Michael Guy vs. Atty. Glenn Gacott, GR No.206147, January 13, 2016 Facts: It appears from the records that there was a breach of contract where the seller of transceivers that were defective was not able to replace the same or refund the amount paid. A suit was filed against the corporation that sold it which was later on discovered to be a partnership. Summons was served upon the partnership and after trial, judgment was rendered against it. Appeal not having made, the judgment became final and executory. The Sheriff levied upon a vehicle belonging to Guy, a partner, but he moved to lift the levy because he was not the judgment debtor. The motion was denied, holding that as a registered partnership, Guy should be treated as a general partner and may be held jointly and severally with the partnership. This was affirmed by the CA which rule that Guy cannoy feign ignorance of the existence of summons and that the summons be not served upon all the partners. It is sufficient that it be served on the managing partner, and being such, he is bound by the service of summons upon the partnershipbased on Article 1821 of the New Civil Code. Issue: Whether a service of summons upon a partnership binds a partner. Held: Guy is not bound by the service of summons upon the partnership. This is especially so that summons was not served upon the general manager. Jurisdiction over the person or jurisdiction in personam – the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem and quasi in rem. (Macasaet vs. Co, 697 SCRA 187,198) Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in the court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action. The partnership was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such. Service of summons upon persons other than those enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. It is not correct to say that it was immaterial whether the summons to the partnership was served on the theory that it was a corporation. Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency, whereby a partner can generally represent the partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitor that a suit against a partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and every partner. It must be remembered that a partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate personality from the persons composing it. Acampado v. Sps. Lourdes and Felimon Cosmilla, GR No. 198531, Sept. 28,2015 Facts: For resolution of the Court is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners Ethel Acampado, et al., seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated 28 June 2007 and 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00805. The assailed resolutions reversed the Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan, Branch 6 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents Spouses Lourdes and Felimon Cosmilla for being pro forma. The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644, respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore null and void. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 31 March 2005 dismissing the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged. The RTC disposed in this wise: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, [respondents'] complaint is hereby DISMISSED. [Respondents] are also ordered to jointly and severally pay [petitioner Katipunan de los Reyes] the sum of P25,000.00 for transportation expenses and attorney's fees as well as [petitioner Acampados] P21,772.50 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Costs against the [respondents]." Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 6 May 2005 seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision. For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration in Order dated 16 May 2005, viz: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion for Reconsideration is declared pro forma and the decision sought to be reconsidered is declared final and executory as the period of appeal has already expired. SO ORDERED." Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking to annul and set aside the RTC Order dated 16 May 2005. For lack of merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by the respondents in a Decision dated 27 October 2006. The appellate court held that there is no showing that lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents. Resonating the disquisition of the lower court, the Court of Appeals declared that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court is nothing but a useless piece of paper and does not stall the running of the reglementary period. On Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents, however, the Court of Appeals reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation of the procedural in a Resolution dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the appellate court vacated the 16 May 2005 Order of the RTC directed the court a quo to thresh out the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents on the merits. In a Resolution dated 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. Issue: Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorar praying that the Court of Appeals Resolution be reversed and set aside on the ground that: The CA gravely erred and committed reversible error in issuing resolutions dated June 28, 2007 and Agust 19, 2011 which, in effect reconsidered its own decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO of respondents. Held: The Court Grant the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the required notice and hearing and service to the adverse party as mandated by the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court. The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.[ The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be disregarded.[ Principles of natural justice demand that a right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. Harsh as they may seem, these rules were introduced to avoid capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial. It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively to a motion, since a motion invariably contains a prayer, which the movant makes to the court, which is to repeat usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose and in the observance of due process, the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose the motion. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded. Failure to comply with the required notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents cause. Nevertheless, the three-day requirement is not a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the rule. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. We here follow the rule and so pronounce that contrary to the findings of the appellate court, petitioners were not given ample opportunity to vent their side on the issue since they were not able to promptly receive a copy of the notice of hearing impinging the latter's right to due process. We consulted the records and we found that no notice of hearing was appended to the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent. As discussed above, a motion for reconsideration is a litigated motion where the right of the adverse party will be affected by its admission. The adverse party in this case had the right to resist the motion because it may result to the reversal of a prior favorable decision. The proof of service was therefore indispensable in order to avoid surprises on the opposite party. The absence thereof is fatal to the motion. It bears stressing that a motion without notice and hearing, is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that cannot be acted by the court. It presents no question that the court can decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. Indisputably, any motion that does not contain proof of service and notice to the adverse party is not entitled to judicial cognizance. Considering that the running of the period towards the finality of the judgment was not stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31 March 2005 became final and executory. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law. To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that we should write finis to this litigation. Consequently, we find no reversible error when the RTC denied respondents' motion for reconsideration. Norlinda Marilag vs Mrcelino Martinez, GR No. 201892, June 22, 2015 Facts: On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan in the amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of five percent (5%), payable within a period of six (6) months. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-208400. When the obligation became due and demandable, no payment was made hence, a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage was filed where the trial court rendered a judgment in the amount of P229,000, with an interest of 12% per annum. Before notice of judgment, the debtor agreed to pay the creditor the amount of P689,000 and the daughter executed a promissory note after paying P400,000 binding himself to pay the balance.As there was no payment was made, the creditor sued the debtor but debtor refused to pay contending that he has already paid more than the amount. The trial court ruled that there was already an extinguishment of the obligation because of the payment. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the court recalled its original decision and ruled that causes of action in the foreclosure and collection are separate and distinct. The CA reversed the aforesaid decision and ruled that there was res judicata, hence, appeal was filed with the SC. Issue: Whether the Cort of appeals erred in dismissing the collection case. Held: The court agrees that the dismissal is correct because of litis pendentia and not res judicata because there was no evidence that the judgment in the collection case already attained finality. The prosecution in the collection case was barred, instead, by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of ther parties and the singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner’s recourse to the subsequent collection cases. To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the round of dismissal is litis pendentia for res judicata, as the case may be). In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits . Roasters Phils., Inc. v Gaviola, et al., GR No. 191874, September 2, 2015 Facts: On 9 April 2003, respondents Georgia Gaviola and Maria Leisa M. Gaviola (Maria Leisa), together with their children Karla Helene, Kashmeer Georgia and Klaire Marlei, filed a Complaint for Damages against Roasters Philippines before the RTC of Las Piñas City. The family was hospitalized due to "acute gastroenteritis and possible food poisoning" when they dined at Kenny Rogers Roasters restaurant Duty-Free Branch in Parañaque. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. In its Answer Ad Cautelam, petitioner alleged that the complaint states no cause of action; that it is not the direct and real owner of the said Kenny Rogers branch; and that there was no valid demand made by respondents. Petitioner counterclaimed for damages. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the refusal of the trial court to dismiss the complaint. On 14 March 2005, the appellate court dismissed the petition. On 7 March 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution declaring the 14 March 2005 Decision to have become final and executory as of 20 July 2005. On 26 April 2007, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure of respondents to prosecute the pending case alleging that respondents had not filed any pleading to revive or re-activate their case since the 14 March 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory. In response to the Motion to Dismiss, respondents filed a Manifestation with Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner and set the pre-trial to 6 August 2007. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration from said order but it was denied by the trial court.[8] On 12 November 2007, the trial court referred the case to mediation. Petitioner meanwhile filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the denial of its Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner also filed the corresponding motion to suspend proceedings before the trial court in view of the pendency of its certiorari petition. The Court of Appeals eventually denied the petition on 18 April 2008 which prompted the trial court to deny petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings. The trial court set the hearing for 19 May 2008. During the presentation of their evidence-in-chief on 19 May 2008, respondents failed to attend the hearing. Consequently, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Issue: The nature and effect of a dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. Held: The Court held that a dismissal of action for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time is a final order and not an interlocutory order, hence, it is appealable. Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the 1997 Rues of Court, an action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of court or any order of the court. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in filing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure is explicit that the dismissal of the complaint due to failure to prosecute “shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise declared by the court. “The Rule says: If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with the Rules or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise declared by the court”. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. SPOUSES RODOLFO & GLORIA MADRIAGA, GR No. 196670, October 12, 2016 Facts: Respondent Spouses Rodolfo and Gloria Madriaga obtained a P750,000.00 loan from Allied Bank (the Bank) secured by a real estate mortgage on their property. Respondents alleged to have religiously paid the loan from June 1996 to August 1999 through Leo Nolasco (Nolasco), the Bank's Creditor Investigator/Appraiser, in the aggregate amount of P628,953.96. In July 1999, respondents converted the remaining Balance of their loan, including interest, in the amount of P380,000.00 to a term loan. Payments were regularly coursed to Nolasco. On 25 May 2001, respondents received a demand letter from the Bank for the payment of P399,898.56. Upon further inquiry, respondents discovered that said amount represented their unpaid obligation from June 2000 to May 2001. Respondents claimed to have paid for the same. They requested for a copy of the ledger and/or record of their loan obligation but the Bank ignored the same. The Bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage over respondents' property. The respondents countered with a complaint for specific performance to examine the loan documents. Answer was filed by the bank. Then, they moved that they be allowed to file an amended complaint which was granted but which they never filed despite repeated extensions. They likewise failed to move that the case be set for pre-trial. The court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the order of the court. The Trial court ruled that they were trying to employ dilatory tactics to thwart the foreclosure of their property. Issue: Whether the trial court correctly dismissed respondents' complaint for failure to prosecute. Held: Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. There are three (3) instances when the trial court may dismiss an action motu proprio, namely: 1) where the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; 2) where he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and, 3) when he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court. The failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in his complaint; hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendants. The presumption is not, however, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure. In this case, respondents should have set the case for pre-trial right after their receipt of the Bank's Rejoinder in May 2002. Instead, respondents sought to delay the proceedings by manifesting that an amended complaint will be. filed. Respondents' offered excuse that their financial status forced the successive withdrawals of their counsels deserves scant consideration. PAO even admitted that respondents failed the indigency test. The failure of respondents to promptly set the case for pre- trial, without justifiable reason, is tantamount to failure to prosecute. Respondents cannot blaim their counsels because they too had been remiss in their duty to diligently pursue the case when they failed to secure the services of a counsel within the given period. Respondents' laxity in attending to their case ultimately led to its dismissal. Indeed, respondents were in the brink of losing their property to foreclosure. This situation should all the more pursue the case relentlessly. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus Jura subverniunt. CLODUALDA D. DAAC vs. VALERIANA ROSALDO YU, G.R. No. 183398, June 22, 2015 FACTS: The instant petition stems from a complaint filed by petitioner Clodualda D. Daaco against respondent Valeriana Rosaldo Yu, Faustina Daaco, and the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City docketed before the RTC, Branch 6, Tacloban City as Civil Case No. 2006-02-16 for Annulment of Title, Recoveiy of Property under TCT No. T-28120 and Damages. After the answer had been filed and preliminary matters disposed of, the RTC, on September 5, 2007, set the pre-trial conference on October 4, 2007. However, upon motion, the trial court dismissed the case as against respondent Yu in its assailed Order for petitioner's failure to appear thereat. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging the following grounds: (1) that she was not properly notified of the pre-trial conference scheduled at 8:30 a.m. on October 4, 2007 as she received notice thereof only at 5:30 p.m. of October 3, 2007, or merely 15 hours before the scheduled conference, and thus, the order of dismissal was invalid; and (2) that there is still an unresolved Motion to Consider the Answer of Respondent as Not Filed, which she had previously filed on October 4, 2006. The case filed by the plaintiff was dismissed due to her failure to appear to the pre-trial. She contended that for the first time in the SC that she was I, properly notified considering that the notice of pre trial conference was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, not in the trial court. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO APPEAR IN THE PRE- TRIAL CONFERENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, RULES, AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE. Held: It is settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Accordingly, the trial court cannot be said to have whimsically or capriciously dismissed the case for it was merely implementing the letter of the law. As the trial court observed, the court was just 20 minutes away from petitioner's residence. Prudence and diligence in complying with the rules and orders of the court would have prompted petitioner to have at least notified the court of her predicament. This way, she could have been appointed with counsel or granted an extension of time to prepare for pre- trial. Unfortunately for petitioner, she not only failed to attend the scheduled conference, she also failed to inform the court the reasons for her absence. Indeed, while a 15-hour notice may be quite impulsive, this fact, standing alone, fails to excuse petitioner's absence. The fact remains that notice was received by petitioner before the date of the pre-trial, in compliance with the notice requirement mandated by the Rules. METROPOLITAN BANK v. FADCOR, GR No. 197970, Jan 25, 2016 Facts: Metrobank granted five (5) loans in the aggregate amount of P32,950,000.00 to respondent Fadcor, Inc. or The Florencio Corporation (Fadcor), represented by its President Ms. Leticia D. Florencio and its Executive Vice-President, Ms. Rachel D. Florencio-Agustin. As such, Fadcor executed five (5) Non-negotiable Promissory Notes in favor of Metrobank. In addition, Fadcor through individual respondents executed two (2) Real Estate Mortgages in favor of Metrobank over ten (10) parcels of land as collateral for the loans obtained on August 2, 1995, in the amount of P18,000,000.00; P10,000,000.00, obtained on September 14, 1995, and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage to secure a loan of P22,000,000.00, obtained on October 26, 1995. Furthermore, the same respondents executed two (2) Continuing Surety Agreements in favor of Metrobank, binding themselves jointly and severally liable to pay any existing or future obligation in favor of Metrobank up to a maximum amount of Ninety Million Pesos (P90,000,000.00) only. Thereafter, respondents defaulted in the payment of their loan amortizations in the total aggregate sum of P32,350,594.12, hence, after demands for payment of the arrears were ignored, Metrobank filed on April 20, 2001 an extra-judicial petition for foreclosure of mortgage of the ten (10) mortgaged parcels of land. On July 31, 2001, the foreclosed properties were sold at public auction in the amount of P32,961,820.72 to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Consequently, the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued to Metrobank and the proceeds of sale were applied to Fadcor's indebtedness and expenses of foreclosure. Nonetheless, the amount of P17,479,371.86 remained unpaid as deficiency obligation, prompting Metrobank to demand from respondents payment of such deficiency obligation. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to pay. Hence, on September 23, 2003, Metrobank filed a Complaint against Fadcor for recovery of the deficiency obligation. Respondents failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial. The RTC, therefore, issued an Order directing Metrobank to present its evidence ex parte. Metrobank presented as lone witness its Senior Assistant Manager, Ms. Irene Sih-Tan and, thereafter, on September 4, 2004, it filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the same Order, but on September 21, 2004, the RTC denied the said motion. After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Metrobank appealed the case to the CA and the latter, on May 17, 2011, granted the appeal, thus, reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that the petitioner's lone witness, Irene Sih-Tan identified and marked Exhibits "A" to "DD-4" only as shown in the TSN, however, the RTC admitted Exhibits "A" to "MM," contrary to this Court's resolution in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 03-1-09-SC[7] which provides that no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of the party's evidence-in-chief other than those that have been identified below and pre-marked during the trial. The CA, in its Resolution dated August 5, 2011, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Metrobank, hence, the present petition. Held: One must not deviate from the fact that this case involves an ex parte presentation of evidence allowed by the RTC after the respondents herein failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference and submit a pre-trial brief despite receipt of the Order of the same court. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, states: Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. The "next preceding" section mandates that: Section 4. Appearance of parties. - It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. Under the present case, it is as if there was no pre-trial because the respondents did not appear nor file their pre-trial briefs despite due notice causing the RTC, on August 9, 2004 to allow petitioner, after the latter filed its motion, to present its evidence ex parte in accordance with Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. When respondents failed to appear during the pre-trial despite due notice, they have already acquired the risk of not being able to dispute the evidence presented ex parte by petitioner. In The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. Joseph Enario, this Court ruled that, "[t]he legal ramification of defendant's failure to appear for pre-trial is still detrimental to him while beneficial to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence."