Consti Cases Review

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINESDe Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987 (En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987. Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years. Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.): 1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member. 2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971. 3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election. Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional. 2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: 1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED. 2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court. IMBONG VS COMELEC doctrine: competence of congress acting as constituent assembly: authority to call constitutional convention as Constituent Assembly in enacting implementing details. Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzles, both members of the Bar, assail the constitutionality of RA 6132 Sec. 19 because it prejudices their rights as sec 19. Petition for declaratory relief - any person interested candidates for delegates of the whose rights are affected of Constitutional Convention. Provions of this act, bring an action Sec. 2: apportionment of delegates: constitutional convention should be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants. Provided that each district is entitled to at least two delegates. Sec. 4: all public officers & employees are considered resigned upon filing certificates of candidacy. Sec. 5: disqualifies any elected delegate from running for a public office while Con Con is ongoing. Sec. 8: prohibits political parties or other organizations from helping Con Con delegates during campaign period. ISSUE: WON RA 6132 is valid? HELD: Yes.RATIO:1. SEC. 4 is valid in accordance with Constitutional prohibition on public employees/officials running for election. It does not deny them of due process or equal protection.2. Law was enacted in Congress capacity as a legislative body exercising its broad lawmaking authority. They can grant powers and fix the qualifications and other requirements needed such as in the case of the Con Con delegates.3. Congress has right to apportion the number of delegates per district. They can limit it if there are economic restraints. IN this case, they were correct in using the preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census & Statistics. This method is fair. Though only provisional, it is still credible. We can’t really effect an absolutely proportional representation. Occena v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 Fernando, C.J. Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Issue: What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission? Held: The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment. Issue: Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment? Held: Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. Issue: What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission? Held: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.” The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702 FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, theConvention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution. HELD: NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Conventionmust be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of thenature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. Sanidad v Comelec On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. not to revision thereof. is seriously doubted. the regularity of the procedure for amendments. and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition forInitiative will first be submitted to the people. thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one. COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid. 991. so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide anysubtitle on initiative on the Constitution. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. Transitory Provisions). but also of the Constitution itself. or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.e.. 127325. The normal course has not been followed. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution. like all other powers organized in the Constitution. 1 and 2 of Art. 1997 FACTS: In 1996. does not provide for its implementation. This petition is however dismissed. executive agreement. After that period. unlike in the other modes of initiative. a function normally exercised by the legislature. . 1973 Constitution). The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials. and 1033. within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision. and the regular National Assembly in its active session. 1. to lift term limits of elective officials. raises a contestable issue. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. Petitioners Sen. The amending.b. or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty. for whatever reason. COMELEC G. No. 1031. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly. . March 19. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution. 15. Unavoidably. the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Section 4 of Article VII. the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. . Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI. the people cannot exercise it if Congress. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution.” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes. a. This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs.d.Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’sinitiative. it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.R. Atty. it does not adequately cover such intiative. is in form a delegated and hence a limited power. written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended. is not self-executory. amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. XVI.Republic Act No. HELD: REPUBLIC ACT NO. . COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. pars. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. No such law has been passed. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty.HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. ISSUE: Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. executive agreement. by people’sinitiative.c. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments. 6735 It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but. as worded. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the requirednumber of voters. What has been delegated. and (c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time. Republic Act No. the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments. cannot be delegated. the hearing on 12 December 1996. Republic Act No. the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. cities. In so dignifying it. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution. ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. [3] Delegation to the people at large. meaning undocketed. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended. which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996. Under Subtitle II and III. an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. or has jurisdiction over.FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. or implemented by the delegate. it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of. . and resources. National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law. [4] Delegation to local governments. or a law which only Congress can pass. sitting en banc. and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President. carried out. 2300 is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. Therefore. COMELEC Empowering the COMELEC. a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering. setting forth therein the policy to be executed. (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper. and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. municipalities. and barangays can pass. 2300. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. 2300 Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct ofinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President. but on its nature and character. Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative. there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved. THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. Without the required signatures. energy. provinces. DELFIN PETITION COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. In every case of permissible delegation. the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative onthe Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC. and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. The petition was merely entered as UND. in the case of initiative on the Constitution. 6735. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country. or barangay law. c. of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. c. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters. (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters. — For purposes of this Act. Title. City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay. recognized and guaranteed. provinces. approved or rejected. Who may exercise.5. the proposition. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law. — General Provisions Section 1. Section 3. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. c. It may be of two classes. Section 5. autonomous regions. (g) "Local government units" refers to provinces. cities. or part thereof. 6735 August 4. and Sangguniang Nayon. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act.Republic Act No. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose.3. That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district. Provided. Sangguniang Bayan. amended or repealed. hereinafter referred to as the Commission. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. enact. as the case may be. a. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted. shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. the reason or reasons therefor. Section 4. resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation. resolution or ordinance. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional. of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof. at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters. municipalities and barangays. municipal.1. Statement of Policy. province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city. the following terms shall mean: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. the Constitution. namely: a. c. Requirements. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections. resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. as the case may be. then at least each municipality in a province or each . laws.6. city. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law. 1989 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: I. passed by Congress. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum. ordinances. and c. provincial. (c) The petition shall state the following: c. namely: c." Section 2. (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. municipalities and barangays. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people. (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed.1.3. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories.2. Sangguniang Panlungsod. (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors. and c.2. in whole or in part. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. approve or reject. cities. and a.4. however.2. (d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law. Definition of Terms. and other legislative bodies. Appeal. Section 12. amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. proposing the adoption. voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2. Section 10. may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body. or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If. Section 11. Procedure in Local Initiative. However. respectively. of any law. Verification of Signatures. publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Prohibited Measures. approval. (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation. Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. If. The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. or amendment. approval. the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution.000) in case of provinces and cities. the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. and fifty (50) in case of barangays. may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives. Indirect Initiative. II. (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite. (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters.barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Section 7. (f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay. and (b) Statutes involving emergency measures. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. as certified to by the Commission. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment. one hundred (100) in case of municipalities. . enactment. III. the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. as certified by the Commission. the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative. ordinance or resolution. (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality. the Commission shall. Special Registration. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. — National Initiative and Referendum SECTION 8. The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee. (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). repeal. Section 6. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — Any duly accredited people's organization.000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions. of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum. the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast. as defined by law. if the majority vote is not obtained. — Local Initiative and Referendum SECTION 13. upon determining the sufficiency of the petition. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate. Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition. cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. one thousand (1. the national law proposed for enactment. Section 18. Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities. it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided. The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions. (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar. ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities. Section 15. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof. sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast. any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region. Limitations on Local Initiatives. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition. sixty (60) days in case of municipalities. if they so desire. Thereafter. as the case may be. the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. Section 20. that in case of barangays. Section 23. If it fails to obtain said number of votes. those against such action may. Effectivity. and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. modified or amended. or his designated representative.(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws. the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months. The initiative shall then be held on the date set. and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. as provided in subsection (g) hereof. — Final Provisions SECTION 19. and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit. the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission. and may be amended. the Commission on Elections. forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. (c) If at any time before the initiative is held. Section 17. shall apply to all initiatives and referenda. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Section 21. Rules and Regulations. by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom. However. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed. through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. provinces. after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted. IV. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional. such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Authority of Courts. Section 14. the initiative shall be cancelled. modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided. Section 22. Appropriations. however. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE . — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. in case of autonomous regions. not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact. the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented. cities. in the presence of a representative of the proponent. the proposition is considered defeated. (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained. any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved. Section 16. apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. Local Referendum. municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection. from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Separability Clause. During the pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. (8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests. NACOCO Digest G. the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO. Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. and interchange of property. Subsequently. counsel for NACOCO(Nat’l Coconut Corporation) . (3) The regulation of the holding. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. 1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. public education. Commonwealth Act No. No. NACOCO'). and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.R. Alikpala. PVTA v CIR Digest Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. (6) The administration of justice in civil cases. Hence. public charity. L-9657 Nov. being a government entity. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”. and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare. No. it is not. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.Bacani v. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. directing petitioner to pay. ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government. and regulations of trade and industry. 444. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. transmission. requested the said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works. It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations. 3. 3. exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. 1956 Two-fold Function of the Government FACTS: 1. 4. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty. this petition for . Judge Martinez issued an order. (4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. health and safety regulations. as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. 29. 2. (5) The definition and punishment of crime. and relations of citizens. progress and prosperity of the people. 518). GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. privileges. a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. (7) The determination of the political duties. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs.’ 4. it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law. and for it to pay with interest. that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. There is no question based on RA 4155. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad. that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. The state. it has only itself to blame. therefore.” The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. Spain paid $400. the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80. To repeat. 2. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. 444. the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The Philippine government. As such. Monte De Piedad Digest Facts: 1. Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner. 444. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States.certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. an institution under the control of the church. Finally. including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. These principles are based upon public policy. . if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work.000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. 3. that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. Nacoco. that petitioner is a governmental agency. is futile. as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change of sovereignty. Furthermore. As a result. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. respondent Court must be sustained. It does not necessarily follow. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. is the parens patriae of the people. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete. Co Kim Chan vs. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. If as a result of the appealed order. as a sovereign. Government v. YES. Valdez Tan Keh 75 PHIL 131 FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad. various petitions were filed. Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action YES. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. It would appear. RA No. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution [ Art. 3 ] as part of law of the nation. the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. judicial acts done under its control. but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). People v gozo Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. LAUREL V. executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. HELD: In political and international law. the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights.ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. Being a de facto government. Wherefore. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. in the exercise of its sovereignty. all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. Hence. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted. ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION HELD: No. The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power . to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces. duties and obligation of government and citizens. Sec. when they are not political in nature. are suspended in abeyance during military occupation. Under the terms of the treaty. ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: Yes. she demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. MISA FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended. all acts and proceedings of the legislative. II. Ord No. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating Mun. DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors. which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. et al.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings. a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. On the date of her arrival. Respondents: The Chief of Staff. Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area".she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Thus. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1. is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings. A certain Capt. which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy. she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. et al. Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. Likewise. Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. among others.000. Lau Yuen Yeung. . Asher Y. PEOPLE Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. Thus.00 to undertake. she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act. After repeated extensions. in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. they were operating officers. the petition is hereby DENIED. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation. becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Capt. Moreover. who dies during the proceedings. if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino. Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289. Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy. the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines. and for the proper administration of the country. an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed. was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim. after the expiration of her authorized stay. native born or naturalized. an alien woman marrying a Filipino. On 25 January 1962. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. 4 October 1971 Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961.whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government. for the maintenance of the law and order. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabit ants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces. In consideration of the foregoing. IV . No. . in not finding that the amended petition failed to allege that petitioner is a person of good moral character. petitioner filed a petition for naturalization. 1992 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PO YO BI TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: PO YO BI. Attached to the motion was the Amended Petition. In the Seventh paragraph. insertions of the clause "From said employment I am now receiving a salary of P350. issued a Notice of Petition for Philippine Citizenship setting the hearing of the petition to 18 January 1960 5 and ordering the publication and posting of the notice. Antonio San Agustin and Uy Chong. incorporation of the following information: he had resided continuously in Iloilo City for 23 years preceding the date of the Amended Petition and up to the present time. 2. 7 On 18 January 1960. JR. in not finding that petitioner's character witnesses are not credible persons within the contemplation of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. VI .10 to which is in reality the Second amended petition. . 3 The factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this appeal are not controverted. 473. petitioner once again moved 9 to amend his petition. he did not consider . the joint affidavit of two (2) of his character witnesses. This second Amended Petition contains the following amendments: 1. In the third paragraph. citing as among the reasons therefor the fact that important allegations had been overlooked in the original petition. the trial court.943. Atty.00 as the annual average income of his wife from the Chinese Commercial School in Iloilo City and of his capital investment in the Bio Guan Company in the amount of P39. . vs. a newspaper of general circulation in the province/city of Iloilo. A copy of the Amended Petition. respondent-appellant. on 19 June 1961. . in not finding that petitioner failed to submit a permission to renounce his Chinese citizenship from the Minister of Interior of the Republic of China. DAVIDE. Rafael Jarantilla. 473. petitionerappellee. issued an Amended Notice of Petition 8setting the hearing of the petition to 12 October 1960 and ordering the publication of the said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the YUHUM. Opong for petitioner-appellee. among other documents. through the Deputy Clerk of Court. L-32398 January 27. On 9 February 1957.G. attaching thereto. 85 allowing the petitioner-appellee to take his oath as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to its decision 2 of 15 October 1963. and the joint affidavit of his other character witnesses. Petitioner filed a motion to amend his petition 6 on 15 January 1960. . although he stayed in Manila (Salazar Street) when he studied in the Chiang Kai Shek High School from June 1939 to 1942. Pablo Oro and Dr. . Dr. through the Deputy Clerk of Court. in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization does not state petitioners' former residence in Manila.00 a month. as amended. J." of the figure P1. II . REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.R.: In this appeal from the Order 1 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo dated 8 January 1966 in Naturalization Case No. .71 as of 31 December 1960. Gualberto C. 4 On 5 March 1959. appellant Republic of the Philippines urges this Court to overturn both the decision and the order because the trial court erred: I . Subsequently. the trial court. and its posting in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court. . . was attached to the motion.. in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization was not published in accordance with the requirements of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. V . . in not finding that petitioner is not exempt from the filing of a declaration of intention. .900. . III . Esta decision no adquirira caracter firme hasta despues del transcurso de dos (2) años a contar desde esta fecha y. que tambien habla. 13 The second Amended Petition itself was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and city of Iloilo. durante dicho periodo de tiempo — dos años a contar desde esta fecha — (1) no ha salido de Filipinas. 238247. se inscribira en la Oficina del Registro Civil. In the Eleventh paragraph. The Record on Appeal fails to disclose any order of the trial court granting the first and the second motions to amend or directing the publication of the second amended petition. que esta igualmente provisto de un Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. una vez firme esta decision. Christmases and New Year's day celebration within said period. Manila.this as interruption of the continuity of his residence in Iloilo City because he always returned to Iloilo City during all the summers. Serial No. el 17 de Julio de 1950. Enrique Po. el cual lleva su fotografia (Exh. 169. libre casa y . y b) Ordenado que. el estudio el Comercio en el Iloilo City Colleges de esta Ciudad (Exh. The facts upon which the trial court based its decision are as follows: Se ha probado que el solicitante es un ciudadano chino. que estudio sus cursos elementarios y secondarios en la Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School ed esta Ciudad y en la Chiang Kai Shek High School de Manila. recibiendo un sueldo de P500. que despues de terminar sus cursos secondarios. On 26 June 1961. 4. color o religion. que esta provisto de un Alien Certificate of Registration No. GG. el cual lleva igualmente su fotografia (Exh. que en las mismas se admiten estudiantes sin tener en cuenta su raza. no ha llegado aun a la edad escolar. are all enrolled in the proper school contemplated by the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines as hereinafter alleged. 157. que el ultimo Colegio tambien esta reconocido por el gobierno. JJ). V). Philippine Government y Philippine Civics estan reconocidas por el gobierno.00 al mes. 3. ciudad de Iloilo. Imperial Reyes. III). a newspaper of general circulation in the province/city of Iloilo. de 1933 a 1938. no evidence of its posting in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court or in the building where such office is located. que su esposa o hijos viven con el en la Calle Arroyo. nacido de padres chinos en esta Ciudad el 31 de agosto de 1923. expedido por el Buro de Inmigracion. que habla. except only the youngest who is not of school age. con quien tiene tres hijos llamados Alice. cuando se fue a China. 29 and 30. el ha residido en la misma calle. Florence. que esta casado con aida Lee Chiu (Exh. se dicta esta decision. insertion of the word "read" between the words speak and write in reference to the English language and to Hiligaynon. 29. tambien expedido por el Buro de Inmigracion. que los tres fueron bautizados en esta Ciudad (Exhs. expedido por el Comandante Provincial de la Constabularia de Iloilo el 2 de septiembre de 1954 (Exh. que esta registrado como ciudadano chino en la Embajada de la Republica de China en Manila (Exh. que esta tambien provisto de un Check-Up Certificate. No. (3) no ha sido convicto de algun delito o infraccion de reglamentos promulgados por el govierno. LL). After trial. respectivamente (Exhs. DD. EE y FF). is not yet of school age. insertion of the opening sentence: "My children are enrolled in the following schools: Alice Po (eldest) at the Chinese Commercial School. vol. (2) se ha dedicado continuamente a un trabajo o profesion licita (lawful). de esta Ciudad. que las dos escuelas en las que so enseñan Philippine History. lee y escribe el ingles tan es asi que declaro perfectamente en dicho lenguaje en la vista de su solicitud enmendada. 169. W). a) Declarando al solicitante Po Yo Bi como Ciudadano filipino. de esta Ciudad. BB). 17 and 24 July 1961 (nos. my youngest and third child. el 23 de enero de 1952." 6. color o religion. 115747. que fue cambaido despues con el No. 57) 12 issues of the Official Gazette and in the 1. Iloilo City. O). HH. as well. oportunamente. Floresca Po. la misma escuela donde estudio sus cursos elementarios (Exh. In none of the above petitions did petitioner state that he is a person of good moral character. MM). que es fundador. encontrando satisfactoria — mente probadas las alegaciones de la solicitud enmendada. 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the GUARDIAN. No. the trial court. que. the latter being one (1) of the principal Philippine languages. antes de ahora. and presently Grade II. handed down on 15 October 1963 its decision 14 granting the petition. through the Deputy Clerk of Court. No. Enrique y Florence. M). There is. apellidados "Po". This amended notice of petition was published in the 10. que so hija. y (4) no ha cometido algun acto prejudicial a los intereses del pais o contrario a la politica anunciada por el gobierno. In the Twelfth paragraph. In the Ninth paragraph. issued an Amended Notice of Petition for Philippine Citizenship setting the hearing of the petition to 26 February 1962 11 and directing the publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in the GUARDIAN. socio y gerente auxiliar de Bio Guan Company de esta Ciudad (Importers & General Merchants). lee y escribe bien el dialecto Ilongo (Exh. Mary's Hospital de esta Ciudad (Exhs. My second child. insertion of the words "and freely" between mingled socially and with the Filipinos. estan ahora estudiando en la Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School de esta Ciudad (Exh. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: POR TANTO. se encuentre a satisfaccion del Juzgado que el solicitante. que desde su nacimiento hasta ahora solo se ha susentado de Filipinas una sola vez. que en el mismo se admiten igualmente estudiantes sin tener en cuenta su raza. y II). JJ y KK). 102653." 5. se expida por el Escribano de este Juzgado el Certificado de Naturalizacion correspondiente que. que ahora reside en la Calle Arroyo. is enrolled in the same school but only in the Kindergarten Department of the same for he is only 5 years old. todos nacidos en el St. per Judge F. previa vista. insertion of the sentence "My children. In the Eighth paragraph. que sus hijos Alice y Enrique. apellidados "Po". the court a quo. 28. which is pending consideration before the committee. China (Nacionalista). que ha pagado su individual residence certificates A y B (Exhs. 20 Only the Republic filed such a manifestation praying therein that the case be decided in accordance with the prayer contained in its Brief 21 and informing the Court that on 10 June 1975. . ni esta afiliado a alguna asociacion o grupo de personas que sostiene o enseña doctrinas subversivas. now challenged in this appeal. que es su intencion renunciar absoluta y completamente a su lealtad y fidelidad a la Republica de China. or four (4) years. in the resolution of 12 October 1972. no padeco de enagenacion mental o de alguna enfermedad incurable o contagiosa (Exh. for three (3) consecutive weeks. 19 On 27 January 1988. 530. incluyendo los miembros de su familia (Exh.83 (Exh. que fue enmendada el 13 de enero de 1960 y el 17 de junio de 1961 (Exh. petitioner. pursuant to the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 18 reiterating therein the grounds he earlier alleged in the motion to reconsider the decision. on behalf of the Solicitor General. 15 On 30 October 1963." The Court further ruled that the publication is a jurisdictional requirement. ni cree en la practica de la poligamia. N). the second amended petition was not published. ni del asesinato para el exito y prodominio de su ideales. S-1 al S-12). . 270. 23 ruled that the above-quoted Section 9 requires that the petition for naturalization be published "once a week. on behalf of the Solicitor General. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to prepare and issue notices of the petition. the Assistant City Fiscal of Iloilo. the trial court handed down the order quoted earlier. color o religion. he then prays that after hearing. Philippine Government y Philippine Civics (sic) y on las que se admited estudiantes sin tener en cuenta su raza. 1. It was said notices alone which were ordered to be published and posted. . H). this Court considered the case submitted for decision without such Brief. AAA). J y K). 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the GUARDIAN. RR-1 y SS-1). filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization of the Office of the Solicitor General a petition for naturalization. filed a motion to reconsider the above decision 16 contending therein that petitioner is not exempt from filing his declaration of intention. . has not complied with Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law and that his witnesses are not competent and credible persons within the contemplation of law. It reads in part as follows: Sec. which hearing shall not be held until after six months from the date of the last publication of the notice. ZZ-1). (3) and these must be "consecutive. it shall be the duty of the clerk of court to publish the same at petitioner's expense. For reasons known only to him. A) es la primera que habia presentado. — Immediately upon the filing of a petition. once a week for three consecutive weeks. no esta en guerra con la Republica de Filipinas y cuenta con leyes que conceden a los Filipinos igual privilegio de permitir a estos a ser ciudadanos o subditos chinos (Exh. In respect to the second amended petition. . Assistant City Fiscal Gengos. 011317. no es poligamo. Se han probado igualmente que el solicitante no esta opuesto a todo gobierno organizado. L).810. All the assigned errors are impressed with merit. namely: (1) the publication must be weekly.00 al año (Exh. The Record on Appeal again fails to indicate what action the trial court took on this motion to withdraw. and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located. birthplace and residence of the petitioner. and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides." This provision demands compliance with the following requirements. que suele cometer su income tax returns (Exhs. However. Thus: . RR y SS). que esta exente de presentar una declaracion de intencion para ser naturalizado como ciudadano filipino por haber nacido en este pais y por haber enviado a sus hijos de edad escolar a escuelas debidamente reconocida por el gobierno donde se enseñan Philippine History.comida. Notification and appearance. OO y PP). setting forth in such notice the name. this Court. petitioner did not file his Brief and. he believes that he cannot substantially establish the same. y que su pais. On 8 January 1966. y que da contribuciones para fines sociales y caritativos (Exhs. and the date of the hearing of the petition. que su solicitud de fecha 31 de enero de 1959. Petitioner filed a motion on 1 December 1965 alleging therein that more than two (2) years had elapsed since the rendition of the decision and that he has complied with all the conditions and requisites imposed by Republic Act No. Neither were the original and the amended petitions. Gengos. On 5 January 1966. the case shall be considered terminated and closed and entry of judgment shall accordingly be made. 9. pagando constantemente su income Tax correspondiente (Exhs. Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law 22 requires that the petition itself must be published. in the Official Gazette. the parties were required to move in the premises and were informed that should they fail to make the proper manifestation within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. I. We shall discuss them in the order they are presented. eight (8) months and sixteen (16) days before the trial court handed down its challenged decision. tradiciones e ideales de estos. in the Official Gazette. Republic. filed a Motion to Withdraw 17 the motion for reconsideration alleging therein that after a deliberate study of the grounds alleged. que no debe al gobierno por contribuciones (Exh. (2) it must be made three (3) times. que durante todo el periodo de su residencia en Filipinas siempre se ha asociado con los filipinos y ha alentado el sincero deseo de estudiar y abrazar las costumbres. S. BBB). As early as 29 November 1958. que su capital invertido en dicha compañia hasta el año 1962 asciendo a la suma de P43. the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his petition. nunca ha sido acusado o convicto de algun delito que envuelva torpeza moral (Exhs. docketed as SCN No. . the notice was published in the 10. the decision be executed and he be allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. que su esposa es "property custodian" de la Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School de esta Ciudad con un sueldo de P1900. 17 and 24 July 1961 issues of the Official Gazette and the 1. Vicente P. Assistant City Fiscal Gengos filed an opposition to this motion. the date and place of his arrival in the Philippines. As correctly pointed out by the Republic. in Co y Quing Reyes vs. on 11 December 1963. QQ. no defiendo ni enseña la necesidad o propiedad de la violencia ni del atentado contra las personas. nationality. In Ngo vs. I have conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living. In Chua Bong Chiong vs. "(Salazar Street)" is vague and uncertain. The petition does not contain the specific averment that he is of good moral character. In Dy vs. is: Third. his having completed his primary and secondary education in schools recognized by the Philippine government wherein enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality and where Philippine Civics. 25 the petition filed therein was denied because. his petition should fail. in the instant case. 473). The law requires that he should allege specifically each of the six qualifications for naturalization prescribed under Sec. 2. As a consequence." Mr. this Court held that the requirement of Section 9 of C. giving his address as "(Salazar Street)". King was not presented to testify that prior to and during 1939. and that his children. non-compliance with the requirements thereof. A reading of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of petitioner's testimony on direct examination reveals that he was not asked about his good moral character. Republic. Although a notice of the filing of said petition. thus. and stating the date and place of the hearing thereof was published. In his second amended petition. as provided for in Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law.affects the jurisdiction of the court. Besides. We likewise agree with the Republic that petitioner was not exempt from filing a declaration of intention. a notice of petition which was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and that the same made references to some date in the petition and stated the date and place of hearing. Neither did he refer to it in any manner in the answers he gave. Thus. and that there is no proof that only one (1) street in Manila is named after a Salazar. petitioner practically copied all the words in the section except for the opening clause on good moral character. Republic. It states: "This school is not limited to any race. That there was in fact. this is not sufficient compliance with said legal provision. The purpose of the requirement is to facilitate the checking up on the activities of the petitioner which are material to the proceedings.In short. in violation of Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. inter alia. is jurisdictional. 26 this Court explicitly ruled that: 1. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. Philippine History and Philippine Government are prescribed and taught as part of the school curriculum. The certification should not have been admitted inevidence and given credit as such constitutes hearsay. supra. on this ground alone. Non-compliance therewith nullifies the proceedings in the case. which omission inevitably nullifies his petition. No. 473 (Sec. did not save the day for both the petitioner and the trial court. considering that Manila is a big and thickly populated metropolis. Director of the Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School 28 dated 14 August 1963 and merely identified by petitioner.. and despite two (2) amendments to the original petition. that a copy of the petition to be posted and published should be a textual or verbatim restatement of the petition as filed. For reasons also known only to him and his counsel. regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel. are all enrolled in the schools contemplated by law. petitioner did not allege in any of his petitions that he is of good moral character. in relation to paragraph 3 of Section 2 of the law above-quoted. and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. It constitutes a fatal defect. as amended. I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. the school was not limited to any race or nationality. he did not reveal the specific place in Manila where he resided during that time. This is not sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law that the petitioner must allege therein his present and former places of residence. 473. In Sy vs. does not make any categorical statement that during the time that petitioner studied in said school until 1939 when he allegedly finished his elementary course. however. The certification of one James King. In both the original and amended petitions. the said petition did not specifically allege that petitioner is of good moral character pursuant to the requirement under Section 7. which provides that — xxx xxx xxx the petition herein has not been so published. . 473. including the decision rendered in favor of the applicant. 4. it is obvious that petitioner deliberately suppressed vital information to make it extremely difficult for the government authorities to locate his place of residence and check on his activities therein during such time. Republic. . (emphasis supplied). the lower court acquired no jurisdiction to hear this case and the decision appealed from is null and void. 2 of Com. making reference to some data therein contained. Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect. a careful reading of the transcripts of the testimony of petitioner on direct examination 27 reveals that petitioner did not mention Salazar Street at all. Petitioner alleges that he completed his senior year of high school at the Chiang Kai Shek High School in Manila. Act No. Since neither the given name of Salazar nor its initial is mentioned. Unfortunately. The certification makes no reference to the past — only the present. Republic. for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case. He testified that he completed his primary education at the Chinese Commercial School in Iloilo City and his secondary education at the Chiang Kai Shek High School in Manila. 7 of Com. The publication of the notice did not constitute substantial compliance with the cited section. he declares that he stayed in Manila from June 1939 to 1942. (emphasis supplied). except the youngest who is not of school age. 3. The third of the six (6) qualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines. only his self-serving declaration supports his claim that these schools are not limited to any race or nationality. 24 We stated: The first assignment of error is predicated upon the undisputed fact that. the school was not limited to any race or nationality. . His claim for exemption is anchored on his having been born in the Philippines.A. creed or religion. he alleges: Twelfth. relative to the publication of the petition. . In the Twelfth paragraph of the second amended petition. Act No. and Oro since petitioner's return to the Philippines from China in 1938 until 1944 (p. the petitioner shall renounce "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince. but merely mentioned what others had been saying. The other character witness Pablo Oro also admitted that he came to know the petitioner only since 1944 (p. could you tell us whether he was (sic) of good moral character? A He is of good moral character and many people say that he is of good repute. the school was not limited to a particular race or nationality. 1963). That community is not confined to the Chinese community. As to the latter.s. 10-11. state or sovereignty. been (sic) a person of good repute and morally irreproachable.. this is all that the witness said: Q Now. Section 12 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a certificate of naturalization is issued. In respect to witness Pablo Oro." It is settled that a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality. On the fifth assigned error. One who fails to do so is disqualified to be naturalized under Section 4 (f) of the law.33 This answer was never amplified to enlighten the trial court as to its factual basis. 34 Moreover. all that he could state as regards the petitioner's reputation and moral character is: Q Now. the witness did not hesitate to breach the boundaries of truth to help the petitioner. October 7. In addition to the foregoing observation of the Republic.s.n. 24. the Republic asserts that: Petitioner's character witness Antonio San Agustin admitted in (sic) the witness stand that he had no contact with petitioner during the period the latter studied in Manila (pp. 32 he explicitly stated that he has "personal knowledge that the petitioner aforesaid is and during all aforesaid periods of his stay in the Philippines. the certification does not state that in 19411942." The periods referred to by him are: (a) from birth of the petitioner in 1923 to 1933. 6. potentate.s. it can be easily noted that the yes answer is actually a qualified one and is not fully responsive. Accordingly. This witness did not likewise categorically answer the "good repute" aspect of the question. and not all persons of good repute are bright. August 21. and not to a general secondary education.. 85. August 21. t. 31 He clearly made a distinction between good moral character and good repute. which is but a part of moral irreproachability. merely states that petitioner "was enrolled in the Third year. Moreover.. vis-a-vis the aforequoted observation by the Republic. Yet. the character witnesses must be in a position to testify on the character and good moral conduct of the applicant during the entire period of the latter's stay in the Philippines as provided by law. Clearly. this Court notes that in respect to the good moral character or good repute of the petitioner. San Agustin could not vouch for petitioner's moral character and conduct from 1939 to 1942 when petitioner studied in Manila and from 1942 to 1945 during the Japanese occupation.In respect to petitioner's high school education.s. judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the court below of 15 October 1963 and SETTING ASIDE its Order of 8 February 1966 in Naturalization Case No. There is then no proof of completion of a full secondary education. t.n. this certification does not prove that petitioner did in fact finish his senior year. Furthermore. there is an apparent attempt to emphasize such conduct within the Chinese community. 10-11. A part is not the whole. 29 It was petitioner himself who identified this certification. The Director-Principal was not even presented as a witness to be cross-examined. The sixth assigned error then is well-taken. 36 In the instant case. 1963). which is supported by the evidence. instead. the witnesses utterly failed to do that. October 8. The "senior high school" stated therein refers to Chinese Instruction. t. He was graduated from the Chinese Senior High School before the closing of that school year as a result of the outbreak of World War II. with costs against petitioner. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. dated 12 January 1962. 30 5. because among the young people in the Chinese community he is one of the best in moral conduct and also he is one of the brightest young man (sic) I have encountered. in his affidavit. or a continuous period of some six (6) years. 1963). The latter means character of the highest order — excellent character." As to the latter period. could you tell us whether the petitioner is of good repute and morally irreproachable? A Yes. petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he obtained such permission. t. The third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law explicitly provides the applicant must have such qualifications during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. Senior High School in Chinese Instruction in this school during the school year 1941-1942.n. 35 In the instant case.n. "to the present. the certification of the Director-Principal of the Chiang Kai Shek High School. It is limited to good moral conduct. it applies to the community in general for the reason that he is required to mingle socially with the Filipinos. because of your long and close association with the petitioner. Thus. SO ORDERED.. It has been held that to establish the qualifications that the applicant must be of good moral character and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence. TERRITORY . he cannot claim exemption from filing the declaration of intention. Petitioner never attempted to explain the term "Third Year" and this only casts serious doubts as to his educational attainment at that time. 1963) and during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 (pp. it is quite obvious that. 19. he mentioned the intellectual qualities of the petitioner. during the period of your acquaintanceship (sic) of the petitioner and your close contact with him as you have testified. Not all "bright" persons are of good repute. he did not venture any personal opinion. when petitioner left the Philippines and (b) from 1938 when petitioner returned to the Philippines. 083 Matulin Rk. Line 11a (Atalaya Pt. WHEREAS.) 21º07'03" 121º57'24" 353º27' 71. . and all the territory over which the Government of the Philippine Islands exercised jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.Ditolong Pt. the Constitution of the Philippines describes the national territory as comprising all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on December 10. — Balintang Is.) — Tumaruk Rk. Now. Latitude E.) 14º06'20" 124º17'23" 331º46' 178. all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines.Finch Rk. forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines. 3046 (as amended by RA 5446) AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.) 16º48'00" 122º26'06" 21º01' 57.Bulubalik Pt.) 19º04'50" 122º12'18" 350º39' 86. Line 7a (Dijohan Pt. .) 18º18'45" 122º20'15" 351º23' 136.) 12º40'59" 125º04'02" 313º30' 22. .) 17º05'50" 122º31'44" 16º56' 34.) 12º32'40" 125º12'57" 313º56' 12. all the waters within the limits set forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always been regarded as part of the territory of the Philippine Islands. WHEREAS. the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago.690 Horadaba Rks.378 Diviuisa Pt. .665 SE Manjud pt.105 Balintang Island Line 3 (Balingtang Is.Horadaba Rks.781 Dijohan Pt. the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty. have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory.656 Tumaruk Rk. together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington. Line 6 (Ditolong Pt. and in the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on January 2. Line 10 (Horadaba Rks. Section 1.) 14º29'45" 122º57'40" 286º27' 148. . therefor. Longitude Asimuth Distance in Meters Y'ami Island (E) Line 1 (Yami I.REPUBLIC ACT No. 1898.480 Atalaya Pt.) 20º28'28" 122º02'06" 347º13' 58. WHEREAS. between the United States and Spain on November 7.Atalaya Pt.Diviuisa Pt. irrespective of their width or dimension.Tinaga I. Line 7 (Diviuisa Pt. WHEREAS.) 14º06'41" 124º16'54" 306º34' 1. . 1930. Line 12a (SE of Manjud Pt. . WHEREAS.Iligan Pt. Line 11 (Matulin Rk. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: N. between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines archipelago.) 19º57'45" 122º09'28" 375º05' 97. all the waters around.986 Tinaga I.225 .268 Finch Rk. and WHEREAS. Line 12 (Finch Rk. — Matulin Rk. Line 5 (Iligan Pt.— Didicas Rk.030 Ditolong Pt. .SE of Manjud Pt. Line 4 (Didicas Rk. .755 Didicas Rk. the said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and described for the information of all concerned.) 16º18'45" 122º14'28" 10º52' 142. .) 15º02'56" 121º59'30" 300º15' 120. Line 8 (Bulubalik Pt.Dijohan Pt. Line 9 (Tinaga I.Sora Cay) 12º27'54" 125º17'59" 322º27' 14.155 Iligan Pt. . 1900.360 Bulubalik Pt. Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk. (E. ) 8º52'50" 126º20'28" 348º40' 131. Line 20 (Above Languyan R. . .Omapoy I. Arangasa Is.470 Omapoy I.350 Cape San Agustin (N) Line 22a (Cape S. . (W) 5º22'05" 125º20'50" 139º01' 3.330 Quinablangan I.) 4º36'04" 119º03'36" 164º05' 13.703 Arangasa Is. Line 29 (Kinapusan Is.Bunga Pt. .Suluan I. Agustin N. Line 24 (Tapundo Pt. Line 22 (Tuguban Pt. Line 15 (Tugnug Pt. Line 24a (Manamil I. . . (W) Line 25 (Balut I. .) 7º16'59" 126º36'50" 26º39' 36. .) 4º43'06" 119º01'36" 238º48' 42.070 Tuason Pt. .Quinablangan I. .326 Suluan Island Line 16 (Suluan I. Line 21 (Pusan Pt.) 6º09'39" 124º13'02" 86º18' 259.950 Sumbasumba I.) 5º23'45" 125º28'42" 66º32' 7. Line 19a (Quinablangan I.) 7º42'58" 126º34'30" 353º08' 25.793 Bunga Pt.) 6º59'24" 126º28'00" 20º33' 83.415 Cauit Pt.484 Tapudo Pt. Line 13a (Bunga Pt.Frances Reef) 4º47'50" 119º52'10" 58º30' 80.Sora Cay Line 13 (Sora Cay .489 Pusan Pt. Line 34 (Omapoy I.) 9º18'35" 126º12'25" 342º44' 49. Awash Line 26 (Middle of 3 Rk.) 23º06'06" 125º33'58" 355º22' 83. .Sanga-Sanga I.Middle of 3 Rk.Tuguban Pt. . Line 23a (Panguil Bato Pt.) 12º12'10" 125º30'40" 331º50' 12.619 Above Languyan R.400 Tongquil I.480 Panguan I. .005 .Cape S. .Bajapa Reef) 4º24'54" 119º14'54" 134º34' 29.330 Bajapa Reef Line 32 (Bajapa Reef) .840 Middle of 3 Rk.) 12º21'47" 125º22'46" 321º03' 22.Tugnug Pt. Line 30 (Manuk Manka I. .290 Manuk Manka I.259 Tuguban Pt. Agustin (N) — Cape San Agustin (S) 6º17'03" 126º12'08" 30º16' 1.707 Cape San Agustin (S) Line 23 (Cape S.686 Tubabao I. .) 10º45'20" 125º57'40" 347º51' 107.Manuk Manka I. Awash) 5º23'20" 125º19'45" 124º47' 149. Line 14 (Tubabao I. Agustin (S) — Panguil Bato Pt. Line 17 (Tuason Pt.Manamil I.) 6º00'15" 121º52'45" 61º29' 115.667 Manamil I.) 5º30'10" 120º57'35" 43º19' 44. Line 33 (Panguan I. Line 28 (Sumbasumba I. Line 18 (Cauit Pt.) 4º55'02" 119º21'15" 246º11' 51.Sumbasumba I.) 9º48'33" 126º10'00" 355º25' 55.Tuason Pt.) 7º29'10" 126º36'10" 356º52' 22.Tapundo Pt.051 Balut I.Balut I.) 5º22'08" 125º24'59" 89º19' 7. — Pusan Pt.) 6º16'15" 126º11'40" 39º23' 125. Line 19 Arangasa Is.Cauit Pt. . Awash — Tongquil I.100 Panguil Bato Pt. (W) .Above Languyan R.445 Kinapusan Is.Panguan I.Tubabao I.847 Frances Reef Line 31 (Frances Reef .) 5º12'37" 120º41'05" 63º14' 101. Line 27 (Tongquil I.235 Tugnug Pt.) 11º21'06" 125º37'40" 331º03' 75. .Kinapusan Is. .590 Pincle Rk.Sanga-Sanga I. Bakkungaan . Line 54a (Rena Pt. Line 49 (Pinnacle Rk.235 Cabra I.) 6º10'32" 118º06'42" 136º04' 18. Line 37 (Taganak I. .666 Cay Line 41a (Cay-Secam I.230 Cape Calavite Line 50 (Cape Calavite . .) 7º59'30" 116º55'15" 204º52' 22. Line 53a (Hermana Mayor — Tambobo Pt. .Tapuitan I. .Pearl Bank) 5º06'12" 119º46'30" 170º05' 80.Pinnacle Rk. of Canipan Bay — Tatub Pt. .925 Secam I. 6º17'45" 117º59'45" 215º36' 79.260 Piedras Pt.Rena Pt. Line 47 (Piedras Pt. Line 41 (Ligas Pt. .Cape Calavite 12º18'34" 119º51'45" 200º40' 134.) 14º55'00" 120º00'20" 168º09' 58. Line 39a (Mangsee Is.) 6º06'00" 118º26'42" 76º52' 15.) 8º36'50" 117º15'06" 218º57' 18.Baguan I. . . Line 46 (Malapackun I.815 Cape Melville Line 40 (Cape Melville .900 N. . Line 35 (Sanga-Sanga I.I.665 Ligas Pt. Line 42 (Secam I.915 Mulugi I.Ligas Pt.) 10º11'28" 118º48'18" 203º19' 124.Cape Bolinao 16º10'25" 119º45'18" 191º39' 18.490 Tambobo Pt. .Mangsee Is.Darigayos Pt.Cape Melville) 7º30'10" 117º18'20" 134º50 48. Line 52 (Capones Is.470 Sibaung I. .Cabra I.Gt. Line 39 (Mulugi I. Bakkungaan O 6º04'05" 118º18'30" 118º39' 24. Bakkungaan Line 37a (Gt. . of Canipan Bay) 8º10'47" 117º00'30" 209º09' 54. Line 53 (Palauig.910 Rena Pt.016 .) 5º49'04" 119º39'01" 103º13' 137.200 Pearl Bank Line 36 (Pearl Bank .805 Gt.Taganak I. Line 38 (Sibaung .Cay) 7º56'28" 116º55'45" 170º40' 5. Line 48 (Tapuitan I.870 Hermana Mayor I.400 Capones Is.) 16º20'20" 119º47'25" 226º20' 80.125 Punta Baja Line 45 (Punta Baja .050 Baguan I Line 36a (Banguan I.Capones Is.) 13º26'40" 120º18'00" 148º12' 58.194 Malapackun I.675 Cape Bolinao Line 55 (Cape Bolinao .535 Taganak I. Line 44 (Tatub Pt. Muligi I.541 Mangsee Is.N.) 6º53'00" 118º25'00" 119º14' 140.) 15º58'00" 119º44'55" 181º43' 22.Sibaung I.570 Tatub Pt. .Hermana Mayor I. .900 Tapuitan I.100 Palauig Pt.) 11º13'40" 119º15'28" 208º47' 136.Malapackun I.) 13º53'30" 120º00'58" 179º26' 113. .Pa-Lauig Pt. Line 54 (Tambobo Pt.) 9º02'50" 117º37'58" 223º30' 32.) 9º15'30" 117º50'04" 225º50' 148.) 15º47'10" 119º47'28" 167º10' 20. of Canipan Bay Line 43 (N.) 15º25'50" 119º53'40" 164º17' 40. Line 51 (Cabra I.) 7º48'50" 116º59'30" 153º54' 15.Piedras Pt.Punta Baja) 8º44'40" 117º21'28" 222º04' 45. . Dile Pt. . . ENTITLED "AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES" Section 1.060 Pinget I.) 17º40'58" 120º20'58" 192º46' 27.Cape Bojeador) 17º55'20" 120º24'22" 195º03' 65. Line 60 (Catanapan Pt.Badoc I. Longitude Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk.A. (E) 21º07'30" 121º56'46" 307º08' 1.) Tumaruk Rk.) 20º28’28" Distance (In Meters) 121º57’24" Line 1 (Y’ami I.075 Catanapan Pt.616 Dile Pt. .Dequey I.Y'ami I.Pinget I. Line 56a (Disle Pt. .) .Catanapan Pt.(M) . Latitude Y’ami Island (E) 21º07’03" E. (W) 20º43'00" 121º46'55" 200º30' 48. Section one of Republic Act numbered thirty hundred and forty-six is amended to read as follows: "SECTION 1.140 Y'ami I.376 Y'ami I. 5446 as amended by R.656 347º13’ 58.Balintang Is.Raile) 29º20'06" 121º46'35" 180º47' 42.Y'ami I.870 Dequey I.) 17º34'30" 120º19'58" 188º27' 12. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters of the Philippines.740 Dalupiri I.Dalupiri I.Tumaruk Rk. . The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: N.) 16º50'15" 120º20'00" 179º58' 81. Line 57 (Badoc I.270 Cape Bojeador Line 58 (Cape Bojeador . Line 61 (Dequey I. Line 59 (Dalupiri I.255 Raile Line 62 (Raile . Line 56 (Darigayos Pt.) 18º29'30" 120º34'00" 222º16' 101. 1968 AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX. (M) Line 64 (Y'ami I.Darigayos Pt.) 19º10'15" 121º13'02" 213º29' 25. Azimuth 353º27’ 71.Y'ami I. To correct typographical errors. .) 19º21'35" 121º20'56" 202º27' 116. Line 56b (Pinget I.105 122º02’06" . This Act shall take effect upon its approval. .(W) Line 63 (Y'ami I. (E. Republic Act No.170 Badoc I. (M) 21º07'26" 121º56'39" 238º40' 237 Y'ami I. (E) 21º07'03" 121º57'24" Section 2. (W) . 9522 September 18. Section 3. . Diviuisa Pt.) Horadaba Rks. .) Dijohan Pt.Bulubalik Pt.155 122º31’44" Line 6 (Ditolong Pt.781 10º52’ 142.Ditolong Pt.Tinaga I. 350º39’ 122º20’15" Line 5 (Iligan Pt.360 300º15’ 120. 86. 357º05’ 124º17’23" .690 306º34’ 1. . 351º23’ 122º26’06" Line 7 (Diviuisa Pt. 97.Horadaba Rks.) Iligan Pt. 19º04’50" 18º18’45" 17º05’50" 16º48’00" 16º18’45" 15º02’56" 14º29’45" 14º06’41" 14º06’20" 21º01’ 57. 34.Matulin Rk. .030 122º14’28" Line 7a (Dijohan Pt.) Bulubalik Pt.Didicas Rk.755 122º12’18" Line 4 (Didicas Rk.Iligan Pt. .) Diviuisa Pt.083 124º16’54" Line 10 (Horadaba Rks.Balintang Islands 19º57’45" 122º09’28" Line 3 (Balintang Is. . 136.) Ditolong Pt. . 16º56’ 121º59’30" Line 8 (Bulubalik Pt.) Tinaga I.375 122º57’40" Line 9 (Tinaga I. .) Didicas Rk. .Dijohan Pt. .980 286º27’ 148.) Matulin Rk. Tuason Pt. 313º56’ 125º22’46" Line 13 (Sora Cay . 14. .663 125º30’40" Line 13a (Bunga Pt. 12.070 355º25’ 55.) Atalaya Pt.) 9º48’33" 321º03’ 22.225 125º37’40" Line 15 (Tugnug Pt. . .) Suluan Island 322º27’ 125º33’58" Line 14 (Tubabao I.225 331º03’ 75. 22. 331º46’ 126º10’00" . . .326 347º51’ 107.Finch Rk.Atalaya Pt.Tugnug Pt.646 355º22’ 83. 12º40’59" 12º32’40" 12º27’54" 12º21’47" 12º12’10" 12º06’06" 11º12’06" 10º45’20" Line 17 (Tuason Pt.Suluan I.Cauit Pt. 178.263 125º17’59" Line 12a (SE of Manjud Pt.) Finch Rk.415 125º37’40" Line 16 (Suluan I.Bunga Pt. .761 331º50’ 12. .Sora Cay) Sora Cay 313º30’ 125º12’57" Line 12 (Finch Rk.) Bunga Pt.Tubabao I. .SE of Manjud Pt.) SE Manjud Pt.) Tuason Pt.480 125º04’02" Line 11a (Atalaya Pt.) Tubabao I.) Tugnug Pt.Line 11 (Matulin Rk. . Cauit Pt.) Tapundo Pt.Panguil Bato Pt.Above Languyan R. 49. 22. . .330 126º36’10" Line 20 (Above Languyan R. 8º52’50" 7º42’58" 7º29’10" 7º16’59" 6º59’24" 6º17’03" 6º16’15" 5º23’45" 5º22’08" 26º39’ 36. . 356º52’ 126º12’08" Line 22a (Cape S. Agustin (S) .707 39º23’ 125. Agustin (N) . Arangasa Is.Tugubun Pt.) Panguil Bato Pt.) Arangasa Is. .259 20º33’ 83.) Quinablangan I.619 126º28’00" Line 22 (Tugubun Pt. 131.) Cape San Agustin (N) 353º08’ 126º36’50" Line 21 (Pusan Pt.Pusan Pt. Agustin N.) Tugubun Pt. 342º44’ 125º24’59" . .) Pusan Pt. 9º18’35" 126º12’25" Line 18 (Cauit Pt.489 126º11’40" Line 23 (Cape S.Cape S.) Above Languyan R.703 126º20’28" Line 19 (Arangasa Is.Tapundo Pt.Cape San Agustin (S) Cape San Agustin (S) 25.Quinablangan I.100 66º32’ 7.484 125º28’42" Line 23a (Panguil Bato Pt. 348º40’ 126º34’30" Line 19a (Quinablangan I .350 30º16’ 1. Kinapusan Is. Awash 7.Sumbasumba I. .) Tongquil I.051 124º13’02" Line 26 (Middle of 3 Rk.) Sumbasumba I. 149. (W) Balut I. 5º22’05" 5º23’20" 6º09’39" 6º00’15" 5º30’10" 5º12’37" 4º47’50" 4º24’54" Line 32 (Bajapa Reef .667 125º20’50" Line 24a (Manamil I. Awash . 139º01’ 125º19’45" Line 25 (Balut I. . Awash) Middle of 3 Rk. .840 120º57’35" Line 28 (Sumbasumba I.) 4º36’04" 61º29’ 115.847 134º34’ 29.400 119º52’10" Line 30 (Manuk Manka I.Manuk Manka I.330 164º05’ 13.) Manuk Manka I.950 43º19’ 44.Panguan I.) Kinapusan Is.Manamil I.Line 24 (Tapundo Pt.Frances Reef) Frances Reef 86º18’ 120º41’05" Line 29 (Kinapusan Is. 124º47’ 121º52’45" Line 27 (Tongquil I.480 119º14’54" Line 31 (Frances Reef . .290 58º30’ 80. (W) . .Bajapa Reef) Bajapa Reef 259.Middle of 3 Rk. .Balut I.445 63º14’ 101.Tongquil I.) Manamil I. (W) 89º19’ 119º03’36" . 3. ) Sibaung I. 4º43’06" 119º01’36" Line 33 (Panguan I. . .Mangsee Is. 137. .915 119º14’ 140.805 136º04’ 18.) Omapoy I. 80.Sanga-Sanga I.) Muligi I.470 215º36’ 79.Gt. 103º13’ 118º06’42" Line 37a (Gt.003 119º39’01" Line 36 (Pearl Bank .) Mangsee Is. Bakkungaan 170º05’ 118º26’42" Line 36a (Baguan I.Baguan I.Omapoy I.) Sanga-Sanga I.535 118º39’ 24. 51.) Taganak I. . Bakkungaan) Gt.I. 238º48’ 117º18’20" . .Panguan I.Pearl Bank) Pearl Bank 42.470 119º21’15" Line 34 (Omapoy I.Taganak I. .541 118º25’00" Line 39 (Muligi I.) Baguan I. 4º55’02" 5º06’12" 5º49’04" 6º06’00" 6º04’05" 6º10’32" 6º17’45" 6º53’00" 7º30’10" 76º52’ 15. Muligi I.050 117º59’45" Line 38 (Sibaung . Bakkungaan-Sibaung I.200 118º18’30" Line 37 (Taganak I. 246º11’ 119º46’30" Line 35 (Sanga-Sanga I. 125 223º30’ 32. 134º50’ 118º48’18" .N.666 117º15’06" Line 43 (N. 170º40’ 117º00’30" Line 42 (Secam I. 204º52’ 117º21’28" Line 44 (Tatub Pt.260 203º19’ 124. .Punta Baja) Punta Baja 5. .) Malapackun I. of Canipan Bay-Tatub Pt. . 22.Cay) Cay 48.Cape Melville) Cape Melville 7º48’50" 7º56’28" 7º59’30" 8º10’47" 8º36’50" 8º44’40" 9º02’50" 9º15’30" Line 47 (Piedras Pt.Piedras Pt.900 117º50’04" Line 46 (Malapackun I.Ligas Pt.) 10º11’28" 209º09’ 54.815 116º59’30" Line 40 (Cape Melville .Tapiutan I.195 225º50’ 148.) Piedras Pt. .990 218º57’ 18.570 222º04’ 45.) Ligas Pt.) Tatub Pt. of Canipan Bay 15. .665 116º55’15" Line 41a (Cay-Secam I.Line 39a (Mangsee Is.Malapackun I.925 117º37’58" Line 45 (Punta Baja . . 153º54’ 116º55’45" Line 41 (Ligas Pt.) Secam I. of Canipan Bay) N. ) Tambobo Pt. 179º26’ 119º47’28" Line 53a (Hermana Mayor I. 148º12’ 120º00’20" Line 52 (Capones Is.Capones Is.235 119º53’40" Line 53 (Palauig. . .Hermana Mayor I. 58.) Cabra I. 11º13’40" 119º15’28" Line 48 (Tapiutan I.Cape Calavite) Cape Calavite 208º47’ 119º47’25" .) Hermana Mayor I.Tapiutan I.Tambobo Pt.490 181º43’ 22. . .230 120º00’58" Line 51 (Cabra I.870 167º10’ 20.Pinnacle Rk.) Capones Is. 134. 136.Rena Pt.590 119º51’45" Line 49 (Pinnacle Rk. .Cape Bolinao) Cape Bolinao 113.) Rena Pt. 12º18’34" 13º26’40" 13º53’30" 14º55’00" 15º25’50" 15º47’10" 15º58’00" 16º10’25" 16º20’20" 168º09’ 58. . 200º40’ 120º18’00" Line 50 (Cape Calavite-Cabra I.) Pinnacle Rk.) Palauig Pt. .400 119º44’55" Line 54 (Tambobo Pt. .675 119º45’18" Line 54a (Rena Pt.100 164º17’ 40.Palauig Pt.910 191º39’ 18. Badoc I. 192º46’ 121º13’02" Line 59 (Dalupiri I.060 120º34’00" Line 58 (Cape Bojeador .) Pinget I.616 120º20’58" Line 56b (Pinget I. 16º50’15" 17º34’30" 17º40’58" 17º55’20" 18º29’30" 19º10’15" 19º21’35" 20º20’06" Line 62 (Raile .Cape Bojeador) Cape Bojeador 81. . . 226º20’ 121º46’55" .Dalupiri I.Dile Pt.270 222º16’ 101.) Dequey I.) Badoc I.255 200º30’ 48. 12.Raile) Raile 27.Catanapan Pt. .) Dalupiri I.075 202º27’ 116.870 180º47’ 42.Line 55 (Cape Bolinao .140 121º46’35" Line 61 (Dequey I. 188º27’ 120º24’22" Line 57 (Badoc I.016 120º20’00" Line 56 (Darigayos Pt. . 179º58’ 120º19’58" Line 56a (Dile Pt.740 213º29’ 25. .Pinget I.) Catanapan Pt. . .) Dile Pt.Darigayos Pt.170 121º20’56" Line 60 (Catanapan Pt.Y’ami I. (W) 20º43’00" 195º03’ 65.Dequey I.) Darigayos Pt. 80. over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. Nothing herein shall be deemed a prohibition on a citizen of the Philippines. and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone. (b) carry out any search. Section 3. Section 2.Y’ami I. or (e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to. of the sea-bed. the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. whether natural or juridical. including the subsoil and the superjacent waters. I. (c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice. MARCOS. President of the Philippines. such as the production of energy from the water. situated in North Borneo. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. or in derogation of. There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.376 121º56’46" Line 64 (Y’ami I. FERDINAND E. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah. That. and scientific research. whether living or non-living.Y’ami I. installation or other structure or device. off-shore terminals. Section 3. . (a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation. maintain or operate any artificial island. the preservation of the marine environment. The exclusive economic zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured: Provided. if allowed under existing laws. do hereby decree and order: Section 1. (W) . the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of international law on delimitation. by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution. (M) Y’ami I. (E) 238º40’ 121º57’24" Section 2. (E) Y’ami I. off-shore terminal. THEREFORE. (M) 21º07’30" 21º07’03" 237 307º08’ 1. currents and winds. (W) 21º07’26" 121º56’39" Line 63 (Y’ami I. NOW. excavation or drilling operations: (c) conduct any research. conservation and management of the natural resources. no person shall. installations and structures. (b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands. WHEREAS. such a zone is now a recognized principle of international law. where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state.Y’ami I. 1599 ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHEREAS. an exclusive economic zone extending to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured is vital to the economic survival and development of the Republic of the Philippines. including the prevention and control of pollution. (M) . Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of any license granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over it territorial sea and continental shelf. both renewable and non-renewable. it shall have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established herein the following. (d) construct. in relation to the exclusive economic zone: (a) explore or exploit any resources. against the performance of any of the foregoing acts. entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines".31" 122º31’42.Section 4.05 5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt.00) or imprisonment ranging from six (6) months to ten (10) years.51 9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 17º5’51. 5446.29 7 PAB-06 Spires Is.73" 121º57’27.08 2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 21º6’57.000.39 6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications. Vessels and other equipment or articles used in connection therewith shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.11" 122º26’50. 17º2’36. This Decree shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette.66" 3. 3046. is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 1.34" 1.79" 122º31’43.17 3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt.61" 3.19" 122º9’46. 17º7’16.91" 122º31’3. the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.74 8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigation and overflight. 17º6’14. or both such fine and imprisonment. on Monday. Section 5. Republic Act No. 18º18’35. as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No.40 .07" 71. 16º49’56. (a) The President may authorize the appropriate government office/agency to make and promulgate such rules and regulations which may be deemed proper and necessary for carrying out the purposes of this degree.32" 99.84" 0. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 16º59’18.00) nor be more than one hundred thousand pesos (100. TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. 3046.83 4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 9522 March 10. the twenty-eight day of July.30" 122º20’19. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: Basepoint Number Station Name Location World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84) Coordinates Latitude (N) Distance to next basepoint (M) Longitude (E) 1 PAB-01 Amianan Is.000.30" 122º31’28. 2009 AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. Section 6. two thousand eight. in the discretion of the court. (b) Any person who shall violate any provision of this decree or of any rule or regulation promulgated hereunder and approved by the President shall be subject to a fine which shall not be less than two thousand pesos (P2.28" 9.71" 70.78" 2. 19º57’38. AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. Begun and held in Metro Manila. 5446.03" 122º27’56. 12º36’18.16" 125º31’30. 14º29’54. 14º6.29.12" 5.10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 12º32.37" 125º3’53.21 23 PAB-16C Alugon 12º13’21.21" 0.00" 125º34’11. 12º27’37.80 18 PAB-14A Cube Rk.17" 125º27’0. 12º6’7.94 27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 9º49’59.94 11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt.71 26 PAB-18A SE Tobabao Is.94 24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt.79 16 PAB-13A Bacan Is.40" 30. 16º47’38.70" 0.51" 125º18’5.43" 122º57’51.10.70" 125º58’8.45" 125º13’32.41" 5.32" 1.23" 7.71" 6.42" 125º17’12. 12º31.88" 0.62" 125º12’59.69" 116.39" 57.58" 126º10’6. 12º11’48.57. 12º11’20. 10º45’16.54 25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt.09 21 PAB-16A S Sorz Cay 12º21’41.91" 124º16’59. 12º28’36.30 20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt.29" 5.19" 5.40" 124º17’26. 14º6.67" 125º31’48.28 28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt.44 .90 19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt.15" 80.33.86" 122º26’4.94" 83.28" 96.95" 125º30’19. 12º41’6.37" 4.41" 125º8’50.47" 1.64" 125º23’7.26 12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 16º18’44.54 14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk.68 22 PAB-16B Panablihon 12º17’27.33" 122º14’06.04 15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt.78" 56.29 13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk.52 17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 2 35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt.14 37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt.28 38 PAB-25B Cape San Agustin 6º17’14. 5º21’58.12 36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt.48" 125º21’52. 7º27’29.18" 125º19’44.26" 1.97" 126º35’57. 5º23’34.76 34 PAB-23B Languyan 7º28’30.35" 126º11’35. 5º23’20.59" 3. 7º16’14. 5º22’2.80" 126º36’18.08" 12.62" 126º20’48.54 33 PAB-23 Languyan 7º29’16.81" 122.42 46 PAB-32 Pola Pt.80" 125º28’19.50" 0.31" 10.43 41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato Pt. 6º21’55.53" 126º28’53.44" 124º15’42.03" 0.73" 1.40" 1.65 40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani Is. 8º53’16.87 44 PAB-30 Manamil Is.24" 0.88 .80 31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 7º42’45. 7º17’19.95 32 PAB-22C Languyan 7º29’49. 8º13’11.30" 1.93" 126º35’59.20" 63.43" 126º35’57.42" 126º35’51.25" 30.02" 126º34’29.21" 3.28 39 PAB-25 Cape San Agustin 6º16’8.20" 125º28’42.73" 126º12’14. 5º23’21.66" 126º25’11.31 43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt.69 30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt.29" 78.29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 6º9’8.11" 0.81" 40.06" 67.79 45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt.44 42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt.91" 125º20’59.47" 126º35’59. 40 57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 4º45’55.01" 119º3’22.17" 85.71 0.36" 119º5’12.41" 118º26’57.20" 2.88 56 PAB-42A Paguan Is.15" 15.24 52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka Is.33" 13.84" 119º14’50.14" 55.38 49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 6º1’8.94 51 PAB-38A Kirapusan Is 5º12.47 PAB-33A Kantuan Is 6º26’47.20 61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 5º46’35. 6º2’33.44 53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 4º24’53.50" 29.17 62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is.08" 118º18’33.34.94" 18.70" 120º41’38.77" 75. 4º42’52.51" 121º54’41.60 59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk.45" 119º22’1.30" 8.88" 121º63’11.37 60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis Pt.24" 119º51’58.28 58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4º47’5.75" 6. 5º2’23.8.72 50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6º0’17.04" 8. 4º47’39.15" 119º39’51.61 54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4º25’3. 6º11’4.65" 118º6’54.22" 122º13. 4º55’10.45" 1.83" 119º14’15.54 63 PAB-48A Taganak Is 6º4’14.44 48 PAB-34A Tongguil Is.73" 119º44’18.30 23.25" 119º3’15. 6º5’58.48 55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 4º36"9.97 .15" 3.07" 119º1’44.08" 43.77" 121º56’36.19" 2.46 64 PAB-49 Great Bakkungaan Is.14" 44. 9º2. 8º44’17.00 93.60 67 PAB-52 Muligi Is.42 73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 8º2’0.89 77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt.47" 117º37’38.27 72 PAB-55 Balabac Great Reef 7º54’36.88 75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 6º52’14.37" 117º15’51.75" 26.06 68 PAB-53 South Mangsee Is.18" 6.20" 117º28’15.65 81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 6º17’43.87" 30.44" 41.61 Secam Is.35" 116º53’16.78" 13. 8º53’32.00 69 PAB-54 Balabac Is.86" 115.76 80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan Pt.17" 116º54’17.20 78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt.53" 118º23’40.22" 119º50’56.88" 81.23" 7.65 PAB-50 Libiman Is.73" 2. 9º59’22. 7º48’30.69 .49" 75.05" 117º18’33.08 70 PAB-54A Balabac Great Reef 7º51’27.86" 116º53’28. 6º13’39.40" 117º20’39.04" 10. 7º30’26.54" 118º36’53.45" 120º1’5.18 71 PAB-54B Balabac Great Reef 7º52’19.90" 118º3’52.09" 5.53 66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is.36" 116º59’51.88 82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 13º53’24.74" 74.12 79 PAB.85 74 PAB. 8º87’56.64" 5.37" 11.26" 116º54’10.64B Dry Is.19" 1.91 76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 11º13’19.82" 119º15’17.61" 82.99" 118º0’5.57. 8º11’18. 12º19’35.69" 116º59’39. 83 PAB-71 Hermana Mayor Is. 15º48’43.61" 119º46’56.09" 9.30 84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 15º57’61.67" 119º44’55.32" 12.06 85 PAB-72B Rena Pt. 16º9’57.90" 119º45.15.76" 0.25 86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 16º10’12.42" 119º45’11.95" 6.43 87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 16º16’34.46" 119º46’19.50" 0.65 88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 16º37’12.70" 119º46’28.62" 1.30 89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 16º18’29.49" 119º46’44.94" 1.04 90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 16º19’28.20" 119º47’7.69" 0.63 91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16º20’4.38" 119º47’20.48" 80.60 92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 17º34’24.94" 120º20’33.36" 6.86 93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 17º41’17.56" 120º21’2.20" 14.15 94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17º55’4.13" 120º24’40.56" 35.40 95 PAB-79 Cape Bojeador 18º29’32.42" 120º33’42.41" 1.77 96 PAB-79B Bobon 18º30’52.88" 120º34’55.35" 58.23 97 PAB-80 Calagangan Pt. 19º10’14.78" 121º12’52.64" 98.07 98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 20º43’15.74" 121º46’57.80" 25.63 99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21º7’17.47" 121º56’43.85" 0.08 100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21º7’18.41" 121º56’48.79" 0.25 101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21º7’12.04" 121º57’3.65" 0.44 Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended. Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act. Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law. Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly. Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation. Magalona v ermita The Case This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. The Antecedents In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their “territorial sea,” the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as “citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,”9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13 In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah. Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris. We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ. The Issues The petition raises the following issues: 1. Preliminarily – 1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. 2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional. On the Threshold Issues Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing “a more direct and specific interest” to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17 The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18 Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law. RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory Petitioners submit that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national territory” 21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22 Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the “outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.”24 UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.26 RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the as the map below shows. vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III. taking into account the Treaty of Paris’ account UNCLOS III (in delimitation (in square nautical square nautical miles) miles) Internal or archipelagic waters Territorial Sea 166. not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines. taking into using RA 9522.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of “about 15. where there are overlapping exclusive .210 Thus.435 274.669 Zone TOTAL 440. as amended. “weakens our territorial claim” over that area.” prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. as shown in the table below:29 Extent of maritime area using RA Extent of maritime area 3046. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046. save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Of course.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law. the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145. RA 9522. Petitioners’ assertion of loss of “about 15.216 square nautical miles. On the contrary.858 171. increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters.Scarborough Shoal.106 Exclusive Economic 382.000 square nautical miles of territorial waters.000 square nautical miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. Under RA 3046. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG. by optimizing the location of basepoints. as under RA 9522. coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations. the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris.136 32.994 586. belie this view. and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG. assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose. and not established by geodetic survey methods. as amended by R. qualifies under the category of “regime of islands.37 Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained . 5446. some of the points.” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. (Emphasis supplied) Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago. also known as Scarborough Shoal. First. 31 Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps.195 nautical miles of water. 3.” save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.” Second.” So sa loob ng ating baseline. The need to shorten this baseline. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc.A. surrounded by water. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. As defined by R. itong malaking circle sa ibaba. adverse legal effects would have ensued. dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III. the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968. 2. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal. Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121”36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servandaobligation under UNCLOS III.” such as portions of the KIG. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III]. which states that “The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles.economic zones of opposite or adjacent States. took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations: What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: “The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.30 Further. petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. Finally. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago. except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length.33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably “depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.35 Hence. up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.06 nautical miles x x x. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. This will enclose an additional 2. any “naturally formed area of land. to wit: 1.” 2. Accordingly. 3046. tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas.” The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate. Ngayon. which is above water at high tide. and in addition.A. Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that “the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles. the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies. Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that “[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. that is Scarborough Shoal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system.34 (Emphasis supplied) Similarly. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. became imperative as discussed by respondents:] ][T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water. the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The other provisions petitioners cite. paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII. and the resources contained therein. More importantly. are not violated by RA 9522. or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space. . regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah. their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject. burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded. in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines. Section 752).Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. in their territorial sea. consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.40 Indeed. and the resources contained therein. now codified in UNCLOS III. in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers. absent enabling legislation. (Emphasis supplied) The fact of sovereignty.regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. if not marginal. including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones.43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III. the political branches of the Philippine government. including the sea lanes. the right of innocent passage is a customary international law. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides. described as archipelagic waters. which. situated in North Borneo. UNCLOS III affirms this: Article 49. (Emphasis supplied) UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitution’s Delineation of Internal Waters As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522.38 Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution39 or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]). bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41 In the absence of municipal legislation. which RA 9522 did not repeal. as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Legal status of archipelagic waters. as well as to their bed and subsoil. keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah: Section 2. in violation of the Constitution. does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary. over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. Section 2 of RA 5446. to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception. relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. “do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. international law norms. 2. placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters. Although Oposa v. domestically. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States. – 1.”49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters. bed and subsoil. Thus. expeditious international navigation. the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines.47 Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters. as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. however. xxxx 4. operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. Section 2.42 Significantly. subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. including overflight. The fact that for archipelagic States. the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III. For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order. or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entirecountry." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. and 3. the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that . The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions.In fact. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. however. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. consistent with the Constitution and our national interest. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. not to this Court. 1 announcingthat she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.R. Moreover. an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. 1986. proclamation No. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law. L-14639 March 25. Nevertheless. as embodied in RA 9522. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first. allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus. No. ET AL. 1986. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas. the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress. the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed througha direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New ArmedForces of the Philippines. it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago. ET AL. with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et. or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court.R. HELD: Yes.53 UNCLOS III. WHEREFORE.On March 25.2. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann. President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. the city's Chief of Police. No. RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones Petitioners hold the view that. 2. the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone. and second. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government G. al deported to Davao. JUSTO LUKBAN. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.On February 25. based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III. we DISMISS the petition. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realmof politics where only the people are the judge. UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III. AQUINO(G. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones. Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO.The Court further held that:1. vs. in the district of Sampaloc. . 73748 . Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street.May 22. 1986)FACTS: 1. If the mayor and the chief of police. 612. according to the preamble of Ordinance No. Lockart (17 Wall. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. respondent. had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. William F. J. City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae. Peralta in his own behalf. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights". that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines. in his own opinion. and therefore. post). and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily." The Solicitor General. procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. No. 1944. was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. creating it are not of a political complexion. And he cites.R. and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. or property without due process of law. 1945 WILLIAM F. In his memorandum he submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts. made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 459). violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth.: Petitioner-defendant. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army. may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao. for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines. 99. SOVEREIGNTY G. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III. No. Ordinances and Executive Orders. a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production. vs. the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner. (22 Wall.United States (20 Wall. Horn vs. 570. L-22 (p. that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right. could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he.. and then. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are. should now be denied force and efficacy. 743). and the summary procedure prescribed therefor. acting under no authority of law. 7. 700. null and void ab initio. created in section 1 of Ordinance No. The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiae. R. Home Insurance Co. the official. liberty. states that. 7. the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texas vs. Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission are tinged with political complexion. plaintiff-appellant. by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.. PERALTA." that the provisions of said Ordinance No. and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. by said Ordinance No. to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. Benedicto Jose y Santos. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission. United States vs. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. 104).. he should be compelled to do so. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No.. the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 581). 7. petitioner. that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created. in support of this last proposition. plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. which he commenced to serve on August 21. in his answer in behalf of the respondent. pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic.Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each. section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. White (7 Wall. in response to an urgent necessity. 65 of the same Assembly. within the reach of process. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. L-49 November 12. and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. vs. 7 does not afford a fair trial. as well as those of the United States of America. The respondents. We believe the true principle should be that. G. and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. Sprott vs. nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life. assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to . defendant-appellee. while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. when called upon to defend his official action. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. for said Court was created. FERIA. Sixth Edition. does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force." (Sprott vs. considered as de factogovernments of the third kind. the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. ..clarify the points in dispute. Horn vs. Mexico. 7 Wall. and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission. In the case of United States vs. he may be immediately convicted. S. during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico. secondly. occupied during the war with that the country by the United State Army. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. 96 U. while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States. 459. if not in all instances. was. of course. No. that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty." (vol. ante). and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to. the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union continued in force in those states during the War of Secession. 176 United States vs. supra). II. . 246). 1942. in truth and reality.. Rice (4 Wheaton. remained unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texas vs. or recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people. Williams vs. in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants. since occupation is an aim of warfare. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23. Bruffy. since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant. and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States. Sprott vs. . Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G.. The question which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are. 1944. 113. and the obligation of allegiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the estate constitution. was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal and citizens as they existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. speaking through the Justice who pens this decision. 1944. merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head. and the purpose of war. "under enemy duress. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government. it is evident that the Philippines Executive Commission. because in the case of the Confederate States.) The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of Texas vs. 17 Wall. recently decided. In fine. United States. supra). as the government established in Castine. by the military occupation of Castine. and the maintenance and safety of his forces.that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble. Maine. Revised. L-5. and were bound by such laws. Maine. 466. . 700.White. and thirdly. Bruffy. And Oppenheim. if they were then valid. were null and void. and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable.. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine. based upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States. R. a portion of which has been already quoted. says that.. the same laws for the protection of the property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers. it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines. is not applicable to the present case. Maine. held: In view of the foregoing. first. because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory. or were in conflict with those constitutions. Lockart. . 570. (Vol. 127. a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14. "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory. p. the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government. As Halleck says. and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present case. issued on January 23.. before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. White. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. 20 Wall. stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions. 249. the validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation. subject to the Constitution of the United States. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts. that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him. as it chose to recognize and impose. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force). the same constitution. 342. "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered. 1943. whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. in his Treatise on International Law. the Supreme Court of the United States held that. and others) that the judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. supra) and that the Confederate States "in most. by the Commander of the Japanese forces. And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied. and such only. United States. pp. In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. this Court. Home Insurance Co. and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. sanctioned no hostile legislation . a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. Mexico. 20 Wall. which was organized by Order No. 1. suspended. Before proceeding further. or by the United States in Tanpico. this Court said: The so-called Republic of the Philippines. except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices. and of the summary procedure adopted for that court. apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people. 2 p. — it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. they were altered and penalized by said Act No. to be punishable. and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant. and in case." (Oppenheim's International Law. the term "martial law. which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum. that is. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones. those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the army. and the success of its operations. p. Part II. II. or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district. but shall be repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects. as we have already stated. the territorial law in general. A belligerent "occupant may where necessary. International Law. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate prospectively only. such variations of the territorial law as may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. . Act No. sixth edition. for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. p. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion.(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. and it is none the less so when applied by civil courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant." (Taylor. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded. therefore. on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure. for it is less objectionable. War. 76. 7.349. . in an occupied district martial law. first. seventh ed. The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit. as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals. 5000). set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts. International Public Law. 598. so far as it is necessary for military purposes. and in so far as. there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines. to life imprisonment or death as maximum. II.) From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate. 7.. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience. is essentially martial. to fix penalties. he declares certain acts. Vol. that is. 1940. for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army. With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist of. or to a special agency entrusted with its administration. that acts committed to their detriment shall not only lose what justification the territorial law might give them as committed against enemies. and generally to administer justice through such agencies as the found expedient. (2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner. are those imposed by the Hague Regulations. 96. not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country. seventh edition. having the sanction of military authority. p. Section III. may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called martial law. p. being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code. (Pub. the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. incident to a state of war. 1944. he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts." (Hall's International Law. the usages established by civilized nations. so far as is necessary for military purposes. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. Westlake says that Article XLIII." in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation to belligerent occupation. as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity. as that which stands to the public order and social and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation. for his security also. pp. and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts. so that any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is enjoined to have in view. unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . 65 of the said Assembly. its support and efficiency. 65 with different and heavier penalties. or for the maintenance of public order and safetytemporarily alter the laws. p. and cases quoted and cited in the footnote).) No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution. Vol. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers. especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely. page 97. the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion. and in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule. and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them. even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe. especially the Criminal Law. it being necessary for the protection of the latter." (Westlake. and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner. and secondly. to establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders. . by whomsoever administered. There is no room for doubt. does not refer to a particular code or system of law. so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders. that is. 386). especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure. And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands. All law. depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 77. or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts. because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state. had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. he may nevertheless. the protection and safety of the army of occupation.) According to Hyde (International Law. whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state. it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. pp. flight to enemy's country. when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government. safety and security of the belligerent occupant. traveling without a permit. and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and against the welfare. considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a . for they were not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Island. and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign). and the crimes against public order." (Hall's International Law.They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader. evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner. Hague Conventions of 1907). seventh edition. to sentences for 'war treason' and 'war crimes. 97. Thus. commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent occupant. they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. vehicles. ammunition." (Wheaton's International Law. using seditious language. spreading alarmist reports. Such offenses. . etc. seventh edition. 7. p. . overcharging for goods. will bind any member of the occupied population as against any other member of it. penalized by Ordinance No. While it is true that these offenses. but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous.. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations. and will bind as between them all and their national government. that is whether or not. as are all political offenses. no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out. sedition and disloyalty. In order to resolve this last question. supra. 98. or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. not indeed so as to be debarred from carrying out his will without notice. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as well as for enactment. in order. of horses. p. says that: "To the extent to which the legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. in the Anglo-Boer war. Especially taking into consideration the fact. — Being in possession of arms. going out of doors between certain hours. and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state. of which this court may take judicial notice. When the occupation comes to an end the authority of the national government is restored. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production. whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country. as they did. without a permit. depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. p. and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists. Sec. the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time. illegal possession of firearms and other. The invaded state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his commands.) It is. together with several others. They are also considered by some writers as war crimes in a broad sense. that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country. LII. War. (3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government. injuring military animals or stores. in case of necessity. to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control. Applying that doctrine to the present case. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. Part II. supra. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e. espionage. because the acts constituting those offenses were punished. when required by military necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment. III. supra. so far as it produces an effect during the occupation.) Westlake. 242. ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. which is within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to punish. 7 and placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political complexion.) And Wheaton. such as rebellion. therefore. — The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. trespassing on defense works. opines "that judicial acts done under this control. It is sufficient to quote the opinion on the subject of several international jurists and our recent decision in the case ofCo Kim Cham vs. administrative acts so done. sending prohibited goods." (Wheaton's International Law. piracy. A prisoner detained under it must be released. etc. holding meetings other than those allowed. wearing uniforms without due authority. speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question. either by the progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code. 518. 1944. not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country. and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. . hindering those in execution of military orders. says: "In general.) We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. since it was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted. no redress can be had for what has been actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation. who. for public rather than private reasons. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations.' to acts of a political character. by the principle of postliminy. procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries. inciting war. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. being in possession. Hall. violation of neutrality. to wit: treason. When occupation ceases. 7 and Act No. (Westlake.g. 65. but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that.. and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. But the law made by the occupant within his admitted power. the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them. when they are not of a political complexion. the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law. correspondence with hostile country. were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war. as above stated. was good and valid. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. defined above by Hyde. and to those that beyond the period of occupation. 245.. In this connection Wheaton observes the following: "Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite. the cast of the occupant possess legal validity. are defined and also penalized by the territorial law Revised Penal Code. cycles. remain good. that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime. imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment. Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course. International Law. War. and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced. The crimes penalized by Act No. whether morally justifiable or not. J. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base. Within its limits. without pronouncement as to costs. of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted. C. This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland. Moran. Whether by signing the MOA. its commands paramount. both territorial and personal. and the Municipality of Linamon. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein. he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement. On the other hand. 5. concur. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication. the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at P17912. concurs in the result. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic 2. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain andAncestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD). It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all laws. As a result of this transaction. and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. So ordered. In view of all the foregoing. although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces.. Reagan v cir Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. Pablo and Bengzon. 6. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional Held: Issue 1: . Jaranilla. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. Whether there is a violation of the peoples’ right to information on matters of public concern. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters. and 7. Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. he. 3. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity.. Two months later. in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner under said law.83. That is the extent of its jurisdiction. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself. ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. He sold it to Willie Johnson Jr for $6600. Iligan and Isabela. among them Act No. Cities of Zamboanga. 65. the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith. According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD. Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question. in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. courtesy and expediency. by nature of his employment. ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? HELD: The Philippines is independent and sovereign. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Issues: 1. have been preserved. certainly not excluding the power to tax. is exempt from Philippine taxation. had already become null and of no effect. JJ.00. its decrees are supreme.crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. a sentence which. before the proclamation.34 and that his income tax would be P2797. Its laws govern therein. 4. In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443. O. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution. the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E. On June 24. In the case at bar. respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOAAD. 1969. 54 SCRA 84 FACTS: On July 3. VILLASOR G. will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition. November 28 1973. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks. issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3. No. respondents almost consummated act ofguaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is. Iligan and Isabela. as a solution to the Moro Problem. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered. Issue 4: Yes.R. particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato. specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits. and the public. Issue 5: No. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution. Pursuant to the said Order. for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Issue 3: The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. J. and International Construction Corporation. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement. The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions. the bar. there is a violation of the people’s right to information. but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. No.An essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks. confirming the arbitration award subject of Special Proceedings. 1961. the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. Kiener Co. the creation of a state within a state. L-30671. The associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. and the Municipality of Linamon.The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. in another or any form. and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. rendered the petition ripe for adjudication. and against the petitioner herein. Ltd. the Cities of Zamboanga. a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat. directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province. In any event. Gavino Unchuan.. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Issue 2: Yes. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT REPUBLIC VS. particularly. Issue 7: Yes. with . The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. 1961 final and executory. this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. by itself. Villasor. (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench. Issue 6: Yes. These petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution’.. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest. sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. JOSENIANO B. Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. respondents.372.331. SATURNINO BACOL. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. Nos. MUSIB M. This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. FLORENTINO ESTOBIO. both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. MARCELINO MATURAN. G. It is readily understandable why it must be so. private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26. ESPINA. LEON G. pay andallowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). DEMOSTHENES MANTO. SRAB 10-03-00067-91 to 10-03-00078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91 for illegal dismissal and damages. 1995 ELDEPIO LASCO. FRAEN BALIBAG. ISSUE: Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void. KYRIACOS LOUCA. acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. BUAT. OSCAR N. Thus. The letter confirmed that private respondent. DR. 1991. being a special fund administered by the United Nations.. RAMON LOYOLA. URBANO BERADOR. I Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent. which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. ESPINA." A corollary. JR. not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. ABELLA. QUIASON. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. We dismiss the petition. Petitioner then alleged that respondent Judge.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Resolution dated January 25. p. GONZAGA. Honorable Guillermo P. all represented by MARIANO R. SATURNINO LASCO. the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void. Labor Arbiter of Butuan City. the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE). but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 1991. 1991. 109095-109107 February 23. HELD: The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. II . 1993. was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory (Rollo. Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING PETILLA. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit. which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its Resolution dated January 25. 21).40. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated September 10. On November 25. J. petitioner. In support thereof. private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. CARMELITO GAJOL. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent. In its Motion to Dismiss. Fifth Division. hence." In the answer filed by respondents.R. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC resolution. UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its operations manager. respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. which acknowledged its immunity from suit. Villasor. an appeal was filed with the NLRC. RODOLFO ELISAN. the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2. vs. Fifth Division.the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees. Cagayan de Oro City. Commissioners of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. 4. It is not surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of international immunities. The property and assets of the specialized agencies. Sec. in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property. such as health. wherever located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. Petitioners. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the instant petition. and the grant of immunity to international organizations. as amended. the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international organizations. provides that decisions of the NLRC are final and executory. Court of Appeals. shall be immune from search. 48 SCRA 242. p. II. which may merit its being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to the necessity of filing such motion. we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because of the implications of the issue in our international relations. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. Private respondent is a specialized agency of the United Nations. understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution (Emphasis supplied). The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. to which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. wherever located and by whomsoever held. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the organization. likewise. the Solicitor General or other officer acting under his direction. 2. the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations: 1. 222 SCRA 37 [1993]). certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal. however. 1. requisition. In World Health Organization v. petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners. whether by executive. as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity. Notwithstanding. Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. (1972). the petition lacks any explanation for such omission. we held that there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international organizations. Philippine Treaty Series. confiscation. In the International Catholic Migration Commission case. it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction (Emphasis supplied). from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization. in accordance with international practice. In the case at bench. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution. Ordinarily. judicial or legislative action (Emphasis supplied). its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks. Hence. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the international organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions. agriculture. administrative. Moreover. XIII. . to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. 3). As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution. It is. We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universal endeavors. Sec. Calleja. and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar. we had occasion to rule that: It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers thatdiplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. Thus. We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof: Sec. 621). The specialized agencies. it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government. Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. expropriation and any other form of interference. Art. 5.Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. their property and assets. Aquino. International Immunities 17 [1961]). science and technology and environment. Sec. 2). 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). they may only be questioned through certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Art. besides.while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI. such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its memberstates. supra). One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction. the petition is DISMISSED. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases. Being an intergovernmental organization. National Labor Relations Commission (G. CALLADO VS. International Catholic Migration Commission v. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. impliedly.R.The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs. HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner. 241 SCRA 580 FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner. petitioner figured in an accident. 106483. It has already been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. 206 SCRA 283/1992). through counsel. May 22 1995. After evaluating petitioner's answer.. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. it has. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. i. illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 1990. No. as well as respondent labor arbiter. Regional Arbitration Branch. III. that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree . Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people. recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party.R. 4). Dec. Calleja. enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. No. G. Hon. SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD). the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner. On February 11. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasijudicial agencies (The Holy See v. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization. 97468-70. before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 1990. 101949. it is an international organization. explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. 86773. The private respondents. the latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7. SEAFDEC VS. SO ORDERED. In these cases. filed a Motion to Dismiss. Sec. Rosario. however. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit. including that of petitioners. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC). 244 SCRA 210 FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). if not expressly. No. IRRI G.R. waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction. who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of various Southeast Asian countries.. which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. The petitioner. Jr. September 2 1993. 1. Iloilo City. indeed. Art. allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if. NLRC G. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity." WHEREFORE. Eriberto U. Nos.R. 1994.e. thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner. There’s no merit in petitioner's arguments. 1973 Facts: del Mar.” (4) It was discretionary on the part of PVA to discontinue pension. L-27299] June 27. Issue: The PVA decided that: (1) Petitioner is barred from receiving any pension from the Philippine Veterans Administration. early on. However. there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief. the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.R. it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its DirectorGeneral is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. Necessarily. in effect. its provisions.” (4) The case is not premature. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal. Held: (1) When a case is a suit against the state: “As a general proposition. to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. not having waived the same.” (2) Suits against the state must be dismissed (3) When a case is not a suit against the state: “where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. “Suffice it to state that where a case as in the present controversy — involves a question solely of a legal nature. contrary to the express language of the Constitution.” . was was relieved with honorable discharge with permanent total physical disability. Presidential Decree No. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can. On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit. civil and administrative proceedings. in suspending a provision of law. the petitioner. not departure from. except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. “the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention” (3) The case is a suit against the state. assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in “adverse consequences on the public treasury. TEST TO DETERINE IF SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE Del Mar vs Philippine Veterans Administration [G. is against the constitution. whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. Philippine Veterans administration granted him pension but was soon discontinued because he received the same pension under the United States Veterans Administration. made its position clear. of a suit against the Government which is not suitable without its consent. “the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA — a mere agency of the Philippine Government — and. Through counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship. 1620.No. in whom all executive power resides. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. “The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar’s receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. 1620. Its terms must be followed. IRRI had. The statute requires adherence to. Article 3 provides: Immunity from Legal Process.” (5) The act committed by the PVA. “… the Constitution limits the authority of the President. No deviation is allowable. Administrative liability is not required.” (2) The filing of the case is premature. reads as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. Fidel V. hence. 1986. PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12. the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. Sabas V. a legislative act. VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. 91359. since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case. Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). He was the counsel of the prevailing party. were performed as part of their official duties. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief. requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located.00 outside of Metro Manila. It contends that the service of the . 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash. or bad faith. "The order of August 26. INC. Ramos. Inc. to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition. Inc. hence. 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued.. Gen. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3. charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12. the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. gross negligence. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature. subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. VS. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. As a result.VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES. even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.255. unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. SUIT AGAINST GOVT. and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators. HELD: Yes. CIR Facts: Petitioner’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. COURT OF APPEALS G. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies. ISSUE: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent. September 25 1992. No.00 within Metro Manila and P2. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto. it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies. without malice. subject of this certiorari proceeding.215. unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.”. 214 SCRA 286 FACTS: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services. which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2. Without such consent. through Col. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority..R. AGENCY PNB v. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith. Edades. however. Furthermore. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City. no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Manansala had previously been issued. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character. not from a mere memorandum. Sr. the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character. and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. therefore. Wheat.: In a petition before the Social Security Commission. as amended. held: "On the other hand. For his labor. the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. Tana allegedly received a regular salary according to the minimum wage prevailing at the time. J. widow of the late Ignacio Tana. pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law . this certiorari petition. that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment. as well as medicare and employees compensation premiums were deducted from Tana’s wages. it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of nonsuability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. Court of Industrial Relations. dated October 23. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. social security contributions. 1970. Manila Hotel Company. vs. distinct and separate from that of the Government. It was only after his death that Margarita discovered that Tana was never reported for coverage. so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations. the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country. it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. it was denied. 1950 . as a government owned and controlled corporation. Act No. later Chief Justice. since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself.. but in a resolution dated September 22. Planters' Bank. the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. and under this law. 1459). Issue:WON the funds mentioned may be garnished Ruling:No Rationale: National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. No. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation. nor were his contributions/premiums remitted to the Social Security System (SSS). before his demise.. since June 19. is untenable for. through Justice Ozaeta. the same may not be garnished. for withholding action in this case. 6 L. respondents. she was deprived of the burial grant and pension benefits accruing to the heirs of Tana had he been reported for coverage. including Quezon City.' Following the law. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff." 5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. alleged that her husband was. according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. attached or levied upon. Manila Hotel Employees Association v. 1965. Hence. Manansala. four (4) weeks a month... petitioner. Gabriel V. Republic Act No.' Accordingly. Margarita Tana. 1970. She further alleged that throughout the given period. 904. and that. its funds may be levied upon or garnished. which is national in nature. and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff.ed. She further alleged that Tana worked continuously six (6) days a week.. There is no longer any reason.notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 244). . 4201 has. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6. 356. Consequently. has already been dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9. "In a 1941 decision. 105. (Bank of the United States v. La Carlota City) and leased from the University of the Philippines (known as Hda. or by any person authorized by this Court.. and for twelve (12) months every year between January 1961 to April 1979. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCHITA AYALDE.. it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. At this stage. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice. the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City. It is an entirely different matter if. as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs.. Audit B-70 located in Pontevedra. . in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance. Audit B-15-M situated in La Granja. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. Thereafter. the NASSCO has a personality of its own. already repealed Commonwealth Act No. La Carlota City). as such. 103. Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government. The Court finds no merit in this argument. "Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions. it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business. an employee of Conchita Ayalde as a farmhand in the two (2) sugarcane plantations she owned (known as Hda. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. [Wherefore]. 1970." Then it can sue and be sued. this Court. B-15-M. Sr. respondent Ayalde belied the allegation that Ignacio Tana.00 representing funeral benefit or a total of P7. raising the following assignment of errors: I The Social Security Commission erred in not finding that there is sufficient evidence to show that: (a) The deceased Ignacio Tana. La Carlota City. was never her employee. while he was never contracted to work in Hda. was hired thereat on a ‘pakyaw’ basis. and he followed his own schedule of work hours. therefore. and report his name for SSS coverage.817. she prayed that the Commission issue an order directing: 1.”[5] Respondent Ayalde filed a motion for reconsideration [6]which the Commission denied for lack of merit in an Order dated November 3. whether as a daily or monthly laborer or as independent contractor. 1988. performing the services of an ‘arador’ (Plower). Audit B-15-M. as well as the testimony of the respondent together with her documentary evidences. Ayalde further alleged that she never exercised control over the manner by which Tana performed his work as an independent contractor.[7] Not satisfied with the Commission’s ruling.[2] In his answer. Moreover. B-70 nor respondents Ayalde and Maghari were registered members-employers of the SSS. in any capacity. the University of the Philippines had already terminated the lease over Hda. Further.[3] For her part. SSS records reflected that there was no way of verifying whether the alleged premium contributions were remitted since the respondents were not registered members-employers. Sr. She also prayed for the dismissal of the case considering that Ignacio Tana. by respondent Conchita (Concepcion) Ayalde with a salary based on the Minimum Wage prevailing during his employment. Audit B-70. Sr. never worked in the farmland of respondent-appellant situated in Pontevedra. he prayed that the case against him be dismissed for lack of cause of action. his job was limited to those defined for him by the employer which never involved matters relating to the SSS. the SSS is ordered to pay to the petitioner her accrued pension covering the period after the 5-year guaranteed period corresponding to the employer’s liability. 1988. B-70 and Hda. Ignacio Tana. he is absolved from liability because he is a mere employee of Conchita Ayalde. The testimony of the petitioner which was corroborated by Agaton Libawas and Aurelio Tana.40. B-70 sometime during crop years 1964-65 to 1971-72. SO ORDERED. the SSS asked the Commission’s leave to intervene in the case. As regards respondent Antero Maghari. Sr. admitting only that he was hired intermittently as an independent contractor to plow. Ignacio Tana. Tana used his own carabao and other implements. Not having reported the petitioner’s husband for coverage with the SSS. and as such. otherwise known as Hacienda Audit No. revealed that neither Hda. B-15-M which are owned and leased. respectively. No. No.[1] The SSS. respondent Antero Maghari raised the defense that he was a mere employee who was hired as an overseer of Hda. PREMISES CONSIDERED. (Pontevedra B-70 Farm for short). Being the agency charged with the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the Social Security Law. (b) During the time that respondent-appellant was leasing a portion of the land of the University of the Philippines. this Commission finds that the late Ignacio Tana was employed by respondent Conchita Ayalde from January 1961 to March 1979. as amended. B-15-M and she had since surrendered possession thereof to the University of the Philippines. the Social Security Commission issued a Resolution on January 28. Ayalde averred that way back in 1971. using his own carabao and farming implements on his own time and discretion within the period demanded by the nature of the job contracted. the dispositive portion of which reads: After a careful evaluation of the testimonies of the petitioner and her witnesses. or burrow Hda. was no longer hired to work thereon starting in crop year 197172.R.067. harrow. Sr. Hence. docketed as CA-G. Consequently. Ayalde appealed to the Court of Appeals. was her employee. and consequently. the SSS to grant petitioner Margarita Tana the funeral and pension benefits due her. . otherwise known as Hacienda No. and 2. respondent Conchita (Concepcion) Ayalde is. Likewise. liable for the payment of damages equivalent to the death benefits in the amount of P7.40 plus the amount of P750. coworkers of the deceased Ignacio Tana. in a petition-in-intervention. (La Granja B-15 Farm for short). respondents Conchita Ayalde and Antero Maghari as her administrator to pay the premium contributions of the deceased Ignacio Tana. the deceased Ignacio Tana. this Commission finds and so holds that the late Ignacio Tana had been employed continuously from January 1961 to March 1979 in Hda. or as an independent contractor. 16427. SP No. sufficienty established the latter’s employment with the respondent. Sr. Audit B-70.Hence. was never registered as a member-employee. Sr.[4] After hearing both parties. for which he was proficient. reversing the ruling of the Social Security Commission and declaring that the late Ignacio Tana. they also held the prerogative of dismissing or terminating Tana’s employment. who was hired by Conchita Ayalde on “pakyaw” basis to perform specific tasks in her sugarcane plantations. they do not cover the 18-year period during which Tana was supposed to have . we reiterate the well-settled doctrine that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact. (b) the payment of wages. Social Security System (or SSS). did not fall within the coverage of the Social Security Law. ruled otherwise.[12] There is no question that Tana was selected and his services engaged by either Ayalde herself. The mandatory coverage under the SSS Law (Republic Act No. insists that Tana was paid solely on “pakyaw” basis. To support her claim. or by Antero Maghari. his heirs are entitled to pension and burial benefits. Sr.[14] A careful perusal of the records readily show that the exhibits offered are not complete. filed a Motion for Reconsideration.II The Social Security Commission erred in holding that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that respondent-appellant was no longer leasing La Granja B-15 Farm. III The Social Security Commission erred in not holding that the deceased Ignacio Tana. and in the absence of an employer-employee relationship between Tana and Ayalde. having been hired as an independent contractor on ‘pakyaw’ basis. and (d) the power of control with regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.[10] And while it is the general rule that factual issues are not within the province of the Supreme Court. should be considered an employee.”[9] Hence. The dispute is in the question of payment of wages. Ayalde. 3) The Court of Appeals was in error in disregarding the settled rule that the factual findings of administrative bodies on matters within their competence shall not be disturbed by the courts. this petition for review on certiorari on the following assigned errors: 1) The Court of Appeals was in error in ruling that an employee working under the “pakyaw” system is considered under the law to be an independent contractor. [11] Our disquisition of the facts shall be our guide as to whose findings are supported by substantial evidence. which was denied on the ground that the arguments advanced are “mere reiterations of issues and arguments already considered and passed upon in the decision in question which are utterly insufficient to justify a modification or reversal of said decision. where there are conflicting and contradictory findings of fact. said rule is not without exception. and Section 8(d) defines an “employee” as “any person who performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services where there is an employer-employee relationship. Petitioner. such as this one.[13] and November of 1978 to May of 1979. The Court of Appeals. 1976 and portions of 1978 and 1979. And while they cover the years 1975. however. The SSS. 4) The Court of Appeals was in error in ruling that even granting arguendo that Ignacio Tana was employed by Conchita Ayalde. their signatures are nowhere to be found. Sr.[8] The Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondent-appellant Conchita Ayalde and dismissed the claim of petitioner Margarita Tan. this Court has not hesitated to scrutinize the records to determine the facts for itself. argues that the deceased Ignacio Tana. (c) the power of dismissal. and are but a mere sampling of payrolls. on the other hand. 2) The Court of Appeals was in error in not giving due consideration to the fundamental tenet that doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor and social welfare laws should be resolved in favor of labor. as intervenor-appellee. Corollarily.. The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not an agricultural laborer who was hired on “pakyaw” basis can be considered an employee entitled to compulsory coverage and corresponding benefits under the Social Security Law. the latter cannot be compelled to pay to his heirs the burial and pension benefits under the SS Law. her overseer. At the outset. such employment did not entitle him to compulsory coverage since he was not paid any regular daily wage or basic pay and he did not work for an uninterrupted period of at least six months in a year in accordance with Section 8(j) (1) of the SS Law. and as such. with the power of control being the most determinative factor. she presented payrolls covering the period January of 1974 to January of 1976. Claimant Margarita Tana and her corroborating witnesses testified that her husband was paid daily wages “per quincena” as well as on “pakyaw” basis. 1161. as amended by PD 1202 and PD 1636) is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship. While the names of the supposed laborers appear therein. was an independent contractor. In cases.” The essential elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee. GALVAN: To prove that it is material to the main question because if ever the hacienda maintains complete payrolls of their employees. is Margarita Tana’s positive testimony. And how did that differ from the pad paper which you said you signed? A. In contrast to Ayalde’s evidence. we just sign on pad paper because we have no payroll to be signed. HEARING OFFICER: Let the witness answer. B-70 is every 15 days? A. B-15-M. You mean. Even Ayalde admitted that she hired Tana as “arador” and sometimes as laborer during milling in Hda.[15] To our mind. WITNESS: There was no payroll. xxx xxx xxx Q. B-70 or Hda. B-15-M) were either destroyed or lost. What do you understand by payroll? A. he was paid. they testified as follows: Margarita Tana: Q. Also an admitted fact is that these exhibits only cover Hda. . In the payroll. Q. these documents are not only sadly lacking. Were the names of workers of the hacienda all listed in that pad paper every payday? A. or lack thereof. Ayalde having averred that all her records and payrolls for the other plantation (Hda. xxx xxx xxx ATTY. How many times did he receive his salary in a month’s time? A. we only sign directly. ATTY. B-15-M. Q. The fact that Tana’s name does not appear in the payrolls for the years 1975. 1976 and part of 1978 and 1979. What is the difference? A. B-15-M must fail. B70 in the years 1961 to 1974. Yes. There is a difference. Moreover. Yes. The veracity of the alleged documents as payrolls are doubtful considering that the laborers named therein never affixed their signatures to show that they actually received the amounts indicated corresponding to their names. [16] In light of her incomplete documentary evidence. Daily basis. is no proof that he did not work in Hda. corroborated by two (2) other witnesses.worked in Ayalde’s plantations. On the matter of wages. sir. Q. During the employment of your late husband. no record was shown pertaining to Hda. Ayalde’s denial that Tana was her employee in Hda. payday in Hda. at the end there is a column for signature but in the pad paper. if she knows.. they are also unworthy of credence. was he paid any wages? A. then the burden of proof lies in the petitioner…. GALVAN: (continuing) Q. B70. only pad paper. Q. 2 times. where Tana was supposed to have worked. Q. was it on “pakyaw” or daily basis? A. Yes. and the rest of 1978 and 1979. What was the manner of payment of his salary. Payroll is the list where the whole laborers are listed and receive their salaries. Yes. sir. Q. Objection overruled.00 now it is P8.. What about the salary of your husband. sir. UNGCO: That is why I’m asking …. There was an increase because formerly it was P4. Q. And the date corresponding to the payroll pad? A. In one quincena my husband receives P60. Q. Q.00 per quincena later on increased? A. Q. Q. Q. every 15 days. did you have a copy of that? ATTY. The same. WITNESS: I don’t have. Yes. HEARING OFFICER: Let the witness answer. Q. how much? A. Do you know if all the workers of the hacienda were listed in that payrolls? . do you sign payrolls everytime you draw your salary? A. In 1979 how much was your husband’s salary per quincena? A.[18] AURELIO TANA: Q. Did you sign payrolls everytime you received your salaries? A. We receive our wages twice a month that is. By the way. ATTY. the practice of the hacienda is to have the names of the laborers receiving that salaries listed on that intermediate pad? A.00 how much was your quincenal together with your husband? A. When you are receiving daily wage of P4.. In the pad paper as substitute payroll. You mean. Did it contain the amount that you receive? A.[17] AGATON LIBAWAS: Q. During your employment.Q.00 while I only receive P30.00. GALVAN: Objection. The highest salary I received for my own was P30. Was this P30. Your Honor.00 in one quincena.00. it is not the petitioner who had a copy. Now. it is usually the owner because the preparation of the payrolls is done by the employer who…. We sign on intermediate pad. I am not sure but it only enumerates our names and then we were given our salaries. how many times did you receive your salaries in a month? A. xxx xxx xxx Q. Q. we find that the testimonies of Margarita Tana. 12 months. he was also paid a daily wage which Ayalde’s overseer disbursed every fifteen (15) days. We find this assertion to be specious for several reasons. as in this case where the employer-employee relationship between petitioners and Esita was sufficiently proved by testimonial evidence. Yes. Ayalde has failed to convince us that. then. Who was in charge in giving your salaries? A. No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. There was no timesheet. In the parallel case of Opulencia Ice Plant and Storage v.A. Mrs. while Tana was sometimes hired as an “arador” or plower for intermittent periods. the absence of time sheet. Absence of these material documents are necessarily fatal to complainant’s cause. how many days in a week did your late husband work? A.’ We do not agree. how many months did your husband work in 1979 considering that he died in 1979? A. Mrs. Thus. which are different from those presented by Ayalde as documentary evidence. Is this working pattern of your husband. On the other hand. Witness. And how many months for that year did he work? A. pay slip and/or payroll/cash voucher to speak of. And yet. The argument is raised that Tana is an independenent contractor because he was hired and paid wages on “pakyaw” basis. in January 1961. Ayalde herself admitted as much. to wit: MARGARITA TANA: Q. considering that you testified that he worked continuously. Yes. His work was continuous except on Sundays. if only documentary evidence would be required to show that relationship. indeed. For. 4 weeks in January 1961. no scheming employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice. First. the claimant and her witnesses were direct and firm in their testimonies. Q. few and incomplete in substance and content. Q. plowing. although she minimized the extent of Tana’s labors. NLRC. 3 months. Q. sir. the petitioners argued that since Manuel P. time record or payroll has become inconsequential. Esita’s name does not appear in the payrolls of the company it necessarily means that he was not an employee. the latter is duty-bound to keep faithful and complete records of her business affairs. Consequently. weeding and stubble cleaning. Was your late husband’s work continuous or not? A. Witness. hauling fertilizers. Antero Maghari. In fine. as no employer would wish to come out with any trace of the illegality he has authored considering that it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument. Tana was not her employee. As the employer.[19] These witnesses did not waver in their assertion that while Tana was hired by Ayalde as an “ arador” on “pakyaw” basis. the testimonial evidence of the claimant and her witnesses constitute positive and credible evidence of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Tana and Ayalde.”[20] (Underscoring ours) Clearly. he was hired to do other tasks in Ayalde’s plantations. This Court held: “Petitioners further argue that ‘complainant miserably failed to present any documentary evidence to prove his employment. Cutting canes. the same all throughout his employment from 1961 to 1978? A. Agaton Libawas and Aurelio Tana prevail over the incomplete and inconsistent documentary evidence of Ayalde. 4 weeks a month and 12 months each year. not the least of which would be the salaries of the workers. xxx xxx xxx . he worked continuously from 1961 to 1978 for 6 days a week. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. It is also undisputed that they were made to acknowledge receipt of their wages by signing on sheets of ruled paper. hauling canes with the use of canecarts. What was the nature of the work of your late husband from 1961 until his death in 1979? A. Q. Q. the documents presented have been selective. please inform the Commission how many months each year from 1961 to 1984 did you work in Hda. each year. you said they were Agaton Libawas. Witness. Q. is that correct? A. Q. Q. considering that according to you. And during this time that you are working in your riceland you will agree with me that you do not know whether the laborers of this Hda. Mr. Q. Their works are the same with that of my husband’s. B-70 and B-15M are 5 months each year? A. he was also plowing because that is one of his duties. will you please inform at least 5 laborers of Hda. from 1961 to 1984 your average working months in Hda. B-70 and B-15M of Conchita Ayalde? A.Q. Q. So. during cultivation if they are short of plowers then they would call me to work for at least 3 months as a plower. Q.[21] AGATON LIBAWAS: Q. He worked only for 10 months because the 2 months are already preparation for cultivation. Is there no other passage in that hacienda except that road in front of your house? A. Are you sure about that? A. if how many months did he work during lifetime from 1961 until he died in 1979? A. Narciso Dueñas. I am sure. Yes. I knew because the place of their work is just near my house. because they have to pass in my house. Aurelio Tana. Hauling canes by the use of bull carts and cutting canes. Q. In your case. B-70 and Hda. His work was continuous. were they regular workers. it is along the way. B-70 and B-15M when you are busy at your riceland? A. xxx xxx xxx Q. Juan Dueñas. Q. you are only a relief worker. B-70 and B-15M. Narciso Dueñas. Mr. you worked only for at least 5 months in Hda. Yes. or extra workers? A. During milling season. and Aurelio Tana. to prove that you have worked there. B-15M with Conchita Ayalde? A. B-70 and Had B-15M are really working because you are devoting your time in your riceland. Yes. Juan Dueñas. How about when the canes are already tall. And according to you. the other co-workers of yours. was a regular worker of the 2 haciendas. How about petitioner Margarita Tana and the late Ignacio Tana. Will you please inform the Commission if the deceased Ignacio Tana which is according to you. Yes. I worked 2 months. But you mentioned among the duties of your husband as “arador” meaning – plowing the fields? A. Ignacio and Margarita Tana. And by continuous you mean he worked straight 12 months each year except in 1979? A. They were regular workers. sir. Witness. is that correct? A. in a year’s time. can you actually see the workers in Hda. Q. Now. xxx xxx xxx Q. what were their jobs? A. Yes. Yes.[22] AURELIO TANA: . all in all. in finding for Ayalde. 6 days a week. The same. Ayalde. in return for which the latter gratuitously allowed Tana and his family to reside in her property. testified that Tana and his family resided in the plantation. What about the petitioner? A. she did exercise control through her overseer. During your employment in the said hacienda where were you residing? A. What road are you referring to? A. Jurisprudence provides other equally important considerations which support the conclusion that Tana was not an independent contractor. How far is Hda. hired on “pakyaw” basis does not necessarily mean that he was not employed to do other tasks for the remainder of the year. however. B-15. . Be that as it may. Q.” Tana was not an employee but an independent contractor. she possessed the power to control everyone working therein and everything taking place therein. It was the Social Security Commission that took into consideration all the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.” It is also an admitted fact that Tana. applying the “control test. Highway road from Barangay Buenavista to La Granja. There is no shred of evidence to show that Tana was only a seasonal worker. not only as “arador” on “pakyaw” basis. Thus. Tana cannot be said to be engaged in a distinct occupation or business. We were working together. During your employment will you please inform the Commission the frequency of work of the late Ignacio Tana? A. Second. The only logical explanation is that he was working for most part of the year exclusively for Ayalde. Consequently. she contends that. he had been working exclusively for Ayalde for eighteen (18) years prior to his demise. of the laborers. It is very near it is divided by the road. much less a migrant worker. applying fertilizers. that Tana worked continuously for Ayalde. Q.[23] It is indubitable. All witnesses. weeding. Q. the conclusion culled from their testimonies to the effect that Tana was mainly and solely an “arador” was at best a selective appreciation of portions of the entire evidence. B-70 from Hda. The Court of Appeals. therefore. doing backbreaking jobs for Ayalde’s business. but it failed to appreciate the rest of their testimonies. Q. Because we were together working. digging canals and plowing. Third. Do you know what is the work of the petitioner during the time when you were together working in the field? A. His carabao and plow may be useful in his livelihood. then there would be no reason for Ayalde to allow them to live inside her property for free. Just because he was. 12 months a year. [24] Certainly.Q. Q. 4 weeks a month. Q. About 20 arms-length. There is also no question that plowing or preparing the soil for planting is a major part of the regular business of Ayalde. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee. How far is your house from the house of the petitioner? A. Secondly. including Ayalde herself. like cutting and loading canes. First. Q. If he was a mere “pakyaw” worker or independent contractor. the power of control refers merely to the existence of the power. wielded the power to hire or dismiss. Jr. be it in progress or quality. As the owner/lessee of the plantations. used his own carabao and tools. Why is it that you are in a position to inform the Commission about the period of employment of Ignacio Tana? A. but he is not independently engaged in the business of farming or plowing. hoeing. Ayalde made much ado of her claim that Tana could not be her employee because she exercised no control over his work hours and method of performing his task as “arador. for short periods of time. to check on the work. A. A closer scrutiny of the records. reveals that while Ayalde herself may not have directly imposed on Tana the manner and methods to follow in performing his tasks. There inside the hacienda. there is no dispute that Ayalde was in the business of growing sugarcane in the two plantations for commercial purposes. relied on the claimant’s and her witnesses’ admission that her husband was hired as an “arador” on “pakyaw” basis. it is sufficient that the former has a right to wield the power. but as a regular farmhand. Even Ayalde admitted that Tana did other jobs when he was not hired to plow. on her own or through her overseer. Witness. .[28] Ayalde failed to counter these positive assertions. he may be classified under the category of an employee when the economic facts of the relations make it more nearly one of employment than one of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished. Margarita Tana alleged that SSS premiums were deducted from Tana’s salary. Mr. Q.[27] Agaton Libawas. Yes. Q. as amended by Section 4 of R. We asked but we were answered that we were being remitted for our SSS. No.A. Q. What happened to the deductions did you not ask your employer? A. also testified: Q. Did you not verify? A. Why do you know that his salaries were deducted for SSS premiums? A. since when were there deductions from your salaries? A.Under the circumstances. Q. are you a member of the SSS? A. Even on the assumption that there were no deductions. he was still ineligible for compulsory coverage because he was not paid any regular daily wage and he did not work for an uninterrupted period of at least six months in a year in accordance with Section 8(j) (I) of the Social Security Law. How about petitioner. International Labor. Up to when? A. the fact remains that Tana was and should have been covered under the Social Security Law. that if ever Tana was an employee.” (Underscoring Ours)[26] We find the above-quoted ruling to be applicable in the case of Tana. whether his service was continuous or broken. There is preponderance of evidence to support the conclusion that he was an employee rather than an independent contractor. there were deductions but I do not know because they were the ones deducting it. if you know? A. Up to 1979. No. on the alternative. There is substantial testimonial evidence to prove that Tana was paid a daily wage. 2658. v. The Court of Appeals also erred when it ruled. and he worked continuously for most part of the year. in your 15-day wages do you notice any deductions from it? A. Tana should be entitled to compulsory coverage under the Social Security Law. Because Antero Maghari asked me and my husband to sign SSS papers and he told us that they will take care of everything. The circumstances of his employment place him outside the ambit of the exception provided in Section 8(j) of Republic Act No. Q. thus: Q. Mr. because I just relied on their statement. As a farm laborer who has worked exclusively for Ayalde for eighteen (18) years. Q. 1611. There were deductions and we were informed that it was for SSS. I do not know how much because our daily wage was only P4. also. How much were the deductions every payday? A. the relationship between Ayalde and Tana has more of the attributes of employer-employee than that of an independent contractor hired to perform a specific project. Were there deductions from the salaries of your husband while he was employed with the respondent from 1961 to 1979? A. Witness. Court of Industrial Relations. Since 1961. to wit: “When a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others of an independent contractor. Witness. Q. which make him fall within an intermediate area. In the case of Dy Keh Beng v.[25] we cited our long-standing ruling in Sunripe Coconut Products Co. even while he was also occasionally called on to plow the soil on a “pakyaw” basis.00. No. Q. testifying. Mr. J. NPC can sue and be sued for tort. several towns in Bulacan were flooded ( particularly Norzagaray ). as its defense. SO ORDERED. During the height of typhoon Kading. has a personality of its own.R. CFI of BULACAN Facts: 1. as a government owned and controlled corporation. 1991 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not governmental but merely proprietary functions and that based on the organic charter (charter . NPC. being a government instrumentality. the National Power Corporation’s plant superintendent Chavez opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136. Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30. RAYO vs.WHEREFORE. it cannot be sued without the express consent of the State. ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR.R. Lingayen Branch 11. . L-49930 August 7.a legal document that provides for thecreation of a corporate entity ) of NPC. The petitioners. The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No.A. 1977 their son. it is performing a purely governmental function. 2. distinct and separate from that of the Government. put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. a paying passenger. Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be suedfor tort. 4. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN. respondents. Therefore. although they are considered to be public in character. Held: The government has organized a private corporation. 16427 and the Resolution dated June 14. The trial court dismissed the complaint. the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C. The Resolution of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No. Facts The Petitioners. In any court. Ponente: AQUINO. separate and distinct from the government. that in the operation of the Angat Dam. 3.R. 5. it can be sued and be sued in any court. SP No. who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood. As a direct and immediate result. 1985 FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINO-MALONG petitioners. Jaime Aquino. they are not exempt from garnishment legal proceedings Malong vs.-G. 5440. No costs. No. Notes : Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their own. No. The petition of the petitioners was granted. 8851 is REINSTATED. filed several complaints for damages against NPC and the plant superintendent. About a hundred of its residents died and properties worth million of pesos were destroyed. the action was a suit against the State. Thus.370. L-49930 G. vs. Issue W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO. G. PNR. in view of all the foregoing. was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. NPC claimed. . No. the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character. It is not performing any governmental function. 741. 4156. as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG). He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the part of the government corporations to deny justice that is due to the people they are to serve. The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation. and only because the petitioner is now permitted to shirk from his obligation to testify truthfully in the action against Herminio and his companies. Disini. 0013 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. I dissent. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the entity was organized. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. Essentially. as held in precedents. Antecedents The petitioner assails the resolutions on August 16. 2007 by the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. on the ground that (a) the Immunity Agreement he had entered into with PCGG covered such testimony. 0013. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN.R. G. I insist that the State’s effort to recover ill-gotten wealth from whoever holds or hides it should not be obstructed or stymied. . DISINI. The Court opines that the Government should not be allowed to “double-cross” the petitioner by compelling him to testify against Herminio and the latter’s companies after he had performed his part under his agreement with the Government. It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Herminio T. The PNR did not become immune from suit. whether corporate or non-corporate. J. However. The decision inflicts a severe blow to the faltering effort of the Government to recover ill-gotten wealth from Herminio and his companies.[1] as well as Resolution No. the petitioner desires to stop PCGG from calling him as a witness against Herminio. The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. 2007 and October 10. concurring: The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an instrumentality of the government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration. as amended by Republic Act No. are immune from suits. J. the Manila Railroad Company. Disini (Herminio) and Herminio’s companies in the action pending before the Sandiganbayan – should not be compelled to stand as a witness in that action.. not the petitioner. and (b) he acted as an attorney on the matters of the proposed testimony. If there is going to be any “double cross. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DISSENTING OPINION BERSAMIN. He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an example of government instrumentality that is not immune from suit for it also performs proprietary functions.Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. a defendant in Civil Case No. Notes Abad Santos.: Today. 2007-031 adopted by the PCGG. or from compelling the petitioner to give testimony in any other case involving Herminio. costs against the Philippine National Railways. Respondents. Petitioner v.” the victims will be the Government and the long-suffering Filipino people. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. it was held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor. Like any private common carrier. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. the Court rules that the petitioner – a vital resource holding credible information sufficient and competent to establish a strong case against against Herminio T. so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.[2] alleging that the Sandiganbayan and PCGG thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. et al. 180564 – JESUS P. the correct rule is that "not all government entities. and Rodolfo Jacob. National Power Corporation.. other than this civil matter and these arbitration proceedings and. known or unknown. 6404/BGD and No. Republic of the Philippines and Burns & Roe Enterprises vs National Power Corporation. civil. et al v. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information or testimony. or any claim or matter. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini or any company in which Herminio T. arising under the Internal Revenue Code of the Philippines which exists as of the date of this agreement. domestic or foreign. In that regard. The Republic of the Philippines agrees that it shall not institute. against Jesus P. 6401/BGD and 6423/BGD. below. The Immunity Agreement provided in its paragraph 1 that: 1. lead or document obtained from him pursuant to this agreement. for or in connection with any conduct directly or indirectly relating to or arising out of the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant in Bataan. and it further agrees that it shall not use.[6] the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and/or ad testificandum to compel the petitioner to appear and testify therein. Disini. respectively in the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration). Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T. or in any resulting arbitration proceeding. let us look at the following background facts. 1984. Republic of the Philippines and Burns & Roe Enterprises v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Republic of the Philippines) in the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini’s former employment by Herminio T. 1989. 3. The parties acknowledge that the Republic of the Philippines is or may become a party to other proceedings relating to circumstances as to which Jesus P. Herminio T. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. criminal or administrative. The Government further bound itself not to call him as a witness to testify in any case brought by the Government against Herminio. 6423/BGD (entitled Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. et al. the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini a defendant in any of the abovereferenced matters. Republic of the Philippines (now pending as Nos. in said arbitration proceeding resulting from said reference. or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters. any information. Disini may have knowledge. other than in the mentioned civil and arbitration cases. Westinghouse Electric S. National Power Corporation. The Sandiganbayan ignored the petitioner’s motion to quash. Before I state my reasons for my submission. Disini. 2007. et al. National Power Corporation. to submit to interviews by those attorneys upon reasonable notice. audit or investigation against Jesus P. the Government ostensibly agreed not to compel his testimony in any proceeding. Disini in any proceeding. Disini. 88-5150 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (or any jurisdiction to which it may be transferred) and in the arbitration proceedings captioned Westinghouse International Projects Company. because the motion was not set for hearing. the petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum and/or ad testificandum on March 6. et al v.) pending in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and in the arbitration proceedings No. Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Instead of appearing on the scheduled date. to provide to the attorneys for the Republic of the Philippines all documents in his possession or under his control related to the subject matter of said action. directly or indirectly. . then and in that event. Disini agrees to appear and to testify truthfully in the civil matter captioned Republic of the Philippines. Philippines or Jesus P. subject to the provision set forth in this paragraph and at paragraph 3. invoking the Immunity Agreement. paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Immunity Agreement stated: 2. Disini. (now pending as No. and to cooperate truthfully with the Republic of the Philippines and its attorneys in the prosecution of this action. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.A. 0013 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.[5] At the instance of the Government as the plaintiff in Civil Case No.I submit that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) validly revoked the Immunity Agreement between the Government and the petitioner. 88-5150 (entitledRepublic of the Philippines. domestic or foreign. to provide affidavits regarding his knowledge of the subject matter of said actions. On February 16. in the event this civil matter or any portion thereof is referred for arbitration.[4] In return for the petitioner’s undertaking. Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Disini owned any interest prior to July 1. civil or administrative proceeding.[3] whereby he agreed to appear and testify in Civil Case No. Jesus P. The Republic of the Philippines by this instrument agrees that it shall not compel the testimony of Jesus P. the petitioner and the Government executed an Immunity Agreement. prosecute or maintain any criminal. and that the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the revocation by refusing to quash the subpoena issued to the petitioner to compel him to testify against Herminio and the latter’s companies. 2007-031. Section 3 thereof reads as follows: 3. FURTHER. Moreover.[8] The petitioner sought the reconsideration of the resolution. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony which is not thereby affected. be it RESOLVED. 2007 its assailed Resolution No. Jesus Disini refuses to heed the subpoena issued him by the Court. there is no such provision in the Immunity Agreement. and especially on plaintiff and argues that the latter cannot now renege on its commitment after he had complied with the terms and conditions thereof. RESOLVED. 2007 through the second assailed resolution. contending that the denial of his motion to quash constituted a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's amended motion to quash. THEREFORE.Without any provision therein respecting retroactive application or making an exception to the instant case. the petitioner commenced this special civil action. WHEREFORE. Jesus Disini himself recognizes. He invokes the binding effect thereof on him. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony. hence. Parties’ Positions The petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan erroneously interpreted the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement to mean that the Government could opt to forego its undertaking not to call him as a witness in connection with any claim brought by the Government against Herminio. none could also be assumed and the presumption is that it can only apply prospectively to cases explicitly stated therein and not to those cases over which this Court had already acquired jurisdiction. but the Sandiganbayan denied his motion for reconsideration on October 10.The petitioner amended his motion to quash by setting it for hearing. Jesus P. 1989 is the only reason that Atty.[9] Hence. However. The petitioner’s failure to comply with the subpoena of the Sandiganbayan prompted PCGG to issue on July 19. Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio Disini. holding: It is evident that the Agreement dated February 16. or long after the instant case was filed in 1987. Jesus Disini and all related motions to quash that he filed are hereby denied for lack of merit. that copies of this resolution be furnished to Mr. cannot be invoked nor be relied upon by Atty. 2007. the agreement cannot be the basis for immunity for cases that had already been filed before this Court. the immunity granted to him was not absolute considering that the same agreement carried the qualification regarding Atty. Disini a defendant in any of the abovereference matters. which is a power of the PCGG that Atty. in view of the revocation and nullification by the PCGG of Section 3 of the immunity agreement. 2007. the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. that such interpretation defeated the very essence of paragraph 3 as a reciprocal exchange between him and the Government. or in any resulting arbitration proceedings. SO ORDERED. Thus. and that paragraph 3 should not be read in isolation from the rest of the agreement. On August 16. there is no point of quashing the subpoena issued by the Court for him to testify in this case since he can already be compelled to testify sans any restrictions or qualifications. the same however. He reiterated the arguments of his original motion. REVOKED and NULLIFIED insofar as it prohibits the Republic of the Philippines from presenting Jesus P. as it is hereby RESOLVED.[7] to wit: NOW. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. on December 4. the Amended Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Atty. Disini and the Republic of the Philippines. or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters. that the Immunity Agreement dated 16 February 1989 between Mr. Disini and the Honorable Sandiganbayan for their guidance. Jesus Disini to quash the subpoena herein issued considering that the immunity granted was consummated only in February 1989. Disini in cases brought against Herminio T. in view of the foregoing. As it is. . but should be construed as referring to his reciprocal obligation to testify truthfully in the cases mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Immunity Agreement. Jesus P. as it is hereby. (emphasis supplied) Even assuming that the said foregoing proviso in the immunity agreement prohibits plaintiff from calling on Jesus Disini to testify in any case brought by the Republic against Herminio Disini without any qualification. even by his own admission. Disini in the Philippines. be. In reply. but also a duty on its part (Tanchanco v. 0013 was belied by the admission in his affidavit dated February 22. in his reply dated July 10. laches or estoppel. transferees. that paragraph 3 also extended the concession in favor of the petitioner to “any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T. 150 SCRA 181 [1987]). that the concession vested in him under the Immunity Agreement did not prevent the Government from prosecuting Herminio in order to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. that he was further disqualified from testifying in Civil Case No. 2007 [10] filed in the Sandiganbayan. Disini”. Section 2(a)). that Executive Orders No. and that the Constitutional provision preventing the State from being estopped by the acts of its agents applies only to irregular acts of its officials. not to the Immunity Agreement which was freely executed between the parties. 1989 that his knowledge of Herminio’s transactions was not acquired in his capacity as a lawyer of Herminio but as an executive of Herdis Group Inc. 0013 and in all other cases filed by the Government against him? . Article XI) even provides that “the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees. the petitioner insisted that the Immunity Agreement did not violate public policy. 0013 regarding matters learned in confidence from Herminio. Issue Can PCGG compel the petitioner to testify against Herminio in Civil Case No. 14 and No. that he acceded to paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement precisely because he needed to protect the privileged communication made to him by Herminio as his client. 1. and that the petitioner was thus estopped from challenging PCGG’s authority to nullify paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement. that the Supreme Court has time and again acknowledged that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth is not only a State policy (Executive Order No. that the Government cannot validly revoke the Immunity Agreement after having benefited from petitioner’s testimony in several cases in Geneva. The Government counters that the Sandiganbayan correctly interpreted the plain meaning of the clear and unambiguous terms of the Immunity Agreement. The Government submits that the petitioner’s claim that the attorney-client privilege precluded him from testifying in Civil Case No.He argues that PCGG through its Resolution No.” The Government points out that the petitioner himself acknowledged. being a contract mutually entered into between him and the Government. stating in paragraph 19 of the reply [11] that only PCGG en banc could repudiate it. 0013 from coverage in light of the last two sentences of paragraph 1.. that Resolution No. in the absence of any express provision giving it retroactive effect. The Government maintains that the Sandiganbayan correctly found the Immunity Agreement to apply prospectively to the cases specifically enumerated therein. 2007-031 could not unilaterally revoke the Immunity Agreement. and that the 1987 Constitution (Section 15. that the fact that Civil Case No. 476 SCRA 202 [2005] and BASECO v. 14-A expressly allowed the power to grant immunity to PCGG. Sandiganbayan. 0013. the authority of PCGG to repudiate the Immunity Agreement. that PCGG was justified in revoking paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement. and that his employment as a lawyer working for Herminio necessarily included Herminio’s availment of his legal knowledge and advice whenever called for. from them or from their nominees. that it is a well-settled rule that a compromise becomes binding upon the parties upon its perfection and has the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved. that the Government already presented several pieces of evidence and witnesses against Herminio in Civil Case No. that the Immunity Agreement contemplated the claims already filed against Herminio prior to its execution (including Civil Case No. 2007-031 was void for violating the principle of mutuality of contracts. PCGG. shall not be barred by prescription. who was also then his client. Switzerland and in the United States of America. a company co-owned by Herminio and former President Ferdinand Marcos. as it was contrary to public policy. 0013 was filed prior to the execution of the Immunity Agreement and before the cases enumerated therein had been filed did not exclude Civil Case No. 0013). 1989[14] and his supplemental affidavit dated March 1. defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. the petition lacks merit. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters: a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. xxx The objective of PCGG’s granting immunity from civil or criminal prosecution has been to encourage individuals to divulge their knowledge of the unlawful acquisition of Government property without fear of self-incrimination. thus: Section 2. and former President Marcos. the petitioner’s refusal to testify because of paragraph 3 would effectively deprive the Government of the opportunity to successfully prosecute Herminio and his companies in the actions already pending in the Sandiganbayan since 1987 yet. however. directly or through nominees. PCGG has the authority to grant civil immunity to anyone who aids the Government in its efforts to recover all ill-gotten wealth. It is grossly wrong and unfair to sustain the petitioner. the grantee should agree to testify and to give up his right to remain silent. District Court and the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. The Government respected its undertaking and refrained from prosecuting him. to wit: Section 5. including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration. Now. PCGG validly issued Resolution No. [12] In exchange for the immunity from civil or criminal prosecution given by the Government.. Inc. by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers. but his immunity from testifying against Herminio pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement.S. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission. Marcos. who had owned two-thirds of Herdis Group.Submission As I made clear at the outset. whether located in the Philippines or abroad. 2007-031 revoking and nullifying Paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement Section 5 of Executive Order No. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent. A. paragraph 2 of the Immunity Agreement granted the petitioner immunity from civil and criminal prosecution in exchange for his undertaking to testify truthfully in the civil and arbitration cases pending before the U. 14 vests in PCGG the authority to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. In direct contrast. 1. the immunity granted under paragraph 3 prevented the petitioner from disclosing any knowledge he might have regarding Herminio. Firstly: The grant of immunity from testifying against Herminio pursuant to paragraph 3 contravened the essential purpose behind PCGG’s establishment as explicitly embodied in Executive Order No. subordinates and close associates. connections or relationship.. in order to enable the Government to recover illegally acquired assets as soon as possible. Inc. a crony of the Marcoses. [13] Thus. his immediate family. Considering that his affidavit dated February 22. Aside from its aforementioned statutory authority to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. . who had conducted business through Herdis Group. 1989[15] revealed that the petitioner had been privy to the various business transactions between Herminio. authority influence. the petitioner is invoking not just his immunity from civil and criminal prosecution. relatives. morals. or in any resulting arbitration proceeding. laches or estoppel. did not apply retroactively to Civil Action No. He had acknowledged PCGG’s authority to repudiate the Immunity Agreement in paragraph 19 of his reply dated July 10. Disini. or public policy. or transferees. or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters. good customs. 2007. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. hence. 2007[16] for rejecting the petitioner’s motion to quash. Disini to testify as a witness in said matters on any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T.” In revoking and nullifying paragraph 3.[18] as follows: xxx 19. PCGG simply acknowledged paragraph 3’s inherent inefficaciousness under this constitutional edict. which had been consummated only in February 16. and (c) There was no point in quashing the subpoena issued to the petitioner. . but was subject of the qualification that he should provide truthful information or testimony. the Sandiganbayan cited threegrounds in its assailed resolution of August 16. and should be sustained.[17] which he had personally signed and submitted to the Sandiganbayan. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: “The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees. Secondly: In upholding the revocation by PCGG of the immunity of the petitioner from testifying against Herminio and his companies. that is. As such. the language and intent of paragraph 3. the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. xxx[19] xxx Lastly. [22] However. In the first place. The immunity agreement of undersigned having been approved by the PCGG en banc in accordance with its rules. even the petitioner conceded that his immunity under paragraph 3 was not absolute. [21]it is still indispensable that such terms be not contrary to law. the immunity applied only to cases filed against Herminio after February 16. not to cases over which the Sandiganbayan had already acquired jurisdiction. paragraph 3 was contrary to the State’s policy on the urgent need to recover all the illegally acquired wealth amassed by President Marcos. his immediate family. PCGG’s revocation of the qualified immunity could not be successfully challenged. public order. The lawyers of plaintiff could not on their own strike down the agreement. namely: (a) The petitioner himself had admitted that the immunity thereby granted to him was not absolute due to the qualification prescribing his obligation to provide truthful information or testimony. The petitioner cannot consequently invoke estoppel to prevent PCGG from issuing Resolution No.[20] xxx plainly indicate the prospective application of paragraph 3. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information or testimony. his own admission barred the petitioner from assailing PCGG’s authority to repudiate paragraph 3. Moreover. shall not be barred by prescription. The Immunity Agreement could apply only prospectively to the cases explicitly enumerated therein. 1989. viz: xxx 3. (b) Assuming that the immunity was unqualified. he could not argue that the Government could not call him as a witness by virtue of his having already complied with the terms and conditions of the Immunity Agreement. the Immunity Agreement. only the Commission en banc could repudiate the agreement. The Sandiganbayan was correct. considering that the petitioner himself recognized the power of PCGG to revoke and nullify paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement. Although parties to an agreement are free to enter into whatever terms they deem proper. Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T.We must not ignore that Section 15. Disini a defendant in any of the abovereferenced matters. 2007-031. not to those already pending as of said date. 0013 which had been pending since 1987 in the absence of any provision for retroactive application or making any exception. Thirdly: The petitioner cannot also validly plead that the mutuality of contracts prohibited the revocation of paragraph 3. and that entering into a compromise agreement necessarily contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to put an end to litigation. 1989. secondly. and where the business may be transacted by another agent. 3. the petitioner’s contention that his employment necessarily included the rendering of legal advice to Herminio as his employer deserves scant consideration. such policy was the reason why paragraph 3 carried the qualification. B. It is appropriate to recognize privilege only to a very . Attorney-Client privilege did not disqualify petitioner from testifying against Herminio The petitioner’s other contention. Relationship of lawyer and client.relatives. A communication is not privileged only because it is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer. it was void and inefficacious. indeed.[26] That the petitioner was a lawyer did not automatically mean that the communications of Herminio to him (or vice versa) were covered by the attorney-client privilege. assuming that he then acted as a lawyer of Herminio. the petitioner himself admitted in his affidavits dated February 22.[24] An examination of the petitioner’s situation indicates that he did not establish the concurrence of the requisites. not their retained counsel. hence. Communication or advice must have been made confidentially. no lawyer-client relationship existed between them. [25] Thus. or that the communications had been specifically made in the course of a professional relationship between them. or advice given by the latter to the former. In such cases. not properly professional. hence. the following requisites must be present: 1. [23] hence. the petitioner did not show that the communications between him and Herminio had been made in confidence by a client to a lawyer. mainly because it was not substantiated. Such communication must have been made in the course of professional employment. 4. being exceptions to the general rule. has no merit. the fact that the agent sustains the character of an attorney does not protect the communications attending the transactions with the privilege.[30] It is worth pointing out that evidentiary and testimonial privileges. Communication made by the client to the attorney.[29] Moreover. Needless to stress. The lawyer-client privilege cannot be extended to communications made to a corporate secretary and general counsel where there is no evidence which hat he is wearing when he receives the communications. and close associates. For the attorney-client privilege to apply. are not lightly created or expansively construed. because they are in derogation of the search for truth. 1989 and March 18. the privilege does not apply where the legal services are so intertwined with the business activities that a clearer distinction between the two is impossible to discern. To begin with. [27] There are many cases. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony. The petitioner was a mere employee of Herminio or of his companies. the petitioner’s mere assertion of the attorney-client privilege was not enough. The relationship between the petitioner and Herminio was one between an employee and his employer.[28] And. that the attorney-client privilege disqualified him from testifying against Herminio. On the contrary. It is axiomatic that the party asserting the privilege carries the burden of proving that the privilege applies. viz: xxx Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. 1989 that his personal knowledge of Herminio’s business operations had been acquired by virtue of his employment as an executive in Herminio’s companies from May 1971 to July 1984. in which attorneys are employed in transacting business. 2. the communications may be testified to by him as by any other agent. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severallyliable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims. i. 2007. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa. Pursuant to their arrangements. the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract. [32] Without jurisdiction means that the tribunal. or any plain. Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents. Sandiganbayan and PCGG were not guilty of grave abuse of discretion The following requisites must concur in order that the petition for certiorari may prosper. inter alia. 104269 November 11. namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a tribunal.R.91. vs. docketed as NLRC Case No. A petition for injunction. the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution. Cagayan de Oro. pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case.limited extent. non-payment of 13th month pay. of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages. or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. or on 19 July 1991. and (c) there is no appeal. et al. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace. which were correct and in accord with the Constitution and the pertinent law. the property custodian of the petitioner. Cagayan de Oro City. Thus. with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards. the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. or officer acted with absolute lack of authority. denying the petition for injunction. and that. of the complainant security guards. or personal hostility. No. and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. J. Fifth Division. and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. G. The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. prohibition and mandamus. Forthwith. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. whichever would come first. prejudice. the decision became final and executory. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. otherwise stated. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.: For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non-suability of the state.e. 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. between the same parties. power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion. such that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has the public good transcending normally the predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. holiday pay and overtime pay. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 1 dated 27 November 1991. respondents. dated 01 May 1990.483. uniform allowances. 1993 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. therefore. one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser.. ACCORDINGLY. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90. as well as for damages. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. board. On 18 July 1991. the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and . In this petition for certiorari. VITUG. 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City. petitioner. board. 2007 and October 10. night shift differential pay. (b) such tribunal. guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner. alleging. its original docket number).[31] C. On 13 September 1990. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions dated August 16. aggregating P266. a board. prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property. the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner. against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. I vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit. or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. [33] Certiorari does not lie. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability." 7 reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal. In this petition for certiorari. is not. 2. 9 True. the following orders are issued: 1. if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. The private respondents. 3083. the petitioner asserts. 8 It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. the Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due notice and hearings. thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. viz: WHEREFORE. which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. This rule. More importantly. On the contrary. Cagayan de Oro City within the same period for proper dispositions. for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties. distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. it has been adjudged to pay jointly and severally with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X. that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored. the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 18 . 10-10-0045590. 17 In this situation. petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims. subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department. premises considered. the doctrine only conveys. however. a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991. 10 We have had occasion. to explain in its defense. if any. conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. "the state may not be sued without its consent. On 27 November 1991. on the other hand. (supra). Meantime. is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. more or less. In case of dispute between the judgment debtors. is conceded when the State itself commences litigation. In the meanwhile. the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution. it claims. Finally. Express consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it. effect. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos." its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 5." 15 Implied consent. the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. the doctrine. by Justice Holmes. 11 The rule. 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months. 12 The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff. express or implied. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle Security case. petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory. 7. not too infrequently. which. relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof. the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. however. 14 In this jurisdiction. argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. 3. In order to ensure compliance with this order. where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract. in connection with the execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff. As has been aptly observed. in any case. a sovereign is exempt from suit. but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on execution within ten (10) days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. on the other hand. without qualification. 4. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent. as correctly phrased. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention isDenied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff is Noted SO ORDERED. petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City Sheriff. express or implied. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. However. has explained. the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States. provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution. since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. 3083.. September 25. 3083. is based on obvious considerations of public policy. 91359." We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. commercial and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis).D. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. that the State has a liability. the claims of private respondents. as amended by Presidential Decree ("P. 1145.R. No. is to give the other party an opportunity to prove. or association. Stated differently. be that as it may.A. The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. as amended. with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos. Inc. . 4. 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. the petition is GRANTED. Facts: The constitutionality of the following provisions of R. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. 20 we ruled: (C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327. when the State waives its immunity.In the Unites States of America vs. to Commonwealth Act ("C. SO ORDERED. No. they are constantly developing and evolving. That no person shall organize or have aninterest in. in relation to Act No. When the state gives its consent to be sued. In the instant case. . vs. the rules of International Law are not petrified. J. partnership. inCarabao. i. in fact. a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. 1445. its commercial activities or economic affairs. in effect. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. 327. 1992 Grino-Aquino. And because the activities of states have multiplied. arising from the Contract for Service.A.Any Filipino citizen or a corporation. is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint: SEC. v. we held: The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. 327. xxx xxx xxx The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. holiday pay. Ruiz. The Labor code. Pursuant. it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private. tersely put. SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS Veterans Manpower and Protective Services.e. and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing.A. indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. . The resolution. But. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines. No. subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines). performed any act proprietary in character. the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. more than . Act No. if it can.") No. Inc. enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. CA G. . nor that it could have. Agricultural Productivity Commission. as appropriated by law. clearly constitute money claims. Thus. in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment.") No. 5487(otherwise known as the “Private Security Agency Law”). dated 27 November 1991. it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Villasor 22 this Court. it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. 23 WHEREFORE. one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided. for underpayment of wages. overtime pay and similar other items. 21 In Republic vs. they are not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or business purposes. aforecited. is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. all it does. as amended by P. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.D. however. and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed. gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract. thus — The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law. stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit. issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief.. Nos. since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA are being called to account in this case. 1988. 1987. exemplary damages in the same amount.00 outside of Metro Manila. without malice. were performed by them as part of their official duties. being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective. through Col.A. or security guard agencies. requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license. On June 29.000. requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located. Invoking this rule.one such agency except those which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x x. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI. Stated differently. or bad faith. In the instant case. the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. On May 12.D. The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO Issue: whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent Held: Yes. Edades.255. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. its commercial activities or economic affairs. the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO . As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature. VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition. As a result. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent.”. which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2. Fidel V. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.215. Ramos. -The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. Section 3. and P200. watchmen. Inc.Inc. unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12. 1986. Sabas V. a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract.000. Even if its action prospers.. gross negligence. No. said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent. because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them. the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that. Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).) SEC. Petition). and subject to the provision of existing laws. Gen. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3. subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. of the 1987 Constitution). 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies.00. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. 1986. Philippine Constabulary. it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies. but worse.00 within Metro Manila and P2. Rules and Regulations by Chief. unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. in consultation with thePhilippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators. no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.” VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R. the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way. PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one. is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.000. 17. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents.” (As amended by P. and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators. 11 and 100. the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D. hence. however. Col. both original and amended. watchmen or security guard agencies. 92432 February 23. failed to submit their position paper. the Office of the solicitor General filed a Manifestation stating that it "cannot legally support the decision of the Labor Arbiter" and therefore prayed that it be relieved from the responsibility of filing the required Comment for the public respondents (Rollo. and considering our finding that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed Forces stationed at Clark Air Base. As a result. In her "Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum of Appeal. 133-139).A. Military Bases Agreement of 1947 (Rollo. 1990 (Rollo. Petitioner then elevated the matter to us. 1988. On July 11. the JAC Maintenance Services owned by Joselito Cunanan. clearly. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the hearings. chose to bring in his own workers. the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the claims of private respondents. On August 12. On August 10. 1988. 1990 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. JAIME CORTEZ. On August 31. we resolved to require NLRC to file its own comment to the petition. let such execution be made subject to existing international agreements diplomatic protocol (Rollo. In view of this Manifestation. service incentive leave pay and holiday premiums. vs. 95). 1995 T/SGT ALDORA LARKINS.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Resolutions dated August 31. JOSEPH GALANG. — U. II It is petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void because respondent Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. 1990. a governmental function.P. 1990 (Rollo. MARIETTA DE GUZMAN. private respondents amended their complaint and added therein claims for emergency cost of living allowance. 1990. Col. to decide whether it would retain their services. Petitioner alleges that she never received nor was served. ROBERTO HERRERA. which NLRC denied on February 5. petitioner. against petitioner. HON. including private respondents. 1988." petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R. It was left to the new contractor. ARSENIO DIAZ. We grant the petition. 35-37). Petitioner moved for reconsideration. to pay private respondents' separation pay (Rollo. RAB-III-08-0572-88). on July 18. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints. They. Frankhauser or to petitioner. The Labor Arbiter. Col. ordered Cunanan dropped as party respondent. 101). pp. or if that is no longer possible. J. ROBERTO SAGAD and MARCELO LOZANO. Col. 1989. He found both Lt. No. 117-118). NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. and Cunanan for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages (NLRC Case No. III of the NLRC. however. Frankhauser. On November 21. were ever served on her. G. On September 9. likewise. Petitioner and Lt. pp. NLRC issued a Resolution affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full back wages. any summons or copies of . The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R. 3 AGS terminated the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the De Guzman Custodial Services. but declared that: In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced. were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS. 78). as amended. 1988. 120.was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services. thirteenth-month pay.5487. I Petitioner was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base. RAB. IRINEO BERNARDO. pp. Joselito Cunanan. San Fernando. which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on their part to do so. which NLRC did on November 29. respondents. the workers of the De Guzman Custodial Services were requested to surrender their base passes to Lt.III-08-0572-88. which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective. p. with the conformity of private respondents. DANIEL HERRERA. QUIASON. DELPIN PECSON. JOSELITO CATACUTAN. The employees thereof. Lt. p. Pampanga.S. CARLOS CORTEZ. The case was therefore submitted for decision on the basis of private respondents' position paper and supporting documents. p. private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch No.R. 1989 and February 5. Pampanga. governing the procedure for service of summons on persons inside U. . does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Sec. Be that as it may. . Intermediate Appellate Court. — U. military bases in the country.S." otherwise known as the R. 12-13). duties. . the appellees are entitled to by virtue of this case are the primary liabilities of their real employer.S. de Macoy v. Vda. any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein (Art. 10). one of which is located inside Clark Air Base. v. While individual respondents. pp. Frankhauser and not the Base Commander (Rollo. de Macoy v. however. authority. 149 SCRA 193 [1987]). This.S. civil or criminal. however. . let it be made clear that We are aware as to who is the real party respondent in this case. Article XIV thereof. Veridiano II. Col. In effect. 182 SCRA 644 [1990]. 3).the original and amended complaints. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction. 1968. but by the United States government (Sanders v. 136 SCRA 487 [1985]). There is no allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. shall be served within any base except with the permission of the commanding officer of such base. The employer of private respondents. the United States Government (Rollo. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases.P. and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American nationals inside the U. If no agreement was reached or if the grievance procedure failed.S. II) or by the arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5. 11). as the case may be. 1985. Rule I. then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons (De los Santos v. Aldora Larkins. If he withholds giving his permission. In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever issued and served on her. 221 SCRA 15 [1993]). Court of Appeals. that they sent notices of the hearings to her (Rollo. was the U.P. Montera. Col. Filmerco Commercial Co. — U. addressed the summons to Lt. Indeed. Col. still the case could not prosper. Court of Appeals.supra. petitioner set forth only one issue and that is the absence of jurisdiction over her person. Frankhauser nor petitioner. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil Procedure may be applied by analogy to NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC. and therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under Article XIV of the R. We agree. as found by NLRC. military bases. are mere elements of the USAF assigned to the 3 AGS. whatever awards. Thus. 206 SCRA 244 [1992]. Government which.S. Notices of hearing are not summonses. Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal capacities. Vda. to serve such process. provides that: . the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void (cf. They contend. but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall forthwith take the necessary steps . 91-92). William Frankhauser and T/Sgt.S. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant. particularly Lt. Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces (USAF) inside the said military base. governed the rights. assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the monetary claims of private respondents proved. .. p. operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the USAF (United States of America v. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27. 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). [N]o process.) Petitioner. The employer of private respondents was not Lt. monetary or otherwise. United States of America v. and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. it is the Government of the United States of America which is maintaining military facilities in the Philippines. Military Bases Agreement. Military Bases Agreement. Frankhauser and petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities for tortious acts (United States of America v. Col. He instead. such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. It is worth noting that NLRC admitted that: At the outset. Ruiz. Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the said body. Col. It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons (cf. and to provide the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may require. Inc. but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. pp. 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). Guinto. private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the respondents in their complaint (Rollo. he should instead designate another person to serve the process. However. Col. in the case at bench. Summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. Government. Guinto. by right of sovereign power. the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint Labor Committee established in Article III of the Base Labor Agreement. . p. Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the U. on the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons on her. she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents. Both parties appealed to the CA. and the costs of suit. CA. Shauf & Jacob Shauf. she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. Philippine Regional Trial Court. P20. Shauf was never appointed to said position.662. SO ORDERED. respondents Second Division Doctrine: official v. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent. CA reversed RTC decision. the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Don E. was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED. Persi denies this allegation. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. Ratio: They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.. Shauf accepted the offer. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. By reason of her non-selection. During that time. . Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director).00 as and for attorney's fees. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Detwiler & Anthony Persi. Shauf v. for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.000. defendants are immune from suit. Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission. Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces Held: No they are not immune. no jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and the person of petitioner and the judgment rendered is null and void (Filmerco Commercial Co.000. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus. petitioners v. etc.Unquestionably therefore. to pay petitioners the sum of P100. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. But Mrs.R. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages. 81 SCRA 458 [1978]). for which she is eminently qualified. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.00 as moral damages. WHEREFORE. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. Appeals Review Board. Hon. the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. v. Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs.supra. CV No. According to the CA. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. personal capacity Keywords: void for overbreadth Date: November 27. jointly and severally. CA Loida Q. WHEREFORE. Mrs. Navarro. she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. 1990 Ponente: Justice Regalado Facts: Loida Shauf. Sy v. Intermediate Appellate Court. continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days. Defendants on the other hand. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39. a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force. There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. More important. Edilberto G. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex. In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor. There is. let alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines. of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex. The petitioner (CaylaoGroup) filed a suit against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity when the MendiolaCommission recommended the government to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts andutterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of immunityand therefore. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees. It is provided that the State may not be sued without its consent. petitioner. in effect. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.With respect to the incident that happened in Mendiola on January 22. he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff. There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler. No. (2) When the suit is against anunincorporated government agency.alG. she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that. Isakson who was not eligible to the position. is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. Manila. thus. defendant Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. 1987 that befell twelverallyists. (3) When the suit is. organized and unorganized. which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law. they should be held accountable Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Branch 9. This is a carry-over from Article II. In the case at bar. while claiming to act for the State. Hon. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. ISSUE: Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State be liablefor the incident? HELD: . Article XIII. but is entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy.It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith. of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor. race. Section 9. nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score. in committing the acts complained of have. Thecase has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity. 2003 FACTS: The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the Constitution underArticle XVI. Shauf. SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Some instances whena suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name. R. irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable. March 19. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. In the same tenor. color and origin. is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology? guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science. violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Republic of the Philippines. For this. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. the the case filed against the military officers was dismissed by the lower court. or creed. RTC of Manila. the Military Officer filed apetition for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court. there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary. Caylao et. against a government officer but thecase is such that ultimate liablity will belong not to the officer but to the government. under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have. Branch 9. not otherwise proscribed. She is a civil service eligible. vs. which will best advance and protect her interests. and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts. Section 3. Sandoval. The defendantswere held liable but it would not result in financial responsibility to the government. Shauf is not limited to these remedies. She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas. but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. local and overseas. Section 3. on its face. 84607. unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. the government should also be liable and should be compensated by the government . On the other hand. for the protection of his rights. Sec. CONSENT TO BE SUED ACT NO. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the indemnification of theheirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability authomaticallyattaches to the State. both original and appellate. Sec. and if said body determine that payment should be made. 3083 . Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. Venue. Moreover. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his claim to the Insular Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its presentation.No.” The court rules that there isno reversible error and no grave abuse of dicretion commited by the respondent Judge in issuing thequestioned orders. Sec. 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him. 3 within five days after the same becomes final. 5. Transmittal of Decision. either himself or through delegates. but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General. The court has made it quite clear that even a “high position in thegovernment does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense. upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.The military officials are held liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they haveexceeded to their authority. Merit v govt. he was bumped by a government ambulance. at the option of the latter. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act. expressed or implied. as if the litigants were private parties. the case does not qualify as suit against the State. including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. 2. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure. 1923. Because of the incident. 8. One day. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original jurisdiction. Sec. Sec. 7. 4. while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura. 3. Execution. — The Governor-General. This Act shall take effect on its approval. the defendant shall have the right to assert therein. the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract. Sec. The acts and utterances of President Aquino doesnot mean admission of the State of its liability. Approved: March 16. E. Sec. Sec. by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties. which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. The purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders that took place and therecommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State. 9. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly andshould guarantee the safety of the people. 6. 4 at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature. the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides. it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay.of the phil islands The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s.While the Republic in this case is sued by name. — Subject to the provisions of this Act. Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured . Complaint against Government.AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED Section 1. viz. blunt. In order for Merritt to recover damages. respectively. and second. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood. is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission.” Case of People of the R. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). difficulties and losses. insurrection. in the sense in which these words are employed. are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. HELD: No.P.beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn. or pointed weapon. that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of. On a motion to quash filed by the accused. 9? There are two elements to the the offense: first. it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or. by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. and joined by the Solicitor General. L-42050-66 20November1978 FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction. lawless violence. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent. by virtue of such provisions of law. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute. he executes the trust confided to him. In the case at bar. on a common ground. or to abet. whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. Purisima GR Nos. etc. HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES. Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. there can be no liability from the government. or in connection with subversion. which would be subversive of the public interest. or public disorder. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence. criminality. rebellion. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that . chaos. the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar. the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed. vs. 9. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. Before those courts. ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance. or create any cause of action in his favor. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. It follows therefrom that the state. the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations. that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. No. since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government. which will avoid all objectionable. G. Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. evil. L-26400. According to the defendants. and the US. mischievous. Held: The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924). Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 Facts: The usa had a naval base in subic. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between phils.undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure. 29 Feb. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca. nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. For this reason. January 31. that the Government had not given its consent to be sued. the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils. the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed. the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale. a suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US. a function of the government of highest order. Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Howecer. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. However. zambales. commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. On 1958. 1972] Saturday. they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored. Court of First Instance of Cebu. Political Law Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. indefensible. In this case. wrongful. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. AMIGABLE VS. then she remains the owner of the lot. G. indisputably. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale. becausepossession is one of the attributes of ownership. appellant may properly sue the government. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private. In the case at bar. Issue: Whether or Not. and that plaintiff had no cause of actionagainst the defendants. since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. the rules of international law are not petrified. 1994 . they are not utilized for . under the facts of the case. the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.R. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. According to them. 108813 December 15. in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines. No. and injurious consequence IMPLIED CONSENT US Vs. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime.. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states.R. governmental and/or public acts.JUSMAG PHILIPPINES. petitioner. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSMAG AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO. 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public respondent)." 5 Private respondent appealed 6 to the National Labor Relations Commission (public respondent). J. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint " for want of jurisdiction. and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner. When dismissed. until his dismissal on April 27." Accordingly. PUNO. First. 1992. although the same was not charged against his leave. the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to the issue on illegal dismissal. Luna and Associates for petitioner. 1992. AND B. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED. in NLRC NCR CASE NO. Labor Arbiter Daniel C. 2 He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27. 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter. 1993. . It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. 7 reiterating its immunity from suit for its noncontractual. The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. 3 He asked for his reinstatement. it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the local courts. the NLRC 8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued. 9 where the "United States Government (was considered to have) waived its immunity from suit by entering into (a) contract of stevedoring services. JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. On March 31. In a Resolution. Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAGPhilippines. JUSMAG contends: I THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION — A. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel — that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control test". 00-03-02092-92. Juan. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT PROOF TO THE CONTRARY. 1969. Luces. II THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION — A. respondents. and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent on December 18. AND B. the undisputed facts.: The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) is the pivotal issue in the case at bench. reversing the July 30. 1991. this petition. JPFCEA. dated January 29. Union President. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. and thus. Galutera & Aguilar Law Offices for private respondent. United States of America. he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA). 1969. a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune from suit for alleged violation of our labor laws. private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. 4 In an Order dated July 30. 1992. JUSMAG filed its Opposition. vs. Hence. JUSMAG assails the January 29. addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines. 1991. thru General Lisandro C. the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper. PAG-IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA). GHQ to Comptroller. or in 1992. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus payments in addition to those previously defined above. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit. c. Therefore. g. dated April 8. It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity from suit.S. medical insurance. costs of living allowance. (Enclosure 3 lists the severance pay liability date for current SASP). position classification. JUSMAG. including compensation of locally employed interpreters. the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the Department of Foreign Affairs (No. "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state.. will result in immediate payments of AFP of all termination pay to the entitled employee. such as: hiring recommendations. b. Rules for computation of pay and allowances will be made available to the Comptroller. In Note No 22. f. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. and its primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines. Any termination of services." This set-up was to change in 1991. Brigadier General Robert G. The term "Operational Control" includes. 227. . In this jurisdiction. thru its Embassy. on air force. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards currently contracted between JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc. be paid salaries and benefits at established AFP civilian rates. nomination and approval of incentive awards. we agree with petitioner that the suit is. extending the funding agreement for the salaries of SASP and security guards until December 31. a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG-Philippines. 1992). Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued bonuses and annual leave will be presented to the Comptroller. the United States Government. 911725. As agreed upon. 1991. i. no more than 74 personnel to designated positions with JUSMAG. A year later. that "the cost of all services required by the Group. laborers. The Agreement delineated the terms of the assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for 1991.We find the petition impressed with merit. but is not limited to. JUSMAG will pay the total payroll costs for the SASP employees. after proper classification. clerks. . with an annual renewal of employment thereafter subject to renewal of their appointment with the AFP (employees and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3). d. albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Any termination of these personnel thought to be necessary because of budgetary restrictions or manpower ceiling will be subject to consultations between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure that JUSMAG's mission of dedicated support to the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way. dated April 18. by the Comptroller. and the cost of utilities. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active duty uniformed members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty at JUSMAG. and the Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP). in Note No. Naval and Army group. approved overtime. Entitlements not considered payroll costs under this agreement will be funded and paid by the AFP. AFP. discipline. other than voluntary resignations or termination for cause. No promotion or transfer internal to JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of their pay and benefits. 11 Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides. Abadia and U. JUSMAG-Philippines. All SASP will. army and naval matters. between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to cover the salaries of security assistance support personnel" and security guards. all personnel administrative actions. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). shall be borne by the Republic of the Philippines. GHQ. for service with JUSMAG. JUSMAG-Philippines. From the foregoing. JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21. and other personnel. one against the United States Government. Sausser. firing recommendations. thru the DFA. any legally mandated changes in salary levels or methods of computation shall be transmitted within 48 hours of receipt by Comptroller. 13 Consequently. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP. JUSMAG. except personal servants. and the thirteenth-month bonus. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of JUSMAG-Philippines Memo 10-2. GHQ. 1947. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to Chief. inter alia. 12 This offer was accepted by our Government. . SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief. h. 1947.the AFP agrees to appoint. Additionally. not later than 14 calendar days prior to required date of payment. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social Security System. e. it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21. JUSMAG shall consist of Air. AFP. the rent of JUSMAG occupied buildings and housing. and payroll computation. For the period of time that there is an exceptional funding agreement between the government of the Philippines and the United States Government (USG). we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their current rate of pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991. dated January 23. All SASP employed as of July 1. in effect. . Hence. In international law. Payroll costs include only regular salary. it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent. 1992. the relevant parts of which read: a. regular contributions to the Philippine Social Security System. 16 This is anchored on the . if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions. without its consent or waiver. 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. 23 In said case. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. and the United States. Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at U. Stated differently. Subic Bay. Santos. JUSMAG consistently contended that the (74) SASP. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. This Court upheld the contention of Harry Lyons. Philippines. not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. mean that sovereign states may. 24 Such is the case at bench. Ergo. vs. For the matter.. including private respondent. Unfortunately. Air Force Recreation Center. Ruiz. was obiter and "has no value as an imperative authority. Rodrigo. No costs. be sued in local courts. Accordingly. Considering his length of service with JUSMAG. the Executive branch. thru Department of Foreign Affairs. in Santos. (emphasis ours) It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons. through its officers or agents. (2) the exchange of notes between our Government. the state itself may be sued. working in JUSMAG. Inc. and (3) the Agreement on May 21." The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. vs.. Inc. . the Court (En Banc) said: The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not. as a commercial and not a governmental activity. its commercial activities or economic affairs. Ruiz. the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. In the case of Harry Lyons. with respect to the waiver of State immunity. thus. We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is stopped from denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with private respondent. the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. Speaking through Associate Justice Isagani Cruz. the petitioner entered into a contract with the United States Government for stevedoring services at the U. thus: . et al. John Hay Air Station. supra. Nonetheless.. 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial. brought about by their increasing commercial activities. et al. As aptly stated by this Court (En banc) in US vs. the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. . He was dismissed from service after he was found to have polluted the stock of soup with urine. in United States of America vs. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states. Apparently. in its Opposition before the public respondent. Then came the case of United States vs. he deserves a more compassionate treatment. mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine. through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. the services are operated for profit. (emphasis ours) Conversely. (emphasis ours) We held further.principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons. We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more than twenty (20) years.. per se. whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions. since a governmental function was involved — the transaction dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay — it was held that the United States was not deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. . . It then sought to collect from the US government sums of money arising from the contract. can take the cudgel for private respondent and the other SASP working for JUSMAG. supra. a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and thus can be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be used only when it enters into business contracts. in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority. 20 Thus. Prescinding from this premise. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well known and available to the general public. the sovereign state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. . we need not determine whether JUSMAG controls the employment conditions of the private respondent. Hon. thru the US Embassy to the Philippines. because by entering into a contract. and if the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the officer against whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof. where and when the state or its government enters into a contract. a state cannot be sued in the courts of another State. 17 Under the traditional rule of State immunity.S. the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign orgovernmental activities ( jure imperii). Inc. the impugned Resolution dated January 29. a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent. . that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person. at all times. et al. 18 we recognized an exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by a state. . However. private and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). supra: The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. This can be gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement. 1991. pursuant to the aforestated Military Assistance Agreement. Nevertheless. Genove countered with a complaint for damages. are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. One of the issues posed in the case was whether or not the defunct Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the defendant United States." As it stands now.. JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.supra between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG. . On the contrary. if. that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on the legal nature of the act. United States of America 19 was decided.S. Naval Base. even without its consent. the motion for reference was denied. Plaintiff Froilan appeals from the said. Enrique Caguiat and Quisumbing and Associates for appellant. No. L-9791 FERNANDO A. Commissioner-appellee.. Appointed Enrique Caguiat as commissioner to examine the accounts involved in the counterclaims. Held: Yes. intervenor-appellee.. alleging that it is in possession of and the one operating the ship. section 13. Santiago vs. Rafael Dinglasan. that the order of the lower court appointing the appellee . Thus. 1952. Santiago. for the delivery of a ship known as FS-197. C. represented by his Attorney-in-Fact. 103 Phil. Luis A. the defendant filed a motion for reference to a commissioner of the issues of fact involved in its counterclaims. FROILAN. Ratio: The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. No. Republic (Consti1) Ildefonso Santiago. After an opposition had been filed by the plaintiff and the intervenor. Froilan v. The court in its order of July 29. represented by Director. LOURDES REYES VDA. 1954. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines. On September 4. defendant and appellee. 473 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC April 28. 34. the defendant filed an amended answer to the complaint and to the complaint in intervention. upon ex-parte motion of the defendant. as compensation for services rendered by the commissioner. 1954. vs..R.670 be paid by the plaintiff and the intervenor in equal shares. Jose for appellee. the plaintiff filed a complaint. It is noteworthy. repondent. 1954. DE CAGUIAT. having purchased it from the plaintiff. the compensation of the commissioner shall be taxed as costs against the defeated party and the court not having as yet made any pronouncement on the point. Also. PARAS. On August 6. L-9791. On April 7. nature and extent of the commissioner's services. and that as provided by rules of Court No. Bureau of Plant Industry. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING Co. the lower court in its order of September 3. 1958 G. the Compania Maritima filed a complaint in intervention. the commissioner filed a motion for approval of his fees to which the plaintiff and the intervenor filed their answer alleging that there was no showing whatsoever as to the time. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Facts: Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot. Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government. to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. However. COMPANIA MARITIMA. Zamboanga City. G. The appellant assails the validity of the commissioner's proceedings in the examination of the accounts in question. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case. On December 1. vs. J. 1952. "the motion is premature".SO ORDERED.: On February 3. petitioner. that the amount charged is excessive. Region IX.R. order. the commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration without notice of hearing to the plaintiff and the intervenor. 1950. however. 1954. The latter did not notify the plaintiff and the intervenor or their attorneys about the meeting time and place of the parties as regards the examinations of the accounts. On December 21. Issue: Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit. When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the defendant. the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. plaintiff-appellant. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. The motion was accordingly held in abeyance. setting up counterclaims against the plaintiff and the intervenor. 1951. on the ground said proceedings were held without notice to and in the absence of the appellant and the intervenor. granted ex-parte the aforesaid motion and ordered that the amount of P4. Alfredo T. and the Regional Director. without notice and hearing. Froilan. While personal attention was perhaps preferable or even desirable. who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC). p. Inc. with legal interests thereon. p. and that the approval and payment of the commisioner's fees were premature. not need the presence of the parties.76. 5. 36] Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated January 27. versus Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. Estanislao's work". San Diego. ordering the defendants therein to pay jointly and severally. Accordingly. vs. 1988 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION.: The crux of the instant controversy dwells on the liability of a bank for releasing its depositor's funds upon orders of the court.1970 which was granted in an Order dated April 6.1970. the lower court irregularly. In granting. Wherefore.] In compliance with said Order. Inc. Q-12785 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. the commissioner did. In view of the fact that the appellant and the intervenor had previously registered their stand that there was no showing as to the alleged service rendered by the appellee. The next criticism made by the appellant is that the appellee did not personally. speaking of the authority that may be granted to a commissioner. of the Rules of Court. On January 26. an Order (Partial Judgment) was issued on January 15. RCBC notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on Appeal. 1954. So ordered without pronouncement as to costs. to do or perform particular acts. Section 3. SCOPE OF CONSENT G. make the examination of the accounts in question and prepare the corresponding report. specially when unnecessary. Quezon City Branch IX entitled "Badoc Planters. J. petitioner. the respondent Judge issued an Order granting the ExParte Motion and directing the herein petitioner "to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor in turn is ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record. and that his service consisted merely of what the appellee termed "reviewing Mr. Rollo. 20. the commissioner may be required to perform only a particular task." which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries.916. appellee's motion for reconsideration filed on December 21. or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of his report. issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor. the order of the court directing payment was set aside by the same judge.670 in shares. 1954. Rule 34. who in turn delivered it to the judgment creditor. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION. second and third counterclaims alleged in its answer to the complaint in intervention of the Compania Maritima and the amended answer to the complaint of appellant Fernando A. but subsequently. pursuant to a writ of garnishment. L-34548 November 29. petitioner delivered to Sheriff Rigor a certified check in the sum of P 206. Meer & Meer for petitioner. the order appealed from is hereby reversed and the lower court is ordered to set the incident in question for hearing.. Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26. If in compliance with the court order. the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the . the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day. provides that the recorder may specify or limit the powers of the commissioner. the plaintiff Badoc Planters. the bank delivered the garnished amount to the sheriff. such as the examination of records of account without hearings. 1970 filed by BADOC. BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution of the said Partial Judgment which was granted on the same day by the herein respondent judge who acted in place of the Hon. 1970 by the Hon. In Civil Case No. jointly and severally. requesting a reply within five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (hereinafter referred to as "PVTA") might have in the possession or control of petitioner or of any debts owing by the petitioner to said defendant.as commissioner solely directed the latter to "examine the long accounts involved in the defendant's first. should the bank be held solidarily liable with the judgment creditor to its depositor for reimbursement of the garnished funds? The Court does not think so. The paramount consideration is that the commissioner assumes full responsibility for whatever is submitted to the court. then Presiding Judge. THE HONORABLE PACIFICO P. a hearing became indispensable.respondents Meer. and may direct him to report only upon particular issues. p. The Solicitor General for respondents. Judge San Diego who had just been elevated as a Justice of the Court of Appeals." Under this reglementary provision. however. Upon receipt of such Notice. and in the absence of a judicial directive to hold hearings. that the compensation sought was excessive. dated September 4. the same is not essential or required. (hereinafter referred to as "BADOC") within 48 hours the aggregate amount of P206. setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC "to restore. CORTES. No. and ordering the appellant and the intervenor to pay P4. the petitioner in this case." For such purpose.R." [Record on Appeal.1970.76. Lourdes P. et al.916. which was within the period for perfecting an appeal. it should be pointed out that RCBC did not deliver the amount on the strength solely of a Notice of Garnishment.R. in fact was the basis of the plaintiff in filing a motion to secure delivery of the garnished amount to the sheriff. far from ordering an immediate release of the amount involved. by virtue of the order of garnishment. private respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order/ Partial Judgment of January 15.] It must be noted that the Order of respondent Judge dated April 6. which. the same was placed in custodia legis and therefore. Faustino Rigor. whose custody is equivalent to the custody of the court. 574.76 with interests at the legal rate from January 27. the RCBC did not thereby make any payment. jointly and severally with BADOC. The case was set for hearings on November 4. ordering petitioner 94 "to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor is in turn ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record. It must be noted that in delivering the garnished amount in check to the sheriff. Civil Code. It is brought into custodia legis. 1970 was composed of two parts. no breach of trust or dereliction of duty can be attributed to RCBC in delivering its depositor's funds pursuant to a court order which was merely in the exercise of its power of control over such funds. 81. the Order of January 27. 1970. 1970 [Rollo. Salvador. that there was nothing irregular in the delivery of the funds of PVTA by check to the sheriff. 1970 categorically required the delivery in check of the amount garnished to the special sheriff. 1970 did not require the bank to immediately deliver the garnished amount constitutes such lack of prudence as to make it answerable jointly and severally with the plaintiff for the wrongful release of the money from the deposit of the PVTA. from that time on. p. That the sheriff. 1970 until fully paid to the account of the PVTA This is without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to move for the execution of the partial judgment pending appeal in case the motion for reconsideration is denied and appeal is taken from the said partial judgment.] Lastly." [Record on Appeal." [Rollo. 1970. It insistently urges that the premature delivery of the garnished amount by RCBC to the special sheriff even in the absence of a demand to deliver made by the latter. p.. 93. 1970 filed by herein petitioner was denied in the Order of respondent judge dated June 10. 205-207.] PVTA however claims that the manner in which the bank complied with the Sheriffs Notice of Garnishment indicated breach of trust and dereliction of duty on the part of the bank as custodian of government funds. at this juncture. much less to appeal from the said Order. However. censured the petitioner for having released the funds "simply on the strength of the Order of the court which. The order of the court dated January 27. The petitioner raises two principal queries in the instant case: 1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment.] The respondent judge however. to reimburse PVTA." [Rollo.. 9 and 11. involving as it does purely questions of law. [See Rollo. 1970. PVTA and even if the court's order of January 27. L-30871 and L-31603. merely serves as a standing authority to make the release at the proper time as prescribed by the rules. before the expiration of the five-day period given to reply to the Notice of Garnishment. 36] It is important to stress. p.916. requiring: 1) RCBC to deliver in check the amount garnished to the designated sheriff and 2) the sheriff in turn to cash the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record. [Article 1249. G. without any reply having been given thereto nor any prior authorization from its depositor. he being a court officer. p. 208. 1970. The record reveals that on February 2. p. . The respondent Judge in his controverted Order sustained such contention and blamed RCBC for the supposed "hasty release of the amount from the deposit of the PVTA without giving PVTA a chance to take proper steps by informing it of the action being taken against its deposit. In the first place. the lower court ordered the dismissal of the case against PVTA for failure to prosecute [Rollo. RCBC was holding the funds subject to the orders of the court a quo. This case was then certified by the Court of Appeals to this Honorable Court. In the second place. the questioned Order of April 6. the bank had already filed a reply to the Notice of Garnishment stating that it had in its custody funds belonging to the PVTA. 1970. 1970 directing the plaintiff to reimburse PVTA t e amount of P206.] Moreover. 20. December 28. Nos. for the law mandates that delivery of a check does not produce the effect of payment until it has been cashed. upon the receipt of the Notice of Garnishment. the bank. 81.] Such allegations must be rejected for lack of merit. Consequently.76 with interests became final as to said plaintiff who failed to even file a motion for reconsideration. The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. and 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15.aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA of the amount of P 206. p. 1970. p. the release of the funds was made pursuant to the aforesaid Order of January 27.] However. Thus. 1970 must be set aside insofar as it ordered the petitioner RCBC. upon delivery of the check to him by RCBC encashed it and turned over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff was no longer the concern of RCBC as the responsibility over the garnished funds passed to the court. While the Notice of Garnishment dated January 26. 58] The Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of April 6. The petitioner merely obeyed a mandatory directive from the respondent Judge dated January 27.] .1970. in view of the failure of plaintiff BADOC to appear on the said dates. pp. 1970 contained no demand of payment as it was a mere request for petitioner to withold any funds of the PVTA then in its possession. This was granted and the aforementioned Partial Judgment was set aside. the order to restore the account of PVTA with RCBC in the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the questioned orders must be upheld as to the plaintiff. thereby observing with prudence the fiveday period given to it by the sheriff. 916. rather." [Record on Appeal. 1970 and on June 19. 36 SCRA 567. the herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from the said Orders. BADOC. under the sole control of such court [De Leon v. duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on Appeal. p. The very tenor of the order called for immediate compliance therewith. No. it is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid.. Confronted as it was with a mandatory directive. On the other hand. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner: xxx xxx xxx That the respondent Judge. the bank cannot be held liable for the subsequent encashment of the check as this was upon order of the court in the exercise of its power of control over the funds placed in custodia legis by virtue of the garnishment.. To expose garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would only undermine the administration of justice. San Diego [G..)] Applying the foregoing to the case at bar. should not prejudice one who dutifully abided by it. Revised Rules of Court]. The respondent Judge nevertheless held that the liability of RCBC for the reimbursement of the garnished amount is predicated on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. after having been judicially compelled to pay the amount of the judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC. . the presumption being that judicial orders are valid and issued in the regular performance of the duties of the Court" [Section 5(m) Rule 131.R.R.This argument deserves no serious consideration. National Power Corporation. 1968. to the clerk.. all the time of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and notice as provided in the last preceding section. etc. Unless there are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the writ or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher. Hon. Palacio [G. v. As stated earlier. shall be liable to the applicant for the amount of such credits. The reason for the rule is self-evident. L-34589. The bank had no choice but to comply with the order demanding delivery of the garnished amount in check. it had no choice but to comply. Rollo.] From the foregoing. was just called upon to perform an act in accordance with a judicial flat. Nor can its liability to reimburse PVTA of the amount delivered in check be premised upon the subsequent declaration of nullity of the order of delivery.] The aforequoted ruling thus bolsters RCBC's stand that its immediate compliance with the lower court's order should not have been met with the harsh penalty of joint and several liability. Comments on the Rules of Court 34 (1970 ed.23. 1970. L-30098. MERALCO. until the attachment be discharged. Under the above-cited rule. 1988] penned by the now Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan. . And this is what will happen were the controversial orders to be sustained. unless such property be delivered or transferred. to the clerk. No. not being a party in the case. [3 Moran. The said case which reiterated the rule in Republic v. or other officer of the court in which the action is pending. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ of garnishment. or such debts be paid. We need not underscore the danger of this as a precedent. May 29. or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied. [Emphasis supplied. A contrary view will invite disrespect for the majesty of the law and induce reluctance in complying with judicial orders out of fear that said orders might be subsequently invalidated and thereby expose one to suffer some penalty or prejudice for obeying the same.R. or owing any debts to the same. No. sheriff. after his Order was enforced. G. 212.. we find that the Appellate Court erred in not absolving MERALCO. .—All persons having in their possession or under their control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued. right on the very next day after its receipt of such notice. The Court disagrees. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishment. However. Section 8.543. Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.. RCBC was already served with the Order requiring delivery of the garnished amount. June 29. The rationale behind such ruling deserves emphasis in the present case: But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC. Emphasis supplied. it may be concluded that the charge of breach of trust and/or dereliction of duty as well as lack of prudence in effecting the immediate payment of the garnished amount is totally unfounded. 23 SCRA 899] that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment is definitely distinguishable from the case at bar. if such property be delivered or transferred. should be released from all responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the sheriff. February 18. In a recent decision [Engineering Construction Inc. the order directing the bank to deliver the amount to the sheriff was distinct and separate from the order directing the sheriff to encash the said check. xxx xxx xxx [ Brief for the Petitioner. This should operate with greater force in relation to the herein petitioner which. sheriff or other proper officer of the court issuing the attachment. to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant. saw fit to recall said Order and decree its nullity. RCBC duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the necessary steps for its protection. thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to double liability.. this Court absolved a garnishee from any liability for prompt compliance with its order for the delivery of the garnished funds. as garnishee. debts or other property. the garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits. 31 SCRA 616] which he found practically on all fours with the case at bar. L-20322. the garnishee. disobedience to which exposed it to a contempt order. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides: Effect of attachment of debts and credits. from its obligations to NPC with respect to the payment of ECI of P 1.114. it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation [Manila Hotel Employees' Association v. for unpaid deliveries of tobacco). Hence. August 31. insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k).R. This brings us to the first issue raised by the petitioner: Are the PVTA funds public funds exempt from garnishment? The Court holds that they are not. a special fund. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Accordingly. it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and separate from the government which owns and controls it. The funds involved were government fundscovered by the rule on exemption from execution. L-17874.] Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund. charged as it was with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment against government funds.] From the foregoing. firm or corporation. 8 SCRA 781]. 598. No. 4155. and the establishment of the Tobacco Research and Grading Institute. office and field expenses. the same may not be garnished. If such funds cannot be executed upon or garnished pursuant to a judgment sustaining the liability of the PVTA to answer for its obligations. this Court has heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment" [Philippine National Bank v. CIR. at the present support and subsidy prices. was by law. Republic Act No. Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration to the Central Bank in gradual amounts regarding Virginia tobacco transactions in previous years. 2265]. 2265. Reotan v. Pabalan. has no personality of its own separate from the National Government. L-16223. which discounted the erstwhile support given by the Central Bank to PVTA.] . the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA). 4155. No. the law has expressly allowed it funds to answer for various obligations. Operational. Republic Act No. L33112. which being an arm of the executive branch of the government. and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public. blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes [Section 1. 3.A.In the Commissioner of Public Highways case [supra]. established in lieu thereof a "Tobacco Fund" to be collected from the proceeds of fifty per centum of the tariff or taxes of imported leaf tobacco and also fifty per centum of the specific taxes on locally manufactured Virginia type cigarettes. it has a personality of its own. it follows that said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution and garnishment. CIR [G. R. redrying. with the Government of the Philippines or with any foreign government. June 15. 1978. to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. "garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government" inasmuch as "by engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation.R. 471 (1956). 2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person.] Furthermore. G. with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry. and CIR. 46 Phil. 100 Phil. National Rice & Corn Corporation. 83 SCRA 595.R.. L-32667. earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized under the law. so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations" [Philippine National Bank v. Bacani and Matoto v. the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character. subject to existing laws [Section 4(h). National Coconut Corporation et al. 319. Manila Hotel Co. Republic Act No. For it was declared to be a national policy. 73 Phil. Republic Act No. 2. including the one sought to be enforced by plaintiff BADOC in this case (i. Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration to FACOMAS and farmers and planters regarding Virginia tobacco transactions in previous years. to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis. as a government-owned or controlled corporation. G. No. 22651. 4. In the aforementioned case. the funds involved belonged to the Bureau of Public Highways. 81 SCRA 314. No. the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) and the Price Stabilization Council (PRISCO) which possess attributes similar to those of the PVTA are clothed with personalities of their own. February 27. [Emphasis supplied. its procurement. separate and distinct from that of the government [National Coal Company v. This court has likewise ruled that other govemment-owned and controlled corporations like National Coal Company. 583 (1924).A." [Section 3. distinct and separate from that of the government. 4 SCRA 418. 1978. to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets. 2265. as emphatically expressed by this Court in a 1978 decision. It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business. this Court held that the allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government and that as such. v.R No. 4155 provides that this fund shall be expended for the support or payment of: 1.e. G. 734 (1941). warehousing and disposal thereof.] The rationale in vesting it with a separate personality is not difficult to find. in the case of PVTA. it possesses the power "to sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such operations. 1962. January 31. attached or levied upon is untenable for. No. handling.] Accordingly. and 3) generally. Collector of Internal Revenue. R.] In National Shipyards and Steel Corp. Section 5 of Republic Act No. and the redrying plants trading within the purview of their contracts. R. 1964. then the purpose of the law in creating the PVTA would be defeated.] Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b). the bank which precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the funds failed to inform its depositor thereof. Continuation of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration support and subsidy operationsincluding the purchase of locally grown and produced Virginia leaf tobacco. No.A. . as follows: WHEREFORE. 3. G. CONRADO IMPERIO. and to pay the cost of suit. which lots are among those covered and described under TCT No. RCBC cannot be charged with lack of prudence for immediately complying with the order to deliver the garnished amount. an agency of the government. the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Conrado.: In Civil Case No. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half (½) share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975. Branch IV. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned. SO ORDERED. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P64. entitled "Margarita D. No. On the other hand. Pascual C. Jr.00 for attomey's fees. RELOVA. The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for respondents. Municipal Government of San Miguel. de Imperio.".R. WHEREFORE. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence presented to substantiate the same. 604-B. 1984 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL. de Imperio. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution of such judgment. ALFREDO IMPERIO. 1978. Bulacan. respondents. the petition is hereby granted and the petitioner is ABSOLVED from any liability to respondent PVTA for reimbursement of the funds garnished. That such court order subsequently turned out to have been erroneously issued should not operate to the detriment of one who complied with its clear order. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and so. all surnamed Imperio. 4. JR. jointly and severally with BADOC. The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Bulacan. BULACAN. RCBC cannot rightfully resist a court order to enforce payment of such obligations. Ernesto. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3. But the bank was in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the case.646 square meters. ADORACION IMPERIO. Finally. represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan. which belong to a public corporation. Hence. DE IMPERIO. HONORABLE OSCAR C. JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA PONGCO. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer: 1. dated October 27. 2. Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned. 5. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan. hence. the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a subsequent annulment of such court orders. CARLOS IMPERIO. are in the nature of private funds insofar as their susceptibility to garnishment is concerned. it is contended that RCBC was bound to inquire into the legality and propriety of the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment issued against the funds of the PVTA deposited with said bank. Baliuag. 2. VDA. Carlos. Rodolfo. The questioned Order of the respondent Judge ordering the petitioner. with an aggregate total area of 4. was chargeable with knowledge of the exemption of such government funds from execution and garnishment pursuant to the elementary precept that public funds cannot be disbursed without the appropriation required by law. Liatchko for petitioner. 4 and 5. ERNESTO IMPERIO. plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid. only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA. premises considered. and the remaining undivided one-half (½) share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. to restore the account of PVTA are modified accordingly. et al. Vda. Adoracion. 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. Pineda and Lucila Pongco. Since the funds in its custody are precisely meant for the payment of lawfully-incurred obligations. vs. 3. and Juan. Bulacan. it had neither the personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of respondent Judge. on April 28. petitioner. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan. et al. J. Vda. rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents. In said case. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner. Alfredo. RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC.440. MARGARITA D. vs. L-61744 June 25. in his capacity as the Presiding Judge. FERNANDEZ. the same cannot hold true for RCBC as the funds entrusted to its custody. the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as custodian of funds belonging to the Bureau of Public Highways..000. 1.The Commissioner of Public Highways case is thus distinguishable from the case at bar. RODOLFO IMPERIO. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C. denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23. are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution. and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law. the municipal authorities of San Miguel. (pp. directed by judgment or order of the court. or only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost. Municipal Council of Iloilo. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people. Judgments rendered for taxes. provides: SEC. even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose. xxx xxx xxx Otherwise stated. Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court. filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration". not otherwise exempt from execution. 24. unless otherwise. In the case at bar. Rollo) Petitioner. it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect. on July 30. 59938. 1982.SO ORDERED. (c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs. The dismissal was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G. there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against them. 11-12. Furthermore. No. and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede. in Tantoco vs. states: It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds to meet its judgment obligation. (p. Respondent judge. Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution dated July 23. if any. The said motion to quash was. as prayed for in the aforestated motion. No. outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment: (a) By levying on all the property of the debtor. — Local government financial affairs. 10. Besides. Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. . however. 477. Presidential Decree No." And. Let a writ of execution be so issued. whether real or personal. Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. respondent judge issued an order which in part.R. Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal possession of the property already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of execution. 52. Fundamental Principles. No. either in the treasury or when in transit to it. intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created. the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel. 1982 in G. defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within which to submit their written compliance. transactions. 1982. The reason for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance thereof. Thereafter. In like manner. Manaois. (b) By selling the property levied upon. (p. Rollo) When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of September 13. as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan. 49 Phil. R. Hence. 86 Phil. and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder: (a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. and (d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess. 604-B. herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Talavera are therefor hereby ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge Agustin C. 2. respectively. Section 15." Thus. it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel. Rollo) The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on time. are public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. if he has more than sufficient property for the purpose. SP-12118 and by this Court in G. to wit: Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14. Finally. are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute. L-59938 and. Roura of San Miguel. on July 27. On September 13.R. 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and effect. Bagasao against said municipality. Bulacan. Section 2 (a). 1982. The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar. issued an order. in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel. 1983. 1982. originally public land is awarded to a provate individual. However.291. and registered under OCT No.The RTC dismissed such motion. 1990 Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents. Bulacan to comply with the money judgments. for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law." Subsequently. the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge. . such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration. 111. 1982. which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5. FACTS: A free patent over three (3) hectares of land. Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4.45. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. Inc. association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for educational. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Nos. and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality. Court of Appeals G. 112. which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account. Municipality of Makati vs. and respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution. religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way. are exempt from execution. There is merit in this contention. a legal easement may be constituted and thus no just compensation is required. ISSUE: Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.00 minus the advanced payment of P338. 110. In this jurisdiction. dated July 27. licenses and market fees.160. the alias writ of execution.EASEMENT AND JUST COMPENSATION When a land. it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation. Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium. situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in the name of Vicente Manglapus. SO ORDERED. no levy under execution may be validly effected.. and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in sections 109. Cagayan. CA. P-24814. The land was granted subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title: ". citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.506. Palacio. Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.00.743. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Sometime in 1982. unless otherwise provided for by statute. the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review. 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution. in which case. After proceedings.94.. are SET ASIDE. 89898-99 October 1. well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution.. Cagayan and Alcala. wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99. 141 as amended. 1982. NIA was to construct canals in Amulung.. this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. dated July 27. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA.666. directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel. 1982. and the order of respondent judge.ACCORDINGLY. However.R. just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way. Municipal revenues derived from taxes.965. It would be otherwise if the land were originally private property. granting issuance of a writ of execution. dated September 13. L-2662.] YES.O. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property. It states that title to the land shall be: ". 68. that – The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation." We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act. THE ISSUES Was E. part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain. 68 valid and constitutional. was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. No. THE FACTS Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda. 110. unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant.O. of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that. In facts these rules . No. aqueducts. Section 112. was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. 1949 I. railroads." In the present case. The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. as well as those of Mining Laws. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. No. in which case. and subject. II. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109. Commonwealth Act No. . 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution. national and international. Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947." Under the Original Certificate of Title. He questioned the constitutionality of E. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law. 141. .O. 68 valid and constitutional? III." This reservation. the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. March 26. "shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways. if the land is mineral. Commonwealth Act No. and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. provides that lands granted by patent. G. telegraphs and telephone lines.. No. No. 113 and 114.R. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form. 112.. 141. This is well within the limit provided by law. Jalandoni. irrigation ditches. PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES SECTION 2 Kuroda v. further to such conditions contained in the original title as may be subsisting. E. 111. The land was originally public land. and similar works.O. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war. as amended.RULING: No. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E. just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way. that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified . ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times. morals. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. safety and welfare of society. good order. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents. rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace. good order or safety. peace. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. Petitioner contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh. In this case.and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. education.’ This doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. G.00 per set." 13 are "one‐sided. Fugoso which referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health.” ICHONG V HERNANDEZ Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business.R.00 to P72. according to him. onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so‐called early warning device at the rate of P 56. there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order for the general comfort." Held: Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty. health and prosperity of the state. 1979 (88 SCRA 195) Facts: The letter of instruction providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles is being assailed in the case at bar as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device. He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. NO. AGUSTIN vs EDU. cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. What are critical or urgent changes with the time. February 2.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort.’ Its scope.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which. a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business.” In the leading case ofCalalang v. and welfare. even to anticipate the future where it could be done. under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”. Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. suitably vague and far from precisely defined. violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). safety. L-49112. and general welfare of the people. and. HELD: Yes. Williams. except in the exercise of his veto power. ordinance. law. insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. In his verified petition. HELD: Under the Constitution. reverse. Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. also. Gonzales. modify.” For the sake of argument. without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985 Facts: Arturo E. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute. or executive order or regulation is in question”. GONZALES V HECHANOVA Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review. final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty. alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils. when it runs counter to an act of Congress. SECTION 4 People v lagman . Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils. the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail. without submitting to the required bar examinations. Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. but. In other words. Garcia. Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. or affirm on appeal. if it applies alike to all persons within such class. our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty. bar. Hechanova not only admits. revise. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter.class. suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative. is not applicable to the case at bar. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws. by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation. even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which. but. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. Hence. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the phils and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. or writ of error. then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. certiorari. Hence. not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law. also. as the law or the rules of court may provide. The power to repeal. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”. Hence. the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps. the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay. is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government. 3-7. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church.info ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service.” SECTION 6 Case DIgest: Aglipay vs Ruiz Facts of the Case: The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. without pronouncement as to costs. which contemplates no religious purpose in view. Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice. and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service. the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. in faithful compliance therewith. in so far as it establishes compulsory military service. requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.Political Law – Defense of State In 1936. theDirector of Public Works promulgated rules and regulationspertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Feb. . the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people. it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. 4052. SECTION 10 & 11 Calalang v Williams Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature.uberdigests. the petitioner. on the contrary. Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress Held: No. nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. the National Defense Law.” Of course. does not go against this constitutional provision but is. 1937. Among others. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila. HELD: The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. In evaluating the design made for the stamp. Lagman reached the age of 20. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government. has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. In the case at bar.” In considering these. www. there is no recourse but to deny the petition thus making the judgment of the trial court final and executory. comfort and quiet of all persons. Feliciano Tumale for private respondents. E. he was drowned and died on October 22. undeniably a member of the working force. vs. however. it is admitted that there was no controversion. was sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion to dismissed based on the alleged absence of an employment relationship. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF. Respondent court dismissed the petition contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not only mandatory but jurisdictional such that the petitioner’s failure to comply therewith had the effect of rendering the judgment final. Department of Labor. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect "that sometime in October. award. 1968. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal within reglementary period would render a judgment final and executory." JOSE ALMEDA VS.:têñ. and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number. or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order. particularly Sec 39 of BP 129.Held: Yes. while Jose Ondoy. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people. Moreno for petitioner. . resolution. the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute. 2 A motion for reconsideration was duly filed. Due to petitioner’s negligence of failing to perfect his appeal. C. 2011 GR # 121013 July 16 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court due to it being filed five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration. my co-worker. petitioner motions for reconsideration and is denied. therefore. resolutions. VIRGILIO IGNACIO. Also. it was found that there was lack of merit in the petitioner’s reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal. or extra-constitutionally. was in that ship. and thereafter was found dead. HELD: Yes. 1968. Subsequently. ONDOY. Espanol for public respondent. G. through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Such omission. the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society. is that subsequently. digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 7. which provides: Sec. That the deceased died in line of Duty. the mother of one Jose Ondoy. but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree. 1980 ESTRELLA B. nor anarchy.39. Social justice is "neither communism. constitutionally. L-47178 May 16. through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community. What cannot be ignored. Social justice. Appeals." but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. but in an order dated August 29.£îhqw⣠The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by petitioner. judgments. judgment. consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health.J. through the adoption of measures legally justifiable. V. nor despotism. petitioner. The period for appeal from final orders. Virgilio Ignacio. respondents. or decision appealed from.R. awards. No. was in the actual performance of his work with said fishing enterprises. COURT OF APPEALS. in the hearing of such claim private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased a fisherman. left the vessel. must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life. Fernardo R." 1 The hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so. nor atomism. who was drowned while in the employ of private respondent. fatal in character. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. FERNANDO. 2. the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. as well as defendants' counterclaim. assisted by her husband. Wenceslao Salonga. in Civil Case No. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines. This Court. the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment. the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B." the dispositive part of which reads: FOR THE REASONS GIVEN. even at this late date. therefore. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Third Judicial District.' 23 WHEREFORE. 1144-0. v. L-47088 July 10. Likewise. All that could be alleged was that he "was lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner. v. This decision is immediately executory. and P600. the then Secretary of Labor. a host of decisions that speaks to the same effect had been promulgated. to the effect that the deceased was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Time and time again this Court has stressed such statutory provision. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and consideration. 16 An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted by two employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the presumption of compensability. It was further noted that nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 to Abong v. for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor. denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 11 It clearly. Workmen's Compensation Commission. it seems. Inc. plaintiff-appellant. Even without such evidence. Otadoy. Costs against private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.) Inc. to quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific. Jose Ondoy. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 to Northwest Orient Airlines. who has resources to secure able legal advice. Conching 19 decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took effect. P6. in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award. defendants-appellees. 13 Nonetheless. now Minister Blas F. 5 The opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Bachrach Motor Co. 2 . 4. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. 1956.: This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City. Workmen's Compensation Commission 17 finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible evidence. JULITA B. 3 Hence this petition for review. merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. Farrales. FARRALES. 18 5. J. and the employer. Inc. Inc.' and that it was controverting the respondent's claim. Branch III.000. Workmen's Compensation Commission. v. 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. 10 By the time respondent secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration. No.00 as compensation for the death of her son.1977. appears. direct and categorical. the award for compensation was sustained. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this year. in Regal Auto Works. 4 this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert "is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. It bears repeating that there is evidence. Costs against plaintiff. 21 Further: "No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. Thus: "The fact that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao' became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC For in No. P300. SO ORDERED. would result in frustrating such a national policy. G. versus Julita B. Workmen's Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss: "There is need. v. 1.00 for burial expenses. That was not controverted. 3 stating that the employee was 'Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10. Plaintiff. 3. that the failure of the referee to grant the award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted. Ondoy is awarded the sum of. assisted by her husband WENCESLAO SALONGA. So it has been since the first leading case of Francisco v. In La Mallorca v. judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint.. entitled "Consolacion Duque Salonga. which even if deceptively plausible. 1981 CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA.R. and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY. Defendants. Workmen's Compensation Commission. with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.00 as attorney's fees. So we have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 12there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the performance of his duty. Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. v. there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. vs. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. the ruling in Caltex (Phil. Under the circumstances. 15 In the present case. FERNANDEZ. usually poor and unlettered. and The Sheriff of Olongapo City. 22 Lastly. Olongapo City. What was said inVictorias Milling Co. the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law. Ople. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer. the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. 7 Thereafter. Workmen's Compensation Commission. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection. the court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining the carrying out of the writ of execution issued pursuant to the judgment rendered by the City Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs. UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 19 In a resolution promulgated on September 15. filed a complaint against Julita B. b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession or occupation of the land by plaintiff. and d) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law. a Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon a reasonable bond be issued enjoining the defendants. the Sheriff of Olongapo City. 1973. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City. illusory and ineffectual. Olongapo City. particularly. plaintiff assisted by counsel most respectfully prays the Hon. a suit for ejectment filed by defendantappellee Farrales against five defendants. 1973. 12 that on February 25. among whom the herein appellant. 1975. Farrales filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal has become moot and academic because "the house of the plaintiffs-appellants. 6 that an opposition to the amended petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was also filed by the defendant-appellee Farrales on January 25. dismissing plaintiff's complaint. and c) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law. 20 The plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors: I — THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING SAID APPELLANTS' RELIEF TO PURCHASE FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JULITA FARRALES THE PIECE OF LAND IN QUESTION. Court the following relief: a) That a restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining defendants. 650 for Ejectment. that on January 22. and in order that whatever judgment may be rendered in this case. appealed from the said decision to the Court of Appeals. 650. 7 that in an order dated January 20. 18 the Court of Appeals resolved on July 8. SECTION 6. the defendant-appellee Julita B. Rita. plaintiff-appellant. . 15 that the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to comment on the said motion to dismiss when required by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 16. 3 that on January 9. filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in aid of appeal. 1973. Consolacion Duque Salonga. Third Judicial District. 21 . to restrain from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. b) That after due hearing of the present amended petition. the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to show cause why the case should not be submitted for decision without the benefit of appellant's reply brief when required to do so in a Court of Appeals resolution dated May 14. Annex "A". 13 that in a resolution dated March 6. 1973. DELIMITS AND REGULATES PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRIVATE GAINS. more or less. 1974. seeking the following relief: WHEREFORE. the plaintiff-appellant. the court a quo denied the petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and lifted the restraining order issued on January 22. 1973. which is not involved in this appeal. 8 that plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction on January 5.The records disclose that on January 2. the Court of Appeals denied the said motion on the ground that "the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Consolacion Duque Salonga. 1972. in order to maintain the status of the parties. Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted by her husband. Salonga filed an urgent petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was duly amended on January 16. 1975 to submit the case for decision without the benefit of appellants' reply brief. 1973. II — THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE SUIT AT BAR. 1973. the plaintiff. 1975. the appellant. 1975.. 17 and that. 4 with the following prayer: WHEREFORE. 1974. 1973.. Sheriff's return and the land where this house was built was delivered to her and she is now the one in possession . Sta. " 14 that on January 13. the trial court rendered the judgment under review. December 28. 1974. in order to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury to plaintiff. 1973. until a final decision is rendered in this case. likewise. WHICH CONTROLS. and there being no justification for the issuance of the writ . 1975. particularly the Sheriff of Olongapo City to restrain from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case 650 for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City. 1973. justice and equity. academic. 650 for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City. plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief: a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land containing an area of 156 Square Meters. where the house of strong materials of plaintiff exists. 1144-0. 1973.. justice and equity. may not become moot.. subject matter of this appeal was demolished on October 21. Consolacion Duque Salonga. 5 that on January 23. 1977 the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because the issue raised in the appeal is purely legal. 9 which was also denied by the court a quo on February 21. 16the Court of Appeals resolved to submit the motion for decision in a resolution dated April 17. Branch III. 10 that after the trial on the merits of Civil Case No. defendant-appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for being vague and her answer with counterclaim to the complaint. 11 that on August 13. Olongapo City. L-21881. vs. it is obvious that no meeting of the and. Court of Appeals. a compromise. 80 Phil. Marciala Zarsadias. (5) THAT the decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City. January 31. and reiterated on February 4. 44 Phil.R. That plaintiff herein. to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears. by common consent amongst themselves defendant sold to Catalino Pascua. as far as plaintiff herein is concerned. formerly acquired by her from one Leoncio Dytuco who. 1958). acquired the same from the Corpuz Family of which only 361 square meters. Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. McDaniel vs. agreement was entered into whereunder said defendant undertook to pay for Carvajal's house on her land. while defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash. Farrales. with the sole and only purpose of causing damage and prejudice to the plaintiff (Complaint. with respect to Jorge Carvajal. From the very allegations of the complaint. p. on which she had erected a house.R. it cannot. Olongapo City. Inc. no contract. Farrales. Civil Code of the Philippines. including plaintiff herein and her husband. if plaintiff's offer to purchase was. before the City Court of Olongapo City. as far as ejectment is concerned. 1968. B. in view of the sale to three tenants defendants of the portions of land occupied by each of said three tenant-defendants. are: At the pre-trial conference. 2-5) 22 The lower court explained its conclusion thus: . the parties stipulated on the following facts (1) THAT the personal circumstances of the parties as alleged in the complaint are admitted: (2) THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land situated in Sta. No. Rule 129. sometime prior to November. Being a judicial admission. L-31018. and instead insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case. March 1. fair and reasonable persistently refused such offer. L-9817. Hence. G. Catalino Pascual and Rosanna Quiocson*. 1968. more or less.. as aforesaid persistently refused by defendant. and. not actually belong to said defendant after portions thereof had been sold to Marciala Zarsadias. defendant Julita B. more or less. either to sell or of sale. therefore. 1970. Branch 1. and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson . also offered to purchase from said defendant the area of One Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters. G. therefore be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question. 3 emphasis supplied). 1971 of Branch III thereof.. Such being the situation. No. by defendant Julita B.. Kroll and Co. which was a case for specific performance to compel the therein respondent Magdalena Estate. Cua Hian Teck G. even before the rendition of the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance. Central Bank. to wit. No. Atkins. (*Per Deed of Absolute Sale.. 3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales (if the land aforesaid. where plaintiff's house of strong materials exists. in which. plaintiff was already in possession as lessee of some 156 square meters thereof. Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson the areas respectly occupied by them.R. (4) THAT. only against plaintiff herein. as found by the trial court. the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot subsequently take a position contradictory thereto or inconsistent therewith (Section 2. but. attorney's fees and costs. in turn. Consolacion Duque Salonga. The facts.The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint for specific performance or the ground that there exists no legally enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee Farrales can be compelled to sell the piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant. so that the decision aforesaid is now being executed. 227). Identity of which is not disputed. 581-0 thereof. 1968. on November 20. (6) THAT the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance aforesaid is now final and executory the records of the case had been remanded to the Court for execution. plaintiff did not have any money for that purpose and neither were negotiations ever had respecting any possible arrangement for payment in installments.. 650 of the Olongapo City Court. the vendee is actually Dionisio Quiocson). and there is here no perfected contract at . paying rentals thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant Farrales. defendant Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-payment of rentals against plaintiff and her husband-jointly with other lessees of other portions of the land. in a suit thereafter filed between him and defendant Farrales. Catalino Pascua. took place and. a decision was rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering the therein defendants. thru the herein defendant Sheriff of Olongapo City. was ever perfected between them. and the corresponding writ of execution had been issued partially satisfied. June 29. to sell a parcel of land to petitioner per an alleged contract of sale in which the Supreme Court ruled: It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners themselves admit that they and the respondent still had to meet and agree on how and when the down payment and the installment payments were to be paid. vs. Exhibit B. Rita. This is only firmed up even more by plaintiff's admission on the witness stand that no agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the disputed land was finalized because. it is clearly admitted 5. Inc. et al. Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection (Articles 1315 and 1475. Jorge Carvajal. 248 Cunanan vs. Civil Case No. 1973. Amparo. Indeed this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. 1973. the same was affirmed with modification only as to the amount of rentals arrears to be paid. accordingly. in a Decision dated November 11. despite the fact that said plaintiff's order to purchase was just. Rules of Court. (Pre-Trial Order. vs. while. Apacible. On all fours to the case at bar. pp. is Velasco et al. by the payment of all rentals in arrears although the removal of said plaintiff's house from the land still remains to be carried out by defendant Sheriff: and (7) THAT.Civil Case No. May 17. and the fact that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein. denominational. WHEREFORE. 657. Moreover. does not change the situation because. other than English. 26 and thus.all. but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land. they may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse them. to any child who has not attained and successfully [p391] passed the eighth grade. in a parochial school. it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce against defendant Farrales. as lessees. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract. 27 As lessees. 29 As to the contention that Sec. 23 The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever perfected between the defendantappellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as vendees. invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State. 6. a perfected contract existed . the defendant-appellee Julita B. 1923 Decided: June 4. as previously shown was not the case with the plaintiff. 1678 of the New Civil Code. There is no showing that the trial court committed any reversible error. Their rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Art. Likewise. SO ORDERED SECTION 12 Meyer v. spouses Salonga to buy the land in question. the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.which is not the case with plaintiff. a perfected contract of sale existed which. therefore. reversed. the plaintiffs-appellants. State of Nebraska (No. P. 24 It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract. 1923 107 Neb. 25 It appears in this case that the offeree. it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the land in question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. the contract is nonexistent.   Syllabus Opinion. and where it is wanting. Farrales not only did not accept. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on the terms of the contract. beyond the power of the Court to grant. without pronouncement as to costs. ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a conviction for infraction of a statute against teaching of foreign languages to young children in schools. the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts. without the acceptance of the other. and is. the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. 28 Anent the appellants' claim that since the appellee sold to the three (3) other defendants in the ejectment suit the three (3) portions of the land in question occupied by them. renders all the more ineffective the action for specific performance in the court a quo. The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that defendant-appellee sold portions of the land to the other lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants Salonga does not change the situation because as to said other lessees. the teaching in any private. as to said other lessees. as correctly found by the trial court. are neither builders in good faith nor in bad faith. under penalty. it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. Mcreynolds Syllabus A state law forbidding. of any modern language. there is no consent. 399. it follows that "she must also sell that portion of the land where appellants' residential house was found to appellants" is unmeritorious. therefore. The social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Where there is merely an offer by one party. but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants. 325) Argued: February 23.[p396] TOP . parochial or public school. to a child of ten years. no contract to sell to speak of. Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar. There being no consent there is. So held where the statute was applied in punishment of an instructor who taught reading in German. Evidently. In the legislative mind. 1920. 1919. The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state. 246 U. Bartels. until they had grown into that language and until it had become a part of them. teach any subject to any person in any language other than the English language. Sec. Minnesota v. by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect. To allow the children of foreigners. to marry. who had not attained [p397] and successfully passed the eighth grade.) 508. Lawton v. but that. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered [p400] with. Nebraska. The statute. or property. 118 U.S. [p399] Other citizens.S. 132 N. 590. . but is subject to supervision by the courts. Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court for Hamilton County. 137. 239 U. Steele. The legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting foreigners.S. shall. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are limited. Yick Wo v. therefore. (Ohio) 20. State v. 313. 257 U. as a consequence. and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. to engage in any of the common occupations of life. liberty. Sec. Hopkins. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. . Dodge. denominational. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides. 78.Allgeyer v. they should not in the schools be taught any other language. shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25). It declared the offense charged and established was "the direct and intentional teaching of the German language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. from among the many that might be taught. it appears. Children's Hospital. 244 U.S. The following excerpts from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion. to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. which follows [Laws 1919." approved April 9. Crescent City Co. Co.S. an emergency exists.S. 474. Without doubt. is obviously necessary. who had emigrated here. except perhaps in rare instances. Cambridge Board of Health. on May 25.Opinion MCREYNOLDS. Co.S. unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment. [p398] who had taken residence in this country. from having their children taught foreign languages in school. Truax v. 357. without reason. and. The law affects few citizens. under the guise of protecting the public interest. . Adams v. 3. a child of ten years.. 152 U. 16 Wall." in the parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation. Slaughter-House Cases. as construed and applied. The legislature no doubt had in mind the practical operation of the law. (Ia. 312. Louisiana. Whereas. 133.S. Pohl v. The problem for our determination is whether the statute.S. Chicago. McGuire. in their selection of studies. 578. in any private. No person. Lochner v. except those of foreign lineage. other than the English language. 219 U. Barber. c. Sec. Its daily capacity for learning is comparatively small. the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. The information is based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the State of Nebraska. deprive any person of life. 200 Mass. Butchers' Union Co. J. It must have ample time for exercise or play. It was to educate them so that they must always think in that language. while an instructor in Zion Parochial School. 198 U. Opinion of the Court MR. establish a home and bring up children. but was a valid exercise of the police power. New York Life Ins.S.W. 549.]: Section 1.R. in that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry. 356.E.S. to be taught from early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that language as their mother tongue. The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction. it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint. 136 U. v. and prevents them. Raich. The result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. therefore. 261 U. but also the right of the individual to contract. 4. Adkins v. was a restriction of no real consequence. 181 N. nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive. Languages. a collection of Biblical stories being used therefor. State. 211 U. for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute. New York. the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens generally." While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed.Wyeth v. naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. 746. 36. A selection of subjects for its education. 45. Tanner. have never deemed it of importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children have reached the eighth grade. Twining v. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction. Burlington & Quincy R. 107 Neb. to acquire useful knowledge. this act shall be in force from and after its passage and approval. Corrigan. "No State shall . That argument is not well taken. v. 525. It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction. New Jersey. individually or as a teacher. 33. parochial or public school.111 U. 2. v.S. 657. Truax v. to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart. under an information which charged that. 165 U. 249. without due process of law. was intended not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in the English language. The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. which.S. as they should be. but the offspring of the inferior. also the teaching of any other language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. 594. go very far. Plato suggested a law which should provide: That the wives of our guardians are to be common. . The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech. and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquility has been shown. exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth. and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter. with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge. . but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. will be put away in some mysterious. Those matters are not within the present controversy. or of the better when they chance to be deformed. follow foreign leaders. The interference is plain enough. Our concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. That the State may do much. 187 N. Hebrew are not proscribed. The Ordinance of 1787 declares. to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. we think. there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to justify its abolition. p. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. McKelvie. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children. indeed. essential. We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State. and develop ideal citizens. Italian and every other alien speech are within the ban. leaving complete freedom as to other matters. It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals. and their children are to be common. in order to improve the quality of its citizens. and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools." Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v.a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. physically. and the public safety is imperiled. But the means adopted. The protection of the Constitution extends to all. Corresponding to the right of control." It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large. and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health. education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves thereto. . enforce this obligation by compulsory laws. it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life. unknown place. The Supreme Court of the State has held that "the so-called ancient or dead languages" are not "within the spirit or the purpose of [p401] the act. including Nebraska. mentally and morally. is clear. Greek. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable. are within the liberty of the Amendment. that certain communities commonly use foreign words. Practically. Spanish. we think. move in a foreign atmosphere. The judgment of the court below must be reversed. although regulation may be entirely proper. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius. [p403] Tanner. indeed. and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind. to the public welfare. 927. Latin. Religion.The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age. but German. and no parent is to know his own child. No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. . French. The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English. schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. supra. In order to submerge the individual. Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. and that the children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type. morals or understanding of the ordinary child. morality. including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English. and "that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this State. which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language. and with the power of parents to control the education of their own. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. and nearly all the States. their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest. Adams v. Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians.W. is not questioned. [p402] nor any child his parent. The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold. but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution -. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution. Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers. 296 Fed. 5. Kentucky. of the State of Oregon from threatening or attempting to enforce an amendment to the school law -. Society of Sisters. 211 U. 17. 928. requires every parent. 2. in general. 511 become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time. guardian or other person having control of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to send him to the public school in the district where he resides. 268 U. Truax v. 239 U. S. 45. S. S. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is present and real before the statute is to be effective.S. 3. 535. P. P. 268 U. S.requiring parents and others having control of young children to send them to the primary schools of the State. and. cannot be construed in its application to such corporations as an exercise of power to amend their charters. S. being intended to have general application. and other officials. 584 Argued March 16. P. S. The Act.an initiative measure adopted by the people November 7. with certain exemptions. 510 APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON Syllabus 1. affirmed. 1925 Decided June 1. Ls. 535. 1925 268 U. The plaintiffs were two Oregon corporations owning and conducting schools. to become effective in 1926 -. APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminary injunctions restraining the Governor. 6. is an unreasonable interference with the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the children. 583. 510 (1925) Pierce v. Berea College v. and in that respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment. § 5259) which. their interest is direct and immediate. 268 U. 4. and entitles them to protection by injunction. But where corporations owning and conducting schools are threatened with destruction of their business and property through the improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by this statute upon parents and guardians. it is true that corporations cannot claim for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.. 534. for the period during which the school is held for the current year. no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage. a suit to restrain future enforcement of the statute is not premature.S. S. In a proper sense. S. 33. Raich. 536. and will Page 268 U. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. P. 268 U. 268 U. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. . 535. 268 U.Pierce v. Society of Sisters Nos. 1922. P. 532 property. All courses of study. § 266. or who have completed he eighth grade. requires every parent. After setting out the above facts. They present the same points of law. The challenged Act. especially constructed and equipped for school purposes. In its primary schools. is an Oregon corporation. and acquire necessary real and personal Page 268 U. 529 MR. These appeals are from decrees. It has long devoted its property and effort to the secular and religious education and care of children. between eight and sixteen. Appellee. 1922. S. and appropriate prayers asked for their protection. under the initiative provision of her Constitution by the voters of Oregon. Jud. have proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce the statute. educate and instruct the youth.Code. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior colleges. and maintains orphanages for the custody and control of children between eight and sixteen. engaged . establish and maintain academies or schools. The appellants. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. and has acquired the valuable good will of many parents and guardians. which granted preliminary orders restraining Page 268 U. Appellee. the primary schools are essential to the system and the most profitable. 530 appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the Compulsory Education Act *adopted November 7. It owns valuable buildings. S. the right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession. based upon undenied allegations. and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. And without doubt enforcement of the statute would seriously impair. unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined the corporation's business and property will suffer irreparable injury. the Society's bill alleges that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training. guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send him "to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year" in the district where the child resides. There are Page 268 U.Page 268 U. Rights said to be guaranteed by the federal Constitution were specially set up. public officers. with power to care for orphans. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue. 531 exemptions not specially important here -. and is accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. and their income has steadily declined. And. or whose parents or guardians hold special permits from the County Superintendent. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by normal children. is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon. Systematic religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. who have not completed the eighth grade. many children between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursued in Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Hill Military Academy.and the successful conduct of this requires long-time contracts with teachers and parents. or who reside at considerable distances from any public school.for children who are not normal. The business is remunerative -. perhaps destroy. organized in 1880. S.the annual income from primary schools exceeds thirty thousand dollars -. further. the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school. both temporal and religious. that. the Society of Sisters. there are no controverted questions of fact. effective September 1. the profitable features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of their property. contemplate continuity of training under appellee's charge. S. 1926. after proper notices. S. 535 under their control: as often heretofore pointed out. 533 in owning. college preparatory and military training school for boys between the ages of five and twenty-one years.Page 268 U. Also. long time contracts must be made for supplies. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept . is valid. and the annual fees received for each student amount to some eight hundred dollars. appellee's business is being destroyed and its property depreciated. irreparable injury will result. S. equipment. we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children Page 268 U. present and prospective. some useful only for school purposes. S. 534 deprivation of their property without due process of law consequent upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons.Code § 266) on motions for preliminary injunctions upon the specifically alleged facts. supervise and examine them. as a part of their liberty. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees against the Page 268 U. In order to conduct its affairs. Under the doctrine of Meyer v. teachers and pupils. 390. parents and guardians are refusing to make contracts for the future instruction of their sons. Military instruction and training are also given. The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under consideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools. Finally. It declared the right to conduct schools was property. that the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause irreparable injury. and thereby destroy their owners' business and property. The elementary department is divided into eight grades. Certainly there is nothing in the present records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons. The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then alleges that the challenged Act contravenes the corporation's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that. and have declared their intention to enforce it. similar to those of the public high schools. they were heard by three judges (Jud. By reason of the statute and threat of enforcement. unless appellants are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to enforce it. and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. and the suits were not premature. but long regarded as useful and meritorious. The average attendance is one hundred. It owns considerable real and personal property. that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught. that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition. and that parents and guardians. law officers of the State and County. as in the public schools. might direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. and some are being withdrawn. the courses of study conform to the requirements of the State Board of Education. to require that all children of proper age attend some school. And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education. and that enforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully deprive them of patronage. No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools. the college preparatory department has four grades. under the supervision of an Army officer. operating and conducting for profit an elementary. and. These parties are engaged in a kind of undertaking not inherently harmful. students or the State. S. Nebraska. to inspect. that these schools were not unfit or harmful to the public. No answer was interposed in either cause. rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children within the State of Oregon. their teachers and pupils. The prayer is for an appropriate injunction. have publicly announced that the Act of November 7. The business and incident good will are very valuable. 262 U. 1922. Appellants. instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 203 U. S. 255; Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 204 U. S. 363. But they have business and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197. The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we must determine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently it was expected to have general application, and cannot be construed as though merely intended to amend the charters of certain private corporations, as in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. No argument in favor of such view has been advanced. Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the State upon the ground that he will be deprived Page 268 U. S. 536 of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not against the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property. Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule approved in Truax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan and Terrace v. Thompson, supra, and many other cases where injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184; Nebraska District v. McKelvie, 262 U. S. 404; Truax v. Corrigan, supra, and cases there cited. The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the Act, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful action is a well recognized function of courts of equity. The decrees below are Affirmed. * "Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:" "Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:" "Sec. 5259. Children Between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen Years -- Any parent, guardian or other person in the State of Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a child under the age of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the commencement of a term of public school of the district in which said child resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse to send such child to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year in said district, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and each day's failure to send such child to a public school shall constitute a separate offense; provided, that, in the following cases, children shall not be required to attend public schools:" "(a) Children Physically Unable -- Any child who is abnormal, subnormal or physically unable to attend school." "(b) Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade -- Any child who has completed the eighth grade, in accordance with the provisions of the state course of study." "(c) Distance from school -- Children between the ages of eight and ten years, inclusive, whose place of residence is more than one and one-half miles, and children over ten years of age whose place of residence is more than three miles, by the nearest traveled road, from public school; provided, however, that, if transportation to and from school is furnished by the school district, this exemption shall not apply." "(d) Private Instruction -- Any child who is being taught for a like period of time by the parent or private teacher such subjects as are usually taught in the first eight years in the public school; but before such child can be taught by a parent or a private teacher, such parent or private teacher must receive written permission from the county superintendent, and such permission shall not extend longer than the end of the current school year. Such child must report to the county school superintendent or some person designated by him at least once every three months and take an examination in the work covered. If, after such examination, the county superintendent shall determine that such child is not being properly taught, then the county superintendent shall order the parent, guardian or other person, to send such child to the public school the remainder of the school year." "If any parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of any child between the ages of eight and sixteen years shall fail to comply with any provision of this section, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not less than $5, nor more than $100, or to imprisonment in the county jail not less than two nor more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." "This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force from and after the first day of September, 1926." Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources. People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690 FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. As evidence, Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian. Ritter was also acquitted for the criminal case of rape with homicide. However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported. G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents. Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent. CRUZ, J.: The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. But first the facts. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3 We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed. In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court: Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule." We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5 In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others. The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6 The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978 FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN,respondents. RESOLUTION FERNANDO, J.: taxpayers. Jr. Factoran. Jr. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines. If there were no such prohibition. and entitled to the full benefit. 1978. inter alia. March 15. July 30. 2 He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination. There is much more importance attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law. whenever appropriate. without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was constitutionally deficient. use and enjoyment of thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical. especially Justices Barredo. are disregarded. it must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the alleged offended party. As prayed for. premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the pre examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles. and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment. 1978. instead of being honored. SECTION 16 OPOSA VS. No. non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of. the right to bail exists. Sr. returnable to it on Wednesday. Enage: 9 Where. processing. II. 2.. It is not to be lost sight of that that United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. FACTORAN G. then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. who. 1 failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause. 1987 Constitution) and the protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. as was intimated in this petition. intellectual. which in itself is a creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. So the Constitution commands. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court. (PENI).. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court. Bandonil. the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus.000. petitioner being a 17-year old minor. in his return filed on March 8. engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. There is relevance to this excerpt from De la Camara v. Guillermo B. Sec. in open court. who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on February 23..R. 16. agreed to act in such capacity. after the hearing. 3 It was in the amount of Pl6. 192. to safeguard the people's right to a healthfulenvironment. 1978 as set forth above. Nonetheless. 1993 FACTS: The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Respondent Judge. ISSUES: 1. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel. 1010183. to [order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso. Aquino and Santos. the right to bail becomes meaningless. the Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso. Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the natural resourceproperty and violates their constitutional right to a balanced andhealthful ecology (Art. without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law. the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15. 603. As construed in the latest American decision.000.O. and social well-being. 6 According accordingly. 4 a youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. As to the excessive character of the bail. 10 WHEREFORE. accepting. he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in 1977. Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15. the rights of an accused. Atty. Inc.00. No." This instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving. give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code.Petitioner Francisco Virtouso. HELD: . the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner.00. justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest. renewing or approving new timber license agreements. alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 'the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial." 8 Thus was the petition resolved. the bail imposed was clearly excessive." 5 As such. Bataan. It is understandable why. however. it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. It is equally pertinent to state that there should be fealty to the constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. Jr. 1978. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law." 7 This Court should. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E. a domestic. 1978. he nevertheless reduced the amount to P 8. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. for the first time in our nation's constitutional history. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes. 1995 Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. renewal and conservation of the country's forest. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens. mineral. is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law (Section 16.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include. wildlife. Court of Appeals Posted on November 18.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA. Issues: 1. Such a right. the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens. off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration. 2012 G.No. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. management. (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. 1993 are declared illegal. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec. The petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right. The petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of their own as well as the future generations’ behalf can only be based on the concept of intergenerational esponsibility insofar as the said right is concerned. and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.Which agency of the government – the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region – should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the . Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). 120865-71 December 7. the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not underthe Bill of Rights. 2. Article II of the 1987 Constitution). The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens. thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. the judicious disposition. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns." Nature means the created world in its entirety. fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.1. inter alia. at the same time. utilization. waters. the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature. fisheries. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which.R. land. as hereinafter expounded. A month later. EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions of DENR. Put a little differently. under whose authority and office the complaint falls. cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay Region”. PD No. The Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed. development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. formed by a group of Taiwanese investors. fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained. argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project. the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. ISSUE: Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without considering the national interest COURT RULING: The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case.issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? 2. Board of Investments (BOI) 191 SCRA 288 November 1990 FACTS: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC). The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. No. effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application. the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. On the other hand. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive. such as in this case. one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan. in her dissenting opinion. 1989 . as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute. Justice Melencio-Herrera. was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products “naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. the provisions of PD 813.927. 78742 July 14. the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. as much as possible. stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations. stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which. as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader. RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. SECTION 21 G.2 of EONo. to wit: “. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion.and Sec. specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. RA 4850. the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens. Sec. Implied repeals are not favored and. now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Justice Gutierrez.. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency? Held: 1. Sec. SECTION 19 Garcia vs. 2. fish cages. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision. Enrique Garcia and others. On the other hand. The ponente. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens. Thus. least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly. and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court. Justice Griño Aquino. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”. latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.R.. if handled by our own government. A special law cannot be repealed. could have been very beneficial to the State. in another dissenting opinion. In February 1989. as amended. Jr. as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. RA 4850. Aquino issued E. Finally. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P. vs. and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. Recognizing this need." 1 especially the less privileged. Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. BENJAMIN R. 1963... enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. who are landless. 1972. REYNALDO G. 229.ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES. it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. ALARCIO. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM. 131. 4. vs. ALMONTE. No. of men and women who. INC. To this end. In 1973. FELISA C. GUICO. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. R. CONSUELO M. developmental. ARRESTO. The sustaining soil. to own directly or collectively the lands they till or. it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. providing the mechanics for its implementation.: In ancient mythology. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. petitioners. beyond the reach of the sustaining soil. 228. without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died. The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. President Corazon C. Victorias Mill District. The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform.O. use. CRUZ. SEGISMUNDO. CIRILA A. No. . Through the brooding centuries. No.respondents. 79744 July 14. HON.. in fact. 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No.D. MORALES. 3844. JR. instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP).petitioners. SALVADOR TALENTO. vs. containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. along with martial law. This was followed on July 22. CANUTO RAMIR B. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE." 2 Significantly. MADRIAGA. to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. 1989 NICOLAS S. FELICISIMA C. 1989 INOCENTES PABICO. CABRITO. and crushed him to death. LLAMIDO. JOKER ARROYO. the State shall respect the right of small landowners. Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air. 1987. 27. 1989 ARSENIO AL. Victorias. No. or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. The giver of life. PRESTOSA. J. petitioners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. and E. 79310 July 14. Thus. 79777 July 14. but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. No. G. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead. subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe. on July 17. Negros Occidental. In determining retention limits. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO. in line with the above-stated principles. taking into account ecological. CABE. G. EMERENCIANA J. HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO. BERNARDO M. FELISA I. like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.O. PHILIP ELLA JUICO. which was promulgated on October 21. respondents. "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. FELIPE A. SALVA. had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8. as they continued grappling. ESTRADA. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL. FAUSTO J. But it is more than a slogan. JUICO. the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition. NEWTON JISON. GERARDO B. respondents. GOMEZ. CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY. ESMENIA J. BAUTISTA.R. petitioner. in the case of other farmworkers.R." 3 The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands. No.D. GUICO. JOKER ARROYO. TEODORO B. the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. vs. otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code. No. DENNIS JEREZA. VICTORINO FERRARIS. by law. ISIDRO T. PHILIP E. declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P. FERRER. Besides echoing these sentiments. respondent. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM. HON.R. Thus forewarned. JUANITO D. and Messrs. as Secretary of Agrarian Reform. AUREA J. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: SEC. ISLA. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. ACUNA. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death.A. No. JR. HON. The State shall. ownership. undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers. Earlier. PHILIP E. there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil.. G. Mother Earth. PAULINO D. INC. JAIME ABOGADO. 00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to . As for the cases invoked by the public respondent. In a subsequent motion dated April 10. No. Nos. 1988 by Vicente Cruz.A. E. however. 6657. while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments. 83. 6657. National Food Authority. Nevertheless. Inc.O.D. the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations. Negros Occidental. the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P. No. while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law. E.-There is hereby created a special fund. v. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. Jr.O. No. No. 1988. he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above. and R.mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. 6657. including extensive public hearings. A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1. the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. No. In connection with the determination of just compensation. 1588.D. 27. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc.O. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. In the amended petition dated November 22. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. No. No. No. No. 4 The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E. was the enactment of R.000. the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.O. 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines. 6657.D.O. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation. is an organization composed of 1. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. No. The petitioners are questioning P. No. 131 and E. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened.000. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares. G. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII.O. No. 79777 Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers. 27 and E. 131 which provides: Agrarian Reform Fund. No. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R. 228. 1989. Nos. The National Land Reform Council. Proc. after almost a year of spirited debate. They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. This law. the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. on the improvement of the interests of farmers. Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. 7 Gonzales v. No.R.R. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E. who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.O. Zobel. it is contended that P. this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution. Victorias. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez v. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. No. In his Comment.A. No.D. which President Aquino signed on June 10.O. The result.A.Subsequently. Section 4. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them. At that. No. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land. 228 as qualified farmers under P. Worse. No. of the Constitution. with its formal organization. The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P. 229.D. No. and will first be explained hereunder. 27. 27. The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment. No. No. E. to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund. even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee. 6 Moreover. 27 and E. Dulay 5and Manotok v. 228 and 229.hectare land. 79310 The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District. due process.D.O. owner of a 1.D. the Solicitor General stresses that P. the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.A. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. due process. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. Moreover. she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. the constitutionality of P. nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. No. including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano. Estrella. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. Inc.400 planter-members. and equal protection. G.000.D. for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. 131 and E. an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50. Nos. it does not conform to Article VI. No. equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. Replying. At any rate.D. Furthermore. No.000 individual sugar planters all over the country. he filed a motion for reconsideration. On April 11. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title. representing coconut and riceland owners. On February 17. 228 and 229 were issued. NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that. assailing the constitutionality of E. No. and the violation of the fundamental right to own property. Furthermore. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. Prudencio Serrano. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands. they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood.. No. 1986..O. On the contrary. thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government. The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures. On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause. in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation. the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona. Finally. but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E. maturing periodically. 229. the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. No. which had not been acted upon when E. From this viewpoint. In addition to the arguments already raised. G. if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land. Section 2 of Proc. 79744 The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform. a coconut planter. 1987. who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. In his consolidated Comment. 1987. Both motions were granted by the Court.O. and (4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives. a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation. No. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents. filed a petition on his own behalf. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro. placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain. contrary to the petitioner's contention. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own. his petition was denied without hearing.O. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents.e. 1986. On the other hand. in violation of the uniformity rule.1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20. with money and in full. A motion for intervention was filed on August 27. no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. this time by Manuel Barcelona. is actually the maximum sum appropriated. He claims that on December 24. although denominated as an initial amount. Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because: (1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary. another motion for intervention was filed. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E. No. The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation. their right to equal protection has been violated. This is not allowed.1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of illgotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that. On September 10.O. et al. 1987. but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time. (3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2. (2) E. not in esse. 131 and E. 229.R. in any event.O. No. The petitioner now argues that: . i. the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond. the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available. Nos. No. to wit. Section 6. or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.O. 1988. which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof. 229. the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund. On September 3. with interest. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. the petition for prohibition would be premature. Memorandum Circular No. G. as in this case. In his Comment. he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6.D.D. 316.O.D. his position is that when P.(1) E. No.R. (3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E. Moreover. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant. Nos. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. (2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.D. No. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures. besides denying him just compensation for his land. and DAR Administrative Order No. 474). is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners.O. No. In their Reply. 228 and 229.farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P. the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. which was promulgated in implementation of P. The petitioner contends that the issuance of E. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential. 1987. industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family.O. the issuance of the implementing rules. series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P. assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power. I . This is especially true if this function is entrusted. The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII. the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Memorandum Circular No. No. 27.D. Moreover. Nos. the regulations implementing P. to a separate department of the government. 11 dated April 21. 27 have already been issued. with an accompanying Retention Guide Table). 27 was promulgated on October 21.1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P. commercial. the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. 1972. According to P. (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. Nos. Section 4 of the Constitution. the public respondent argues that P. the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14. 1978.D.0. 18-81 dated December 29. In his Comment. 228 and 229. 10 As for LOI 474. 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land. Nos. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. No. which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts. involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. the Memorandum dated July 10. Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads: The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.D. 228 declaring that: Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21. besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree. No. 27). 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines. the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.D. On the issue of just compensation. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization payments. He likewise argues that. No. No. to wit. No. 1. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary. In his Reply to the public respondents. 78742 The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners). assuming this has not yet been done. No. No. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. the provisions of E. quoted above. And so we shall. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Proc. brushing aside. It need only be added. strictly speaking. that — . No. 229.18 That fund. 1987. The policy. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint. when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries. President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.O. the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. By the same token. 13 And even if. earnest studies were made by Congress or the President.. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely. In addition. they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts." to use Justice Laurel's pithy language. No. it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature. in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional.A. 228 and 229. i. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. like any statute. The promulgation of P. 229. is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution.O. Proc. No. No. 131. Nos. 1987. To doubt is to sustain. it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. technicalities of procedure. 16 The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27. 131 and E. and heavily. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation. however. the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall.. 228 was issued on July 17.O. Thus. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E. to insure that the Constitution would not be breached. 15 The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions. No. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted. it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.. as earlier noted. requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. were both issued on July 22. In the first Emergency Powers Cases. 17 Indeed.e. the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R. it does not assert any superiority over the other departments. In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it. and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. where the acts of these departments. or both. the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 12 With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for. Significantly. In arriving at this conclusion. Even so. No. if we must. II We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions. No. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.O. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide . and Sections 20 and 21 of E. 1987. No. For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive. indeed. when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her.D. born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments. or of any public official. 131 and E. Clearly. the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party. they are not covered by the definition. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. No. we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel. 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. some portions of the said measures.Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government. have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. is a blend of courtesy and caution. the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. and the other measures. they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. or board should. 20 The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship. the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable familysized farm. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder. speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities. It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act. both houses of Congress. NAWASA. where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value. No. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject. further. which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose. an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making . But for all their peremptoriness. fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned.) Finally. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII. 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent. 23 III There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. in that sense. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs. In other words. 21 Hence. who embodied. If the duty is purely discretionary. Provided. 22 And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain. For example. No. which is agrarian reform. these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law. such as commodity produced. if an inferior court. Mahon. and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm.D. Tuvera. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder. That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. are not applicable. if it is a clear duty imposed by law. that LOI 474 could not have repealed P. 24 for example. Such are the ways of despots. directly or indirectly. infrastructure. and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. terrain. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. any public or private agricultural land. had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The argument that E. unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation. it is futile to argue. Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable.for the creation of said fund. if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. R. as the petitioners do in G. and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder. LOI 474 was published. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner. to wit. unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Hence. which should be demolished for the public safety." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures.O. to be expressed in its title. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI. The Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. or obscene materials. The confiscation of such property is not compensable. but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. for an unreasonable length of time. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. deserves only short attention. which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. the courts will require specific action. in the first case to require a decision. which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. the courts by mandamus will require action only. public official. in the Official Gazette dated November 29. v. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. though. or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue. this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives. resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law.R. with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. such as a building on the verge of collapse. every presidential issuance. With particular reference to Section 24. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos. for that is not its principal purpose. whose word was law during that time. No. subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age. He said: Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed.A. This section declares: Retention Limits. 131 and E.19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation. especially by a specific department of the government. In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co.O. no person may own or retain. the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. as it were. 79744. In the case of City of Baguio v. by whatever name it was called.1976. and is. there is the contention of the public respondent in G. If the duty is purely ministerial. Correctly and categorically stated.R. Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain. But where." 27 The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R. there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. 28 In Penn Central Transportation Co. which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks: Euclid. curiously enough. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use. however. Nos. safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on . So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose. However. This "fair compensation. no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain. an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. Significantly. 6657. Prof. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore." the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. Generally speaking. they too have not questioned the area of such limits. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-. Ambler Realty Co. however.. the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal. But restriction imposed to protect the public health.A. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. The problem. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose. Once the object is within the authority of Congress. to carry out such regulation. No.a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed. 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978. John J. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation. Parker. not being questioned in these petitions. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. 30 The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned." as he called it. Justice Douglas declared: If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary. 31 To be valid. the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. 26 As for the power of expropriation. 272 US 365. While insisting that there was here no taking. theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger. was explained by Prof. moreover. they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available for public use. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. The challenge to Proc. the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. Costonis in this wise: In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status. the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. 131 and E.O. Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners." literally construed.compensation. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. which had been designated a historic landmark. the retention limits finally agreed upon are. there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. Recent trends. New York City. v. We therefore do not discuss them here. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different planets. To the police power. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress. on the other hand. which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. No. or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee. throughout its entire length. In any event. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority. we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours. Obviously. will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.substantial distinctions. In U. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal. as it did by the Act of March 3. It refers to "those questions which." 37 Even so. person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. in their wisdom. it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands. no less important. in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle." In any event. which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise. It is not enough that there be a valid objective. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company. Basically. v. This brings us now to the power of eminent domain. (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. It is no exaggeration to say that a. as in the case of the police power. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters. Parenthetically. to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for. which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and. a question of policy. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell. With regard to his property." . There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9. his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.R.1909 that the entire St. it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. But for all its primacy and urgency. Mary's river between the American bank and the international line. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused. of a particular measure. and the waters connected therewith. Cuenco: 36 The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance. namely. subject only to a few notable exceptions. The legislature and the executive have been seen fit. Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need. that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. not legality. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal. that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. IV Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.S. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification. It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. the end does not justify the means. One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned. Put otherwise. while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). 38 it was held: Congress having determined. but illegal. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. under the Constitution. (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only. We do not find it to be so. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself. No. That right covers the person's life. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d). The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. 131 and R. 41 It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power." 43 Nevertheless. in case of rejection or no response from the landowner. which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land. EPZA v. (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority. As a necessary consequence. 1533. Moreover.40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real. upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act. subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property. Proc. it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Justice Hugo E. After the expiration of the above period. to the manner of fixing the just compensation. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land.D. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property. This time. No. Objection is raised. No. xxx In the present petition. the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner. (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. full.. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees. and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount.: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. following the applicable decrees. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. Where the State itself is the expropriator. which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. the matter is deemed submitted for decision. . needs a longer and more thoughtful examination. i. (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. As earlier observed. substantial. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. whichever was lower. The second requirement. to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress .D. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. to appoint commissioners for such purpose. 27.e. Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that: Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or. which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.. the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. however. the Court held through Mr. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment. ample.. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional. . and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.." That public use. However. the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform. although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property. Gutierrez. the payment of just compensation. The purposes specified in P. the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. To be sure. independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect. within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. No. we answer in the affirmative. Thus. as "the compensation is a public charge. Castellvi.that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act. we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P. the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor. still have the power and authority to determine just compensation. and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.. as pronounced by the fundamental law itself. the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. must be binding on us.A. No. the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment. Jr. at the option of the landowner: (1) Cash payment. he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner. (b) Transferability and negotiability. the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. up to the amount of their face value. insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash. as the just compensation for the land.xxx It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. (iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons. (3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability. (c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash. after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented. whether in full or in part. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations. physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC. . Although the proceedings are described as summary. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. or for performance bonds. That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion. This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows: SEC. and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.interest or his assigns. the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. his successors-in. for any of the following: (i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government. which shall have the following features: (a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. 18. Otherwise. the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. (ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private corporations. the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. under the following terms and conditions: (a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property. including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated. in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17. or as may be finally determined by the court. (4) LBP bonds. the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP. The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes. and other pertinent provisions hereof. (b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash. LBP preferred shares. for Section 16(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved. the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. But more importantly. Anything beyond that is more. The cost will be tremendous.) In the United States. trade schools. The contention of the petitioners in G. we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. 47 (Emphasis supplied. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. bonds. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled. and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation. not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. And so. and an owner. 49 (Emphasis supplied.) In J.R. let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms. Thus — The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. willing. further. That the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above.(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution. preferably in a small and medium. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied. and anything short of that is less. they cite jurisprudence holding that: The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation. In support of this contention. and other institutions. conformably. and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations. far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated. And. but not compelled to buy. Tuazon Co. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us. (vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals. calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance. whenever it is possible to make the assessment. which is the measure of the indemnity. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money. than the money equivalent of said property. 48 "Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money. or other valuable advantage. be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 46 this Court held: It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. there must be a standard medium of payment. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived. which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking. we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed. v. although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. which is the only medium of payment allowed. from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. (vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities. colleges. in the nature of things. which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.scale industry. Provided. would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property. than just compensation. in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid. which should be neither more nor less. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today. the weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. That the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments. which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise.) Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot. from all levels of our society. finally. However. (v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided.) It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. No. (Emphasis supplied. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Land Tenure Administration. binding upon both parties. but not compelled to sell.M. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. . The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. and (viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time. we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment. killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. 56 that: . although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law. conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice. or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation. until just compensation has been made to him. primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed. in Rubottom v. the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the aforequoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle. that in case of failure or refusal to register the land. 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. this cannot be avoided. as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P. tax credits. The recognized rule. In the end.) In Kennedy v. As early as 1838. not a little inconvenience. indeed. that the right to enter on and use the property is complete. are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock. and that is not what we shall decree today. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. As already remarked. 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. 50 On the other hand. and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.O. Nevertheless. as the latter did. the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners. Knight.. there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use. The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.." The other modes. v. The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E. our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail. No. as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated." Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. No less importantly. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is . they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method.D. the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. Indianapolis. however. LBP bonds. Otherwise. 27. the bigger the payment in money. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value.accepted principle of eminent domain. in contravention of a well. Camus and Paredes. is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16. No. it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours. which are likewise available to the landowner at his option. will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Admittedly. or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act. big and small. It is noted that the smaller the land. McLure. With these assumptions. title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money). the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution." In Rexford v. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. other properties or assets. no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. is filed. Thus: Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid. On the contrary.. 52 (Emphasis supplied. with other things of value. but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act.We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program.51 .. In fact. but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide. "it is an experiment. 4. No.D. Proc. as recognized under E. we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. No. (Emphasis supplied. to use Justice Holmes's words. Nos. 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative. Obviously. No. the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected. it does not appear in G. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. for its part. there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level. In any event. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. the Court holds as follows: 1. 27. And where once it bred for him only deep despair. categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21.A. R. the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R. we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably. which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No." and so we learn as we venture forward.D. 27. But we have to start somewhere.) It is true that P. 3. On the contrary. shall be considered as advance payment for the land.D. and for so long. and E. Meantime. it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved.A. At last his servitude will be ended forever. V The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. 27. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. 228. No. That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21. under P.A. further. By the decision we reach today. This is inevitable.D. fettered his soul to the soil. title also remains with the landowner. indeed.D.O. No. they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned. Until then.A. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder. these enactments are less than perfect. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P. . if any. especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition. No.beneficiary after October 21. that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Hence. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. 131. assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights. 6657. To be sure. In the pursuit of agrarian reform. all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed. however.If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid . Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream. the Court cannot resolve these issues. 6657. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project.." It was understood. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R..R. No. now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future." WHEREFORE.O. 27. conformably to the constitutional requirement. after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.D. No.) it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree.O. by our own mistakes. When E. 27 are retained and recognized. No. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. (Emphasis supplied. 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation). 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. are retained by him even now under R. No. It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P. if necessary. P." In connection with these retained rights. 228. All rights previously acquired by the tenant.farmers under P. . and." The CARP Law. 6657. that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first. as all life is an experiment. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action. No. No. No. 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. Hence. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar andG.al. Sr. 2009. petitioner issued the subject demolition advicesfor the enforcement of Demolition Order No.Respondent in his capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the National Commission on IndigenousPeoples. Respondent has willfully disregarded and defies the Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his office.180206 and in the case at bar. 29-CAR-09). 83.R. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his jurisdiction was called upon to protect andpreserve the rights of the petitioners (in the NCIP cases) who were undoubtedly members of theindigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples. 1983. et. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. as amended. 180206 because the Courthas in fact affirmed the power of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs ofinjunction without any prohibition against the issuance of said writs when the main action is forinjunction. and(2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27.Baguio City. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction.Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the demolition advices are simply enforcing theprevious demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-in. No. disobedience.interest. and hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their implementation.Respondent claims that he issued the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in NCIPCase Nos. vs ATTY.R. 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction4 in NCIP Case No. Hence Atty. Demolition Order No.al. No.R.180206 which dismissed the previous injunction case. 31-CAR-09.5. In addition. the aforesaid individuals filed a petition for injunction (Case No.the court is constrained by the principle of stare decisis in granting the instant petition. 29-CAR-09. Despite the Court’s pronouncement in G. JR. No. this petition asserting that the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction wereissued in willful disregard.R. without pronouncement as to costs.. MASWENG. No. The said orders clearly contravene the court’s ruling in G. who are owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by petitioner arenot entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.G. Sr.Hence.The court finds that petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments andcounter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol WatershedReservation. Basco and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCOR’s charter is against the constitutional provision on local autonomy.R. No.BAUTISTA. defiance and resistance of this Court’s Decision in G. .al. Petitioner contends that respondent’s act of enjoining the execution of the demolition orders and demolition advices is tantamount to allowingforum shopping since the implementation of the demolition orders over the structures in the BusolForest Reservation had already been adjudicated and affirmed by this Court. Series of 2005 against Alexander Ampaguey. Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen. Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued the following separate temporaryrestraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:(1) 72Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27. 2014 Facts:In pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. respondentstill issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. 33. 180206. delineation and recognition ofancestral land claims with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction(Case No. in relation to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rule.R. 31-CAR-09)while Magdalena Gumangan. 188913. he maintains that the orders andwrits he issued did not disregard the earlier ruling of this Court in G. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor ofthose occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued bypetitioner.et. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED.Held:The court ruled in affirmative. February 19. Order dated July 31.. PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction7 in NCIP Case No. SECTION 25 Basco v pagcor Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy – imperium in imperio On July 11. albeit issued by the same hearing officer). No. Masweng is guilty of indirect contempt under Section 7 ofRule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Order dated July 31. filed a petition for identification. BRAIN S. all in Busol Watershed. et al. HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITYMAYOR REINALDO A. et. As it is. SECTION 22 CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO. 180206 that Elvin Gumangan. only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by respondent. 2009.Issue:Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject temporaryrestraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal. Limbona vs. HELD: NO. has the power of control over Local governments. all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative. as well as fees.D. being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees. subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words. the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant. should it still be so minded. This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments. Consistent with the said invitation. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues. A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide. Congress. therefore. Mangelin (170 SCRA 786) Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook. Such taxes. fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution. Section 5. Further. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. Further still. After declaring the presence of a quorum. the City of Manila. Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes. (2) of P. Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao. as they are now constituted.” “and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.Basco et al contend that P. the Assembly is enjoined. as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress.” with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein Now. impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.” At the same time. Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook … . All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. PD 1869. its operation might be burdened.D. that Section 13 par.” In defiance of Petitioner’s advice. local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. Regional Autonomous Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. fees. The President exercises “general supervision” . it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable. whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle. charges or levies of whatever nature. and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide. what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? Held: Firstly. Otherwise. consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. income or otherwise. We therefore order reinstatement. ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR’s charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters. their legislative arm. under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). But if it is autonomous in the former category only. 1987 Cortes. debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts. or access to. of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction.” On the other hand. In that case. SECTION 28 Legaspi v.over them.” since in that event. the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one. we assume jurisdiction. sec. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must. The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. These constitutional provisions are self-executing. 1987 Constitution). as we noted.R. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. for policy development. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense. an autonomous government of the former class is. decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation. its acts are. Therefore. Article III. is made to discharge chiefly administrative services Hence. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. No. L-72119 May 29. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. on the other hand. (1987). A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. J.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of “autonomy. Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. the Sangguniang Pampook. According to a constitutional author. Hence.” In the second place. Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of. 1618. 6. as well as to government research data used as basis. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought.” He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. mandates that “[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. the right and the duty under Art. say. art. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. is autonomous in the latter sense. involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . subject to such stations as may be provided by law. Sec. III Sec. information of public concern. These government employees. transactions. Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records. in which the central government commits an act of selfimmolation. the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. that is. Its . CSC G. be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. of necessity. then. the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III. Issue: whether or not Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed must be granted on the basis of his right to information Held: Yes. it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature. in the first place. shall be afforded the citizen. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. or decisions. had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Presidential Decree No. Decentralization of power. the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII). X. However. and papers pertaining to official acts. The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. 15. and to documents. but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. and in the proper case. Issue: whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring the mandamus suit Held: Yes. the public. De Villa. Certainly. the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought. IX. In case of denial of access. part of the general “public” which possesses the right. G. by its very nature. by competitive examination. 7. and except as to positions which are policy determining. and therefore. 2. etc. But then. primarily confidential or highly technical. To safeguard the constitutional right. B. the duty to disclose the information of public concern. as in this case. second sentence). It does not open every door to any and all information. Thus. access to official records. being a citizen who. civil service eligibles. the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. 1989 (173 SCRA 211) DECISION . that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts. is a public right. III.. the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner’s right to know who are. if it is of public concern. it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. neither unusual nor unreasonable. or loss of. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. if actually possessed. and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. However. The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. as far as practicable. Petitioner’s request is. the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern. and who are not. through any citizen.. which. has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result. Hence. and. in every case. the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. papers. its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions. undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented. (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles. Under the Constitution.e. The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof.authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to. as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility.[2]). The names of those who pass the civil service examinations. therefore. Issue: whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern Held: The above question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. i. are “subject to limitations as may be provided by law” (Art. as already discussed. Sec. In the instant. Valmonte v. Sec. that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured. this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. The petitioner. there is nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility. are released to the public. No. such as those affecting national security. It follows that. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. And when. 83988 September 29. (Art. The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. public records may be avoided. and more importantly. or. (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest.R. For mandamus to lie in a given case. PADILLA. in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. the former should prevail. Zambrano. Chanco for respondents. economic and political development of the National Capital Region. AFP. Metro Manila. in the interest of public security. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. True. Gruba. No. In this connection. vs. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. In the alternative.R. at the cost of occasional inconvenience.: I. or simply looks into a vehicle.” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers. or flashes a light therein. Where. and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela. Ricardo Valmonte. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela. voting 13-2. MANUEL L. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. as abnormal times. G. the checkpoints during these abnormal times. BIDIN. at the very least. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. . CARMEN G. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted. Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD. 1991 MA.] NO.:p At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order. the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters. the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement. military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures. maintaining peace and order. AQUINO-SARMIENTO. petitioner. the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds. these do not constitute unreasonable search. J. II. respondents. Petitioners Atty. THE RULING [The Court. THE ISSUE Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures? III. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Francisco Ma. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. Metro Manila. with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. J. THE FACTS On 20 January 1987. 92541 November 13. when conducted within reasonable limits. who is a resident of Valenzuela. Araullo. DISMISSED the petition. not all of which are reported in media. But. for example. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. Chua Law Firm for petitioner. they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units. The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". On February 27. Valmonte. however. 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v. arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. respondent Morato opted to ignore it. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. among others. that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination. respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned. to gain access to the records sought to be examined. this petition anchored on the following: A. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo.. 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal. 10-89 (dated July 27. wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions." Petitioner informed the Board. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY. 1989. ARBITRARILY. petitioner. AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 1989.e. Hence. B. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22. respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss. Del Mar v. 170 SCRA 256 [1989]. cut or classified accordingly. If the error is rectified. which in turn. IN BAD FAITH. i. Bagatsing v. are purely and completely private and personal. Nonetheless. We disagree. Ramento. Malabanan v. the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato. He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. Ramirez. 106 Phil. However. the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. as chairman of MTRCB. Provincial Board. Petitioner argues. 1989) declaring as strictly confidential. Valencia. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent. the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided by law. comity and convenience. citing Aguilar v. Acting on the said request. Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. that respondent Board issued Resolution No. IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION. it was only much later. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film. herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). In that meeting. judicial intervention would then be unnecessary. their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such. The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations. In said meeting. No. 40 SCRA 210 [1971]. Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary. 38-42). a request therefor may be legally denied. 10-89 which declared as confidential. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS. that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board). . Philippine Veterans Administration.1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial. 88-1-25 (dated June 22. on the other hand. C. After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary.In February 1989. Veterans' Backpay Commission [1969]. 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). Thereafter. otherwise. respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment. Pascual v. de Tan v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. private and personal. 1 SERIES OF 1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION NO. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. on July 27. 129 SCRA 359 [1984]. private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions. 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. pp. the issue raised by petitioner. he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law (Rosales v. seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. 51 SCRA 340 [1973]. 74 SCRA 306. the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. 1989. 466 [1959]. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]). The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail. Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied) As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]). Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts. Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]): Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. (emphasis supplied) It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates. The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,supra). We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides: Sec 4. Decision. — The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose . . . For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee of five BOARD members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the second review session. This second review session shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from the date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration. Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety. The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television program in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an ad hoe committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein created. An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee. The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final. Implementing Rules and Regulations Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. — a) A proper application having been filed, the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant, within ten days from receipt of the completed application. The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture subject of the application. b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision giving him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons for such disapproval or denial and the classification considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the majority opinion may express his dissent in writing. c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant. Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. — Within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the SubCommittee referred to in the preceding section, the applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which shall consider the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a second preview of the film. The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding section. Sec 13. Reclassification. — An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the immediately preceeding two sections may reedit such film and apply anew with the Board for its review and reclassification. Sec 14. Appeal. — The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second review shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication. On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the same decree as follows: Sec. 5. Executive Officer. — The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties: (a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the BOARD; (b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD; (c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate personnel; and (d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the BOARD. It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or television programs. The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari — a delegated power cannot be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of delegation. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void. SEPARATION OF POWERS In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution). Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. “Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation. Angara vs. Electoral Commission Digested Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139 DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, RULING: In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA Posted by kaye lee on 5:21 PM G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation] FACTS: Nevertheless.there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which. thus presenting a question of policy. Completeness test . and on March 31. under the principle. like him. not what the law shall be. the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case." With this power. more or less. who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. L-38025 August 20. Therefore. 1979 Makasiar. 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales. and under Section 9 of Article XVII. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution. and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation.. or specifically on November 29. all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of." It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Casibang v. as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). 1972. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers. Issue: whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit Held: . 1973. the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department. the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution. herein petitioner.” He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. (3) rampant vote buying. by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival. Yu was proclaimed on November 9. 1973. . ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate. (2) terrorism. for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government. administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations. and two months thereafter. at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case. The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution. respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts. "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA). the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. is not subject to delegation.. such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. protected only those incumbents. In the meantime or on September 21. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: 1. 797. RULING: No. Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof. In short.. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. No. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. (4) open voting or balloting. who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. based on a Memorandum Circular No.. 2. J. the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. and even with such authorization. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI. and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation. Aquino G. Respondent Yu contended that “. placing the entire country under Martial Law. as the same has been entrusted or committed to. the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1973. on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation. the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. Facts: Respondent Remigio P. and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code. issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. 1972. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Thereafter or on October 10. Sufficient standard test .R. 1081. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. 2. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA. Article XVII of the New Constitution. ‘And there has been no amendment. have no right to hold the same. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest. although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the ‘term’ thereof. although the same is now indefinite. G. order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. v. try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended. 2. 208566. respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. No. 1081. after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases.” While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections. then certainly. Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases. 2 of Sec. nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who. November 19. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. namely. primarily intended for local projects. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. 3-A. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: the Congressional Pork Barrel and the Presidential Pork Barrel. albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9. commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the office.entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. the ‘term’ refers to the period. Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite. cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office. modified or repealed by the National Assembly. modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected. 1971 elections. 2013 Constitutional Law. although Section 9. and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard. it neither was. not legality. et al.” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9. they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision. enjoy their privileges and emoluments. HON. OCHOA JR. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.. Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution. for said General Order. BELGICA et al. 3. GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. General Order No. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution. and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance. legality or constitutionality of any decree. they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently. discretionary funds. a question of policy.No. returns. the term of office of the private respondents expired.” and “according to Section 8. Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution). Separation of powers. fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and. of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. including its members. as amended by General Order No. hence. the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. In other words. within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971. the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear. of a particular measure”. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements. in an election protest. are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government. it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected. Validity of the pork barrel system. try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners. 3. by virtue of the foregoing. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office. simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity. such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions. perform their functions. Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification. as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Indeed. Therefore. duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is . if in fact and in law. Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions. Hence. allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Congressional pork barrel. The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum. General Order No.’ Consequently. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance. made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect. issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. . A‘term’ of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear.R. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. tried and determined under the laws then in force. a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. to repeat. As a result. covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. Congressional pork barrel. Congressional pork barrel. Non-delegability of Legislative Power. In particular. in Bengzon v. The fundamental rule. held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Local autonomy. individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. allow. the Court. demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. which means to allot. Clearly. would. and hence. undoubtedly. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon). Essentially. if written into the law. The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article. including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle. the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators. in one form or another. respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether. allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910. in effect. Checks and Balances. an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. The Court finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of making equal the unequal. Accountability. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word appropriation. The lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. under the 2013 PDAF Article. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition. and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same. the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality. wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not. as such. assign. insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators. To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation. which creates a Special Fund comprised of all fees. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. puts it — the various operational aspects of budgeting.legislators have been. as categorically articulated in Abakada. who are vested with post-enactment authority. authorized to participate in — as Guingona. Congressional pork barrel. however. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon. the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and. Malampaya Fund and Presidential Social Fund are valid appropriations. revenues. be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. cannot be overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective. As the Constitution does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1). the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office.An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1). without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. To a certain extent. set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. except that it be made by law. violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles. Jr. and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources (a determinable amount) to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President‖ (a . In this regard. Towards this end. Presidential pork barrel. The fact that individual legislators are given postenactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing. leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. announce the legislative policy. all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869. ―[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax. While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist. All declarations of unconstititionality must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine. carried out. second. in fact. third. are legal appropriations under Section 29(1). Operative fact doctrine. Presidential pork barrel. Presidential Social Fund. There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The Presidential Social Fund may be used to first. known as supplementary rule-making. As they are severable. the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. That the subject phrase may be confined only to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government under the principle of ejusdem generis. or implemented by the delegate. cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited. the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and. the first indicated purpose. the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence. Verily. however. used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase. the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government. the Executive department has. referred to as contingent rulemaking. Financing priority infrastructure development projects an undue delegation.000. or 60% [. as amended by PD 1993.000. namely energy development programs of the government. finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second.] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150. the second test is called the sufficient standard test. The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities. As it reads. the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence. Malampaya Fund. The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement. Undue delegation. while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is early deducible from its text. as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines (also a specified public purpose). Singson . Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed. and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869. is belied by three (3) reasons: first. and.00 (also a determinable amount) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities. Presidential pork barrel. meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to.” Thus. which similarly sets aside.specified public purpose). as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. remains legally effective and subsisting. as amended by PD 1993. the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents. On the other hand. To be sufficient. the phrase ―and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority. the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR]. or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation. The first test is called the completeness test. resembling. In fine. allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. in effect. Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Daza v. we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers. under the Constitution.A. 9335 is constitutional. Briefly stated. (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC. 1988.ATTRITION ACT OF 2005. it refers to those questions which. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. R. malfeasance. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. What is involved here is the legality. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC. PURISIMA. the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation. No. 9335 FACTS: Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed their revenue targets. of the Constitution clearly provides: Section 1.A. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries” is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence. of a particular measure. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. Issue: whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Held: No. On December 5. 1989 Cruz. ISSUE: Is R. the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Facts: The House of Representatives. etc. That RA No. thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. J. the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters. 9335 constitutional? HELD: YES. even the political question. in legal parlance. what it means in ordinary parlance.G. except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR. namely. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. a question of policy. Section 1. The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. 86344 December 21. NO. (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.R. R. No. we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. In other words. On the basis of this development. the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR . No. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS. the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. in proper cases. abuses. not the wisdom. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s implementing rules. The term political question connotes. However.A. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction. Article VII. Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature. not legality. 1991 CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. List B would contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law and includes small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$500. In effect. No.formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF. J. and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I. THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS. respondents. if an investment by a non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%. Abraham C. Kintanar and Asuncion Law Firm for PABMA. Paterno CRUZ. 32. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan). 50. The said section makes certain that "the SEC or BTRCP. not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country. The petitioner also attacks Section 9 because if a Philippine national believes that an area of investment should be included in list C. under Article 47 thereof. PATERNO and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BATTERY MANUFACTURERS. it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list. Demaree J." Otherwise. La Vina for petitioner. This is well explained by the fact that prior to the effectivity of RA 7042. The petitioner attacks List A as not a true negative list in the strict sense of the term. and THE BUREAU OF TRADE REGULATION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION.:p The petitioner challenges RA 7042 on the ground that it defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. the petitioner claims that the transitory provisions of RA 7042.000. etc." The category of "existing enterprises" should be qualified by the term "Filipino. V. All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single proprietorship. subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List. It would merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws. petitioner. 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code. Senator VICENTE T. intervenors. shall not impose any limitations on the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in this Act. In his Comment. Section 7 provides that "non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof. Raval and Jhosep Y. List C would protect existing foreign enterprises as well. prior authority from the BOI was required. . NEDA.B. It is alleged that Articles 2. It is also argued that by repealing Articles 49. Specifically.R. Finally. On the other hand. Padilla. The system of negative list abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. "small to medium" are reserved to Philippine nationals. vs.00. Lopez for Sen. 226). in effect Filipinos are not encouraged to go big. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met. the Solicitor General counters that the phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone." Furthermore. as the case may be. THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Jimenez. invest in: (1) any enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives). DELEGATION OF POWERS G. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. he argues that under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval. RA No. 100883 December 2. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines. provided that a non-Philippine national could." The provision for a Foreign Investment Negative List in Section 8 does not satisfy the constitutional mandate for the government to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments. DBM. such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national economy. & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years. He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government. without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI).) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself. List C would merely contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further foreign investments. In other words. to the extent that the total investment of the non-Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital. that the petitioner. Concluding. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer. Much valuable time would have been saved in the presentation of a leaner. Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations. However. 913. it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5. The fact that List B contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. To insist otherwise would be tantamount to saying that those laws are useless and should therefore be erased from the statute books. The requisite proof and public hearing under Section 9 are. sounds too much like speechifying that is better addressed to a political audience than to a court of justice. as just remarked. This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. we agree that there is at this point no actual case or controversy. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines. and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. during the transitory period. He also suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question. not conjectural or anticipatory. He discusses at length the different regulatory requirements for doing business in the Philippines and explains the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy.With the effectivity of RA 7042. Senator Vicente T. we find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it. Coming first to the procedural objections to the petition. We hold. In fact." But this does not mean that the Act is shifting the burden of proof to Filipino enterprises while deregulating foreign investments at the same time. The Solicitor General adds that Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C." The approval by the BOI and the other regulatory requirements set forth in the aforementioned articles were purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. Regarding the alleged elimination of certain rules in the Code. "SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprises. The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws (which would be used as a basis for List A) regulate or limit the extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for Filipinos." Allowed to intervene. this should not be construed as a scheme to discourage Filipino enterprises from going into big enterprises. a certain layer of bureaucracy has been removed. particularly the Filipino partners therein. the applicable laws are EO No. Paterno. can reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant. however. and particularly as a member of the House of Representatives. with the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15. the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. this provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C. comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. hence. necessary to prevent detriment to the economy and the consumers. The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy. the scheme is for foreign investments to supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises. is now the initial step to be taken by foreign investors. On the contrary. as the case may be. To doubt is to sustain. 133 in conjunction with EO No. Furthermore. The SEC has PD 902-A. Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest. The petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the consumers. consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers. not to say even a necessity to resolve it. as amended. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination. A considerable portion of the petition. Pertinent provisions of these laws are contained in the SEC Licensing Procedure of Foreign Corporations. Moreover. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. he argues that the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List is not imaginary. registration with the SEC or BTRCP. specifically. as a citizen and taxpayer. the Solicitor General stresses that Section 16 of the provides that only "Articles forty-four (44) to fifty-six (56) Book II of EO No. and this is also true of the reply (if not more so). as well as the provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos. Furthermore. 226 are repealed. On the merits. a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. prematurely. Otherwise.** raises substantially the same points stressed by the Solicitor General in defense of the Act and amplifies the argument that the Act does not deregulate foreign investments to the disadvantage of the Filipino entrepreneur. and BP 68 for its governing laws. Activities which do not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included in list C so as to allow healthy competition. It channels efforts at promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital. 1 The court has carefully gone over the petition and wryly observes that it could have been pruned and limited to the strictly legal principles involved in the interest of a speedier disposition of the case. (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity. the areas of investments not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined. For BTRCP. strictly legal tract. On the contrary. to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy. Foreign corporations already doing business in the Philippines under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law. foreign investors must first comply with certain requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines. . (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party. therefore. particularly because of the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect. the case-to-case authorization by BOI. 2 We will also hold that the constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact. of the explanation given by the Solicitor General and of the Intervenor in their respective Comments. with no . A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. The Court is not a political arena." 5 and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo. 4 Justice Laurel made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom. However. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. His objections to the law are better heard by his colleagues in the Congress of the Philippines. As Cooley observed: "Debatable questions are for the legislature to decide. Electoral Commission. in the fashion he suggests. ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that “only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer” may the probation system be applied. considering that they can be killed anywhere. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional. we are satisfied that the Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. After considering the merits of the case. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. without any pronouncement as to costs. we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The IPO denied the application. The provisions on nationalism are cited. in effect. Further.This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon." And fittingly so for in the exercise of judicial power. but this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule. His painstaking study and analysis of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 reveals not only his nationalistic fervor but also an impressive grasp of this complex subject. Iloilo for the violation of E.In the case at bar." 6 We find. is granting freedom. however. Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. Ynot v IAC Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST Facts On January 13. the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation. as in pardon. if they so please. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting issues. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act. Issue: Is E. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. justice or expediency of legislation. People v vera Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. While awaiting new trial. the petition is DISMISSED. WHEREFORE. But his views are expressed in the wrong forum. however. Economic dependency is deplored. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. The challenged section of Act No. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.O. we may now also "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 3 In Angara v. we hold that the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner. under the expanded concept of the political question. It is true that. The petitioner is commended for his high civic spirit and his zeal in the protection of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign competition. 626-A. who have the power to rewrite it. the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. 1984. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.O. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. It is so ordered. Due process is invoked. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. the law is challenged on broad constitutional principles and the proposition that the Filipino investor is unduly discriminated against in his own land. In the light. Further. that irregularity does not exist in the case at bar. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. On the contrary. 11 Act No. 626-A unconstitutional? Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. 52.e. were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12. 4224 and MECS Order no. No. Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. and the securing of the health and safety of the general community. the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander. Petitioner.O. MECS Order No. The Facts . July 31. is also well recognized.R. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. established a uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility. unreasonable and inequitable requirement Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. Thus. high standards in our professional schools in general. Tablarin vs. issued by the then Minister of Education. retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. and the difficulties of maintaining. 52. INC. are widely known. 4224 and MECS Order no. 626-A unconstitutional. Culture and Sports. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea). MECS Order No. legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinationshave long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair. The need to maintain. has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 1985. No. 4224 and 5946.. selectivity consisting. 165299 December 18. The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe anadmission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. thus denying due process. 1985..000. Similarly.: The Case This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. among other things. articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools. 75238. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard.A. Issue: Whether or not Sec.R. the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i. SP No. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.00. In the instant case. 5(a) and (f) of R. 78164.Republic Act 2382 as amended by R. 2009 PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY. J. by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. s.A. The Supreme Court found E. the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession. 1987] Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. Obviously. on the other hand. Gutierrez [G. s. in the current state of our social and economic development. known as the Medical Act of 1959 created. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand. 5(a) and (f) of R. Respondent." G. convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment. Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) tomedical school from the BME. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission. among others. BME from enforcing Sec. and medical schools in particular. However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. The executive act defined the prohibition.less difficulty in one province than in another.A. Due process was not properly observed. DECISION CARPIO. which was carried out forthright. 5 (a).R. vs. of educ. the date LLDA received the request for re-sampling.5 The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS). (signed) CALIXTO R.3 On 22 June 2001. Brgy.000. Paraiso Quezon City Subject: Notice of Violation PH-01-10-303 Gentlemen: This refers to the findings of the inspection and result of laboratory analysis of the wastewater collected from your firm last 5 September 2001. Meanwhile.1avvphil On 16 September 2002. It was reported that petitioner’s wastewater treatment facility was under construction. a notice of violation was issued against the respondent after it was established that its discharge was pollutive.13 the pertinent portion of which reads: Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty be set aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September 2001. On 5 September 2001.8 On 1 March 2002. a Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Quezon City. Subsequently. and Discharge Permit from LLDA. petitioner prayed that the Notice of Violation dated 30 October 2001 be set aside and the penalty and fine imposed be reckoned from the date of actual hearing on 15 April 2002. INC. Furthermore. Very truly yours. 114 Roosevelt Avenue. During the public hearing on 30 April 2002. Sample of respondent’s effluent was collected on 5 September 2001 and the results of laboratory analysis confirmed the quality thereof. on 15 April 2002. the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. is hereby ordered to pay a penalty of One Thousand Pesos (P1. pursuant to Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. Inc. LLDA issued an Order to Pay. On 6 June 2001. The laboratory results11 of the wastewater sampling finally showed compliance with the effluent standard in all parameters.000. BOD. Oil/Grease and Color. AC/PO-ESI. The fact that the subsequent re-sampling reported compliance with the effluent standard . In its position paper12dated 25 August 2002. Evaluation of the results of laboratory analysis showed that your plant’s effluent failed to conform with the 1990 Revised Effluent Standard for Inland Water Class "C" specifically in terms of TSS. the Investigation Report4 stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance.6 Consequently. within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter. you are hereby directed to submit corrective measures to abate/control the water pollution caused by your firm. Presidential Decree No.Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry. INC. another wastewater sampling was conducted on 25 April 2002 but the results10 still failed to conform with the effluent standards in terms of Oil/Grease Concentration. According to LLDA. the date of inspection until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater and a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5.00) per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from 5 September 2001. LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation7dated 30 October 2001 which states: THE GENERAL MANAGER PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY. and Oil/Grease Concentration. Petitioner requested for another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002. Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5.00) per year for operating without the necessary clearance/permits from the Authority. Furthermore. the penalty should be reckoned from 5 September 2001. PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY. (Please see attached laboratory analysis) In view thereof. 984.000. to 17 May 2002. 984. Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD). Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD). CATAQUIZ General Manager Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. This Public Hearing Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. The mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD No. Petitioner manifested that its wastewater discharge was not on a daily basis. BOD. another public hearing was held to discuss the dismissal of the water pollution case and the payment of the accumulated daily penalty. the date of initial sampling. On 9 August 2002. a compliance monitoring was conducted and the result of the laboratory analysis9 still showed non-compliance with effluent standards in terms of TSS. Thus. LLDA informed petitioner of its continuous non-compliance with the effluent standards. It is respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.The authority shall have the following powers and functions: xxx (d) Make. excluding Saturdays and Sundays as well as legal holidays from 5 September 2001 to 17 May 2002. decision or regulation of the Commission for the control or abatement of pollution shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos per day for every day during which such violation or default continues. . The Court of Appeals denied the petition. however. the power to impose administrative fines in pollution abatement cases was expressly granted under Section 9 of P. The 5 June 2002 sampling confirmed that respondent’s effluent already complied with the standard showing that its water pollution has ceased. it must resort to other venue for the appropriate remedy. 813. which granted the LLDA additional powers and functions. Inc. thus: "Section 9. 984 to the now defunct National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC)." In addition. WHEREFORE. . the express grant of power to impose administrative fines as couched in the language of P. for a total of one hundred seventy-two (172) days.(a) Any person found violating or failing to comply with any order. viz: "Section 4. deterioration and pollution. How could it effectively perform its role if in every act of violation. Additional Powers and Functions.A. the delegation of authority to the agency is liberally construed. and the Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to impose the fine after due notice and hearing. Marcos promulgated P.D. Respondent passed the standard because it already implemented remedial measures to abate the water pollution.D." Former President Ferdinand E. and the preservation of undue ecological disturbances. is hereby ordered to pay the accumulated daily penalty amounting to ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND (PhP172. The Court of Appeals’ Ruling The Court of Appeals held that LLDA has the power to impose fines. 5 September 2001. Respondent did not submit any proof of its actual operation hence. xxx (i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Executive order.00) PESOS within fifteen(15) days from receipt hereof as a condition sine qua non for the dismissal of the above-captioned case. 927.O. Finally. It is therefore but just and proper that the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial sampling. 984 was not reproduced in E. but also those implied. and carrying out the development of the Laguna Lake Region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control. premises considered. Penalties. 4850 with the end view of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces. Hence. 927 to clothe LLDA not only with the express powers granted to it. rules and regulations. alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. should be given some measures of flexibility in its operations in order not to hamper it unduly in the fulfillment of its objectives.does not negate the 5 September 2001 initial sampling.D. this petition. the penalty shall be computed for five (5) working days per week. alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and time within which such continuance must be accomplished.000. to 17 May 2002. The LLDA. citing adherence of other courts to the principle that the authority given to an agency should be liberally construed in order to permit the agency to carry out its statutory responsibilities. incidental and necessary for the exercise of its express powers can be easily discerned from the grant of the general power to "exercise (such) powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities. it can be logically implied from LLDA’s authority to exercise the power to "make. preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems. which the LLDA denied in its Order15 dated 27 November 2002.O. Former President Marcos further issued E. To correct deficiencies and clarify ambiguities that "impede the accomplishment of the Authorities’ goal. This is especially true where the agency is concerned with protecting the public health and welfare. to enable the LLDA to effectively perform its role. because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal with it? 16 (Emphasis in the original) The Issues .O. SO ORDERED. the clear intendment of E. as an agency implementing pollution laws. the date the request for re-sampling was received by the Authority." Nonetheless. 927.14 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. thus: Concededly." Indeed." This finds support in the wealth of authorities in American Jurisprudence. as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. it may be well to recall that the LLDA was created under R. respondent Pacific steam Laundry. 984 (PD 984)19 created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. Pasay. paragraphs (e). except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works or changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single residential building provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. and (p) of PD 984 referred to above states: SEC. which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC). 192 (EO 192). f. two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary. is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. and p of P. hospitals. under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable. or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. 6. 4850 (RA 4850)20 to manage and develop the Laguna Lake region. created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. (g) Issue. Pollution Adjudication Board. which reorganized the DENR. The Board shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman. The Commission may impose reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal of all permits herein required.18 We disagree with petitioner. may require subdivisions. xxx (j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations. Section 19 of EO 192 provides: SEC. 19. Quezon and Caloocan. public buildings and other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central sewerage system and sewage treatment works. and three (3) others to be designated by the Secretary as members. The Environmental Management Bureau shall serve as the Secretariat of the Board. condominium. (Emphasis supplied) Section 6. (j). j. On the other hand.D. comprising of the provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo. for the discharge of sewage. – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: xxx (e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing. The Board shall assume the powers and functions of the Commission/Commissioners of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984. Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984? 2. by rules and regulations. or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided. Presidential Decree No. Power of LLDA to Impose Fines Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions. the Commission. k. the Director of Environmental Management. Manila.Petitioner raises two issues: 1. 984. These powers and functions may be delegated to the regional officers of the Department in accordance with rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board. renew. (k). g. (f). for the prevention and abatement of pollution. (f) Make. LLDA is a special agency created under Republic Act No. Powers and Functions. RA . or deny permits. industrial waste. (g). Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative powers?17 The Ruling of the Court We find the petition without merit. (k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission. xxx (p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Decree. EO 192. particularly with respect to Section 6 letters e. however. – There is hereby created a Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. hospitals. condominiums. and promulgate rules and regulations governing the Procedures of the Authority with respect to hearings. preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems. f) After due notice and hearing. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1 . thus: SECTION 4. 813 (PD 813). the development authorities concerned may. even PD 984 authorizes the LLDA to undertake pollution control activities within LLDA’s development area. c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing. the filing of reports. i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Executive Order. manufacturing processing or commercial use without doing damage. industrial waste. undertake the pollution control activities themselves. (2) issue. such as the LLDA Charter. alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. however. renew or deny permits. Section 10 of PD 984 provides: SEC.4850. deterioration and pollution. – The Commission [NPCC] shall have no jurisdiction over waterworks or sewage system operated by the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System. for the discharge of sewage. for the purpose of inspecting and investigating conditions relating to pollution or possible or imminent pollution. with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control. Thus. or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided. the Commission shall consult with the authorities charged with the planning and execution of such projects to ensure that their pollution control standards comply with those of the Commission. designs. except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works or changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single residential building provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. and other data for sewage works and industrial waste disposal system. 10. by rules and regulations. inspect the construction and maintenance of sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems for compliance to plans. the issuance of permits.25 the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board. prescribe. alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. Once minimum pollution standards are established and agreed upon. g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decision of the Authority. plans. or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system. Both the Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA are empowered. specifications.24 the scope of authority of LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to the Laguna Lake region as defined by RA 4850. such as the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority and the Laguna Lake Development Authority. and other rules and regulations for the proper implementation and enforcement of this Executive Order. h) Authorize its representative to enter at all reasonable times any property of the public dominion and private property devoted to industrial. except where a special law. under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable. in Laguna Lake Development Authority v. e) Issue. Indeed. as amended by Presidential Decree No. public buildings and other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central sewerage system and sewage treatment works. Court of Appeals. but the rules and regulations issued by the Commission for the protection and prevention of pollution under the authority herein granted shall supersede and prevail over any rules or regulations as may heretofore have been issued by other government agencies or instrumentalities on the same subject. to: (1) make. (Emphasis supplied) A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Jurisdiction. and (3) exercise such powers and perform such other functions necessary to carry out their duties and responsibilities. may require subdivisions. renew. and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances. licensing and enforcement.23 LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring. suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.21mandates LLDA to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region. the Authority may also revoke. The Authority [LLDA] shall have the following powers and functions: a) Issue standards. as amended. The difference is that while Section 19 of EO 192 vested the Pollution Adjudication Board with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general. d) Make. that the Authority. provides for another forum. In case of development projects involving specific human settlement sites or integrated regional or subregional projects. industrial waste. for the prevention and abatement of pollution. by mutual agreement and prior consultation with the Commission. b) Adopt. or deny permits for the prevention and abatement of pollution. 927 (EO 927).22 Under Executive Order No. The Authority may impose reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal of all permits herein required. Additional Powers and Functions. for the discharge of sewage. rules and regulations to govern the approval of plans and specifications for sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems and the issuance of permits in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order. among others. holding that under Section 4-A of RA 4850. and in addition such person may be required or enjoined from continuing such violation as hereinafter provided. and its Director is one of the members of the Pollution Adjudication Board. drain. The National Environmental Protection Council (NEPC). Court of Appeals. LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent standards. .000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984: SEC. Contrary to petitioner’s contention. reads: SEC. run. The P1.062. private or public. or by both fine and imprisonment. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. The Court ruled that LLDA. 16. It was only after the investigation result showing petitioner’s failure to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner. In this case.R. 75238. drain.000 representing penalty for pollutive wastewater discharge. Environmental Management Bureau. – No person shall throw. SP No. Under Section 4(h) of EO 927. run. this does not preclude LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty." In the same manner. we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities. as amended. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards or from such other wrongful act or omission of a person. Prohibitions. as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. or otherwise dispose into any of the water. requiring petitioner therein to pay a fine of P1. Although petitioner in that case did not challenge LLDA’s authority to impose fine. air and/or land resources of the Philippines. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power Petitioner contends that if LLDA is deemed to have implied power to impose penalties. – There is hereby created an Environmental Management Bureau. LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. as amended. – x x x (b) Any person who shall violate any of the previous provisions of Section Eight of this Decree or its implementing rules and regulations. punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control and management. subject to Section 19 hereof. Clearly. x x x (Emphasis supplied) The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of the Pollution Adjudication Board. the Environmental Management Bureau assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC except with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. by endorsing to LLDA the pollution complaint against petitioner. Although the Pollution Adjudication Board assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater. there are adequate statutory limitations on LLDA’s power to impose fines which obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise of such power.26the Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals which sustained LLDA’s Order. xxx SEC 9. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Clearly.27 the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by law. WHEREFORE. we DENY the petition." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. in the recent case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. shall be liable to a penalty of not to exceed one thousand pesos each day during which the violation continues. LLDA then imposed upon petitioner a penalty of P1. 8. We do not agree. or any Order or Decision of the Commission. the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) and the Environmental Center of the Philippines (ECP). then LLDA will have unfettered discretion to determine for itself the penalties it may impose. Penalties. allow to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof. suffer to be thrown. has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order. holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. the DENR’s Environmental Management Bureau endorsed to LLDA the pollution complaint against petitioner.In this case. the Court acknowledged the power of LLDA to impose fines. in the exercise of its express powers under its charter. Section 4-A of RA 4850. LLDA’s power to impose fines is not unrestricted. juridical or otherwise. or cause. 4-A. or by imprisonment of from two years to six years. Under Section 16 of EO 192. Laguna Lake Development Authority. are hereby abolished and their powers and functions are hereby integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau in accordance with Section 24(c) hereof. which will amount to undue delegation of legislative power. permit. Thus. thus: SEC. the Environmental Management Bureau deferred to LLDA’s jurisdiction over the pollution complaint against petitioner. Section 3. municipal. at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters. municipalities and barangays. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. the Constitution. resolution or ordinance. shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. namely: a. Section 4. passed by Congress. approve or reject. Section 5. or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories. namely: c. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country. City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay. . Definition of Terms. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law.1." Section 2. city. of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. laws. Who may exercise. Requirements. enact. or part thereof. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum. (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 1 Republic Act No. in whole or in part. a. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. hereinafter referred to as the Commission. (g) "Local government units" refers to provinces. and Sangguniang Nayon. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation. 6735 August 4.2. There are three (3) systems of initiative. of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.3. It may be of two classes. cities. or barangay law. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law. provincial. Statement of Policy. — General Provisions Section 1.2.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.SO ORDERED. Sangguniang Bayan. autonomous regions. (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. as the case may be. municipalities and barangays. provinces. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional. and c. recognized and guaranteed. (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters. (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. ordinances. the following terms shall mean: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. 1989 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: I. Sangguniang Panlungsod. cities. — For purposes of this Act. Title. and a. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose. resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections. Section 10. approval. the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast. however. and c. II. If. Section 9. However.5. upon determining the sufficiency of the petition. the reason or reasons therefor. of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite. Section 7. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. the national law proposed for enactment.4. c. and (b) Statutes involving emergency measures. the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.6. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters. or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. c.(c) The petition shall state the following: c. c. as the case may be. the Commission shall. approval. (f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region. c. as certified by the Commission. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. approved or rejected. if the majority vote is not obtained.1. (d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law. the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment. the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution. Section 6. Special Registration. the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast. as certified to by the Commission.2. Verification of Signatures. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters.3. province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city. Provided. (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality. (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. — National Initiative and Referendum SECTION 8. . contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate. of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. If. Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition. amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. the proposition. Prohibited Measures. amended or repealed. or amendment. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions. from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. Appeal. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast.Section 11. the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented. (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved. and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. or his designated representative. sixty (60) days in case of municipalities. through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities. (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation. The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee. Section 16. Effectivity of Local Propositions. Section 12. those against such action may. as defined by law. (c) If at any time before the initiative is held.000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions. if they so desire. (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar. as the case may be. provinces. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed. The initiative shall then be held on the date set. the initiative shall be cancelled. one hundred (100) in case of municipalities. the proposition is considered defeated. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided. proposing the adoption. ordinance or resolution. the Commission on Elections. the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months. in case of autonomous regions. sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition. III. repeal. any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region. giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities. may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection. . Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. If it fails to obtain said number of votes. The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities. by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom. it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. Local Referendum. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted. Indirect Initiative. cities. respectively. apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. however. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof. and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit. and other legislative bodies. may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives. one thousand (1. modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided. Section 17. However. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2. as provided in subsection (g) hereof.000) in case of provinces and cities. Section 14. enactment. and fifty (50) in case of barangays. Section 15. the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative. (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained. and may be amended. — Local Initiative and Referendum SECTION 13. The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. of any law. that in case of barangays. in the presence of a representative of the proponent. — Any duly accredited people's organization. modified or amended. (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission. IV. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws. regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Separability Clause. the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. Towards this end. youth. urban poor. or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. Declaration of part y. (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national. Section 23. (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. However. Title. sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which. Section 20. veterans. (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. Any organized group of persons may register as a party. Rules and Regulations. women. Definition of Terms. regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional. free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party. such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform. and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. organization. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code.Section 18. sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national. AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR Section 1. organization. Section 3. by-laws. such party. attaching thereto its constitution. . as the most immediate means of securing their adoption. organizations and parties. Section 5. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. organization or coalition for purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national." Section 2. fisherfolk. shall apply to all initiatives and referenda. platform or program of government. Section 21. elderly. indigenous cultural communities. Authority of Courts. regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). the State shall develop and guarantee a full. to become members of the House of Representatives. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure. employment. peasant. Section 4. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. Any party. Thereafter. 7941 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. not later than ninety (90) days before the election. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Effectivity. and professionals. regional. handicapped. — Final Provisions SECTION 19. or coalition shall file with the Commission. a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system. overseas workers. and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations. which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors. That the sectors shall include labor. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. list of officers. interests or concerns. Registration. Section 22. SECTION 5 REPUBLIC ACT No. Appropriations. coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election. (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws. organization. organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote. or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided. (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal. a registered voter. organized for religious purposes. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Section 11. . Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district. prepare a certified list of national. from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Section 7. foundation. The COMELEC shall. or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided. and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. a vote for the party. or sectoral parties. Section 10. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. organizations. organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The COMELEC may. a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. organizations. he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. refuse or cancel. after due notice and hearing. the registration of any national. and the second. not less than five (5). That each party. Manner of Voting. (3) It is a foreign party or organization. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list. organizations. regional or sectoral party. able to read and write. motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party. whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition. finally. Section 6. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. Section 8. sectoral organization. Certified List of Registered Parties. That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998. Each registered party. finally. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. regional. (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year. (b) The parties. rules or regulations relating to elections. or withdraws in writing his nomination. after due notice and hearing. That a vote cast for a party. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. not later than sixty (60) days before election. Section 9. and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election. the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. For purposes of the May 1998 elections.The COMELEC shall. The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system. the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties. foreign political party. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. organization or association. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies. Number of Party-List Representatives. organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names. organization. That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided. In case of a nominee of the youth sector. (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government. organization. Section 13. Section 18. 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives. Change of Affiliation. Effect. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong. TOBIAS. organization. the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party. Section 17. people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. decrees. Repealing Clause. or parts thereof. Separability Clause. Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule". or coalitions on a nationwide basis. Issues: WON RA 7675 is in: 1. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives. Rules and Regulations. ABALOS. the party. ET AL. Violation of Article VI. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives. 2011 342 SCRA 247. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties. Section 22. the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system. COMELEC. Section 15. vs. Section 21. If the list is exhausted. Section 20. Vacancy. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act. Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional. Term of Office. That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election. In view of the foregoing facts. Violation of Article VI. or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 14. the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. Section 16. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties. All laws. Effectivity. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party. 20% Allocation) FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5. Appropriations. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject. rules and regulations. Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and . No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. organizations. 2. the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. ROBERT V. who shall serve for the unexpired term. Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. With a plebiscite held on April 10. Starting 1995. the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress. or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list. he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin. digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9. Section 19. organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.Section 12. Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district. or coalition. organizations. unless otherwise provided by law. executive orders. October 6. BENJAMIN S. Rights of Party-List Representatives. ET AL." As to Article VI Sec 5(1). The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. 1994. however. assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No." Held: WHEREFORE. In its Resolution dated May 9. 2001. the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a nonextendible period of five days from notice. is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No. no winning party. also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. but subsequently reset it to May 3. computed as follows: 208 ——– x . Meanwhile. the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers.80 The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. 2001. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941). together with the respondent parties.RA 7941. 2001. June 26. 2001. the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it. 147613. directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15.80 representatives This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections. the number of party-list seats would be 52.x . docketed as GR No. will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. 2001.” Furthermore. as follows: No. On April 18. it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. of district representatives ———————————.R. speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law? 2. 2001. On the other hand." It also asked. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16. It however deemed it necessary to require parties. Commissioner Ralph C. It also set the date for hearing on April 26. the Court directed the parties to address the following issues: 1. Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14. 2001. The same declared therein a policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. 4. This Petition. as may be provided by law. 3785. 3785. To illustrate. On April 17. 2001. was mandatory. docketed as GR No. 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended. this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC. who shall comprise “twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition. 2001. 2001. 3. In its Resolution dated April 17. 147589. as an alternative. ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory. avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives. The problematic question.” We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula. 147589. wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times. organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. During the hearing. More specifically. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. Facts: On April 10. 3785. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. but barred the proclamation of any winner therein. however. Note: Clearly. is there no other plain. as provided under the Constitution. that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. No. 2001. and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17.” Bagong Bayani Labor Party v COMELEC G. The COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from . the COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. 2001. dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC.20 = 52 . It added that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections. Public Respondent. 2001. considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections. of party-list . HELD: No. until further orders of the Court. On April 11.20 = No. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. Issues: During the hearing on May 17. Indeed. to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies. it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented. The COMELEC. directing the COMELEC "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election. it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited. under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court. In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion When a lower court." For its part. peasant. that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action. as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. speedy and adequate remedy. the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope. principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which.notice hereof. or rules. deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine. because the party-list election is national in scope." In view of the participation of political parties In its Petition. Concurrently. the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district. Indeed." Finally. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. urban poor. . that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty. however. youth. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. Indeed. and professionals. handicapped. In any event. indigenous cultural communities. the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc. . women. therefore. "where the issue raised is one purely of law. through the Office of the Solicitor General." In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean. such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. It has been held that certiorari is available. insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. however. did not act on that Petition. this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system. regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office." In the end. Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court. for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives. hence. "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group. Moreover. 2001. like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. violates or ignores the Constitution or the law. No pronouncement as to costs. it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles. has made its position on the matter quite clear. SO ORDERED.. Moreover. not to reinvent or second-guess it. and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections. and their meaning is ascertained by reference to. Filipino-style. In view of the Courts assistance The Court. or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. precepts. where public interest is involved. it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. the function of all judicial and quasijudicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it. The requisite character of these parties or organizationsmust be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system. no motion for reconsideration was possible. this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain. Thus. The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. and in case of urgency. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. But a resolution may just be a formality because the COMELEC. fisherfolk. "labor. In view of the pendency of the elections. doctrines." More to the point. notwithstanding the presence of other remedies. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with. after summary evidentiary . it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d). as the most immediate means of securing their adoption. destitution and infirmity. organizations and parties. the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency. In view of OSG contention Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy. overseas workers. the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. veterans. because representation is easy to claim and to feign. Rather. hence. the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national." Finally." Indeed." However. Hence. its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties. . it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law. the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate. the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system. In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785 Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Rather. therefore." For its part. It is ironic. qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. namely. for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. to this date. shall remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition. elderly. which this Court must urgently resolve. but genuine power. when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution. the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. The Resolution of this Court dated May 9. regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof. the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors. even if a candidate garners 49. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. urban poor. it is not its only purpose. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. (2) No. indigenous cultural communities. indigenous cultural communities. COMELEC . women. 2009 ] Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. the handicapped. veterans. On the other hand. the Court decided tocontinue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections. BANAT vs. the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning.e. As already explained. Party list representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. Thus. However. peasants. but they are not limited to them. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. In sum.9% of the votes. can major political parties participate in the party-list elections? Held: (1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in theConstitution. a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor. and youth sectors. (In this sense. 1975.” (3) No. The Constitution. There would have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical. In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza. Sec 5 of Art VI. sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.") Under the party-list system. On the contrary. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling. These groups can possibly include other sectors. for whom the party-list system was intended. labor. the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the-broadest possible representation of party. representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives. J. whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented. in paragraph 1. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5. under the party-list system. i.) Indeed. We rule that.. the two systems of representation are not identical. Thus. to assist the COMELEC in its work. In this light. the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines. the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc. in computing the allocation of additional seats. urban poor. neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not. overseas workers.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. and youth sectors. VI. the "third or fourth placers" in district elections. indigenous cultural communities. a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. the elderly. and professionals. However. left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that Marcos . the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. peasant. these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented. a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some Presidential Decrees. women. the youth. women. peasant. directly or indirectly. refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the House. party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. urban poor. Issues: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2). They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors. On the other hand. §5(2). fisherfolk. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2). in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district. culled from the law and the Constitution. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC. Under Art. and declaredfurther in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. GR 17927 [ April 21. Aquino v comelec On January 21. by vote of 8-7. these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. he gets no seat.hearings. if he so desires. 1081 issued on September 22. city. that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. municipalities. the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. While his term of office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30. or barangay may be created. there must be a plebiscite in the political . the President. such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. petitioners do not have the personality to file suit. and all government authority emanates . that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated. 1972 by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. Pursuant to this law. decrees and orders. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. in whom “sovereignty resides . as this was the decision of the people. abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. the SC affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. She contended that under the Constitution.” it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. divided. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. upon creation of a province (S. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo warranto petition. Kabunsuan being created. do not claim such right to the office and not one of them is the incumbent Solicitor General. . The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10. This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings. . the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections. 1973. For the purposes of the 2007 elections. Thus. Second. The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines. municipality. however. HELD: First of. Maguindanao has two legislative districts.. Kabunsuan). No province. municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. Under the (1973) Constitution. First. ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government. . The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. city. the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17. 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law. 1973. Third. by the general referendum of July 27-28. which provides: Sec. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Sema v comelec Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population Requirement The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Article X of the Constitution. and as aforestated. the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces. On the issue at bar. merged. cities and barangays. The petitioners. COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any). can continue in office beyond 1973. the creation of any of the four local government units province. . Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1stdistrict). Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). Later. 10.does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations. that the question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. the appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the courts. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. once created. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code. 1995 – Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. However. Note further that in order to have a legislative district. Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said Congressional election. ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win. and city and municipal councils. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter. 1995 – COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos‘ proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. The instances (i. SECTION 6 Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 Facts: March 8. 1995 – COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejo‘s petition for disqualification meritorious. May 11. filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k. . On the other hand. ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district.e. under its plenary legislative powers. and that a province. Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction. her choice of domicle was Tacloban. March 23. there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. Leyte. In fact. Yes. incumbent of and candidate for the same position. April 24. and as such. Marcos‘ corrected certificate of candidacy void. At most. of the first district of Leyte. 1995 – In a supplemental petitition. Article X of the Constitution. 1995 – COMELEC en banc denied Marcos‘ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24. 1995 – Montejo. However. Hence. 1995 – Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELEC‘s head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an ―honest misrepresentation‖ and that she has always ―maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement. it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. should have at least one representative in the HOR. The confusion of the ―honest mistake‖ made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. March 29. It is the husband‘s right to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. May 7. Congress has delegated to provincial boards. and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10. May 25. not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution‘s residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framer‘s of the constitution)2. After the death of her husband. Thus. It is the fact if residence. and thus candidate. subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. When she got married to the late dictator. the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wife‘s domicile of origin. Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot. she was required to change residences and apply for voter‘s registration in these cited locations. and her original certificate cancelled.units affected. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage. (3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioner‘s qualifications after the elections. 3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family.(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. observe mutual respect and fidelity. Padilla. 1995 Agapito A. 78 of B. (Dissenting): A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Jr. 881. it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. Francisco. returns. J. The death of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Marcos‘ domicile of origin was Tacloban. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 881 even after the elections. J. Vitug. Davide. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice.R. Regalado. Aquino vs. (Dissenting): A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. And the law is clear that in all situations. The COMELEC‘s resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular agency‘s powers.P. (Dissenting): Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. (Separate): It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC. Petitioner Commission on Elections. Davide. re: woman’s domicile. (Concurring): The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected.P. J. Rosario and Mr. her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. Mendoza. Respondents Ponente: KAPUNAN. Move Makati. 1986. In agreement with Regalado. and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. When she married the former dictator. 120265. Yes. Marcos‘ living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement. J. J. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which. (Separate): Women‘s rights as per choosing her domicile after husband‘s death is evident in this case. but the HRET). In any event. J. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law. expressed through the ballot.: The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. Voted for dismissal. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. The mischief in petitioner‘s contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasijudicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. It has none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected. and Mrs. and render mutual help and support. by no less than a constitutional fiat. The controversy should not be blurred by academic disquisitions.A. J. 6646 in relation to Sec. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte. Sections 6 2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Aquino. thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives. No. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. 4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together. September 18. COMELEC G. 78 of B. The HRET‘s jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections. and 7 of R. are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Romero. this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give . Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte. the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted. J. No. J. Nolledo and Mr. Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22. (Concurring): All her life. (Concurring): Residence for election purposes means domicile. Puno. Held: Yes. VI of the Constitution. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City. His birth certificate places Concepcion. HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.effect to the will of the majority. This was. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. . The HRET in its decision dated November 6. Art. Petitions are dismissed. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners. the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Issue: WON Jose Ong. Jose Ong. The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong.VI of the Constitution. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative ANTONIO Y. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines. petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange of domicile. the domicile of originshould be deemed to continue. the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions. Northern Samar for voting purposes. and 2)Jose Ong. Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable. 1991 Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr. petitioner. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion. En Banc Doctrine: citizenship Date: July 30. 1989. Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. In the absence of clear and positive proof. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG. however. under Sec. CO. Co v. denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12. his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. JR. he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. it does notengender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’soriginal domicile. At that time. Makati City. 6. Jr. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1] Co v. indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose. Petitioner. respondents. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. On May 11. 1987. 1989. Hence. a duly registered political party. in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang. Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. vs. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong.Cembo. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Private respondents Move Makati. Jr. Concepcion. 1989. FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. found for the private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent. Jr.Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. and Mateo Bedon. Art. these petitions for certiorari. To successfully effecta change of domicile.. 6. Jr. for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. Tarlac. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Jr. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. as a natural born Filipino. Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old.Ratio: The records show that in the year 1895. In 1971. He was already a citizen. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28. Parenthetically. He was baptized into Christianity. 1954. the CFI of Samar. the respondent looked for work here. under earlier laws. arrived in the Philippines from China. after trial. in search for better education. 3. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. As a result. Agripina Lao. went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. of Filipino mothers. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. 1987 but also to those who. 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance. Emil. a branch was setup in Binondo. The business prospered. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Manila. and 4. The Court interprets Section 1. If one so elected. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila. In 1969. and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Expansion became inevitable. 1973. respondent's full brother. On April 28. correspondingly. the private respondent. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. 1973. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. SECTION 2. Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino. In the meantime. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17. filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15. 1955. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. having been born of Filipino mothers. On May 15. Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. The two fell in love and. got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. As a resident of Laoang. one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. he was not. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. The father of the private respondent. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. 2. After completing his elementary education. was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. Those born before January 17. conferred the status of a natural-born. thereafter. Pursuant to said order. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. elected citizenship before that date. declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong. During this time. election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one . Jose Ong Chuan. Later. Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang. Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2. Jose Ong graduated from college. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: SECTION 1. the following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. As the years passed. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang. his elder brother. however. The couple bore eight children. Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather). 1957. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy. And therefore.” On the other hand. petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives. RESPONDENT. Section 2. the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives.” while Section 7. Article IX. QUIRINO D. being contrary thereto. d) Section 7. petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. DE OCAMPO & AFRICA AND ENRIQUE M. which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. He. his name has not been carried in today’s Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. and. maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67. RILLORAZA. and. SECTION 7 MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO. JR. In support of his contention. the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows: a) Section 13.. … Having lost in the autonomous region elections. petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. SPEAKER. VS. FERNANDO FOR PETITIONER. b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior. to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest. he was not paid the emoluments due his office. did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code. In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.” The record does not indicate what action was taken on this communication. Article XVIII thereof provides that “the Senators. Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. J. are provided for in the Constitution. MITRA. as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened. but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991. his staff was dismissed and disbanded. therefore. PETITIONER. Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision. expressed his intention “to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao.: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest. performing an administrative act. . he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.. at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. HON. petitioner. Article IX of B. and his office suites were occupied by other persons. The House Secretariat. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. JR. 1992. In this petition. JR. therefore. respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67. On 15 January 1990. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990: The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17. and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress. EN BANC DAVIDE. Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30. CAMILO L. par. AFRICA. Blg. In effect. ABAD SANTOS. in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker.) HON. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.’ The word ‘ipso facto’ is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. however.who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries. Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections. 1990. AND (HON. it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution. Section 67. RAMON V. agency or instrumentality thereof. SABIO SECRETARY. He has established his life here in the Philippines. unless otherwise provided by law. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990. Article VI states: “The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin.P. 30. Blg. 881.P. municipal. mayors. or city official running for an office. except for President and Vice-President. members of various sanggunians. other than the one which he is actually holding. it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. 666. Article IX of B. IS SECTION 67. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION? B. ‘BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT’. It must be noted that only in B. There are. death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office. as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term “voluntary renunciation” of office enunciated in par. municipal or city official running for an office. is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition: A. he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. thus: Sec. — Any elective provincial.P. be considered on forced leave of absence from office. In sum. They did not do so. Section 67. Article IX of B. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion. respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67. Article IX of B. 27. No. Section 67. The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows: Sec. or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. Section 7. They further maintain that their questioned “administrative act” is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers. Respondents assert that petitioner’s filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule. 24.P. Article IX of B.He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Article IX of B. shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 881 reads: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.A. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control. 2 (now Section 67. Candidate holding elective office. in addition. sub-provincial.P. BLG. municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present Constitution. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.P. Blg. EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN. other than the one for which he has been lastly elected.P. Candidate holding office. ARTICLE IX. PALMARES: . 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office. Moreover. Blg. petitioner’s demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized. upon filing of a certificate of candidacy. the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67. Article VI of the Constitution. OF B. He further maintains that respondents’ so-called “administrative act” of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. — Governors. The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C. Article IX of B.P. 2. AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH? On the other hand. Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. which reads: Any elective provincial. other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress. shall. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.P. petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority. city. Blg. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise: Sec. 881 as among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened. — Any elective provincial. among which are resignation. or barangay officials. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. On the contrary. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution. Blg. thus: MR. Blg. shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Blg. Candidates holding political offices. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67. integrity. Mr. Now. under our Constitution. Mr. Now. act with patriotism and justice. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public officials. Mr. petitioner seems to confuse “term” with “tenure” of office. Your Honor. but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. Now. that the people’s latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General: . He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials. why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service. loyalty. what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it. Mr. So we believe. otherwise. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. As I said. They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature. Speaker. integrity. should be considered ipso factoresigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 1 of Article XI on “Accountability of Public Officers” is more emphatic in stating: Sec. Speaker. we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Speaker. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress. Mr.M. Mr. they do not comply with that latter mandate. that means that he does not want to serve.In the old Election Code. but I don’t mind repeating it. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people. this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy. Speaker. on the part of the Committee. but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the community which voted him to office. in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. city.P. and efficiency. in the 1971 Election Code. Now. they cannot go back to their former position. that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.): Thank you. or the rationale behind it? MR. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resignednot because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution. what is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy. … Assemblyman Manuel M. And that is the reason. However. Section 1— Public office is a public trust. Garcia. Speaker. in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office. Now. because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices. why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected. but did not assume the office. and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate. Now.” It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67. this was not in the 1935 Constitution. Blg. but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability. then. Public office is a public trust. if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to.): I have already stated the rationale for this. Speaker. because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. The purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to. GARCIA (M. Any elective provincial. but primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public officers. 2. It states that (sic) Article XIII. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility. Speaker. May I know. said: MR. Mr. not their own personal ambition. Article IX of B. we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. 1. to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. and lead modest lives. it says that: ‘Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years. Obviously then. petitioner’s assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. sub-provincial. what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus. In fact. argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. serve them with utmost responsibility. Your Honor. the people. the elective public officers must serve their principal. the provision seems to be different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III. I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which we were elected. PEREZ (L. we made this proposal based on constitutional grounds. let us say. loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people. but not by impeachment. the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7. bribery. To justify the nullification of a law. does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. basis is that in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his own. RONO: My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person … my. This maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest. it appears in Section 6. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. Article IX of B. MAAMBONG: Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term ‘voluntary renunciation’ does not only appear in Section 3. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners: MR. Article IX of B. if any. of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt.P. DAVIDE: Yes. and therefore it should be considered. MR. MR.C. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law. concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono: MR. the Members of the Supreme Court. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what ‘voluntary renunciation’ means? Is this akin to abandonment? MR. on impeachment for. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Blg. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress.The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R. That the ground cited in Section 67. The term remains and his successor. more embracing. the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. is allowed to serve its unexpired portion. Article IX of B. Angeles. an intention to relinquish his office. 76 Phil 12). 881. DAVIDE: Abandonment is voluntary.L. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. the Vice-President. treason. That the act. Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67. The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of legislature. MAAMBONG: Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation? MR. does not suffice. when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office.). not a doubtful and argumentative implication. other high crimes. he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term. DAVIDE: It is more general. Lansing. graft and corruption. And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity. 881. In other words. As held in the case of State ex rel. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. Berge vs. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Even then. MAAMBONG: It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. MR. A doubt. MR. contemplated in Section 67. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. shall we say. TOLENTINO: . Blg. culpable violation of the Constitution. or betrayal of public trust.P.P. he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure. even if well-founded. Section 2 of Article XI provides that “(t)he President. but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. and the Ombudsman may be removed from office. the Members of the Constitutional Commissions. and conviction of. not his term. Under the questioned provision. at least from the legal significance. SO ORDERED. Blg.P. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability. JR. which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7. It’s not just an intention. Feleciano. Cruz. As such. It was their duty to remove petitioner’s name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67. As administrative officers. no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members. B. to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. this Court categorically pronounced that “forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. J. In conclusion.. The causes and procedures for removal found in the . but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention.A. JJ. That’s precisely. and and salutary to certain quarters. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Article IX. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. 180 above-quoted. Fernan. The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical. par. RONO: Yes. Blg. seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao. Speaker. Gatuslao: … The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67. in Castro vs. Paras.. politically palatable.Yes … MR. I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power. 881. through Justice J. Article IX of B. It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. RONO: And in the other. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13. Mr. a case involving Section 27 of R. since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office.P. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. dissenting: I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion. The reason for this is obvious. must be definite. took no part. 881. the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office. Medialdea and Regalado.J. sir. MR.B. it is not necessary. in purported implementation of an invalid statute.P. C. TOLENTINO: Yes.L. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. Blg. No. It was their ministerial duty to do so. concur. This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself. Article IX. 881. unforeseen and unforeseeable. Article IX of B. but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies. Only the moment and act of filing are considered.P. B. as petitioner opines. MR. what I’m saying that while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough.. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ. because he is running for the same position. Court of Appeals. it’s already there. The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section 67. that the other position be actually held. In Monroy vs. … As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held. 881 itself. the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Thus. We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution. Griño-Aquino. respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67. Narvasa. Once the certificate is filed. as We had occasion to remark.. Reyes. Blg. it is otherwise. WHEREFORE. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. both substantive and procedural. The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened: A. the 1971 Election Code. And if disenfranchisement should there be. an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. Article IX. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. being permanently comatose on a hospital bed. the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. “Voluntary” refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. 665. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor. the same should only be by due process of law. Section 13). p. As aptly stated by the petitioner: We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives. p. Sec. administrative act’ of the respondents. city. did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of “voluntary renunciation” as found in the Constitution? From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B. p. (See Petition. and ultra vires. par. Blg. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision. D. Only the Constitution can do it. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person’s acts. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. 16[3]). He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. however. C. 8) The respondents would now add to the above provisions. 180. the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation. or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. Act No. It has to be in the constitution. and the 1978 Election Code — does not help the respondents. VI. On the contrary. 17).P. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. as against their disenfranchisement by mere ‘administrative act’ of the respondents. Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one’s public office? In other words. B. we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress. that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history.P. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. They are exclusive.Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. B. (Reply to Comment. Such being the case. including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. 881 — namely. VI. In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation. agency. 2). (Petition. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed. running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. and not by mere arbitrary. 881. VI. but more important. I must stress. 5) The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. VI. all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement. he was not trifling with the mandate . 7.P. The citation of the precursors of B. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. they strengthen the case of the petitioner. 8) I take exception to the Solicitor General’s stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. Sec. capricious. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial. Section 67 provides: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. It is voluntary renunciation. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. Sec. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of “voluntary renunciation” and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents. It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one’s current position. or instrumentality thereof. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers. and municipal officials. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death. 8) I take exception to the Solicitor General’s stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. city. the 1971 Election Code. being permanently comatose on a hospital bed. did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of “voluntary renunciation” as found in the Constitution? . 8) The respondents would now add to the above provisions. This is a true for the President and the members of Congress itself. Sec. B. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political respectability. It is for this reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. Act No.. On the contrary. 7. and municipal officials. or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution. and and salutary to certain quarters. The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical. J. politically palatable. The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened: A. They are exclusive. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. JJ. p. agency. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. It has to be in the constitution. Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. The citation of the precursors of B. including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. I VOTE to GRANT the petition. # Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ. to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power. in purported implementation of an invalid statute. (Petition. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run. Sec. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo. The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. 180. Section 13). Only the Constitution can do it. an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. 16[3]). He wants to continue serving his people. (See Petition. Article IX. p. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers. We must await the proper case and controversy. 2). It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one’s current position. VI. D. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision.of his people. C. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. they strengthen the case of the petitioner. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Padilla and Bidin. VI. Blg. Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one’s public office? In other words. B. and intimate manner. VI. dissenting: I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.. 881. For the Foregoing reasons. or instrumentality thereof.P. JR. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office. Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. Section 67 provides: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous.. par. more direct.P. 881 — namely. It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. It is voluntary renunciation. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. and the 1978 Election Code — does not help the respondents. VI. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death. Sec. 17). Section 27 of Article II of Rep. 665. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. concur. they shall not be questioned in any other place. whether the same is in session or not.From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B. p. as against their disenfranchisement by mere ‘administrative act’ of the respondents. he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez. “Voluntary” refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary renunciation. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a person’s acts. HELD: Article VI. I must stress. ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor. the same should only be by due process of law. He wants to continue serving his people. In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation. all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement. while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous. either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices. and for any speech or debate therein. running for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of “voluntary renunciation” and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. and in going to and returning from the same. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers. he was not performing his official duty. 5) The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. and intimate manner. administrative act’ of the respondents. in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation. was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. and breach of the peace. or votes cast in the halls of Congress. SECTION 11 Jimenez v cabangbang Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. And if disenfranchisement should there be. but more important. and not by mere arbitrary. and ultra vires. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous. On 14 Nov 1958. that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history. statements made. however. Jesus Vargas. under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. both substantive and procedural. either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee . more direct. the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. (Reply to Comment. felony. caused the publication of the said letter. such as speeches delivered.P. with the aid of some civilian political strategists. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense. Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason. Such being the case. among others. I VOTE to GRANT the petition. capricious. and other acts performed by Congressmen. himself. we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress. It is obvious that. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. in thus causing the communication to be so published. As aptly stated by the petitioner: We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives. For the Foregoing reasons. Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines.” The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.” which. 11. Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. J. I am humiliated. And I am not only that. debased. does not deny making the aforequoted statements. However.thereof. 3. is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]. considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces. Accordingly. 2006. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court. It may not be extended by intendment. under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff. it has constitutional foundations. likewise. degraded. The purpose of her speech. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor: x x x I am not angry. I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman. I am nauseated. explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity. 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant. after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated . I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. I am homicidal. inspite of its importance. Art. added that “it is of course possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge”. 2007. In her comment on the complaint dated April 25. it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged. I am suicidal. it should be noted that defendant. In other words. JR. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. To Pobre. I am foaming in the mouth. She. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages. that as such they are by law. and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers. however. and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. I am irate. with enclosures. was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for damages. Petition is dismissed. having been handpicked by Vargas. Senator Santiago. Antero J.: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22. implication or equitable considerations. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as “planners”. and that. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class. Hence. the very document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans. through counsel. according to her. the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Romeo Jalosjos. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. VI of the Constitution. Pobre v Santiago DECISION VELASCO. would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. like her. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. the Court.” The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto. be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. but for the public good.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters.” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots. parliament. its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI. however. investigate and denounce anomalies. Section 11 of the Constitution. [2] This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall. a member of the Bar. they might be driven to take the law into their own hands. and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result. Pendatun. v. powerful. not for their private indulgence. in Osmeña. Without parliamentary immunity. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago. or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government. In this case. Rule 8. can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Jr. would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice. To the Court. this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Indeed.[5] For the above reasons. the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8. As old as the English Parliament. To reiterate.” Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court. however. in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment. not the courts. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt. she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court.position of Chief Justice. or its equivalent.” [1] As American jurisprudence puts it.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place: x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties. the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. which respectively provide: . that this could not be the last word on the matter. but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. I am foaming in the mouth. therefore. an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law. as a member of the Bar and officer of the court. I am suicidal. (Emphasis ours. I am homicidal. demean. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. VI.Canon 8. as any perceptive individual. VIII of the Constitution that provides: Section 5. nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision. The Court is. in his professional dealings. is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. offensive or otherwise improper. perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. the admission to the practice of the law.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. the Integrated Bar. Rule 8.) . Her achievements speak for themselves. a law professor. Sec. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. Senator Santiago. I am nauseated. Lest it be overlooked. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers.––A lawyer shall not. and legal assistance to the underprivileged. In a sense. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule. the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.[7] Senator Santiago should have known. an author of numerous law textbooks. she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them. debased. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge. practice. her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. To be sure. Needless to stress. 5(5) of Art. As Senator Santiago alleged.01. Canon 11.) A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. and an elected senator of the land. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit. save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s exofficiochairperson. and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates. (Emphasis ours. Senator/Atty. its individual members. pleading. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. thus. I am irate. At any event. We quote the passage once more: x x x I am not angry. like any other. I am humiliated. Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities. use language which is abusive. Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an “unjust act” the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. And I am not only that. degraded. I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. and procedure in all courts. impartiality and independence. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be “with all good fidelity x x x to the courts. which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. even without any sign of remorse from her. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. however. For. it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office. he is.[16] This Court. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. Cloribel[12] that: A lawyer is an officer of the courts. for malevolent purpose or personal malice. Sorreda. The factual and legal circumstances of this case. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.” Faith in the courts. which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum. and assist it to maintain its integrity. in the case of Atty.” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties. xxxx (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x. and embarrass or.” Thus has it been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court. Noel S. Francisco B. attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice. [14] Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity. among other things: (4) Shield the judiciary. practice. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against “unjust criticism and clamor. as a corollary. “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda. unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer. a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties. the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. but also covers any misconduct.The Court. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.” That same canon.” Also. malign the men and women who compose them. deter the Court from doing so. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. a lawyer should seek to preserve.” And more. in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law. besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct. as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor. and in the case of Atty. in Sorreda. Cruz in Tacordan v.[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Generally speaking. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto. [9] In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. . The Court wrote in Rheem of thePhilippines: x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that “[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude. to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. worse. from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it.” [13] The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will. trifle with the integrity of courts. “like the court itself. and procedure in all courts. [15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group. Miriam DefensorSantiago is.. DE GUZMAN JR. Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case. ET. AL. stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. We cannot agree with her more. the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. although she has not categorically denied making such statements. “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution. [20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. under any circumstance. while the other five were herein respondents. as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court.R. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. SECTION 13 Bengzon v drilon On 15 Jan 1992. G. FACTS: On 14 May 1979. however. J. ET. granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. conformably to Art. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. Hon.”[19] But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks. Sec. WHEREFORE. the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint. 25 March 1982 Case Digest The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sixto T. and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit. VI. she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.[21] Finally. Jr. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court. the . the Senate President had not apparently called her to order. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. a private corporation. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. Suffice it to say in this regard that.DISMISSED.. Finally. but to enable them. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members. Pobre against Senator/Atty.We. No. 11 of the Constitution. an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI). vs. SECTION 14 PUYAT. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using. as the people’s representatives. De Guzman. to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. the letter-complaint of Antero J. L-51122. AL. let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action. some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. especially this Tribunal. SECTION 16 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thus. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. on 30 May 1979. a position that. as counsel for the Acero group. unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader 4.R. the Senate met in caucus. By virtue thereof. The following session day. Under those facts and circumstances. Drilon as majority leader. All an Assemblyman need do. after the quo warranto suit had been filed. The prohibition being clear. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. 1998. the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. Article VIII. belonged to the "minority. Marcelo B. Section 11. He acquired them "after the fact". 1998 FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. according to them. And what is more. However. the debate on the question continued. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that. November 18. if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto. thus. which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside." Sen.Acero Group. the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election. Thus. then in force. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez." while only those who had voted for him. Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. the validity of the objection. unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping. also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. RULING: The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily. He had acquired a mere Php200. before he moved to intervene. that is. he was assuming the position of minority leader. to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore. there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. GUINGONA G. but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. and Sen. albeit indirectly. provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. Realizing. then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares. the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. No. On 25 May 1979. certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. On July 30. with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. 134577. it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200. by virtue of the Motion for Intervention. No consensus on the matter was arrived at.00 worth of stock in IPI. he decided. and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority. Juan M.00. perhaps. allegedly the only other member of the minority. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? HELD: . Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. ISSUES: 1. A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators. Was Respondent Guingona usurping. he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group. in intervening in the SEC Case. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. after the contested election of Directors. the losing nominee." During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority. the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. On the third session day. rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. instead. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and. Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez. When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979. Franklin M. with the agreement of Senator Santiago. is in effect appearing as counsel. but still failed to resolve the issue. 1973 Constitution. The following day. which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader. no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. Verily. he was recognized as such by the Senate President.such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority." who could thereby elect the minority leader.FIRST ISSUE The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President. prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their . Therefore. the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent." and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. disregarded or overlooked." Where no provision of the Constitution. By the above standard. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority. the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate. it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority. such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself. the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious orwhimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful. The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. Osmena v pendatun Then Congressman Osmeña Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief. but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue. the laws. no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. Thus. the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof. Therefore. since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus. however. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution. Upon a motion for reconsideration. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker. petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings. we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another. or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review). In this case. dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. THIRD ISSUE Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. Furthermore. not by this Court. FOURTH ISSUE Grave abuse of discretion . SECOND ISSUE There was no violation. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. To recall. it is. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. however. the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated." but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. He further asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show cause why the House should not punish him. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes). It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.” Us v pons Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan. Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior. which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President. prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives. now a member of Congress. in fact. and Honrada (the clerk of court). HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan. Osmeña’s petition is dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914. despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. Atty.capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. Therefore. ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio claimed that. should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing. Atty. which is not a penalty but a preliminary. the then vice mayor of San Francisco. The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who was then the governor of the same province). Act 2381 should be null and void. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3). Gelacio. Subsequently. Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world.’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension. Since this is the case. Paredes v sandiganbayan Political Law – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA 3019 On 23 Jan 1990. the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. The SC ruled. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019. On the other hand. And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. On 5 Apr 1914. when imposed. Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated? HELD: Section 15. . preventive measure. the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381. it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. However. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. Gimenez.. during the consideration of the bill before said House.HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the bank’s auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2. par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: “The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. as provided in same law. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee. and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. 1914. 1959. HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. when they are. and RONALDO B. EDCEL C. To supplement the circular. not the latter a finished product. ZAMORA. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law). AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. as the SC have said.: . as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde” The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. Casco Philippine chemical co v gimenez Casco Philippine Chemical Co. WIGBERTO E. Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. JOHN HENRY R. JOKER P. RAUL DAZA. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product. This settles the question. to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government. ARROYO. by members thereof. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. respondents. LAGMAN. JOSE DE VENECIA. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate. and time of reaction. which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Casco maintains that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and. without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation. the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1. and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. clear and explicit. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. 95. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. RODOLFO ALBANO. DECISION MENDOZA. its Circular No. “formaldehyde”. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. affirmed the ruling of CBP’s auditor. OSMEÑA. would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence. petitioners. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. J. citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate. acidity. In compliance.” The Auditor General. not by judicial decree. TAÑADA. vs. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. Inc. A. the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21. Wednesday. I move to adjourn until four o’clock. Daza). and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence “(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum. violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. Deputy Speaker Raul Daza. (2) in violation of Rule XIX. Mr. 1996.) On the same day.[1] Rep. the four versions differ on three points. 1996: MR. they admit. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. No. 1996 the word “no” on line 17 appears only once. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. following Rep. charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are “constitutionally mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Petitioner Rep. What is that. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6. Daza). I stood up. 1996. and (4) the published version abovequoted. without conceding. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count.m. Rep. The session is adjourned until four o’clock. At 11:48 a. VI. He was fourth in the order. of November 21.m. that these rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art. After a roll call. I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report. in order to expedite the resolution of this petition. No. Exequiel Javier.) (3:40 p. 8240. so I wanted to object. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12. No. next week. There being none. Mr. 1996 of the House of Representatives. Arroyo’s interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p. Rep. [3] the . However. on November 21. §112. Edcel C. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia. MR. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.m. MR. (Gavel) MR. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a. did not call for the yeas or nays. Daza). 1996. No. §103 of the rules of the House. There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report. Wednesday. §16(3) that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that. The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. although until the end of his interpellation he never did. ALBANO. as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21. Lagman. Ramos on November 22. ALBANO. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. wait a minute.m. Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word “approved” appears in the transcripts. 1996. consequently. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Daza). 7198 are in question. also obtained by Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. ARROYO. proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech. 1996. Daza). Speaker. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21.. the Secretary of Finance. (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.” which appears in the other versions. (It was 3:01 p. 1996 and transmitted on September 16. In the course of his interpellation. next week. Rep.m.. ARROYO. chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. after a recess. I stood up. the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Any objection to the motion? MR. 1996. Petitioners’ allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum.m. Objection. Rep. but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rogelio Sarmiento. Speaker of the House of Representatives. ARROYO. He was interrupted when Rep. [2] the Chair. and the Chair called for the motion. (2) in the transcript certified on November 21. Petitioners’ principal argument is that R. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. Enrique Garcia. in submitting the conference committee report to the House. no. The session is resumed. (It was 3:40 p. Lagman and Rep. Daza). More specifically. Speaker. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. Rep. to 3:40 p. Mr. Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano. 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17.m. Speaker. no.m. to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word “approved. According to petitioners. there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that. which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. The session is suspended for one minute. 1996. after which he was interpellated.m. on November 21. while in the other versions it is repeated three times.” which appears on line 13 in the three other versions. to 3:40 p. the Executive Secretary. §35 and Rule XVII. petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII. Edcel C. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 1996. also obtained by Rep.This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28. which petitioner Rep. the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of aquorum. of November 21. approved. Lagman. cannot be heard. and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better. In addition. 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep.A. because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session. although not successfully. Rep. in the transaction of any business. Indeed. all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that. 7198. At all events. by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House. no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.. We think no court has ever . there being no objection. Rule XXI. that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules. courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation. the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings. In Osmeña v.” In State ex rel. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights. Joseph & Co. always subject to be exercised by the House. VI. No. or even more just. Albano’s motion and afterward declared the report approved. respondents contend that.” In State v.[11] it was held: “At any rate. Mr. and with their observance. it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure. Albano’s motion to approve or ratify. enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. No. more accurate. City Loan & Savings Co. but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power. 1996.. Lagman. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration. Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. shows that “On Motion of Mr.” [7] This Journal was approved on December 2. covering the sessions of November 20 and 21. and Rule XVIII. It is a continuous power. Journal No. In the decided cases.” In McDonald v. Arroyo’s question. the courts have no concern. absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal. Arroyo’s question which. is a point of order or a privileged motion. In his supplemental comment.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural. in passing the bill which became R.[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: “When it appears that an act was so passed.[8] After considering the arguments of the parties. as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules. it is alleged. First. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. in enacting a law. §§121-122. Respondents’ defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. the rules of the House. Albano. 8240. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.Chair deliberately ignored Rep. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.[5] the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. both here and abroad. and within the limitations suggested. considering the Court’s power under Art. Pendatun. (3) in violation of Rule XVI. VIII. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power. Ballin. No. Speaker?” and did not repeat Rep. but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. were faithfully observed. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states. §97. but in the absence of constitutional restraints. in varying forms of expression. “What is that . 1996. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. Art. Moore.A. and (4) in violation of Rule XX. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. This case is therefore dismissed. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule. Secretary of Finance. §109. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House.[13] it was held: “The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules.e. No.” In Crawford v. i. 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution. respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R. Although the Constitution provides in Art. It is argued that Rep. the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. intermediate its introduction and final passage. Having made the rule.’ Consequently. ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. 8240.m. on November 21. and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum. Savings Bank. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. and also by the United States Supreme Court. §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government. §§2627. Gilchrist. it should be regarded. [4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. 39 of the House of Representatives. Arroyo’s query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28. This authority may be abused. §123. State. To begin with.[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: “The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. VI. this contention stands the principle on its head. v.[10] the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” was invoked by parties. precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.A. modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings”[9] and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. in view of the changed membership of the Court. .[12] the rule was stated thus: “The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.’” In United States v. Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p. .[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: “The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. But the cases. 641. the manner in which the conference committee report on H. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders. In re Ryan. more than mere comity. is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. we decline to follow them. State v. this Court’s function is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction. The above principle is subject. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. VIII. §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide. As we have already held. or the respective branches thereof. On the other hand. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. 11 S. Due regard for the working of our system of government. Railway Co. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report. such as those relating to national security.”[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice. symbolized by its banging of the gavel. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature. as the Solicitor General has pointed out.W. not that it erred or has a different view. as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Then the Chair declared: “There being none. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion. Third. §1.” Schweizer v. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report. might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto. there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power.” They claim that Rep. 151. It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. . after Rep. with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may. 54 Ark. Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. 101. and which it or they may change or suspend at will. Second. however. 185. Albano’s motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken.C. For while Art. No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report. either in accordance with its own rules. VIII. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. Mr. it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our Art. quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion’s sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission. by two-thirds vote. In 1957. and it exists only at legislative pleasure. mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.[20] it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.[21] If. 187. W. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. . §1. read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. . Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Brown. It may. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. 18. chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. . even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character. Mr. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. and duly signed by the governor. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. What happened is that. The Chair called out for objections to the motion.declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself . approved. or in violation thereof. Dismissing this contention. 33 S. If there are any such adjudications. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction. It has basis in legislative practice. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act. In the absence of a showing . then. . Petitioners argue that. then. State. however. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was “railroaded. Gill. 50 N. the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself. or without making any rules. Thus.[18] In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who.” At the same time the Chair was saying this. VIII. §5 and. E. Petitioners. VIII. W. No. “What is that . the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held: We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. McDonald v. contend that under Art. v. 80 Wis. Rep. 50 N. however. to this qualification. therefore. could be no reason for the court’s refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature. Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. 15 S. Arroyo was asking. 80 Wis. the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. under Art. . 407. Tolentino said: . instead of seeking redress in the House. the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. suspend the operation of the rule. its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner. VIII. Consequently. §1 power. [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. but this alone. to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. Rep. “nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. Albano’s motion approved. . It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved. 414. although Rep. in accordance with the rules of the House. is that he did not. the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday. When the Chair announces the vote by saying “Is there any objection?” and nobody objects.m. this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep.[22] Indeed. our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem. . Rep. the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. Speaker. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors. democratic theory: . No one. [35] Rep. except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill. it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better. if that motion is not presented.[29] It would appear. Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. there being no objection. then the Chair announces “The bill is approved on second reading. or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. joined by Justice Davide. Arroyo’s question was not. It was 3:40 p. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. i. petitioners in this case. The Journal of November 21. Lagman and Rep. except Rep. Albano. The advantages or disadvantages. Tolentino. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. on that day Rep. But Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated. Arroyo’s question were so. Thursday. a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. more accurate and even more just.S. Indeed. the phrase “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. But. November 27. Rep. In one case[38] we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno. are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. to my mind. Rep. no one objected to its approval except Rep. To repeat.m. to disputing this doctrine. the signing of H. if old-fashioned. the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 1996. the power granted to the courts by Art. Rep. It is thus apparent that petitioners’ predicament was largely of their own making.”[25] [23] Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote. is sufficient. of Wednesday of the following week.” If there was any doubt as to the vote. Arroyo. only the five. “this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. (emphasis added) This Journal was approved on December 2.. any motion to divide would have been proper.[28] Indeed.” [39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good. 1996. To be sure. this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. however. The fact. No. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision. No.. Rep. 1996.. respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion.[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. if voting had been conducted. No. 8240. §1 extends to cases where “a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. however. Circuit Court of Appeals. [33] Rep. 1996 of the House shows: ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION On motion of Mr. because when it resumed at 3:40 p.[31] Given this fact. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte. and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. and a substantial compliance. and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it. Mr.. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. Albano’s motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. then the voting comes in.[26] at the request of one-fifth of the Members present. November 21. So I believe there is substantial compliance here. this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained. 7198 was approved on that day. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. then a debate follows and after the debate. Zamora objected to the report[36] but not to the manner it was approved. that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem.[37] Fourth. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. Again. and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned. while it is said that. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.e. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon. considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. we assume that the House approves the measure. [30] And even if Rep. Lagman. So. as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. 1996. the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.[34] At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21. Under this rule. it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R. where as here there is no evidence to the contrary. in form or substance. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement. Arroyo’s question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects.”[32] Here. Under the enrolled bill doctrine. [24] In the words of the U.A. there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v.m. 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.Mr. VIII. is well established. the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. . Moreover. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State. of the President of the Senate. the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven. §26(2) of the Constitution that “upon the last reading of a bill. but to represent ourselves with competent. a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government. the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules. With respect to other matters. that it was passed by Congress. with the duty of enacting and executing the laws.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco.[45] To overrule the doctrine now. JJ. which became R. as the dissent urges. and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[40] This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been “surreptitiously” inserted in the conference committee: [W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared. respectively.A. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature. §16(4) provides: Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings. Actually. or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. leaving the court to determine. the bill which became R. as a rule of evidence. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. and honest legislators. Indeed. Hermosisima. they should turn to improve the Legislature. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election . 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. because all are required to conform to them. when the question properly arises. [46] ___________________ It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. at the request of one-fifth of the Members present. assumed office. real or imagined. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress. is in conformity with the Constitution. and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. of legislative skullduggery. and Torres. No. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. No. JJ. or at some remote period of time. and Quiason. that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow. we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. affect national security. not three but four (Cruz. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance. the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21.[49] WHEREFORE.A. whether the Act. be entered in the Journal. careful. Panganiban. [44] The enrolled bill doctrine. was approved on that day. by facts resting only in the memory of individuals. with a change in the membership of the Court. except to say that. carries. the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED. In the absence of anything to the contrary.[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress. and to accept. charged. and of the President of the United States. . 8240 is shown in the Journal. VI. all bills authenticated in the manner stated. as having passed Congress.[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as “public memorials of the most permanent character. But they aim in the wrong direction. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. so authenticated. No. and from time to time publish the same. 8240. and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. 7198. Bidin. in its judgment.The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule.” As already noted.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court. in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 8240. Pons. is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution. Feliciano. and the yeas and nays on any question shall. no amendment shall be allowed. they should be permanent.A. SECTION 17 Lazatin v hret Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office. as already noted. No.[41] It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. in United States v. Thus.” [42] In other cases.” thus: “They should be public. on its face. excepting such parts as may. Art. VI. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. 1987. and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition). 1992 to all regional election directors. The Bondoc promulgation was cancelled because the decisionlack the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of the rules of the tribunal. against certain election returns. Its independence would be undermined if the removal of Camasura for as a punishment for “party disloyalty” for voting for Bondoc would allow them to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case. The judges in HRET all wanted out cause of this distressing development. and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates. city and municipal election registrars. and assumed his duties as Congressman. Buan. to proclaim the winner. The LDP informed Herrera that they were no longer part of LDP hence..so Camasura being a member of the LDP revealed to the chief congressman Conjuanco that he voted for Bondoc and he did so in view of what was in line with truth justice and self respect. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC. provincial election supervisors. election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor. Pineda Facts: Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Rep of the 4th district of Pampanga. considering the premises. So they cant just shuffle and manipulate the political component for the electoral tribunal to serve the interests of party in power. resignation forms the political party. Pineda was proclaimed winner of the election. alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HReT by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the tribunal? Held: No.If allowed so. Chavez. Jr. private respondent therein. he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid.” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board.contests. So the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relation to the election. Chavez in favor of Francisco I. this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 211 SCRA 315 Facts: On May 5. is a matter that is also addressed. The members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as the members of the judiciary are. 104704. The operative term found in the section was “sole Judge”. 1992 elections. They can only be replaced in cases such as expiration. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith. So on the eve of promulgation of Bondoc’s win. alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6. The revelation prompted efforts by the LDP to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. returns and qualification of their respective members. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga. to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. In the COMMENT of the SolGen. Bondoc vs. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code. death. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. 1992. Buan. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction. and formal affiliation with another party of any valid cause hence mere disloyalty is not a valid cause for termination. So congressman Camasura voted with the SC justices and Congressman Cerilles proclaimed Bondoc the winner of the election. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the answer to this question. Bondoc filed protest to house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). No. his (Camasura’s) vote in favor of Bondoc should be withdrawn. Congress man Jose Conjuangco thru a letter stated that Camasura and Bautista were being expelled for the LDP for allegedly helping in the organization ofPartido Pilipino of Danding cojuanco and for having members of LDP join said pol party. from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11. prohibition and mandamus. which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. then the HRET isn’t really a sole judge of senatorial elections. disqualifying Melchor Chavez. 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets. Chavez vs Comelec Case Digest FRANCISCO I. the Comelec issued Res. has taken his oath of office as such. boards of election inspectors. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Court’s Resolution dated May 5. It’s suppose to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office devoid of partisan consideration. and Lazatin himself. the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public. The decision held that Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23 votes. On May 8.. Jr. It (HRET) was made to function as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. 1992.. permanentdisability. The LDP insisted a recount and the recount has increased Bondoc’s win by 107 votes. HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17. CHAVEZ vs. They were saying that unseating should be prevented in all cost. They also said that the tribunal should not be hampered in doing its constitutional function by factors. Bondoc asked the court to annul the decision of the House in rescinding Camasura’s nomination and restrain the replacement of Camasura through a petition for certiorari. . However. Abalos. respondents. 2008 AQUILINO L. headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs. receipt. as the case may be. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was then tasked to re-canvass the MCOCs submitted by Task Force Maguindanao. Although PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Maguindanao (MBOCsMaguindanao) were present during the canvass proceedings before the SPBOC-Maguindanao. Vice-President. Pimentel’s counsel objected to the Maguindanao MCOCs because: a) the proceedings were illegal. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action. EMILIO S. mostly copy 2. Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. nevertheless.: On 4 July 2007. custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass.1 The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Omnibus Election Code). Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs. Vice-President. At the time of filing of the Petition. With other candidates conceding. this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.R. continued to conduct canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS. Sec. G. 242. Maguindanao. the Bedol PCOC was excluded from the national canvass then being conducted by the NBC. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO. retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao. . Ferrer. Pimentel III (Pimentel) filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus(with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order). Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc. it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez’ name in the list of qualified candidates. no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation. Hence. J. chaired by Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) Lintang Bedol. the candidates’ legal counsels were not allowed to ask them any questions. petitioner Aquilino L. around two months after the said elections. vs. The recanvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs was conducted by the SPBOC-Maguindanao from 25 to 26 June 2007 at Shariff Aguak. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao). Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. However. Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: “For purposes of the elections for President. Sr. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. and Commissioner Nicodemo T. the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. In particular. SANTOS. petitioner. Zubiri (Zubiri). PIMENTEL III. were marred by irregularities. and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI. No. the only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President. THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. b) the MCOCs were palpably manufactured. transmission. or the copy intended to be posted on the wall.92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. and the PCOC (Bedol PCOC) and other electoral documents submitted by the said PBOC-Maguindanao were tainted with fraud and statistical improbabilities. c) the results reflected in the MCOCs were statistically improbable. 178413 March 13. Task Force Maguindanao. acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC). the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as Senators. 2 All of the foregoing observations. e) in most of the MCOCs[. different from the procedure adopted in the canvass of COCs from other provinces/areas. 2. until further orders from this Court. It violated its own rules when it deprived petitioner [Pimentel] of the right to ventilate and prove his objections to the Maguindanao COCs. and (b) COMPELLING or ORDERING respondent NBC and its deputy. plenary powers in fully or accurately ascertaining due execution. The NBC. however. maintaining that the said PCOC did not reflect the true results of the elections because it was based on the manufactured Maguindanao MCOCs. authenticity and fitness for the canvass of the MCOCs collected by the Comelec in the exercise of such broad plenary powers. or. 2007 elections ("NBC") of including. 2007. and k) that it has not been established that the other copies of the MCOCs have been lost. j) that the manner the "re-canvassing" which was being done where the parties are not allowed to ask questions was patently illegal. In the proceedings before the NBC. g) the serial numbers of the MCOCs are not clearly stamped. The second Maguindanao PCOC was thus included in the canvass proceedings conducted by the NBC and. f) there was no evidence or indication that the copy 2 MCOCs had been posted as intended by law. on June 29.000 votes. and she was ordered to sit down or she would be forcibly evicted from the session hall. manifestations. h) copy 2 of the MCOCs cannot be used for canvass. Pimentel’s lead over Zubiri was significantly reduced from 133. The respondent NBC acted with manifest grave abuse of discretion when it refused to exercise its broad. and objections made by Pimentel’s counsel. improper. allowing petitioner [Pimentel] to substantiate his claim of manufactured results and . III. 2007. Forthwith ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondent Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators for the May 14. the authenticity and due execution of which had not been duly established. the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for Maguindanao. in order to maintain and preserve the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of this Petition. After proper proceedings. so as not to render the issues raised in this Petition moot and academic.3 Pimentel seeks from this Court the following remedies: 1. unworthy and unfit for canvass. on June 25. Pimentel’s counsel thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass. Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCsMaguindanao and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. i) that the MCOCs are therefore. as well as those made by the other candidates’ counsels. On 29 June 2007. resultantly. II. in the event that the proclamation of Respondent Zubiri is made before the application for a TRO is acted upon.] no watcher signed. were simply noted by the SPBOC-Maguindanao without specific action thereon.ISSUE A STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER requiring the parties to observe the status quo at the time of the filing of the Petition. Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the laws. the SPBOC. in the national canvass of votes for Senators the results from the Province of Maguindanao as reflected in its new/second Provincial Certificate of Canvass as well as the proceedings and acts of the respondent Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao ("SPBOC") in canvassing or "re-canvassing" the collected MCOCs. 2007 Elections for Senators) based on the on-going senatorial canvass which includes the new/second Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Maguindanao. anchored on the following grounds: I.d) there is no basis for saying the MCOCs were authentic because there were no other available copies for comparison purposes. refused to grant her request. leading to the preparation of the new/second PCOC for Maguindanao. including. and in obvious partiality to Zubiri. to perform their ministerial constitutional duty of fully determining the due execution and authenticity of the MCOCs.000 votes to only 4. but not limited to. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to equal protection of the law when the respondent SPBOC and the respondent NBC unconstitutionally adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the canvass of COCs from Maguindanao. in the alternative. 26 and 27. The motion to exclude made by Pimentel’s counsel was once again denied by the NBC. 2007 elections ("NBC") from proceeding with any proclamation (of the twelfth and last winner of the May 14. RENDER JUDGMENT: (a) ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE for being unconstitutional and illegal the proceedings and acts of respondent Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators for the May 14. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to due process of law when the respondent SPBOC and the respondent NBC adopted an unconstitutional procedure which disallowed the petitioner [Pimentel] the opportunity to raise questions on the COCs subject of the canvass. Pimentel thus filed the Petition at bar on 4 July 2007. pre-proclamation controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation. among other remedies. Zubiri (with 11. After a close scrutiny of the allegations. said prayer was deemed denied for failure to garner the required majority vote. the canvass proceedings before the NBC continued. the nature of the duty of canvassing boards. Pimentel argued that Aggabao cannot be applied to the instant Petition because of the difference in the factual backgrounds of the two cases. the Chairpersons of the former PBOC and SPBOC of Maguindanao and the Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Maguindanao. while in the present case. Commission on Elections. under the premises. Pimentel prayed for the denial of Zubiri’s Motion to Dismiss.12 dated 14 July 2007. Moreover. On 23 August 2007. 178413 before this Court and SET Case No. custody and appearance of election returns and certificates of canvass. In the meantime. or any matter raised under Sections 233. Santos. 7166. primarily. but adding the reference to the certificates of canvass. No. that Pimentel filed an Election Protest (Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam) before the SET on 30 July 2007. "there are now two cases involving the same parties with practically the same issues and similar remedies sought filed before the two (2) separate courts/tribunals.propound questions to the officers concerned. docketed as SET Case No. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. and the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao. custody and appearance of the election returns. 7166. Definition. Pimentel’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order was set for oral arguments on 13 July 2007. with Zubiri submitting his Memorandum9 on 31 July 2007. Pimentel asserted that his Petition questioned not Zubiri’s proclamation. Pimentel filed before this Court his Comment/Opposition (to Private Respondent’s Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss). 241. as follows: SEC. receipt. NBC.4 Pursuant to the Resolution5 dated 10 July 2007 issued by this Court. and by 14 July 2007. and the extent of allowable pre-proclamation controversies in Senatorial elections. and evidence presented by all the parties before this Court.15 Pimentel alleged that Zubiri’s Motion to Dismiss solely relied on Aggabao v. identified the issues that may be subject of a pre-proclamation controversy. The parties were then directed to submit their respective Memoranda. 9369. 234. in consideration of his proclamation pursuant to Resolution No. Pimentel. to serve for a term of six years beginning 30 June 2007 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. providing for synchronized national and local elections. On 19 July 2007.10 on 1 August 2007.8 All the parties complied. but the conduct of the canvass proceedings before the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao. it issued Resolution No. Emilio S. and SPBOC-Maguindanao collectively sought the denial of Pimentel’s application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Status Quo Ante Order and the dismissal of the instant Petition. controversies involving his election and qualification as a Senator are now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). 001-07. Based on the foregoing.292 votes over Pimentel.099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10. 7859. After hearing the parties’ oral arguments. without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the Court. after which. Zubiri called the attention of the Court to the "glaring reality" that with G. while the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindano. COMELEC Resolution No. Pimentel prays.R. Petitioner [Pimentel] also prays for other reliefs. Under Republic Act No. In Aggabao.11 on 10 August 2007." Zubiri also pointed out Pimentel’s ostensible failure to inform this Court of his institution of SET Case No.807 votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections. 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation. 881. chaired by Atty. this Court rules to dismiss the present Petition. transmission. dated 17 April 2007. Zubiri further informed the Court through a Manifestation. NBC 07-67. Pimentel already filed his Petition before this Court prior to the proclamation of Zubiri as Senator. the Court voted seven for the grant and seven for the denial of Pimentel’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order. transmission. NBC 07-67 and his formal assumption of office on 16 July 2007. to wit: . Zubiri filed with this Court a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss. 001-07 and the subsequent developments therein.004.17 amending Sections 30 and 15 of Republic Act No. Pre-proclamation controversy/case A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. He maintained that his case was one of first impression and no existing jurisprudence could be used as precedent for its summary dismissal.19 Essentially reiterating Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Counter-Protest and Petition for a Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses) on 13 August 2007. receipt. The respondents Zubiri. otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.16 However. 001-07 before the SET. thus. to which Zubiri filed his Answer Ad Cautelam (With Special Affirmative Defenses. Since the NBC found that the remaining uncanvassed certificates of canvass would no longer materially affect Zubiri’s lead of 19.13 Zubiri sought the dismissal of the Petition at bar arguing that. Zubiri filed his Comment6 on the Petition at bar on 12 July 2007. In his election protest. for the annulment of Zubiri’s proclamation as the twelfth winning Senator in the 14 May 2007 elections. Pimentel then reiterated his arguments in his Memorandum that Sections 37 and 38 of Republic Act No. significantly affected and changed the nature of canvass proceedings. therein petitioner Aggabao filed his Petition before this Court after the proclamation of therein private respondent Miranda as Congressman for the Fourth District of Isabela. arguments. just and equitable.14 dated 16 August 2007. filed their joint Comment7 on even date. proclaiming Zubiri as the twelfth duly elected Senator of the Philippines in the 14 May 2007 elections.18 respectively.984. 2) The canvassed election returns/certificates of canvass are incomplete. 17. and Members of the House of Representatives. 7166: SEC. – For purposes of the elections for President. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial. However.SEC. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. read: SEC.21 The law. transmission. shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. 9369. for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. Vice-President. and 4) When substitute or fraudulent election return/certificates of canvass were canvassed. after the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 19. appear to be tampered with or falsified. recognizes an exception and allows the canvassing body motu proprio or an interested person to file a written complaint for the correction of manifest errors in the election returns or certificates of canvass even in elections for President. no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation. 234. considering that the effect of said delay is. 21 and 22 hereof. and Member of the House of Representatives. Senator. it would appear that any pre-proclamation case relating to the preparation. threats. According to Section 16 of Republic Act No. transmission. SEC. matters raised under Sections 233. now reads: . However. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President. prior to its amendment. Section 15 of Republic Act No. However. since such cases do not directly relate to the certificate of canvass or election returns. or intimidation. proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented. or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district boards of canvassers in Metro Manila Area. Vice-President. Pre-proclamation cases to resolve pre-proclamation controversies are allowed in local elections.22 To be manifest. City and Municipal Offices. this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. Senators. 18. All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed. in the case of national offices for which there is no hold over. 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced. or contain discrepancies in the same returns/certificates or in the other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233. receipt. or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic. However. when these cases question the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers before the board itself or the COMELEC. custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass. custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass. Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof. 37. 7166. city and municipal officer shall be allowed and shall be governed by Sections 17. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. coercion. 16. receipt. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. – Pre-proclamation cases involving provincial. custody and appreciation of the election returns. was prohibited in elections for President. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. 20. Vice-President. 7166 was then worded. as to elections for President. Vice-President. As Section 15 of Republic Act No. as the case may be. – The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy: 1) Illegal composition or proceedings of the Board of Canvassers. Vice-President. and Member of the House of Representatives. 3) The election returns/certificates of canvass were prepared under duress. The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election. 7166. transmission. contain material defects.23 The law likewise permits pre-proclamation cases in elections for President. VicePresident. to leave the office without any incumbent. receipt. nonetheless. 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code. 15. Senator. Section 15 of Republic Act No. Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers. and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board of canvassers only. pre-proclamation cases are prohibited. – Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission. Proceedings which may delay the proclamation of the winning candidate beyond the date20 set for the beginning of his term of office must be avoided. the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. 234. and (4) there exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided. upon request of the presidential. However. but also on COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators. certificate of canvass or statement of votes. but also with the supporting documents. 7166. 9369. which was likewise amended by Republic Act No. the procedure on preproclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Sections 17. and their corresponding votes in words and figures. such as the statements of votes.) The highlighted portions in the afore-quoted section identify the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. According to the amended Section 15. as the case may be. Vice-President. custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass shall be allowed in elections for President. duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province. respectively. 881. appears to be incomplete the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission. receipt. custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice. 18. senator. for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-Presidentor senator. Section 30 of Republic Act No. incompleteness. shall. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President. permissible pre-proclamation cases shall adopt and apply the procedure provided in Sections 17 to 20 of the same . – Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice-president and senators. Vice-President. vice-president. signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them. 9369. Vice-President. Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers. shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of their respective proceedings. (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or in any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate. That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy. (Emphasis supplied. or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area. and member of the House of Representatives. Congress or the Commission en banc. no pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation. and Member of the House of Representatives. 7166 by adding an excepting phrase to the general prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. as the case may be. no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation. 7166. 19 and 20 . (3) a fourth criterion for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass was added. (4) pursuant to the exception now provided in Section 15 of Republic Act No. certificate of canvass or statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a simulated image. (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice-president or senator. as the case may be shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery the election returns from polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. shall be guilty of an election offense and shall be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. provides: SEC. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President:The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators:Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. specifically: (1) the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass is now imposed. (2) the third criterion for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass requires the absence of discrepancy in comparison not only with other authentic copies of the said certificates. on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed. erasure or alteration as mentioned above. this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. transmission.) Republic Act No. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the election. as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local board of canvassers. 9369. When the certificate of canvass. 15. or a printed copy of an election return. receipt. except as provided for in Section 30 hereof. as the case may be. 9369 significantly amended Section 15 of Republic Act No.SEC. Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof. except as provided by Section 30 of the same statute. city or district. transmission. Senator. not only on Congress acting as the NBC for the election for President and Vice-President. as amended by Republic Act No. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. (Emphasis supplied. count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it. – For purposes of the elections for president. mandating the absence of discrepancy between the number of votes of a candidate in a certificate when compared with the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of the precincts covered by the same certificate. vice-presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party. 30. In case of any discrepancy. Any person who presents in evidence a simulated copy of an election return. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act No.29 and to substantiate his claim that the Maguindanao MCOCs are palpably manufactured and are not fit for canvass. in the conduct of its canvass proceedings. receipt. since such a case is prohibited in elections for Senators. as amended by Republic Act No. The Petition at bar Pimentel’s objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs delve into "matters relating to the preparation. properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs. A pre-proclamation case under Section 30 is allowed only as an exception to the prohibition under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166. 7166. There is no ambiguity in the said provision. Vice-President. All that is called for is to apply the statutory command. and (5) the use of a simulated copy of an election return. or a printed copy of said election documents bearing a simulated certification or image shall be penalized as an election offense. in elections for President. This is a case where the law is clear. at least. and Senators. Exceptio firmat regulim in casibus non exceptis. custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. 9369. of Republic Act No. 7166. as amended by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. exceptions. as amended by Republic Act No. custody and appreciation" of the said MCOCs by the SPBOC-Maguindanao. This Court rules for the respondents. in this case.30 He is raising issues related to the tampering with. which are properly the subject of a preproclamation controversy. are strictly. and not to local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies. falsification of. receipt. 7166. there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition. No interpretation is needed. 7166. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions. when was it accomplished. Ultimately. 9369.28 because of the supposed mysterious circumstances surrounding the loss or unavailability of any other copy of the said MCOCs. and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. transmission. as amended by Republic Act No. how was it posted x x x". Pimentel. but reasonably construed.31 Pimentel insists that the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC should hear his observations.25 1926 and 2027 of Republic Act No. namely: (1) Congress as the NBC for the election for President and Vice-President. those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule. or statement of vote. In sum. 9369. the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation. Undeniably. or discrepancies in the Maguindanao MCOCs. transmission. namely: (1) correction of manifest errors.32 Even if there is still a need for this Court to construe Section 30 of Republic Act No. pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President. accept his evidence. 33 A maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the expressed exception or exemption excludes others. 7166. as to whom it imposes the duty. According to the rules of statutory construction. certificate of canvass.24 18. as its name suggests. specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic Act No. this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. was constituted to be of the same stature and to perform the same function as the PBOC-Maguindano: to canvass the Maguindanao MCOCs and prepare the Maguindanao PCOC to be submitted to the NBC. conversely. and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for the election for Senators. as a general rule. however. the exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC. It speaks in a language that is categorical. and rule on his objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs in what would undeniably be a pre-proclamation case. which were mostly copy 2 or the copy for the wall. 7166. 9369. As with other general rules. it is too plain to be misread. what Pimentel seeks is that his pre-proclamation case be given due course by the boards of canvassers.statute. Proceedings before the SPBOC-Maguindanao The SPBOC-Maguindanao. The SPBOC-Maguindanao. Indeed. Vice-President. . (2) questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers. as amended by Republic Act No. as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17. 9369. argues that his pre-proclamation case is an exception to the prohibition pursuant to Section 30. He decries the denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC of the opportunity to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCsMaguindanao on "where did that copy 2 come from. as amended by Republic Act No. they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants. Respondents contend that Pimentel cannot initiate and pursue a pre-proclamation case before the SPBOC-Maguindanao or the NBC. 9369. It is quite explicit. 7166. the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies. it still cannot extend the scope of said provision to local boards of canvassers. even after its amendment by Republic Act No.34 And. the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 9369. for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. what was the basis. with the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four given criteria. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions. He suspects the authenticity and due execution of the Maguindanao MCOCs used by the SPBOC-Maguindanao in its canvass. in relation to Section 15. It is also significant to note that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, prohibits preproclamation cases in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives; while Section 30 of the same statute, as amended, refers only to elections forPresident, Vice-President and Senators. The intent of the Legislature to confine the application of Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, only to Congress or the COMELEC en bancacting as the NBC thus becomes even more evident, considering that the said provision does not apply to elections for Members of the House of Representatives. It must be borne in mind that only the votes for national elective positions such as the President, Vice-President, and Senators are canvassed by the NBC. The canvassing of votes for local elective positions, including those for Members of the House of Representatives, end with the local boards of canvassers. Therefore, it would be contrary to the legislative intent to extend Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, even to the canvass proceedings before local boards of canvassers. This Court can only conclude that the canvass proceedings before local boards of canvassers in elections for Senators are unaffected by the amendment of Republic Act No. 7166 by Republic Act No. 9369. They still remain administrative and summary in nature, so as to guard against the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation proceedings that would lead to a vacuum in so important and sensitive office as that of Senator of the Republic.35 For the same reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the four criteria enumerated by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, are not mandatory on local boards of canvassers in their determination of authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to them. It is already well-settled that the local boards of canvassers, as well as the SPBOC-Maguindanao in this case, may proceed with the canvassing of the election returns or certificates of canvass for as long as they appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.36 Boards of canvassers are ad hoc bodies that exist only for the interim task of canvassing election returns. They do not have the facilities, the time and even the competence to hear, examine and decide on alleged election irregularities, unlike regular courts or the COMELEC itself or the electoral tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House), which are regular agencies of government tasked and equipped for the purpose. While this Court has time and again expressed its abhorrence of the nefarious "grab the proclamation and prolong the protest" strategy of some candidates, nonetheless, it recognizes the very limited jurisdiction of MBOCs and PBOCs. Unless Pimentel is able to show cogently and clearly his entitlement to the summary exclusion of clearly unacceptable certificates of canvass, this Court must uphold the constitutional and legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions and authenticity of official documents.37 The burden is upon Pimentel to establish that the Maguindanao MCOCs are manufactured, and that it is evident on the face thereof. Pimentel’s insistence on being allowed to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao reveals that, although he has his suspicions, he has yet no actual evidence that the Maguindanao MCOCs were indeed manufactured. Moreover, Pimentel’s main objection to the Maguindanao MCOCs used in the canvass by the SPBOC-Maguindanao is that they are mostly copy 2 or the copy intended to be posted on the wall. According to Section 43 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7859, dated 17 April 2007, the MBOCs must transmit copy 1 of the MCOCs to the PBOC for use in the provincial canvassing of votes. The SPBOCMaguindanao was compelled to use copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs in the absence of copy 1 thereof. The fact that copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs was not the copy meant for the PBOC-Maguindanao does not necessarily mean that copy 2 of the said MCOCs was manufactured, falsified or tampered with. All the seven copies of the MCOCs required to be prepared by the MBOCs should be considered duplicate originals.38 Just like copy 1 of the MCOCs, copy 2 should be afforded the presumption of authenticity as an official document prepared by the MBOCs-Maguindanao in the regular performance of their official functions. Copy 2 is no less authentic than all the other copies of the MCOCs although it may be more susceptible to manufacture, falsification, or tampering. If the manufacture, falsification, or tampering of copy 2 of the MCOCs is not apparent on its face, the burden to prove the same falls on the candidate making the allegation in a regular election protest. At least as far as the proceedings before the local boards of canvassers are concerned, this Court’s ruling in Pangarungan v. Commission on Elections39 still holds true: it is not required that all the other copies of the election returns or certificates of canvass be taken into account and compared with one another before one of them, determined to be authentic, may be used or included in the canvass. The SPBOC-Maguindanao determined that copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs is authentic and duly executed on its face, while Pimentel insists otherwise. This issue involves the appreciation of copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs by the SPBOC-Maguindanao, the proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy, which, as this Court already declared, is still prohibited in proceedings before local boards of canvassers for elections for Senators. The resolution of the issues raised by Pimentel as to the irregularities and suspicious circumstances surrounding the Maguindanao MCOCs, which appear prima facie regular on their face, compels or necessitates the piercing of the veil of the said MCOCs. These issues, however, are more appropriate in a regular election protest, wherein the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.40 Proceedings before the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for elections for Senators Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentel’s request to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC. As already declared by this Court, the NBC has the duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four criteria enumerated in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. It has not been established to the satisfaction of this Court that the NBC failed to comply with its duty under said provision. Pimentel asserts that in the absence of all the other copies of the Maguindanao MCOCs, except copy 2, there is no way to apply the third criterion under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. According to this criterion for authenticity and due execution of a certificate of canvass, there must exist no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate or in any of its supporting documents such as the statement of votes by city/municipality/precinct and no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate. Pimentel posits that without any other copies available for comparison, then copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs cannot be deemed authentic and duly executed. While it is true that having only one copy of the certificate of canvass may raise problems as to the determination by the NBC of its authenticity and due execution since there are no other copies to compare it with, such is not the situation in the Petition at bar. According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the PCOC to the NBC. For the 14 May 2007 senatorial elections, the NBC excluded from the national canvass the Bedol PCOC submitted by the PBOC-Maguindanao after it found the same to be tainted by irregularities and statistical improbabilities. Thereafter, the SPBOC-Maguindanao was created, which re-canvassed the Maguindanao MCOCs and prepared and submitted to the NBC the second Maguindanao PCOC. Hence, the four criteria enumerated in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, must be applied by the NBC to the second Maguindanao PCOC. The authenticity and due execution of the Maguindanao MCOCs, which had already been determined by the SPBOC-Maguindanao, are no longer in issue before the NBC. To allow Pimentel to revive again before the NBC the issue of authenticity and due execution of the Maguindanao MCOCs after a determination thereof by the SPBOCMaguindanao is like granting him an appeal, a remedy which is without any statutory or regulatory basis. The SPBOC-Maguindanao prepared all seven copies of the second Maguindanao PCOC. It properly submitted the first copy to the NBC for national canvassing of the votes for Senators. All the six other copies are in existence and have been distributed to the intended recipients. There is no allegation or proof that there is a discrepancy among the seven authentic copies of the second Maguindanao PCOC. Neither is it shown that the second Maguindanao PCOC contains any discrepancy when compared with its supporting documents. It would thus appear to this Court that the second Maguindanao PCOC passed the third criterion for its authenticity and due execution as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. As for the three other criteria, there is no sufficient allegation, much less proof, that the NBC did not apply them to the second Maguindanao PCOC or that the second Maguindanao PCOC actually failed to meet any of them. Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before the NBC to still question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC from the national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and due execution had been determined by the NBC in accordance with the criteria provided by the law. Due process and equal protection of the law Pimentel alleges that the proceedings before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao disallowing him from asking certain election officials, such as PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, questions regarding the Maguindanao PCOC and MCOCs, deprived him of his right to due process. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,41 this Court already provided a discourse on due process, to wit: The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law x x x." There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government’s action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he has not established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the canvassing of votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had been proclaimed. May he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a property right which he cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue and settle them for him. Pimentel only made a sweeping claim that in the canvass proceedings of the Maguindanao votes before the NBC and the SPBOCMaguindanao, he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process, both procedural and substantive. After going over his allegations, however, and the definition of substantive due process, this Court finds that Pimentel cannot invoke denial of substantive due process because he is not assailing any law, which, arbitrarily or without sufficient justification, supposedly deprived him of life, liberty, or property. At most, Pimentel can claim that he was denied procedural due process when he was not allowed by the NBC and the SPBOCMaguindanao to propound questions to certain election officials. But even on this point, Pimentel fails to convince this Court. Asking election officials questions and confronting them with evidence are not part of the canvass proceedings. There is no statute or regulation expressly providing for such a procedure. Any objection or manifestation concerning a certificate of canvass before the NBC, as well as any contest involving the inclusion or exclusion of an election return or certificate of canvass before a local board of canvassers, must be orally submitted to the Chairperson of the NBC or the local board of canvassers, as the case may be. Simultaneous with the oral submission, the party concerned must submit his written objection, manifestation, or contest in the form required. The objection, manifestation, or contest shall also be recorded in the minutes of the canvass. In the event that the NBC or local board of canvassers shall determine that there is a proper case for the objection, manifestation, or contest submitted, it shall automatically defer the canvass of the assailed election return or certificate of canvass. Within 24 hours from the submission of the objection, manifestation, or contest, the party concerned shall submit his evidence which shall be attached to his written objection, manifestation, or contest. Within the same 24hour period, any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection, manifestation, or contest. Upon receipt of the evidence, the NBC or the local board of canvassers shall take up the assailed election return or certificate of canvass, and after considering the objection, manifestation or contest, together with the opposition thereto and the evidences submitted, shall summarily and immediately rule thereon.42 The afore-described procedure does not provide any party the opportunity to question and confront election officials and other witnesses. It may have been allowed on occasion by the boards of canvassers, but it does not necessarily ripen into a legally demandable right. Again, canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature. As for local boards of canvassers, in elections for Senators, they only need to determine the authenticity and due execution of the election returns or certificates of canvass on the face thereof. As for the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass shall be limited only to those submitted before it by the local boards of canvassers and in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. The limitations on the powers and duties of the boards of canvassers are meant to avoid any delay in the proclamation of the elected official. Issues whose resolution would require the presentation and examination of witnesses are more properly raised in a regular election protest. And as a final observation on the matter of due process, this Court notes that although Pimentel was not able to propound questions to the election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, he was still able, through his counsel, to state his observations, manifestations, and objections regarding the said certificates, which were duly noted.43 He may not have received the response or action that he wanted with respect to his observations, manifestations, and objections, but Pimentel cannot deny that these were heard and presented in the canvass proceedings. Pimentel further admitted that he did not submit his written observations, manifestations, and objections as the rules of procedure before the NBC and the local boards of canvassers require.44 He cannot now decry that his observations, manifestations, and objections were not given due course when he himself failed to comply with the procedure governing the same. Equally baseless is Pimentel’s averment that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated when the NBC and the SPBOCMaguindanao adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the canvass of the Maguindanao MCOCs, different from the procedure adopted in the canvass of the certificates of canvass from other provinces/areas. Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.45 According to Pimentel, he was deprived of equal protection of the laws when he was not allowed to question the election officials involved in the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao, although he was allowed to do so for other provinces or districts. In support of his claim, Pimentel compared his own experiences in the canvass proceedings for different provinces or districts. This Court, however, finds Pimentel’s assessment misplaced. What would have been essential for Pimentel to allege and prove was that other senatorial candidates were allowed during the canvass proceedings to question the election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, while he was not; and that the other senatorial candidates were given undue favor, while he was the only one unjustly discriminated against. It seems apparent to this Court that the position of the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC not to allow, during the canvass proceedings, the questioning of election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, was consistent for all senatorial candidates. Hence, petitioner was similarly situated with all the other senatorial candidates and they were all treated alike insofar as the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao were concerned. Electoral protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) Pimentel’s Petition is for Certiorari and Mandamus, both governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. A special civil action for certiorari may be filed under the following circumstances: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.46 The extraordinary remedy of mandamus, on the other hand, may be availed of under the conditions provided below: RULE 65, SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. The writ of mandamus shall be issued only if the legal right to be enforced is well defined, clear and certain. It lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.47 To avail of both special civil actions, there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the petitioner, and in this, Pimentel’s Petition falters. It must be kept in mind that Zubiri was proclaimed the twelfth Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections on 14 July 2007, and that he formally assumed office on 16 July 2007. In accordance with this Court’s ruling in Aggabao, Pimentel’s Petition must be dismissed, for his recourse lies, not with this Court, but with the SET. This Court elucidated in Aggabao48 that: Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections we ruled that: The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft Jr. and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. and Senators.of jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate. this Court has already established in the preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition. while Section 15. as it does. 7166. must be shunned. now a member of the Senate. has already been proclaimed as the winner in the congressional elections in the fourth district of Quezon City. considering the premises. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which has been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith. the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction to hear the protest. and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives. The afore-quoted pronouncements are likewise applicable to the Petition at bar. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative. Grounds which are proper for electoral protests should not be allowed to delay the proclamation of . the remedy open to the petitioner was to have filed an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. Thus: Finally. Commission on Elections. certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. a contest relating to the election of Zubiri. once a winning candidate has been proclaimed. Since Pimentel’s prayer for a TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order had been denied. with due regard to the people’s mandate. Zubiri was proclaimed the twelfth winning Senator in the 2007 Senatorial Elections. has taken his oath of office as such. In this case. Pimentel further claims that he is not challenging Zubiri’s proclamation. Finally. petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. except for the permissible pre-proclamation controversies. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. Thus. hence. then logically and necessarily.49 this Court similarly ruled that the word "sole" in Article VI. It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving. It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed. COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election. to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. but rather the conduct of the proceedings before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. as amended by Republic Act No. taken his oath. petitioner’s remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET. 2004. In Lazatin v. The provisions in question did not materially change the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal. of Republic Act No. Thus: (I)n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised. which still remain summary and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the elected official with as little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the new term of office. did introduce an additional exception to the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President. His remedy is not this petition for certiorari. Pimentel attempts to bring his case outside the jurisprudential precedent set by Aggabao. Thus: The petition is impressed with merit because the petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga. and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates. 9369. that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election. Pimentel cannot deny that he assails the canvass proceedings because he believes that the annulment and setting aside thereof would result in his winning as the twelfth Senator in the 14 May 2007 elections. in relation to Section 30. and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Zubiri’s proclamation must also be annulled and set aside. The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. returns. That Pimentel filed the present Petition prior to Zubiri’s proclamation is insignificant. Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective members. for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies. and qualifications ends. returns. taken his oath and assumed office on June 14. This is just a roundabout argument. upon proclamation of the winning candidate and despite its alleged invalidity. but to no avail. After the proclamation. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari and mandamus on matters which may be threshed out in an election contest. Vice-President. As such. This Court deems it necessary to stress that attempts to delay the canvass proceedings. with the references therein to the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over election protests involving members of the House of Representatives also being true for the SET as regards election protests involving Senators. the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte. In Chavez v. is a matter that is also addressed. and if he is the rightful winner. Commission on Elections we ruled that. and assumed his duties as Congressman. The reason for this ruling is self-evident. women. a period commonly fraught with tension and danger for the public at large. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET).Respondents. 2010 DARYL GRACE J.. petitioner Jovito S. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections. Cristina Palabay. to the Legislative Department of the Government and to ask that Department to strike a new and different equilibrium in the balancing of the public interests at stake. On July 16. SO ORDERED.. No. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10. 2009 respondent HRET issued an order. . Palparan. the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. petitioner Daryl Grace J. and Agustin C..R.. LUCABAN. of course. x . which merely interprets faithfully existing statutory norms. For those who disagree with that public policy. JR. No costs. 2009. ABAYON. Jr.. to engage in judicial legislation and in effect to rewrite portions of the Omnibus Election Code. G... All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee.R.. Antonio Flores. In G.. Erlinda Cadapan. and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. ERLINDA CADAPAN.. Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers. Reyes. RENATO M.. that public policy. and not Abayon who was just its nominee. Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Petitioner. said Abayon. Respondents Perfecto C. RONYL S. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL..2 prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari. JR. the appropriate recourse is not to ask this Court to abandon case law. The Facts and the Case In G. Jr. PALPARAN. since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors..50 It may well be true that public policy may occasionally permit the occurrence of "grab the proclamation and prolong the protest" situations. DOROGA.1 The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17. were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ. however.. The appropriate recourse is. petitioner Abayon.51 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. Ronyl S. CRISTINA PALABAY. vs. filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee. in HRET Case 07-041.the winners. Doroga. 2004. Renato M. Respondents. petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization.R. JR. vs... Lucaban. 189466 February 11. youth... DR. Finally. REYNALDO LESACA.. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca. Dela Cruz. balances the possibility of such situations against the shortening of the period during which no winners are proclaimed. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.R.. dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. PERFECTO C. all registered voters. 189506. J. DECISION ABAD.-x G. REYES... 189506 CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. 189466.. Petitioner... JR. she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.: These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress. a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Jr. and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives. urban poor. Jr.. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives.. No. she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives. the State shall develop and guarantee a full.The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national.A.Shortly after the elections. that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Since the two cases raise a common issue. says petitioner Abayon. They have the same deliberative rights. such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector.4 hence. as provided by law. 2009. 5. and those who. vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. not their parties or organizations. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. petitioner Palparan. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented. before that party-list group. the victims of communist rebels. and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. and sectoral parties or organizations. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives. although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections. it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office. Declaration of Policy. it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. If at all. Consequently. in HRET Case 07-040. Towards this end. Section 5. free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party. . . and emoluments. Once elected. The Court’s Ruling Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R. The Issue Presented The common issue presented in these two cases is: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations. and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants. any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. But. he said. Article VI of the Constitution. Indeed. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.5 identifies who the "members" of that House are: Sec.) 7941. the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition. who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections. HRET. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay. from the Constitution’s point of view. however. through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10. For Palparan. which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. the Court has caused their consolidation. (Underscoring supplied) Clearly. regional. however. both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. salaries. namely. to become members of the House of Representatives." thus: Sec. Such question must be brought. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules. and security guards. Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs). the Party-List System Act. respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition forquo warranto against Bantay and its nominee. not he. respectively. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members. the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national. 2. Bantay’s personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him." This means that. who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces. These representatives are elected. organizations and parties. 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. unless otherwise fixed by law. and sectoral parties or organizations. regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof. cities. the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. former rebels. On July 23. the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees. regional. shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national. not before the HRET. (1). and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. echoing the Constitution. vs.. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.. to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. 192769 . No. What is inevitable is that Section 17. 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23. In the cases before the Court. those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent.1avvphi1 In case of a nominee of the youth sector. the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16.. respectively. 2009 in HRET Case 07-040. he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. G.R.. able to read and write. WHEREFORE. the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.. such vote.. initially. Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to. Parenthetically. 191998 December 7. Petitioners. in appropriate cases. once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature. and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon. No." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party... 7941. ROSALES. SO ORDERED. and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. 9. who..8 But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position. the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. This is true. Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. a registered voter. although the Party-List System Act does not so state. Commission on Elections. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties..-x G.."7 It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay.. in the end. eventually. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.. would be a vote for its nominees. the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives... as pointed out above. and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.6 a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives.. 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10. would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are.. the COMELEC seems to believe. states: Sec.. 2009 and Resolution 09183 dated September 17. Section 9 of R. Since. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.10 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. 2010 WALDEN F. that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. among other things. By analogy with the cases of district representatives..A. bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.R. x . (Underscoring supplied) As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Respondent.. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and. Qualification of Party-List Nominees.. . Subsequently. Petitioner. 2010 its initial "List of Political Parties/Sectoral Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the May 10. represented by TEODORO CASIÑO. the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2009. 2010. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. OCAMPO. filed with the COMELEC another petition for disqualification against Arroyo. 2010.: We resolve the three (3) consolidated1 special civil actions for certiorari. namely: Natural Resources..4 Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence5 to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s. Ethics and Privileges.-x G. Saturnino C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO. RESOLUTION BRION.. 2010.. the COMELEC may motu proprio effect the disqualification of party-list nominees who violate any of the limitations mentioned in Section 7 of the Resolution. 2010 elections.... Maza. on March 23. Justice.. On March 30. represented by Neri Colmenares." Arroyo was listed as AGPP’s first nominee. the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List.. the certiorari petitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized and underrepresented sector. rules or regulations of the Commission.. vs. 2010. and that (d) AGPP is not a legitimate and qualified party-list group and has no authority to nominate him. organization.Respondents. It likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list groups and nominees to make the required documentary submissions.11 in relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. (c) is a member of the House of Representatives. gathered from the pleadings. The Factual Antecedents The common factual antecedents. 794112 (the Party. No.. Fisheries Resources. the deadline for submitting the requirements mentioned in Section 6 of the latter Resolution was on March 29. Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires that the party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. 88073 which prescribed the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes of the May 10. 192832 BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST.13 The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized and the underrepresented.8 in relation to Section 6 of Resolution No. 2010 elections. National Defense and Security.. if not already complied with prior to the effectivity of the Resolution. (b) the Chairman of the House’s Energy Committee.15 In his Answer.List System Act). represented by Teodoro Casiño. but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives. 8807.7 Section 8 of Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also states that the COMELEC may cancel motu proprio the registration of any party registered under the party-list system for failure to comply with applicable laws. 8696. mandamus and prohibition that commonly aim to disqualify respondent Juan Miguel "Mikey" Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) in the May 10... J. 8646.14 On this basis. Aquaculture. COMELEC. 2010 elections. organizations and parties. Respondents. the sector which the AGPP represents – tricycle drivers and security guards – because he is not only a member of the First Family. Transportation and Ways and Means. (collectively referred to as certiorari petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification10 against Arroyo. Arroyo counter-argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over issues involving the qualifications of party-list nominees. not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.18 .. MAZA and SATURNINO C. and. AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10. and to the sectoral party. vs. (b) has not been a bona fide member of AGPP ninety (90) days prior to the May 10.9 On March 25. Public Works and Highways.. pursuant to Resolution No. On November 29. 2010 elections. particularly. Petitioners. Ocampo. (c) a member of key committees in the House. political party or coalition they seek to represent. the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. x .6 Under Section 10 of the same Resolution.2 On March 25.16 When the COMELEC published on March 26.R. petitioners Liza L.... 2010. are briefly summarized below. citing in this regard the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.LIZA L.. 2010 elections with their respective Nominees.17 It alleged that Arroyo is not qualified to be a party-list nominee because he (a) does not represent or belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector.. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO of Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List. AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees. and Bayan Muna Party-List. Reyes. to sit in the House of Representatives. Rosales (mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter requesting for a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP. livelihood and skills program. Nos. 8807. 8807. 19 Meanwhile. 2010 elections.R.In his Answer. and. 2010. and to enjoin the COMELEC from giving due course to the AGPP’s participation in the May 10.25 The COMELEC en banc Ruling The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division’s ruling in its July 19. In the interim.23 It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires the nominee to be "a bona fide member [of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the elections.20 Through a letter dated April 7.31They sought to compel the COMELEC to disqualify motu proprio the AGPP nominees for their failure to comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 2010 elections. and farmers’ day activities. 8807 is ultra vires.28 Thus. the COMELEC Law Department replied that as of that date. the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary evidence required by Resolution No. On July 23 and 29. and. No.32 docketed as G. AGPP obtained in the May 10. only needs to be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent. thereafter. and declare the disqualification of the nominees of AGPP for their failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto39 were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC failed to respond to both letters. His name was.21 They also wrote the COMELEC on April 20. 2010. 8807. entered in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. 2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat.35 On July 21. (2) he is not a bona fide AGPP member for at least ninety (90) days preceding the May 10. 2010. 191998 argue that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in failing to order the motu proprio disqualification of AGPP despite its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements under Section 6 of Resolution No. and (4) his nomination and acceptance of nomination as AGPP’s nominee violate AGPP’s continuing undertaking upon which its petition for registration and accreditation was based and granted. as AGPP’s first nominee.R. the mandamus petitioners filed with this Court their Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. 2009. On the same day.22 The COMELEC Second Division Ruling In its May 7. 192832. 2010. the COMELEC. 8807. since the requirement that a nominee belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is not found in RA 7941."24 It found that Arroyo (a) became a member of the party on November 20. on April 6. (3) in light of these preceding reasons.R.30 docketed as G. consistently with Section 10 of Resolution No. it concluded that Arroyo possessed all the requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941. 8807. the mandamus petitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to act. 2010 consolidated resolution. the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions. the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the Court: (a) direct the COMELEC en banc to review all its decisions in cases for disqualification of nominees and cancellation of registration of party-list groups filed in the May 10. 2010 elections. 2010 Joint Resolution. On the other hand.40 The Petitions The mandamus petitioners in G. proclaimed Arroyo as AGPP’s duly-elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives.38 On July 28 and 29. 2010.R. that a Filipino citizen. (c) actively supported and advanced the projects and programs of the AGPP by regularly attending its meetings.29 On May 7.R. This entitled Arroyo. 2010. Nos. in order to qualify as a party-list nominee. as AGPP’s Representative.36 On the same day.34 to annul the COMELEC Second Division’s May 7. he would not be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislations for the sector he seeks to represent. 2010. the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petitions for disqualification against Arroyo. in compliance with Section 6 of Resolution No. Arroyo took his oath of office. No. among others. the certiorari petitioners in G. 2010 elections. (b) in giving due course to the participation of AGPP and its nominees in the May 10. 19276933 and 192832.27 The COMELEC en banc also held that Section 6 of Resolution No. in line with the eight-point guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong . 2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPP’s nominee. 192769 and 192832 contend in common that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in failing to disqualify Arroyo as AGPP’s nominee since: (1) he does not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector he claims to represent. 2010. for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. 2010 joint resolution and the COMELEC en banc’s July 19. as well as those which have not been resolved. petitioners Walden F. sitting as the National Board of Canvassers. 191998.37 before Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Andres B. Bello and Loretta Ann P.26 It held. the certiorari petitioners elevated their case to this Court via two (2) separate petitions for certiorari. He stated as well that he is a bona fide member of AGPP at least ninety (90) days prior to the elections. On September 7. No. reiterating their letter-request dated April 7. Arroyo reiterated that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over cases involving the qualifications of party-list nominees. 2010. and must likewise be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. (b) actively participated in the undertakings of AGPP and adhered to its advocacies. In G. Nos. to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner." Under Section 2. Yusoph to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for their open defiance of the Court’s Decisions in Ang Bagong Bayani42 and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. oath and assumption to office as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives. Ferrer. and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. the mandamus petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.R. Armando C. under Section 6 of RA 7941. 192769 and 192832 for lack of jurisdiction in view of Arroyo’s proclamation and assumption to office as a Member of the House of Representatives. existing laws or (b) who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a nominee. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). the jurisdiction over issues relating to his qualifications now lies with the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. the registration of any national. prays for the dismissal of the petitions in G. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Nos.41 and (b) order Commissioners Nicodemo T. 2010 elections. In the present case. COMELEC. Similarly. the COMELEC. trust. Tagle. 191998 petition. any interested party may file a verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a partylist organization: SEC. Furthermore. returns. organization or association organized for religious purposes. officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain. Grounds for Disqualification. regional or sectoral party. 8807 (quoted below).R. .R. the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives. Petition for mandamus. 191998). When to file Petition. We deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of the parties’ submissions. 192769 and 192832. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. in relation with Section 4. – Any nominee (a) who does not possess all the qualifications of a nominee as provided for by the Constitution. and proclaiming it a winner. Our Ruling We dismiss the petitions. or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. while under item (b) thereof shall be filed any day not later than the date of proclamation. alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent. and there is no other plain. For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G. Lucenito N. — When any tribunal. (3) It is a foreign party or organization. after due notice and hearing. No. Despite notice. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party. the OSG failed to comment on the G. or station.43 The Case for the Respondents In G. (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal. – The petition under item (a) of Section 2 shall be filed five (5) days after the last day for filing of the list of nominees. Section 4. Arroyo counter-argues that the petitions should be dismissed outright because upon his proclamation. remove or cancel. No. 6. which provides: SEC. (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to AGPP’s participation in the May 10. corporation. Issues The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP’s nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPP’s registration. the canvassing of AGPP’s votes. and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. of COMELEC Resolution No. any interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee: Section 2. 3. organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Velasco and Elias R. board. immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court.Bayani.R. R. they are.R. foreign political party. Section 5.46 Thus.. foundation. whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes. (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws. Article VI of the Constitution. so that a declaration thereon (in this case. Nos.. although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections. who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces. "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. Unfortunately for the mandamuspetitioners. may be used only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief. the prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be done. The filing of a petition for mandamus with this Court. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. In filing the present petition. Whether or not the mandamus petitioners can still file a petition for cancellation of AGPP’s registration at this point in time. as provided by law.e.e. These provisions effectively provide the "plain. the mandamus petitioners opted to confine themselves to writing letters to ask the COMELEC to act in accordance with Section 10 of Resolution No. is a question we are not prepared to rule upon. 5. identifies who the "members" of that House are: Sec. to prevent the COMELEC from canvassing AGPP’s votes. therefore. it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. No. we find the mandamus aspect of G. and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. pursuant to Section 2(b) of Resolution No. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office. its patent intent to disqualify Arroyo. We note that in lieu of filing the above formal petition that Resolution No. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fiftymembers. cities. unlike the present petition which is a formal petition (whose clear intent is similarly to disqualify Arroyo). we have to recognize the futility of the petition and to dismiss it on the ground of mootness since we cannot provide the mandamus petitioners any substantial relief.R. and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants. 8807. was premature. they should have filed the proper petition for disqualification.1avvphi1 This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. While these moves are technically objections to Arroyo and to the AGPP’s registration. in fact. 8807. and from proclaiming it a winner – we find that this has been mooted by the supervening participation. 191998. we note that neither Section 6 of RA 7941 nor Section 8. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 191998 improperly filed under the standards of Section 3. regional. 192769 and 192832 – whether jurisdiction over Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP nominee should now properly be with the HRET since Arroyo has been proclaimed and has assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. however. Nos. or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. for all intents and purposes.47 We move on to the principal issue raised by the certiorari petitions in G. (Underscoring supplied) . any day not later than the date of proclamation. a petition for mandamus is not the correct remedy under the circumstances as the immediately applicable remedy is a petition for disqualification or for cancellation filed with the COMELEC. and those who. The prohibition issue has been rendered moot since there is nothing now to prohibit in light of the supervening events. A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events. they cannot in any way be considered formal petitions for disqualification.48 the Court said: But. i. Specifically. As to the prohibition aspect of G. we need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties. In Abayon v. No. 2010 elections.45 the mandamus petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions apply. in relation with the certiorari petitions in G. unless otherwise fixed by law. 8807 and RA 7941 provide.R. As to the remedy of filing a complaint for cancellation of registration. Under the circumstances. (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition. It bears stressing that mandamus.(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government. as an extraordinary remedy. Even the substantive merits of the mandamus petition in G. (1). fail to persuade for the reasons more fully discussed below. 192769 and 192832.R. (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year. Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifies the period within which a complaint for cancellation of registration should be filed. 191998 – i. the mandamus petitioners also violated the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. speedy and adequate remedy" that the mandamus petitioners should have taken. and sectoral parties or organizations. shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national. rules or regulations relating to elections.44 While this is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions. election and proclamation of AGPP after it secured the required percentage of votes in the May 10. as pointed out above. organization. No. such vote. clear and complete. party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are. as pointed out above. would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent. The Court also held in the same case that: In the cases before the Court. in appropriate cases. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. organizations and parties. respectively. As this Court held in Lazatin v. from the Constitution’s point of view. Towards this end. the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. – The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national. and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. §17 of the Constitution.Clearly. 1998. They have the same deliberative rights. and emoluments. the State shall develop and guarantee a full. which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17. private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives. 6 of R. this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In the same vein. in the end. regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner’s action. both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility. Since. and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.A. the elections were held. xxxx What is inevitable is that Section 17. 2." This means that. These representatives are elected." It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee – the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay. and sectoral parties or organizations. would be a vote for its nominees. Pursuant to Art. Sec. We said: As already stated. it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office. once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives. who. By analogy with the cases of district representatives. Declaration of Policy. 1998. however. and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Commission on Elections49 where we acknowledged that the Court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was already a member of the House of Representatives. those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. which the COMELEC en bancdenied on June 11." thus: Sec. Similarly applicable is our ruling in Perez v. the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives. Commission on Elections. considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16. 1998. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. 1998. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms." Earlier. through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party. among other things. free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party. The following day. No. to become members of the House of Representatives. VI. salaries. (Underscoring supplied) As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. this could not be done. the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it . sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature. May 11. regional. 1998. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16. petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22. a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives. not their parties or organizations. the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national." Under the amended 1935 Constitution. this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm "as full. 1998. Once elected. Clearly. Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to. 192769 and 192832 are likewise DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 86344 December 21. we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. under the Constitution. 1988. even the political question. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. Nos. 86649 Digest . not the wisdom. SO ORDERED. J. the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.R. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. On the basis of this development. The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.50 In the present case. What is involved here is the legality. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction. we RESOLVE to DISMISS the petition in G. of a particular measure. too. WHEREFORE. now pending before the HRET.remained as full. No. clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. No. In light of these conclusions. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. it refers to those questions which. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP. Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature. of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.R. in legal parlance. the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. The term political question connotes. No. namely. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. In other words. the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.R. we see no need to further discuss the other issues raised in the certiorari petitions. in proper cases. what it means in ordinary parlance. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. of the filing of two (2) petitions for quo warranto against Arroyo. On December 5. SECTION 18 Daza v. following the lead of Abayon and Perez. We take judicial notice.R. 1989 Cruz. Briefly stated. 191998 for prematurity and mootness. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. Facts: The House of Representatives. thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. Singson G. Section 1. No pronouncement as to costs. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. Issue: whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Held: No. The petitions in G. has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. of the Constitution clearly provides: Section 1. AGPP’s first nominee. Thus. a question of policy. it is not disputed that Arroyo. Coseteng v Mitra G. not legality. Article VII. Bandon. as the 12th CA member. Francisco Sumulong. eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments (CA). Romero. and Singson. Verano-Yap. 1. not because it raises a political question. upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader. and some independents. Hence the petition of for Extraordinary legal writs by Coseteng to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan. Cuenco. and d.. 1990 Topic: Commission on Appointments Facts: 1. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution YES. on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA). 1987 resulted in the election to the House of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i. to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation on following grounds: a. Congressman Ablan. and (2) that in any case.R.e. KBL. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIB 2. Petitioner Anna Dominique M. was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. Lobregat. They were elected by the House (not by their party) in accordance with the . she be appointed as a member of the CA and HRET. The Court held that the petition should be dismissed. A year later. 5. KBL. including the House representation in the CA. Mitra (Digest) G. Jr. the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18. House . 6. Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority . Cong. NP-Unido. Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA. the LDP was organized as a political party. Beltran. Moreover. the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House. the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid. 3. As 158 out of 202 members of the House affiliated with it the House committees. as they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. 4. must be nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions. Panaghiusa. Then. No. the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan. representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. Upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader.. Lakas ng Bansa (LB). Cabochan. After the reorganization. Liberal Party (LP). 86649 July 12. Locsin. there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the CA should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The congressional elections of May 11. but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18.Coseteng v. Mercado. c. 8. that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House. b. Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen. outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. (which it does not). 7. hence. the members representing the political parties. considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18. Imperial. or coalitions thereof. had to be reorganized to conform with the new political alignments. elected from the Coalesced Majority. Respondent’s contention was that: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the CA is a political question.L. as members of the Commission on Appointments. two NPC and one LAKASNUCD. The results of such a formula would produce 7. i. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. HON. the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments. 4.e. of Senators elected. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP.Constitution. UY.R. ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA. DEL ROSARIO. 5 NPC senators.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD. The other political parties or groups in the House. HON. ABAYA. GLENN ANG CHONG. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party.. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. 3.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. HON. MANDANAS..4% or less than 1% of the House membership. MARY MITZI CAJAYON. the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators. WAHAB M. LORENZO R.5 members for LDP. and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority). ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON. respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap. 1992 elections. The problem is what to do with the fraction of . Romulo. HON. and 0. HON. 1. PROCESSO J. Petitioners. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.5 members for NPC. REYNALDO S. The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival. HON. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable. hence. HON. 2. Guingona. HON.4% of the House membership. ALVIN SANDOVAL. 2. one LP-PDP-LABAN. vs. as the majority floor leader. a member of LAKAS-NUCD. 180055 July 31. HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP. . HON.6 members. its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only . 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators. 2009 FRANKLIN M. G. FREDENIL H. HON. No. ARAGO. HON. ALFONSO V. HON. UMALI JR. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate. HERMILANDO I. CECILIA S. ALCALA.5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. HON. are bound by the majority's choices. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or . LUNA. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. Guingona v Gonzales After the May 11. HON. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. PAUL RUIZ DAZA. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. MARIA EVITA R. she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. opposed the said compromise. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7. the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO.5 to 7. a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. HON. MAMBA. a political party should represent at least 8. it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. ANTONIO A. AND HON. HON. CASTRO. HON.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. SOLOMON R. In order to resolve such. AKBAR. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. HON. TAÑADA III. DRILON as President and in representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (LP).5 to be able to elect Romulo. JOSEPH EMILIO A. MANUEL M. CHUNGALAO. Respondents. Eileen R. the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA). Petitioner. Jose V.. EILEEN R. TALIÑO-MENDOZA and HON.. HON. MANUEL B.... HON. x . VILLAR. Loren Legarda NPC Sen. GEMMA D. REPRESENTATIVE PROSPERO NOGRALES in his capacity as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Dimaporo Lakas-CMD Rep.. PROSPERO C. ATTY.. Prospero C. Yap Lakas-CMD Rep. The contingent in the Senate to the CA was composed of the following senators with their respective political parties: Sen.. MA. EMMYLOU J. Alan Peter Cayetano Lakas-CMD Sen.. Ermita-Buhain Lakas-CMD Rep.. in his official capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives. ABDULLAH D. JOSE V.. DEFENSOR. SR.. Maria Ana Consuelo A. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada PMP Sen.: In August 2007. 2009 SENATOR MA. ERMITABUHAIN. HON. Nograles Lakas-CMD Rep. HON.S. RODOLFO "OMPONG" PLAZA. JOSE DE VENECIA JR.. Juan Ponce Enrile PMP Sen. Eduardo C. HON.. Jose Carlos V. Panfilo Lacson UNO Sen. LACSON. JOSE CARLOS V. RODOLFO T. Mar Roxas LP Sen. ZIALCITA. EDGARDO C. Joker Arroyo KAMPI Sen. Richard Gordon Lakas-CMD Sen. EMMANUEL JOEL J.. Albano III KAMPI . MADRIGAL. Lacson Lakas-CMD Rep. vs. ARTHUR D.. Respondents. HON. in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives. No. HON. ALBANO III.. J.-x G. NOGRALES. HON.. HON. GULLAS. Abdullah D. DIMAPORO. in her official capacity as Secretary of the Commission on Appointments. Miriam Defensor-Santiago PRP The members of the contingent of the House of Representatives in the CA and their respective political parties were as follows: Rep.R. and THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Lito Lapid Lakas-CMD Sen.. HON..S. DECISION CARPIO MORALES. Zialcita Lakas-CMD Rep. in their individual official capacities as "elected" members of the Commission on Appointments. HON. ASPIRAS.. SENATOR MANUEL VILLAR in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments. Madrigal PDP-Laban Sen. VILLANUEVA. CONRADO M. in his official capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments. HON. YAP. EDUARDO R. 183055 July 31. Rodolfo T. HON. ESTRELLA III.HON. ANA CONSUELO A.. petitioner in the first petition. Article VI of the Constitution. Atty.8 In reply. Estrella NPC Rep. requested from the House of Representatives leadership2 one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party. for prohibition. Representative Neptali Gonzales II4 begged the indulgence of the Liberal Party "to allow the Legal Department to make a study on the matter. OUSTING THE AFFECTED RESPONDENTS WHO USURPED.11 (Italics in the original) And it prays that this Court: a. issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction.1 During the session of the House of Representatives on September 3. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. the party should be represented in the CA. 2007. Villanueva CIBAC Party List In the second week of August 2007. and control.7 As of October 15. contrary to the rule on proportional representation of political parties with respect to the House of Representatives contingent in the said Commission. requested the Secretary General of the House of Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section 18. Atty. 2007 of the first petition by petitioner former Senator Franklin M. Representative Tañada. c.R. however.6 Representative Tañada also brought the matter to the attention of then Speaker De Venecia. 180055 raises the following issues: a. Conrado M. THE WRITS PRAYED FOR IN THIS PETITION BE ISSUED NULLIFYING THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. No. by letter of September 10. mandamus. Senator Manuel B. Sr. et al. against then Speaker De Venecia. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. authority. Gullas KAMPI Rep. WHETHER THE LIBERAL PARTY WITH AT LEAST TWENTY (20) MEMBERS WHO SIGNED HEREIN AS PETITIONERS. WHETHER THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ RESPONDENTS HAVE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTING THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL CONSTITUTION BY DEPRIVING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO ONE (1) SEAT THEREIN. xxxx c. Article VI of the Constitution.9 Hence spawned the filing on October 31. drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Gemma D. in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives. enjoining all Respondents and all persons under their direction. Declare Respondents’ action in not allotting one (1) seat to Petitioners null and void for being a direct violation of Section 18. Emmylou J. Villar in his capacity as ex officio chairman of the CA. Representative Tañada. 2007. reiterating the position that since there were at least 20 members of the Liberal Party in the 14th Congress. and control from further proceeding with their actions relating to the illegal and unconstitutional constitution of the Commission on Appointments and to the unlawful exercise of its members’ functions. INTRUDED INTO AND UNLAWFULLY HELD POSITIONS IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AND REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS TO RECONSTITUTE AND/OR REELECT THE MEMBERS OF SAID COMMISSION. Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party). WHETHER AS A RESULT OF THE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDENTS. No.3 To his request. authority. no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department. RESTRAINING THE CURRENT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS FROM SITTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Aspiras in her capacity as Secretary of the CA. Emmanuel Joel J."5 In a separate move. G. Immediately upon the filing of the instant Petition. and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 2007. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand.10 The petition in G. supervision. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the House of Representatives informed Representative Tañada that the department was constrained to withhold the release of its legal opinion because the handling lawyer was directed to secure documents necessary to establish some of the members’ party affiliations. b. After careful consideration of the merits of the case.Rep. and the individual members of the House of Representatives contingent to the CA. Ma..R. Plaza NPC Rep. b. petitioners in the first petition. . supervision. IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO ONE (1) SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Eduardo R. 180055. Representative Arthur Defensor. render judgment making the injunction permanent and ordering Respondents and all persons under their direction. Taliño-Mendoza NP Rep. Ana Consuelo A. Gordon cannot be a member of the CA as Independents cannot be represented in the CA even though there will be three Independents in the CA. 2007. 2007 Elections by. 2. whoever they are. Liberal Party is not represented in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled to one (1) nominee. If Sen. THE POWER TO ELECT MEMBERS TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS BELONGS TO EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION.17 III. 5. e. respecting and allowing Congressman Alfonso V. 3. Party-List CIBAC has a representative in the Commission on Appointments although it only has two members in the House of Representatives and therefore [is] not entitled to any seat. THE LIBERAL PARTY DOES NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS THAT WOULD ENTITLE THE PARTY TO A SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. 2. THEREFORE. then Sen. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE AFFILIATION OF THE MEMBERS NEED TO BE SETTLED IN A TRIAL.14 (Emphasis in the original) Then Speaker De Venecia and Representative Defensor filed their Comment and Opposition15 on February 18. Alan Peter Cayetano is now NP. WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS THAT THERE MUST AT LEAST BE A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR IT TO VALIDLY CONDUCT ITS PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACT ITS BUSINESS. 4. THE PETITION IS NOT DIRECTED AT THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS. by separate letters of April 17. claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation for the following reasons: 1. 3.12 Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary Aspiras filed their Comment13 on December 6. Jr. moving too for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds: I.19 (Emphasis in the original) Meantime. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE COMMISSION MUST HAVE COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP IN ORDER THAT IT CAN FUNCTION. intruded into and have unlawfully held positions in the Commission on Appointments and f. insofar as they violate the rule on proportional representation of political parties in said Commission. 2008. THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO EXHAUST THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM. NOT THE PROPER PARTY TO INSTITUTE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO. Oust the affected respondents. If Senators Richard Gordon and Pilar Juliana Cayetano are Independents. Declare the proceedings of the Commission on Appointments null and void. 2008 to Senator Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles. 16 II.S. reorganize. IT IS. AS SUCH. Require Respondents to alter. 18 IV. Umali. who usurped.21 . II. he still can sit in the CA representing NP. as the duly nominated Commission on Appointments member of the Liberal Party of the Philippines to sit therein as such. moving for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds: I. Madrigal of PDP-Laban.20 She also claimed that the composition of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation for the following reasons: 1. at the very least. Lakas-CMD currently has five (5) members in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled only to four (4) representatives and thus [is] in excess of a member. PMP has two representatives in the CA although it only has two members in the Senate and thus [is] entitled only to one (1) seat. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDAMUS. KAMPI has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA. reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with proportional representation based on the actual numbers of members belonging to duly accredited and registered political parties who were elected into office during the last May 14. Senator Ma. KAMPI currently has three (3) members in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled only to two (2) representatives and thus is excess of a member.d. PRP has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA. and 4. . Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. DESPITE REPEATED DEMANDS FROM PETITIONER. a specter of doubt continues to be raised on the validity of actions taken by the CA and its committees.25 The CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions. IN FAILING. and of the written comment of Sen. 2008 meeting of the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions. 2008.29alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction A."24 and that without any such resolution. . .27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Undaunted. transmitted the same to the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions. G.28 Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13. and .Senator Madrigal thus requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that. like Damocles’ sword. IN CONTINUOUSLY CONDUCTING HEARINGS AND PROCEEDINGS ON THE APPOINTMENTS DESPITE THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMPOSITION WHICH MUST BE PROHIBITED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. "all actions of [the] CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional. in the meantime."22 By letter of May 13. I believe it is imperative that the serious constitutional questions that I have raised be settled before the plenary acts on this endorsement by the Committee on Budget and Management. Declar[ation that] the composition of the Commission on Appointments [is] null and void insofar as it violates the proportional party representation requirement mandated by Article VI. 3. . Arroyo that "If there is a complaint in the election of a member or members. . Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. upon my instructions. and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them. the composition of which is null and void for being violative of the proportional party representation requirement under Article VI. by letter of June 2. namely the Senate and/or the House. by letter-comment of May 26. issu[ance of] a temporary restraining order/a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Respondents from proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officials and members of the Commission on Appointments which composition is unconstitutional. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Prohibition against respondents Senate President Manuel Villar. opined that the CA has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House. for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA. Speaker Prospero Nograles and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to desist from further proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officers of the Commission on Appointments. .R. B. In view however. Senator Madrigal. 2. reiterated her request that all actions of the CA be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents. and C. Speaker Nograles.30 (Emphasis in the original) She thus prayed for the 1. the Secretary of the Commission. pending resolution of the instant Petition. .23 Still later or on May 19. she would be forced to invoke Section 20 of the CA rules against every official whose confirmation would be submitted to the body for deliberation. WHICH REQUIREMENT MUST BE ENFORCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. No. of your manifestation during the May 26. TO RE-ORGANIZE THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. It was my intention to have the Committee study and deliberate on the matter and to recommend what step/s to take on your request that "all actions of the Commission be held in abeyance" x x x. 183055. and the CA. Senator Madrigal again wrote Senator Villar as follows: Today. 2008 the second petition. Otherwise. 2008. . . 2008. I was advised that the Committee on Budget and Management of Senator Mar Roxas has endorsed the ad interim appointment of Rolando G.26 By letter of May 28. IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Senator Madrigal sent another letter to Senator Villar declaring that she "cannot in good conscience continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA. 2008. Senator Villar advised Senator Madrigal as follows: xxxx Noting your position that you will not continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA … "until the constitutional issue of the CA’s composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission" x x x. until such time as [she] get[s] a response to [her] letters and until the constitutional issue of the CA’s composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission." I have given instructions to transmit the original copies of your letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate so that your concerns may be addressed by the Senate in caucus and/or in plenary. Andaya as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management for approval by the CA in the plenary. it shall be addressed to the body that elected them. . . 2008 addressed to Senator Villar. . their petition had become moot and academic. V. underscoring supplied) In his Comment and Opposition35 filed on September 3. Presumption of regularity in the conduct of official functions. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original) The first petition.4. 36 B. 2008 a Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition. WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.39 Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA. Senator Madrigal’s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. 18005532 and G. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. II. III. 2008. UMALI. THE PETITIONS HAVE ALREADY BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE ALFONSO V.R. No.34 (Emphasis in the original. Speaker Prospero Nograles and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to reorganize and reconstitute the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the 1987 Constitution. G. has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA. CONSIDERING THE AFOREMENTIONED FACTS AND JURISPRUDENCE. G. 37 C. JR. Each House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the composition of its own contingent to the CA. G. Jr. 180055.R. As for the second petition. E. IV. the petition is withdrawn. it fails.31 The Court consolidated G. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Gullas of KAMPI. later filed on August 15. THE PETITION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AS REQUIRED BY RULE 65 SECTIONS 2 AND 3 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.R.R. In his Comment of August 19. as prayed for.40 Senator Villar’s .R. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY THE HONORABLE COURT AND THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION. or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi. respondent Senator Villar proffered the following arguments: I. 28-91. TO THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Umali. The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not available to the Petitioner. THE REMEDY OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO RECONSTITUTE THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS RESTS. No. No. No. hence.. Petitioners in the first petition. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT SENATOR MADRIGAL HAS NO STANDING TO PURSUE THE INSTANT CASE. 2008 on the second petition. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Mandamus commanding respondents Senate President Manuel Villar. 38 D. 2008. Petitioner has no standing to file [the] petition. Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort. WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.33 alleging that with the designation of Representative Alfonso V. MEMBER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY. 180055. 183055 on July 1. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. Speaker Nograles proffered the following arguments: A. Petitioner is estopped. 183055. No. of the Liberal Party as a member of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA in replacement of Representative Eduardo M. a brother-in-law of Pres. The Petition in G. J. The Petition is WITHDRAWN. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is premature. Article VI of the Constitution. Furnishing a copy of Petitioner’s letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. At the hearing. 89914 November 20. the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. SECTION 21 & 22 Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest G. is not Senator Madrigal’s affair. Senator Aquilino Pimentel advocated the allocation of a position in the Commission on Appointments for the Party-List Representatives. prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. v." 3. in the 11th Congress. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:41 In order that the remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed of. Article VI of the Constitution. Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan. within constitutionally defined limits. nor any plain. SO ORDERED.R. Senator Madrigal’s filing of the second petition is thus premature. Just like the Petitioner in the instant case. Senator Pimentel first wrote to the Senate President. each chamber exercises the power to choose. Pimentel. within constitutionally defined limits. WHEREFORE. citing Sen. Jr. their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not this Court. 1991 Padilla. it is the Members of the House who claim to have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments that must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the Commission on Appointments. Section 18. as is the following observation of Speaker Nograles. requesting that the Commission on Appointments be restructured to conform to the constitutional provision on proportional representation. to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Just like Senator Pimentel. and emphasis supplied by Representative Nograles) It bears noting that Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of Senator Madrigal’s letters to the Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to address her concerns. even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA. Under Section 17. a question of fact which the Court does not resolve. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Consequently. 180055 is GRANTED. 183055 is DISMISSED. who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. underscoring. In the said case. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions. Under Sections 17 and 18. an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Further. xxxx Thus. Pimentel filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme Court.R. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law". Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa.lavvph!1 It is worth recalling that. 2. No. Aquino. Following the ruling in Pimentel. Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. No.43 and that Senator Alan Peter Cayetano be considered a member of the NP such that he may sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle his party to one seat – involves a determination of party affiliations. xxx Without awaiting final determination of the question xxx.invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken. No. it cannot be said that recourse was already had in the House of Representatives. Senator Madrigal’s suggestion – that Senators Pilar Juliana Cayetano and Richard Gordon be considered independent senators such that the latter should not be allowed to be a member of the CA. . there must be "no appeal.R. demanding seats in the Commission on Appointments for Congressmen.42 (Italics. who have not even raised the issue of its present composition in the House.: Facts: 1. the Honorable Court ruled: "The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal. legislative or administrative proceeding. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino. 455. et al. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. No. the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear.4. SENATOR RICHARD J.” Verily.” ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. filed with the Court of motion for intervention. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (En Banc) FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of . and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives. Article VI. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against selfincrimination. Hence. SABIO v. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. 174340 17 October 2006. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan. G. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution. Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. 4. No. ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation NO. GORDON. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. 3. but also to any of their respective committees.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial. RULING: No. J. 2. Finally. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress. Clearly. In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. particularly Mr.R. where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. 1. including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Ermita. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected. HON. Sandoval-Gutierrez. Sandejas. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees. As provided therein. II. it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. Sec. a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E. Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI. 464. 28). 2006 [Article VI Sec. others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections.” Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum. Col.O. the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E. allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. Gudani. and the right of access to public information (Art. by definition. 21). and the Philippine National Police (PNP).O. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. the Senate of the Philippines. Section 21. 170165. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry. Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. Sec. 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E. the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command. bureaus. As a result. and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. 7). III. Moreover. VI.O. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must. The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project. an exemption from the obligation to disclose information.government. . 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers. Certainly. or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles. the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. 464. XI. Sec. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. being a legitimate subject for legislation.” Considering these jurisprudential instructions. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry. encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.” PCGG belongs to this class. the policy of full disclosure (Art. enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. through its various Senate Committees. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. as a matter of necessity.O. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. which requires all the public officials. the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department. 1). be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. being broad. inter alia. wire tapping. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions. August 15. in this case to Congress. Ermita . Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer. conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for. SENGA Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM GR No. April 20. GR 169777. in the absence of any constitutional basis.O. Col. Senate vs. No.O. Gudani and Lt. Legislative Investigation] FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. and for Other Purposes”. 464. the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. 4(b) of E. In the exercise of its legislative power. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. However. This cannot be countenanced. the principle of public accountability (Art. prohibiting Gen. GUDANI VS. The infirm provisions of E. however. The privilege being. Sec. At the same time. ON THE ALLEGED OWWA LOSS OF P480 MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY . the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. Employment. However. THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND OTHERS. Romero: Pursuant to P. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inc. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief. 543. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.S. Resolution No.: At issue once again is Section 21. SC ruled in Senate v. 2006. any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces. Resolution No.S. The Facts On August 15. as owner of R-II Builders. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition. J..RULING: Yes. the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege. The duty falls on the shoulders of the President. CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA OF P550. 537. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief. and Human Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. the clash may soon loom or actualize. At the same time. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify.86 MILLION” and P.. to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The Case This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65. IN AID OF LEGISLATION. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT. Reghis romero v jinggoy Estrada DECISION VELASCO. entitled: “RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. which pertinently reads as follows: Dear Mr. and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. petitioner Reghis Romero II. [1] signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary. assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so. the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. as commander-in-chief. If the President is not so inclined. In doing so. but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. JR. the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege. entitled: “RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE. the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. received from the Committee an invitation. IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION. the Committee sent petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his request. The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of R. They likewise raised the following main arguments: (1) the proposed resolutions were a proper subject of legislative inquiry. albeit for a different hearing date. petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. Pasay City. Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition. Chavez. (Emphasis in the original. invitations were sent to each of the other six petitioners. that: (1) he answered questions concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project and how much of OWWA’s original investment had already been paid. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to protect OWWA funds in the future. was denied. Rest assured that your rights. 2006. petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO [6] alleging.R. when properly invoked and not unfounded.T. They also averred that the pendency of Chavez “is not sufficient ground to divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into the matters alleged in the petition. No. No. 2006 Committee investigation. [8] observing that the Senate’s motives in calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a political question. Article VI of 1987 Constitution regarding inquiries in aid of legislation. He predicated his request on grounds he would later substantially reiterate in this petition for prohibition. caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum[4] on petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4. and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation. 8042. (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners’ criminal liability for plunder. will be duly respected.OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS. docketed as G. AND R-II BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II. Senate of the Philippines. In their Comment dated October 17. Inc. and (4) unless the Court immediately issues a TRO.R. National Housing Authority.. before the Court could resolve the issues raised in G. 537 and 543. “the Migrant Workers Act” and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions. Two days after.[7] none of which were related to the subject of the inquiry. Francisco I. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p. interposed an opposition.) In his letter-reply[2] dated August 18. (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination. 2006 of another urgent motion for a TRO in which petitioners imputed to the Committee the intention to harass them as. none of them had even been mentioned in relation to the subject of the investigation. petitioner Romero II appeared at the September 4. Respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 164527. then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders. being unmeritorious. On August 30. 174105. Pecson Room. on the 23 rd day of August 2006 at the Sen. The following day. petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition. as Chairperson of the Committee.[3] On the same date. 2006. may we have the privilege of inviting you to the said hearing to shed light on any matter.” In this petition. requesting them to attend the September 4. some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested.” x x x the Committee on Labor. The manifestation was followed by the filing on September 19. Employment and Human Resources Development chaired by Sen. detained. On August 28. The Committer later issued separate subpoenas[5] to other petitioners. 2006. as resource person. respondents. 2nd floor. 2006.A. except for petitioner Romero II. among others. nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners raised at every possible turn. Senator Jinggoy Estrada. seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued. 2006 Committee hearing. 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions. Meanwhile. the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. and forced to give testimony against their will. petitioners filed the instant petition. G. in compliance with our September 5. covered by the subject matter and purpose of the inquiry. By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21. it is not in aid of legislation. and (2) petitioners’ right against self-incrimination was well-protected and could be invoked when incriminating questions were propounded. within your knowledge and competence. he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to return at the resumption of the investigation. . (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty.m.[9] respondents made a distinction between the issues raised in Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate resolutions. 2006 Resolution that ordered them to submit a comment on the original plea for a TRO. THEN OWWA ADMINISTRATOR WILHELM SORIANO. 164527. prejudice or sympathies. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. on that ground. legislate wisely and effectively. the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. In fine. there is no more legal obstacle––on the ground of sub judice.” [13] For by an en banc Resolution dated July 1. inter alia. 2008 in G. Financial Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank)provides the following reason: [T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.R. In such cases. On the other hand.[12] Chavez. Thus. however. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. denied with finality the motion of Chavez. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component. petitioners filed their Reply[10] reiterating the arguments stated in their petition. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue. On one hand. the exercise of sovereign legislative authority. save in certain exceptional instances.On December 28. [17] and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation. Senate Committee on Banks. assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s assailed investigation. 3(d). is no longer sub judice or “before a court or judge for consideration. so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. Otherwise. [18] albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. The Court’s Ruling The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition.[16] A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes.R. obtains under the premises. A violation of the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. No. and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy. No. Nazareno–– . [11] The rationale for the rule adverted to is set out in Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez: [I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries. undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and. first and foremost of which is: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee’s inquiry is sub judice. in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence. assuming it is invocable––to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding. in G. 2006. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court. thus. for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15. it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. 164527. As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. through the application of a law. actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. Surely. it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist.[15] none of which. influencing the court. still. cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation. What we said in Sabio v. At any rate. even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court. courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle. as the petitioner in Chavez. 2007. or obstructing the administration of justice. the Court. there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. inquiries in aid of legislation are. 2008. The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub Judice Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez petition.[14] Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness. Gordon suggests as much: The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the twin resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. PS Resolution Nos. So it must be here. x x x (Emphasis added. of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters. not in the same status. This is clearly provided in Art. Sec. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: xxxx SEC. it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The foregoing consideration is not all. However. it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.[20] it can very well be stated that the termination of the assailed investigations has veritably mooted the instant petition. the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is. No. and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. the Court draws attention to its pronouncements embodied in its Resolution of September 4.” That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. per available records. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations: Certainly. which was quoted at the outset.R. 180643 entitled Neri v. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations. opted to take up anew. in the conduct of its day-to-day business.[21] Sabio emphasizesthe importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae. 21 of the Constitution.. i. et al. the matter of the constitutionality of the . it must be emphasized that [“this right may be] invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked. The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information. Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments. the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before it.e. The denial of the instant recourse is still indicated for another compelling reason. all pending matters and proceedings. The logic and practicality of such rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. Public Order and Safety. there is no rhyme or reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court.. even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked: Anent the right against self-incrimination. Undeniably from the foregoing. and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be had to others who possess it. as an unfinished matter. the Court refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota[23] of the controversy. On the postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and after it.) Following the lessons of Neri.[T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. In this regard. 2008 in G. as reiterated in Garcillano v. This disposition becomes all the more impeccable.[19] While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry. but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the first time. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. considering that the Senate of the present Congress has not. VI. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. such issue may be presented before the courts. The consolation is that when this power is abused. As may be noted. but as if presented for the first time. Indeed. xxxx Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be respected by respondent Senate Committees. x x x the Senate as an institution is “continuing. to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees. 123.[22] (Emphasis supplied. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. terminated. its inquiry into the investment of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project.” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. With the foregoing disquisition. for all intents and purposes.) As a matter of long and sound practice. since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse. Issue: Does the passing of SB No. was passed in the Senate. What the Constitution simply means. On March 22.R. 537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable controversy. approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. 1243. WHEREFORE.assailed Committee invitations and subpoenas issued vis-à-vis the investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 yearsof service. the SC rejected the challenge.” was filed in the House of Representatives. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill. HELD: By a 9-6 vote. Senate Bill No. Meanwhile. 1243. 1993. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. according to the 9 justices. was filed in the Senate. holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. a counterpart of HB No. SECTION 25 Garcia vs. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required? Held: Yes. the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions. there is no more investigation the constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695 Facts: On April 18. entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done. 8817. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. . having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore indicated. NO. In short. is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. SB No. 1243. the Senate’s own version of HB No. SECTION 24 Tolentino v secretary of finance Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. ALVAREZ V. is that the initiative must come from the HoR. GUINGONA – G. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. into Republic Act No. upon being apprised of the action of the Senate. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. 1243 was filed in the Senate. does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives. the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. 1994. HB No. the petition is DENIED. 8817. the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. Article 6 of the Constitution. 8817. the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 195657). On the other hand. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Mata Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who wasreversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject ofthe act. such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. Indeed. as follows: 1. one subject. of PD 1177 is constitutional. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations.” Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. such provisions are void. 16[5]. project or activity of any department. or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message. the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. As passed. 10900. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution. on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. Provision on Debt Ceiling. bureau. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17. thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers. On the same day. HOWEVER. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. 1993. This Section provides that “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund. bureaus. It also violates the rule on onebill. inoperative and without effect. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. 113105. but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. then Minister of the Budget. Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. however. appropriated for the different departments. which are included in the General Appropriations Act. in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. August 19. ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1. the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994). transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. the President. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. bureau. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. 7663. office or agency of the Executive Department to any program. offices and agencies of the Executive Department. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez GR No. from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. 1994 FACTS: House Bill No. 1993. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. On December 30. the President signed the bill into law. and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. project or activity of any department. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department. There is no transfer from one department to another here. are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and . Demetria v alba Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba. the Prime Minister. bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. HELD: Sec. Sec 44. the Speaker. Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE. entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE. or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR. as expressed in the title. without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken. to any program.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. whether foreign or domestic. 3. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court. 4618 for the National Stud Farm. while exercisable by the President. operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s). 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers” 5.D. 3. The requirement in Special Provision No. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. being “inappropriate” provisions. COA. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval. Special Provisions Nos. Book VI of E. No. No. No. 4. Ombudsman.A. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP. Special Provision No. it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E. and on the other hand. Furthermore. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court. Schlesinger. pp. is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae. 307 U. not in the appropriations law. since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional 3. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes. the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law.S. is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto. there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. 292. No. As held by the court in Gonzales.O. 2d 1307 [1973]). New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. Valencia. 3-7). 1177 as reiterated under Section 26. Veto of the Provisions The veto power. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance. the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Miller. No.A. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.g. (d) Commission on Human Rights. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. Chapter 4. (c) Ombudsman. prohibiting the use of the .” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds. and CHR. E.D. (CHR). the Administrative Code of 1987. the Congress ISSUES: 1. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. There is. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance. 7.O.Section 31 of P.O. 292. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi 2. 5. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service). it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. Therefore. The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P. therefore. Holtzman v.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 433 [1939]. HELD: Locus Standi We rule that a member of the Senate. has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. No. 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). as well as the entire Special Provision No. R. 6675). No.D. 2. In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs. and of the House of Representatives for that matter. (b) Commission on Audit (COA). P. 484 F. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation. No. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto.. sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2 on the “Use of Fund. and to reverse the debt payment policy. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. so is the power of each member thereof. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers. it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. p. which have been contracted for by the AFP. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines. the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art.000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. The Special Provision. which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. 147 [1977]). But even if such is the intention. the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law (Schwartz. constitutional commissions. On Constitutional Law. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court. 10). Until the guidelines are issued. the NHA and the DPWH. Sec. much less to deactivate 11. there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS. SECTION 26 . III. we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended. Under the Faithful Execution Clause. more so. contracts entered into by the Government itself.