Consti 2 digest.docx

3/1/2013Constitutional Law 2 CASE DIGEST Name: Vonn Rhoel A. Bondad Course: LLB I ID No. 12-000593 Instructor: Atty. Domitilo G. Pineda, Jr. 1 | P a g e 01- ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L-24693 OCTOBER 23, 1967 ...................................................... 3 02- TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTAION GR L-59234, 30 SEPTEMBER 1982, EN BANC, MELENCIO .................................................... 3 03- REPUBLIC VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G.R. NO. 141314. NOVEMBER 15, 2002 ...................................................................................................... 4 04- LIM VS. PACQUING G.R. 115044, JANUARY 27, 1995 ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 05- LUTZ VS. ARANETA G.R. NO. L-7859, 22 DECEMBER 1955 ................................................................................................................................................. 6 06- MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION G.R. NO. 111097 ................................................................................................... 7 07- VALENTIN TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD G.R. NO. L-75697 ......................................................................................................................... 7 08- RESTITUTO YNOT VS.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. NO. 74457 ......................................................................................................................... 8 09- CRISTINA DE KNECHT VS.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. NO. L-51078 ............................................................................................................................. 9 10- PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-119694 ................................................................................................ 9 11- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 137569 ............................................................................................ 10 12- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 146587. JULY 2, 2002 ................................................................... 11 13- THE CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL G.R. NO. L-14355 OCTOBER 31, 1919 ..................................................... 12 14- LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE CASE DIGEST G.R. NO. L-19201 JUNE 16, 1965 ................................................................ 13 15- PHILEX MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. NO. 125704 AUGUST 28, 1998...................................................... 13 16- G.R. NO. 130716 CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) ...................................................................................... 14 17- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 .............................................................................................................. 15 18- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 25, AND MARK B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 ............................................................................................................... 16 19- GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VS. HON. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, MORALES, AND MARK . JIMENEZ A.K.A . MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, [G.R .NO. 148571. SEPTEMBER 24, 2002] ............................................................................................................................. 17 20- ESRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 ............................................................................................................................. 18 21- PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-52245 ............................................................................................. 19 22- ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GR NO. 46496, FEBRUARY 27, 19450/ 69 PHIL. 635 ........................................................................ 20 23- PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. VS. PETE PRADO GR NO. 105371, NOVEMBER 11, 1993/ 227 SCRA 703 ....................................................... 20 24- GONZALES VS . COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. NO. L-28196; 9 NOV 1967] ...................................................................................................................... 21 25- ORMOC SUGAR VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY GR L-23794, 17 FEBRUARY 1968 ........................................................................................................ 21 26- PEOPLE V. CAYAT G.R. NO. L-45987 MAY 5, 1939 ................................................................................................................................................. 22 27- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS G.R. NOS. 132875-76. FEBRUARY 3, 2000 .................................................................................. 22 28- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY MIJANO Y TAMORA G.R. NO. 129112. JULY 23, 1999 .................................................................................... 23 29- SOLIVEN V. MAKASAIR G.R. NO. 82585 NOVEMBER 14, 1988 ......................................................................................................................................... 23 30- ALLADO V. DIOCNO G.R. NO. 113630 MAY 5, 1994 ......................................................................................................................................................... 24 31- BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. NO. L-64261 DECEMBER 26, 1984 ............................................................................................................................... 25 32- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLORENCIO B. DORIA G.R. NO. 125299 JANUARY 22, 1999......................................................................................... 26 33- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE Y TEJAS, G.R. NO. 87059 JUNE 22, 1992 .............................................................................. 28 34- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, G.R. NO. 91107 JUNE 19, 1991 ........................................................................................ 29 35- SAMMY M. MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 123595 DECEMBER 12, 1997 .................................................................................................. 30 36- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN AND ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. NO. 125754 DECEMBER 22,1999. ...................... 31 37- COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ET AL. VS. ALFREDO C. FLORES G.R. NO. 78631 JUNE 29, 1993 .......................................................................................... 33 38- RICARDO C. VALMONTE VS. RENATO DE VILLA G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989 ................................................................................................... 34 39- HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PEDRO PACIS, AND MARTIN ALAGAO, VS. REMEDIOS MAGO AND HILARION U. JARENCIO39 G.R. NO. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28, 1968 ............................................................................................................................................. 35 40- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561 JANUARY 18, 1991 ...................................................................................................... 37 41- GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 ............................................................................................. 38 42- ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, ET AL. VS. APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ET AL, G.R. NO. 117565 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 ..................................................................... 39 43- CLEMENTE MAGTOTO VS.MIGUEL M. MANGUERA G.R. NOS. L-37201-02 MARCH 3, 1975 ........................................................................................... 40 44- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA G.R. NO. 91374 FEBRUARY 25, 1991 ................................................................................... 40 45- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAIME AGUSTIN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1995 ...................................................................................... 41 46- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO BASE G.R. NO. 109773 MARCH 30, 2000 .......................................................................................... 41 47- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. EDWARD ENDINO&GERRY GALGARIN G.R. NO. 133026 FEBRUARY 20, 2001....................................................... 42 48- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DAVID S. LOVERIA G.R. NO. 79138 JULY 2, 1990 ......................................................................................................... 43 49- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, G.R. NO. 122485 FEBRUARY 1, 1999 ....................................................................... 44 50- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT G.R. NO. 109775 NOVEMBER 14, 1996 ...................................................................... 47 2 | P a g e 51- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINDO MOJELLO G.R. NO. 145566 MARCH 9, 2004.......................................................................................... 48 52- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS G.R. NO. 71092 SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 ........................................................................................ 49 53- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RONILO L. PINLAC G.R. NOS. 74123-24 SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 ...................................................................................... 51 54- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO MASONG, DEFENDANTS G.R. NOS. L-46960-62 JANUARY 8, 1987 ................................................................................................................................... 52 55- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA. G.R. NO. 122142 MAY 17, 2000 .................................................................................. 53 56- GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 ............................................................................................. 54 57- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AURELIO BALISACAN G.R. NO. L-26376 AUGUST 31, 1966 ............................................................................... 55 58- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEO P. ECHEGARAY G.R. NO. 117472 FEBRUARY 7, 1997 ............................................................................................. 56 59- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN RELOVA G.R. NO. L-45129 MARCH 6, 1987................................................................................................ 57 60- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-36528 SEPTEMBER 24, 1987 ............................................... 59 61- JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, ETC. AND EVANGELINE PONCE CARPIO, G.R. NO. 172716 NOVEMBER 17, 2010 .............................................................................................................................................................................. 60 62- VALERIO TACAS VS. FLORENTINO C. CARIASO G.R. NO. L-37406 AUGUST 31, 1976 ....................................................................................................... 61 63- GARCES VS. ESTENZO GR. NO. L-53487, MAY 25, 1981 ................................................................................................................................................... 62 64- ERNESTO G. GONZALES VS.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G.R. NO. L-38178 OCTOBER 3, 1985 ........................................................ 62 65- MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 .................................................................................................................................. 63 66- YAP VS. CA GR. NO. 141529 JUNE 6, 2001 ............................................................................................................................................................. 64 67- IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.)VS.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 119673 JULY 26, 1996 ............................................................................. 64 68- PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA VS.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS G.R. NO. 124382 ............................................................................................... 65 69- PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.VS. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON G.R. NO. 81958 ...................................................................... 66 70- RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., VS.THE COURT OF APPEALS FERNAN G.R. NO. L-62100 ...................................................................................................... 67 71- BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 103956 ....................................................................................................................... 68 72- AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG AND JUAN PONCE ENRILE G.R. NO. 82380 ............................................................................... 69 73- CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) G.R. NO. 130716 ....................................................................................... 70 74- MANUEL LAGUNZAD VS. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979 .................................... 71 75- AMELITO R. MUTUC VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS75 G.R. NO. L-32717 NOVEMBER 26, 1970 ................................................................................ 72 76- NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 102653 MARCH 5, 1992 ......................................................................................... 73 77- CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS VS.VALERIANO E. FUGOSO G.R. NO. L-1800............................................................................................................................... 73 78- JOSE B.L. REYES VS. RAMON BAGATSING, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA G.R. NO. L-65366 .................................................................................. 74 79- ABELARDO SUBIDO, VS.ROMAN OZAETA G.R. NO. L-1631 FEBRUARY 27, 1948 .................................................................................................. 75 80- LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ GR L-63419, 18 DECEMBER 1986 ............................................................................................................................................... 76 81- ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS.FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. NO. L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979. ........................................................ 76 82- ENEDINA PRESLEY VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 86774 AUGUST 21, 1991 .......................... 77 83- TERRY LYN MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 101148, AUGUST 05, 1992 .......................................................................................................... 78 84- LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE VS.HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 105597 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 78 85- BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN .G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984 .............................................................................................................. 80 86- CRISTOPHER GAMBOA VS. J. ALFREDO CRUZ G.R. NO. L-56291 JUNE 27, 1988 ............................................................................................................. 80 87- ISABELA SUGAR VS. MACADAEG 98 PHIL. 995 ................................................................................................................................................................. 81 88- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MALIMIT GR NO. 190775, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 ......................................................................................................... 81 89- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GALLARDE GR NO. 13302, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 ............................................................................................................ 82 90- CATALINO N. SARMIENTO V.S THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO G.R. NO. 75271-73 JUNE 27, 1988. ..................................................................... 82 91- THE UNITED STATES VS. J. VALENTINE KARELSEN, G.R. NO. 1376 JANUARY 21, 1904 .......................................................................................... 83 92- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE LEGASPI Y RAMIREZ G.R. NOS. 92167-68 ............................................................................................................ 84 93- EFREN C. MONCUPAVS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. G.R. NO. L-63345 ................................................................................................................................ 85 94- MANUEL Q. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. CABALLERO,-VERSUS- HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, FERNANDO ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. L-45647 AUGUST 21, 1987 ....................................................... 86 95- EMETERIA VILLAFLOR VS. RICARDO SUMMERS G.R. NO. 16444 ...................................................................................................................................... 87 96- PEOPLE V. DUERO G.R. NO. L-52016 MAY 13, 1981 ....................................................................................................................................................... 87 97- STONEHILL V. DIOKNO, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) .................................................................................................................................................................... 88 98- ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996] ............................................................................................................................... 89 99- QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD G.R. NO. L-10280 SEPTEMBER 30, 1963 ................................................................................................... 90 3 | P a g e 01- ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L-24693 OCTOBER 23, 1967 Facts: On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance No. 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1stclass (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2ndclass (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. 02- TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION GR L-59234, 30 SEPTEMBER 1982, EN BANC, MELENCIO FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT. ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate 4 | P a g e property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed. 03- REPUBLIC VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G.R. NO. 141314. NOVEMBER 15, 2002 FACTS: On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172. On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh, subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicant‘s customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA), the ERB rendered its decision adopting COA‘s recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO‘s billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that ―the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the Board‘s Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with MERALCO‘s billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCO‘s customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.‖ The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be ―borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business‖ hence, should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year. On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCO‘s customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the public interest should prevail over private profits. HELD: In third world countries like the Philippines, equal justice will have a synthetic ring unless the economic rights of the people, especially the poor, are protected with the same resoluteness as their right to liberty. The cases at bar are of utmost significance for they concern the right of our people to electricity and to be reasonably charged for their consumption. In configuring the contours of this economic right to a basic necessity of life, the Court shall define the limits of the power of respondent MERALCO, a giant public utility and a monopoly, to charge our people for their electric consumption. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State‘s police powers. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. 5 | P a g e 04- LIM VS. PACQUING G.R. 115044, JANUARY 27, 1995 Facts: The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044: a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC). b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994. c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC). The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065. On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, inter alia, resolve the legal question, 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional. Issue: 1. Whether or not PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State, as the government contends, or 2. Whether or not PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being Violative of the equal protection and non- impairment provisions of the Constitution, as ADC argues. Held: 1. Police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus: The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as follows: WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country; WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development program under the new society; WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from local government to the National Government. It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz: In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled 6 | P a g e that questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied) It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local governments) to consider and approve. 2. On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that: A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege. As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements. There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years ago. 05- Lutz vs. Araneta G.R. No. L-7859, 22 December 1955 FACTS: Due to the threat to industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; the National Assembly promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma challenged the legality of the taxes imposed by the said Act. In plaintiff's opinion such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. 567 is primarily an exercise of the police power. HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in the said Act is a pure exercise of the taxing power. However, the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground 7 | P a g e of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. 06- MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION G.R. NO. 111097 Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino. On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino. On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution. Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, ―gambling and other prohibited games of chance.‖ Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. 07- VALENTIN TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD G.R. NO. L-75697 Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, ―An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that: "SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." "Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.‖ 8 | P a g e ―Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.‖ The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry. Issues: 1. Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. 2. Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional. Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business." 08- RESTITUTO YNOT VS.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. NO. 74457 Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. Issue: Whether or not the law is valid. Held: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. 9 | P a g e 09- CRISTINA DE KNECHT VS.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. NO. L-51078 Facts: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner. Issue: Is the choice of Fernando Rein and del Pan Streets valid? Held: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. 10- PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-119694 Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free Comelec Space• and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non- compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space,• the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidates utilization of the Comelec space• procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid. Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to donate free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy. 10 | P a g e 11- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 137569 Facts: The De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell for an amount of P11,800,000.00 , Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on December 14, 1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for specific performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. While this case for specific performance was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the government. Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on December 14, l988 and that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas. The trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of P23,976.00 per square meter for the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1,380 square meters to be expropriated Meanwhile, the trial court upheld the validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of Guerrero. Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motions praying that the just compensation for the land be deposited in .As his motion for intervention and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved, Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and injunction with temporary restraining order to enjoin the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of mandamus. De la Ramas filed on March 17, 1993 a Motion for Authority to withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991.The trial court denied the motion of the De la Ramas. In its order dated October 7, 1993, the trial court clarified that the area of land covered by the contract to sell included the portion expropriated by the Republic and that the Contract to Sell dated December 14, 1988 executed by the parties is a valid document that authorizes the plaintiff to step into the shoes of the defendants in relation to the property covered by TCT No. 16213; and that the transfer shall be free from all liens and encumbrances except for the expropriated portion of 1,380 square meters. As a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed by the Branch Clerk of Court in favor of Guerrero upon payment by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on January 11, 1994 and the further sum of P1,608,900.00 on February 1, 1994 as full payment for the balance of the purchase price under the contract to sell of December 14, 1988. The entire amount was withdrawn and duly received by the De la Ramas. Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920- square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land.This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence, this petition. Issues: Who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question? Held: Guerrerois entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question. The title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property. It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract's validity, which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero. Stated in another way, Guerrero was buying the entire property free from all claims of third persons except those of the government.Evidently, Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. 11 | P a g e The fact that the De la Ramas have withdrawn and appropriated for themselves the amount paid by Guerrero. This amount represented the purchase price of the entire 4,075 square meters of land, including the expropriated portion, which was the subject of their agreement. The payment, therefore, to them of the value of the expropriated portion would unjustly enrich them. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. 12- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 146587. JULY 2, 2002 Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (―PIA‖), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the ―Voice of America,‖ had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid. The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya. Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court. In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled. 12 | P a g e Issue: Whether or not the trial court of Bulacan erred in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000 Held: The trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose . WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 13- THE CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL G.R. NO. L-14355 OCTOBER 31, 1919 Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged: That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court. Issue: Whether or not the Cemetery being the subject of the expropriation proceedings by the City of Manila is public or private property and whether or not such expropriation necessary by standards of exercise of the power of eminent domain. Held: It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.) Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.) The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same, used the following language: The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration, government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually effectuated. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at law, for the wounded sensibilities of the living, in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Associationvs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.) In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows 13 | P a g e that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. 14- LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE CASE DIGEST G.R. NO. L-19201 JUNE 16, 1965 FACTS: Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor‘s gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to a religious organization is subject to donor‘s tax? HELD: Constitutional exemption for religious purpose refers only to property taxes.—Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. Imposition of gift tax on property used for religious purposes not violation of Constitution.—A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. 15- PHILEX MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. NO. 125704 AUGUST 28, 1998 Facts: Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 8, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36975 affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision in CTA Case No. 4872 dated March 16, 1995 ordering it to pay the amount of P110,677,668.52 as excise tax liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6, 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. The facts show that on August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.982.52 Issue: Whether or not the contention of Philex that In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund, the same should, ipso jure, off-set its excise tax liabilities since both had already become "due and demandable, as well as fully liquidated;" hence, legal compensation can properly take place. Held: We see no merit in this contention. In several instances prior to the instant case, we have already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the aforementioned distinction. Prescinding from this premise, in Francia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we categorically held that taxes cannot be subject to set-off or compensation, thus: We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government. The ruling in Francia has been applied to the subsequent case of Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, which reiterated that: . . . a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually 14 | P a g e creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off. Further, Philex's reliance on our holding in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc., wherein we ruled that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet been approved by the Commissioner, is no longer without any support in statutory law. It is important to note, that the premise of our ruling in the aforementioned case was anchored on Section 51 (d) of the National Revenue Code of 1939. However, when the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, the same provision upon which the Itogon-Suyoc pronouncement was based was omitted. Accordingly, the doctrine enunciated in Itogon-Suyoc cannot be invoked by Philex. Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philex's position, it asserts that the imposition of surcharge and interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified. Philex posits the theory that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all, it still has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR. We fail to see the logic of Philex's claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. To be sure, we cannot allow Philex to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. If any taxpayer can defer the payment of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. Moreover, Philex's theory that would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give rise to confusion and abuse, depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit and offset their tax liabilities. Corollarily, the fact that Philex has pending claims for VAT input claim/refund with the government is immaterial for the imposition of charges and penalties prescribed under Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. The payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the BIR is not vested with any authority to waive the collection thereof. The same cannot be condoned for flimsy reasons, similar to the one advanced by Philex in justifying its non-payment of its tax liabilities. 16- G.R. NO. 130716 CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. He also claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth." 15 | P a g e Issue: 1. Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to bring the action. 2. Whether the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution Held: On the first issue, petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets. On the second issue, General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution.In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitimate. And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts. Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill - gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandigan bayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. 17- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the ―extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to theUnited States. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen‘s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. RULING: Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. 16 | P a g e ―Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. ―The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. ―Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision. ―In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. ―The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution 18- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 25, AND MARK B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 FACTS: Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to RP-US extradition treaty and Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country" which was founded upon the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of provisions of the United States Code. Private respondent addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. In response to private respondent, petitioner, denied the foregoing requests. Respondent then claims his procedural right to due notice and hearing of his case which is indispensable of the right to due process. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between the due process clause in the Constitution and the RP-US Extradition Treaty? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. Categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should 17 | P a g e be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. These two components law of the land, international law and municipal or national law, are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by PD No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. 19- GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VS. HON. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, MORALES, AND MARK . JIMENEZ A.K.A . MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, [G.R .NO. 148571. SEPTEMBER 24, 2002] FACTS: The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No.0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioner‘s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and 2. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. HELD: 1. No. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. The case under consideration is an extradition and not acriminal action; therefore it is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. No. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has beenarrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not applyto extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. 18 | P a g e 20- ESRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the president of the republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself directly or indirectly, ill- gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three and seventeen centavos (p4,097,804,173.17), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the republic of Philippines through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means. Respectively or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos (p1,847,578,057.50); and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with john does jane does, commissions r percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred thousand pesos (p189,700,000.00) more or less, from the Belle corporation which became part of the deposit in the equitable bank under the account name 'jose velarde'. Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. it violates the due process clause for its vagueness 2. it violates the constitutional right of the accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him 3. it violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder 4. it is beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting these to mala prohibita, in violation of the due process concept of criminal responsibility. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit Ratio: In view of vagueness and ambiguity - Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner‘s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner‘s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein arification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the 19 | P a g e most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be nconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. In view of due process - On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth. In view of mens rea - As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In view of estoppels - Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute. In view of plunder as a malum in se - The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. 21- PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-52245 Facts: Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Dumlao alleges is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation. Issue: 1.Whether or not the section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is unconstitutional 2. Whether or not the petitioners have loci standi to seek judicial redress Held: The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and the portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. 20 | P a g e The petitioners have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. It is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 22- ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GR NO. 46496, FEBRUARY 27, 19450/ 69 PHIL. 635 FACTS: TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio‘s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker‘s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documentsthat they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are; (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be ―substantial.‖ Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 23- PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. VS. PETE PRADO GR NO. 105371, NOVEMBER 11, 1993/ 227 SCRA 703 Facts: Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law. Issues: Whether or not RA 7354 is unconstitutional being - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. 21 | P a g e - Violative of the Equal protection clause Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 24- GONZALES VS . COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. NO. L-28196; 9 NOV 1967] Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)member;2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates The Constitution. Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned."The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."Article XV of the Constitution provides:. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. 25- ORMOC SUGAR VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY GR L-23794, 17 FEBRUARY 1968 Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional. Said company also filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time. Issue: 1. Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause. 22 | P a g e 2. Whether the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed. Held: Yes. The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance‘s enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon. Yes, Equal Protection Clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn‘t bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 26- PEOPLE V. CAYAT G.R. NO. L-45987 MAY 5, 1939 FACTS: Cayat is a native of a non Christian tribe in Baguio. He was found guilty of act 1639 which prohibits natives of non Christian tribes from acquiring wines and liquors other than those native wines which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed act violates the constitutional provision on equal protection, due process, and whether or not it is an improper exercise of police power. HELD: Equal protection not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification to be reasonable (1) must rest on substantial distinctions (2) germane to the purpose of the law (3) not limited to existing conditions only (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. In (1), not based on accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. Non Christian refers not to religious belief but to geographical area. In (2), unquestionable because it is designed to insure peace and order in and among Non Christian tribes. In (3), it applies for all times as long as those conditions exist. In (4), it‘s not an argument here. The government raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress with the ultimate view of placing them with Christians on the basis of true equality. 27- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS G.R. NOS. 132875-76. FEBRUARY 3, 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. 23 | P a g e The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant‘s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. 28- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY MIJANO Y TAMORA G.R. NO. 129112. JULY 23, 1999 FACTS: That on or about the 10th day of May, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Jimmy Milano, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one HAZEL RAMIREZ Y ABING, who is a child below seven (7) years old, against her will and consent. The witnesses for the prosecution were Hazel‘s mother, Dina Ramirez, Arnulfo Valiente and Hazel Ramirez herself. The accused-appellant denied the charges. The trial court did not accord credence to the testimony of accused-appellant, pointing out that the defense of denial and accused-appellant‘s alibi, deserve no serious preoccupation of the mind. Nor yet can his claim that he was too drunk to know what transpired at the time when the rape was committed, be given weight to disprove the charge against him. Hence, the instant review and appeal. ISSUE: Is the death penalty law violative of the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like him, the poor, the uneducated, and the jobless. HELD: The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. Republic Act No. 7659 specifically provides: x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: x x x 4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old. x x x Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons – rich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or non-religious. No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively imposed. 29- SOLIVEN V. MAKASAIR G.R. NO. 82585 NOVEMBER 14, 1988 Facts/Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Held: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the 24 | P a g e judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. 30- ALLADO V. DIOCNO G.R. NO. 113630 MAY 5, 1994 Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge. The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal. A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other, along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Parañaque. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. Issue: Whether or not there was truly a probable cause in the issuance of the assailed warrant. Held: Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, defined probable cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." This definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent cases. Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. And as a protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting the accused. The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremationStrangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on 16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided. 25 | P a g e In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause. In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is a function of the prosecutor. Cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one" In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them. 31- BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. NO. L-64261 DECEMBER 26, 1984 Facts: Two [2] search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz- Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question. Issue: 26 | P a g e 1. Whether or not the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City basing on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states: ―Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.‖ 2. Whether or not these search warrants are valid considering the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. Held: 1. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b]. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 2. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit: Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: [a] Property subject of the offense; [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. 32- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLORENCIO B. DORIA G.R. NO. 125299 JANUARY 22, 1999 Facts: On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The information reads: That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. Issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom. Held: (1) .Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty- bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 27 | P a g e (2) The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest. To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise: Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows: 28 | P a g e In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross- examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. 33- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE Y TEJAS, G.R. NO. 87059 JUNE 22, 1992 FACTS: The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division. Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused is lawful? HELD: The requirements of Rule 113 Section 5 have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed. The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house. It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This 29 | P a g e is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security. There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him. The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized. 34- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, G.R. NO. 91107 JUNE 19, 1991 FACTS: NARCOM set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the accused personal effects was legal? HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a). Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 30 | P a g e While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 35- SAMMY M. MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 123595 DECEMBER 12, 1997 Facts: In an Information filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as follows: That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been "premature. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 186 Then in its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors: Issue: Whether or no the respondent court was correct in affirming the finding of the Trial Court that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner Legal, validating it as ―stop-and-frisk‖ and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Held: Granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within 31 | P a g e which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared." Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination: Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court: When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. 36- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN AND ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. NO. 125754 DECEMBER 22,1999. Facts: An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and . . . saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana." They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug 32 | P a g e paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both however denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements. The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution to be more plausible convicted both accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each of them not only to reclusion perpetua but also to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Both accused appealed, although separately, each one represented by a separate counsel. Issue: Whether or not Zenaida Bolasa‘s assertions that the search in her residence was illegal as her arrest preceding it was illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized from her could not be properly used as evidence against her correct. Held: The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable." For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable." Thus, arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant — 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;. 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment. Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused- appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest 33 | P a g e and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law. 37- COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ET AL. VS. ALFREDO C. FLORES G.R. NO. 78631 JUNE 29, 1993 Facts: In a letter dated April 20, 1987, the MPAA, through counsel Rico V. Domingo, lodged a complaint before then Director Antonio Carpio of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against certain video establishments for violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1988, in connection with its anti-piracy campaign. Specifically complaining of the "unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film", the MPAA sought the NBI's "urgent assistance in the conduct of search and seizure operations in Metro Manila and elsewhere". (p. 29, Rollo.) On the basis of said letter, NBI and private agents conducted discreet surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them private respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT). Thus, on April 20, 1987, Danilo Manalang, a.k.a. Ronaldo Lim, allegedly an NBI agent, went to the office of FGT to have the copyrighted motion pictures "Cleopatra" owned by Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. and "The Ten Commandments" owned by Paramount Pictures, Inc. reproduced or retaped in video format. For the reproduction services, FGT issued Order Slip No. 3482 dated April 20, 1987 and Delivery Slip No. 118667 dated April 22, 1987, for which services Danilo Manalang paid P45.00. On May 5, 1987, Manalang also had MGM's copyrighted film "Walk Like a Man" reproduced or retaped by FGT for P15.00 (p. 5, Rollo). Consequently, on May 14, 1987, NBI Agent III Lauro C. Reyes, with Manalang and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz as witnesses, applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig. Introduced as evidence in support of the application were the following: the letter dated April 20, 1987 of the MPAA through Rico V. Domingo (Exh. A) FGT's Order Slip No. 3842 (Exh. B); FGT's Delivery Slip No. 118667 (Exh. B-1); video cassettes containing the film "The Ten Commandments" (Exhs. B-1-A, B-1-B); video cassette containing the film "Cleopatra" (Exh. B-1-C); video cassette containing the film "Walk Like a Man" (Exh. B-1-D); FGT's Order Slip No. 3923 dated May 5, 1987 (Exh. B-2); FGT's Delivery Slip No. 123321 dated May 6, 1987 (Exh. B-3); list of copyrighted MPAA member company titles (Exh. C); sketch of location of FGT's office or premises (Exh. D); affidavit of Rebecca Benitez-Cruz (Exh. E); special power of attorney designating Ms. Benitez-Cruz as petitioners' attorney-in- fact (Exh. F to F-8); and affidavit of Danilo Manalang (Exh. G). Upon the offer of these pieces of evidence, Judge Alfredo C. Flores of the aforesaid court, issued Search Warrant No. 45 which reads: TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: GREETINGS: It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit: (a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the attached list; (b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being reproduced or retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the reproduction/repating business of the defendants; (c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described, which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned. You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above- enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs. WITNESS MY HAND this 14th day of May 1987, at Pasig, Metro Manila. (pp. 30-31, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.) At or about high noon of the same day, agents from the NBI, led by Lauro C. Reyes and Mamerto Espartero, with the assistance of the personnel of the Videogram Regulatory Board headed by Elmer San Pascual, duly served Search Warrant No. 45 on the operators or representatives of FGT. In the course of the search of the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures or films owned and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were 34 | P a g e machines and equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters. Inventories of these seized articles were then prepared and copies thereof were furnished Jess Ayson, production manager of FGT. On May 18, 1987, the NBI agents filed a return of the search warrant with a motion to retain custody of the seized items (p. 32, Rollo). Issue: Whether or not Search Warrant No. 45 is valid. Held: The right to security against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Thus, Sections 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites in the issuance of search warrants: Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The search warrant must contain a specific description of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity (Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990]). The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]). 38- RICARDO C. VALMONTE VS. RENATO DE VILLA G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989 Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. Issue: Whether or not the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed. Held: Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a 35 | P a g e reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. 39- HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PEDRO PACIS, AND MARTIN ALAGAO, VS. REMEDIOS MAGO AND HILARION U. JARENCIO39 G.R. NO. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28, 1968 FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, acting upon a reliable information received to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 elements of the counter- intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary 36 | P a g e injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago. Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses. On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond. ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question. HELD: The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon.The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs. It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and 37 | P a g e so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods. 40- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561 JANUARY 18, 1991 FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The appellant and his common-law wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, spouses Reyes following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. ISSUE: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized objects contained in the four parcels. HELD: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as 38 | P a g e an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. 41- GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 Facts: Petitioners Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba and their co-accused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. On the ground of invoking (sic) the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case particularly accused Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmeña. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. Twenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979. The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information (Lauchengco vs. Alejandro, L-49034, January 31, 1979, 88 SCRA 175). The accused did not oppose the motion. Respondent judge granted it in his order of October 8, 1979. On October 24, 1979, Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. Issue: Whether the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally dismissed after the accused had been arraigned because of complainant's failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. Held: The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. —When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240). Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299). If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is 39 | P a g e denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717). The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense 42- ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, ET AL. VS. APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ET AL, G.R. NO. 117565 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit- complaint dated November 16, 1989, charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday. Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? Held: The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, the Court said: . . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee. The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of public officers, as follows: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept. 40 | P a g e 43- CLEMENTE MAGTOTO VS. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA G.R. NOS. L-37201-02 MARCH 3, 1975 Facts: Petitioner assailed the orders of the respondent Judges in G.R. No. L-37201-02 declaring admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution. Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Issue: The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, which reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence, and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. Held: This specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. 44- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA G.R. NO. 91374 FEBRUARY 25, 1991 Facts: John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered on August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30,000.00, with costs against him. The fatal weapon, a shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the government. Issue: The defendant-appellant interposed the appeal from said judgment alleging that the trial court committed inter alia the following errors: 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD CONFESSED TO OR ADMITTED THE KILLING. 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE PARAFFIN TEST RESULTS AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. Held: 1. The inadmissibility of the alleged verbal confession of the appellant is raised on the ground that he was maltreated as a result of which he suffered twenty-seven injuries in the form of contusions, lacerations and abrasions. It does not appear, however, that the prosecution proposed to rely on this alleged confession of the appellant, or that the trial court considered the same at all in the resolution of the case. If it were to be considered at all, it would be worthless because of the undeniable fact that the appellant was not only arrested without a warrant and entry into his house was effected without a search warrant, but worse, he was maltreated since his arrest so much so that he suffered multiple injuries. The police investigators responsible for this manhandling should be investigated and held to account. Such involuntary confession cannot help the case of the prosecution. It is a stain in the record of the law enforcement agents who handled the case. 2. As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any 41 | P a g e person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. 45- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAIME AGUSTIN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1995 Facts: In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650- R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta. While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and their presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Issue: Whether or not the accused has been informed of his rights. Held: The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer. The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance off counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 46- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO BASE G.R. NO. 109773 MARCH 30, 2000 Facts: In the early morning of February 8, 1990, a group of men arrived at the residence of Julianito Luna y Tagle, Barangay Captain of Namunga, Rosario, Batangas. One of the two men who introduced themselves as policemen allegedly looking for a certain Hernandez suddenly shot Julianito in the head with a .45 caliber pistol and immediately after, they sped away in an owner-type jeep. Accused-appellant Elberto Base was among those identified on board the jeep and, together with Conrado Guno, Frederick Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio, were indicted for Murder with Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority in a Second Amended Information 1 alleging that — That on or about the 8th day of February 1990, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, in Barangay Namunga, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with a caliber .38 revolver and .45 caliber pistol, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation and by means of a motor vehicle which is a top down owner type jeep colored green with Plate No. UV-CFU-178, and without justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said .45 caliber pistol, suddenly and without warning, one Julianito Luna y Tagle known to them to be an elected Barangay 42 | P a g e Captain (Punong Barangay) of the said Municipality while in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof, or in connection therewith, thereby inflicting upon the latter [a] gun shot wound, 1 x 1 cm., left temporal region, 2 cm. above the left ear, entry with contusion collar, inwards, upwards and backwards, with exit at right occipital region and with avulsion of brain, complete fracture of skull, which directly caused his death. Issue: Whether or not the Sworn Statement dated February 8, 1990 was executed in violation of the accused constitutional rights, firstly his right to counsel of his own choice. Facts: The mantle of protection afforded by the constitutional provision of Sec. 12, Article III covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody. 31 The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. 32 However, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. 33 It must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. 34 Indeed — The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. 35 x x x x x x x x x Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter. While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. 36 Verily, to bean effective counsel "[a] lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. 37 The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 47- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. EDWARD ENDINO&GERRY GALGARIN G.R. NO. 133026 FEBRUARY 20, 2001 Facts: YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once shared. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for 43 | P a g e Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. Issue: Whether or not the videotaped confession which the accused made over TV Patrol was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. Held: Such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein. We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.1âwphi1.nêt We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 48- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DAVID S. LOVERIA G.R. NO. 79138 JULY 2, 1990 Facts: The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLIX (159) with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under the following information: That on or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney with Plate No. NXG-150-Pil. '84, one of the passengers, Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300.00 and a colored brown wallet containing P50.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P350.00; that on the occasion of said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which prevented his death. Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 3). Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty (Record, p. 18.) After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May 26, 1987 reads: From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal. 44 | P a g e Issue: The appellant assails the manner in which he was identified by Manzanero at the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional right to counsel. Held: Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under review occurred reads: Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence. Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating: Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the abovequoted constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial investigation [People v. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379]. which has been defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" [People v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975, January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]. Hence, for instance, these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court [People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] because he is no longer under custodial investigation. The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642], concerning the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation finds application in the instant case. In that case, the accused was arrested for vagrancy and taken to the police station. The following day he was placed on a line-up and a female complainant pointed to him as one of the persons who robbed her. While on trial, the accused filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence on the ground, among others, that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at the time the complainant was in the process of accusing or identifying him for allegedly committing a crime. The motion having been denied by the trial court, the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, which ruled that the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time that the police investigators start questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under investigation. The Court held that in the police line-up conducted in that particular case, it was the complainant who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the police while the accused was not questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded that the latter could not, during the line-up, invoke his right to counsel because he was not under custodial interrogation. In the case at bar, Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th PC Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another robbery, went there to check. Having identified the appellant among the detainees, he reported the matter to the Marikina police [See Exh. "B"]. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun then took the sworn statement of Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. "B" [TSN, December 8, 1986, p. 3.] Since, as in the Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked. But even assuming that the process of identification of the appellant by Manzanero at the PC headquarters was attended by constitutional infirmities, only Manzanero's sworn statement (Exh. "B") where he identified appellant and which was taken by Pat. Ayun, would be excluded for being inadmissible in evidence. The testimony of Manzanero made in open court positively identifying the appellant, as well as those of Richard Bales and Betty Apolinario, would not be affected. These testimonies, taken together with the other evidence on record, would be sufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction. 49- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, G.R. NO. 122485 FEBRUARY 1, 1999 Facts: Appellant was arrested in Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21). 45 | P a g e Issue: Whether or not the accused claims that his extra-judicial confession was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel is tenable. Held: This contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer: Q — Will you please inform the Court what was that call about? A — We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I think, rape with homicide. Q — And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person present? A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped. Q — And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already there? A — The accused was already there. Q — Was he alone? A — He was alone, sir. Q — So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did they tell you, if any? A — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime charged, sir. Q — By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta? A — Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's Office. Q — Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused? A — No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone. Q — But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay? A — Yes, sir. Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start? A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir. Q — And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as assisting lawyer to the accused? A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution. Q — What are those right? A — That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him. Q — Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing? A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro. Q — I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be able to recognize the same? A — Yes, sir. Q — Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you mentioned? A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing. ATTY. PRINCIPE: May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A. proper. Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform? A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro. Q — But you were present? A — I was then present when he signed. Q — There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures? A — These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir. Q — The signature of whom? A — The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir. ATTY. PRINCIPE: 46 | P a g e May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compañero be encircled and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2. Q — After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused? A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement. Q — What was the reply? A — He said "Opo". Q — Did you ask him of his educational attainment? A — It was the Police Officer who asked him. Q — In your presence? A — In my presence, sir. Q — And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the question started? A — Yes, sir. Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he signed this waiver? A — Yes, sir, I was also present. Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver? A — I had also explained to him, sir. Q — In Filipino? A — In Tagalog, sir. Q — And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay, "Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is that? A — This is also signed in my presence. Q — Why are you sure that this is his signature? A — He signed in my presence, sir. Q — And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature? A — This is my signature, sir. Q — And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize the signature? A — This is also my signature, sir. (emphasis supplied). Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; 2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anystatement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; 5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; 47 | P a g e 8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun; 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements; 11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. 50- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT G.R. NO. 109775 NOVEMBER 14, 1996 Facts: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14). Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24). Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.). Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22). Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17). Issue: Whether or not the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates his right against self-incrimination, and because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights. Held: The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . " It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion 48 | P a g e Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (Emphasis ours.) These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged. 51- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINDO MOJELLO G.R. NO. 145566 MARCH 9, 2004 Facts: On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death. 1 Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows: 2 That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body which caused her death. Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed. On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that the appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. 7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. Issues: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Held: The Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial investigation – to elicit a confession. 49 | P a g e The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence. The appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution. 18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. 19 As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. 20 Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. 21 Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case. Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings. The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest . The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano. On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse. The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption . 52- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS G.R. NO. 71092 SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 Facts: While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first confessions were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. On September 18, 1975, the three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975, they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco. In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and September 25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each. In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing. We note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of harassment against her father by his supposed political enemies. Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was acquitted, while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder. In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned.The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased having been a tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. It dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim, who had earlier brought a physical injuries suit against the former, that case having been dismissed. It observed, furthermore, that he was not questioned by the police after the killing, notwithstanding efforts by the three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. It 50 | P a g e relied, finally, on the retraction of the accused themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability. It was satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean bill of health" in connection with the murder case. With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused- appellants. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on their innocence. The acused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self- defense. The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco had but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming. Issue: whether or not these statements can stand up in court. Held: Based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo.11 In that decision, we laid down the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions: ... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned. The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically." With reset to the confessions of September 18, 197 5, while it is stated therein that this Office had just requested the services of Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you wining to accept the legal assistance of Atty. NAVARRO to handle your case, the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically, the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). On the contrary, it is clear therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. What we said in People v. Galit, applies with like force here: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of September 25, 1975. But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension. Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self- incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below, says: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth or making her submit to a pregnancy test or a footprinting test, or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases." In each case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel. But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. 51 | P a g e Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence. It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity" when he allegedly "spilled the beans before the law enforcers on September 9, 1975. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his voluntary statements Chavez v. Court of Appeals tells us: Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel. Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus. For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be made to suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time. 53- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RONILO L. PINLAC G.R. NOS. 74123-24 SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 Facts: Accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate information, as follows: Re: Criminal Case No. 10476 That on or about the 8th day of April, 1984, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon things, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of KOJI SATO, by detaching the four (4) pieces of window jalousies and destroying the aluminum screens of the servant's quarters and entered through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress and once inside, took, robbed and carried away the following articles, to wit: Cash amount and/or cash money P180.00, Alba (Seiko) wrist watch. 300.00, Gold necklace with pendant of undetermined value, to the damage and prejudice of the owner KOJI SATO, in the aforesaid total amount of P480.00 and a necklace of undetermined value. Re: Criminal Case No. 10477 That on or about the 8th day of April, 1984, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon things, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of SAEKI OSAMU, by slashing the screen wall of his house and entered through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once inside, took, robbed and carried away a Hitachi Casette tape recorder of undetermined value, belonging to the said SAEKI OSAMU, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof, in the amount of undetermined value. That on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above named accused, RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO in order to insure the commission of the said Robbery, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one SAEKI OSAMU, several times with a kitchen knife he was then provided with, thereby causing several mortal wounds on the person of the said SAEKI OSAMU, which directly caused his death. After said accused entered a plea of not guilty, the cases proceeded to trial. On March 18, 1986, the trial court rendered its now assailed decision finding the accused guilty as charged. Issue: Whether or not the conviction was proper under the circumstances that the accused (now petitioner) contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession, which was allegedly obtained thru force, torture, violence and intimidation, without having been apprised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel. The only evidence presented by the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial confession of the accused, which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution. 52 | P a g e Held: In the case of People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, promulgated on March 20, 1985, which cited the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, this Court reiterated the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. Therein, We said — At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. (pp. 19-20, 139 SCRA) When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289). The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accused. (People vs. Nicandro supra) Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession. 54- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO MASONG, DEFENDANTS G.R. NOS. L-46960-62 JANUARY 8, 1987 Facts: On that tragic morning of May 23, 1973, when three girls were slain, the youngest only five years old, under the most mystifying and shocking circumstances. Consider the carnage and the girls who fell before the bloodied knife: Zenaida Nastae, 21 years old, stabbed once to death, ears severed; Canda Carluman, 7 years old, stabbed once, hemorrhaging to death; and Mona Carluman, 5 years old, stabbed twice to death, ears severed. These were Nature's creatures still on the threshold of their lives, and yet they were cut down in the innocence of their youth without mercy and without reason. The day following the massacre, prodded perhaps by a sense not only of duty but also of outrage, a joint PC-police posse arrested seven persons in Barrio Talanusa, to wit: Teodoro Villarin, Saturnino Totoy, Solomon Totoy, Gregorio Tundag, Sinfroso Masong, Mohamod Esmael and Balbino Estrera, all suspected of the killings. Found in their possession and confiscated were two home-made shotguns, one .38 caliber homemade pistol with two live bullets, five hunting knives with scabbards, an undershirt with Latin words arranged in a mystic design, a pair of trousers, four bottles of oil and two human ears. Wilfredo Rojas, their alleged leader, was arrested later in Malangas, also of Zamboanga del Sur, and turned over to the Margosatubig police. After investigation, all the suspects were charged with the murder of the above-named victims in three separate informations to which they all pleaded not guilty. Later, on motion of the prosecution and over the objection of the other defendmurdants, Esmael and Estrera were discharged so they could be used as state witnesses. Every one of the remaining defendants was provided with counsel de oficio An 53 | P a g e extended trial followed and decision was finally rendered on January 27, 1975, convicting all of them and sentencing them to death. The lone exception was Saturnino Totoy, who, because of the mitigating circumstance of minority, was meted out the lesser penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal . All the accused were also held solidarily liable for the civil indemnity of P12,000.00, to be paid to the heirs of each of the three victims. Issue: Solomon Totoy challenges his supposed confession on the ground that it was taken in violation of the Bill of Rights. Held: The requirements of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution. This statement was obtained from him on May 28, 1973. It is therefore covered by Magtoto v. Manguera and other subsequent cases holding that this section should be given only prospective operation from January 17, 1973, when the Constitution was ratified. The said provision categorically states that "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right." The record does not show that this requirement was observed. On the contrary, there merely appears in the opening paragraph of the said confession the vague statement that: The affiant has been informed of his rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, and under the state of Martial Law, and the nature of the investigation, and without violence, intimidation, force nor reward the affiant declared as follows: xxx xxx xxx This surely does not suggest compliance with the constitutional mandate. The rights which Totoy was entitled to know were not specifically communicated to him. Being informed of his "rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" did not mean he was informed particularly of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. He was not told he did not have to answer if he did not feel like answering. He was not told he had a right to be assisted by counsel. He was not given a chance to retain counsel de parte if he wanted to, and neither was he offered the services of counsel de oficio. Not knowing about his right to counsel, he could not have waived it; and in any case, the waiver, to be valid, would have needed the assistance of counsel under the ruling announced in People v. Galit, which is still the prevailing doctrine notwithstanding the reservations of some members of this Court. In fine, what we see here is a superficial observance of the requirements of the Bill of Rights through a mere recitation by rote of the sacramental advise, which was inadequate to begin with. There was no sincere effort or desire to apply the guarantees of Section 20 that could have protected the suspect from the rash and uncounseled statements he subsequently made, knowing no better. That statement is, of course, not admissible against him. 55- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA. G.R. NO. 122142 MAY 17, 2000 Facts: On or about August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and carry away the amount of P4,000.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine Currency; that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter. Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District investigated the robbery with homicide. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of the accused conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is valid. Held: Art. III, §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his 54 | P a g e own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same §12. The accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, §12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. There was only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v. Januario: 17 Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 18 Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. As observed in People v. Bandula, 21 the independent counsel required by Art. III, §12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation. 22 For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 56- GENEROSO ESMEÑA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 Facts: Petitioners Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba and their co-accused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. On the ground of invoking (sic) the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case particularly accused Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmeña. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. Twenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979. The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information (Lauchengco vs. Alejandro, L-49034, January 31, 1979, 88 SCRA 175). The accused did not oppose the motion. Respondent judge granted it in his order of October 8, 1979. 55 | P a g e On October 24, 1979, Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy. Issue: Whether the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally dismissed after the accused had been arraigned because of complainant's failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. Held: The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. —When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240). Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299). If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717). The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense 57- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AURELIO BALISACAN G.R. NO. L-26376 AUGUST 31, 1966 Facts: On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged: That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death. To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed therefrom. 56 | P a g e This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). Issue: whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L- 19860, December 23, 1964). Held: It is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445). 58- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEO P. ECHEGARAY G.R. NO. 117472 FEBRUARY 7, 1997 Facts: On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect. Between December 31, 1993, when R.A No. 7659 took effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-appellant has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction his case was elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence. Issue: Whether or not R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se: a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution. b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution. Held: The detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following analysis. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re- impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that: . . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just civilized and ordered society. Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning hateful and 57 | P a g e abominable, which in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death: All the crimes mentioned therein are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. 59- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN RELOVA G.R. NO. L-45129 MARCH 6, 1987 Facts: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. Issue: whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. Held: It must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV 58 | P a g e (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute). In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951): While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied) 59 | P a g e By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case. 60- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-36528 SEPTEMBER 24, 1987 Facts: Respondent Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the two (2) cases, the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case No. F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, Rep. Act No. 3060), by alleging that the accused. conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to be publicly exhibited ... completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and partnership, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]. On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]. On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, accused Agapito Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused, Roberto Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. On 15 November 1972, the accused Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case No. F-147348, without however, substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. On 27 December 1972, accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending against him Criminal Case No. F-147347, for violation of Rep. Act No. 3060, where the information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348. Petitioner opposed the motion to quash but the respondent City Court, in an order, dated 20 January 1973, dismissed the case (Criminal Case No. F-147348) stating thus: In one case (F-147347), the basis of the charge is a special law, Rep. Act No. 3060. In the other case (F-147348), the basis of the same is the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that the allegations in the information of said cases are Identical the plea entered in one case by the accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case, as said allegations therein are not only similar but [sic] Identical facts. After the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case No. F- 147347, the accused changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of Rep. Act No. 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. 60 | P a g e Issue: 1. Whether or not conviction or acquittal in, or dismissal or termination of a first case is not necessary, so long as he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same offense. 2. Whether or not the conviction of respondent Gonzales in Criminal Case No. F-147347 by imposing on him a fine of P600.00 can retroactively supply the ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348. Held: 1. It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other. 2. But even if conviction in Criminal Case No. F-147347 preceded the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F- 147348, still that conviction cannot bar the prosecution for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, because, by pleading to the charge in Criminal Case No. F-147348 without moving to quash the information, the accused (now the respondent) Gonzales must be taken to have waived the defense of double jeopardy, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 117, section 10. (Barot v. Villamor, 105 Phil. 263 [1959]) It is only in cases where, after pleading or moving to quash on some other grounds, the accused learns for the first time that the offense of which he is charged is an offense for which he has been in jeopardy that the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on that ground. ... In the case at bar, however, the fact is that the accused (now the respondent Gonzales) was arraigned in the same court. He, therefore, cannot claim ignorance of the existence of another charge against him for supposedly the same offense. 61- JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, ETC. AND EVANGELINE PONCE CARPIO, G.R. NO. 172716 NOVEMBER 17, 2010 Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce‘s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce‘s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3 After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner‘s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner‘s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner‘s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner‘s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion. Issues: whether petitioner‘s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. 61 | P a g e Held: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court‘s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges. Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55 Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). 62- VALERIO TACAS VS. FLORENTINO C. CARIASO G.R. NO. L-37406 AUGUST 31, 1976 Facts: Two criminal complaints filed against petitioner by the same Chief of Police, one Felipe Agdeppa, to demonstrate the applicability of the Bonotan ruling. The criminal complaint for less serious physical injuries dated January 2, 1973 was worded thus: 'The undersigned Chief of Police, Sinait Ilocos Sur, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, accuses Valerio Tacas of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries committed as follows: That on or about 4:30 o'clock p.m., December 15,1972, in Bo. Zapat Sinait Ilocos Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, tile above-named accused, With deliberate intent did then and there willfully and feloniously assault and attack Emiterio lbaan with a bolo inflicting upon the latter multiple hacking wounds and stab wounds on the different parts of his body which injuries shall incapacitate the said Emiterio lbaan from the performance of his customary labors for a period of at least 30 days and requires medical attendance for the same period of time. Then came on April 17, 1973, after having been convicted of the aforesaid offense, the other criminal complaint against him for assault upon a person in authority. This was the language used: "The undersigned Chief of Police, Sinait Ilocos Sur, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, accuses Valerio Tacas of the crime of Assault Upon a Person in Authority committed as follows: That on or about 4:30 o'clock p.m., December 15, 1972, in Bo. Zapat Sinait Ilocos Sur, Philippines and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and attacked one Emiterio lbaan, a duly elected and incumbent barrio Captain of Bo. Zapat Sinait Ilocos Sur by stabbing him three times with the use of a jungle bolo. It Was pointed out by petitioner that on the very same day that he was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries, he pleaded guilty and was immediately sentenced to a prison term of thirty days of arresto menor, there being in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. He did serve such sentence, but after his release, came on April 17, 1973, the aforesaid criminal complaint, this time for assault against a person in authority. He did object on jeopardy grounds, but to no avail. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not constitutional provision on double jeopardy bars a prosecution for the crime of assault upon a person of authority, the alleged offense having been committed by the accused on the occasion of having inflicted a bolo wound on the offended party for which he had previously been charged and convicted of less serious physical injuries. He had, moreover, fully served his sentence in jail. Held: From the commission of the act complained of, resulting in the prosecution for less serious physical injuries, there was no circumvening event or circumstance that could affect or change the nature if the act originally committed. This is a case therefore of there Being a single act resulting in the complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority. The indictment, was, however, solely for less serious physical injuries. it is therefore now too late to hold him liable as 62 | P a g e well for the offense of assault against a person in authority. The objection coming from the Solicitor- General that this is not one of those cam where the offense is Identical cannot be sustained in view of the well-settled interpretation embodied in the Rules of Court provision cited such constitutional requirement is satisfied if the subsequent indictment is "for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. 63- GARCES VS. ESTENZO GR. NO. L-53487, MAY 25, 1981 Facts: The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". Issue: Is the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, valid and constitutional? Held: Yes. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses. 64- ERNESTO G. GONZALES VS.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G.R. NO. L-38178 OCTOBER 3, 1985 Facts: The plaintiffs are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor organization. All, except Jose Mercado and Victoriano Mercado, have been seasonal employees or laborers of the defendant Tarlac Development Corporation since prior to October 19, 1962. The Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union is a labor organization represented by its president Pacifico Millo. All of its members have also been working with the Central Azucarera de Tarlac long before October 19, 1962. The defendant Tarlac Development Corporation is a corporation that operates the Central Azucarera de Tarlac. On the date mentioned, the Tarlac Development Corporation and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union entered into an exclusive collective bargaining agreement.The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppages or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketting, sit-down strikes, or any other interference with any of the operations of the Central during the term of this agreement, so long as the procedure outlined in Article X hereof is followed by the Central and the Central abides by the result of the procedure therein provided. The Central, upon the written request of the Union, shall discharge any employee or worker who shall fail to fulfill the conditions aforesaid or who resigns or is suspended from membership in the Union for disloyalty The plaintiffs, through members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, being ignorant of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3350, and believing that it was the only way by which they could continue working for the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, by reason of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement, joined the defendant Labor Union on the date mentioned. Upon being informed of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts them from the effects of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement due to their religion the plaintiffs resigned from the defendant labor Union, who in turn demanded from its co-defendant, the Tarlac Development Corporation, the dismissal of the plaintiffs from their work under the above-quoted provision of Section 4 of the bargaining agreement. Hence this petition. Issues: 1. Is Republic Act No. 3350 which exempts members of any religious sect—prohibiting the affiliation of their members in any labor organization—from the operation of a union security provision constitutional? 2. Is the dismissal proper? Held: On the first issue,Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts plaintiffs-appellees from the operation of the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of October 19, 1962, remains constitutional. Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general 63 | P a g e welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate. The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. Regarding the second issue, the Court finds that plaintiffs-appellees, as members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, may not be dismissed from their employment by reason of their resignation from the defendant-appellant Labor Union. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC IN CIVIL CASE NO. 4017 DATED OCTOBER 29, 1964, IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO. 65- MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 FACTS: In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines (2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return HELD: Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President‘s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is a power borne by the President‘s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President‘s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President‘s power as protector of the peace. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order. Another question to determine is whether or no there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, and the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. 64 | P a g e 66- YAP VS. CA GR. NO. 141529 JUNE 6, 2001 Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, ―in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.‖ He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. Issue: Was the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals on accused‘s bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel? Held: The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. 23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. 67- IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.)VS.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 119673 JULY 26, 1996 Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast. On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92- 14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City. 1 Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rendered a Judgment ordering respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program. Petitioner is however directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration whereby the portion directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is hereby deleted and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."Respondent Board appealed to the Court who reversed the trial court. Hence this petition. Issues: (1) whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo (2) assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs. 65 | P a g e Held: On the first issue, PD No. 1986 section provides that the Board has the power toreview and examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime." On the second issue, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule .There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs. SO ORDERED. 68- PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA VS.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS G.R. NO. 124382 Facts: Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.He began his work with the SDA as a literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA over the island of Negros. He worked his way up the ladder and got promoted several times until he was transferred to Bacolod City where held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991.On various occasions he received several communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. In his written explanation he reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time.Petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of the Negros Mission,tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo but Pastor Buhat denied so the two exchanged heated arguments. On his way out, petitioner overheard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough).Irked,he returned to the office of Pastor Buhat, and tried to overturn the latter's table then banged the attaché case of Pastor Buhat on the table, scattered the books in his office, and threw the phone. On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting at the Negros Mission Conference Room. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits. Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideño rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The SDA appealed the decision to the National Labor Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration then NLRC reversed its original decision. The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once again.Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioner. Issues: 1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA; 2) Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state 3) Whether or not such termination is valid. Held: The first two issues were resolved jointly. The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration. The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or 66 | P a g e purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation. Private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish. The Court has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action war brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction. The active participation of private respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction. On the final issue, the petitioner was terminated from service without just or lawful cause. Having been illegally dismissed, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority right and the payment of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices. Private respondent failed to comply with the above requirements. The alleged grounds for the dismissal of petitioner from the service were only revealed to him when the actual letter of dismissal was finally issued. For this reason, it cannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly prepare for his defense. We cannot sustain the validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. In the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private respondents failed to demonstrate, between petitioner and his wife, petitioner cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. After all, they still have separate and distinct personalities. Indeed, he even labored hard for the SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal from the service for a non-existent cause. The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. 69- PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.VS. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON G.R. NO. 81958 Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. Issue: whether or not Department Order 1 is valid under the Constitution Held: The assailed order is valid. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. 67 | P a g e Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety,"as may be provided by law. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. 70- RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., VS.THE COURT OF APPEALS FERNAN G.R. NO. L-62100 Facts: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former corporation. Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co- stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management committee was organized and appointed. Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division. When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety. On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefore his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. 68 | P a g e Held: Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 .The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed. 71- BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 103956 Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws secretion 15 of which states that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." Issue: Whether Resolution No. 2347 Section 15a is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and is therefore unconstitutional. Held: The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. First it infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Second, it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to dole out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 69 | P a g e 72- AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG AND JUAN PONCE ENRILE G.R. NO. 82380 Facts: Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions) for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who suggested that they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it. The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Power a unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution in the Philippines in 1986. The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or televisi on production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. Private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Petition with the Regional Trial Court of to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution and the trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. Respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." Held: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which led up to that denouncement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines. 70 | P a g e 73- CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) G.R. NO. 130716 Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. He also claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth." Issue: 1. Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to bring the action. 2. Whether the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution Held: On the first issue, petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets. On the second issue, General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution.In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitimate. 45 And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, 47 unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts. 48 Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill- gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandigan bayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 71 | P a g e 74- MANUEL LAGUNZAD VS. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979 Facts: Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business outfit, the "MML Productions."The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla. Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party (then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. 4 On October 3, 1961, petitioner received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation" of his life.On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. 5 Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in the picture. On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, 7 petitioner and private respondent, represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement" Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of private respondent's demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture." On October 10, 1961, petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private respondent. 9 Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor Traversing the Complaint, petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure. By way of counterclaim, petitioner demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being without any valid cause. Private respondent duly filed her Answer to Counterclaim alleging that the transaction between her and petitioner was entered into freely and voluntarily. On June 30, 1964, the trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter Court affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having been denied by the Court, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Initially, or on June 16, 1970, this Court denied the Petition for lack of merit, but resolved subsequently to give it due course after petitioner moved for reconsideration on the additional argument that the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of expression, and that the Licensing cement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech and of the press. Issues: In his Brief, petitioner assigns the following errors to the appellate Court: a. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION IN THE CASE BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM WAS INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE AND CHARACTER; b. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO MAKE COMPLETE FINDINGS OF FACTS ON ALL ISSUES BEFORE IT; c. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF, OR FOR HAVING AN ILLEGAL CAUSE OR CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACT, d. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, IS NULL AND VOID; RESPONDENT NOT HAVING HAD ANY PROPERTY NIGHTS OVER THE INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF MOISES PADILLA WHO WAS A PUBLIC FIGURE. e. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, WAS NULL AND VOID, PETITIONER'S CONSENT HAVING BEEN PROCURED BY MEANS OF DURESS, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE; f. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF RESPONDENT AS DEFINED IN ART. 26 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OVER THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILM THE PUBLIC LIFE OF A PUBLIC FIGURE, INFRINGED UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS. 72 | P a g e Held: Petitioner's contention that respondent Court failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues raised before it is without basis. respondent Court has substantially and sufficiently complied with the injunction that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Neither do the court agree with petitioner's submission that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family.Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioner's contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. It is not, however, without limitations. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is denied and the judgment appealed from hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner. 75- AMELITO R. MUTUC VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS75 G.R. NO. L-32717 NOVEMBER 26, 1970 Facts: On October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2 which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. Issue: The validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes. Held: It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing. 73 | P a g e 76- NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 102653 MARCH 5, 1992 Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, Issue: Validity of section 11 oof R.A. 6646. Held: The nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind- deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged" candidates. 77- CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS VS.VALERIANO E. FUGOSO G.R. NO. L-1800 Facts: This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the ground that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Issue: Does section 1119 which was enacted through delegation of power confer right to the mayor to refuse the permit sought by permit being sought by the petitioner? Held: The Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. We must adopt the second construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. 74 | P a g e Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted 78- JOSE B.L. REYES VS. RAMON BAGATSING, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA G.R. NO. L-65366 Facts: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. During the course of the oral argument, it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarment, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." The petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On October 25, 1983, the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro. It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." Issue: Is the denial of a permit to hold the rally, in consideration of Ordinance 7295, violative to exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly? Held: The denial of a permit to hold the rally violates the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block- away at the Roxas Article 22 reads, The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. Respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights 75 | P a g e of free speech and peaceable assembly that is why application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. 79- ABELARDO SUBIDO, VS. ROMAN OZAETA G.R. NO. L-1631 FEBRUARY 27, 1948 This is a petition for mandamus. The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, prays that an order issue "commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives (to) examine all records in the respondents' custody relative to the (said) transactions." Facts: The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of Deeds and later, on appeal, by the Secretary of Justice. No request to inspect the records seems to have ever been made, but the Solicitor General, answering for the respondents, gives to understand that not even this would the petitioner or his representatives be allowed to do if they tried. As the petitioner appears not to insist on his request for a list of sales of real estate to aliens, we shall confine our discussion to the second part of the prayer; namely, that the petitioner be allowed to examine all the records in the respondents' custody to gather the material he wants. In this connection, the Solicitor General contends that "the examination or inspection of the records in the office of the register of deeds may be made only by those having special interest therein and subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Land Registration Office, and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled, to safeguard the public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the records, that records may not be disclosed for publication." Issues: Whether or not the petitioner should not be allowed to examine all the records in the respondents' custody to gather the material he wants on the ground of liberty of the press. Is a petition for mandamus the proper remedy for the petitioner? Held: Newspapers have a better-established right of access to records of titles by reason of their relations to the public than abstracters or insurers of title. Whether by design or otherwise, newspapers perform a mission which does not enter into the calculation of the business of abstracting titles conducted purely for private gain. Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the public while abstracters do so for the benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers of real estate only. It is through the medium of newspapers that the public is informed of how public servants conduct their business. The public through newspapers have the legitimate right to know the transaction in real estate which they believe, correctly or erroneously, have been registered in violation of the constitution. The publication of these matters is certainly not only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where, under the constitution, the people should rule. The newspaper proprietor can demand access to public records on the basis of his special pecuniary interest. The interest of the newspaper man in public records is the interest of the manufacturer in his raw materials. By being denied access to the records the newspaper is cut off from a source of income and profit. That the newspaper's prospective business from the sale of copies containing information gathered from the records was a sufficient pecuniary interest to entitle the proprietor or employee to access to the documents was finally established in two cases. Mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and the petition will be granted commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to examine, extract, abstract or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible with his decision. Independently of statutes the petitioner, as editor of a newspaper, has the requisite interest in land records even under the common law theory entitling him to the writ of mandamus. 76 | P a g e 80- LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ GR L-63419, 18 DECEMBER 1986 FACTS: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812-13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act. HELD: Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute. 81- ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS.FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. NO. L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979. Facts: Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1 On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Restrictions were later annotated and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant- appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, was submitted in the lower court for decision. The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and welfare. The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void. 77 | P a g e On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration. On April 14, the appeal was given due course and the records of the case were elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised. Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred — 1. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police power; and 2. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a finding that the building was erected along the property line, when it should have been erected two meters away from said property line. Issues: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee. Held: 1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties. 2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced. The decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as to costs. 82- ENEDINA PRESLEY VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 86774 AUGUST 21, 1991 Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 28, 1988 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against Teofilo Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3,803.55. The Almendrases were at the time of the filing of the action the registered owners of a house and lot located at 102 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila. As such registered owners, they were members of plaintiff BAVA pursuant to the Deed Restrictions annotated in their title (TCT No. 73616) over the property in question and defendant Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the same address. At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati Development Corporation, the Deed Restrictions was already annotated in their title providing (among others) 'that the lot must be used only for residential purpose' When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it sent a letter to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store. Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified as a purely residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and registered in the name of BAVA. 78 | P a g e It has likewise been established that the Almendrases had not paid the BAVA membership dues and assessments which amounted to P3,802.55 as of November 3, 1980. Teofilo Almendras contended that there was no written contract between him and appellee BAVA. Only a consensual contract existed between the parties whereby Almendras regularly pays his dues and assessments to BAVA for such services as security, garbage collection and maintenance and repair of Jupiter Street. However, when the services were withdrawn by appellee BAVA, there was no more reason for the latter to demand payment of such dues and assessments. (Rollo, pp. 30-31) After due hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision in favor of BAVA which was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Issues: 1. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECENT CONSOLIDATED DECISION EN BANC OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT PROMULGATED DECEMBER 22,1988 WHICH CONSOLIDATED DECISION APPLIES ON ALL FOURS IN THE CASE AT BAR IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. 2. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE ALMENDRASES TO PAY THE ALLEGED UNPAID ASSOCIATION DUES IS PATENTLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS. 3. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS. Held: In accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the respondent court's decision has to be reversed. With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55, the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic after petitioner Presley purchased the property subject of lease from the Almendrases and settled all association dues. Likewise, the demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual basis. 83- TERRY LYN MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 101148, AUGUST 05, 1992 FACTS: Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a restraining or status quo order is the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition for habeas corpus (CA-G.R. SP. No. 25442) wherein petitioner challenged as illegal and violative of constitutional due process her arrest without a warrant by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and her resultant detention at the CID Detention Center. ISSUE: Whether or not Writ for Habeas Corpus should be granted. RULING: Petitioner's release from detention has rendered this petition moot and academic insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas corpus proceeding shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty." (Rule 102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court)Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner's permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from this country. Her subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the proceedings before the proper forum, she is found to be an undesirable alien, will have no more connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent detention on the night of 17 July 1991. Petitioner's claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at this instance. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General's rejoinder to petitioner's reply, there are factual issues that make petitioner's citizenship controversial. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; the factual controversies must first be resolved before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. 84- LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE VS.HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 105597 Facts: Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges. On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the Court 79 | P a g e of Appeals on March 7, 1991 which was, however, dismissed by the said court's Fourth Division in a decision promulgated on June 28, 1991 on the ground that pre-trial investigation for the charges against the respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO). the Court of Appeals' decided that they cannot at this time order the release of petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus without giving the military from here on a reasonable time within which to finish the investigation of his case and determine whether he should be formally charged before the court martial or released for insufficiency of evidence thus the instant petition was DISMISSED. On May 27, 1992 respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals where he assailed his continued detention at the ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal of all the charges against him. He contended that his continued confinement under the circumstances amounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus." 6 In a Resolution dated May 29, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile, Commanding General of the Philippine Army "to produce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q. Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued detention. Issues: 1. May the respondent court not impose a time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the respondent's case where the law itself provides none; and, 2 Does the Resolution of June 3, 1992 contravene a previous decision by a co-equal body, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals which on September 27, 1991 dismissed respondent's petition for habeas corpus. Held: In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, the court cannot accept petitioners' submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private respondent — or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial, for that matter — a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Petitioner next contends that the Decision of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992, issuing a writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent contravenes a previous decision of a co-equal body, the Court of Appeal's Fourth Division which earlier denied the same which the court found to be untenable. The factual circumstances surrounding both decisions are different. First, at the time of the first petition, the private respondent was being held in the detention center for eleven months without charges being filed against him. The pre-trial investigative panel had not yet been constituted. Because of his confinement without charges, a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and continued detention without charges violated his constitutional rights. The Fourth Division found adequate support upholding military jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the Articles of War. It also noted that the case against the private respondent was ongoing and that it would be difficult to order respondent's release on a writ of habeas corpuswithout giving military authorities reasonable time within which to investigate and try the case. The Court nonetheless urged the Chief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with all deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case." Second, by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was before the court's Twelfth Division (herein respondent court), the JAGO's Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against the petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. These finding obviously militate against petitioners' contention that the appellate court's Twelfth Division abused its discretion in issuing an order allegedly in contravention to the Fourth Division's earlier orders. The factual circumstances are hardly similar. The respondent court, under these changed circumstances could be hardly faulted for issuing the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent. The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." As we emphasized hereinbefore, and we repeat it once more, petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his continued confinement. Were we to uphold the proposition that our courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper military authorities to review the general court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean 80 | P a g e that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in petitioner's argument that the Constitution's guarantees are guarantees available not to all of the people but only to most of them. 85- BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN .G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984 Facts: Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher‘s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the no-existent obligations of the teacher‘s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980 but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019. Issue: Whether or not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner‘s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. According to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word ―office‖ applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged. 86- CRISTOPHER GAMBOA VS. J. ALFREDO CRUZ G.R. NO. L-56291 JUNE 27, 1988 Facts: In Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales Petitioner alleges that: On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of counsel violated constitutional rights to counsel and to due process of the Petitioner. Held: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above- cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it 81 | P a g e be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued. 87- ISABELA SUGAR VS. MACADAEG 98 PHIL. 995 FACTS: The Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., BISCOM for short, is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of centrifugal sugar at Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. Among its employees were Enrique C. Entila and Victoriano Tenazas. On March 6, 1952, Entila and Tenazas joined the Fraternal Labor Organization (FLO), which is a labor union composed of employees and laborers of the BISCOM. On May 3, 1957, the BISCOM entered into a two-year collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop clause with said union wherein it was stipulated that the agreement may be extended for a period of one year unless either party notifies the other in writing not less than 60 days prior to its expiry date of its intention to terminate the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the corporation was denied the right to due process. RULING: The court a quo likewise found that Tenazas, being a member of the Board of Directors of the FLO, did not undergo an impeachment proceeding as provided in its by-laws relative to the action to be taken against an officer of the union, while Entila was not given proper hearing even if he was called before a lawyer of the union for investigation. The court found that during the alleged hearing not a single witness was presented as Entila was merely questioned regarding the contents of certain affidavits. In fact, the son of Entila who was a law student asked for postponement of the hearing so that he could prepare the defense of his father, but the request was denied. This is also a question of fact which we cannot now look into being supported by substantial evidence. 88- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MALIMIT GR NO. 190775, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 FACTS: Appellant Jose EncarnacionMalimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of OnofreMalaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant‘s right to self incrimination was violated. RULING: Appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates his right against self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights. We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a 82 | P a g e prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an objectevidence. 89- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GALLARDE GR NO. 13302, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 FACTS: On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide of a minor. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was denied the right to due process. RULING: A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term ―homicide‖ as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. 90- CATALINO N. SARMIENTO V.S THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO G.R. NO. 75271-73 JUNE 27, 1988. FACTS: The first issue was submitted to the Court in G.R. No. 77567, which was given due course on July 1, 1987. 1 The case arose when later petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. 2 As a result, the BATU filed a notice of strike on claiming that the ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. 3 The conciliatory conference failed to settle the dispute. The ATC then filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. 4 Noting that the impending strike would prejudice the national interest as well as the welfare of some 350 workers and their families, the MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. 5 At the same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted action. This order was reiterated upon the representation of the ATC that some 40 workers had declared a strike and were picketing the company premises. 6 Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however, because of the acceptance by President Aquino of the resignations of eight of its members, leaving only the vice-chairman in office. 7 For this reason, the MOLE, set aside the orders of NLRC and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute, at the same time enjoining the company to accept all returning workers. 8 This order was itself set aside upon motion of both the BATU and the ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in the NLRC. The MOLE then returned the case to the respondent NLRC and directed it to expeditiously resolve all issues relating to the dispute, "adding that the union and the striking workers are ordered to return to work immediately." The second issue was raised in G.R. Nos. 75271-73 which is consolidated with the first- mentioned petition because of the Identity of their factual antecedents. This issue was provoked by three criminal complaints filed against the petitioning workers in the municipal trial court of Calamba, Laguna, two by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC and the third by the Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints, were for "Violation of Article 265, par. 1, in relation to Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines." 11 The third, filed, was for coercion. 12 In all three complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for work. Acting on Criminal Case No. 15984, Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the municipal mayor of Calamba, Laguna. 13 The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to the NLRC and, later, for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 15973 and 15981 on the 83 | P a g e ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC. 14 As the judge had not ruled on these motions, the petitioners came to this Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Then issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Tuico from enforcing the warrant of arrest and further proceeding with the case. 15 This order was reiterated on September 21, 1987, "to relieve tensions that might prevent an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties in the compulsory arbitration proceedings now going on in the Department of Labor," and made to apply to Judge Paterno Lustre, who had succeeded Judge Tuico. 16 ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike; 2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain persons involved in the said strike may be validly restrained. HELD: It must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they win also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in activities inimical to their employer's interest. The Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered. On the second issue, as a general rule the prosecution of criminal offenses is not subject to injunction, the exception must apply in the case at bar. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed before the municipal court of Calamba, Laguna, is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in the NLRC. The first two complaints, as expressly captioned, are for "violation of Art. 265, par. 2, in relation to Art. 273, of the Labor Code of the Philippines," and the third complaint relates to the alleged acts of coercion committed by the defendants in blocking access to the premises of the ATC. Two of the criminal complaints were filed by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC although he vigorously if not convincingly insists that he was acting in his personal capacity. In view of this, the three criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular No. 15, series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of B.P. Blg. 227.These circulars, briefly stated, require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure the clearance of the Ministry of Labor and/or the Office of the President "before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute," including "allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines of such factory, or the employer's premises." It does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down "to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objectives of this law," before the three criminal cases were filed. 91- THE UNITED STATES VS. J. VALENTINE KARELSEN, G.R. NO. 1376 JANUARY 21, 1904 FACTS: The defendant was accused of the crime of embezzlement. That the said J. Valentine Karelsen, on the 2nd day of April, 1903, whilst acting as postmaster at Calamba, of the Province of Laguna, P. I., and having in his charge public funds belonging to the post- office, withdrew, for his own use and benefit, the sum of $1,000, gold currency of the United States, the property of the Post-Office Department of the Government of the Philippine Islands, contrary to the statutes made and provided in such cases. Several days after the case was presented, the accused presented a demurrer to the said complaint. The defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The cause thereupon proceeded to trial on the same date. The court found the defendant to be guilty of the crime of embezzlement of public funds, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for the period of ten years and one day of presidio mayor, perpetual absolute disqualification, indemnification to the Government in the sum of $1,000, gold, which must be 84 | P a g e made effective by the bond given by the accused, and to the payment of costs. The defendant appealed from said sentence. ISSUE: 1. The evidence adduced at the trial does not prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. The court erred in pronouncing judgment against the accused for a "delito grave" in the absence of the accused. HELD: Judge Baldwin, in the case of People vs. Green (15 Cal., 512), in commenting upon this case (People vs. Cohen) said: "It is true, the court says, money should be described as so many pieces of the current gold or silver coin of the country, but we think we may well infer that a twenty-dollar piece of the gold coin of the United States is current coin of the United States, and is of the value of twenty dollars of our money." A complaint for the crime of embezzlement ought to state the description of the property embezzled with the same particularity as is required in a complaint for larceny. But in the case of larceny the property was in the possession of the owner, and he is presumed to know its particular description, while in embezzlement where the offense is committed by a person in the course of a long, continuous employment as a clerk, cashier, or postmaster, who is daily receiving and disbursing large sums of money, a description of the pieces of denominations of the money is absolutely impossible. In such a case, if his accounts are correctly kept, the only description which can be made is by a general statement of the amount which his books disclose. Is it to be argued that a cashier, for example, who daily embezzles sums of money for months is to be discharged from liability simply because the prosecution can not give a minute description by piece or denomination of all the money so misappropriated? England has taken advanced ground upon this question, and by the seventh and eight George IV, chapter 29, section 48, enacted that "it shall be sufficient to allege embezzlement to be of money without specifying any particular coin or valuable security, etc." In the present case the books of the accused showed that he had the sum of $1,046.64, gold, United States currency, belonging to the Post-Officce Department on the 1st day of April, 1903. He is charged with embezzling "$1,000, gold, legal money of the United States." This allegation is in substance in the terms of his own accounts, and we fail to see how he can in any way misunderstand the allegation or be confused in making his defense under it. It is admitted that the sentence of the court below was announced to the accused in the jail, and not by the judge but by the clerk; that he was not brought into open court and informed by the judge there of the sentence. Section 41 of General Orders, No. 58, provides that "the defendant must be personally present at the time of pronouncing judgment, if the conviction is for a felony." The offense here was a felony. In all criminal prosecutions the accused has an absolute right to be personally present during the entire proceeding from arraignment to sentence if he so desires. In cases of felony he can not waive this right. The court in case of felony must insist upon the presence of the accused in court during every step in the trial. The record must also show that the accused was present at every stage of the prosecution. (Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 574.) It is not within the power of the court, the accused, or his counsel to dispense with the provisions of General Orders, No. 58 (sec. 41), as to the personal presence of the accused at the trial. We mean by the phrase "at the trial" to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from the arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. We are of the opinion that for this error the sentence of the court below should be reversed, without disturbing the verdict, and the cause remanded with direction to the court below to pronounce the judgment in accordance with the provisions of section 41, General Orders, No. 58. 92- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE LEGASPI Y RAMIREZ G.R. NOS. 92167-68 Facts: On January 7, 1987, Ronaldo drove the jeepney to service the Novaliches-Bagong Silang route in Kalookan City. Ronaldo was accompanied by Ariel Heloma, as conductor. Dominico Mirasol, a friend of Ronaldo, rode the jeepney. While the jeepney was waiting for passengers, appellant Teody Pamela approached Ronaldo and offered to hire said jeepney. Thereafter, appellant Pamela, together with accused Manuel Torres and Cresencio Palacio, boarded the jeepney. Mirasol alighted before the jeepney reached its terminal. At that time, there were about seven other passengers, including appellants, Torres and Palacio. When Ronaldo failed to go home that night, Jose Abales started a search for him. At about 2:30 a.m. of the following day, a patrol of the San Jose City police noticed a jeepney parked along the shoulder of the road. Suddenly, the jeepney started and sped away. Notwithstanding the warning shots fired by the police, the jeepney refused to stop. The police then radioed their headquarters for assistance. A road block was placed along the route of the jeepney, forcing it to stop. Appellants were then placed under arrest. 85 | P a g e The bodies of Ronaldo Abales and Ariel Heloma were found that morning in Camarin, Kalookan City. Abales had a single stab wound while Heloma suffered multiple stab wounds. Both their hands were tied behind them. The accused were charged with double murder charging and violation of R.A. No. 6539.Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were jointly tried and the court rendered that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double homicide as defined and penalized under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and taking into consideration [the] presence of one aggravating circumstance without the attendance of any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal. Issue: 1. Were the accused deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them? 2. Did the trial court err in finding a conspiracy to commit the complex crime of robbery with double homicide and in convicting them merely on the basis of circumstantial evidence? Held: 1. While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two information. Thus, the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14[2]). 2. We see no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court, whose evaluation of the evidence is accorded respect. The circumstantial evidence found by the trial court is sufficient to convict appellants. The requisites provided for in Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence regarding the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence have been complied with. 93- EFREN C. MONCUPAVS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. G.R. NO. L-63345 Facts: Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons. After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33. Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition. Issues: whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release Held: The release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary', it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. Temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of the actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents. 86 | P a g e 94- MANUEL Q. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. CABALLERO,-VERSUS- HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, FERNANDO ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. L-45647 AUGUST 21, 1987 FACTS: Petitioners claiming to be the absolute owners of several contiguous parcels of land planted with coconut trees, situated in Salubsub, San Isidro, Gingoog City, filed a petition for injunction with restraining order and damages against the herein private respondents for having allegedly entered the aforementioned parcels of land and illegally harvested the fruits of the coconut trees planted therein without petitioners‘ knowledge and consent, to the prejudice of said petitioners. Answering, the private respondents admitted that the petitioners are the lawful owners of the parcels of land described in the petition. They claimed, however, that the respondents Fernando Esconde, Cesar Navarro, and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the land, while the rest, except Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez who is allegedly an investigator designated by the Land Reform Farmers‘ Association to organize the tenants into an association to put up a solid front in a program to help the New Society and to secure the success of the land reform program, are the harvesters of the coconut lands. They also contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, which is purely agrarian in nature and cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. After hearing, the respondent judge found that the issuance of a temporary restraining order would be proper in the interest of justice and, consequently, ordered the respondents to cease and desist from gathering fruits from the coconut trees in the land until the petition for injunction shall have been heard and resolved. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,the respondent judge issued the controversial order suspending hearings on the case pending the comment and/or certification thereon by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, in accordance with PD 1038. The petitioners moved for reconsideration of this order, but their motion was denied. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over the case 2. Whether or not PD 1038 violates the constitutional provision on the right to a ―speedy disposition of cases.‖ HELD: It is an erroneous assumption that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not an ejectment case (or a case designed to harass or remove a tenant) filed against a tenant, may be tried by the courts. A close look at the law in question will show that no such power has been granted the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. In the first paragraph of Section 2 of the law in question, it is stated that a case which seeks the ejectment, harassment or ouster of a tenant from the landholding should be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform ―for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties.‖ However, the second paragraph of the same section provides that ―the preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the case is certified,‖ and that ―said court, judge or hearing officer may, after due hearing, confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial merits of the case may warrant.‖ Since the referral of ejectment and other cases against a tenant to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is only for the preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties and the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform are not binding on the courts, there is no diminution of judicial power involved in the operation of the law nor an encroachment on the independence of the judiciary by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. This Court has categorically declared that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative powers on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of judicial review is expressly given by statute. In the determination of whether or not the right to a ―speedy trial‖ has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay.The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the ―speedy disposition of cases‖ guarantee. To strike down a law on the ground that it violates the guarantee of ―speedy disposition of cases‖ requires more than a citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public officer whose duty and responsibility it is to apply and administer the law. The challenge must be based on a clear showing that it is the law, or its operation, and not merely its administration, which invades and impairs constitutionally protected personal or property rights. In the case at bar, it is true that the referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform opens the door to more bureaucratic red tape and, perhaps, more opportunities for corrupt practices. The defects in the bureaucratic system do not, however, constitute valid arguments against the merits of legislative policy intended to protect the legitimate tenant-tiller. Besides, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD 1038. This is a matter left for Congress to re-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority. 87 | P a g e 95- EMETERIA VILLAFLOR VS. RICARDO SUMMERS G.R. NO. 16444 Facts: Petitioners, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflorto submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision.Hence this petition. Issue: whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure Held: Compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians does not violate that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure. Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. 96- PEOPLE V. DUERO G.R. NO. L-52016 MAY 13, 1981 FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated April 17, 1979, convicting Severino Duero of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of Fausta Duero an indemnity of fifteen thousand pesos and the sum of two thousand pesos which he took from her (Criminal Case No. 8860). The facts of the case are as follows: Fausta Condino Vda. De Duero, was feloniously killed in her house located at Barrio Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo. No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. The principal evidence of the prosecution is the testimony of Lieutenant Tomas C. Lujan, the chief of police of Cabatuan. Lujan declared that Severino voluntarily confessed to him that he (Severino) committed the robbery with homicide but Severino refused to sign a confession. Lujan was not the only police officer who heard Severino Duero‘s confession. Patrolman Rolando N. Alag, a member of the arresting team that picked up Duero and brought him at Lujan, stated in his sworn statement before the mayor that Duero admitted that he took part in the robbery with homicide. Alag said that Severino Duero made his confession in the course of their conversation on the way to the police station and not by reason of a formal investigation. Patrolman Rufino Tormon. another member of the arresting team, corroborated in his sworn statement Alag‘s declaration as to Severino Duero‘s confession. The sworn statements of Alag, Tormon and Hudieras and others were the basis of the criminal complaint for robbery with homicide filed by Lieutenant Lujan an in the municipal court against Severino Duero. The trouble is that at the trial Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed that he was maltreated by the police. Severino Duero‘s counsel DE OFICIO in this Court contends that the trial court erred in admitting the oral testimony on Severino Duero‘s oral confession, in giving credence to the testimonies of Lujan, Cenizal, Montaño and Tranquilino Duero, in finding that robbery with homicide was committed. The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel DE OFICIO‗s contention that Severino‘s oral confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Article IV of the Constitution which provides: SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel , and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the 88 | P a g e free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in evidence. ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of his oral confession during the custodial interrogation when the accused was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel, as required by Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution . HELD: Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. The new provisions in section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution were adopted from the ruling in Miranda vs. Arizona which specifies the following procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused persons: The above procedure was not followed by the police in this case. Hence, Severino Duero‘s oral confession is inadmissible in evidence. Without that confession, the prosecution‘s other evidence is not sufficient to establish Duero‘s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is acquitted. 97- STONEHILL V. DIOKNO, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government herein referred to as Respondents- Prosecutors, several judges (respondent-judges), issued on different dated, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal property, to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactionsincluding disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means ofcommitting the offense," which is described in the applicationsadverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. Petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the officers of the corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, whether or not petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. 89 | P a g e (2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, whether or not search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. (3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. HELD: (1) The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. (2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: a. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein; & b. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementionedapplications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or 98- ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996] Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martin‘s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband‘s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin‘s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin‘s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney‘s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring ―the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable‖ is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband‘s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a ―lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.‖ Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible ―for any purpose in any proceeding.‖ The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in 90 | P a g e confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. 99- QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD G.R. NO. L-10280 SEPTEMBER 30, 1963 FACTS: In May 1952 petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased US Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000withoutthe necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to themselves.· Warrants were issued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released.· Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.· Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised administrative code. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398 of Pres Quirino which authorized the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during investigation (on the ground that such power is vested in the legislature and that there must be a legislation authorizing the same) 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, is valid/legal Held: The President has the power to carry out order of deportation but may not order arrest during investigation. And no, power may not be delegated.· Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own ountry by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." While it did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien maybe effected in two ways: 1. by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and 2. by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No.613.SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation wherefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).· Re: the extent of the Pres‘ power to investigate does it include authority to arrest? May it be delegated? Here‘s the history…· Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien under investigation· Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 reorganized the deportation board to issue the warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release <this is incompatible with….>3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and 91 | P a g e the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).· Justice Laurel said that this constitutional provision is not among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest.· The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation. The extent of the curtailment of liberty dependent upon conditions determined by the discretion of the person issuing a warrant. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.