Christos Galanopoulos, Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis

$QWL1LKLOLVPLQWKH7KRXJKWRI1LNRV.D]DQW]DNLV &KULVWRV*DODQRSRXORV Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Supplement to Volume 28, Number 1, May 2010, pp. 7-37 (Article) 3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV DOI: 10.1353/mgs.0.0083 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mgs/summary/v028/28.1A.galanopoulos.html Access provided by University of Athens (or National and Kapodistrian Univ. of Athens) (17 Mar 2016 15:31 GMT) Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis Christos Galanopoulos Abstract Nikos Kazantzakis is one of the foremost literary anti-nihilists. He is viewed as an affirmative fatalist, with fatalism considered an optimistic stance, not a pessimistic one. The term anti-nihilism is akin to Kazantzakis’s “Cretan Glance” and Pandelis Prevelakis’s depiction of Kazantzakis as a heroic pessimist. Kazantzakis was not a nihilist, despite his failure to overcome nihilism. He tackled nihilism as a historical and psychological problem that cannot be resolved ideologically. In terms of some contemporary postmodern debates, his anti-nihilism provides the best antidote to our present-day nihilistic predicament. Nikos Kazantzakis needs to be viewed more seriously in the light of literary, political, and philosophical anti-nihilism. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that most, if not all, of his literary creations target the issue of nihilism in its historical and psychological implications. His heroes, from Zorba and Odysseus to Christ, Buddha, and Saint Francis, all confront nihilism. The less known characters from his plays Julian the Apostate, Constantine Palaiologos, Kouros, Kapodistrias, and the Prometheus trilogy, among others, all come to terms with the problem of nihilism. In fact, Kazantzakis’s works convey one main theme in words that constantly recur: the κραυγή (outcry) of the struggle, the ascent toward meaning, humanity’s confrontation with the nihilistic abyss. Pandelis Prevelakis calls Kazantzakis a heroic pessimist, which is the same as calling him an anti-nihilist. Kazantzakis’s own “Cretan Glance,” the term he coined for his uncompromising gaze at the nihilistic abyss, is the stance of a defiant anti-nihilist (1958:37, 62). His massive literary output helps us find meaning in a world caught in transition. Nihilism, as defined by Friedrich Nietzsche, implies a transitional period in history where the fundamental moral values have been devalued, and the new ones have not yet arrived (Nietzsche 1968:9). Kazantzakis was certain that he lived in such an age, and spent his whole life trying to find the solution to its situation. The result he achieved was deliberately Journal of Modern Greek Studies 28 (2010) 7–37 © 2010 by The Johns Hopkins University Press 7 8 Christos Galanopoulos incomplete: Kazantzakis knew that an ideological solution would be but another nihilistic disguise. But in its incompleteness, his thought allowed for creative action: the constant unmasking of nihilism in an affirmative fatalism which is termed here as anti-nihilism. It must be kept in mind that the term anti-nihilism here is not meant to convey an ideological stance “beyond nihilism” either in political, epistemological, or theological terms. Political nihilism was an underground movement in nineteenth-century Russia, which espoused science while rejecting old cultural values; epistemological nihilism implies a rejection of reason and a resolute skepticism about the possibilities of objective or subjective knowledge; theological nihilism implies resolute atheism. The political anti-nihilism of Kazantzakis is a resolute struggle against ideological absolutism. Epistemologically, Kazantzakis rejected not reason but scientific rationalism, as he explains in his essay on Henri Bergson, whom he claimed was the first to espouse the collaboration of intuition and intellect in philosophy (Kazantzakis 1983:284). Reason, for Kazantzakis, is akin to the monistic Logos of Heraclitus and Bergson’s intuitive durée (duration) with its famous élan vital that opposes discrete fragments of rational thought. Theologically, Kazantzakis is neither a theist nor an atheist, but rather a panentheist; that is, one who believes “in an infinite force inherent in matter,” but also transcending it (Bien 2007:397). Thus he escapes the intellectual sterility of both ideological materialism and metaphysical absolutism. Instead, Kazantzakis believed in a not-all-powerful deity that struggles together with humanity and that needs humanity in order to stay alive.1 Kazantzakis’s god was the sacred bull, the one over whom Cretans in the paintings of the palace at Knossos, defying fear and danger, did somersaults, turning this “exalted game” into art (Kazantzakis 1965:486).2 Herodotus, in The Histories, calls the sacred bull by the Egyptian name Apis, and the Greek name Epaphos (Herodotus 2003:159, 182). Kazantzakis also seems to have adopted as his god Epaphos, the god of επαφή (touch). He explained this to Prevelakis as early as 1934 (Prevelakis 1984:408, 590). The issue here is not whether or not God exists. Kazantzakis’s well-known metaphors such as the caterpillar turning into a butterfly, the flying fish, and the worm turning its body into silk are certainly relevant. The opposition of theism and atheism is nihilistic because it posits totalities; that is, metaphysical absolutes. It is denied by Kazantzakis, who takes a panentheistic stance in order to avoid the ideological trap while remaining open to the creative possibilities. Kazantzakis synthesized the philosophies of Bergson and Nietzsche in a profound way, shedding important light on the one in terms of the other, and on his own work in terms of both. Their styles and tem- the stance “beyond nihilism” misses the point of the struggle against nihilism. but also by willing it—a response that equals a Cretan Glance focused directly upon nihilism. both were monists critical of Kantian dualism. Understood in this light. reward and recognition. do not concern us. negation of life. nihilistic throes of a culture that . Kazantzakis in his Obra (as he liked to describe his work [Prevelakis 1958:52]) tells us to affirm life not just by accepting our fate. is not fatalism as many are accustomed to think of it. modernity is caught in the transitory. both wrote of life as affirming (its feeling of power in Nietzsche. and manly courage” (1965:465). History is the history of values. his system was deliberately incomplete (Kazantzakis 1983:284). human alienation. all the rest. but must fill us with joy. The confrontation with fate is no longer negative and fruitless but full of new creative possibilities. Note here that “value” according to Nietzsche is a historical term. and both elevated creativity (Nietzsche as the “grand style” in art and Bergson as creative evolution). even though. This. sterile. a state also known as passive nihilism— recall in Zorba the Boss’s “conversion” from a Buddhism of passivity to a Zorbatism of action. Against the dizzying circle of fear of death and hope for life. In a significant note at the end of his essay on Bergson. not beyond it.3 Nihilism is a pathological state. Thus. Kazantzakis writes: “the certainty that no recompense exists must not make our blood run cold. “Our duty is to act. but his earlier stance was not contradicted. Nietzsche wrote in a more aphoristic style. which was also Nietzsche’s project. Kazantzakis offered an active nihilism that struggles against the negation of life caused by passive nihilism. Nietzsche was the first to articulate the problem of nihilism as one concerning the question of value. In his Report to Greco. and dehydration resulting from a culture turned weary. his final work.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 9 peraments were certainly different—Bergson wrote systematically. both wrote of the fusion of Becoming and Being.” Kazantzakis wrote to his first wife. Against this nihilism of passivity and renunciation. Yet how really different were Bergson’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies? Both were influenced by Darwin while being critical of his deterministic progressivism. nor is it passive nihilism. while also attempting to create a system—the revaluation of all values. because Nietzsche did not go so far as Bergson in overthrowing cause-and-effect rationalism. Kazantzakis anticipated these comparisons. both were anti-rationalists. he would accept recognition. then. Galatea (Kazantzakis 1979:72). as Kazantzakis claims. and old. Later of course. its ascending force in Bergson) and as negating (resentment of power in Nietzsche and descending force in Bergson). one of quiet desperation. pride. he writes that we must not confuse Bergson’s élan vital with Nietzsche’s will to power. In this sense. as it is what value one assigns to what one does or thinks.4 Heidegger posits himself as the first thinker who was able to separate his thought from the nihilistic trap of historicism and metaphysics. In this sense. the uncertainty of transience is embraced as freedom. In this light. which Nietzsche named. he studied the towering historicists of his time. for Kazantzakis as well as for Heidegger. thus a prisoner of the metaphysical and historicist nihilism that he (Nietzsche) attacks. For Georg Hegel. This is a historicist line of thought. . Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s valuative thought was intent on placing Nietzsche as the last metaphysical and historicist thinker. or rather the fusion.”5 Kazantzakis was well versed in historicist thought. But. . Martin Heidegger remarks categorically that Nietzsche defined nihilism as history. to hold my body straight and let the holy spark at my head consume and melt it” (Kazantzakis 1974:34). . it is the unfolding of that movement. nihilism is the result of the movement of the history of Western civilization. or “being-there. Kazantzakis’s rejection of recompense and reward is part of his intellectual effort to avoid a false value and. devaluation. it was the materialist actualization of the communist revolution. is a heavy burden rather than a relief. . . understood nihilism . the will to power (1982:53). for Karl Marx. which is the unfolding of its meaning. this was the actualization of the Spirit in the form of the perfect State. it must be noted that for Nietzsche “the notion of value implies a critical reversal. Heidegger writes that. the prophet of historical nihilism. But I want. not out of hope. for Nietzsche. Nietzsche. The problem of critique is that of the value of values . But Kazantzakis was also well aware of the nihilistic trap of historicism: “Life is a spark that shines for a moment between two endless nights. to be critical of the value of values. Heidegger is very similar to Kazantzakis. For Nietzsche. in the sense of the progressive movement of valuation. The greatest values devaluate themselves. Gilles Deleuze writes that Nietzsche revolutionized philosophy in that he was the first thinker to introduce “the concepts of sense and value into philosophy” (Deleuze 1983:1). and revaluation. it is the identification of Becoming as Being. of Becoming and Being. and for Nietzsche it was the valuation-devaluation-revaluation that produced the Overman. instead of the “new conformism and new forms of submission” that a theory of value may lead to.10 Christos Galanopoulos still adheres to dead values. especially Oswald Spengler. Kazantzakis’s holy spark is the synthesis. according to Heidegger. Historicism implies that history moves according to a dialectical pattern. very carefully. But this freedom. the question is not so much what one does or thinks. the old absolutes are dethroned. with his concept of Dasein. out of pride. instead.” (Deleuze 1983:1). “the only deliverance” (Kazantzakis 1965:312). Unlike Thielicke. Thielicke warns against the deceptive nature of nihilism. the former being a witting or unwitting disguise of nothingness clothed with superficial meaning and the latter a passive or active form of nihilism. “I had known well enough for years that the only way for me to escape intense pain or joy and to retrieve my freedom was to bewitch this pain or joy with the magic charm of words” (1965:448). the Becoming of Being. behind his forehead. Being in Apollo. Kazantzakis agreed.6 For Nietzsche. freedom and necessity. the beautiful mask and the dreadful face behind. One is reminded of Heraclitus. Nietzsche understood nihilism as a transitory state. the Becoming of Being—frees the artist from the constraints of both the irrational and the rational to become inspired by the ecstatic affirmation of life and to produce art. one that is traversed through “Dionysian laughter” and “an ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life as that which remains the same” (Nietzsche 1968:539). woe to the man who sees only what is hidden beneath it! The only man with true vision sees at the same moment. Becoming is personified in Dionysos. He did not allow himself to be victimized by the burdensome realization of uncertainty. Happy the man who. and in a single flash. instead. as one. (Kazantzakis 1963a:20) Nietzsche was the first to distinguish between passive and active nihilism. This is affirmative fatalism. Theologian Helmut Thielicke explained psychological nihilism as the “dread of the abyss of nothingness that yawns on the horizon of an atheistic world” (1961:117). who explains change and non-change. Dionysos represents the irrational drive that—fused with Apollonian rational tranquility. The nihilist rejects the old metaphysical moralism and is faced with the impossible task of finding meaning in a meaningless world. not .Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 11 to be a psychological state for which there was no ideological solution. But the psychological reaction to such a state varies among different people. creates this mask and this face in a synthesis still unknown to nature. which may hide behind even someone who “thinks of himself as being an advocate of an absolute” (1961:40). associating the former with Buddhism and the latter with his own proto-existentialist philosophy. Kazantzakis assesses covert and overt nihilism as follows: Woe to the man who sees only the mask. he turned uncertainty into art. Even if Kazantzakis noted that “the more I wrote the more deeply I felt that in writing I was struggling. which is in constant change. whose aforementioned statement indicates a desperate need to reaffirm Christian faith. Thielicke distinguishes between covert and overt nihilism. sharing the Nazi belief in the moral purity of the German peasant. although he did carefully articulate the irrational drive of the will-to-power. indicate a resolute nihilism (1960:33). and out of his fright he fashioned a great hope. the Superman. Even Nietzsche gave way to terror for an instant. I will conquer death!” (Kazantzakis 1975:6). nor did Kazantzakis think of him as one. he was certainly prophetic. Nietzsche wrote that the twentieth and twenty-first centuries would be times of nihilism. a depression sufficiently unbearable to produce a false “savior” named Adolf Hitler. Even Heidegger. He remained true to this statement throughout his life. Friar’s point may be strengthened by Kazantzakis’s . Both Nietzsche and Kazantzakis teach us that totalitarian fascism is the nihilistic result of false hopes and fears and of the negative willingness to escape the heavy burden of freedom. to have accepted easy solutions would not have benefited his high moral standards: “I considered metaphysical hope an alluring bait which true men do not condescend to nibble” (Kazantzakis 1965:325). even if he joined the Nazi party for only a year. Is it possible that Kazantzakis also fell into the deceptive trap of metaphysical nihilism? Kimon Friar suggests that Kazantzakis’s earlier writings. notoriously. that is. Eternal recurrence struck him as an interminable martyrdom. a future savior. even surpassing his master. living in such troubled times. in this regard: I wonder if such a cry has ever been heard on earth. Yet this should not induce anyone to think of Nietzsche as a proto-fascist. But the Superman is just another paradise. a cry proud enough to scorn hope. another mirage to deceive poor unfortunate man and enable him to endure life and death. Concerning the twentieth century. but for deliverance” (1965:436). a Nietzschean nihilistic stage and a Bergsonian stage in which Kazantzakis overcomes nihilism. Kazantzakis lived in an age of great uncertainty. One would generally agree that our times are best described as times of uncertainty. Kazantzakis had lived through the financial collapse of the 1930s. I will raise an army. especially his Spiritual Exercises. Two devastating world wars unleashed human irrationality in all of its terribleness. transitional periods that would witness terrible events. indeed an “age of breakdown and catastrophe” as historian Eric Hobsbawm has described it (1996:22). he knew full well that it is only through art that this deliverance may be achieved: “Words! Words! There is no other salvation! I have nothing in my power but twenty-four little lead soldiers. For Kazantzakis.12 Christos Galanopoulos for beauty. (Kazantzakis 1965:339) Unlike Nietzsche. surely more terrible than even Nietzsche could have imagined. espoused Nazi ideology. Nietzsche. Friar distinguishes two different stages in Kazantzakis’s literary output. I will mobilize. rather than an anti-nihilist. Furthermore. It might seem that. although. There is only the unlimited and deathly silent Abyss” (1976:217).  . what I desired most deeply was not the cure but the wound” (Kazantzakis 1965:333). They relieved them temporarily.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 13 own assertion that “the wounds opened in me by Nietzsche were deep and hallowed. at the end of Zorba. If we follow Poulakidas’s definition of eschatology.  . which implies reason and moderation. the Boss does not become Zorba. forcing them to conclude that Kazantzakis was a nihilist. The revision has been quoted many times. Yet. at least one Zen Buddhist scholar distinguishes between Buddhism and Zen Buddhism and asserts that “there are eschatological ideas in Buddhism as well—for example. He writes that Kazantzakis differs from Buddhism in that “his concept of Nirvana is eschatological—in the future all becoming will cease—rather than ethical. the Boss undergoes a conversion from Buddhist nihilistic passivity to a Zorbatic stance of the tragic hero. but both simultaneously. nor does Kazantzakis report some sort of cure. it is Kazantzakis’s “bomb-shell” statement at the end of the revised Spiritual Exercises that presumably troubles them.’” but not in Zen Buddhism (Nieda 1961:140). Ultimately. Just as Zarathustra does not become the Overman. Poulakidas associates Kazantzakis with eschatology. He reminds us that the Buddha project “had obsessed him [Kazantzakis] most of his life” (1976:208) and he concludes that Kazantzakis “in his Spiritual Exercises can be accused of nihilism. [Buddha’s] ‘last teachings. sophrosyne. neither only Becoming nor only Being. But the point precisely is that if Kazantzakis had a theology. For Kazantzakis. we would have to conclude. Kazantzakis cannot be understood as an eschatological thinker. as Peter Bien maintains. Thus. Here it is again: “Lord. at least during the time of writing Spiritual Exercises. you . Becoming and Being are one. . Friar is not clear as to when the change from wound to cure happened. one can argue that such a division rather undervalues the importance of Kazantzakis’s earlier works. with Poulakidas. Andreas Poulakidas closely examines Kazantzakis’s Buddhist influences in Spiritual Exercises. Spiritual Exercises can be understood less pessimistically and there is no need to save Kazantzakis from nihilism by relegating it to an early intellectual stage that he surpassed. his “Apollonian ‘sophrosyne’ soon reasserts itself” (1963:162). that Kazantzakis. For Kazantzakis. Bergson’s mystic salves could not heal them. he has no theology. as Buddha taught” (1976:216). but soon the sores opened again and bled—for as long as I remained young. disguised beneath a theological system. . If he were. was a nihilist. For both Friar and Poulakidas. is “a distorting intervention” (1952:136).  . then he could have been accused of nihilism.  . at least during the time of the addition of the revised last part in 1928. as a state attained here and now. rather than as a growing stage in his philosophical development. Spiritual Exercises. . He is careful not to give a simple answer. Schopenhauerian subjectivism. a literary and philosophical treatise that has been falsely interpreted as an expression of nihilism. written a decade and a half after Serpent and Lily. “Action is the widest gate of deliverance. Peter Bien wonders what this means (1989:133). What is our goal? To be shipwrecked!” (1960a:59)—is the expression not of a fatalistic pessimism. . the solution is that Kazantzakis was uncompromising with regard to every metaphysical notion: hope as well as hopelessness. it lasts a moment and it is good” (Kazantzakis 1963a:17).g. and Christian mysticism. and . But freedom cannot be a metaphysical absolute. No. nor did he find a solution to his hopelessness. The problem has no solution and simultaneously many solutions. . . . .14 Christos Galanopoulos and I are one . Amid the labyrinthine complexities of the mind it finds the shortest route. One of the most seemingly nihilistic of his statements in Spiritual Exercises—which reads “Our body is a ship that sails on deep blue waters. but of an affirmative fatalism that embraces fate and transcends failure by willing it. is better understood as the starting point of Kazantzakis’s literary engagement with nihilism. In terms of the present study. his attitude toward hopelessness changes to a Bergsonian call to action. the result of a dialectic between seemingly opposing forces (1989:133–143). Bien arrives at the conclusion that it is positive and multifaceted. even this ONE does not exist!” (Kazantzakis 1960a:131). . But in his uncompromising struggle to find meaning. After examining the statement in terms of Buddhistic nihilism. it does not ‘find’—It creates its way. Perhaps there was a certain change of attitude toward hopelessness from the early to the later Kazantzakis. that Kazantzakis is a nihilist—and indeed warns against such an answer. e. notion. At any rate. Kazantzakis’s earlier works need not to be thought of as exhibiting a passive acceptance of nihilism from which Kazantzakis later recovered. He had no hope. As Kazantzakis pointed out again and again. serves as the inaugural beginning of the anti-nihilistic struggle. “Life is a very simple miracle . Later. or idea. In Serpent and Lily he writes. Spiritual Exercises. there is no freedom except in the moment that is fleeting and simultaneously fulfilling. “I am at peace because I have no hope” (1980:82).. It alone can answer the questionings of the heart. Understood in this light. “in a synthesis still unknown to mankind”—he found freedom. the essence of freedom is struggle. In other words. This is what the statement means for the anti-nihilist Kazantzakis. hewing to right and left through resistances of logic and matter” (Kazantzakis 1960a:99). he may have given the false impression that by bridging hope with hopelessness—again. Depending on one’s reading. rather. Glicksberg’s interpretive emphasis is weighted toward the nihilistic conviction of meaninglessness. A merely theoretical overcoming of nihilism would strangle creative inspiration. contrary to Savvas’s ­understanding. Nihilism. A religious atheist. If one is to focus on writings such as. he became the arch-anti-nihilist artist. he was able.” only to explain that this is also the source of Kazantzakis’s creative inspiration: “He overmastered all his experiences. . Such an anti-nihilism is found not in metaphysics but in aesthetics. As Glicksberg suggests. is the antidote. of one whose intellectual pessimism is transformed into creative action. a resolute nihilism. called nihilism.7 He writes that Kazantzakis offers no hope except the affirmation of life in the face of resolute nihilism (Prevelakis 1958:187). one may assume that he interprets Kazantzakis’s work as nihilistic through and through. This does not imply. he asserts categorically that one may not expect a constructive political theory from a nihilist (1958:163). if one were to pinpoint the main objective of Kazantzakis’s life and the driving force behind his work. Prevelakis is rather subtle on this issue. But. It is the position of a heroic pessimist.” one may conclude without further ado that Kazantzakis was a resolute nihilist (Alexiou and Stefanakis 1983:290). Minas Savvas writes that Kazantzakis “was not dominated by any one man or philosophy. a letter to Lefteris Alexiou in which Kazantzakis writes that his “inner ‘modesty’” leads him to a “terminus” that is named not “Victory” but “Nothingness. he embraced and abandoned Christianity. Bergson’s élan vital. working with and against nihilism. Buddhism. Communism. For example. “Kazantzakis is a fitting example of the secular saint. was cured of all prohibitions. and Existentialism” (1971–1972:284). in seeking the Absolute. In fact. it would more than likely have to be that. one would be inclined to hail him as a religious visionary engaged in a lifelong quest for God” (1975:276). Only a consistent anti-nihilism. say. he never gave up the quest for the innermost secret of life even after he became convinced that there was no ultimate meaning to be found” (1975:176). in art. Prevelakis posits Kazantzakis as a “complete nihilist. In doing so.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 15 Literary critic Charles Glicksberg argues that Kazantzakis was a nihilist throughout his literary lifetime. furthermore. but only an honest rejection of false hopes. He conquered the awareness of nihilism by means of tremendous poetic creativity” (1958:205). Obviously. to avoid the nihilistic trap of empty absolutes. A main reason why some Kazantzakis scholars conclude that he overcomes nihilism is that they confuse it with the political and pseudophilosophical movement that took place in nineteenth-century Russia. He is convinced that “if one knew nothing of Kazantzakis’s negative beliefs and his open espousal of nihilism. however. in a profound way. “I am both theory and practice” (Kazantzakis 1960a:48). saying that he “embraced a position that may be called ‘homeopathic. to overcome nihilism with more nihilism. as one more synthesis of seeming opposites. Bien is more careful. there is no opposition between the two. “presents Nietzsche not as the germ spreading nihilism. and since he does not believe. Not only does this conclusion not mark the end of the struggle. “which left a permanent mark upon his writing” (1971–1972:285). who believes in nothing. is governed by a wild rage” (Kazantzakis 1963b:174. . namely. “the man who knows perfectly well that he has nothing to hold on to. “Kazantzakis resolves the conflict between the active and contemplative life by deeming contemplation the highest form of action” (Bien 1989:188).16 Christos Galanopoulos nihilism is not a philosophy. Savvas attempts to link Kazantzakis to Marxism. He clarifies the meaning of action in Kazantzakis as creative action. Kazantzakis 1975:78). indeed one who does not make the error of prescribing a medicine such as Marxism or even Nietzscheanism. Most deeply. contemplateur more than I do” (Bien 1989:58). in his dissertation. In fact. Bien is at his best when discussing this point. he claims that nihilism is a “sickness” and that Kazantzakis. he had to be consistent with his anti-rationalism: “No one despises the . What Kazantzakis meant by “action” is the action of the artist and thinker. so that the patient might come to a crisis and then be cured—or die” (Bien 2007:21). . I feel that matter and spirit are one” (Bien 1989:60. it does the opposite: it leads to the position of the desperado. Bien suggests that Nietzsche convinced Kazantzakis “that nihilism could be a homeopathic weapon for the cure of contemporary decadence and not just a symptom of that decadence” (1989:35). but as the physician diagnosing it and attempting a cure” (1971–1972:254). is such a diagnostician. The present study suggests that Kazantzakis. the creative inspiration to compose or create. that is. Interestingly. Kazantzakis is averse to the action of the political demonstrator. Bien quotes Kazantzakis’s declaration: “I am a monist. Bien states that Nietzsche’s dangerous move was to prescribe a homeopathic cure for nihilism. Kazantzakis was an anti-intellectual among intellectuals. for there is no cure. For Kazantzakis. it is a pathological symptom of cultural decline. of theory and practice.’ proclaiming that since Soviet communism was a disease. too. Nowhere is this . Bien repeats this assertion when speaking of Kazantzakis’s interpretation of what was going on in the Soviet Union. If Kazantzakis is similar to Nietzsche in this respect—and the term anti-nihilism is certainly applicable here— one should not interpret this to mean that Kazantzakis prescribes the Nietzschean Ubermensch (Overman) as a solution. let us have more of that disease rather than less. The patient is not cured. Bien 2007:392). theory is practice. Thus. . . but a metaphysical thinker bent on transcending communist materialism and moving toward metaphysical conceptualization— another transformation of matter into spirit in the known Kazantzakian manner. Theologian Lewis Owens attempts to shed light on Kazantzakis’s concept of metacommunism in order to show that Kazantzakis was not a communist. . Kazantzakis is neither a nihilist . what Kazantzakis asserted is that he did not draw a sharp distinction between denier and praiser. the political must serve the metaphysical” (2001a:432). was careful not to fall into the nihilistic trap of a metaphysical absolute. It’s a big rupture with communism—not in a backward direction of course.” that Kazantzakis’s “god can evolve only through matter” (Bien 1989:73). Bien. . Owens defines Kazantzakis’s metacommunism as “the desire for the creative renewal after the destructive fire” (2001a:432). he quotes Kazantzakis’s assertion: “. while accepting the “metaphysical wind. my God is still hungry. The point here again is that Kazantzakis. but terrifyingly forward” (Owens 2001a:440. he would have fallen into the metaphysical and nihilistic trap of ideology. And he deduces that “like the individual. who has paid very close attention to the political thought of Kazantzakis. but is more careful about the importance of matter and leans more toward the permanence of this process rather than its actualization. The emphasis is on terrifyingly. a Kazantzakian eschatological doctrine? Owens quotes a line in a letter from Kazantzakis to his wife Eleni that he takes from Bien’s Kazantzakis: Politics of The Spirit. whether scientific or theological. then. for doing so would negate both the Bergsonian élan vital and the Nietzschean affirmation of life. In terms of binary oppositions. Likewise. Is there. That is because I am not a man of practical energy but rather a man who has assigned himself the aim in life of attempting to think and to formulate his thoughts” (Prevelakis 1984:229). . volume 1: “I’ve finished the essay on metacommunism that I wrote you about. It is apparent here that Owens interprets Kazantzakis theologically. Eleni Kazantzaki 1968:15. if he had done so. 1983:196). Kazantzakis 1963a:185–186). both of which Kazantzakis espoused and fused together. He emphasizes.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 17 better reflected than when Kazantzakis speaks of himself and his work in his Apologia when he was arrested in Crete as a communist and atheist: “I am neither a narrow-minded denier nor a superficial praiser. Elsewhere. He believes in matter” (Bien 2007:70. . . and does not take an ideological position.” as he liked to say. although Kazantzakis himself had misgivings about interpretations of his work that begin from a methodological standpoint. also links metacommunism to the synthesis of matter with spirit. . he is neither a communist nor an anti-communist. regarding “the goal of amalgamating activism and nihilism. the struggle becomes the eschatological end. the struggle to give meaning to life has no eschatological end. but his understanding of eschatology is different from that of Poulakidas discussed earlier. For Kazantzakis. in a letter to Galatea. . His reference seems to be similar to Charles Glicksberg’s “secular saint. the one that is or is not. We want it to live and struggle here with us.8 Kazantzakis sees all political and theological doctrines as masks that hide the nihilistic abyss. On the other hand. Bien traces the political movements that Kazantzakis espoused and rejected. Similarly. and matter is transformed into spirit. no final purpose. We love it just as the potter loves and desires his clay. have a purpose? What do we care? Don’t ask. he places himself in historical transitoriness. On the contrary.” but Bien does not see Kazantzakis as a nihilist. he remains uncorrupted by the metaphysical lures of both materialism and spiritualism while working with them—as the silkworm works with mulberry to make silk—letting his body be consumed by the metaphysical flame.9 A political form of nihilism is misleading because it places value on what is essentially nothing. We have no other material to work with. Bien refers to Kazantzakis as an eschatological thinker. because it Becomes. The message is non-eschatological and non-metaphysical through and through: “we do not want the world to disappear. Tranquilly gazing at the abyss by the end of his intellectual journey. nor do we want Christ to load it on His shoulders and transfer it to heaven.18 Christos Galanopoulos nor a meta-nihilist—under a dogma or ideology—but an anti-nihilist. but Bien is more careful not to confuse Kazantzakis’s politics with an overcoming of nihilism. anti-nihilism can be understood politically as an effort to depict the nihilism disguised beneath political ideology. Thus there is no contradiction between Kazantzakis’s caution concerning metaphysical lures and his assertion to Prevelakis that he accepted the “frightful metaphysical wind passing above me and shriveling my body” (Prevelakis 1984:39). fight!” (1979:74). in this life. ending with a politically uncompromised Kazantzakis who becomes an eschatologist without an eschatology. thus transubstantiating matter into spirit by not allowing matter to be weighed down by a metaphysical or “spiritual” doctrine. always remaining true to both Body (Becoming) and Spirit (Being). What purpose? Does this Earth. indeed seeing them as One. Bien’s choice of title may also be compared to James Lea’s Kazantzakis: Politics of Salvation (1979). Kazantzakis wrote: “Ah! If we could only perish suddenly by serving a purpose. In his Kazantzakis: Politics of the Spirit (Volume 1). thus again avoiding the metaphysical trap of nihilism from both directions. this starlight. no other solid field over chaos to sow and reap” (Kazantzakis 1965:423). Espousing neither materialism nor spiritualism. Seen in this light. If understood in the light of anti-nihilism. including the mistake. Indeed. . most significant in that it is most final. Eschatology is a historicist doctrine involving the teleological assumption that history moves in a linear direction toward an inevitable.10 Marx was also a historicist thinker. and Bien certainly does not.  . It was Georg Hegel who inaugurated the age of historicist literature with his seminal Philosophy of History. the comfortably established soon wind up as conservatives and little by little the conservatives become reactionaries” (Eleni Kazantzaki 1983:269. the “last man. was also in historiography the great age of historicism. Kazantzakis’s metacommunism is a metadialectic in which the rationalistic mask of binary oppositions is revealed as a form of nihilism. Thus. in which he posited that history culminates in the actualization of the Spirit on Earth. finding it too confining and failing to see much of a difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat when it came to political reality. is the final ideological mask that needs to be overthrown as the last value. which planted the intellectual seeds for thinkers like Kazantzakis. Bien has certainly exhausted the subject. which bears similarities to eschatological thought.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 19 Kazantzakis may be thought of as an eschatological thinker. Kazantzakis’s political thought is of the highest caliber. It is rather with a sense of pity that he writes. and Bien is certainly convincing when he presents Kazantzakis’s work as “eschatological politics” (2007:56). akin to Nietzsche’s “great politics” in that it avoids the nihilistic traps hidden beneath ideology. Kazantzakis took historicist thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Oswald Spengler very seriously. There is no doubt that Kazantzakis was deeply concerned with politics or that he was a political thinker. But it would be an error to identify an eschatological doctrine in Kazantzakis. By “great politics” Nietzsche meant an anti-metaphysical polemic against sterile ideologies. the value of numbing nothingness. Bien describes Kazantzakis as “a romantic naturalist. By naturalist here. Indeed. “The revolutionaries have become comfortably established. which threaten with a totalitarian vision of . I mean a person who believes that being and nature are identical. of viewing nihilism as ideology.  . and culminating in the communist revolution. which is precisely why Kazantzakis shied away from Marxism. Kazantzakis also wages war against the “satisfied” in life who choose the descending as opposed to the ascending Bergsonian flow. this is not far from eschatology. his “historical materialism” implies that history moves in the pattern of class conflict based on the given economic mode of production in a historical era. hence that everything supernatural—including any teleological explanation of the ultimate purpose of being—must be rejected” (2007:xi). the nineteenth century. 1968:219).” or Buddha. culminating event. In Kouros. is to confront failure without regret and thus to transubstantiate it into freedom. bless it!”).’ ‘Stimulant’ means what conducts one into the sphere of command of the grand style” (1977:130). Kazantzakis loved people but only from far away. Kazantzakis’s last novel. And again: «Να πολεμάς χωρίς ελπίδα· / και να νογάς βαθιά ν’ αυξαίνει η δύναμή σου / στην άκρα απελπισιά» (“To fight without hope / and to realize deeply that your strength increases / in extreme despair”) (1964b:530.11 Saint Francis or The Poor Man of God (1962). It is this will to nothingness. as he once wrote rather humorously. is yet another most powerful indication of Kazantzakis’s nihilistic concerns. however. “For me. my own job is not to see anyone at all. the Kapetanios advises Theseus to seize the moment passing above him as if it were Ariadne (1964a:287). which Nietzsche—openly and proudly declaring himself an Aristotelian—opposed to the “feeling of power” in the strongnatured. His “politics” was directed against the “will to power” of the weak-natured. μεγάλη η χάρη της!» (“No other hope remains / but lack of hope.20 Christos Galanopoulos human nature. akin to the desire for power. In one of his most significant sentences. his aesthetic amor fati. while power itself does not corrupt but ennobles the mind” (Kauffman 1974:194). Heidegger understood. The novel is abundant in seemingly nihilistic sentences that must by now . 548). It would appear that Kazantzakis’s literary heroes in the end fail in what they set out to accomplish. ‘O mon Coeur. Nietzsche declares: “Man would rather will nothingness than not will” (1969:163). His inner modesty and care for humanity drove him away. The point. Palaiologos exclaims. suis ton chemin comme le rhinocéros!’” (Eleni Kazantzaki 1983:322. as did Kazantzakis. to say the great Yes to life. his final evocation of yet one more great anti-nihilist. for example: «άλλη ελπίδα δεν απομένει / παρά η απελπισιά. to will it together with its successes and failures. but he never lost his deep sense of social responsibility. “The point is that the will to power may be ruthless and a source of evildoing. Constantine Palaiologos abounds in descriptions of Kazantzakis’s philosophy of turning hopelessness into the supreme hope (1964b). and what Kazantzakis set out to accomplish. It is Nietzsche’s fatalism. Every contact is painful for me and—what is worse—superfluous. not to live with human beings. and to oppose the negation of life—that is what Nietzsche meant by the “grand style” in art. that Kazantzakis makes his goal to expose and struggle against as the foremost example of modern Western decadence. that Kazantzakis espouses and turns into a literary engagement designed to confront the problem of nihilism. “Nietzsche’s principal declaration concerning art as the great ‘stimulant of life. 1968:265). To love one’s fate despite and because of one’s failures becomes the supreme antidote to nihilism. To embrace one’s fate. An example is: “To be a saint means to renounce not only everything earthly but also everything divine” (Kazantzakis 1962:22). In The Last Temptation of Christ (1960b).Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 21 be understood in the light of the culminating struggle against nihilism. so that the flow of creativity and the vital affirmation of life may reassert themselves. jovial monk taunt Francis: “What I want to see is this: for you to become so poor that you must renounce even the hope that one day you will see God. This statement crystallizes the idea that the book has maintained all along. That is the highest form of sainthood” (1962:160). echoing the advice of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “remain faithful to the earth” (Nietzsche 1995:13).12 It is the organic vitality of the body that Kazantzakis affirms in the end. the poverty of meaning. It is in this life that this happens. and turns it into art. And elsewhere in the same novel: “Man cannot sprout wings unless he has first reached the brink of the abyss” (1960b:43). rather than being a nihilist in his early career and overcoming nihilism later on. Francis is scandalized at first. Kazantzakis employs the butterfly as a creature of the earth that achieves in nature the focal point of Kazantzakis’s message: the momentary transubstantiation of matter into spirit. . . Who knows: perhaps this. Poverty here is akin to the Silence ending the revised Spiritual Exercises. His homeopathic approach to nihilism is revisited in the words that he puts in the mouth of his Christ: “This world . especially in the realm of the phenomena of experience. . showing again that Kazantzakis remained consistent with the project that he inaugurated in that book. This statement should be viewed not as a renunciation. That is. . downgrading. . but as an attempt to get rid of all absolutes. as love’s begging sparrow. and only this. constitutes absolute Poverty” (1962:161). In Saint Francis again: “The great Yes is formed only by these many No’s” (1962:110). we must rid ourselves of empty. . the struggle to unveil the mask of the last value. must be destroyed right down to its roots if the new world is to be planted” (1960b:367). That is what perfect Poverty means. O Lord. . Kazantzakis tackles anew the literary and philosophical themes that commonly appear in his work. Elsewhere in the novel. one of his communist acquaintances in the 1920s. Kazantzakis has a fat. of seeing Thee. that of nothingness. Kazantzakis wrote that he (Kazantzakis) could not espouse a fundamental metaphysic: “my . Kazantzakis embraces poverty. the tiny sparrow becomes one final panentheistic metaphor. . and sterile metaphysical absolutes. but slowly understands and prays that he may have the strength to renounce “the hope. nor does he forget Mary Magdalene’s observation that “it is here on earth that we women live out eternity” (1960b:353). To Victor Serge. At the novel’s end. Christ acknowledges the butterfly as his “sister” (1960b:69). JeanFrançois Lyotard. While Kazantzakis has been carefully studied in some theological and literary circles. 1968:222). not only mirrored the times in which he lived. Deleuze. Given the present availability of space. the point here is that they exhibit some similarities to Kazantzakis’s intellectual project against nihilism and thus deserve closer attention. In fact. and whose main concerns have been with the nihilistic topics of the loss of the Subject and of the inauthentic and fractured Self. and Jean Baudrillard. “postmodern” intellectual schools of thought such as poststructuralism and deconstruction.13 His work begs to be rescued from the grip of academic classification and given the open public space that it deserves. at least to my knowledge. all of which are deeply woven into the work of Kazantzakis. 1963:258). and Lyotard are considered here. as pathological states. he has been all but ignored in other academic and intellectual circles. No matter what one’s prediction may be concerning their value in the future. Roland Barthes. to name but a few of the most famous ones.22 Christos Galanopoulos metaphysical sense is not sufficiently basic” (Eleni Kazantzaki 1983:273. authoritarianism. signifies nothing but its own . There is an unforgettable line in Zorba. all of modern philosophy from Spinoza and Hume to Nietzsche and Bergson is reflected in that sentence. a masterstroke of Kazantzakis’s pen that encapsulates what our tired times need. Michel Foucault. it is curious that Kazantzakis. Neither is he a romantic revolutionary. Given the massive amount of academic output dedicated to philosophy and literary criticism during the second half of the twentieth century and into the present. an oppressive absolute that. Jacques Lacan. Gilles Deleuze. is never seriously mentioned or referred to in the more popular. but greatly anticipated our own times. A “metaphysical lure” or empty absolute that Kazantzakis refers to is the meaningless signifier (image) that these thinkers refer to.14 For the past 40 years the world has been witness to a new wave of post–May 1968 French intellectuals. nor a person who insolently fights matter. Kazantzakis. rather than referring to a signified (concept). only Derrida. which openly claim Nietzschean and Bergsonian influences. Jacques Derrida. it may very well be that the oftentimes difficult project of reading these thinkers can be aided by knowledge of Kazantzakis and his works. Instead. What is more. The Boss says: “Zorba sees everything every day as if for the first time” (1952:51). and fragmentation. a life-negating mystic. and those only in passing. as well as with totalitarianism and its sibling. everything for him is insatiably holy (Eleni Kazantzakis 1983:313–314. This sentence mirrors Kazantzakis’s mind in all of its hidden alleys. have become household names. Bulgarian-born Julia Kristeva. loss of desire. through his massive literary output and many travels. let alone the obvious postmodern themes of inauthenticity. capitalism is the sole signifier. the postmodern age is one of post-this and post-that. accelerating during and after the 1930s. Kazantzakis becomes one of the great modern—and postmodern—writers. Against such a scenario. the various political movements that Kazantzakis espoused and then rejected can also be read in terms of those movements as signifiers that Kazantzakis found in the end to be nihilistic—that is. “attempter” and . can be read in terms of the postmodernist projects of those writers. Yet Kazantzakis held that hoping is fruitless and that the transitional age is permanent: a new table of values will become entrapped in a new false absolute and another oppressive signifier and master narrative. were absolutistic and came tumbling down. In this sense. a towering figure in the field of historiography. Since capitalism in its consumerist stage signifies nothing but itself. Thus. Kazantzakis’s flirtation with the various movements of his time. Postmodernism. we live in a transitional age of meaningless metanarratives. Can Kazantzakis be viewed as a postmodern thinker? Perry Anderson has pointed out that Spanish-speaking writers were the first to use the term post-modernismo in the 1930s. empty of meaning. but one that signifies nothing because it cannot be trapped under an ideology. Postmodern thinkers like Lyotard have been accused of capitalism because they find that the end of capitalism will come only in homeopathic fashion after more capitalism—similar to Bien’s explanation of Kazantzakis’s homeopathic Nietzschean solution to nihilism. much in the way that Kazantzakis suggested. especially Marxism. Historian Arnold Toynbee. is not an ideological term but one signifying a transitional historical era. its own totality—in a dizzying play of nihilistic signifiers. like nihilism.15 Other such metaphysical lures include modern master narratives and meta-narratives or ideologies such as fascism and communism.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 23 image—that is. finds the historical transition from modernism to postmodernism to have occurred sometime around the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. It is an era in which capitalism has emerged victorious and unopposed. an age in which the values of modernity have been devalued but new values have not yet arrived. Lyotard’s project was to show the postmodern condition as one in which modern master narratives. Thus. In the sense of the history of western civilization as the unveiling of nihilism. thus placing the turning point from modernism to postmodernism during Kazantzakis’s lifetime (Anderson 2006:4–5).16 Jean François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1984) “was the first book to treat postmodernity as a general change of human circumstance” (Anderson 2006:26). and his eventual rejection of them as empty absolutes. a metahistorical age in which historicism has collapsed and the possibility of meaning in history has collapsed together with it. Derrida focuses on Nietzsche in similar fashion to Bien’s suggestion that Kazantzakis follows Nietzsche more in terms of “style” than of ideas. he continues. . . perhaps the most influential philosopher in the postmodern debate. there is a rift. ‘we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We remember Kazantzakis saying in 1910 that if anything remains from Nietzsche it is only a “rhythm. perhaps “style” could be a better translation. In his Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles (1979). Kazantzakis remarks here that. . then. very much in the tradition of the continental Franco-German intellectual exchange. In my ‘historical’ reading of crisis.’ But. Negative and positive go together. Out of this rift comes art.24 Christos Galanopoulos “tempter” (to use Nietzsche’s play with words).17 For Allan Megill. a ­“philosopher of the future” who challenges us and instructs us to struggle against this nihilistic predicament (Nietzsche 1989:52–53). when we fall into this abyss. that we also need to give a historical reading of Kazantzakis.  . “we fall upward. The reason why Kazantzakis has been largely ignored in the postmodern debate could be that his work. . In Heidegger’s universe. as it does for Nietzsche as well—except that Heidegger is much more explicit about the relationship pertaining between art and crisis. Derrida and Deleuze even wrote books entirely about Nietzsche. Nietzsche gave old ideas a new ­radiance . as already suggested. . . Megill writes: By the early 1930s. to a height . Megill’s reading of Heidegger comes strikingly close to the need for such a reading of Kazantzakis. imitating . an abyss. . Is it possible. (1985:143) Elsewhere: “Heidegger professes to find an abyss (Abgrund) in the sentence ‘language speaks. has been analyzed mainly as theology. What Kazantzakis wishes to say is clarified at the end of his dissertation. . Heidegger had become a herald of absolute crisis. . who uses the word “abyss” but clearly does not consider himself a theologian? In his analysis of Heidegger. a prophet of extremity. the dominant metaphor is that of the break” (1985:xiii). a fissure.”’” (Megill 1985:168). This radiance is the Nietzschian “rhythm” which so impressed Kazantzakis and which he desired to acquire in his own right. What is curious about these postmodern writers is that their thought is saturated with Nietzschean influences. the dominant metaphor for crisis is the abyss: the metaphor of humanity stranded in a world without God or other absolutes on which we can depend. Crisis opens the way for his aestheticism. .” The word ρυθμός means more in Modern Greek than it does in English. the notion of crisis opens up the space within which aestheticism can flourish. “in the ‘theological’ view. on the contrary.  . . The complete degradation of the extant world prepares the ground of an aesthetic creation ex nihilo. truth will not be pinned down. activities that produce intensities.  . . Against the psychological nihilism of conformism and alienation. Kazantzakis placed “desire” at the heart of his creative inspiration: “The things that move me most deeply—unity. (Bien 1971–1972:265–266) Thus. “Woman (truth) will not be pinned down. speaking of truth in the Nietzschean metaphor of the female. constantly bringing out the existential themes of the loss of authenticity and the desire for life in a culture of copies and simulations.” From this postmodern perspective. woven into his analyses of major thinkers from Spinoza and Hume to Nietzsche and Bergson. Bien reasserts that what Kazantzakis derived mostly from Nietzsche was an aesthetic perspective. that free and intensify the flow of desire.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 25 the Nietzschian prototype. In truth woman. being and becoming.  . What Nietzsche meant by the aesthetic was the radical overthrow of metaphysical sterility with the power of desire.” And in Kazantzakian fashion. “Desire” here is akin to Kazantzakis’s Dionysian intoxication and creative ascent. He attempts a monistic synthesis of necessity and freedom. he warns against “those essentializing fetishes [such as femininity or female sexuality] which might still tantalize the dogmatic philosopher. Deleuze and Lyotard are concerned with the negation of life in the face of nihilistic totalities. As with Kazantzakis. Derrida. among others.  .” (1952:199). were secondary. re-action. are embraced over modern politics. namely. . In his book Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983). quotes Nietzsche: “‘Certainly she has not let herself be won—and today every kind of dogmatism stands sad and discouraged. Lyotard concludes: “More important than political leftism.18 Lyotard may be the most extreme of all the postmodern writers in his constant delineation and rejection of anything that is remotely similar to the representational logic of modernity. .  . Deleuze is an especially important postmodern philosopher and critic whose thought stresses the postmodern opposition to the modernist logic of binary oppositions and hermeneutics. Deleuze analyzes the themes of active and re-active nihilism much in the way that Kazantzakis writes about what uplifts the human spirit. Freud. the impotent artist or the inexperienced seducer who has not yet escaped his foolish hopes of capture” (1979:55). namely. not the degrading aestheticism of art for art’s sake. [T]he ideas . Deleuze and Lyotard posit a philosophy of “desire” as the nexus of the resistance toward nihilistic totalities. and Kafka. If it continues to stand at all!’” Derrida comments. “which champions the production of intensities. closer to a concurrence of the intensities: a vast subterraneous . firmness of purpose and constancy of desire . Melville. He lashes out against all systems in an effort to re-vitalize desire. action and what downgrades it. Marx. Lyotard proposes “a relationship between theory and fiction—between philosophy and poetry. The intellectual affinities between Kazantzakis and Derrida are even more obvious. declaring that “we are obliged . in principle. is now dead. Kazantzakis writes: “I have been struggling for a lifetime to stretch my mind until it creaked at the breaking point in order to bring forth a great idea able to give a new meaning to life. How would Derrida deconstruct Kazantzakis? It is possible that Derrida would find a kindred spirit in Kazantzakis. who could very well be the most controversial philosophical thinker of our times. . much in the way Kazantzakis has been. between ethics and nihilism” (Campolo 1985:447). . . Is it possible to have a Kazantzakian reading of Derrida and vice versa? Can Derrida’s deconstructivist project be seen in the light of a Kazantzakian “inner modesty”? After all. and easy solutions. This passage can be connected to several Kazantzakian themes: the subterranean κραυγή (outcry) against the dullness of humanity. to dwell dangerously between the barriers and the gorges. Lyotard remarks: ‘the difference between what I write and poetry and literature is that. and comfort to men. .26 Christos Galanopoulos movement. one who posits a limited God and counsels against the nihilistic totalitarianism that lurks in binary oppositions. a new meaning to death. he is severely popularized. I think that all genuine questioning is summoned by a certain type of eschatology. . . Like Kazantzakis. the metacommunism that brings revolution closer to actuality than does the totalizing numbness of Soviet authoritarian communism. most pointedly. which had a short. And now. Derrida has reflected on the relation between his work and eschatology: While Derrida interrogates “the idea of an éschaton or télos in the absolute formulations of classical philosophy” he emphasizes that this “does not mean that I dismiss all forms of Messianic or prophetic eschatology. . don’t we have the right to present theoretical statements under the form of fictions? Not under the form. more of a ruffle in fact. Anticipating this postmodern turn. look! .19 It even seems that his philosophy of deconstruction. But I do wonder more and more: is there a real difference between theory and fiction? After all. political ideologies. wavering. Derrida’s philosophy targets metaphysical absolutes in all of their forms. and the intensification of struggle toward a higher synthesis. but in the form’” (quoted in Pefanis 1991:101). the idea has turned into a tale” (1965:474). textual interpretations. . More than anything. Derrida himself states that Derrida must be deconstructed in the end. is as much revered as he is attacked and despised. on account of which the law of value is dis-affected” (Best and Kellner 1991:155). In Just Gaming. what I write is not fiction. happy life in American literary circles. Derrida. Deleuze defines “nomad thought” as a Nietzschean “war machine” and “nomadic force”—a force that constantly seeks to decodify nihilistic codes. Both reject the binary opposition of “theory” and “practice. Kazantzakis’s metacommunist credo would find a home among Derrida’s readings of Marx.’ It was not a matter of deconstruction becoming political. for Derrida “deconstruction is a kind of activism beyond the simplistic binary politics that so often informs what we call ‘activism’” (Smith 2005:114–115). as Derrida would concur. . “It ‘has been clear from the beginning’ that ‘this political deconstruction’ is about ‘the deconstruction of political structures. even a messianic without messianism . the simplistic binary logic of artificial opposites. summons or motivates it. Where the Messiah never shows up. Both Kazantzakis and Derrida want to elevate Marx from the ideological lure of the Party. By “codification” Deleuze implies the institutionalization of everything. if there is style. As with Kazantzakis’s cry. In the same way that Bien maintains that for Kazantzakis the importance of Nietzsche lay in “style. it must be plural ” (Spivak 1997:xxix). Derrida sees deconstruction as “‘a positive response to an alterity which necessarily calls.” For Kazantzakis this turns into the literary act as practice.’ as he puts it” (Smith 2005:12).” (Smith 2005:68) Thus Derrida explains that the project of deconstruction is “an eschatology without an éschaton. from laws and contracts to thought and even madness (1991:142–143). . . Derrida sees deconstruction as—in his words—“‘a messianism without religion. and the absolutistic metaphysics of interpretation—what Nietzsche terms “the deception through meaning” (Spivak 1997:xxiii).Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 27 though it is impossible to define this eschatology in philosophical terms. . The emphasis on plurality is at the heart of Deleuze’s “nomadology.’” (quoted in Smith 2005:86). for if that were the case—if the Messiah actually arrived—that would be the end of the story” (Smith 2005:111). perhaps.” a deliberate word play on Gottfried Leibniz’s Monadology (2007). if there is a spirit of Marxism which I will never be ready to renounce. Derrida writes: “Now. it is not only the critical idea or the questioning stance.” so Derrida concurs: “As Nietzsche said. it has always been such” (Smith 2005:13).” the Cretan Glance at the abyss from which he derives his creative power—which. Kazantzakis arrives at a philosophical “silence. . . Nietzsche has reminded us that. is always under deconstruction. it is perhaps a change of style that we need. It is even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation” (Smith 2005:86).’ Deconstruction is therefore vocation—a response to a call—the ‘call of the other. Both Kazantzakis and Derrida have similar attitudes toward what constitutes political activism. Deleuze is similar to Derrida in his pluralism: “in fact pluralism—otherwise known as empiricism—is almost indistinguishable from philosophy itself” (Deleuze 1983:4). certainly resonates with the philosophy of Nietzsche and several of his postmodern followers. lived as a nomad. This line of thought is very much at the heart of the Zorbatic vision of experiencing each day differently. how to deal with the uncertainty and transience of our existence. KING LOW HEYWOOD THOMAS SCHOOL . But no. a siege.  . most meaningfully—by Kazantzakis himself. Moreover.21 Hume is instrumental in pointing out that our habitual “associations of ideas” blur reality from our experiences. Deleuze posits Nietzsche as a nomadic thinker. He calls for a radical empiricism. to use his own terminology. How similar Kazantzakis is here! He.” instead. But this message is brought out most beautifully—and. a nomad. moving from furnished room to furnished room” (1991:149). Kazantzakis’s message that one should live life courageously by accepting and willing one’s fate in all of its implications. and turning his nomadic life into a machine of war against nihilism: “I began to write. too. one who “makes no attempt at recodification. much in the way that Bergson taught: “Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements. and provides a most refreshing example of.28 Christos Galanopoulos Against such codification.  . a merciless hunt. His life became fused into his writings. Kazantzakis’s Spiritual Exercises especially is such a war machine. a spell to bring the monster out of its hiding place” (Kazantzakis 1952:134). but by dissociation and division” (1998:89). In his last essay before his death. his “masterful siege of the language permits him to transmit something uncodifiable: the notion of style as politics” (1991:143). It should become obvious after reading Kazantzakis that he depicts the times in which we live with profound intellectual insight. if not solution to. I would argue. this was not writing: it was a real war. Deleuze wrote that “transcendence is always a product of immanence” (2001:31). living far from home. Deleuze portrays a Nietzsche who “lived like . and thus become who one is. What we need is to look inward and begin a self-critical process of dissociation. one in which Plato’s “poisoned gift” of introducing “transcendence into philosophy” will be overthrown with “a restoration of immanence in its full extension and in its purity. It is Hume who guides Deleuze’s thinking here.20 Deleuze’s project of decodification begins at the most minuscule or “molecular” level. the archetypal anti-nihilist. reduced to a shadow. copies of images from past impressions already in our minds render us unable to experience difference. always traveling. which forbids the return of any transcendence” (1997:137).  It has to be kept in mind that by “art” Kazantzakis was careful not to imply art for art’s sake. expresses the necessary rhythm of the whole universe. 10  Stefanakis goes so far as to assert that Spengler influenced Kazantzakis even more than Nietzsche or Bergson did (Alexiou and Stefanakis 1983:219). None other than Derrida also pays great attention to the importance of “style” in Nietzsche. and asserts that while for Plotinus the non-ontological “One” becomes a “final resting place” and results in “nihilistic paralysis.” for Kazantzakis instead “it is a new beginning and not a final resting place” (2001b:269–277). completed nihilism: incomplete because it involves a devaluation and a revaluation that are still in the realm of old value. including value itself. Bien shows that Kazantzakis’s most important Nietzschean influence was in terms of Nietzsche’s “style” (1971–1972). Politics of the Spirit (1989). True freedom and not its confusion with individual arbitrariness. Palaiologos. shows Kazantzakis as a nihilist. thus willing their fate and freeing themselves. it would seem that the title “anti-nihilism. 11  Thodoros Grammatas provides a useful summary of Kazantzakis’s work in a 1982 issue of Διαβάζω. was well aware of this trap. Thus.’ held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves” (Heidegger 1977:61). 5  See Heidegger’s “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead” (1977) for a discussion of incomplete vs. as I try to show. 3  See note 3 at the end of «H. Zorba turns failure into freedom and teaches the Boss how to dance on the face of it. Bergson» in Alexiou and Stefanakis (1983:285). acknowledging him as a kindred thinker (1989:231–232). Thus. Heidegger contends that. Owens compares Kazantzakis to Plotinus. both Minoas and Theseus perfectly exemplify the themes of love 1 2 . This is all fine and good but in postulating a metaphysical abyss beyond nihilism. It is in the same way that Kazantzakis.” given that metaphysics is nihilistic. 6  In his dissertation entitled Heraclitus and Philosophy (1986).” Owens again separates metaphysics from nihilism and moves dangerously close to the “metaphysical lure” that Kazantzakis warns against. In the play Kouros. 9  A more agreeable comparison could be made with Deleuze’s “politics of style” at least in terms of Nietzsche’s influence on Kazantzakis.” Nietzsche’s philosophy “remains. Kazantzakis.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 29 NOTES  See his “Confession of Faith” in Alexiou (1981:297–300). he writes. completed because it involves a revaluation of all values. and Prometheus. and Kapodistrias all know that their efforts are in vain but actively engage in them all the more. 7  Lea divides between two schools of scholars and places Prevelakis in the nihilistic camp (1979:181–182). 8  In another essay. free choice becomes the necessary choice (1986:210). or a plunge into aestheticism. Obviously. Julian the Apostate. they are the two different sides of the same coin. He writes that Odysseus must embrace death in the end. Bien’s choice of title. Owens seems to underscore the importance of immanence in his “transcendenceimmanence. emphasizes the Bergsonian influence on Kazantzakis. 4  See Peter Bien for an illuminating letter that Kazantzakis wrote when he first learned about Heidegger. It is worth adding that it is widely thought that Heidegger fell short of his mark. as well as Nietzsche. But the argument in this essay is that an “overcoming” of nihilism is the equivalent of a plunge into another metaphysical absolute. in particular. See Peter Gordon (2003). Kostas Axelos writes that for Heraclitus freedom and necessity are not opposites. I would say that Kazantzakis deeply understood the implications of Spengler’s thought because he had mastered Bergson and Nietzsche. as a “countermovement to metaphysics. as does everything ‘anti. See his Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles (1979). fuse freedom and necessity as affirmative fatalists. lurks behind nationalist ideology (as well as behind national identity and language). The “last men” in Nietzsche are those who are “the most despicable” because they “have invented happiness” (Nietzsche 1995:17). but his cry was: The Cretan Glance. It was meant be his “final word.” never posited a “New Man. who espouses the postmodern possibilities of pluralities and multiplicities. In the story. Gourgouris discusses what he terms Said’s “experimental method. as opposed to a metaphysical or transcendental nationalism. 12  Διγενής Ακρίτας (Digenis Akritas) and Faust were other projects that he was hoping to enlist in the battle but was not able to complete. Vassilis Lambropoulos. of course. affirming the materiality of the body and thus remaining in confrontation with nihilism and avoiding the trap of a metaphysical “dreamworld. Bien’s use of arguments by Gourgouris and Gregory Jusdanis is in line with my arguments here concerning nihilism and how to battle it as a false religion and a psychological need that. But Kazantzakis also sees the Last Man as Buddha—see Zorba the Greek (Kazantzakis 1952:134). Again. to use Gourgouris’s term. Kazantzakis also despised the “happiness” of those who are “satisfied.” Prevelakis mentions the plan to write Faust in his introduction to the Τετρακόσια Γράμματα and describes it as a work that seriously “tortured” Kazantzakis for the last seven years of his life (1984:πβ΄–πδ΄). 14  Theodore Frangopoulos writes that some of the reasons why the Greek public has . to come down on the side of the visible world. Kazantzakis’s “Akritas” was meant to be the “first new man” who would overcome the “last old man. of denying the stability of any presumable ground. Faust would be murdered by one of his students in the name of a new religion. is of valuable use here.” But Kazantzakis never wrote “Akritas. the reactionary nihilism of the metaphysical need.” a “resistance to identity [that] means profound alertness to history. in terms of the present essay.30 Christos Galanopoulos of fate and of finding freedom by living in the moment. But Kazantzakis ultimately preferred to be earthy.’ is provided. and the break with master narratives.” where he declares that “nationalism is invented” (2005:218). Bien joins the debate in “Inventing Greece. in this case. taken from Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra. as Bien reflects: “The best proof of the equation ‘nationalism = religion.” also a “sense of mobility. I suppose. 79).” In his discussion of Kazantzakis’s “Akritas. Both works are important to note because they show Kazantzakis constantly trying to find ways to continue the ascent toward the resolution—or rather the completion—of the problem of nihilism. by how people behave” (2005:218). These metaphors are. to the temporal fluidity and multiplicity we inhabit in our being in the world. without regrets or false hopes and fears (Grammatas 1982a).” Bien explains that Akritas would have rejected the ephemeral life for a dream world beyond the reality of space and time (2007:182). with his defense of syncretism as “Heraclitean harmony. as quoted by Bien. of restlessly moving from object to object. In a study of Edward Said. the attempt by Stathis Gourgouris to demythologize transcendental nationalism and move toward a radical secularism is similar to my attempt here to show Kazantzakis as one who demythologizes or unmasks the faces of nihilism in religion and politics. Faust was not created. Such language is at the heart of the project of this essay.” And. including those masking nationalism and secularism. and imply the completion and overcoming of nihilism. calls “the metaphysics of nationalism. 13  For example.” a “dynamic” antidote to cultural assimilationism (2001:232–234).” specifically the Odysseus of his epic Odyssey (Prevelakis 1984:486). what I would call. calling transcendence the “blissful pill of oblivion” (2004:64–66.” Faust would be the founder of a new monastery—it is well known that Kazantzakis kept thinking of such a monastery throughout his life—one where absolute freedom would be declared and myths would have no place. Nihilism lurks behind people’s hopes and fears and the need to believe in the myth of a metaphysical or “transcendent” absolute. Kazantzakis is a great example of an intellectual who was not outwitted by nihilistic disguises in what Jusdanis. as the only way to affirm life and to live freely. these thoughts. who finds Kazantzakis to be more of a philosopher than a poet (1983:120). for the poet. Vasilikos is rather ironic when he writes that the Odyssey became popular in the United States because Americans. Kazantzakis writes: “We know that all these words. from connecting to the underlying power and beauty of Kazantzakis’s ideas. In his dissertation. For example. but a new mask with which to conceal the Abyss” (1960a:101). one of the ways to avoid a difficult confrontation is to reject the opposition beforehand (1997). Grammatas explains that Kazantzakis favored demotic as the language closest to a “semantic” language. for Kazantzakis. and provide no research skills). that his philosophy is too complex to have the patience to follow. and these incantations are. All of this of course is done on the symbolic level. Given Frangopoulos’s comment about the serious reception of Kazantzakis outside of Greece as opposed to within his native country. Kazantzakis was painfully aware. to the latter’s heavy handedness with demotic Greek. He further writes that it was not until he met Friar in 1959 that he became seriously interested in Kazantzakis (1997:285–288). Vasilikos is perhaps the most famous case of a well-known Greek intellectual who was averse to the works of Kazantzakis owing. In Spiritual Exercises.Anti-Nihilism in the Thought of Nikos Kazantzakis 31 not considered Kazantzakis more seriously may be that his choice of demotic Greek makes his work difficult to enjoy. Frangopoulos adds that Kazantzakis has been seriously studied only outside Greece. educational conservatism of high school classes in modern Greek (which are devoted mostly to translating. it becomes all the more curious that the Greek public has not paid very much attention to Kazantzakis—at least not until the celebratory year of 2007. especially in the Odyssey. Yet he also confesses that he was inspired by the epic in its English translation. 15  Grammatas discusses the linguistic themes of signifier and signified in Kazantzakis’s work—his use of pseudonyms as an effort to bridge the gap between signifier and signified (1982b). as an artist. in part. as Bien suggests. because of his greatness. the pseudonym “Psiloritis” is both the signifier-person who descends from the mountain and the signified-person with the mountain’s attributes. these allegories. alas. memorizing. Frangopoulos asks: “What gives us the right to ask Kazantzakis for solutions? Could it be that we cringe from paying serious attention to him because we are suspicious that he will lead us to the nihilism that underlies our lives?” (1997:306). once more. Citing a letter of Kazantzakis to Yannis Hatzinis in which he denies the accusation that he lacks hope. It is also possible that the literary scholasticism and. was then a visiting professor in Athens: “William Spanos. In the words of Vasilis Vasilikos. Grammatas argues that nihilism. Still. He further postulates that Kazantzakis achieves momentary freedom with his jump into the abyss: the acceptance of life’s tragic reality (1983:157. postmodernism as “a collective reference” was first used after 1972 with the publication of the journal boundary 2. the signifier/signified relation is artificial. 165). Grammatas points out that. But in beholding the abyss. block students. William Spanos. He claims that it is difficult to pay serious attention to someone so great who. does not provide a model to live by. This question lies at the heart of what I seek to accomplish here. living in a “megatherium. And in Zorba: “I was only changing words and calling it deliverance” (1952:175). poetry was not Kazantzakis’s most successful medium. decided to found the journal as a result of the US collusion with the Greek Junta” and the “kind of complicity” between .” prefer bulky works. 16  According to Anderson. calling for the young Greek generation to follow their example (1997:304–306). and that he refuses to enlist his negativism in a given ideology (1997). this relation is harmonious (1983:118). is the expression and vindication of the purest form of humanism (1983:157). whose creator. which is also acknowledged by Grammatas. That is. of the inability of words to move beyond the symbolic and into reality (1983:143–144). as well as how massive an epic it was. and he invokes Friar and Bien. and some literary analysis. indeed. Kazantzakis equates “poetry” with “ the great danger” and resumes the struggle against nihilism (1952:270). and—in Jürgen Habermas fashion—he cannot fathom the survival of Marxism devoid of it (1989). saves the god Epaphos not through silence but through action. . not a mystic in any way. seek to address is the totalitarian. But while discussing the “provocative soteriology” (1998:455) of Kazantzakis’s struggling God. . who acknowledges the importance of Derrida and introduces Kazantzakis to “postmodern theology” (1998:459). In this light. Kazantzakis shares affinities with both Critical Theory (the Frankfurt School and beyond). . in the vein of this essay. which Kazantzakis also worked out in his own way. as well as with post-structuralism and deconstruction. McCormick (2001). especially its historicist metaphysic of binary oppositions. especially in that the . Moreover. and calls for a new International as a response to the new Holy Alliance of the outgoing twentieth century” (Postone 1997:370. is similar to Kazantzakis’s anti-nihilism. Habermas and Derrida share the same task of addressing the human condition after the Nazi experience. Thus. One could imagine a similar response by Kazantzakis. the nihilistic mentality. 20  See Prevelakis (1958:220–222) for a discussion of the Spiritual Exercises and Prevelakis (1984:μη΄) for further elaboration on this theme. a task that.” to use Habermas’s Kantian language (2003:15). it is becoming more clear that the reasons behind the criticisms of Derrida lie in that he was appropriated in the United States by a group of literary analysts who boxed his work exclusively in the field of literary analysis. Kazantzakis. the unknowable God. Derrida . his otherwise rich and enriching knowledge of postmodern topics is marred by his strategic defense of a political stance (it must be kept in mind that postmodernism does not signify an ideological stance but rather. deconstructs the intellect’s deepest and most ultimate ground” (1998:458). And elsewhere: “Kazantzakis .  . the attempt to save God from Hume’s empiricist skepticism by locking Him away. including Kazantzakis. not a position). it signifies a transition. 17  A notable postmodern theological view is provided by Darren Middleton. like nihilism. “In the face of the new world order . In accord with what I attempt to show. all of Nietzsche and Philosophy is about these themes. 19  For a lucid and friendly account of the charges directed against Derrida. What all of these thinkers. and the widespread claims that Marx and Marxism are finally dead . Derrida 1994). as this essay contends.  . defiantly presents deconstruction as the heir of a certain spirit of Marxism. 21  Scholars who are familiar with the philosophy of David Hume will readily see the significance of empiricism in connection with the present essay. Middleton seems to confine himself to the Kantian metaphysics of the thing-in-itself. In my view. Derrida has attempted to show that the critique of Enlightenment rationalism need not be associated with a rejection of Marxism but rather with its liberation from doctrinaire language. thus neglecting his wider philosophical concerns (Borradori 2003:15). 18  In fact. or. . For that reason also he was mistaken for a thinker who had made a fundamental break with the “unfinished project of modernity. scathingly criticizes capitalism. and its analysis of authoritarianism.” in which Derrida uses the Apology of Socrates as a metaphor for his own Apologia concerning deconstruction.32 Christos Galanopoulos orthodox modernist New Criticism intellectuals and “the callous officialdom he was witnessing” (2006:16). What these schools also have in common is the Marx-Nietzsche-Freud fusion. . It is a pity that Deleuze was concerned with Kazantzakis’s main two philosophical influences but failed to study Kazantzakis’s work. Middleton writes: “theologians err when they seek to identify the God of their metaphysics [with the] God of faith” (1998:460). A polemical critique is offered by Alex Callinicos who is too occupied with his ideological party loyalties to see the nihilistic absolutes resulting from the influence of the Enlightenment. Deleuze discusses Bergson as well in the light of what uplifts and what downgrades in his book Bergsonism (1988). the breakdown of ideology. . McCormick discusses Derrida’s speech entitled “Force of Law. see John P. Furthermore: we are accustomed to seeing the same causes for effects that are repeated. Axelos. Athens: Kastaniotis. New Haven. Anderson. It is no accident that Peter Gay. Athens: Exantas (first edition 1962). Becker 1932). David 1996 The Vision of Hume. Νίκος Καζαντζάκης: Γεννήθηκε για τη Δόξα (Nikos Kazantzakis: Born for Glory). The results of this query can be devastating if one continues to see a cause and effect relationship everywhere: we may go through life prejudiced and desensitized. Hume argues that it is our “custom” or “habit” to create causes and see no further. Becker. REFERENCES Alexiou. In his The Vision of Hume. 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