Civ Rev Digests Batch 1

TAÑADA VS.TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. FUENTES vs ROCA Facts: -Sabina Tarrozza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Zamboanga City. Later on, she sold the same to her son Tarciano Roca under a deed of absolute sale, meanwhile, the latter has failed to register the same. After 6 years, Tarciano offered the lot to the petitioners (Fuentes spouses). An agreement to sell prepared by Atty. Plagata, among others was thereafter signed by the parties, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. -Several conditions were required by such agreement, among others was that within 6 months Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca to the sale. -As soon as Tarciano has met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga, thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in favor of the spouses who constructed a building on the lot. -In 1997, 8 years after Tarciano and Rosario passed away, their children, together with Tarciano’s sister who was represented by her son, filed an action for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC of Zamboanga on the ground that the sale was void for Rosario’s consent was not secured and her signature on the affidavit was forged. -However the Fuentes spouses argued that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it and that the 4 year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. -RTC- dismissed the case on the ground of prescription CA- reversed the RTC’s decision and found sufficient evidence of forgery and that since Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958, it also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged. Issue: Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed? Held: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. However, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without his wife’s written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. Petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed with modification directing respondents Roca to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate and to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs HYPERMIX On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued Memorandum CMO 27-2003. Wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%. Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper. TC = ruled in favor of respondent. Trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. The appellate court, dismissed the appeal. W/N the basic requirements of hearing & publication was observed? SC = NO. Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit: Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons. xxx xxx xxx Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down. In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petition is DENIED. KASILAG vs RODRIGUEZ PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage. Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis. ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith,” the P’s lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis. HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void. RATIO: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof. DIGEST 2 FACTS: May 16, 1932: Emiliana Ambrosio, owner of a 6.7540 ha land in Limay, Bataan, encumbers the improvements on the said land under mortgage for P1000 and payable to Gavino Rodriguez. The said amount is due after 4 ½ years or on November 16, 1938 with 12% interest per annum, to render the said mortgage null and void. Upon Emiliana’s failure to pay for the stipulated interest and tax on the land and its improvements, both parties entered into a verbal agreement wherein Emiliana conveyed to Gavino possession of the land by agreeing to no longer collect interest on the loan, pay the land tax, enjoy improvements on the land and introduce improvements on it. ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino Kasilag should be considered a possessor of the land in good faith all the while being ignorant of the law of antichresis? HELD: Affirmative. Gavino Rodriguez, the petitioner, is deemed a possessor in good faith. RATIO: *Good faith as basis for excusable ignorance Mr. Rodriguez’s acceptance of the mortgage of the improvements firmly believed that he was not violating prohibition regarding alienation of the land, and his was ignorant of “his consent to possession and enjoyment of the land” constituted a contract of atichresis. Article 433 of the Civil Code defines a possessor in good faith “who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.” ELEGADO vs CA FACTS: Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon, his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return with the Philippine Revenue Representative in U.S.A. Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount of P96,509.35 which was protested by the law firm of Bump, Young and Walker, a foreign law firm, on behalf of the estate. The protest was denied and no further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of that protest. Meanwhile, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon. Ward Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines, which was eventually allowed with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. As such, he filed a second estate tax return with the BIR. The Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in a lower amount of P72,948.87, which was also protested to by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office, This time a domestic law firm, on behalf of the estate. Later, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35 (the first assessment), stating that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final and executory. Elegado regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed against the second assessment, and actig on this belief, he filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. The Commissioner in the end instead cancelled the second protested assessment in a letter to the decedent's estate, which was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic. The motion was granted and the petition dismissed, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be allowed on the ground that the first assessment is not final and executory because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws HELD: Hells NO. Petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. RATIO: Since no appeal was made within the regulatory period, the same has become final. The petitioner no longer has a cause of action as can be seen from the express cancellation of the second assessment as it was precisely from this assessment that he was appealing. The said assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the letter. The respondent court was on surer ground when it followed with the finding that the said cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic. There was really no more assessment to review. The petitioner argues that the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals. The petitioner is clutching at straws. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their ignorance? If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find. As no further action was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and executory. In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the question of its validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals. What the estate of the decedent should have done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after it received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the first two issues he now raises without basis in the present petition. The assessment being no longer controversial or renewable, there was no justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition except to dismiss it. CABALIT vs COA Ombudsman. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions. ISSUES: Whether or not – FACTS: • The Philippine Star News (Cebu City) reported that LTO employees in Jagna, Bohol are shortchanging the government by tampering with their income reports. State Auditors Teodocio D. Cabalit and Emmanuel L. Coloma of the Provincial Revenue Audit Group conducted an investigation. Tampering of official receipts of Motor Vehicle Registration during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 was then discovered by the investigators and a total of 106 receipts were tampered. The difference between the amounts paid by the vehicle owners and the amounts appearing on the file copies were pocketed by the perpetrators and only the lower amounts appearing on the retained duplicate file copies were reported in the Report of Collections. The scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, and resulted in an unreported income totaling P169,642.50. A formal charge for dishonesty was filed against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies. On February 12, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas directed the parties to submit their position papers pursuant to A.O. No. 17, dated September 7, 2003, amending the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. No cross-examination of State Auditor Cabalit was conducted. The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found petitioners liable for dishonesty for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the Ombudsman. Thus, they separately sought recourse from the CA. The CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed with modification the findings of the (1) There was a violation of the right to due process when the hearing officer at the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas adopted the procedure under A.O. No. 17 notwithstanding the fact that the amendatory order took effect after the hearings had started (2) Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar are administratively liable RULING: (1) No, the petitioners were not denied due process of law because they were afforded every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. They cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. • Section 5(b)(1) Rule 3, of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, plainly provides that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified position papers on the basis of which the hearing officer may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that based on the evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be conducted. But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound discretion of the hearing officer. • Petitioners failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing officer’s determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by the Court. • There is no merit in their contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case was already undergoing trial before the • • • • • • • • • the Court elucidated:  Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.O. 9 years later. series of 1990. The rule admits of certain exceptions. 07. However. Yolanda filed a petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. the only set of rules of procedure governing cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. In 1994 Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. There have been various amendments made but it has remained. and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case. SP. Nos. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. In Tan.• • • hearing officer. Petitioner Leonardo G. Hence. The assailed Decision dated January 18. 86256. being supported by substantial evidence. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy. Yolanda filed an MTD for lack of jurisdiction – declaration of presumptive death under rule 41 of the FC is a summary proceeding thus the judgment thereon is immediately final and executor. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the case to the CA. 7 every time it is invoked. In Marohomsalic v. 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. whether civil or criminal. as (a) when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation or (b) where to apply it would impair vested rights. the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. Olaivar is held administratively liable for DISHONESTY and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service as well as the accessory penalties inherent to said penalty. Jr. The OSG filed an MR – that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. to no avail. CA granted the MTD. No. No. Yolanda claimed that from that time she had not received any communication from her husband notwithstanding efforts to locate him.O. the phrase “as amended” is correctly appended to A. as amended. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them. to date. No. . RTC denied MR. (2) Only questions of law may be brought by the parties and passed upon by the Court in the exercise of its power to review. One does not have a vested right in procedural rules. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to. Hence. nor arise from. The Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion.R. 2006 and Resolution dated September 21. petitioners failed to show that application of A. WHEREFORE. should not have been applied. RTC rendered a decision declaring him presumptively dead.O. No. v. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. the Court found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA. 17 is just one example of these amendments. Court of Appeals. A. Cole. procedural laws. REPUBLIC vs GRANADA Yolanda Cadacio Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1993. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. we clarified that the Office of the Ombudsman has only one set of rules of procedure and that is A. of any other than the existing rules of procedure.O. Her brother testified that he had asked Cyrus’ relatives regarding the latter’s whereabouts. There is no merit to Cabalit’s assertion that she should have been investigated under the “old rules of procedure” of the Office of the Ombudsman. 86394 and 00047 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In reversing the CA. CTA En Banc concluded that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the allegation that its clients were foreign-based. MR was denied. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage. I think it is about RoC v. petitioner Accenture filed with the Department of Finance (DoF) an administrative claim for refund or issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate (in the amount of P35. CIR argued that (1) Sale by Accenture of goods and services to its clients are not zero-rated transactions. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. On Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that. On November 2008. Bermudez-Lorino. as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. four years after Jomoc. the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. DoF did not act on the claim. (2) Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant and petitioner has failed to prove that it is entitled to a refund. Burmeister as basis. Tango: In sum.21) for having excess or unutilized input VAT credits earned from its zero-rated transactions. 2007 (after petitioner filed with the division) cannot be made to apply to its case. Jomoc.844. Division cited the January 2007 case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. under Article 41 of the Family Code. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA. In contrast. the Court in BermudezLorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended “to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar. that Burmeister.[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. FC regarding presumptive death. in rendering judgment thereon. petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code. a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Issue: Whether or not the CTA can apply the Burmeister case. In the present case.[7] issued a few months later. Section 1(m). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals. the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage.178. the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. In Jomoc. At any rate. because its claim has not been fully substantiated or documented. In Republic v. It further ruled that petitioner’s services would qualify for zero-rating under the 1997 NIRC only if recipient of the services was doing business outside the Philippines. As observed by the CA. this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled Republic v. On August 2004.ISSUE: WON the CA erred in granting the MTD on the ground that the decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory hence not subject to appeal. It ruled that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that its foreign clients did business outside the Philippines. under the Rules of Court. the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Bermudez-Lorino. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that. ACCENTURE vs COMMISSIONER Facts: On July 2004. We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. NOTE: Sorry ang gulo. On appeal. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding. Accenture filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc.[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. having been promulgated on January 22. petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. among others. From the decision of the CA. expressly falls under the category of special proceedings. petitioner argued. NO. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72. even when petitioner had filed . Division denied the petition. but it only further affirmed the Division’s Decision and Resolution. through its then President Jose V. on November 28. which was served with the denial only on May 31. As such.before the aforementioned case was even promulgated. Nolasco was valid and effective. the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3. The UP filed an urgent motion to reconsider the order dated September 26. CA can be given retroactive application? Held: Firstly. the RTC denied the urgent motion on April 1. rendering the filing of the UP’s notice of appeal on June 3. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. 2004. Abueva. When the Court interpreted Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code in Burmeister. but the CA denied the UP’s motion for reconsideration on April 19. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal. 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP. Quezon City. it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3. 2002. Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished. such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23. the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time and granted the private respondents’ motion for execution. That counsel was the OLS in Diliman. 2002. on October 9. 2002. Following the RTC’s denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 7. and moved for the execution of the decision. On June 23. UP vs DIZON Facts: On August 30. 2001. The Court also stated that an interpretation of Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code is an interpretation of Section 108 of the 1997 Tax Code. 2004. but the UP paid only two of the billings. the UP failed to pay the billing. 1990. the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3. However. 2003. Despite the lifting of the disallowance. concluding that petitioner failed to prove that its clients were doing business outside the Philippines. 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UP’s period to appeal. In the course of the implementation of the contract. 2002. it does not pass a new law. even assuming that the service upon Atty. On February 24. The UP sought a reconsideration. 2002. the UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA). the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Stern Builders opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being belated. and that the period . The Court upheld the Decision of the CTA En Banc. When the Court decides a case. through its counsel. the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UP’s notice of appeal had been filed late. 2004. and the sheriff of the RTC served the writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be made. The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4. 2004. 2002. entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB). the UP appealed to the Court by petition for review on certiorari. On September 26. 2002. 2004. the latter being a mere reproduction of the former. 2004. On May 11. The UP moved for the reconsideration of the denial of its petition for review on August 29. 2002. Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31. 2003. 2002. 2002. the pronouncements made in the said case may be applied to the case at bar without violating the rule against retroactive application. but the Court denied the motion on October 6. the interpretation became part of the law from the moment abait became effective. Held: The Court stated that even though Accenture’s Petition was filed before Burmeister was promulgated. After trial. the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. The third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Secondly. the UP. On June 24. 2004. Issue: Whether or not the fresh period rule announced in Neypes v. prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP and its corespondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. The denial became final and executory on November 12. but merely interprets a pre-existing one. 2002. and to restrain the proceedings. the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1. the Court denied the petition for review. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period because the UP’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman. to quash the writ of execution dated October 4. and merely presented evidence that its clients were foreign entities. "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. their employment was increased to three years. United Arab Emirates." is impervious to any serious challenge.8 Era mentioned the real reason – "because I dont (sic) want the company policy"9 – for his resignation. viz: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule. free laundry. The respondents expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign. The agency moved for reconsideration. For its part. Inc. and free medical and dental services. nine hours a day. 8042. xxx We have further said that a procedural rule that is amended for the benefit of litigants in furtherance of the administration of justice shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending. appointment letters6 Under the letters of appointment. Unfortunately. Modern Metal gave the respondents. to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial. equity calls for the retroactive application in the UP’s favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. finding that the respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs. free transportation. but nothing happened. counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. cited personal/family problems for their resignation. 2001 as compared to the judgment in Neypes that was rendered in 1998.4provided for a two-year employment. xxx It is cogent to add in this regard that to deny the benefit of the fresh-period rule to the UP would amount to injustice and absurdity – injustice. Out of fear. Ancheta rendered a Decision10 dismissing the complaint. contending that the appeal was never perfected and that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s decision. salary of 1. pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Serrano v. They called up the agency and complained about their predicament.13 The NLRC denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration. because parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 would enjoy the benefit of the freshperiod rule but the later rulings of the lower courts like that herein would not. For that reason. It claimed that the respondents. The agency assured them that their concerns would be promptly addressed. on the other hand.350 AED with overtime pay. the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing. a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform. paragraph 5. that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and release papers. the agency countered that the respondents were not illegally dismissed. Labor Arbiter Ligerio V. consistent with the Court’s ruling in Serrano. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure." in Section 10.resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. as they put it. food allowance. while still working for Modern Metal. The respondents’ employment contracts. the respondents. as equity delights in equality. motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The ruling declared unconstitutional the clause. the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court. moved for partial reconsideration. because the judgment in question was issued on November 28. The respondents claimed that they were shocked to find out what their working and living conditions were in Dubai. but granted the respondents’ motion.A. of R. absurdity. their supposed employment failed to materialize and they had to go home because they had already resigned from Modern Metal. maintaining that their salaries should have covered the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. The respondents.14 It sustained the respondents’ argument that the award needed to be adjusted. Gallant Maritime Services. limiting the entitlement of illegally . particularly in relation to the payment of their salaries. they voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. However. except Era. free and suitable housing (four to a room). applied with another company which offered them a higher pay. Court of Appeals. whichever is less. except Era. PERT/CPM vs VINUYA Facts: Complainants alleged that the agency deployed them to work as aluminum fabricator/installer in Dubai. therefore. Section 10 of R.16 It upheld the NLRC ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed. 2010. Held: The agency posits that in any event. NERWIN vs PNOC . 8042.52 (emphasis ours) This argument fails to persuade us.. whichever is less."51 It argues that R. the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement "of" his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Let this Decision be brought to the attention of the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration as a black mark in the deployment record of petitioner Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co.dismissed overseas Filipino workers to their salaries for the unexpired term of their contract or three months. 10022. amending Section 10 of R. be applied in the present case in view of the enactment of R.A. 8042 which was struck down as unconstitutional in Serrano. The ruling cannot be given retroactive application. in any event. 1 0022 is constitutional is not for us to rule upon in the present case as this is an issue that is not squarely before us. 10022. unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language used. Laws shall have no retroactive effect. not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law. 8042. As Amended. 2010 and which amended R. 8042. or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary. the amendment introduced by R. the respondents were not illegally dismissed and. Section 10 of R. the petition is DENIED. 2011 and the Resolution dated June 23. entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No.26 Further. First.53 By its very nature. 10022 on March 8. Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.A. were not entitled to their money claims. reads as follows: In case of termination of overseas employment without just. Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC’s award to the respondents of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. Further Improving the Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers. The agency posits that the Serrano ruling has no application in the present case for three reasons. premises considered. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective application. unless the contrary is provided. 114353 are AFFIRMED. which was enacted on March 8. They point out that the Serrano ruling is curative and remedial in nature and. declared unconstitutional by the Court.54 We thus see no reason to nullity the application of the Serrano ruling in the present case. Inc.A. but because retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. The amendment restored the subject clause in paragraph 5. 2010. restored the subject clause in the 5th paragraph. The amendment. pursuant to the Serrano ruling. in the meanwhile. 2009.. Second. The respondents maintain that since they were illegally dismissed.A.A. Thenamaris Ship’s Management.A. and For Other Purposes.A.A. should be given retroactive application as the Court declared in Yap v. the respondents take exception to the agency’s contention that the Serrano ruling cannot. Whether or not R. 10022. The assailed Decision dated May 9. valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract. while the Serrano ruling came out on March 24. Their Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress. as enunciated in Serrano. the Serrano ruling has been nullified by R. 8042 declared unconstitutional — cannot be given retroactive effect. In other words. No. WHEREFORE. 8042. Third.A. which lapsed into law (without the Signature of the President) on March 8. contained in Section 7 of R. whichever is less. SP No. R. we make no pronouncement on it. this is an issue that awaits its proper day in court. the CA was correct in upholding the NLRC’s award of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.A. and as a record that should be considered in any similar future violations. 10022. 8042. plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. as such.A. restored the subject clause in Section 10 of R. 10022 — restoring a provision of R.A. the respondents filed the complaint in 2007.R.A. for the supply and delivery of about 60. the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. 15. CA granted petition and annulled and set aside the TRO. Bids and Awards Committee. Dissatisfied. Notwithstanding. contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping. as Chairman. ISSUES: I. were required to submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. 11. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract. In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW PROJECT) 13.FACTS: 1. 80 8. In response to the said invitation. 6. alleging that requisition was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 2. 9. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction. Visayas and Mindanao. citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin]. 80 "given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. including private respondent Nerwin. 3. including its identified supplier in Malaysia. Guerzon. 4. Respondent filed appeal with CA. the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint. PIB. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondent's [Nerwin's] manufacturing plants and facilities. On the other hand. The said contract consisted of four components. Respondents sought the dismissal of the case. and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents' proposed bidding for the wooden poles. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and . PIC and P3 — IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms. violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs. stating that the complaint averred no cause of action.000 pieces of woodpoles and 20. namely: PIA. and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint. Upon learning of the issuance of requistion for the O-ILAW Project. 14. 10. upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. 80 to another bidding. 7. At the same time. NEA's Board of Directors passed Resolution No. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy.000 pieces of crossarms needed in the country's Rural Electrification Project. However. Only four bidders. the National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract. Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC against PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. the NEA administrator recommended to NEA's Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. (IPB No. they were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit their financial bids. PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms. NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who. issued Requisition No. 12. such as private respondent [Nerwin]. bidders. In 1999. necessary for NEA's projected allocation for Luzon. RTC granted a TRO 16. Qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. Finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding. 5. prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction. 80). to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA's requirements. among others. alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. which injunctive application was granted. or the earlier TRO. This law was. earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge. when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project. except the Supreme Court. 8975 provide: Section 3. to restrain. acting under the government's direction. preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government. there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence. implementation. secondly. Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of. except if issued by the Supreme Court. in the first place. on government projects. (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof. whether public or private. for that matter. Indubitably. officials or any person or entity. (c) Commencement. shall issue any temporary restraining order. when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue. grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. 2000.e. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction.. whether public or private. that would justify respondent Judge's blatant disregard of a "simple. comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects. and. . or any of its subdivisions. or any person or entity. the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government. . when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because. prohibit or compel the following acts: (a) Acquisition. aSCHcA xxx xxx xxx This prohibition shall apply in all cases. Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms. Moreover. firstly. or even from the facts of the case. in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners' sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. to restrain. already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Order. prosecution.preliminary injunctions. i. to bolster the significance of the said prohibition. such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued. The CA's decision was absolutely correct." Respondent Judge did not even endeavor. the Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue. or any of its subdivisions. although expectedly. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project. The said proscription is not entirely new. he should not have given due course to private respondent's complaint for injunction. prohibit or compel the following acts: xxx xxx xxx (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof. thus. . and public utilities operated by. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. operation of any such contract or project. . HELD: The petition fails. — No court. shall issue any temporary restraining order. execution. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders. disputes or controversies instituted by a private party. such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued. including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. and worse. to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7. Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. acting under the government's direction. The CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC: It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judge's issuance of a preliminary injunction. — No court. except the Supreme Court. thus: Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order. the government. officials. in fact. Thus. The RTC gravely abused its discretion. compensatory and moral damages.rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the death of Jose. actual or constructive. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge. Inc. to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government. disputes or controversies instituted by a private party. there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Had the claimant been aware. including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same. and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. Pasig City which resulted to his instant death. preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect. of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. The claimant. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights. Jose’s loss of earning capacity. moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued. Inc. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts. the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous. she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had. attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project. Consunji. Jose Juego’s widow. Waiver of rights The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. The applicant shall file a bond. — Any temporary restraining order. -RTC. 11-2000. . The Court of Appeals. by his choice of one remedy.M. if appropriate under the circumstances. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. among other defenses. actual. which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought. to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void. -CA. The employer raised. through Administrative Circular No. the rule in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. is deemed to have waived the other. a construction worker of DM Consunji.. Where one lacks knowledge of a right. filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer. in an amount to be fixed by the court. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower. nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. the claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law. Section 4. Held: As a general rule. and (e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue. D. Hence. without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws. This prohibition shall apply in all cases. but chooses not to assert them. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. the court may. DM CONSUNJI vs CA and JUEGO Facts: -Jose Juego. however. Nullity of Writs and Orders.reversed RTC’s decision in toto Issue: Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. Maria. grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer. erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. notwithstanding a person’s ignorance. the Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver. it also behooves this Court to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws. Waiver is a defense. This entitled Aujero to receive his retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her. This may be deduced from the language of the provision. private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities. Aujero further claimed that he had no choice but to accept the lesser amount as he was in dire need of money. thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat? SC = YES. the defense is waived. therefore. That Aujero was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. It is. While it is the Court’s duty to prevent the exploitation of employees. which.055. and it was not incumbent upon private respondent. On appeal.439. argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code. a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca. but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. Considering Aujero’s claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated. Dire necessity may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it. After 3 years. It is. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. The argument has no merit. as plaintiff. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Aujero and directed Philcomsat to pay the balance of his retirement pay. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived. perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Aujero filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14. does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. On the contrary. with an awareness of its consequences. . Accordingly. otherwise.00.015. private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies. thus.91. ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.327. Ignorance of the Law Petitioner. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8. it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver. Aujero subsequently executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9. On the contrary. he applied for an early retirement which was approved. Civil Code). the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) reversed the decision of the LA and decided in favor of Philcomsat. though. The LA maintained that Philcomsat failed to substantiate its claim that the amount received by Aujero was a product of negotiations between the parties. Aujero contends that the significantly deficient amount he previously received was more than an enough reason to declare his quitclaim null and void. AUJERO vs PHILCOMSAT Petitioner Hypte Aujero was the Vice President of respondent company Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat). After 34 years.A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. W/N the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid. FFCCI paid this amount HRCC submitted to FFCCI its second progress billing covering its completed works from September 18 to 25. the period of time that Aujero allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives. in turn. FFCCI only approved the gross amount assessed by the DPWH during said period. the quitclaim executed by a party constitutes a valid and binding agreement. HRCC completely halted the construction of the subcontracted project. Subsequently. subject to stipulated deductions. The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI.e. As such. Subsequently. HRCC sent FFCCI a letter demanding the payment of its progress billings within three days from receipt thereof. However. claiming that it still had to evaluate the works accomplished by HRCC. FFCCI. Thus. HRCC submitted to FFCCI its first progress billing covering the construction works it completed from August 16 to September 15. Inc. Cruz & Co. joint measurement of the completed works. 2004. the CIAC ruled that FFCCI could not impose upon HRCC its valuation of the works completed by the latter. which was far less than that billed by HRCC. equipment. FFCCI claimed that it no longer has any liability on the Subcontract Agreement as the three payments it made to HRCC already represented the amount due to the latter in view of the works actually completed by HRCC as shown by the survey it conducted jointly with the DPWH. ISSUES: 1. FFCCI did not pay the amount stated in the second progress billing. after it had evaluated the completed works approved the payment of a gross amount far less from what HRCC billed (around 6 Million worth of difference) which amount was paid to HRCC. The CIAC rendered a Decision in favor of HRCC. HRCC submitted to FFCCI its fourth progress billing for the works it had completed from October 26 to November 25. it was justified in not paying the amount stated in HRCC's progress billings. i. HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then pay. Also. FFCCI sought for reconsideration but it was denied. 2004. On appeal. if not a mere pretention. FFCCI did not immediately pay the amount stated in the third progress billing. HRCC. FFCCI. pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Subcontract Agreement. leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project. when his knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. FFCCI and the DPWH then jointly evaluated the completed works of HRCC for the period of July 26 to September 25... claiming that it had already paid HRCC for the completed works for the period stated therein. hence. HRCC submitted its third progress billing for its completed works from September 26 to October 25. they agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials. FFCCI asserted that the DPWH was then able to evaluate the completed works of HRCC only until July 25. Additionally.F. Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present.Aujero’s educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured. Meanwhile. holding that the payment method adopted by FFCCI is actually what is known as the "back-to-back payment scheme" which was not agreed upon under the Subcontract Agreement. 2004. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter's progress billings. 2004 as the approved net payment for the said period. labor. within 30 days from receipt thereof. filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint against FFCCI praying for the payment of the overdue obligation and attorney's fees. Likewise. 2004. 2004. FFCCI then filed a petition for review with CA assailing the foregoing disposition by the CIAC.) Whether FFCCI's non-compliance with the stipulation in the Subcontract Agreement requiring a joint quantification of the works . the CA rendered a Decision denying the petition for review filed by FFCCI. The Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act. (FFCCI) entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct. intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. VILLAREAL vs PEOPLE FF CRUZ vs HR INDUSTRIES F. and. provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual. Instead. on separate dates. of a right known by him to exist. do not infringe on the rights of others. which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed. . albeit in amounts substantially different from those claimed by the latter.) Whether there was a valid rescission of the Subcontract Agreement by HRCC? HELD: 1. if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right. and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled. Basically. the authority is settled: “. The terms of the Subcontract Agreement should prevail. it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property. conferred with statute. or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it. or guaranteed by constitution. and agree to waive. and. . FFCCI had necessarily waived its right to dispute HRCC's valuation of the works it had accomplished. and without detriment to the community at large.) YES 2. it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCC's completed works contemplated by the parties in the Subcontract Agreement never materialized. Donato Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right. whether secured by contract. FFCCI proceeded to conduct its own verification of the works actually completed by HRCC and. FFCCI's voluntary payment in favor of HRCC.) First Issue: Effect of Non-compliance with the Joint Quantification Requirement on the Progress Billings of HRCC (IMPLIED WAIVER) The petition by FFCCI is not meritorious. RATIO: 1. and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law. FFCCI did not contest the said progress billings submitted by HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latter's completed works as required under the Subcontract Agreement. benefit. the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity. . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character. The main question advanced by FFCCI is this: in the absence of the joint measurement agreed upon in the Subcontract Agreement. It is the responsibility of FFCCI to call for the joint measurement of HRCC's completed works. FFCCI. the voluntary abandonment or surrender. FFCCI's failure to demand a joint measurement of HRCC's completed works reasonably justified the inference that it had already relinquished its right to do so.completed by HRCC on the payment of the progress billings submitted by the latter constitutes as a waiver of its right to question HRCC’s billings? 2. advantage. The joint measurement requirement is a mechanism essentially granting FFCCI the opportunity to verify and. claim or privilege. or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right. how will the completed works of HRCC be verified and the amount due thereon be computed? The determination of the foregoing question entails an interpretation of the terms of the Subcontract Agreement vis-à-vis the respective rights of the parties herein. contest HRCC's valuation of its completed works prior to the submission of the latter's monthly progress billings.) NO Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the arbitration costs shall be shared equally by the parties herein. made the said payments to HRCC.” Here. Thus. . . . In People of the Philippines v. since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right. is a glaring indication that it had effectively waived its right to demand for the joint measurement of the completed works." As to what rights and privileges may be waived. FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC's valuation of the completed works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement. are intended for his sole benefit. the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the parties' respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit. The joint measurement contemplated under the Subcontract Agreement should be conducted by the parties herein together with the representative of the DPWH and the consultants. had effectively waived its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC's submission of its monthly progress billings. by a capable person. and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive. and does not contravene public policy. having relinquished its right to ask for a joint measurement of HRCC's completed works. if necessary. on account of its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC's completed works. custody of children. HRCC shall at all times proceed with the prompt performance of the Works in accordance with the directives of FFCCI and this SUBCONTRACT Agreement. and second. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Whenever the petitioner was out of • • • • • the country. The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations as stated in Article 1191 of the Civil Code. respondent gave birth to a baby girl. respondent was often out with her friends. RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. while the right to rescind reciprocal obligations is implied. • SG’s COMMENT: • . 1998. the Subcontract Agreement reads: “Notwithstanding any dispute. CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. After 3 years. Nueva Ecija. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129. HRCC had agreed to continue the performance of its obligations pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. whether FFCCI is already barred from disputing the work stoppage of HRCC. respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. Basilan Province. HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement. therefore. CA denied the petition on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Lamitan. divesting the Court of Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors? RULING: • The petition is granted. THORNTON vs THORNTON PR (R:45) CA’s resolution which dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. HRCC had no right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage. that is. Rule 142 of the Rules of Court. controversy. respondent left the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. whether HRCC has the right to extrajudicially rescind the Subcontract Agreement. habeas corpus in relation to the latter. On December 7. nevertheless the contracting parties may waive the same. FACTS: • Petitioner (American) and respondent were married on August 28.) Second Issue: Validity of HRCC's Rescission of the Subcontract Agreement (EXPRESS WAIVER) The determination of the validity of HRCC's work stoppage depends on a determination of the following: first. The costs of arbitration should. that such right need not be expressly provided in the contract. However. the latter having waived such right.2. it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Petitioner went to Basilan. Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton. §5(b) provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide petition cases for guardianship. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. be shared by the parties equally. but did not find them there and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. applying Section 1. leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp. She wanted to return to her old job as a “guest relations officer” in a nightclub. 2001. However.” In spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement. Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite. differences or arbitration proceedings relating directly or indirectly to this SUBCONTRACT Agreement and without prejudice to the eventual outcome thereof. A year later.  In 1997. WHEREFORE.  In allowing the CA to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. KIDA vs SENATE This is a resolution to resolve various motions for reconsideration that assails the SC’s decision dated October 18. Supreme Court: CA’s contention cannot be upheld because it will result in an iniquitous situation. The provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. Petitioner’s Contention: Unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors. Second.-SP-No.R. the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and  • • • emotional well-being. Hence. the welfare of the child is paramount. as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected. all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws. a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the RTC issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. or with any of its members and. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G. 03-04-04-SC §20 (5/15/2003) of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors has rendered the issue moot. First. REGARDING IMPLIED REPEALS:  Rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored: The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. Sixteenth Division. by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. Parents would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. 0303-04-SC §20. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals. CA.• • • A. §20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the SC. CA’s Contention: RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since. No. The legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and wellbeing will be prejudiced. the petition is hereby GRANTED. the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.M. In any case. To the court a quo. whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.  The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction was to avoid clogging of regular court dockets. if so granted. RA 8369: The provisions of RA 8369 did not revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and SC to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. 2011 where the SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 10513 which postponed the regional elections in the ARMM (which were to be held on the 2nd Monday of August 2011) to the 2nd . the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. and a clear finding thereof must surface. leaving individuals without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. No.  The provisions of RA 8369. The petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy and this lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties.M. the word “exclusive” apparently cannot be construed any other way. before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. RA 7092 and BP 129 are not absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the CA and the SC from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. 9054. a seaman. then a student. Petitioner further argues. provided there is quorum. CA reversed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Does RA 10513 amend RA 9054? (basta is about irrepealable laws) NO. and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote. To reiterate. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. Held: The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code. On March 1994. the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal. as well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent was convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11 days of imprisonment. Their union begot 4 children. RA 9333 and RA 10513 merely filled the gap left in RA 9054. future legislatures. Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. which enacted RA No. CA (promulgated on January 1995). In requiring all laws which amend RA No. Respondent became violent. PESCA vs PESCA Facts: Petitioner Lorna Pesca. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. Congress. Dade: A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects. The rule follows the legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply to the case at bar. got married March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. stating that petitioner had failed to establish that (1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) that incapacity is grave. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have no retroactive application. by its own act. and cannot tie the hands of. whether pertaining to persons or things. 9333 and RA No. and respondent Zosimo Pesca. 9054. The other laws only also fixed the date of the elections for the ARMM but did not change or modify any part or provision of RA 6734 (sorry ang gulo kasi nung case so I’m guessing ito yung original?) Even assuming that RA No. Where the legislature. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote). 10153 did in fact amend RA No. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. (I got this part from the first case) The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. On November 1995. As we explained in Duarte v. Article XVII of RA No. the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. RA 10513 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. However. (3) preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is psychological (6) that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by an expert (8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. in 1988. respondent assaulted petitioner.Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint OICs to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. either to introduce new laws or repeal the old. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed. RA 9054 fixes the schedule of the first ARMM elections and it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of . within its territorial jurisdiction. the act of one legislature is not binding upon. RTC decided in favour of the petitioner. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. [emphasis ours] Under our Constitution. petitioner noticed that her husband was emotionally immature and irresponsible. where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. 2010. but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. 298 SCRA 408. the Court. until authoritatively abandoned. or abandoned. necessarily become.the law. hence.A. November 9. 2010. No. not only of those called upon to abide by them.M. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority. This A. the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts. 10-2-5-SC. Article VII of the Constitution. especially with a new membership. 1998. and a different view is adopted. judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favour of the parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith (“lex prospicit. considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the President.M. devoid of rationality and foundation. The contention has no basis. the criteria that must control the actuations. (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17. to call for a rectification. 10-2-5-SC and. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed. 2010. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication. 98-5-01-SC. to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. granting the petition in A. Thus. But ours is not a common-law system. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere. both in her allegations and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent. accordingly. No. but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute was enacted. No. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado. if not control. being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. 2. involves the constitutional validity of the appointment of two (2) RTC Judges on March 30.. DE CASTRO vs JBC Facts: On March 17. . unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority.e. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds itself later overruled. The one highest court does not bind itself. 1998 – a date that falls within the supposed ban under Section 15. to the extent that they are applicable. (In Valenzuela . i. and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. We nullified the appointments. and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts.) Held: First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling. Puno by May 17. and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines. directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. or reversed. the Court promulgated its decision. as the highest court of the land. non respicit”). and that its wisdom should guide. Petitioner utterly failed. after re-examination. (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice.M. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom. The Court erred in granting the petition in A. the Court in this case is. may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. The Court. Motions for reconsideration were filed by several groups and individuals arguing among others that: 1. therefore. Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and. because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.M. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. No.43 147997. No.27 a petition for certiorari that assailed the CA’s affirmance28 of the dismissal order of the Iloilo City RTC (Branch 28) in Civil Case No.22 The CA initially dismissed the petition.51 commonly holding that there existed no .46 On the other hand. where the same cases were pending. and their respective nominees for reconveyance of different properties with 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) nationwide.5 The petitioner. the petitioner. the respondent filed its compliance with motion to revive proceedings.R. parties.R. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the RTC of Malabon (Malabon case).49 167255.25 Tala Realty opposed the motion and filed again a motion to suspend proceedings.R.R. No.45 and 144705.48 and the decisions in G. stating that after the dismissal of G.47 citing the Court’s consolidated decision in G.R. 144700. and also prayed for a writ of prohibition to order the 17 RTC branches and the three CA divisions. 127611 for late filing. setting aside the RTC’s order to hold proceedings in abeyance for mootness. Nos.50and 144705. persuaded two other major stockholders. 22493.26 citing the pendency with this Court of G.39 137533. the Malabon RTC directed the parties’ counsels to inform it of the status of the pending cases. citing the 16 other civil cases filed in various courts12 involving the same facts. Q-95-24830 in the Quezon City RTC (Branch 91). Pedro.e.34 the petitioner summarized this Court’s rulings in the consolidated cases of G.11 The petitioner and her co-defendants moved to dismiss the Malabon case for forum shopping and litis pendentia.24 Subsequently. subject of the present case. Nos.36 and reported on the other cases involving the same parties decided by this Court. 130184 and 139166.37 137980. 4521 before the Batangas City RTC (Branch 84).9 Tala Realty repudiated the trust.41 an d 142672.40 143263. due to this Court’s dismissal of G. i.33 In her compliance. Since the General Banking Act4 limits a bank’s real estate holdings to no more than 50% of its capital assets. Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre. a major stockholder and a director of the respondent. with a threat to eject the respondent. 6 In implementing their trust agreement. and goodwill. 144700.. 132703. G.30 involving the CA’s reversal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. and (2) G. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to the respondent the properties for 20 years.13 Malabon RTC denied the motion to dismiss. such as G. 132703.R. 132703. No. and again ordered to hold proceedings in abeyance. and to enable it to acquire new branch sites.38 132051.R. the respondent sold to Tala Realty some of its properties. including Civil Case No.TY vs BANCO FILIPINO Facts: Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (respondent) wanted to purchase real properties as new branch sites for its expansion program.23 but on motion for reconsideration. claimed the titles for itself. Nos. 129887. issues. Nos.18 citing the pendency with this Court of G. renewable for another 20 years at the respondent’s option with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty decides to sell them. The Malabon RTC granted to hold proceedings in abeyance.14 finding no commonality in the 16 other civil cases The petitioner filed a motion to hold proceedings in abeyance. two other similar petitions have been elevated to this Court: (1) G. to desist from further proceeding with the trial of the cases. Remedios. No.R. and demanded payment of rentals. the respondent’s Board of Directors decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites to allow more flexibility in the opening of branches.R.31 The Malabon RTC granted the motion.32 Six years later. it modified its ruling.35 and in G. No. No.R. 12761119 that assailed the denial of their motion to dismiss Civil Case No.10 Respondent filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty. deposits.29 The petitioner filed her separate opposition to the respondent’s motion for pre-trial and a motion to hold proceedings in abeyance. 130184. 127611.R. the respondent moved for pretrial.20 Respondent elevated its case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.42 as well as the other related cases decided by this Court.R. 130184 and 139166. Nos. and reliefs pleaded in the respondent’s complaint.44 167255. to organize and incorporate Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) to hold and purchase real properties in trust for the respondent. It is the Court's duty to apply the previous rulings in G. regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. 131469.55 CA affirmed the RTC’s orders. which the Court follows as precedents. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty. which means "to adhere to precedents. 130088. 130088.52 the petitioner argued that the proceedings should not be revived since all the reconveyance cases are grounded on the same theory of implied trust which this Court in G. the present action for reconveyance cannot prosper. 130088. Nos.R. like cases ought to be decided alike. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. No. 131469. thus: Time and again. No. is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere."70 Under the doctrine. Nos.R.R. and not to unsettle things which are established. 131469.54 RTC granted the respondent’s motion to revive proceedings. 137533 and G. In this particular sense. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.74 WHEREFORE. Nos. Civil Case No. 155201 and 166608. absent any powerful countervailing considerations. Nos. 137533. which is based upon the judgment. in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations. Once a case has been decided one way. No. 137533. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against the respondent arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance case subject of the present petition.R. 2002 decision in G.R. 130088. Metro Manila is hereby DISMISSED. the petition is GRANTED. 137533 and in G. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that. SP No. VIRTUCIO vs ALEGARBES .72 The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. in light of G. Held: The case at bar presents the same issue that the Court already resolved on April 7. 155201 and 166608 are the same.R. 155171. stare decisis differs from res judicata. when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts. a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same. it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. No. 130088. should be decided in the same manner. 13753353 found void for being illegal as it was a scheme to circumvent the 50% limitation on real estate holdings under the General Banking Act. 155201 and 166608. on the other hand.R. any other case involving exactly the same point at issue. 155201 and 166608 to the present case.R.R. even though the parties may be different. where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. No. where facts are substantially the same. 155171.forum shopping. 155171. 137533 and G. 155171.R. as reiterated in G. 155201 and 166608. 131469. No. wherein we applied the Court’s November 22.R. Thus.73 (italics supplied) It bears stressing that the basic facts of the present case and those of G. 155171.71 The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment. In her comment to the respondent’s motion to revive proceedings. 137533 applies as stare decisis to the present case. litis pendentia and res judicata among the respondent’s reconveyance cases pending in the other courts of justice. and apply it to all future cases. Nos.R. the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same [issue]. Clearly. G. 131469. 107104 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 2009 in G. that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. pointed out that it was the court’s prerogative to suspend or not its proceedings pending the resolution of issues by another court. the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts.R. noting that res judicata is not applicable since there are independent causes of action for each of the properties sought to be recovered. it will adhere to that principle. which results therefrom. as in the present case. Tala Realty. Stare decisis et non quieta movere.59 It noted that res judicata does not apply since the issue of validity or enforceability of the trust agreement was raised in an ejectment case Issue: The core issues boil down to whether the Court’s ruling in G. No. affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. however. Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio). Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio. including Lot Nos. 6. Here. Alejandro and his family. Lantawan. Alegarbes filed an MR but MR was denied. 14. 140. The decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by virtue of adverse possession. the land was later on subdivided into three (3) lots as a consequence of a public land subdivision. In so ruling. entitled to retain possession of it. 138. 7. thus. 15. introducing permanent improvements thereon since 1960. peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription. void ab initio. as well as Alegarbes' wife and children. 5. claiming that his approved application covered the whole area. 16. respectively. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio). Pls19. Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription. 3. Custodio vs. An order of execution was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered Alegarbes to vacate the subject lot. 10. Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES. 139 and 140 had been open. His possession of Lot Nos. Respondent Jose Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated in Bañas. 4. 1952. who dismissed his appeal. 14 No. In his Amended and Supplemental Answer. Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.FACTS: 1. He further alleged that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and deceit. His application was approved on January 23. 9. and the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Only Lot 138 was given due course. therefore. the CA explained that even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final. CA promulgated its decision declaring Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 2. none of which touched upon the issue of Alegarbes' open. The Director of Lands denied Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to exclude Lots 139 and 140. However. The CA ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and. which. 13. had been permanently occupying the said lot and. but he refused. continuous. were likewise given due course. modified or set aside. finality and could not be reversed. Basilan in 1949. thereby reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. Alejandro Alegarbes. 8. He further argued. He then sought relief from the Office of the President (OP). 17. Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was void ab initio considering that the Acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act. continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. In his Answer. ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision in the CA for Recovery of Possession and Ownership. Virtucio filed this petition. 11. The applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140. Alegarbes also averred that his now deceased brother. The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the administrative bodies. by way of special and/or affirmative defenses. that the approval of his homestead application on by the Bureau of Lands had already attained 12. The petition must fail. Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Virtucio then filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC. The RTC rendered its decision favoring Virtucio. 139 and 140. the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by Alegarbes through acquisitive . "The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. In the case at bench. that the conclusion made by the RTC was not substantially supported. It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. are conclusive and binding upon this Court.prescription and the character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a factual issue. There was. It appears. The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the Director of Lands. continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and beyond the jurisdiction of these agencies. it declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it." The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier decision. in fact. neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. It was of the view that the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Issue: Whether or not this Court should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court? Held: Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial . which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are considered precedents. therefore. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. Hence. the need to review the facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion. he. hence. calls upon this Court to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle. which involved the same factual circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided. The Court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint. the case was set for trial on the merits. PEOPLE vs RITTER Facts: Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal. When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the abovementioned decisions. There is no reason for the Court to disturb these findings of the CA as they were supported by substantial evidence. Thus. Alegarbes. On the CA Decision involving a similar case Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio v. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP. When arraigned. Even the RTC itself noted in its decision: The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his favor — what divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. hence. it merely recognized the primary jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. CV 26286. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of such crime. the findings and conclusions of the CA are apparently contrary to those of the RTC. the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140. however. Thereafter. Moreover. which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes' open.R. it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. This simply means that the land subject of the controversy remains to be in the name of the State. CA-G. are accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record. which is wanting in this case. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal and. in effect. A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of any patent in favor of either parties. for Recovery of Possession and Ownership. enticing them with money. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. the RTC should have exercised utmost caution. supra) The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals. express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. for the construction and extension of a building in UPLB.xxx” We cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. and lawabiding people. (People v. Hence. good customs. pero malabo parin pucha. The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied. The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. The RTC had no authority to direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the depository banks of the UP. specifically: (a) the order Judge Yadao issued on January 3. I think this is the closest thing to our topic. natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. *This case did not mention anything about NCC 9 & 10. This object may have caused her death. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much. their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the motions for execution against the UP and the garnishment of the UP’s funds. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. decent. The appellant has abused Filipino children. the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. if not more so. for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal. The sheriff served notices of garnishment to UP’s depository banks (Land Bank & DBP). and all its orders and issuances thereon were void and of no legal effect. the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction. Stern Builders and dela Cruz as the claimants had no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. but UP only paid 2. Stern Builders sued UP to collect the unpaid billing and recover damages. 2007 allowing Stern Builders and dela Cruz to withdraw . The third billing was not paid due to the disallowance of the COA. prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and garnishment. and by authorizing the withdrawal of the garnished funds of the UP. However. Sorry guys… COA must adjudicate private respondents’ claim before execution should proceed. however. we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs. W/N the funds of UP are subject to garnishment? SC = NO.Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: “xxxThe rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. Something must be done about it. the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. pimps. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. By eschewing utmost caution.conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act Before the conviction is affirmed. The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. As such. On its part. UP vs DIZON UP entered into a construction agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corp. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles. public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). There were 3 billings sent to UP. We. Tolentino. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP. and. perhaps. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff. another vehicle drove by. 10-2000. 2007 directing DBP to forthwith release the garnish amount to Stern Builders and dela Cruz. when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder and to which was attached a pair of horses.the deposited garnished amount. 1445. She was aware of Presidential Decree No. as well as of the rules and procedures of the COA. the defendant. Nothing extenuated Judge Yadao’s successive violations of Presidential Decree No. xxx Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. who was himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question. crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped. ISSUE: Whether the employer-defendant. along the lefthand side of the street as she was going. 1903. who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver. and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata. and (d) the order of April 10. severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head. was riding. prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units" precisely in order to prevent the circumvention of Presidential Decree No. but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it. that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. The judgment is reversed. without special finding as to costs.86 issued on October 25. (c) the sheriff’s report of January 17. enjoining them "to observe utmost caution. that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are — Art. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable. prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units. 2000. 2007 manifesting the full satisfaction of the writ of execution. (b) the order Judge Yadao issued on January 16. 2007 deying the UP’s motion for the redeposit of the withdrawn amount. Carmen Ong de Martinez. and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. not only for personal acts and omissions. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred. 1445. judges are hereby enjoined to observe utmost caution. considering that the Court circulated to all judges its Administrative Circular No. xxx . Art. is liable for the negligence of such driver HELD: NO. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed. in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by. presented evidence to the effect that the cochero. CONDON vs COMELEC MARTINEZ vs VAN BUSKIRK FACTS: Carmen Ong de Martinez. came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding. The trial court found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him. such orders and issuances should be struck down without exception. to wit: In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit. city of Manila. was riding in a carromata on a district of Ermita. which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away. 1445. and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses. RATIO: There is no general law of negligence in the Philippines except that embodied in the Civil Code. the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises. Hence. was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. 1902. the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon. CTA invoked §229 of the NIRC1. 229. 1999. it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on. 1998 and its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent. months. that they had never run away up to that time and there had been. where on the face of the return upon which payment was made. or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority. left his team as usual and was assisting in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into the plaintiffs' carriage caused personal injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle. cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that. therefore. 2 Art. days or nights. In any case. He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house. such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. months. under the circumstances. Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is. If the months are designated by their name. is the custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is sanctioned by employers. 13. even without a claim therefor. under the last paragraph of the above provisions. it was dismissed as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. When the law speaks of years. he explained that while PPGI’s business was doing good the first quarter. .No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. during all that time. that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question. that the cochero was experienced and capable. that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months. -. who had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time. if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the horses. PPGI was required by revenue officer Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim and PPGI complied but its claim was not acted upon. whether or not such tax. and. days. liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team. to leave teams under like circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon. Held: That acts.Finally. of thirty days. It was further shown that. or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected. • • 1 Sec. it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each. the first day shall be excluded. no accident due to such practice. In computing a period. of twenty-four hours. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable. no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided. the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom. and nights from sunset to sunrise. and the last included. or sum has been paid under protest or duress. that he had been in the habit. The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code2. however. In Yap's letter to revenue district officer Parcero. penalty. respondent suffered losses that year and so it was entitled to a tax refund. which custom was sanctioned by their employers. Gilbert Yap (vice chair of PPGI) applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. refund or credit any tax. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. but such suit or proceeding may be maintained. during which the animals has shown no disposition to become unruly. masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. A coachman or driver. CIR vs PRIMETOWN FACTS: • • On March 11. until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident. PPGI filed a petition for review in the CTA. However. That the Commissioner may. Respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14. or by any applicable statute. “night” from sunrise to sunset. the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioners’ MR was denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to file petition for review under rule 42 of the rules of court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21. or by order of the court. unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains. “day”. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. If the last day of the period. was filed beyond the reglementary period. Section 1. Thus. However. to a day of twenty-four hours and. 2007. Although §27 (Repealing Clause) of AC1987 did not expressly identify laws to be abolished. 2007. Sunday. It filed an appeal in the CA and reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. 2007. (b) CALENDAR MONTH  a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. the CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. 2007. On September 21. the time shall not run until the next working day. according to the CTA. 31. Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides: Section 1. Because the year 2000 was a leap year. The rule that a year has 365 days applies. notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits. “month” of thirty days. He filed his petition on June 5. the petitioner received the copy of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4. being the more recent law. MONTAJES vs PEOPLE Montajes was charged for direct assault when he uttered the words “YOU’RE A USELESS CAPTAIN” and attacked Rellon with a lagaraw (bolo). 2007. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls on a Saturday. The case is REMANDED to the CTA. Sunday or legal holiday. However. Petitioner filed an MR which the RC denied on May 4. which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return. Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-day extension from May 19. as thus computed. the provision impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the AC1987. and a party is granted an extension of time. 2007. governs the computation of legal periods. its basis is not. 2007. 2005 MTC found him guilty of direct assault. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules. 2007 (Monday) considering that the last day fell on a Saturday. The CA said: As borne by the records. falls on a Saturday. the extension should be counted from the last day which is a Saturday. Accordingly. When he was arraigned.  There exists an incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under both laws. On December 29. — “Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. CA correctly concluded that respondent filed its petition in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period. APPLICABLE LAWS:  Two laws provide for computation of legal periods: (a) Article 13 of the Civil Code and (b) EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 19873. the petition is hereby DENIED. ISSUE: WON THE PETITION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME – YES. 2007 and not from May 21. the two-year prescriptive period under §229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. How to compute time. 2007. a Sunday. Trial ensued. 2007 (Monday) and not from May 19. On appeal to the RTC on January 23. respondent's petition. the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. he pleaded not guilty. It appears that petitioner reckoned the extension from May 21. 2007 (Saturday).• Thus. LEGAL PERIODS: (a) YEAR  12 calendar months. • • ISSUE: Whether or not PPGI filed its claim within the reglementary period? RULING: • • • YES. • 3 Sec. the 15-day reglementary period within which to file a petition for review expired on May 21. 2007 or until June 5. . within which to file his petition. Legal Periods. or a legal holiday. Respondent’s MR was denied. May 19. §31 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Korea. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time.We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A. the “lex fori” . No. Sunday or legal holiday. the next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday. 2007. the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May 19. Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday. SC ordered CA to reinstate the PFR. We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on our clarification in A. the time shall not run until the next working day. to declare that Section 1. a Sunday. we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29. Korea and that the facts proven did not warrant the relief prayed for. the petition filed on June 5. In this case. Held: The Court held that the lower court’s conclusion as to jurisdiction was erroneous. However. Facts: Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray. 2007. who was formerly a resident of Pusan. for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar. does not permit bigamy. No. as it was solemnized in Seoul. the jurisdiction of the lower court being an issue in the appeal. there can be no doubt as to the validity of the marriage between plaintiff and defendant. Petitioner's filing of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21. The Court upheld the findings of the lower court that documents presented were insufficient. the provision no longer applies. Plaintiff appealed to the CA.M. 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday. Plaintiff’s action for . like Philippine Law. Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. 2007. 2007 was already two days late. CA certified the case to the SC. where the last day of the period for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday. 2007. Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted. petitioner prayed in his motion for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21. the due date ceases to be the last day and hence. He then filed his petition for review on June 5. Exhibit A was unsigned. the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday. Summons was served by publication as the latter’s whereabouts was unknown. so that when a motion for extension of time is filed. Whether or not the plaintiff’s marriage to defendant was valid. counting 15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19. the aforecited provision [Section 1. Issue: 1. Sunday or a legal holiday. a Saturday. It was an action in rem. NOW THEREFORE. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant was already married prior to their marriage. a Philippine citizen. The CA did not act on the motion for extension. the Court Resolves. or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits. Plaintiff presented a purported police clearance from Seoul. as it concerned the status of the parties. but instead issued a Resolution dated September 21. RAYRAY vs CHAE KYUNG LEE . and there being no competent proof that defendant was married to another prior to her marriage with plaintiff. Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. Sunday or legal holiday.[14] Thus. not the place of celebration of the marriage. Korea and its supposed translation (Exhibits A & B respectively). Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads: xxxx Whereas. Prior marriage was not proven. 2007dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. However. 2007 within which to file his petition. Whereas. the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period. was therefore on time. 2007 or up to June 5. The presumption is that Korean Law.M. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties. in which case. Lower Court dismissed the complaint. sought the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. 2. stating it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the marriage. Based on Section 1. termination procedures. petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable. Inc. Angel Seafood Corporation. public order or public policy. as the foreign principal. representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract. the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e. we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. Under the contract. a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations. Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal). 2001. petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable. hence. thus. given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit..). it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter.g. Unfortunately for petitioner. which she voluntarily entered into. that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.600. specific causes for termination. even if pleaded.annulment on the ground of the supposed prior marriage was dismissed ATCI OVERSEAS CORP vs ECHIN Facts: Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principalco-petitioner. 2001. morals. Inc. Indeed. more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it. the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Held: As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract. as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient.. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case. Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract. NLRC illuminates: In the present case. TUNA PROCESSING vs PHI KINGFORD Facts: Kanemitsu Yamaoka. and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the . Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran. represented by petitioner.. Respondent was deployed on February 17. Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. v.. co-patentee of Yamaoka Patent and five (5) Philippine tuna processors. 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11. petitioners failed to discharge. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or. in this case. they must not only be alleged. she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.00. and the Ministry. etc. customs and practices of the host country. finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee. the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. good customs. however. shouldering her own air fare. for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract. Thus. as long as they are not contrary to law. On July 27. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws. the same was not substantiated. clauses. 2. She returned to the Philippines on March 17. Mommy Gina Tuna Resources. the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait. In international law. The Labor Arbiter. namely. held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3. Also. East Asia Fish Co. including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations. 2001. under the doctrine of processual presumption which. It is hornbook principle. the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l. all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. is not proved. respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency. they must be proven. that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules. Santa Cruz Seafoods. or its successors or assigns. Doing business without a license. and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law).750. a municipal law. that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No. is the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1.28 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act. To enforce the award. Ruiz of Branch 61. RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform.846. the New York Convention and the Model Law on the other? Without doubt. After all. As between a general and special law. withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations. is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation. both already form part of the law."sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).23 as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. The first judge inhibited and thus. the total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI. Recognition. Simply put. Held: The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides: Sec. as its title An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution. however.30 Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.10) for breach of the MOA. does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the affirmative. the licensees.12 Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California. United States and won the case against respondent and ordered that within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the Parties. 133. in turn.No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license. pursuant to the terms of this award.22 the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention). how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand. shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action."29 It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition. Now. and theAlternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines. including respondent Kingford. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004). On the other hand.20 Issue The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue. it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a foreign arbitral award. we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New York Convention and theModel Law. the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation. to which the case was re-raffled. but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.would suggest. Judge Cedrick O. The petitioner counters. organization and regulation of private corporations. and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our . Indeed. and for Other Purposes . . applies in the instant petition. the latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant. granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. Maria Cristina Bellis. that the court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law.000. born in Texas. Mary E.000. Jr.40 Premises considered. Finally. governs the subject arbitral award. for that reason alone. in trust. Amos Bellis. 3. Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him. or a total of P120. precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation. and expenses of administration are paid for. 6.S. participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. various amounts totalling P40. by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration. the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied. FACTS: 1. Jr. and the legacies of three illegitimate children in the amount of P40. even assuming. report and administration and . in which he directed that after all taxes. (b) P120. inter alia.courts.00. 7. WHEREFORE. although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines. by his second wife. Subsequently.. may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. is not. in the following order and manner: (a) $240. although not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Branch 61. paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240. Bellis. All considered. who survived him. since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement. and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court. Texas.000. a resident of San Antonio. 9. Mary E. or P40. Bellis died. as executor of the will. The executor then submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account.00 each. In the project of partition.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. he had five legitimate children.39 petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court. SO ORDERED. he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis.00.A. his distributable estate should be divided. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.000.. Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question. Amos G. therefore. as in this case. but because Republic Act No. Mallen. AMOS vs BELLIS 2.00 to his three illegitimate children. 4. it becomes bound by the contract. only for the sake of argument." By his first wife. compulsory heirs of the deceased. Amos Bellis. the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court. U. The People's Bank and Trust Company. the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies. Clearly. Lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account. whom he divorced.000. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. on the matter of capacity to sue. and finally. he had three legitimate children. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. Makati City in Special Proceedings No. the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. Amos G. and Miriam Palma Bellis.000. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children. not the New York Convention. petitioner TPI.000. conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240. obligations. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and.000. Amos G. a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures. 5. Recognition. 8. petitioner TPI. was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. Mallen. in fact submits itself to arbitration. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Violet Kennedy.00 to his first wife. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and. there are no forced heirs or legitimes. a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law. who died on March 27. since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. -Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila. and (d) the capacity to succeed. with costs against appellant. the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. and that under the laws of Texas. for as this Court ruled in Miciano vs. MR filed was denied. it applied the national law of the decedent. however. Brimo. For it has specifically chosen to leave.S. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator. . In the present case. Accordingly. with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession. -A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. which in this case is Texas law.. they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Wherefore. They provide that — "Art 16. ISSUE: Whether Phiippine or Texas Law should apply." It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes. and Art. Tayag. the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law. Amos G. 16 of the Civil Code. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. 867. render applicable the national law of the decedent. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. Relying upon Art. 870. which as noted. Bellis. two stock certificates of appellant. the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York. since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern. but would still refer to Texas law. The parties admit that the decedent. renvoi would arise. to the decedent's national Law. is illegal and void. the amount of successional rights. inter alia. 2. -CFI Manila: ordered the domiciliary administrator. 1039 of the Civil Code. 50 Phil. So ordered. As stated. if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated. was a citizen of the State of Texas. in intestate or testamentary successions. -Lazaro A.project of partition. U. it should not be presumed different from ours. he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. (b) the amount of successional rights. County Trust Company. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas. TAYAG vs BENGUET CONSOLIDATED Facts: -Idonah Slade Perkins. Nonetheless. 1960 in New York City. 1039. is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased. par. to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. and on January 22. Article 16. it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. -The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order. 10. it would not alter the law. left among others. they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will. intestate and testamentary successions. "However"." "Art. for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. 1963. Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.A. Rather. which did not provide for legitimes. the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto. Bellis. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. . The ICA was entered into in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). KAZUHIRO HASEWAGA vs KITAMURA In March 1999. a Japanese firm." Benguet Consolidated appealed the order. Thereby.. DPWH awarded the STAR (Southern Tagalog Access Road) project to Nippon. the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court. Code. the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33. the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33. arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York. and (3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York. we sustained the lower court. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country. Ltd. Since there is a refusal.. dated February 11. be declared or considered as lost. Inc. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act.S.-On February 11. but they are not applicable to the present case. make the decisions of the U. where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant.S. the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled..S. in actions where he is a party. in New York." -Appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are in existence. But in February 2000. in effect. conclusive on our courts. Moreover.. Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property submitted to him for resolution. In April 1999. In an opinion by Justice J. invoked by the appellant. as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated." Its view is that under the circumstances. In January 2000. U. Inc. That. and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein.. Reyes. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator. Inc. 1964. the County Trust Company. including the exclusive review by United States courts).. they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator. . there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. 1964. it would allege that there was a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. -LC: rendered an order of this tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa. thus: "We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines. the stock certificates cannot be declared or considered as lost. the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract.A.002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated.L. was contracted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. The provisions of the U. would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator. (2) orders said certificates cancelled. Kazuhiro Hasegawa.B. determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien entities.002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated." It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and conclusive. Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. Issue: Whether or not the lower court’s order is proper? Held: The appeal lacks merit. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction. Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Inc. the parties. nonpayment of commission. for illegal termination.. on appeal significantly changed its theory. so since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines. and the domicile. it does not mean that the local laws must automatically apply. or place of incorporation of the parties. there are three phases and each next phase commences when one is settled. However. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. Hasegawa. *Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should apply is premature. to wit: 1. Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. 2. place of business. which was denied. was to be performed. In 1994. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. and herein petitioner . respondent filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the petitioner and impleaded BMSI and RUST International reiterating the allegations made in the earlier labor case. Also consider. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes cognizance.” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute. Rouzie entered into a contract whereby the respondent was hired by BMSI as representative to negotiate the sale of services with the Philippine government. Respondent secure a service contract with the government on behalf of BMSI. the property. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule. In conflicts cases. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. was negotiated. W/N the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed? SC = NO. The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR. (BMSI) a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut. applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis. the court should consider where the contract was made. the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages. which was also denied. respondent filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against BMSI and Rust International In. Rust International. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it. Eventually. Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. such ground is not one of those provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case. that the RTC is an inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. In a case involving a contract. construction. The trial court denied the motion. and breach of contract. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? This case is not yet reached the second phase because upon the RTC’s taking cognizance of the case. The Labor Arbiter rendered a favorable decision for respondent. He filed a motion for reconsideration. Then he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 3.Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in Japan hence.” It controls the nature. In 1998. the res. such cases are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. courts here have jurisdiction. Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss. In the first place. the issues. whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state. choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. RAYTHEON vs ROUZIE FACTS: Brand Marine Services. The respondent also alleged that BMSI. this time invoking forum non conveniens. Respondent elevated the case before the Supreme Court but it was dismissed. cases arising from the contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. and respondent Stockton W. The court must determine which substantive law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the respondent upon the filing of the complaint. ISSUES: 1. the Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contention stating that the presence of a valid choice of law clause did not suggest that Philippine courts are precluded from hearing the civil action. The MR was likewise denied. She likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the Shari'a courts pursuant to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The case was referred to the CA. The motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the lower court. hence. a court in conflicts. hence. But in places where there are no Shari'a courts. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. the instant case could properly be filed before the RTC. Petition is DENIED. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death. Zorayda and Adib however filed a motion to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other cases. thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. TAMANO vs ORTIZ FACTS: Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. The petitioner sought the dismissal of the case on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens. like Quezon City. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action? 2. Under this doctrine. The RTC of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by it since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence. hence the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens became necessary. The CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Shari'a courts only when filed in places where there are Shari'a courts. Prior to his death Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J.combined and function as one company. joined by her son. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens? RULING: Petitioner contended that their written contract with respondent included a valid choice of law clause. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED RATIO: . respectively. it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage.of -law cases may refuse impositions on its jurisdictions where it is not the most convenient forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. the petition for review was DENIED. It also filed an Omnibus Motion which was denied by the RTC. Estrellita filed a petition with the SC seeking to set aside RTC denying her motion to dismiss. The High Court ratiocinated that jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law. the laws of the State of Connecticut. However. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was also denied. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single. filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. It also acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner when it appeared voluntarily in court. Estrellita is now before the SC reiterating her earlier argument that it is the Shari'a court and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Code of Muslim Personal Laws divests the RTCs of its jurisdiction to try cases regarding Declaration of Nullity of Marriage where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites such as in the case at bar? HELD: NO. and not exclusively in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal laws. Zorayda alleged that Tamano never divorced her and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with a certain Llave never became final and executory. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the case. which the CA granted. Private respondent Zorayda. The Supreme also pointed out that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled the need for a full-blown trial to determine the alleged merging of BMSC and Rust International. person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . a Muslim convert. was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30. Application. . under Islamic rites and in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage. Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the RTC of Iligan City. 129 which provides — Sec. 1083. Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. (6) of BP Blg. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs. par. Interestingly. Quezon City. the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former. Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. PD No. which provides — Art. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. 2. contrary to the position of Estrellita. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. the agreement rankled on Pacasum. the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. 1982. it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Salazar of the RTC. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims. may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides. Article 13 of PD No. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer.Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Estrellita argues that the Shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. the RTCs are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Zorayda and Adib. On December 18. alleging that: (a) Zamoranos. with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto. 1983. Zamoranos wed Pacasum. Subsequently. . 19. He filed several cases against Zamoranos: 1. Iligan City. at the time of her marriage to Pacasum. Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28. 13. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Nevertheless. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit District Court which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18. Eventually. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . at the election of the plaintiff. the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of RTC. (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court. The relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de facto separated. xxx As alleged in the complaint. Assuming that indeed Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws. in a motion to dismiss. but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Hence. • • • • • . Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage. Personal actions. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. Later. 1083. they wed again in civil rites before Judge Laguio of the RTC. On December 20. II. . Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage was bigamous and void ab initio. Consequently. tribunal. 1982. such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. Subsequently. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC. 13. Consequently. the RTC was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the MR that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. 1992. 19. Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman. . ZAMORANOS vs PEOPLE FACTS: • On May 3. 1989. RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. As it turned out. solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code. the Shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. in Islamic rites. Title. it escalated into a battle for custody of their minor children. or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. 1982. or in a motion for reconsideration. The RTC. No. Iligan City. For example. found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims.D. in the sense that as long as the .  Pacasum filed an Petition for Review and the Secretary of Justice granted Pacasum’s Petition for Review and reversed the resolutions of the City Prosecutor. on subsequent marriage. • However. The administrative cases were dismissed in due course. On the civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage. On the criminal litigation front. On April 3. but it was denied. Iligan City. 3. Branch 6. is correct when it declared that the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. (2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application. after an MR filed by Zamoranos. The RTC. However. Branch 6. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines.D. 1083 – Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon:  The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application. upon motion of Pacasum. Branch 2. the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the Civil Case by the RTC of Iligan City.  Zamoranos filed MRs. • Article 3 (Conflict of Provisions) of P. there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code. the RTC dismissed the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. Branch 6. 1083 provides that: (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application. the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos was dismissed. • In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. In the meantime. this Code shall prevail. the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC. Subsequent motions and petition for certiorari filed by Zamoranos were likewise denied by the CA. Iligan City. reinstated the Bigamy case against Zamoranos. the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former. the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasum’s appeal became final and executory. the latter shall prevail. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases. the RTC. but they were denied by the Secretary of Justice. The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court. or body. Branch 6. and were such at the time of their marriage. ISSUES: Whether or not RTC. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information. The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information. should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman. the former shall prevail. (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim. tribunal. No. Iligan City committed an error of jurisdiction when it prosecuted Zamoranos for violations of the RPC? RULING: • The RTC.• • • • • Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos’ dismissal from service and disbarment. Branch 6. On separate appeals. 2009. Iligan City. Iligan City. whose marital relationship was governed by P. Accordingly. The bride-to-be's trousseau. Branch 6. and attested to by Judge Usman.R. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity. No. Their wedding was set for September 4. defendant had carnal access to plaintiff. wounded feelings. 194075 is DENIED. defendant. he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon. Moreover. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code... Exh. Two days before their marriage." The record reveals that on August 23. is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. who was then 28 years old. E). 7-8). refers to severance of matrimonial bond. Francisco wrote Beatrice a letter telling her that their marriage has to be postponed because his mother opposes it. It must not be overlooked. A day before their wedding he sent her a telegram saying that nothing has changed and assured her that he was returning soon. the latter suffered mental anguish. ISSUE: is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? NO. A-1). Araceli Santos. Beatrice sued for damages. Thus. C). SP No. besmirched reputation. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives. was valid. only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. . the RTC. A. is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage. CA however decreed that complaint did state a cause of action for damages. Francisco was never heard from again. moral shock and social humiliation. entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently.R. party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. 6. who in time reciprocated the tender feelings. the day before the wedding. Issue: Whether or not there was a cause of action under Article 21 of the Civil Code. premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Both were of adult age. the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. It was however dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao. with but two days before the wedding. which was subsequently issued (Exhs. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED. Exh. In consideration of defendant’s promise of marriage. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. Plaintiff had to resign to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn. with accessories.. Plaintiff filed with the CFI. mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. however. the latter conceived a child. as well as other kinds of divorce.. A matrimonial bed.  The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. As stated. entitling one to remarry. and the next day.• • subsequent marriage is solemnized “in accordance with” the Muslim Code. the two experts unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq. No. as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court." But he never returned and was never heard from again. WASSMER vs VELEZ Francisco Velez and Beatrice Wassmer decided to get married. It was alleged that due to defendant’s refusal to marry plaintiff. Iligan City. 5. that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity.R. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. And then. 193902 is GRANTED.: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it .. plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant’s plea for carnal knowledge. 1954. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman. TANJANCO vs CA Facts: Defendant Apolonio Tanjanco courted plaintiff. Defendant expressed his undying love and affection for plaintiff. friends and acquaintances (Tsn. As a result. the petition in G. WHEREFORE. was bought. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. is quite different. The petition in G. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. From 1958 to December 1959. single. false and fabricated. Before August 20. Dagupan City. with repeated acts of intercourse. ABANAG vs MABUTE Facts: The complainant alleged that respondent courted her and professed his undying love for her. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered. filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement of marriage. petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount not less than P45. When she did not agree. flagrant or shameless. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Sometime on August 20. reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600. without the assistance of counsel. the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. the plaintiff maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant. insisting that she herself wrote the letter-complaint. BAKSH vs CA Facts: Private respondent. The complainant filed a Reply. Petitioner. the latter courted and proposed to marry her. in reality. He believes that the complainant’s letter-complaint. and is an exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. was prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog. It defined what immoral conduct is as as conduct that is willful. good customs. attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents in Banaga.4 To justify suspension or disbarment. Issue: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry. which was written in the vernacular. Held: The Supreme Court held that when a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in the sexual congress. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent. Guilig.5 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and equitable. proof that he had. 1987. on the other hand.000. she sustained injuries. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. or public policy. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. the respondent would have used the "waray" or English language if she had written the letter-complaint. She became pregnant.A week before the filing of the complaint. is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartment. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her. but grossly immoral. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change.6 . respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. 1987.Held: The Court held that the facts stand out that for one whole year (1958-59). She belied the respondent’s claim that she was being used by Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him. and as a result of such maltreatment. and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation. Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. Respondent vehemently denied the complainant’s allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless. the act complained of must not only be immoral. and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Relying on respondent’s promise that he would marry her. but after several months into her pregnancy. the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him. There can be no case made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. It is essential however. she agreed to live with him. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint. An "Absolute Deed of Donation". catatonic type.9 However. in lieu thereof. 2876. acting as Feliciano's guardian. we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Mercedes then sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her. TC issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. 8. the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise . While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and. the donation would still be void. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio. 5 HISAET 5. 7.10 WHEREFORE. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. Mabute. and. In addition. No costs. as well as damages against the herein respondents. Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. Recovery of Possession and Ownership. TC appointed People's Bank and Trust Company (now BPI) as Feliciano's guardian. is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property to their children Alex Catalan. Samar. Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio. Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. issued Tax Declaration No. BPI. it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives. 3. where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists. as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. Paranas. 6. especially those that will affect their and their family’s future. CATALAN vs BASA FACTS: 1. 9. DOAS was registered with RD of Pangasinan. FELICIANO CATALAN was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction. not only with respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. private conduct. Issue: Whether the acts of respondent is considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct. filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents. to a certain extent. for lack of merit. This is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts. Held: We find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct.7 The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married. The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. preoccupation with worries. The conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal. SO ORDERED. the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative complaint against Nicolas B. and sparce (sic) and pointless speech. withdrawal. 18080 4 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. was executed wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN (Mercedes) one-half his the real property located in Binmaley Pangasinan 4. 18081." On September 1949. as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property to their son Eulogio Catalan. which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect. Thus. The remaining half of the property remained in Feliciano's name under Tax Declaration No.2. Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo then donated Lot 4 Eulogio and Florida Catalan. 10. Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. People's Bank and Trust Company filed a special proceeding before the CFI of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. for the sum of P400. 12. yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FELICIANO CARALAN WAS SUFFERING FROM INSANITY AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED. (2) it should be free. if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented. are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. However. petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors neither there was any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document. Certainly. the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it. TC found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. -The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs was that during the time they executed and signed the document.be nullified. there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. The sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned. shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed. since the donation was valid. that is they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. sister of Luis. 13. induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother. for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. against Luis Espiritu who later on died. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another. A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes.795 -Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land. like any contract. the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers. the court declared. Thus. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent. Feliciano then passed away. Thus. and (3) it should be spontaneous. 189. what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. despite his illness. and that the defendant be ordered among others. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts. all surnamed Mercado were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu. the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld. In order for donation of property to be valid. No. MERCADO vs ESPIRITU Facts: -Counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the CFI of Bulacan. Competency and freedom from undue influence. The complaint was amended against Jose Espiritu as the administrator of the estate of the deceased. Like any other contract. renders the donation voidable. Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Thus. they were minors. an agreement of the parties is essential. capacity will be presumed. is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. It dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and declared Delia and Jesus Basa as lawful owners of the land. notwithstanding the fact that said land was valued at P3. It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano's capacity at the time he donated the property. 32 CaHcET Needless to state. The defendant by means of cajolery. to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz. . 11. Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the the RTC. who accepts it. The courts. Rizal. Unfortunately. Rule 92 of the Rules of Court. respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Under Section 2. rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications. petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. San Juan. Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin. The union produced three children. for their part. After Maria's death. or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of law and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water.206. unkempt and smelled of urine.400. On October 2. stepmother. Upon Felix's death in 1993. as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero. and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them. they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state. made by minors who pretend to be of legal age. petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. 1951. claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle. after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. On December 16. when in fact they are not. because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education. Sotero C. aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. In 1968.Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age? Held: Yes. Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. ATIZADO vs PEOPLE HERNANDEZ vs SANTOS FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14. upon reaching the age of majority. Felix married Natividad Cruz. have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate. persons who. 1998. Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight. Meanwhile. Branch 76. ISSUE: Whether or not Lulu is an incompetent and the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property is necessary. Felix and petitioners undertook various “projects” involving Lulu’s real properties. Teresa and Ma. Nevertheless. nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. Subsequently. half-siblings and maternal relatives. in their interpretation of the law. Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene. for that reason. Victoria. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis. disease. Lulu was given full control of her estate. to deliver the properties for her to manage. is valid. Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle. herein petitioners. Lulu identified and described her parents. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family. though of sound mind but by reason of age. Thus. During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993). They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and. Cecilio. respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo. Lulu signed a special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. respondent Jovita San JuanSantos. HELD: YES. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. In 1974. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18. weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their . Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. During the hearing. Furthermore. Ciriaco San Juan. In September 1998. the latter died due to complications during childbirth. she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications. If warranted. Ma. 32 Besides. a clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. On re-cross examination. Lulu’s legal guardian. Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma. AAA testified that accused-appellant was not her sweetheart. Even assuming that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents. Thus. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS RATIO: The defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental retardation. are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. he cannot manage his property wisely. She purportedly was no longer angry with accused-appellant. and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. PEOPLE vs BULAGAO FACTS: Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate Informations When it was time for the defense to present their evidence it also presented the victim AAA as its witness who recanted her testimony for the prosecution that she was raped by her adoptive brother accused Bulagao. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in his mind. the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the complained of incidents. Nevertheless. 2002. The presiding judge set the case for hearing and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study. She fabricated the charge of rape against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with him for making her do laundry work for him. this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court. Accused-appellant. the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape committed against AAA. On redirect examination. Luisa Agamata. There was no showing from the findings of the psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him. the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian. The petition alleged that the respondent has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke and that due to his age and medical condition. did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering from mental retardation. the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong.property without outside aid. within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. Eventually. particularly Ms. This time. she testified that the sexual encounters between her and the accusedappellant were consensual. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father. an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The appeal is DENIED. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent. since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo. 33 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. nor his answers in his testimony. in his appeal. OROPESA vs OROPESA FACTS: • Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for him and a certain Ms. show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. AAA testified that accusedappellant did not force himself upon her. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of the accused raising mental insanity should be given credence? HELD: NO. we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Cirilo Oropesa. his girlfriend. The Court Social Worker • • . it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. • A “finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear. the report was ambivalent. and other similar causes. even though they have lucid intervals. In any event. becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). which did not include any expert medical testimony. though of sound mind but by reason of age. it is significant to note that the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. As per §2. With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence. However.” – Under this rule. and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties. The petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his testimony and of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett. and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. The report was submitted without any finding on the respondent who refused to talk to the social worker. rule 92 of the rules of court who should be placed under guardianship? RULING: • The petition is without merit. tax declarations.• • • • • conducted her case study and interviewed petitioner and his witnesses. and (3) can provide solutions to problem . take care of themselves and manage their property. In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue. prodigals. Thus. those who are of unsound mind. Meaning of the word “incompetent. On the other hand. (2) is capable of mental calculations. the word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers. disease. Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. positive and definite evidence” and that evidentiary standard was unchanged. expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice. emotional. The only medical document on record is the “Report of Neuropsychological Screening” which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. Subsequently. weak mind or other similar causes. Oropesa does not have the mental. deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write. Cirilo O. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied due to insufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. cannot. Oropesa: (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested. These testimonies. his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners. disease. • • • • • ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is considered an “incompetent” person as defined under §2. the trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case. but by reason of age. are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. Petitioner’s MR and Appeal to CA was dismissed.” Thus. Ms. Alma Altaya. petitioner failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. which do not in any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. Even if the petitioner’s procedural lapse can be overlooked. The respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. • • 4 §2. and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence. his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his. without outside aid. and persons not being of unsound mind. for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent. (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record. persons who. and the respondent’s former nurse. Rule 92 of the ROC4. the Court ruled that “where the sanity of a person is at issue. weak mind. the respondent filed his “Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered. were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties. 1969 in Cebu City. 2003. Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression.situations. or mood disorder bipolar type. benefit for minor child. the petition is hereby DENIED. 2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. or who is qualified as an expert. condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. She further alleged that the death was not deliberate and of his own will but as a result of a mental disorder. The Comelec ordered the cancellation of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the office he had sought to be . 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is enough that Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while still on board. No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim. alert and able. Jr. the state or Facts: Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January 22. Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by Crewlink. The assailed Decision dated February 29. In the instant case. no evidence. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. PEOPLE vs BOAQUINA JALOSJOS vs COMELEC CREWLINK vs TERINGTERING Respondent Editha Teringtering. or any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. such as a psychiatrist.A. Meanwhile. Surprisingly.. witness. had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. and in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of death benefits. CV No. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9. or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness’ own perception of the person. 1973. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane. He jumped off a second time and was no longer saved. Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink – he took a medical exam and was declared fit to work. for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. damages and attorney’s fees. It was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17. spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering. Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. premises considered. On April 30. Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19. 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16. except for mildly impaired abilities in memory. but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. ISSUE: WON Jacinto was insane. Crewlink asserted that Editha was not entitled to the benefits because Jacinto committed suicide. 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 29.R. This Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning. The issue of insanity is a question of fact. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos. Judge Francisco Ro. On April 9. on motion filed by his Probation Officer. 1970. The Report concludes that Gen. He was saved the first time and someone was assigned to watch over him. But then. reasoning and orientation. 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another. other than her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder. WHEREFORE. 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod. on December 19. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. respondent. It is the observation of the trial Court that oppositor is still sharp. former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration. 88449 are AFFIRMED. burial assistance. petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. She asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder. Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. In the case of Jalosjos. to pretend to borrow Certificate of Stock No. two months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum. for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand.” The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. they would support the petitioner’s family by the continued payment of his salary.3 Anticipating the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained by the Marcos military. respondent Locsin sent Rebecca Fernando. to four years. He then discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder of Businessday in its corporate books. on 26 May 1979. together with respondent Raul Locsin (Locsin) and Enrique Joaquin (Joaquin). temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of “deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. a notary public for Quezon City. When petitioner demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership of his shares of stock. The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it. as the Corporate Secretary of Businessday. and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. and at the same time. He also learned that Purugganan. eight months and twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum. Fernando explained that this was merely a mistake committed by respondent Locsin’s secretary.elected to when in fact he was not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case. under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that “the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation (Businessday). When Fernando returned the borrowed stock certificate. 100 for the purpose of using it as additional collateral for Businessday’s then outstanding loan with the National Investment and Development Corporation.5 The parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan. On 29 July 1986. The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. Joaquin and Hofileña for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioner’s shares of stock with Businessday. the sentence of which he has not yet served. had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor of respondent Locsin. they refused to do so. and Hector Holifeña had an unwritten agreement that.8 On 16 January 1986.6 During the petitioner’s detention. Joaquin. was active in the political opposition against the Marcos dictatorship. in the event that petitioner was arrested.. by operation of law. Locsin. to Camp Crame where the petitioner was detained. Petitioner testified that he agreed to execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock. the word "cancelled" was already written therein. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office. it is immediately executory. appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin. When the petitioner became upset. Petitioner. in the event of a military crackdown against the opposition. OLAGUER vs PURUGGANAN Facts: Olaguer alleges that he was the owner of 60. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code. while petitioner was detained. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year.4 Petitioner also executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA).7 As part of his scheme to defraud the petitioner. petitioner was finally released from detention. he became ineligible perpetually to hold or to run for any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final. even before they are sold. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. petitioner filed a Complaint before the trial court against respondents Purugganan and Locsin to declare as illegal the sale of the shares of . respondent Locsin ordered fellow respondent Purugganan to cancel the petitioner’s shares in the books of the corporation and to transfer them to respondent Locsin’s name. the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification.” which isperpetually. who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday. Once the judgment of conviction becomes final. Jr. an employee of Businessday. through his wife.14 He denied that he made any arrangements to continue paying the petitioner’s salary in the event of the latter’s imprisonment. and payment of damages. including respondent Locsin.16 In view of petitioner’s previous instructions. Petitioner. insanity. received from respondent Locsin the amount ofP600.1aw Trial court in its Decision dismissed the Complaint filed by the petitioner."29 citing Article 381 of the Civil Code. Furthermore. and do not exempt the incapacitated person. respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioner’s shares. particularly if he was jailed. Light-a-Fire Movement. in order to provide for the needs of his family should he be jailed or forced to go underground.000." as provided under the SPA he executed in favor of respondent Locsin. insanity or imbecility. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations. However. a relative. prodigality and civil interdiction. The trial court concluded that petitioner had intended to sell the shares of stock to anyone. ratified the sale to respondent Locsin by his receipt of the purchase price. may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.22 Issue: The first issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale since respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA27 issued in his. which actively sought the overthrow of the Marcos government through an armed struggle. without leaving an agent to administer his property.13 At the time petitioner was employed with Businessday. Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive. his whereabouts being unknown. Held: Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the definition of the word "absence" to a condition wherein "a person disappears from his domicile. nevertheless. to restore to the petitioner full ownership of the shares. the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. and without leaving an agent to administer his property. It also ruled that petitioner. Joaquin and Holifena’s favor. exiled or forced to go underground. his whereabouts being unknown. the instrument should always .00 as payment for the shares of stock. if necessary. imbecility. the entire provision hereunder quoted: ART 381.19 Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court that there was a perfected contract of sale. If the language will permit. the construction that should be adopted is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment. to assure support for petitioner’s family in the event that something should happen to him. petitioner. respondent Locsin was unaware that petitioner was part of a group. It ruled that the sale of shares between petitioner and respondent Locsin was valid. the instrument will be held to grant only those powers that are specified. and his failure to raise any protest over the said sale. and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. Petitioner also puts forward that the word "incapacity" would be limited to mean "minority. and that the SPA drafted by the petitioner empowered respondent Locsin. from certain obligations. at the instance of an interested party. When a person disappears from his domicile. thus. 38 Minority. buy petitioner’s shares of stock in Businessday. but nobody wanted to buy them. It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed. to sell the shares for such price and under such terms and conditions that the agents may deem proper. in support of this definition.12 Respondent Locsin contended that petitioner approached him and requested him to sell. such as easements. the judge. respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares himself. and.stock. the state of being a deaf-mute. or a friend. and two other agents. claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among the instances covered by the terms "absence or incapacity. prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act.21 It further ruled that granting that there was no perfected contract of sale. the state of being deaf-mute. which is hereunder quoted: ART."30 He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code. It further found that petitioner consented to have respondent Locsin buy the shares himself. Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose.15 When petitioner was detained. Petitioner’s reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been appointed to administer the property. promulgated on 30 June 2003. Umale. Pasig City which was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation (Amethyst Pearl). for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor. is that which should be applied. Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl's outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty. defining the terms "absence" and "incapacity" by their everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction. no longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court. ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against petitioner Leonardo S. he himself would be unable to administer his property. limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority. even constructing commercial establishments thereon. No costs. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. 6. the state of being a deaf-mute. Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and continued in possession of the subject premises. Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides that the death. which will carry out the purpose. if not outright impossible. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1.00. It would be equally incongruous. 2000.be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers. a deaf-mute. at the time of its execution. civil interdiction. would render the SPA ineffective. 2003. 1999-May 31. imbecility. in turn. prodigality and civil interdiction. as among those acts that the agents were authorized to do. Sometime in 2003. Nor could he have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that. making ASB Realty the owner of the subject premises 3. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a payparking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60. 7. not only would he be prevented from appointing an agent. he was concerned about his possible arrest. "the state of not being present" and the "inability to act. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING." given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend stockholders’ meetings and vote in behalf of petitioner. legal situations. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30. On June 2003. that of paying any liabilities with the Businessday group of companies." "for the purpose of.720. petitioner himself had already authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and thus. the act of applying the proceeds of the sale of the shares to any obligations petitioner might have against the Businessday group of companies. The construction. This construction covers the situation wherein petitioner was arrested and detained. if not impossible. This interpretation is supported by the use of the word "and" in enumerating the authorized acts. insanity. insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent extinguishes the agency. In such cases. death and disappearance. wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty Corporation (ASB Realty). that is. Ortigas Center. The language of the SPA clearly enumerates. Petitioner had not submitted evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. SO ORDERED. ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. On the other hand. .32 Petitioner’s contention that the shares may only be sold for the sole purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner’s subsisting obligations to the company is far-fetched. In the present case. and other related acts. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge. Likewise.31 In the present case. to sell the shares of stock. a company that is. the instant Petition is DENIED. 5. limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of "incapacity" under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd. Upon the contract's expiration on continued occupying the premises and paying rentals. 2. an imbecile. 4. UMALE vs ASB REALTY FACTS: 1. instead of phrases such as "only for." as provided under Article 38. affirming the validity of the sale of the shares of stock in favor of respondent Locsin. This much is admitted by petitioner in his testimony." "in order to" or any similar terms to indicate that the petitioner intended that the SPA be used only for a limited purpose. This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Street. they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. Pending the resolution thereof. Umale died and was substituted by his widow and legal heirs. Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was "for a long period of time. as amended and its corresponding rules of procedure — forfeit the power to sue from the corporate officers and Board of Directors? Corporate rehabilitation is defined as "the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and . the RTC ruled that ASB Realty retained all its corporate powers. There is no denying that ASB Realty. are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. Moreover. Amethyst Pearl. 14. this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the instant suit. 13. 12. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. As a creature of law. It found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract with Umale. They agreed that Umale did not have to pay rentals until the sale over the subject property had been perfected between them. Having been placed under receivership. This power is granted to a duly-organized corporation. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. expressly or impliedly.8. such as ASB Realty. Allegedly. The question becomes: Do the laws on corporate rehabilitation — particularly PD 902-A." Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended. despite the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. it is its duly-appointed receiver that should sue to recover possession of the same. in the law. 10. Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed. which is to conserve and administer the assets of the corporation in the hope that it may eventually be able to go from financial distress to solvency. Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. the retention of its corporate powers by the corporation under rehabilitation will advance the objective of corporate rehabilitation. it is the rehabilitation receiver that has the power to "take possession. Citing the Interim Rules. 9. MTC agreed with Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file suit to recover ASB Realty's property. Among the general powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to sue in its own name. MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. unless specifically revoked by another law. RTC reversed decision of the MTC." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises. Corporations. the RTC noted that the rehabilitation receiver was not granted therein the power to file complaints on behalf of the corporation. as the owner of the leased premises. With respect to ASB Realty's personality to file the unlawful detainer suit. Under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules). control and custody of the debtor's assets. 16. including the power to sue. 15. What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty has a dulyappointed rehabilitation receiver. Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. 11. is the real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit. It held that ASB Realty had no cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not Umale's lessor. Since there was no contract between himself and ASB Realty. the RTC denied reconsideration of its Decision and granted ASB Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Umale then filed his appeal with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter into a lease contract. ASB Realty had no more personality to file the complaint for unlawful detainer. He was adamant that his lessor was the original owner. the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out. ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease with Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996. Issues: Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation? The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers. CA affirmed RTC decision in toto. In asserting his right to remain on the property based on the oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl. solvency. the rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of the developments in the case. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Facts: . It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code. could recover damages from physician who caused the same.This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman." This concept of preserving the corporation's business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-inpossession or debtor-in-place. corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received. an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave. GELUZ vs CA . This means that the debtor corporation (the corporation undergoing rehabilitation). Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty. remains in control of its business and properties. the necessity of keeping the receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. In fact. To be sure. he did not know of. Again. campaigning for his election to the provincial board. because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". It states therein that the interim rehabilitation receiver of the debtor corporation "does not take over the control and management of the debtor corporation. There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation that would ipso facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation. even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. such as ASB Realty. Nita has undergone the same procedure by the defendant in her succeeding pregnancies. is carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules. there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to recover its property from an errant lessee. the rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. to the abortion Issue: Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child? Held: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. who voluntarily procured her abortion. subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver. the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death. so that these assets would be managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan. While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover its property and the back rentals from Umale. CONTINENTAL STEEL vs MONTANO Hortillano. the rule that is relevant to the instant case. -Nita Villanueva knew defendant Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. . if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. through its Board of Directors and corporate officers." Likewise. Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent. no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). she had an abortion which was performed by the defendant. The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of which involve some kind of disposition or encumbrance of the corporation's assets) during the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor corporation's right to sue. nor gave his consent. since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). To conceal her pregnancy from her parent. The concept of debtor-in-possession. -The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan. In the present case. without legal personality. the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. Birth determines personality. the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent SC: 1. No. impregnated Quimiging. and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. by contract and by will. Without such qualification. specifically. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits. Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. a fetus. relying on Articles 40. 1. Article 41. For civil purposes. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception. sustaining defendant's objection. 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Article 40. it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Hence. he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else. while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death. the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. 2. Article 42. It was maintained by Hortillano that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law. Hence according to the petitioner. then child shall be understood in its more general sense. she had to pay for hospitalization and stopped studying. Petitioner appealed with the CA. defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. ruled that no amendment was allowable. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. If the unborn already has life. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. his/her mother. but the court. QUIMIGING vs ICAO FACTS: Icao. 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a month. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born. However. she had later given birth to a baby girl. namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent. a minor. The fetus had to rely on another for support. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. qualifies as death. Civil personality is extinguished by death. since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse. that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother.Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die 2. As a result. then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 3839 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child. if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months. Yes. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Duly summoned. Proceeding from the same line of thought. for sustenance. but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. ISSUE: Is a conceived child entitled to support? . Moreover. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. Hortillano’s wife. a married man. which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb. sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI. Yes. DE JESUS vs SYQUIA FACTS: Antonia Loanco. a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. The defendant-appellee." violates Article 40 aforesaid. The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code: ART 2219. Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin. As a consequence. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint RULING: Yes. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i. On February 1931. 1931. moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. defendant was a constant visitor. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages. 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint. that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). even it is only “en ventre de sa mere. he even wrote a letter to priest confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the . it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. rape or other lascivious acts Hence. although as yet unborn. It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn. Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. The unborn child. the defendant. This is because the Civil Code (Art. Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order. abduction. Judgment reversed. is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. abduction. besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.HELD. Additionally. A conceived child. Readings of Articles 40. DIGEST 2 FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. He got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that. rape or other lascivious acts. as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17. Petition granted. just as a conceived child. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. suing through her parents. therefore. In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy. with costs against Icao. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction.. set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision. which includes its right to support from its progenitors. damages and attorney’s fees. “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code. the girl has a cause of action. As a result. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child. Cesar Syquia.e. ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action. 21. which provides moral damages for victims of seduction. she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support. has a right to support from its progenitors. however. a provision supported by Article 2219. 2. provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions. It constitutes a part of the assets of his estate. Joseph Hospital in Manila. justified by the conduct of the father himself. Finally. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. chattels. paragraph (a). and estate of the deceased which • • . in the Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong. there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. to maintain and operate the said plant. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. the making of an inventory of all goods. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension. Rule 82. Petitioner contents that it was an error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. After giving birth. mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status”.child. Furthermore. but his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. credits. among other cases. It should be noted that during the christening of the child. and in Quezon City. for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive. defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. ISSUES: 1. Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. LIMJOCO vs INTESTATE ESTATE OF PIO FRAGANTE • The original applicant Pedro O. rights. that was first planned. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. He died while the case is pending. appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission. and that as a consequence. he applied for certificate of public convenience (Case No. he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. §1. Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality? RULING: • The right of Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen and before his death. §2. Rule 88. authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. Though he was out of the country. Pacita Loanco. “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child. 4572) to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased". In view of the evidence that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. and in subsequently granting to the estate the certificate applied for because it is in contravention of law. • • • ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Rizal. and includes artificial as well as natural persons. represented by the executor or administrator. by its very nature. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission. if any. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. the CFI ordered a judgment against Soliven etc (5 sila) etc to pay QPP a certain amount plus legal interest. it cannot survive. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made. the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity.• • • • • • shall come to his possession or knowledge. cannot be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors. QPP was not aware of Oria’s death nor were QPP’s representative aware of the special proceeding regarding his estate. After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. devises. because death extinguishes the right. (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent. or creditors. after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure. or unless. Unless otherwise expressly provided by law. Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure. Dumlao and the other heirs of Oria sued QPP for the annulment of judgment against Oria and and against his land. The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation. It has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property. or to the possession of any other person for him. being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator. It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. have an interest in the property. that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. there would be no juridical basis for the estate. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. 1959 – long before June 13. The examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. instead of the heirs directly. to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased . T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. unless the action is for recovery of money. It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". although natural persons as heirs. rights and assets left by the decedent. Under the present legal system. and the heirs of the decedent. Oria died on April 23. devisees or legatees. • However. debt or interest thereon. The principal of the bond signed and acknowledged the summons for all of them. They failed to pay so upon motion. . any action affecting the property or rights of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive. for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. the court ordered the foreclosure of the security bond and the sale at public auction of Oria’s land that was given as surety. the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. DUMLAO vs QUALITY PLASTICS On February 28 1962. 1960 when the action was filed. article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons. such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. But the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which. may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator. is a generic term. Summons of the complaint we personally served. it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding. and. The word "person" in its legal signification. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. He had no more civil personality. Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife. was unaware of Oria's death. and Natividad (23-25). There is no difficulty in resolving that issue.if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin. it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. EUGENIO vs VELEZ FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28. Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Sr. there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria. the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. In addition. 6. Civil Code). Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria. who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife. the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman. Inc. wife Angela Joaquin.. Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan. daughters Pilar (32-33). decided to leave building. Misamis Oriental. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Issue: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro. validly served with summons. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother. Albeit. as contemplated in section 23. Vitaliana. his son’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . Feb. Sr. Jr. Concepcion. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court. 70. Jr. petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. Sr. 294 of the Civil Code. JOAQUIN vs NAVARRO Facts: Feb. Whereas. died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence. Theresa Academy. the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No.ISSUE: Was the judgment valid against Oria? NO. 25 year old single. Inc. 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products. they met Japanese patrols. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son. and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. 37 and 42. As they came out. Estoppel has no application to this case. Joaquin Navarro. which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations. son Joaquin Navarro. His juridical capacity. Sr. But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products. legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. was lost through death. in order to annul the judgment against Oria. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person.. He was not. and he could not have been. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased. HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “Persons charged with duty of burial.. As far as Oria was concerned. Jr. 1945: battle of liberation of Manila. The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria. (Arts. and Adela were hit and killed. it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. Held: . Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. 1945: on their way to St. the judgment against him is a patent nullity. 67. 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner. 10. 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27. and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. this inference should prevail. in the absence of proof. the person who alleges prior death of either must provethe allegation. in cases of calamity. . Art. In light of the conditions painted by FL. not evidence. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations. Art. in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In the Civil Code. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided. In the Rules of Court.Reversed. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or morepersons who would inherit one from the other. a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. there is a hierarchy of survivorship. it is presumed that they died at the same time.