, ownership of the Lahug lots were transferred to Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Respondent filed recovery of ownership of his Lot with the RTC of Cebu and maintained that since the Lahug Airport has been closed, the purpose of the property had ceased and title to the property had therefore reverted to him.  Respondent however failed to present evidence on entering the previous compromise agreement made.  Lastly, Gopuco asserted that there were several announcements that the Lahug Airport was soon to be developed into a commercial complex, which he took to be a scheme of the Province of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his property.  The RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent to pay exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.  Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to CA, which overturned the RTC decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey lots to respondent upon payment of the reasonable price as determined by it, and deleted the costs of damages. ISSUES: 1. WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT. 2. WON THE CA ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS. HELD:  When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.  It was ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between the parties. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since respondent was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke the same.  Eminent domain is generally described as ―the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government‖ that may be acquired for public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation or condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power.  The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that ―private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.‖ This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse. In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking of the compensation received have long become final. Neither has respondent, in the present case, adduced any evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in his favor.  The trial court was thus correct in denying respondent‘s claim. However, the petitioner‘s claim of harassment or that the respondent acted in bad faith is unfounded, the imposition of litigation expenses and costs has no basis. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. GENUINE NECESSITY G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM FACTS:  The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.  After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.  The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed  For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzons‘ successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.  In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase ―subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.‖  The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic‘s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of ―the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present,‖ the court adjusted the market value at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.  After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in- interest according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained.  Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.  Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead the Republic.  RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 32 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.  Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:  An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiff‘s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet title.  WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.‖ ISSUE: The basic issue is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation HELD:  From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss  Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual‘s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.  “Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor‘s title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner‘s report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.  Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic‘s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time  WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988 MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS:  This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution dated April 24,1985 by the former Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, setting aside its earlier decision dated January 10, 1985 and dismissing the special civil action for expropriation filed by the petitioner.  Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.  The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.  An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter.  The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road.  On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution No. 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land.  However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.  Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.  Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner.  The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property.  The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products. ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exercise its power of eminent domain to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road? HELD:  This Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity thereof. There is absolutely no showing in the petition CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 33 why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.  WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned resolution of the respondent court is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. L-51078, October 30, 1980 CRISTINA DE KNECHT, vs. HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA FACTS:  A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Cristina de Knecht against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judge presiding over Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City), and the Republic of the Philippines pines seeking that judgment be rendered annulling the order for immediate possession issued by respondent court in the expropriation proceedings and commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for immediate possession issued in said action, with costs.  And that a restraint order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex-parte enjoining respondents, their representative representative and agents from enforcing the here questioned order for mediate posession petitioner offering to post a bond executed to the parties enjoined in an amount to be fixed by the Court to the effect that she will pay to such parties all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide she is not entitled there.  Ten years ago, the government through the Department of Public Workmen's and Communication prepared a to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposed extension, an adjunct of building program, the project would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard that this route would be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSA. Then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction and/or improvement of buildings and other structures located within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue.  Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old substantial houses; that upon learning of the changed the owners of the residential houses that would be affected, the herein petitioner being one of them.  Petitioner filed a formal petition to President Ferdinand E. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adoption, the original plan of making the extension of EDSA through Araneta Avenue instead of the new plan going through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets; that President Marcos directed then Minister Baltazar Aquino to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why the proposed project should not be suspended.  Minister Aquino submitted his explanation defending the new proposed route; that the President then referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for investigation and recommendation; that after formal hearings to which all the parties proponents and oppositors were given full opportunity to ventilate their views and to present their evidence, the Settlements Commission submitted a report recommending the reversion of the extension of EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue; and that notwithstanding the said report and recommendation, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.  The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground that said Republic had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank.  The respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought be condemned. ISSUES: 1. Whether the plan to make the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Street be made? 2. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated? HELD:  From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.  The petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action except to dismiss said case. GR No. 87351, February 12, 1990 RP vs. DE KNECHT *no case digest submitted* G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006 LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs. HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI FACTS:  Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City , Metro Manila. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig . Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner‘s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."  Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners.  On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig . As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 34 determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.  Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 1998. ISSUES: THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997 (ATTACHMENT "A") AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1998 (ATTACHMENT "B") ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES OF COURT AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT: I A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONER‘S PROPERTY. B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH. C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. THE COURT A QUO‘S ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996, WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONER‘S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW: II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OF RULE ON ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG ‘S COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUO‘S DENIAL OF PETITIONER‘S RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21 APRIL 1995). III THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE ON HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW WAS THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILED UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT. HELD: On the two main issues – one substantive and one procedural  Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:  "SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. – Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff‘s attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service."  The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendant‘s property for the use specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiff‘s attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.  The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, "specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner‘s property for public use." What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and appointing commissioners to fix just compensation.  Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.  The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA- G.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice. We now proceed to address the substantive issue.  The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus: Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.  In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the expropriation.  The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.  Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner‘s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner‘s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public.  Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one‘s property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 35  The petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig , docketed as SCA No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED. JUST COMPENSATION: DEFINED G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001 SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO FACTS:  This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato, ordering the National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity) to pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the taking of the latter‘s property.  Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Niño, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondent‘s husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit.  Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The NIA then paid respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property (Exh. 2). The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035, §18, which provides in part that ―  Financial assistance may also be given to owners of lands acquired under C.A. 141, as amended, for the area or portion subject to the reservation under Section 12 thereof in such amounts as may be determined by the implementing agency/instrumentality concerned in consultation with the Commission on Audit and the assessor‘s office concerned.  Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.  Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.  At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1) that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the name of respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area had been taken by the NIA for the construction of an irrigation canal.  On October 18, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:  TRIAL COURT RULING: In view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the defendant, National Irrigation Administration, to pay to plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs.  On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October 31, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION. 4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM MAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER. HELD:  First. Rule 7, 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides ― Certification against forum shopping. ― The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi- judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.  Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing . . . .  By reason of Rule 45, 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, in relation to Rule 42, 2 thereof, the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping applies to the filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, such as the one filed by petitioner.  As provided in Rule 45, 5, "The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding . . . the contents of the document which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."  The requirement in Rule 7, 5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.  In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the verification and certification against forum-shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 36 the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.  Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the land under litigation, as already stated, is covered by a transfer certificate of title registered in the Registry Office of Koronadal, South Cotabato on May 13, 1976. This land was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-25592) P-9800 which was issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted on February 18, 1960. We have held:  Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owner‘s duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings.  The Solicitor-General contends, however, that an encumbrance is imposed on the land in question in view of 39 of the Land Registration Act (now P.D. No. 1529, 44) which provides:  Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:  Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined.  As this provision says, however, the only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.6  In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use.  Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public use.  Third. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.  Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4 provided:  Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . . .  It is now provided that ―  SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.  A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.  After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (Emphasis added)  Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it was also the property owner who brought the action for compensation against the government after 25 years since the taking of his property for the construction of a road.  Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara:  [W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it" . . . .  In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.14  Fourth. Petitioner finally contends that it is exempt from paying CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 37 any amount to respondent because the latter executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees of any compensation due in favor of the Municipal Treasurer of Barangay Sto. Niño, South Cotabato . However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held:  [I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not even have bothered to give her any amount for damages caused on the improvements/crops within the appellee‘s property. This, apparently was not the case, as can be gleaned from the disbursement voucher in the amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396) issued on September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee, and the letter from the Office of the Solicitor General recommending the giving of "financial assistance in the amount of P35,000.00" to the appellee.  Thus, We are inclined to give more credence to the appellee‘s explanation that the waiver of rights and fees "pertains only to improvements and crops and not to the value of the land utilized by NIA for its main canal."15  The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner. GR No. 146062, June 28, 2001 RP VS IAC FACTS:  A property consisting of 4 parcels of land with a total area of 9,650 square meters was the subject of expropriation. Its previous owner, Avegon Inc., offered it for sale to the City School Board of Manila on July 21, 1973 at P2, 300,000. The school board was willing to buy at P1, 800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila intervened and volunteered to negotiate with Avegon Inc. for a better price. On June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold the property and its improvements to Amerex Electronics Phils. Corporation for P1, 800,000.00. On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) a complaint against Amerex for the expropriation of said property before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 99190). The complaint stated that the property was needed by the government as a permanent site for the Manuel de la Fuente High School. The fair market value of the property had been declared by Amerex as P2, 435,000, and the assessor determined the market value as P2, 432,042. The assessed amount for taxation purposes is P1, 303,470 and was deposited with the PNB on September 30, 1975. The Government was able to take actual possession of the property on October 13, 1975. Amerex then filed a motion to dismiss citing the issue on just compensation to be fixed at P2, 432,042, the market value of the property determined by the assessor which was lower than Amerex's own declaration. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff saying that they can present evidence of a much lower market value. Amerex then filed a motion to withdraw the deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB without the plaintiff opposing provided that an order of condemnation be issued to allow plaintiff to present evidence on the matter of just compensation. On March 12, 1976, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave of court to amend its complaint stating that after it had filed the same, P.D. No. 464was amended by P.D. No. 794 and that the amended complaint would state that the fair market value of the property could not be in excess of P1,800,000, the amount for which defendant's predecessor-in- interest had offered to sell said properties to the Division of Public Schools of Manila and which amount was also the purchase price paid by Amerex to Avegon Inc. This was denied by the lower court, but after the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, the lower court admitted the amended complaint on April 27, 1976. Audited financial statements were submitted by Amerex and the statements yielded the amount of P2, 258,018.48 as the total value of the property. On October 18, 1976, the plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino as commissioner on the ground that he could not be expected to be unbiased inasmuch as in the three appraisal reports submitted by Amerex. Amerex opposed the motion to disqualify Aquino as commissioner, and the court, in its order of November 5, 1976, denied it. The commissioner then filed his appraisal for the fair market value of the property which is P2, 258,018.57 for purposes of determining just compensation payable to defendant AMEREX. The plaintiff objected the report and reiterated that the value should be only P1, 800, 00.00. Basing it on the evidence, the court ruled to fix the market value at of P2,258.018.57 for just compensation, hence the plaintiff elevated the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not disqualifying Commissioner Aurelio B. Aquino from membership in the Committee of Appraisal. 2. Whether or not respondent Court erred in totally disregarding petitioner's evidence showing that the award of just compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00. HELD: 1. No, the court did not err in not disqualifying Commissioner Aquino. The report of the commissioners is merely advisory and recommendatory in character as far as the court is concerned. The court may choose to take action or to set aside the report or appoint new commissioners, hence it really does not matter if the commissioner had a pre conceived and biased valuation of the property. The determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a judicial function and not bound by its Commissioners. 2. No, the Court did not err in disregarding 's evidence showing that the award of just compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the property is worth lower than P1, 800,000 basing it on the value when it was first offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila. The appraisal made by Ampil Realty and Appraisal Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975, which date is nearest to that of the actual taking of the property, should be the basis for the determination of just compensation the record being bereft of any indications of anomaly appertaining thereto. Wenceslao Ampil, the president of said appraisal firm, also had testified at the trial and therefore petitioner had the opportunity to confront him and to question his report.  WHEREFORE, the just compensation of the property expropriated for the use of the Manuel de la Fuente High School Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School) is hereby fixed at Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00). After deducting the amount of P1, 303,470.00 therefrom, the petitioner shall pay the balance with legal interest from October 13, 1975. December 19, 2005 RP VS GINGOYON FACTS: The construction of the NAIA 3 had spawned controversies that had its roots with the promulgation of the Court‘s decision in Agan vs PIATCO (2003 decision), which nullified the contract between the Government and the contractor (PIATCO) for being contrary to law and public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. and several respondents filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision but were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004. However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO. On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC).The CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 38 Government sought for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited 3 Billion in cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the assessed value for taxation purposes. This was the case now presided by Honorable Gingoyon. On the same day that the complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. This decision was based on Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, however this was amended by Republic Act No. 8974. RA 8974 provides that as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. On the basis of RA 8974, the RTC directed first, that the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch, immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. The Government was also not allowed to perform acts of ownership like leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other parties. The Government then filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed January 4, 2005 order. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed 3 Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. And on the same day the Government issued a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. These motions were heard by the RTC but were denied in an Omnibus Order dated January 10, 2005. Thus the present petition for Certiorari for the nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 7 and 10, 2005 and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. ISSUE: Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case HELD:  Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation.  Since funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction, for the to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.  Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.  In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states: Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of one hundred percent of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7.  If Sec2 Rule 67 applies then PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession.  Hence the Court ruled that just compensation should be made before the Government may take over the NAIA 3. GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006 CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION FACTS:  From January 1995 to December 1995, Central Luzon Drug Corporation has been granting 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778.00. Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, respondent deducted the total amount of P219, 778.00 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. Subsequently on December 27, 1996, the Central Luzon Drug Corporation claimed for a tax credit amounting to P150, 193.00 (P219, 778.00 20% sales discount given to senior citizen – P69, 585.00 income tax).  Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not able to decide the claim for refund on time, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18, 1998. However, this was dismissed by CTA declaring that even if the 20% sales discount is granted to senior citizens as a credit, this cannot be applied when there is no tax liability or the tax credit is greater than the tax due. The respondent then filed with the CA a petition for Review on August 3, 2000. The petition for the P 150, 193.00 tax credit was granted and the decision of the CTA set aside, thus this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales in accordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94. HELD:  The 20% sales discount given to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax credit and not as a deduction from the gross sales.  Wherefore the petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.  Legal Basis: Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides: Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportations services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, that private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit.  The above provision explicitly employed the word ―tax credit.‖ Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a ―deduction‖ from gross sales. To construe it otherwise would be a departure from the clear mandate of the law.  It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself especially when the words and phrases therein are clear and unequivocal. The statute in such a case must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Its literal meaning should be followed to depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 39 statute.  The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned. GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS BICOLANDIA DRUG CORP. *no case digest submitted* JUST COMPENSATION: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION 149 SCRA 305 (1987) EPZA vs. DULAY FACTS:  On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the city of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).  Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. it included four parcel of land registered in the name of private individual. The petitioner, therefore offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.  The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the parcel of land in pursuant to P.D. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones in relation to Proclamation No. 1811.  On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises. On December 23, 1980, the private respondent filed its answer.  At the pre-trial conference, the respondent judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.  The respondent judge issued the order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.  Subsequently the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending a certain amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation of the properties.  The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and objection to commissioner‘s report on the grounds that P.D. No 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 Rule 67 of the rules of court on the ascertainment of just compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. In addition the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enjoining the order. ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the revised rules of court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. NO. 1533 insofar as appointment of commissioners are concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. NO. 1533 valid and constitutional? HELD:  The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this court inutile in a matter which under the constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The courts task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor and its choice must be limited to the lower of the two. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or a charade.the court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. The court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess the just compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings in order for the owner of the property is entitled to recover the fair and full value of the lot. In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation which the court may consider as one of the factors in arriving at just compensation, as envisage in the constitution. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights, no statute, decree or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court‘s findings. The determination of ―just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.  We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court‘s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.  WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. 263 SCRA 708 PANES vs. VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE *no case digest submitted 195 SCRA 59 BELEN vs. CA FACTS:  A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known as Lot No. 10, Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. On it stood a house built by Belen.  Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family in the early part of 1978; Juliano bought a house standing thereon, not belonging to Belen, and move in without the latter‘s knowledge. On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and they came to an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay one half of the rental to Manotoc Reality, inc. Later a fire razed both Belen‘s and Juliano‘s houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything on the land anymore. However, on juliano‘s pleas, Belen acceded to Juliano‘s continued stay on the land on the explicit condition that his occupancy should not be longer than two and a half years. When Juliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulated term despite demand, Belen brought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court sometime in September, 1982, and succeeded in obtaining judgment dated September 5, 1984, a order of the MTC to the defendant to vacate the subject lot and pay plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 as a attorney‘s fees, plus cost of suit.  Juliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of manila. That court reversed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but the decision was made to rest on the expropriation of the Manotoc Estate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, where the  Manotoc Reality Incorporated ceased to be the owner of the land.  Belen has perfected an appeal by certiorari to SC and prays for judgment on the following essential propostions that Manotoc Reality Services has been denied of its right of just compensation, not having receive any money as payment for the subject property, and the NHA not having taken possession thereof in an appropriate action of eminent domain. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 40 ISSUE: Is the passage of Presidential Decree No. 1670 constitutional, whereas it disregarded the right of compensation and due process of law? HELD:  Presidential Decree No 1670, together with the companion decree, numbered 1669 was struck down by this court as unconstitutional and therefore, null and void. The Court found that both decrees, being ―violative of the petitioners‘ (owners) right to due process of law.  The court said on the determination of just compensation: ―The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation.  Having failed to provide for a hearing, the government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.  WHEREFORE, PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be viod ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.  The decision of the Court of Appeals of October 2, 1986 and that of Regional Trial Court thereby affirmed, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court(Branch VII), Manila, rendered on September 5, 1984 in Civil Case No. 078756-cv is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with cost against the private respondents. SO ORDERED. 227 SCRA 401 REPUBLIC VS CA *no case digest submitted* 206 SCRA 196 MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. PINEDA *no case digest submitted* 263 SCAR 758 DAR VS. CA *no case digest submitted* G. R. No. L-57524 January 8, 1986 REPUBLIC VS.,SANTOS FACTS: The case is an expropriation case which involved the 66,096 square meters of land claimed by 44 persons, located in Paranaque and Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was necessary for the widening of, and construction of interchanges in the Manila South Diversion Road. The Appraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at forty pesos (P40) per square meter, or an amount of P2, 641,190. The Government deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the Philippine National Bank but some of the respondents withdrew including Maura Santos. The Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June 19, 1969 granted the fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2, 641,190. Fourteen (14) claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation: Benjamin Morales for the court as chairman; Pacifico Javier, the provincial assessor, for the Republic, and Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimants. The commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970 recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100 a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters. The trial court in its decision dated May 13, 1972 modified that recommendation. It fixed P100 a square meter as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants. The Court of Appeals in its decision of June 29, 1981 in turn modified the trial court's decision and adopted the commissioners' report and it added 6% legal rate of interest. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the just compensation to be paid by the Government is 40 or 100, as recommended by the commissioners. 2. Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not holding that the commissioners should not have relied on the price of P100 for the land of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in November, 1969 and on other irrelevant evidence. 3. Whether or not Appellate Court erred in disregarding the fact that 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter. HELD:  We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in relying on the commissioners' report whose recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. As pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the filing of the instant expropriation case. In Presidential Decree No. 1533 provides that just compensation should be the value of the land "prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." In the case, it should be noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square meters. She was already paid P1, 036,360 for her expropriated land.  Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out of 44 had winningly sold their lands to the Government at P40 a square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provincial assessor was a member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a reasonable price. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated.  As noted in the Velasquez case, the moment a parcel of land is sought to be condemned, the price, for some occult reason, immediately soars far beyond what the owner would think of asking or receiving in the open market. Owners ask fabulous prices for it and neighbours look on with an indulgent smile or even persuade themselves that the land is worth the price for which the owner holds out in view of the fact that it is wanted by an entity whose financial resources are supposed to be inexhaustible. Consequently, the petitioner should pay only P40 per square meter for the expropriated lands. CMC (CMS) Investments, Inc. was paid P35 a square meter for its 530 square meters. It is entitled to a deficiency on which 6% legal rate of interest per annum should be paid from the time the petitioner took possession of its land up to the date of payment. The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside. The just compensation for the lands described in paragraph 2 of petitioner's complaint is forty pesos (P40) per square meter. GR No. 170422, March 07, 2008 SPS. LEE VS LBP *please read full text* JUST COMPENSATION: WHEN DETERMINED G. R. No. L-50147 August 3, 1990 ANSALDO VS. TANTUICO FACTS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 41 Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used for the widening of a road for more than forty-three years, without benefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners. The owners of the land are Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names and have an aggregate area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Work Transportation and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. The said owners did not make any action until twenty six years later asking for the compensation of their land. The case was referred to the Secretary of Justice who rendered an opinion that the just compensation be made in accordance with Presidential Decree 76 which provide that the basis for the payment of just compensation of property taken for public use should be the current and fair market value thereof as declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos' property in accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time of taking. The Commission on Audit declined the recommendation and decided that the compensation be from the actual time of the taking of the land. ISSUE: (As to the precise time the just compensation be based) Whether or not the just compensation be based on the time of the actual taking of the possession or PD 76. HELD:  In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a taking when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a taking in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense. Under these norms, there was undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldos' property when the Government obtained possession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use.  It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the property is to be established. As stated in Republic v. Philippine National Bank;  When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that compensation be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would never be operative. As intimated in Republic v. Lara (supra), said provision contemplates normal circumstances, under which the complaint coincides or even precedes the taking of the property by the plaintiff.  The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Rpublic v. Larae, is that; Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just i.e.,"just; not only to the individual whose property is taken but, to the public, which is to pay for it.  Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law. The petition is denied and the challenged decision of the Commission on Audit is affirmed, and the Department of Public Works and Highways is directed to forthwith institute the appropriate expropriation action over the land in question so that the just compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance with the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007 NAPOCOR, vs. TIANGCO FACTS:  Respondents are owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.  NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents‘ aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse.  NPC‘s Segregation Plan# for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents‘ land. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and coconut trees.  After repeated unsuccessful negotiations, NPC filed an expropriation complaint against the land of the respondent in the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC after paying the deposit requirement.  The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the property using the 1984 tax declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in the decision of the supreme court)  The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it was denied by RTC. So They filed an appeal and the CA gave merit to the contention of the respondents and made its revised valuation using the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the value of the property). The case went up to the SC. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the property should be valued using the 1984 or the 1993 tax declarations. 2. Whether or not Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by P.D. 938 will apply. HELD 1. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. Normally, the time of taking coincides with the filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the case of Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for the proper CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 42 determination of just compensation. 2. It should not apply in the case at bar, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken. G.R. No. 142971 May 07, 2002 CITY OF CEBU VS SPOUSES DEDAMO FACTS:  On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. For the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose  Deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160  Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that their purpose was not for public purpose but for the benefit of a private single entity, Cebu Holdings. Also the respondents alleged that they don‘t have any other land in Cebu City.  On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.  14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement4 wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed on some certain stipulations. One of the stipulations was: 1. xxx 2.xxx 3.xxx 4.xxx 5.xxx 6.xxx 7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement shall be followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just compensation for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by this Honorable Court to determine the same shall have rendered their report and approved by the court.  The RTC rendered its decision on the value of the property according to the assessed value of the commissioners. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the assessment of the property was no accurate. The court adjusted its decision on the value based on the new assessed value.  Petitioner elevated the case to CA. But the petitioner failed to convince the CA and the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date the filing of the complaint. 2. Whether or not the basis of the just compensation is the value on the actual date the filing of the complaint considering the agreement entered into by the parties. HELD: 1. It asserts that it should be which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time the property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in "National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals." 2. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."  More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code  Furthermore, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.11 It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment. JUST COMPENSATION: MANNER OF PAYMENT 175 SCRA 343, 1989 ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. DAR *no case digest submitted* 249 SCRA 149, 1995 DAR vs. CA FACTS:  Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).  The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.  Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).  The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).  Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 43 (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges — with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon — that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)  The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it. ISSUE: Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation. HELD:  Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.  The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:  Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands — (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)  It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".  The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20  In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.  Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.  The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform". 22  The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.  The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.  Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.  Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that: despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" — even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" — the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 44 upon full payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied)  We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.  The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.  Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)  The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. JUST COMPENSATION: TRIAL WITH COMMISSIONERS 206 SCRA 196, 1992 MERALCO vs. PINEDA FACTS:  Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.  On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila.  The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.  Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated December 27, 1974 the petitioner's legal existence and the area sought to be expropriated as too excessive.  On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a motion for contempt of court alleging, among other things that petitioner's corporate existence had expired in 1969 and therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws.  But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order dated January 13, 1975 authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated.  On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. However, respondents motion was denied in an order dated September 3, 1976.  In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the presiding Judge Nelly Valdellon-Solis retired, so respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed with Branch XXII.  Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing private respondents' property.  On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.  On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended.  On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment. But despite the opposition of the petitioner, the respondent court issued the first of the questioned Orders dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private respondents, to wit:  As prayed for by defendants Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, thru counsel Gil de Guzman, in their Motion for Payment, for reasons therein stated, this Court hereby orders the plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of P20,400.00 for the expropriated area of 6,800 square meters, at P3.00 per square meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of this case.  The aforesaid sum of P20,400.00 having been deposited by plaintiff in the Philippine National Bank (Pasig Branch) under Savings Account No. 9204, let the Deputy Sheriff of this Branch Mr. Sofronio Villarin withdraw said amount in the names of Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, the said amount to be delivered to the defendant's counsel Atty. Gil de Guzman who shall sign for the receipt thereof.  On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank.  By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted the Omnibus Motion hereunder quoted as follows:  Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated December 15, 1981 filed by CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 45 Atty. Gil de Guzman, counsel for Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and for himself, and it appearing that there is deposited in the bank in trust for them the amount of P90,125.50 to guarantee just compensation of P272,000.00, thereby leaving a balance of P161,475.00 still payable to them, the same is hereby GRANTED.  Mr. Nazario Nuevo and Marianita Burog, respectively the Manager and Cashier, Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch, Pasig, Metro Manila are hereby ordered to allow Sheriff Sofronio Villarin to withdraw and collect from the bank the amount of P90,125.50 under Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver the same to Atty. Gil de Guzman upon proper receipt, pending final determination of just compensation.  Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982 praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00.  On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 and to declare private respondents in contempt of court for forging or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of petitioner's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion.  In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property.  On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:  Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges in favor of defendants Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita Bautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a total of P369,720.00, this amount to bear legal interest from February 24, 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00, all these sums to be paid by MERALCO to said defendants with costs of suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by defendants.  For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt are DENIED; for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of the orders of December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 is also DENIED.  Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence." ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. HELD:  The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The said sections particularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and the court's action upon commissioners' report, to wit:  Sec. 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.  Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.  We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia (G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain, to wit:  There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."  The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.  Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 46 commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.  Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.  Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342- 343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff.  All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court. GR No. 129998, December 29, 1998 NPC vs. HENSON FACTS:  On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) originally instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint for eminent domain, later amended on October 11, 1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.  Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga, more particularly described as follows:  ―Parcels of rice land, being Lot 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the subdivision plan Psd-03-017121 (OLT) and being a portion of Lot 212 of Mexico Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Jose Matulid, Municipality of Mexico, province of Pampanga, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the North by Barangay Road Calle San Jose; on the East by Lot 6, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) owned by the National Power Corporation; on the South by Lot 101, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) being an irrigation ditch; on the West by Lot 100, Psd-03- 0017121 (OLT) being an irrigation ditch and Barrio road, containing an aggregate area of FIFTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED ELEVEN (58,311) square meters, which parcels of land are broken down as follows with claimants: 1. Lot 1-A=43,532 sq. m.- Henson Family 2. Lot 2-A=6,823 sq. m.- Alfredo Tanchiatco, encumbered with Land Bank of the Phil. (LBP) 3. Lot 3-A=3,057 sq. m.-Bienvenido David, encumbered with LBP 4. Lot 4-A=1,438 sq. m.-Maria Bondoc Capili, encumbered with LBP 5. Lot 5-A=3,461 sq. m.-Miguel Manoloto and Henson Family Total A=58,311 sq. m.‖  and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 557 in the name of Henson, et al.; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7131/Emancipation Patent No. A-277216 in the name of Alfredo Tanchiatco; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7111/Emancipation Patent No. A-278086 in the name of Bienvenido David; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7108/Emancipation Patent No. A-278089 in the name of Maria B. Capili; Certificate of Land Transfer No. 4550 in the name of Miguel C. Manaloto, and Subdivision Plan Psd-03- 017121 (OLT), which is a subdivision of Lot 212, Mexico Cadastre as surveyed for Josefina Katigbak, et al. Said five (5) parcels of land are agricultural/riceland covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of the Department of Agrarian Reform.  Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.  On March 28, 1990, petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land.3  On April 20, 1990, respondents filed a motion to dismiss.4 They did not challenge petitioner‘s right to condemn their property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter.  On July 10, 1990, the trial court denied respondents‘ motion to dismiss. The court did not declare that petitioner had a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated. However, the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of respondents‘ property, to be deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990.  On September 5, 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11, 1990, the court‘s deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land.  On November 22, 1990, and December 20, 1990, the trial court granted the motions of respondents to withdraw the deposit made by petitioner of the provisional value of their property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.  On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of the subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their individual reports.  Commisioner Mariano C. Tiglao, in his report dated September 10, 1992, recommended that the fair market value of the entire 63,220 square meters property be fixed at P350.00 per square meter. Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza, in his report dated February 24, 1993, recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P375.00 per square meter. Commissioner Victorino Orocio, in his report dated April 28, 1993, recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P170.00 per square meter.  However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports.  On May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney‘s fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.  In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.  On July 23, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00, as attorney‘s fees was deleted. ISSUE: The issue presented boils down to what is the just CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 47 compensation for the taking of respondents‘ property for the expansion of the NPC‘s Mexico Sub-station, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga. HELD:  The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.  In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners.  On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair market value at P375.00 per square meter. This appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of such raw land.  Consequently, we agree with Commissioner Atienza‘s report that the fair market value of subject parcels of land be fixed at P375.00 per square meter.  We also agree with petitioner that the area of the communal irrigation canal consisting of 4,809 square meters must be excluded from the land to be expropriated. To begin with, it is excluded in the amended complaint. Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in including the same in the area to be taken.  The trial court erroneously ordered double payment for 3,611 square meters of lot 5 (portion) in the dispositive part of its decision, and, hence, this must be deleted.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly required petitioner to pay legal interest on the compensation awarded from September 11, 1990, the date petitioner was placed in possession of the subject land, less the amount respondents had withdrawn from the deposit that petitioner made with the Provincial Treasurer‘s Office.  We, however, rule that petitioner is under its charter exempt from payment of costs of the proceedings. G.R. No. 156093. February 2, 2007 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. DELA CRUZ FACTS: NAPOCOR a government-owned and controlled corporation filed a complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right of way against Spouses Norberto and Josefina Dela Cruz who are registered owners of the parcels of land to be expropriated by NAPOCOR. After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner‘s Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land, petitioner then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted. The pre-trial was terminated in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation. Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject properties, it is the opinion of herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the abovementioned Order, but said motion was denied in the trial court‘s. Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, but it directly filed a petition for review. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to present evidence on the reasonable value of the expropriated property before the Board of Commissioners. 2. Whether or not the valuation of just compensation herein was not based from the evidence on record and other authentic documents. HELD: It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Court is mandated to only consider purely legal questions in this petition, unless called for by extraordinary circumstances. petitioner raises the issue of denial of due process because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to present its evidence on the just compensation of properties it wanted to expropriate, and the sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the trial court‘s Order on the matter of just compensation. because this case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration and brush aside this technicality in favor of resolving this case. Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to present evidence before the commissioners. It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor and petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the commissioners‘ report, and that petitioner was also not given any opportunity to file its objections to the said report. the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners‘ findings. The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient. it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. For compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was the commissioners‘ ocular inspection of the properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners‘ report. Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient as earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial court‘s ruling in this respect should be set aside. Petition is granted. G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006 LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some portions of their properties. Attached to the complaint is was Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong, which was created to appraise the properties that would be affected by the construction of the project in question. Commissioners submitted their report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market value of properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m., the Commissioners took into consideration the following factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Republic is bound and put in estoppel by the gross negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an error of law in affirming the amount fixed by the trial court based on the report of the board of commissioners. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 48 HELD: There was no reason why the Republic could not have moved to reconsider the assailed CA Decision or appealed it within the reglementary period. These procedural devices (reconsideration and appeal) were not only available; they would have also constituted plain, speedy and adequate remedies for questioning the alleged errors in the CA Decision. Petitions must be filed within 60 days. In the present case, the Petition was filed after over a year. The rule on non-estoppel of the government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice. The request was predicated on the conclusion that the "compensation costs as recommended by the commissioners and fixed by the court in the above-mentioned Decision are reasonable and acceptable"; and that the "move will hasten the legal process, thereby shorten the time of the proceedings and stop the running of interest. The more critical issue is the determination of the amount of just compensation for the expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605. The Republic avers that the values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by sufficient evidence. Leca, alleges that the fair market value ascribed to its property was not sufficient. As both the Republic and Leca correctly pointed out, however, the Commissioners' Report relied heavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties in the vicinity. It must be noted, though, that the interest of Petitioner Leca is distinct and separate from and will in no way affect the settled rights and interests of the other parties that did not appeal the judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation. JUST COMPENSATION: LEGAL INTEREST FOR EXPROPRIATION CASES G.R. No. 60225-26. May 8, 1992 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. ANGAS FACTS: National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. a consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. HELD: the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. It was declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private respondents by the Government through the National Power Corporation. G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004 WYCOCO V. JUDGE CASPILLO FACTS:  Felciano Wycoco owned 94.1690 hectares unirrigated and untenanted rice land- TCT No. NT.206422 and voluntarily offered to sell the land to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in line with the ( CARP) for P14.9M  A notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares for P1, 342, 667.46 by the DAR sent to him. The amount raised to P2,594,045.39 and later modified to P2,280,159.82 excluded the idle areas.  He refused and prompted the DAR to indorse the case to DARAB, fixing the just compensation.  DARAB requested the LBP to open a trust account for Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by the DAR and the properties were distributed to the beneficiaries.  On April 30, 93 he filed a manifestation in VOS case no. 232 NE 93.  While Cabanatuan Court acting as the Special Agrarian Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the RTC of Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case. 2. Whether or not there was a just compensation offered to the plaintiff. HELD:  Point out that there‘s no need for Wycoco to present an evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is in public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare. So the curt fixed the compensation of: P142,500.00- per hectare 94.1690- hectares (land size) P13,428,082- total compensation + actual damages P29,663,235.00 for unrealized profits and P8,475,210.00 legal interest  This must be paid by DAR .  DAR and LBP filed a separate petition before the CA and dismissed on May 29,97=Final execution June6,07 and Feb. 9,99 respectively. The dismissal prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before SC praying the execution of Cabanatuan court‘s decision and compelled Judge Caspillon to inhibit himself from the hearing of the case.  CA modified the decision, deducted the compensation due to Wycoco the amount corresponding to 3.372 hectares for it was found to have been previously sold to Republic.  Sec 50and 57 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform law of 1988)  DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted jurisdiction over the cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot lodge with administrative agencies.  Rule XIII Sec.II of New Rules of Procedures of DARAB  Sec.II… just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 49 but shall be brought directly to the RTC designated as Special Agrarian Court…  So RTC or Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case at bar because it is the designated as SAC.  RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidences so a fair compensation shall be determined. There are factors to be considered such as the cost of acquisition, size, shape, location and tax declaration, for ignoring the said factors, remand of the case for determination is necessary.  ―THIS CASE BE REMANDED TO RTC FOR THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COPENSATION. JUST COMPENSATION: WRIT OF POSSESSION G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001 CITY OF MANILA V. OSCAR SERRANO FACTS:  Ordinance No. 7833, enacted by the City Council of Manila authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila‘s First District in Tondo: TCT Nos. 70869,105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of the Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold to qualified occupants pursuant to Land Use Development Program of the City.  Lot 1-C One of the lots to be expropriated Consists of 343.10 square meters / 7 = produced 49 square meters for each person Covered by TCT No. 138272 from TCT No. 70869 This lot belongs to Feliza De Guia, upon her death, said lot was transferred to Alberto De Guia and then to Edgardo de Guia heir of Alberto, after the former‘s death. The said lot was again transferred to Lee Kuan Hui-TCT No. 217018 and subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia – TCT No. 226048. ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279. HELD:  On Sept 26, 1997 the petitioner filed an amended complaint for expropriation (RTC) to the supposed owners of the lots with TCT Nos. 70869 (including 1-c), 105201,105202 and 138273, the Serranos, heirs of late Demetria De Guia.  RTC issued an order to the petitioner to deposite P 1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the lot and the issuance of a writ of possession in their favor.  CA reversed RTC‘s decision and rather favored the respondents, in the reason that the petitioner failed to do the other modes of acquisition of property, that is to tried first in the city government before it can resort to expropriation, under R.A.7279  SC reinstated the decision of RTC, because in this case it is very early to determine if the petitioner has been granted the right to expropriate the property, since what has been issued by the RTC to them is just a writ of possession, which is not a right of an ownership. Under R.A. 7279 there are requirements that the petitioner‘s need to complied with before expropriating a property. To determine whether or not the petitioner complied it and the expropriation of the property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279, further proceeding must be made in RTC.  Thus the case was remanded back to RTC. G. R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005 REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON FACTS: A dispute occurred after the contract between the government and PIATCO has been nullified for its being contrary to law and public policy. PIATCO and other investors who funded the facilities for NAIA 3 cannot operate it and the government as well cannot took it over, for doing so the government would enrich itself unjustly by the PIATCO and other investor‘s expense. The government wanted to expropriate NAIA 3, but isn‘t it illogical that a government would expropriate the property it already owned? So, the expropriation would only be limited to the facilities and improvement that have been introduced to NAIA 3, with its equivalent just compensation. ISSUE: 1. Whether R.A. No.8974 or Rule 67 is applicable in property expropriation in the case at bar. 2. Whether Judge Gingoyon can be compelled to inhibit himself in the case HELD:  Prior to this case a decision to Agan v PIATCO has been rendered by the court, the 2004 Resolution: the government should fully paid first the owner of the properties subject for expropriation before it took the properties in its possession and ownership. This decision is final and executor.  Rule 67 stated: SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depository. - Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.  R.A. No. 8974 SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.- Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines: a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof; . . . c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.  Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.  Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned. . . .  Clearly that, applying Rule 67 would be a direct rebuke to 2004 Resolution in Agan and the court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executor orders. It would violate 2004 Resolution. Thus, it would be R.A.No. 8974 the applicable law for the expropriation- in which the government must pay first the just compensation to the property owner before it can took and use it.  R.A. No. 8974 well complemented with 2004 Resolution.  Judge Gingoyon cannot be compelled to inhibit himself, for incompetency may be ground for administrative sanction but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 50 JUST COMPENSATION: EXPROPRIATION OF UTILITIES, LANDED ESTATES, AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY G.R. No. L-12032, August 31, 1959 CITY OF BAGUIO vs. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY FACTS:  On April 25, 1956 a municipal corporation filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Baguio for declaratory relief against defendant, a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383, which contends that said Act does not include within its preview the Baguio Workshop System. In which the said Act is unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of the ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system without compensation and without due process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated.  On May 22, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Republic Act No. 1383 is a proper exercise of the police power of the State, that assuming that said Act contemplates an act of expropriation, it is still a constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain, that at any rate the Baguio Waterworks System is not a private property but a "public works of public service" over which the Legislature has control and that the provision of the said Act being clear and unambiguous, there is no necessity for construction.  On June 21, 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as well as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, denied the motion and ordered defendant to file its answer to the complaint. On July 6, 1956, defendant filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the ground already advanced in this motion to dismiss, adding thereto that the action for the declaratory relief is improper for the reason that the Baguio waterworks System has already been transferred to defendant pursuant to Republic Act No. 1383 or, if such has not been done, there has already been a breach of said Act. ISSUES: 1. Plaintiff's action for Declaratory relief is improper because there has already been a breach by plaintiff of Republic Act No. 1383 2. Republic Act No. 1383 does not contemplates the exercise of the power of eliminate domain but the exertion of the police power of the State; and 3. Assuming arguendo that Republic Act No. 1383 involves the exercise of the power of eminent domain the same does not violate our Constitution. HELD:  The decision maintain that the property held by a municipal corporation units private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such property against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of full compensation. (McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).  In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different. The people of a compact community usually require certain conveniences which cannot be furnished without a franchise from the State and which are either unnecessary in the rural districts, such as a system of sewers, or parks and open spaces, or which on account of the expenses it would be financially impossible to supply except where the population is reasonably dense, such as water or gas. But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized to exercise the functions of a private corporation, it is clothed with the capacities of a private corporation and may claim its rights and immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is subject to the liabilities of such a corporation, even as against third parties. (19 R.C. L. p. 698)  The attempt of appellant in having waterworks considered as public property subject to the control of Congress or one which can be regulated by the exercise of police power having failed, that question that now arises is: Does Republic Act No. 1383 provide for the automatic expropriation of the waterworks in question in the light of our Constitution? In other words, does said law comply with the requirements of section 6, Article XIII, in relation to section 1(2), Article III, of our Constitution?  Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides: SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of National Welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.  Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution provides: (2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  It is clear that the State may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to public ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. There is an attempt to observe this requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer of appellee's waterworks system to a national agency it was directed that the transfer be made upon payment of an equivalent value of the property. Has this been implemented? Has appellant actually transferred to appellee any asset of the NAWASA that may be considered just compensation for the property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to show that such was done. Neither is there anything to this effect in Office Memorandum No. 7 issued by the NAWASA in implementation of the provision of the Republic Act No. 1383. The law speaks of assets of the NAWASA by they are not specified. While the Act empowers the NAWASA to contract indebtedness and issue bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance when necessary for the transaction of its business (sec. 2, par. (L), sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action has been taken to comply with appellant's commitment in so far as payment of compensation of appellee is concerned. As to when such action should be taken no one knows. And unless this aspect of the law is clarified and appellee is given its due compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of its property even if appellant desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an effective payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution. In this respect, the decision of the trial court is correct.  Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968 THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA FACTS:  Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that "buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General." The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots), Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school (1 lot), Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (1 lot), and another 23 vacant lots. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 51 1948, RA 286 created the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. On 26 May 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to CA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. However, on 14 July 1951, a Cabinet Resolution was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.  On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Section 6 of the law provided that ―upon the approval of the Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General." On 11 January 1955, the Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July 1951. The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960, then for the quarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it.  However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga." On 12 July 1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation 2. Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be ordered to continue paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments to Zamboanga del Norte. HELD:  WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials the corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are assessed against the defendants.  It is SO ORDERED. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 52 - DUE PROCESS - PURPOSE OF GUARANTY 110 US 516, 1884 HURTADO VS CALIFORNIA *no case digest submitted* MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY 431 SCRA 534 CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO *no case digest submitted* 233 SCRA 163 LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted* SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 86 SCRA 275, 1978 VILLEGAS VS. HU CHONG TSAI PAO HO *no case digest submitted* 39 Phil 660; No. 14078; March 7, 1919 RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO FACTS:  The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.  In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.  Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.  It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.  It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. ISSUES: 1. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty? 2. Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional? HELD:  The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.  Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor- General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.  One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.  ―Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.  None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.  Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. VOID FOR VAGUENESS/OVERBREADTH 292 SCRA 141 (1998) BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES FACTS:  On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308 entitled ―Adoption of National and Computerized Identification Reference System‖. The purposes of the said order are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and foreign residents with the convenience to transact businesses with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations because it will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify person seeking basic services on social security.  Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for two vital constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power of Congress to legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenry‘s protected zone of privacy. ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional for being overbreadth? HELD:  The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that the broadness, vagueness and overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the people‘s right to privacy in clear and present danger.  Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what specific biological characteristics will be gathered (b) what particular biometrics technology will be employed (c) whether data is limited to use for identification purposes only (d) how data will be handled (e)who shall control and access the data.  Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy because, as technology advances, the level of reasonable expected privacy decreases. G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 53 JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS:  The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President Joseph Ejercito Estrada together with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan, and Delia Rajsas of the crime of plunder defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec. 12 R.A. No. 7659.  During the term of President Estrada, he together with the individuals mentioned above wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth amounting to four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos (4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.  Under RA 7080 ―An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder‖ as amended by RA 7659 Section 2, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (50,000,000) and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.  Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.  Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms and ―combination‖ and ―series‖ in the key phrase ―a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts‖ found in Section 1 par. d, and the word ―pattern‖ in Section 4. ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for it suffers from the vice of vagueness? HELD:  The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.  The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. GR No. 171390, May 3, 2006 DAVID VS. ARROYO *no case digest submitted* GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005 ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint against petitioner Ong, a former Commissioner of the BIR claiming that petitioner has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. The Director of the Fact Finding Committee of the office of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of investigation on the matter; of which petitioner was required to submit counter affidavit and controverting evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submitting his Statements of Assets and Liabilities, income tax return, bank certificates showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking Corporation, certificate from SGV and company and other documents explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned assets. Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Ra 1379, in relation to RA‘s 3019 and 6770 against Ong and all other person‘s concerned. ISSUE/S: 1. WON, the right to preliminary investigation is withheld by RA 1379 from a co-respondent Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officer or employee. 2. WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that the office of the Ombudsman is disqualified to file a petition for forfeiture considering of the duality of function, as investigator and prosecutor of the case. 3. WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that RA1379 is unconstitutional since it violates the presumption of innocence and the right against self incrimination. HELD: 1. No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the public officer or employee who has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 54 proportion to his salary and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, the reality thst the application of the law is such that the conjugal share of Nelly Ong stands to be subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her the right, in line with the due process clause of the constitution, to a preliminary investigation. 2. No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Ombudsman has the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth. 3. No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot invoked constitutional assurance against self incrimination because such right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications to the accused. In this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They may present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market placements and other fund sources in their defense. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PUBLIC REQUIREMENT 146 SCRA 446, 1986 TANADA VS. TUVERA *no case digest submitted* 263 SCRA 421, 1996 PITC VS. ANGELES *no case digest submitted* GR No. 147096, January 15, 2002 REPUBLIC VS. EXTELCOM *no case digest submitted* PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - IMPARTIAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL 141 SCRA 307, 1986 TANADA VS. PAEC *no case digest submitted* 119 SCRA 353, 1982 ANZALDO VS. CLAVE *no case digest submitted* GR No. 159190, June 30, 2005 TEJANO VS. OMBUDSMAN *no case digest submitted* 273 US 510, 1997 TUMEY VS. OHIO *no case digest submitted* 262 SCRA 452, 1996 PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS *no case digest submitted* 268 SCRA 332, 1997 TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted* PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - NOTICE & HEARING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD GR No. 170288, September 22, 2006 BUDIONGAN VS. DE LA CRUZ *no case digest submitted* G.R. No. 114944. June 19, 2001 ROXAS VS VASQUEZ FACTS:  A complaint was filed by the then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III before the Ombudsman against certain officers of the Philippine National Police including herein petitioners Police General Manuel C. Roxas and Police Colonel Ahmed S. Nacpil for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). This was after the Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and purchasing of sixty fire trucks.  After a review of the preliminary investigation conducted, an Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan which excluded herein petitioners and three others among the accused.  However, upon motion, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Without any notice to or participation of the petitioners, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued the first assailed Order, dismissing the charges against Generals Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that the petitioners together with P/Lt. Col. Julian Kairan be likewise indicted.  Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however it was disapproved. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading petitioners as additional accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners‘ indictment, on reinvestigation, was without notice nor participation of petitioners, hence, null and void for being violative of their constitutional right to due process. HELD:  Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners at the reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of respondent Office of the Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly settled in the recent case of Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we held as follows --  xxx. And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that ―under the Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman [Administrative Order No. 07], particularly Sec. 7, in relation to Sec. 4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman actively participated therein, their participation is no longer accorded to them as a matter of right in the stage of the reinvestigation.‖ In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. (underscoring ours)  At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case No. 18956. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 55 A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004 MAROHOMBSAR VS JUDGE ADIONG FACTS:  Herein complainant Bailinang P. Marohombsar was the defendant in a civil case for ―injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction‖ filed by Yasmira Pangandapun questioning the legality of Marohombsar‘s appointment as provincial social welfare officer V of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to Marohombsar‘s appointment, Pangandapun used to occupy said position as officer in charge.  Judge Adiong issued the temporary restraining order. During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the following day.  A complaint was thereafter filed against Judge Santos B. Adiong of the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Marohombsar for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming of a judge in connection with his issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary restraining order in the civil case involving herein complainant. ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant was denied due process because the preliminary injunction was issued without hearing. HELD:  In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his position. [180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989] PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ FACTS:  Herein petitioner, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing and that the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process. HELD:  The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.  While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.  It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.  WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE. 101 Phil 833 (1957) SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE FACTS:  On or about June 21, 1954, Emilio Suntay took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge with her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. Alicia‘s father, Dr. Antonio Nubla, filed a verified complaint against accused in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.  On January 10, 1955, the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. He left the Philippines for San Francisco, where he enrolled in school.  On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law."  Hence, this petition to annul the order. ISSUES: 1. WON the Court‘s order for the cancellation of the petitioner‘s passport is illegal. 2. WON the Secretary for Foreign Affairs can exercise his discretion of cancelling the passport without hearing. HELD:  The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 56 directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.  Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.  The petition is denied. 8 SCRA 244 (1963) DE BISSHOP VS GALANG FACTS:  Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three years as the prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax.  The Commissioner of Immigration advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days.  De Bisshop filed the present case for prohibition to desist from arresting and detaining him. ISSUE: WON the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens. HELD:  The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.  The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. . . . In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. 161 SCRA 232 (1988) VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO FACTS:  The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.  After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position paper.  Public respondent rendered judgment and dismissed the case for some of the employees; other employees were entitled to payments by the complainant. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners' counsel at his address, through the receptionist. According to Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing the decision  Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served. On November 23,1987, petitioners, through new counsel, filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.  Hence, this petition to annul the judgment by public respondent and the writ of execution be set aside. ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process of law because Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing. HELD:  Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 57 June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions.  The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS [GR 46496, 27 February 1940] ANG TIBAY VS CIR FACTS:  Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion for new trial of the National Labor Union.  The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.  Principles behind the case: 1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separation of powers The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm- laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum ―canon‖ or rental to be paid by the ―inquilinos‖ or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. 2. The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements, but not free to ignore or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process involving proceedings of administrative character. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 3. Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative proceedings; Guidelines a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be ―substantial.‖ Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‖ e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 4. New trial granted under circumstances The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 58 created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. 77 SCRA 321, 1977 MONTEMAYOR VS ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION FACTS: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process. HELD: The Constitution assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of Labor during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case. Furthermore, with regards to petitioner‘s filing of MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to their requirements of due process as the witnesses against him were not called so that petitioner could cross-examine them, this cannot be given credit. Petitioner did not object to the presentation of the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses at the school investigation and did not assert his right to cross-examine them. Petitioner waived his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on the strength of his evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in the NLRC. Petitioner's only right is to be heard Petition dismissed. 11 SCRA 317, 1964 MERALCO VS PSC FACTS:  Meralco made several applications for the revision and reduction of its rate, which were approved by the Commission. On June 9, 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. It was then examined and a report was submitted to the commission.  Hearing was reset from May 30, 1956 to June 22, 1956. On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing".  After reports had been submitted with regards to the auditing, Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO.  Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the said Commission handed down a decision, wherein Meralco is required to reduce its present authorized rates effective January 1, 1958 based on the authorized rates.  Hence, the present petition for review with preliminary injunction which was issued by this Court ISSUE: Whether or Not there was a violation of due process, thus the decision of the court is considered void. HELD: The record shows that no hearing was held.  On June 22, 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding.  The record further shows that after the "preliminary hearing" held on June 22, 1956, no other hearing was held; the cases were never set for hearing; and Meralco was not given an opportunity to present evidence to rebut the audit report  The decision therefore was null and void having been rendered without any hearing; the Commission could not validly make findings of fact without affording petitioner the right to cross- examine and confront witnesses, as well as the right to present its evidence; the decision contained findings contrary to law and at any event, the decision was based on obsolete allegations of fact, and since the submission of the audit report of the GAO, on whose allegations the decision was predicated, there had occurred recent developments which had substantially altered the situation of the Meralco and which have to be taken into account by the Commission, in fixing just and reasonable rates  It should be remembered that there should be no short cuts in the disposition of the time-honored principle that no one should be deprived of his life, liberty and property, without due process of law. Considering the fact that the reduction of rates herein sought might involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged to have been committed, if true, would affect likewise not only the right of the petitioner but also public interest, it would have been a better part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the final resolution of the controversy  "Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law", which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. "Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated. 145 SCRA 100, 1986 ATENEO vs. CA FACTS:  Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the university charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, a boarder and first year student of the university with unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria  "Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini … was asking for 'siopao.' I was at the counter and I told him that the 'siopao' had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr. Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing presence of other boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going to give back his money without any CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 59 contempt. He retorted that he did not like to accept the money. He got madder and started to curse again. Then he threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But then he actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell him myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying because I was hurt."  The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. Based on the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university. This triggered the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.  In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning.  After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 (actual damages); P50,000.00 (moral damages); P5,000.00 (attorney's fees) and to pay the costs of the suit  Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.  However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the appellate court, the lower court's decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.  The petitioner now asks to review and reverse the resolution of the division of five ISSUE/S: 1. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process of law 2. WON respondent‘s complaint for recovery of damages was premature because administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted 3. WON private respondents are entitled to damages HELD: Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed. 1. No, he was accorded due process.  Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual findings of trial courts and administrative agencies  The appellate court resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts by administrative officers in matters falling within their competence will not generally be reviewed by the courts, and the principle that findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.  The court does not agree. The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of trial courts and administrative tribunals is correct as a general principle. However, it is subject to well established exceptions. Factual findings of trial courts are disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of the parties or the evidence presented.  A similar rule applies to administrative agencies. By reason of their special knowledge and expertise, we ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever (1) the factual findings are not supported by evidence; (2) where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; (3) where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; (4) when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest  Why he is deemed to have been accorded due process  When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the waitress and his slapping her on the face. Rev. Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop with the admission. He interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon who were present during the incident.  The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty -Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes of the same College. There is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is concerned.  Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were met.  The claim that there was no due process because the private respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings will also not stand. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed. When informed about the December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case was not the fault of the petitioner university.  Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping incident. Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).  Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened to her because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, but this did not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that the altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but normal on the part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramon who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top which she threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thus adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was "unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the university, specifically under the 1967- 1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic regulation (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal from CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 60 the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Paño, 137 SCRA 245).  Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the College of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the College of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university one of the provisions of which is as follows: under the title "Dining Room" - "The kitchen help and server should always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and precisely because of her service to boarders, not to mention her sex, she deserved more respect and gracious treatment.  The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law in the appellate court's ruling on due process. 2. No, complaint was not premature.  The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in view of its pending appeal from the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It argues that the private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court was premature.  The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents can recover damages as a result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can be done. The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts. 3. No, there is no basis for recovery of damages.  There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same offense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school. Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second semester were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.  There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was get up to protect the privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University in this case. 161 SCRA 7, 1988 ALCUAZ vs. PSBA FACTS:  Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded the school because they wanted to admin to hear their grievances with regards to ―not being able to participate in the policy-making of the school‖, despite the regulations set by the admin with regards to protest actions  During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987.  Court ordered the school authorities to create a special investigating committee to conduct an investigation, who made recommendations which the school adopted  A lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing and answering the complaints  Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due process when they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.  Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that there be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ? 2. WON there was contempt of Court by the respondents HELD: 1. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.  There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for 'one semester. after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties."  The Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Standards of procedural due process are: a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; b. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and e.the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.  Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributed at the beginning of each school  Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administration.  Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was taken by the school when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an investigating body.  The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986.  Findings of the investigating committee: 1. students disrupted classes 2. petitioners involved were found to be academically deficient & the teachers are found to have committed various acts of misconduct.  The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court has ruled CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 61 that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution.  Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless : 1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence; 2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; 3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; 4. when palpable errors are committed; or 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.  Investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate. 2. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable.  No defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction.  Respondent school has fully complied with its duties under the temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic. GR No. 89317, May 30, 1990 NON vs. DANES FACTS:  Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re- enroll because they participated in student mass actions against their school the preceding sem  On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present in their classes  Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower court considered that in signing their enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be re-enrolled. ―The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students xxx whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx‖  In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their alma matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner that would not put the college in a bad light.  Judge Dames‘ decision considering these facts said that what the students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school. ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re- admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. àYES RATIO:  In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one semester and contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is deemed terminated.  However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass action.  This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-à-vis the right of school officials to discipline them.  The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. In protesting grievances disorder is more or less expected because emotions run high. That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Consti is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my be barred from re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies.  Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school. Constitutional freedom of free speech and assembly also not absolute. However, imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process and penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. (procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right to ans the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them, right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be duly considered)  The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued with public interest. The Consti allows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107 and 137 of the respondent school‘s manual, a student is enrolled not just for one sem but for the entire period necessary for the student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232 gives the students the right to continue their course up to graduation.  Academic freedom not a ground for denying students’ rights. In Villar, the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.  School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer students say they are graduating students and if there are any deficiencies these do not warrant non-readmission. Also there are more students with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted. And some of the petitioners had no failing marks.  The court held that the students were denied due process in that there was no due investigation. In fact it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought.  Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate to the offense committed with due process.  But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced. Moot and academic. They‘ve already suffered enough. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 62 - TAXATION - PURPOSE G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE FACTS: The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this commission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959. Algue filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue had to accept the warrant of distrant and levy. Algue, however, filed a petition for review with the Coourt of Tax Appeals. ISSUE: Whether the assessment was reasonable. HELD:  Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must contribute his share in the running of the government. The Government, for his part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.  Tax collection, however, should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1] of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven that the payment of fees was reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP) to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a business requiring millions of pesos.  The assessment was not reasonable. 177 SCRA 27, 1989 COMMISSIONER VS. MAKASIAR *no case digest submitted* TAX EXEMPTIONS 33 PHIL 217, 1916 YMCA VS. CIR *no case digest submitted* 51 PHIL 352, 1927 BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS PROVINCIAL BOARD *no case digest submitted* 14 SCRA 292, 1965 LLADOC VS CIR *no case digest submitted* 107 SCRA 104, 1981 THE PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO FACTS:  In this case the provincial city assessor of Abra filed a certiorari and mandamus against the ruling made by Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of First Instance of Abra, it was because respondent denied a motion for declaratory relief by Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such exemption without even hearing the side of the petitioner. Petitioner further argued that clearly the judge ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and disregards the basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in the constitution. The important argument made by the petitioner is that the judge failed to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464 which states that" No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code until the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties within this time herein specified for their performance unless such irregularities, informalities or failure shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that the taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by the court in the pending proceeding."  The judge responded by saying there is no dispute that the properties including their procedure are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes." HELD:  The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be granted since the judge would not have made such a grave mistake if he had only made a clear distinction between the present provisions of the constitution to the provisions of the 1935 constitution regarding tax exemptions on land, buildings and improvements. The main difference is that in order for a land, building, or improvement to be tax exempt, there must be and exclusive, actual and direct use of the enumerated for religious or charitable purposes. It is also a rule that tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris  The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds for the protection of due process to clearly show if the respondents really did not violate any constitutional provisions in regards to tax exemption but instead, what respondent judge did was directly ruled on the case of declaratory relief on the basis that it was exclusive, actual, and directly as sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop as compared to the motion to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction since the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of procedural due process. 162 SCRA 106, 1988 ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 63 FACTS:  This is a case for a review or certiorari on the decision made by the defunct Court of First Instance of Abra Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656. In this case the court decided that the seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Provincial Treasurer of the said province of the lot and building of Abra Valley College, Inc. to be valid since the said school was not tax exempt. What transpired was the school was issued a ―Notice of Seizure‖ of the lot and building of the school covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner for failure to pay the amount of P5,140.31 back taxes by the respondent The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.  After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the dismissal of the case and after exchange of pleadings the court ordered the respondent treasurers to deliver the proceeds of the auction sale. Finally the parties involved entered into a Stipulation of Facts administered by the court dismissing the notice of seizure and notice of sale in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all the back taxes of the school upon the payment of the auction price.  Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts found out that the school was recognized by the government offering Primary High School and College courses and has a population of more than 100,000 students all in all; that the school was situated right in the heart of town of Bangued, Abra a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; that the high school and college students are housed in the main building; that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. In light of the evidences it was left after the courts to determine whether the said school was exclusively for educational purposes.  The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of taxes.  The trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision. After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition was filed on August 17, 1974. In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition Respondents were required to answer said petition. The petitioners raised the arguments that the courts a quo: 1. made an error in sustaining a valid seizure and sale of the college lot and building used for educational purpose 2. Made an error in declaring that the college was not exclusively for educational purposes merely because the college president resides in it 3. made an error in declaring the college not tax exempt from property taxes and in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 as realty taxes. 4. made an error in ordering the confiscation of the P6,000.00 deposit made in the court by petitioner as payment of the P5,140.31 realty taxes. ISSUE: Whether Abra Valley College Inc. subject to tax exemption as stated in the constitution that a school should be ―exclusively for educational purpose‖ despite the proof that there are other purpose attached to the lot and building such as a residence of the College president? HELD:  In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes ... Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides that churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes  The Supreme court ruled that the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes and that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.  While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, they may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.  Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.  PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner 101 PHIL 386, 1957 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA FACTS:  In this case the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, religious, missionary organization duly registered in the Philippines and doing business through its agency here in Manila. In the course of their ministry, their Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect Upon knowledge the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, requiring the plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees were CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 64 being collected which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action. The plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and a refund should be made by the defendant of the payments made and the legal costs. The defendant replied that, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances  Before the trial the party submitted a stipulation of facts stating the sales made by the petitioner from 1945 to 1953. When the case was set for hearing the plaintiff argued that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work. The defendant answered that due to the cross-examination of the lone witness of plaintiff it was proven that the claim of plaintiff that if having no profit from the sales is evidently untenable. This made the judge to dismiss the case for lack of merit on the grounds thatfrom the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364).  Not satisfied with the decision, they took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court where the petitioner argued these points 1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not unconstitutional 2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos. 2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; 3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and 4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar. HELD:  In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant- appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.  Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. DOUBLE TAXATION 95 PHIL 46, 1954 PUNZALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA *no case digest submitted* LICENSE FEES GR No. 10448, August 30, 1957 PHYSICAL THERAPY ORG. VS MUNICIPAL BOARD *no case digest submitted* CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 65 - EQUAL PROTECTION - SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION 163 SCRA 386, 1988 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON FACTS:  The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS‖.  The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges its Constitutional validity.  On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. ISSUE: WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure is valid under the Constitution, assailing:  "discrimination against males or females;"  that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"  and that it is violative of the right to travel  it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. HELD:  The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.  As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.  The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.  Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.  "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.  The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.  Petition dismissed. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 99 PHIL, 1856 PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ FACTS:  This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks, members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.  Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong, admits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim, Marciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan, Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer and who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provincial board member.  The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda refused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the Huks. He supported Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate. ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only of homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that the trial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime and in sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. HELD:  Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with Pangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed. His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him.  That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was forcibly removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty for several hours and was then brought to another place where he was killed. While under interrogation, his grave was already being prepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him, caused him to fall into his grave.  We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and that CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 66 the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective. From the surrounding circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, as observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended to terrorize the supporters of Lazatin.  Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for that offense.  The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209 and other cases).  Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, which is more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo  However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78) years old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him.  WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense that the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in article 40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. 85 PHIL 648, 1950 PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN FACTS:  Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two other companions managed to ran away.  Accused admitted to committing the said crime ISSUE: The only question raised with much earnestness by his attorney de oficio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal Code classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is unconstitutional, because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than the taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby denies him the equal protection of the laws. HELD:  In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3 Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves cannot be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves.4 There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied  The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection with article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision correccional to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4 years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed decision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered. GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998 CHAVES VS. PCGG FACTS:  Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.  Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth. HELD:  In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants. Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner.  With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. The foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petition granted. 111 SCRA 433, 1982 NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS:  Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. Respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 67  To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. To quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous.  The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The Constitution specifically mentions the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. GR No. 142030, April 21, 2005 GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE FACTS:  Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, Sanggunian Bayan members, all public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.  The information filed with the Sandiganbayan stated that herein petitioners caused undue injury to the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, by refusing to perform their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10.  Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. A special prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners‘ motion. ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded the equal protection of laws. HELD:  Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor.  The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor‘s conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise.  The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another. Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit PUBLIC POLICY [G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL. FACTS:  PNB was formerly a government owned and controlled corporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized and incorporated as a private commercial bank.  R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1 July 1989 covering all government owned corporations. Section 12 thereof provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates, but certain additional compensation were exempted from consolidation. In the present case, the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to be granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989.  "The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to implement R.A. 6758. On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court, in the case of Rodolfo S. de Jesus, et al. of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) vs. Commission on Audit held that DBM- CCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.  "In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case, a petition for mandamus was filed by respondents on 20 December 1999. Respondents alleged, that they are employees hired by PNB on various dates after 30 June 1989; that from the dates of their respective appointments until 1 January 1997 they were unjustly deprived and denied of the allowances being enjoyed by other employees of PNB. According to respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 was CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 68 ineffective paved the way to their entitlement to the allowances/fringe benefits. The withholding of their entitlement to the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a violation of respondents' rights to the equal protection clause of the Constitution since incumbents or employees of PNB who were already in the service as of 1 July 1989 received the benefits and allowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issued General Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the benefits to respondents effective 1 January 1997. But Respondents contend that extending to them the allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the payment of the same and, hence, they should be given their allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from the date of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accede to. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Court of Appeals denied petitioner‘s appeal. Thus, this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned fringe benefits HELD:  The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they were hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office.  Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the prior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was correct in contending that by extending the assailed benefits to respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting that the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an illegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them those benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that — as a private entity — it could legally do so.  The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper, because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly — not collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised in the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to this Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now challenge the very basis of their arguments?  A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it in seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.  WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. [G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.] CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the New Central Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional because the classification of BSP employees provided by law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the assailed proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner contended that the classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contended that the assailed proviso is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the Government Service Insurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines, Development Bank of the Philippines and Social Security System were also amended, and their respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of Government Financial Institutions (GFI), the BSP rank-and-file employees are also discriminated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law HELD:  Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.  The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.  Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is held unconstitutional. [G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.] UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter- requests to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 69 and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same prime time and the same number of television and radio stations all over the country to be used in its campaign for "NO" votes in the plebiscite for the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on the proposed constitutional amendments. The Commission, in its Resolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's "demand'' being of the view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments in the forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six (26) television and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stations throughout the country were initiated under his leadership and capacity as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutional prerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policy pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the head of any political party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration proved futile, hence this present action, assailing the Comelec's resolutions as contrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and inequitable for violating the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same not conducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause for denying UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the President in campaigning for the ―NO‖ votes in the plebiscite for the amendments to the 1973 Contstitution. HELD: The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when the President spoke in the nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President- Prime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what petitioner asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petition the television and radio stations as indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act. Appeal dismissed. 227 SCRA 703 (1993) PJA VS PRADO *no case digest submitted* 248 SCRA 700, 1995 OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted* GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999 TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS *no case digest submitted* G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005 COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al vs. RUBEN TORRES, as Executive Secretary, et al FACTS: On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. The law contains provisions on tax exemptions for importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. After which the President issued several Executive Orders as mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227. Herein petitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive legislation. HELD:  To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the Legislature to create a free port where the ―free flow of goods or capital within, into, and out of the zones‖ is insured. The phrase ―tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment‖ was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious from the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of the phrase ―such as,‖ that the enumeration only meant to illustrate incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone.  The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that ―. . .the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments.‖ However, the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being contrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly provides that ―exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.‖ G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000 ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing FACTS: Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better treatment of their colleagues who have been hired abroad. These foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not accorded the local-hires which include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local- hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the school is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. ISSUE: Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent school constitutes racial discrimination. Held: YES.  The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."  The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 70 employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.  In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.  The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003 PHILRECA vs. DILG FACTS: On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party. From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan. Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax. ISSUES: 1. WON the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violated the equal protection clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines? 2. Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between the Philippine and the US Governments? HELD: 1. No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under RA 6938. First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of funds. a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid- up share capital be less than P2,000.00. b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that ―every local government unit shall enjoy local autonomy,‖ does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein. Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class. 2. No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties. The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 71 GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005, RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH FACTS:  Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).  Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.‖  Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.‖  Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled ―An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.‖  The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.  On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers 2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules violate the equal protection clause 3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power HELD:  Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and valid.  Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself.  It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.  The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2.  What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.  We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. Third, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.  The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State‘s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.  Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine. GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways FACTS:  On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01- 034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).  Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.  Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the said administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.  On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting petitioners‘ application for preliminary injunction. On July 16, 2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court, conditioned upon petitioners‘ filing of cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with.  On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).  Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 72 Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.  Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003.  Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA 2000 2. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional HELD:  The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by the then Department of Public Works and Communications on February 19, 1968, that bans the use of bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized vehicle on limited access highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is not an ordinary road, the same ―necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.‖  On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and in violation of ―The Limited Access Highway Act‖ (RA 2000) Department Orders 74 and 215 released by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated April 5, 1993 and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the North and South Luzon (DO 74), and the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities. The Court explained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer had authority to regulate activities related to transportation.  In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of Public Works and Communications when it had the authority to regulate limited access facilities.  Likewise, the Court upheld the decision of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch 147 declaring DO 123, which limits access to the above expressways to only 400cc motorcycles, as unconstitutional for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate the said order. G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 People vs. Jalosjos FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives HELD:  Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.  The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.  The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused- appellant‘s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Trillanes vs Pimentel FACTS:  At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. [1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.  In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.  Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.  Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests‖  The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three. [7] The trial court just the same denied the motion.  The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not the "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests‖ constitutional. HELD:  The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.  It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides.  All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.  It is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 73 application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.  He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.  Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non- bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.  In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.\  Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002 USA vs PURGANAN FACTS:  Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.  Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.  The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition  In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his ―immediate arrest‖ pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.  Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an ―Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,‖# which prayed that petitioner‘s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.  In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.  The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.# After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. HELD:  After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.  In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.  The Constitution guarantees: ‗x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.‘ This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.  The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‗mandate of the people‘ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.  A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.  A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.  The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.  We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003 Farinas vs Executive Secretary FACTS:  The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.  According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 74  Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.  The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:  SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.  They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.  The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit.  Invoking the ―enrolled bill‖ doctrine. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.  The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, ―An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,‖ is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. HELD:  The petitioners‘ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.  The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.# The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:  The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.  Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure# while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.  Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.  By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.  Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.  In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.# No such transgression has been shown in this case.  WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED GR No. 1288845, June 01, 2000 INT’L SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS QUISUMBING *no case digest submitted* CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 75 - THE NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE - EMERGENCY POWERS 93 PHIL 68, 1953 RUTTER VS ESTEBAN *no case digest submitted* ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES 154 SCRA 142, 1987 VILLANUEVA VS CASTANEDA *no case digest submitted* G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988 SANGALANG VS IAC FACTS:  Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block  Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with appellant Ayala  The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale  The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to be and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare  On April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati . Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street  There is a perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of Jupiter Street the destruction of which opened the street to the public. ISSUE: Whether or not the MMC Ordinance represents a legitmate exercise of police power? HELD : Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. [G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000] ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, respondents. FACTS:  On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot: be used exclusively…for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building will be constructed thereon,… The BUYER shall not erect…any sign or billboard on the roof…for advertising purposes… restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate…These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.  In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81- 01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.  On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01? 2. Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred from questioning the conditions of said deed HELD:  The legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,# nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene ―law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Non impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.# Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.  A real party in interest is defined as ―the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.‖ It is noted that the lessee who built the commercial structure, it is he and he alone who stands to be either benefited or injured by the results of the judgment in Civil Case No. 64931. He avers he is the party with real interest in the subject matter of the action, as it would be his business, not the Hermosos. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983 AURELIO TIRO vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS FACTS:  In Civil Case No. 11616 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools.  Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 76 21. ISSUE: The core issue is whether or not Circular No. 21 is valid and enforceable and the answer is definitely in the affirmative. HELD:  The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.  Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do. ADMIN REG - RENTAL LAWS G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992 Caleon vs. Agus Development Corporation FACTS: Respondent is the owner of a parcel of land which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the apartment for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. For failure of petitioner to comply with the demand, private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the required sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25). The petitioner argued that the said law cannot be applied because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition in subleasing which had been in effect between the parties long before the enactment of BP 25. ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which is a ground for Ejectment. 2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 in application to the case at bar, is unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts. 3. WON the petitioner can invoke the promotion of social justice policy of the New Constitution. HELD:  The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome vs. Gotico where the court ruled that the leased of the building naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of the building to the lot. Under our Civil Code, the occupancy of a building or house not only suggests or implies the tenancy or possession in fact on the land on which they are constructed. In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that petitioner in leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed which lot belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she has violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which enumerates the grounds for judicial ejectment, among which is the subleasing of residential units without the written consent of the owner/lessor.  Well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.  In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.  Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by this Court as a police power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to July 14, 1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied.  Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of social justice policy of the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, the objective of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is to remedy the plight of lessees, but such objective is not subject to exploitation by the lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, the prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the premises without the consent of the owner. As enunciated by this Court, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto.  The petition is denied for lack of merit. ADMIN REG - TAX EXEMPTIONS G.R. No. 131359 May 5, 1999 MERALCO vs. Province of Laguna and Benito Balazo FACTS:  Province of Laguna by virtue of existing laws issued resolutions through their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (―MERALCO‖) for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas.  On 1991, Republic Act No. 7160 was enacted to take effect on 1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province enacted an Ordinance imposing a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the preceding calendar year within this province, including the territorial limits on any city located in the province.  Based on the ordinance, respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. Petitioner paid the tax which is under protest. A formal claim for refund was thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under Laguna Provincial Ordinance, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which provides, “Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current.*** Such franchise tax shall be payable…be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 77 national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.‖  The claim was denied; respondents relied on a more recent law, Republic Act No. 7160 than the old decree invoked by petitioner. Petitioner MERALCO filed a complaint for refund. ISSUE: WON Laguna Provincial ordinance is violative of the non- impairment clause of the Constitution and of PD No. 551. HELD:  Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.  Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 of RA 7160, tax exemptions or incentives enjoyed by certain entities.  In the recent case the Court has held that the phrase in lieu of all taxes ―have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges,‖ and that ―upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions except only as provided therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax.‖ In fine, the Court has viewed its previous rulings as laying stress more on the legislative intent of the amendatory law – whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not – rather than on whether the law can withdraw, without violating the Constitution, the tax exemption or not.  While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts.  These contractual tax exemptions are not to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires.  Petition is dismissed. G.R. No. L-13307 February 3, 1919 La Insular vs. Machuca FACTS:  La Insular is a commercial partnership engaged in the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes in the city of Manila. On 1913, a contract was entered into between its general agent and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco, whereby the plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to Manuel Nubla. The price was fixed at 172 per box. Manuel is the principal obligor while Rafael Machuca bound himself as surety, jointly and severally with Manuel Nubla. It appears that when the contract was executed cigarettes were subject to a specific tax of the peso for each thousand cigarettes. This tax was, under the law then prevailing, paid by the manufacturer, and the liability for said tax naturally fell upon the plaintiff. By Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914, the Philippine Legislature increased the specific tax on cigarettes from P1 to P1.20 per thousand cigarettes, and by amendatory Act No. 2445, effective from January 1, 1915, it was declared that, as regards contracts already made for future delivery, the burden of the increased tax should, unless the parties should have otherwise agreed, be borne by the person to whom the article taxed should be furnished.  After this provision become effective, the plaintiff continued, as before, to pay the internal-revenue taxes and in order to reimburse itself to the extent of the outlay incident to the increase in the tax added the amount of P10 per box to the price of the cigarettes. The monthly statements thereafter submitted to the purchaser by the plaintiff showed this increase; and as payments were from time to time made by Nubla, they were credited by the plaintiff upon account, with the result that, upon the showing of the plaintiff's books and assuming that Nubla had been properly charged with the increased tax, all cigarettes delivered prior to August 1, 1916, had been fully paid for. During the months of August and September, however, fifty-six cases of cigarettes were taken by Nubla, for which no payment has been made; and for the recovery of the amount alleged to be due for these cigarettes this action was instituted by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance. Judgment having been there rendered in favor of the plaintiff, both defendants have appealed. The trial court ruled that as a surety, Machura‘s liability was limited to the payment of the price stipulated in the original contract. ISSUE: WON Legislative Acts mentioned altered the obligation of the contract in question as to release the surety in his indebtedness. HELD:  Article 1827 of the Civil Code declares that the liability of a surety is not to be extended, by implication, beyond the terms of his contract. Well-recognized rule of jurisprudence, that if any material alteration or change in the obligation of the principal obligator is effected by the immediate parties to the contract, without the asset of the surety, the latter is discharged. In order to effect a release of the surety, the change in the contract must, as a general rule, be made by the principal parties to the contract. Indeed, no valid or effective change in the contract can, generally speaking, be made by any other person than the actual parties thereto. A recognized exception — more apparent than real — is found in cases where sureties on official bonds have been held to be released as a result of changes effected by the Legislature in the duration of the official term or in the duties of the officer whose fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. The law is particularly watchful over the rights of sureties. To permit parties to alter and modify their contracts as they please, and to hold the sureties answerable for the performance of such parts as were not altered, would be transferring their responsibility, without their consent, from one contract to another. The contract, by the modification and alternation, becomes a new and different contract, and one for which the sureties never become responsible.  Based on the recognized exemption, the Acts of the Legislature by which the increased tax on cigarettes was imposed neither CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 78 impaired, in a constitutional sense, the obligation of the contract which is the basis of this action nor changed that obligation in such sense as to occasion the discharge of the surety.  The surety is clearly bound by the application of the payments made by the creditor with the assent of the principal debtor, and no doubt that when Manuel Nubla from time to time paid the bills submitted by the plaintiff, and which, after January 1, 1915, showed an increased of P10 per case in the price of the cigarettes, he very well knew that this additional amount was due to the inclusion of the new tax paid by the plaintiff.  The judgment appealed from is affirmed. ADMIN REG - POLICE POWER GR L-63419, 18 December 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ FACTS:  Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L- 66839-42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR 74524-25), Abad vs. Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 (GR 75812-13), Hojas vs. Penaranda (GR 75765-67) and People vs. Nitafan (GR 75789) are cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP 22 which were consolidated herein as the parties (defendants) thereto question the constitutionality of the statute, BP 22.  The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected asked for relief. ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is constitutional. HELD: YES. The language of BP22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or post dated, whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value. BP 22 is aimed to put a stop or to curb the practice of issuing worthless checks, which is proscribed by the State because of the injury it causes to public interests. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check which is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law publishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The statute is not unconstitutional. G.R. No. L-20344 May 16, 1966 ILUSORIO VS. CAR FACTS:  Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, upon the ground that it violates the freedom of contract and impairs property rights, as well as the obligation of contracts.  Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents herein have for years worked on said land under the share tenancy system. Before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity with the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, that they (respondents) wanted to change their tenancy contract from said system to leasehold tenancy. The Ilusorios having refused to agree thereto, said respondents — and three other tenants whose claims were dismissed by the Court of Agrarian Relations — instituted this proceedings, in said court, on November 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitioners herein, as respondents in said court, is that the aforementioned Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, is unconstitutional, which was rejected by the lower court. Hence this appeal in which the Ilusorios maintain: (1) that said provision is unconstitutional; and (2) that the lower court had acted arbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them from respondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for the agricultural years 1959-1960, 1960-1961, and 1961-1962. ISSUES: 1. Whether the prohibition against impairment of contracts is absolute. 2. Whether R.A. 1199 is constitutional. HELD: 1. NO. The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such provisions are restricted to contracts with respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and involving the public right and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent proper exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. 2. YES. Republic Act 1199m including Section 14 thereof, which permits the tenants to change the nature of their relation with their landlord from tenancy system to leasehold tenancy, is constitutional. It is a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy law enacted by our law-making body, was passed by Congress in compliance with the constitutional mandate that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the State shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant ... in agriculture ... ." (Art. XIV, see. 6). G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983 TIRO VS. HONTANOSAS FACTS:  Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools.  Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No. 21.  Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the trial court's decision. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 79 ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 21 impairs the obligation of contracts. HELD: NO.  Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do.  The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing. 207 SCRA 748 CANLEON VS AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. *no case digest submitted* GR No. 109405, September 11, 1998 BLAQUERA VS ALCALA *no case digest submitted* 123 SCRA 713 GANZON VS INSTERTO *no case digest submitted* ADMIN REG - EMINENT DOMAIN POWER 156 SCRA 623 Kabilang vs. NHA FACTS: On May 21, 1986, petitioners filed an Amended Petition, accompanied by a motion to admit said amended petition. In the Amended Petition, the petitioners (only four of whom are original petitioners, the rest being newly impleaded) invoke as an additional ground the alleged non-publication of P.D. No. 1808. On May 29,1981, the Court admitted the Amended Petition and required respondents to comment thereon. The Court further required the Republic of the Philippines to move in the premises within ten (10) days from notice, considering the supervening events that had transpired since the filing of the respective memoranda of the petitioners and the respondent Republic of the Philippines. Respondent NHA submitted its comment on June 11, 1986, stating that contrary to petitioners' allegation in the Amended Petition, P.D. No. 1808 was published in the Official Gazette of October 4, 1982 (Volume 78, No. 40, pp. 5481-4 to 5486-8) and reiterating its arguments discussed in its comment dated September 4, 1981 on the original petition and its later comment/opposition dated March 19, 1982. On July 2, 1986, the NHA filed a manifestation by way of report on the current status of the subject property, stating inter alia 1) that all available workable areas in the subject property, totalling approximately 3.1 hectares and consisting of 378 lots averaging 50 square meters each, have been substantially developed, except for some minor repair work still to be undertaken; 2) that the NHA has already invested P3 million representing the cost of implementing the development plans in the workable areas of the project site; 3) that in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1808, the N HA has already deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount equivalent to the cost of all subdivision lots in the project site; 4) that 76 landowners have already withdrawn the corresponding compensation for their respective lots, totalling Pl,919,402.44, while 72 landowners including the petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. have not yet claimed the compensation for their respective lots totalling Pl,581,676.52; and 5) that all titles to the homelots, except the lost title of Cresencio Deboma, which is undergoing reconstitution, have already been transferred to respondent NHA pursuant to the provision of P.D. No. 1808. ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808. HELD:  The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.1 It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.  The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. For the same reason, petitioners can not complain that they are being deprived of their property without due process of law.  Nor can petitioners claim that their properties are being expropriated without just compensation, since Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1808 provides for just compensation to lot owners who have fully paid their obligations to the City of Manila under their respective contracts before the issuance of the decree. However, in accordance with our decision in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Hon. Ceferino Dulay, etc., et al., G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, which declared P.D. No. 1533 unconstitutional, those lot owners who have not yet received compensation under the decree are entitled to a judicial determination of the just compensation for their lots. ADMIN REG - FRANCHISES, PRIVILEGES, LICENSES GR No. 162243, November 29, 2006 ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES *no case digest submitted*