CASO 2 PRUEBA 1

2.3 Italian expansion, 1933 1940 Change Continuity Perspective Examine the reasons or Italy pursuing a more expansionist oreign policy in the 1930s. To what extent was there continuity in Italian oreign policy in the 1930s? Discuss the consequences o oreign policy in the 1930s or Italy. A ter a 13 year campaign, the Italian colony o Libya is subdued 1932 1933 January Hitler becomes Chancellor o Germany Mussolini proposes the Four Power Pact July 1934 June Mussolini meets Hitler in Venice Italy sends troops to its border with Austria to prevent Hitler s attempts July at 1935 April The Stresa Con erence Italy invades Abyssinia October 1936 May Italy conquers Abyssinia Mussolini initiates talks o an Axis agreement with Hitler October Italy intervenes in the Spanish Civil War Hitler s Germany also sends assistance July to Franco Italy joins Germany in the Axis 1936 October agreement An unofcial agreement is made with 1937 Britain accepting the status quo in Mediterranean Mussolini is impressed by Hitler on a visit to Germany September Italy joins the Anti-Comintern Pact with November Germany and Japan, an anti-Soviet alliance 129 Italy withdraws rom the League o December Nations Italian and British agreement: Britain 1938 April recognizes Italian Abyssinia Hitler visits Mussolini May Anti-semitic laws are passed in Italy September The Munich Con erence Mussolini announces his long-term 1939 February programme April Italy invades Albania Italy and Germany sign the Pact o May Steel military alliance Italy declares itsel a non-belligerent 1 September when Germany invades Poland Mussolini declares war on Britain 1940 June and France September Italy invades Egypt and Greece October Italy declares war on the Soviet Union 1941 June December Italy declares war on the USA What factors had an impact on Italy s foreign policy in the 1930s? 1. The impact of fascism The character o the Italian people must be moulded by fghting. Mussolini In the 1 93 0s, Italian oreign policy continued to be in uenced by the actors identifed on page 84. However, historians generally agree that Italian oreign policy was directed by Mussolini during this period Self-management and and that he pursued a more clearly Fascist oreign policy rom the ATL mid- 1 93 0s: glorifcation o war or its own sake, pursuit o imperial thinking skills expansion, and a move away rom diplomacy and cooperation. Re er back to the diagram on D uring this period, Mussolini s methods became more assertive and page 89 which identifes the key he was more aggresive diplomatically. He continued to assert anti- characteristics o Fascism. As French territorial claims, but he moved away rom his relatively good you read through this chapter, relationship with the B ritish, instead ostering closer ties to Hitler s identi y where Fascist ideology Germany. This led to a series o Italo German agreements including the appears to have shaped Rome B erlin Axis and the Pact o S teel. Mussolini also engaged in wars Mussolini s oreign policy. in Abyssinia, S pain and Albania. 130 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 The road Mussolini embarked on in the 1 93 0s would ultimately lead to the Italian entry into the S econd World War in 1 940 as an ally o Germany. 2. The impact of domestic economic isues As with the other European countries and Japan, Italy was also a ected by the Great D epression. The economic problems caused by overvaluing the lira were exacerbated by this worldwide crisis. Investment rom the US A was withdrawn, and Italian armers were also badly a ected by the collapse in grain prices. Industry declined and unemployment grew to 2 million. The government responded with more intervention, including bailouts or the industrialists. The B ank o Italy was on the brink o collapse when the government set up the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano in 1 93 1 , which gave fnancial support to banks and industries. The allocation o raw materials was brought under government control and direct control o maj or industries increased. The Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale was set up in 1 93 3 and took over shares o companies and TOK banks. As a result, Italy developed the largest public sector in Europe, Discuss in pairs the extent to excluding the S oviet Union. Indeed, by the end o the 1 93 0s, the which economic orces are the government controlled 2 0% o the capital o key companies. Wages that main driving orce or historical had already allen be ore the depression were cut urther. change. You should consider There were some measures that provided relie rom the impact o the the rst case study on Japan Great Depression, such as public works programmes and the removal o the in the 1920s and 1930s as ban on emigration. Indeed, Mussolini managed to prevent the social and well as considering this case political upheaval that the depression precipitated elsewhere in Europe and study on Italy. Make notes rom he retained power. Nevertheless, the economic crisis meant that Mussolini your conversation and add to needed to distract the Italian public rom Italy s internal economic problems these as you read through this by ostering the revolutionary spirit that he and ascism espoused. Foreign chapter. policy would now need to be more dynamic and inspirational. The result o this, however, was that rom 1 93 6 the Italian economy was urther undermined by Mussolini s emphasis on autarky, and the costs o Il Duce s wars. Thus, domestic economic actors may have been a actor Economic independence, or in Mussolini s decision to invade Abyssinia and intervene in the S panish sel -su ciency. C ivil War; nonetheless, these wars came at a high price or the Italian economy. E ven though taxes were increased, the wars led to an annual budget defcit o 2 8 billion lire by 1 93 9. This ultimately had a negative political impact and undermined support or the regime rom the elites. Who controlled Italian foreign policy in In 1936, Mussolini appointed his son-in-law, Count the 1930s? Galeazzo Ciano to work on oreign policy. Ciano had initially supported closer links with Germany. However, When he came to power in 1922, Mussolini wanted to Ciano then became disillusioned with Hitler and argued control Italian oreign policy himsel . In 1929, once his against the Pact o Steel, signed in May 1939. Ciano authority seemed secure, he appointed Dino Grandi as advised Mussolini to create a bufer zone in the Balkans oreign minister. Grandi was a committed Fascist who against Germany and he supported the invasion o avoured a strong oreign policy. He wanted to move Albania. Ciano lost avour with Mussolini or his anti- away rom Anglophile policies and demonstrate Italian German stance when Hitler swept victoriously across strength, and ultimately ready the armed orces or the Europe. Ciano ultimately relented and supported Italy coming war . Grandi believed that Italy should not trust joining the war with Germany in June 1940. the League o Nations. Nevertheless, Mussolini still directed oreign policy and in July 1932 he moved Grandi to the position o ambassador in Britain. 131 Source skills J. C alvitt C larke and C. Foust. Russia and could Italy willingly concede to any other Italy against Hitler: The Bolshevik Fascist power hegemony in the Mediterranean s Rapprochement of the 1 930s (1 991 ). hinterland the D anubian ( including Austria and Hungary) and B alkan areas. In the mid- 1 930s, Italy received 86 percent o its imports by sea, and o these, 1 3 percent First question, part a 3 marks passed through the D ardanelles, 1 7 percent What key points are made in this S ource through S uez, and 70 percent through regarding Italian economic needs and their Gibraltar. Hence the ascist conviction that in uence on Italian oreign policy in the 1 93 0s? Italy must either dominate or be the prisoner o its Nostro Mare, the Mediterranean. Nor E xaminer s hint: In pairs, identify three of the following points. Highlight them in the source. Italy was dependent on imports from the sea. The majority of imports came through Gibraltar. Italy had to dominate the Mediterranean. Italy could not allow another power to dominate the area. 3. Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1933 E xtract from D ino Grandi s diary, 1 93 2 I have asked myself why the Boss is so taken with Hitler. [Mussolini] has searched breathlessly for the last ten years or so, wherever they might be found, for allies for a revolutionary foreign policy destined to create a new order in Europe, a new order of which He considers himself supreme Pontiff not only in the spiritual but also in the material sense An international action founded exclusively on the Party, on the Regime, on a revolutionary ideology. Social skills Discuss the following question with a partner. What does the quote from Grandi s diary (above) suggest Mussolini wanted to gain from potential allies ? To demonstrate Italy s central role in E uropean diplomacy, Mussolini held a meeting in Rome in 1 93 3 . Mussolini s intention was to develop an alternative to the League o Nations or E uropean diplomacy. The Four Power Pact, or Quadripartite Pact, was signed on 1 5 July 1 93 3 in Rome. It set out that smaller nations should have less say in Great Power relations, unlike their role at the League o Nations. B ritain, France, Germany and Italy signed the agreement, although the French parliament never ratifed it. The signatories agreed to adhere to the League s covenant, the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg B riand Pact. 132 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 The resulting Four Power Pact allowed or urther Great Power cooperation, though in reality this pact had little meaning and was dismissed by the other powers. In Italy, however, it was heralded as a success or Mussolini. Nevertheless, in 1 93 4, Mussolini s actions seen as signifcant, not only domestically, but also by the other European powers. Italy had Class discussion promoted an independent Austria since the end o the First World Discuss Mussolini s attitude War and so Mussolini opposed (the name given to Austria s towards Hitler s new unifcation with Germany, which was one o Hitler s aims) . When, government in Germany up to on the 2 5 July 1 93 4, Austrian Nazi supporters murdered the Austrian 1935. Why might Italy be seen C hancellor E ngelbert D ol uss, Mussolini immediately mobilized his troops by the Western democracies to the border to deter any attempt by Hitler to achieve . This as key to containing an action was su fcient to deter Germany and Hitler did not intervene. expansionist Germany? In addition, because by 1 93 5 Hitler s rearmament was alarming the rest o Europe, Italy was now perceived to be key to guaranteeing the status quo in Europe. In response to Hitler s policies, Italy, B ritain and France met in the Italian town o S tresa in April 1 935 . The Final D eclaration o the Stresa C on erence , signed on 1 4 April 1 93 5 , aimed to rea frm the Locarno Treaties and to confrm the independence o Austria. The three powers also agreed to resist urther attempts to breach the Treaty o Versailles. Together, they protested against Hitler s violation o the Treaty o Versailles. This Stresa Front agreed to work to prevent any uture changes to the European settlement. (See also pages 21 4 2 1 5 .) However, the agreement was vague and did not even specifcally name Germany. No methods to uphold their aims were agreed. In act, Italy had been keener than B ritain to adopt a frm stance regarding Germany; B ritain was more concerned not to o end Hitler. None o the signatories would sanction an actual invasion o Germany. Nevertheless, Mussolini knew that a resurgent Germany would righten B ritain and France, and that this could lead them to be more accommodating towards Italian territorial demands. The Stresa Front also gave Italy more protection rom . Most signifcantly, Mussolini got the impression during the Stresa talks that, in working with B ritain and France, he had gained their consent to expand Italian control in Abyssinia. Only two months later, in June 1 93 5 , B ritain apparently broke the principles agreed at Stresa when it signed the Anglo German Naval Agreement with Hitler s Germany ( see page 2 1 4) . B y signing this agreement, B ritain had condoned German naval rearmament and had done so without consulting its S tresa Front allies. Mussolini believed that this action ended the S tresa agreement. Source skills Robert Mallet, a B ritish historian and settlement o ered ascist Italy, i allied to academic, in an academic book Mussolini and Germany, clear possibilities or the creation the Origins of the Second World War, 1 93 3 40, o Mussolini s long anticipated B alkans, (1 983 ) . Mediterranean and Red Sea empire. As Mussolini stressed to Hungarian prime In the long- term Hitler s avowed minister, Gyualia G mb s, that same spring, determination to overturn the Versailles 133 he did not intend E thiopia to be the limit o policy should consider its uture de ence rom an Italian expansionist drive. O n the contrary, German incursions to be an absolute priority. a ter taking E thiopia he would also conquer Meanwhile the Italian military continued to the B ritish-controlled territories o Egypt express their own reservations to the wisdom and the S udan, thereby linking Italian north o Mussolini s enterprise In actual act, A rica possessions with those to the east o Mussolini had already elected to give orthodox the continent. Italy s empire would stretch diplomacy one last try. Amid rumours that uninterrupted rom the Mediterranean to the the German and Austrian general sta s had Indian O cean. recently held conversations, the dictator requested a meeting o B ritish, French and B ut in the immediate short term Mussolini Italian statesmen that April at Stresa, in continued to ace domestic anxiety over his northern Italy I Mussolini had wanted to plans or Ethiopia. The ear that Hitler might sow anxiety within o fcial German circles, he well attempt a coup against Austria once Italy had succeeded. had deployed large numbers o troops to East A rica remained widespread, and Mussolini First question, part a 3 marks could not move without quelling Italian According to this source, what were Mussolini s anxieties which, by mid 1 93 5 , were mounting. key motives or engaging in the Stresa Front The oreign ministry, although having given agreements? support to Mussolini s A rica policy, remained emphatic in its demands that Austria should Second question 4 marks remain an independent state. A detailed report With re erence to the origin, purpose and content on the current European situation o 2 nd April o this source, assess its values and limitations or concluded that Austria amounted to Italy s own historians studying Mussolini s oreign policy in demilitarised zone , and that Italian de ence the 1 92 0s. ATL Examiner s hint: Remember Sel -management, social and thinking skills that, as this is a to what In pairs, discuss and make bullet point notes on the ollowing question. extent question, you should identify points that agree and Mussolini s foreign policy had only limited success up to 1 935. To what extent points that disagree with the do you agree with this statement? assertion that Mussolini s foreign policy had only limited success up to 1 935. Italian foreign policy, 1935 39 Mussolini s Italy was at war continuously between 1 93 5 and 1 93 9. The key turning point in Italian oreign policy was the invasion o Abyssinia in 1 93 5 3 6, which would take Italy s oreign policy on a new course. This action was condemned by the League o Nations and limited sanctions were imposed. Although its aggression had a negative impact on its relations with the Western democracies, the invasion was received positively in Italy. The conquest o Abyssinia led to a surge o nationalist eeling and this in turn encouraged Mussolini to urther acts o aggression. What were the domestic infuences on Italian agriculture had not ul lled Mussolini s goal o autarky oreign policy in 1935 39? and the economy would not be able to sustain a general war. The limited war in Abyssinia and the intervention in There was a lack o support rom the political elites, Spain would be a drain on Italian resources. These actors including the King, or a shi t in Italian oreign policy that had to be borne in mind while Mussolini still aspired to had traditionally supported Britain. These groups were control the Mediterranean and maintain the momentum o generally hostile to the Germans. The economic situation Fascistization that had ollowed the war in East A rica. also infuenced oreign policy. Italian industry and 134 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 Why did Mussolini invade Abyssinia in October 1935? Source skills Source A Source B A sp eech Mussolini made to the Italian Patricia Knight. Mussolini and Fascism (2 003 ) . p ublic the day before the Italian invasion of The invasio n o Abyssinia was undertaken Abyssinia, O ctober 1 93 5 . primarily to de mo nstrate Italy s great power It is not only our army that marches to its status and, in doing so, avenge Adowa, objective, 44 million Italians march with that the scene o the disastrous de eat o Italian army, all united and alert. Let others try to tro op s in 1 8 9 6 . O ne o the mo re rustrating commit the blackest injustice, taking away aspects o Versailles had bee n Italy s ailure Italy s place in the sun. When, in 1 91 5 , Italy to acquire any new colo nie s and Mussolini united her ate with the Allies, how many no w intended to recreate the glories o the promises were made? To fght the common Ro man E mp ire and achieve a place in the victory Italy brought her supreme contribution sun to rival B ritain and France . Further o 670,000 dead, 480,000 disabled and more mo tives were the p ro sp ect o economic than one million wounded. When we went to gains in the orm o o il, co al and go ld and the table o that odious peace they gave us only o A rican recruits or the Italian army. the crumbs o colonial booty. Mussolini also tho ught o E ast A rica as a ertile area or Italian settlement, given the First question, part a 3 marks exp ected increase in p op ulatio n ro m the What, according to S ource A, were the reasons or B attle or B irths. Abyssinia was in any case the invasion o Abyssinia? the o nly remaining uncolo nized A rican te rritory and se eme d an easy target, given Second question 4 marks Italy s military sup eriority and its p resence With re erence to the origin, purpose and content in ne ighbo uring E ritre a and S omaliland. o Source A, assess its values and limitations or historians studying the Italian invasion o Abyssinia. E xaminer s hint: Read the provenance o Source A or the invasion and what the Italian public would again. In response to the second question, consider the have related to at the time. It o ers an insight into values and limitations given below. what Italians saw as important in October 1 935. Would you have ound the same values and Limitations limitations? Mussolini needed to justi y his policies publicly and Which ones had you not thought o ? may not be representing the wider views held in Italy at the time. Do you have any comments to add? The date o the speech may be a limitation, as Values it is the day be ore the invasion and Mussolini A value o the origin is that it is a speech made by the needs to rally support. Indeed, as this is a speech, dictator o Italy himsel , and Mussolini directed oreign it is probably propaganda. Other motives or the policy. The author had planned and ordered or the invasion, such as to rally public support or his invasion o Abyssinia. personal dictatorship, would not be revealed. A value o the purpose is that it o ers insight into The speech lacks hindsight as it was given on the eve how the invasion was presented at the time to the o the invasion. Italian public. As it is a speech, it will give the The content ocuses on the justifcations, mainly reasons that Mussolini used to justi y the invasion. historical, or Italian expansion. It presents a highly A value o the content is that it reveals what the one-sided perspective o Italy s position and does not Italian government believed to be the key reasons elaborate on the specifc aims o Il D uce. 135 Thinking skills Thinking skills Re er back to the terms o the In pairs, discuss the ollowing questions. Treaty o London on page 87, 1 What key actors motivated the Italian invasion o Abyssinia according to and the gains Italy attained rom Source B on page 135? the Paris Peace Settlement on page 90. In pairs or small groups, 2 Attempt to fnd evidence rom the sources and this chapter that support: discuss the validity o Mussolini s economic motives or the invasion claim that Italy had been given ideological motives or the invasion only the crumbs of colonial booty (Source A page 135) . changing diplomatic alignments in Europe as a actor in the invasion. Musso lini s o reign policy o bj e ctives in invading Abyssinia, which had not yet bee n co lo nize d, o riginated in the lo nge r- te rm Italian Communication skills natio nalist ambitions to build an emp ire and to beco me a gre at imperial p o wer like B ritain and France. He also asp ired to an empire Draw a mind map that akin to the classical Ro man E mp ire, which had contro lled large summarizes the reasons swathes o A rican te rritory. or Mussolini s invasion o Abyssinia. The political reason or the invasion was to consolidate Mussolini s personality cult ( Il Duce) and to rally support behind the regime. War or its own sake was also an element o the Fascist ideal, and this war would give Mussolini an easy victory as Abyssinia was not modernized. It would also be revenge or Italy s ignoble de eat to the Abyssinians in 1 896. In addition, Mussolini would be able to bolster his own military orces by drawing on colonial troops. However, there were also economic reasons or conquering Abyssinia. Mussolini needed to divert attention rom the ailings o the corporate state and the impact o the Great D epression. Abyssinia was targeted in order to gain territory or emigration and to provide an export market or Italian goods. Mussolini also hoped to fnd oil. When Hitler announced German rearmament, Mussolini brie y hesitated in his invasion plans as he did not want to leave himsel too exposed in Europe when he was at war in A rica. However, the S tresa C on erence led him to think he had nothing to ear; the meetings had convinced him that B ritain and France would not obj ect strongly to an expansion o Italian control in the territory. Mussolini also wanted to demonstrate Italy s power to Germany. Nevertheless, Mussolini did not make his plans clear to B ritain and France as he did not want to provoke them in an area where they, too, had colonial Map of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, 1935 36 possessions ( see map) . 136 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 The events What happened? Communication As you see rom the map on the previous page, Italy had already skills acquired colonial territory on the border o Abyssinia. The border itsel Go to www.youtube.com/ lacked clarity, and this lack o clarity gave Mussolini the opportunity to watch?v=op-dD3oUMh0, or manu acture an incident that would lead to war. search for The Abyssnia Crisis, It was Italy that had backed Abyssinia s entry into the League o Nations 1935 6 . in 1 92 3 and ( as you read on page 1 02 ) the two countries had signed a This clip from The Road to treaty o riendship in 1 92 8. However, Italy drew up a plan to annex War: Italy shows the Italians Abyssinia in 1 92 9 and an invasion plan in 1 93 2 . Then, in D ecember motives and actions in 1 93 4, Italian orces clashed with Abyssinians at the disputed Wal Wal Abyssinia. oasis, which resulted in the death o 3 0 Italians. Mussolini demanded an apology and considerable compensation; the Emperor o Abyssinia, Haile S elassie, requested an investigation by the League o Nations. However, Mussolini would not entertain the idea o a League investigation, and in a secret order instructed his orces to attain total conquest o Abyssinia. Il Duce made a huge commitment to the war, sending an army with support personnel totalling 5 00, 000 to E ast A rica. The Abyssinians, without modern weapons, were soon in retreat. In S eptember 1 93 5 , the League resolved that neither side could be Class discussion held responsible or the Wal Wal incident as the area had been disp uted. O n 3 O ctober, Italy launched its ull- scale invasion, and Why was the conquest of then on 6 O cto ber, Italian orces captured Ado wa. This had historic Abyssinia important to impo rtance to Italy as its orces had been de eated there in 1 89 6. The Mussolini? Consider the role League o Nations co ndemned Italy as the aggressor on 7 O cto ber of ideology as well as other and, our days later, the League o Nations Assembly voted to impose factors such as economics and sanctions. O n the 1 8 November, these sanctions, although limited, the impact of events outside were p ut into e ect. Italy. D uring the war, tensions between Italy and B ritain reached crisis point in the Mediterranean, where B ritain had two large naval bases. However, B ritain and France wanted to retain good relations with Italy and to maintain the S tresa Front to contain Hitler s Germany. In D ecember 1 93 5 , the B ritish and French oreign ministers, S amuel Hoare and Pierre Laval respectively, drew up a secret pact which would o er Italy hal o Abyssinia to bring about a swi t resolution to the crisis. However, this plan was leaked to the press, and B ritain and France were pressured by public opinion to withdraw the deal ( see C hapter 2 .6) . Italy continued its war and, on 6 April 1 93 6, the Abyssinian army was de eated at Lake Ashangi. Italian orces fnally took the capital, Addis Self-management skills Ababa, on 5 May 1 93 6, and Emperor Haile S elassie ed to B ritain. On 9 May, Abyssinia was ormerly annexed by Italy. It became part Summarize Mussolini s actions o Italian East A rica with Eritrea and Somaliland. in Abyssinia on a detailed timeline. Place Mussolini s Mussolini had his great conquest. The war had the desired impact domestically, with a surge in nationalist sentiment that was urther actions above the timeline. After reading Chapter 2.6, you encouraged by the League s condemnation and economic sanctions. can add the actions of Britain E ven the Italian Queen Mother had supported the war e ort, and and France below the timeline. participated in the call to und the war by donating her gold wedding ring to the government. 137 Thinking skills Source A with a Golden Rose. R. Overy and A. Wheatcroft. The Road to War: Mussolini now enjoyed a new role as conqueror and The Origins of World War II, pages 220 21 (2009) . imperialist; his reputation in Italy reached its highest point. The threat o sanctions united public opinion behind Source B Mussolini. There developed a strong anti-British Extracts from Mussolini s telegrams to a commander in sentiment. In ca es, zuppa inglese was re-christened Abyssinia, 1936 37. zuppa imperiale. The war was popular at home. Women exchanged their gold wedding rings or iron substitutes 5 June 1936 to swell the national bullion reserves. The Queen was All rebels made prisoner are to be shot. the rst o 250,000 Roman women to o er her ring in 8 June 1936 [SECRET] a ceremony held at the War Memorial in Rome. A total o ten million were collected nationwide. When the To nish o rebels as at Ancober use gas. war began to go Italy s way in February 1936, the new 8 July 1936 commander, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, became a national I repeat my authorization to initiate and hero. But the victory was won only with a massive war systematically conduct policy o terror and e ort, using all the modern weapons o war against extermination against rebels and populations in Ethiopian tribesmen armed with rifes and spears. By complicity with them. Without the law o ten eyes May 1936 there were over 400,000 Italian and native or one we cannot heal this wound in good time. troops in Ethiopia, and a war that was supposed to cost 1.5 to 2 billion lire in total ended by costing 1 billion lire 21 February 1937 every month. To speed up occupation the Italian air orce Agreed that male population o Goggetti over used gas bombs on Ethiopian soldiers, both mustard gas 18 years o age to be shot and village destroyed. and phosgene, a total o 1521 canisters, which killed and maimed an unknown number o soldiers and civilians. In Questions May the whole o Ethiopia was annexed and on the 9th In pairs or as a class, discuss what the telegrams in King Victor Emmanuel was declared Emperor. The King Source B suggest about the nature o the Italian war in received the news, Mussolini recorded, with tears in his Abyssinia. In what ways do these telegrams support the eyes . The Pope presented the new Empress o Ethiopia points made by Richard Overy in Source A? What were the results o the Abyssinian War? S p eech by Mussolini, May 1 93 6 Italy has her empire at last; a Fascist empire because it bears the indestructible tokens of the will and of the power of the Roman lictors An empire of civilisation and humanity for all the populations of Abyssinia. That is the tradition of Rome, who, after victory, associated the peoples with their destiny. Lowe, C and Marzari, F. 1975. The results of the Abyssinian War for Italy B y May 1 93 6, Italy had won the war. Mussolini had succeeded in creating an Italian E ast African empire. The war had been won relatively quickly and had co st only 1 , 000 Italian casualties. Mussolini had demonstrated Italian military might and he had expanded the Italian empire. This was to be the peak of his foreign policy success. Giovanni Gentile, a Fascist philosopher, claimed: Mussolini has not just founded an empire in Ethiopia. He has made something more. He has created a new Italy . 138 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 Nevertheless, the assault on Abyssinia had initiated a Mediterranean scare and the Naval C hie o S ta Admiral D omenico C avagnari warned Mussolini against raising tension with B ritain. Indeed, the Italian navy was incomplete due to unfnished building and modernization programmes and it could not take on the B ritish Royal Navy. A naval war between Italy and France, and their ally Yugoslavia, was possible, but C avagnari cautioned that a naval war with B ritain would mean certain de eat. In addition, although the League o Nations li ted sanctions in July, the Italian victory had come at a high economic price. The budget defcit had risen rom 2 .5 billion to 1 6 billion lire during the war, and there was the continued cost o maintaining 2 5 0,000 occupying troops. In October 1 93 6, the lira was devalued by 40% , which hit the middle classes hard. Italian trade had to shi t to Germany due to the sanctions imposed by the League. The erocity and atrocities perpetrated by Italian orces gave them a reputation or great brutality. Finally, or Italy, the war did not really end in 1 936. The Italians were orced to fght a drawn-out guerrilla war in Abyssinia until it ell to the British in 1 941 . The results of the war for collective security Source skills The war had once again exposed the weakness Source A o the League o Nations, which had been utterly An Italian p oster rom May 1 93 6, Italy ine ective in its response to Italian aggression. It fnally has its E mp ire . also caused Italy to move away rom good relations with Britain and France, and closer to Germany. Indeed, it is signifcant that, during the war, on 6 January 1 936, Mussolini told the German ambassador that he no longer had objections to Austria becoming a German satellite. He stressed, however, that it must remain independent. Then, on 22 February 1 936, Mussolini agreed to the German rearmament o the Rhineland; this meant Italy would no longer uphold its Locarno obligations. (See page 1 62 or urther discussion o the impact o Mussolini s actions on Germany.) Source B A cartoon by D avid Low published in the UK newsp ap er, the Evening Standard, on 1 5 February 1 93 5 . First question, part b 2 marks for each source Second question 4 marks What is the message of the artists in S ources A With reference to its origin, purpose and content, and B ? assess the values and limitations of Source B for historians studying the Italian war with Abyssinia. Thinking skills 1 Discuss, in pairs or small groups, the key diferences in how Source A and B each get their message across to the viewer. Which source is more efective in achieving this? 2 In what ways could the Abyssinian crisis be seen as a turning point in international relations? Source skills Fourth question 9 marks b Using the sources and your own knowledge, Here are some examples of the style of question discuss the results of the Italian invasion of you could expect for the Fourth question on a Abyssinia in 1 93 6. Paper 1 set on the Italian expansion in Abyssinia: c Using the sources and your own knowledge, a Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree that Mussolini s examine the reasons for the Italian invasion of foreign policy was wholly successful up Abyssinia in 1 93 6. to 1 93 6 . 140 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 ATL Communciation and social skills Write a brief plan for the own knowledge part of each of the questions a, b and c on page 140. Share your plans with a partner. Give feedback on each other s plans by answering the following questions. 1 Have you and your partner structured your plans to meet the command terms of each question? TOK 2 Are there key points that your partner has missed? Spend 30 minutes reviewing 3 What points has your partner included that you have not? the primary sources in the case studies you have covered thus far. With a partner discuss how far you agree with the following Why did Italy intervene in the Spanish Civil War statement: in 1936 39? Sources from the time are Mussolini s success in Abyssinia encouraged him to look or urther always biased and give an military greatness and, when civil war broke out in S pain in 1 93 6, he incomplete picture of events. quickly decided to intervene. Taking military action was in line with Follow up on your discussion by Fascist ideals regarding the central role o war and society. Mussolini considering how the limitations hoped to gain naval bases in the B alearic Islands rom General Franco of sources pose a challenge for in return or his assistance, and had aspirations to re-establish the historians. Feedback to the class. Mediterranean Roman Empire. Nevertheless, Italian intervention in the S panish C ivil War was also motivated by ideology; Mussolini responded to requests or assistance The S p anish C ivil War rom the militarist rebels to help fght against liberal democracy and 1 93 6 3 9 socialism. Mussolini had made, as he had done in Germany, close The S panish C ivil War connections to right- wing groups in Spain since the installation o a new was a war ought between S panish Republic in 1 93 1 . He wanted to stop communism spreading Spanish Republican in S pain and to prevent communists rom attaining a strategically orces, who supported important position at the mouth o the Mediterranean. Indeed, he the democratically presented the rationale or intervention to the Italian public as part o elected le t- wing the continuing struggle against Marxism. Finally, he also intended to coalition Popular Front weaken France, part o his wider oreign policy obj ectives, as France government and S panish had close links with the le t Popular Front government that Franco Nationalist orces who and the generals were attempting to overthrow. Thus, Mussolini would supported conservative prevent France rom gaining in uence in a le t- wing S pain, and would and right- wing groups. strengthen his own strategic position in the Mediterranean. These included ascists, Zara S teiner highlights another reason: supporters o the church, the military and the royal Mussolini saw in the Spanish War an opportunity to fashion the new Italy amily. The Nationalists, and the new Italian . There is only one way to create a warlike people , led by General Franco, had the Duce claimed, to have ever greater masses who have waged war and ever attempted to seize power greater masses who want to go to war . S teiner, 2 01 1 in a coup in July 1 93 6. A Howeve r, unlike during his invasion o Abyssinia, Mussolini did civil war developed, when no t have a clear plan when he sent his orces to S p ain; nor were the Nationalist orces there clear nationalist goals that could ap peal to the wider Italian ailed to take the capital, po pulation. Italy sent mo re assistance, including 7 0, 00 0 tro ops, to Madrid, and hal the army Franco than any o ther country and the war raged on ar longer than remained loyal to the he had anticipated. government. 141 What were the results o intervention in the Spanish Civil War? Although the intervention was supported by the C hurch as Franco s orces had aligned themselves with the Roman C atholic C hurch in S pain, it was not generally popular with Italians. Indeed, the consequences were mainly negative or Italy: The economic cost had been high; the lira was devalued and it lost hal its oreign currency reserves. The total cost o the war amounted to around 1 4 billion lire and it led to Italy increasing its trade with Germany. One third o Italy s arms stocks were consumed by the war. Although Italy had helped secure a right-wing regime in Europe, and was on the winning side, Italy s military weakness had been exposed. For example, Italian orces were roundly de eated by the International B rigades fghting or the Republic at the B attle o Guadalaj ara in March 1 937. Italian submarine attacks on supply ships led to increased tension between Italy and France and B ritain. General Franco maintained his independence and Spain did not become an Italian satellite state. Italy drew closer to Germany. Thinking skills 1 What does the extract below rom the historian Richard or France. From 1937 onward Mussolini, who Overy suggest about: now bore sole responsibility or the three service the economic impact that Mussolini s wars in departments in the Italian government, began Abyssinia and Spain had on Italy to authorize substantial new programmes o rearmament The great weakness o the the impact o domestic economic weaknesses on Italian strategic position was the economy. Italy Italian oreign policy? was heavily reliant on oreign sources o raw War had become an addiction or Mussolini. His materials, particularly coal, oil and iron ore, and conversation had always been spiced with a was very vulnerable to blockade She lacked vocabulary o confict, but a ter Ethiopia and Spain, the real means to play the part o a great power. he came to see himsel as a great war leader. In Mussolini declared the need or a policy o sel - March, 1938, jealous o the King s position as ormal su iciency To ensure that the strategy worked, head o the armed orces, he appointed himsel and the state extended controls over the economy his monarch as First Marshals o the Empire to like in Germany, on trade, investment, and labour create a spurious equality between them. Yet without utilization. By 1939 the state owned 80% o the expanding and modernizing Italy s armed orces, country s arms capacity. Italy was trans ormed into uture war are was in jeopardy The limited e ort a war economy in peacetime. in Ethiopia and Spain orced Italy to spend almost as Overy, R and Wheatcro t, A. 2009. The Road to War: The much o her national income on armaments as richer, origins of World War II, pages 222 23. industrialized Germany, and twice as much as Britain Random House. London, UK 142 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1936 The new relationship between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany One o the key results o the S panish C ivil War or Mussolini was that he now committed himsel to a ormal alliance with Germany by signing the Rome B erlin Axis Alliance on 2 5 O ctober 1 93 6. This coalition agreement between Italy and Germany was drawn up by Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo C iano. Source skills A p ublic sp eech announcing the Rome histo ry in common. B oth believe in will as B erlin Axis by B enito Mussolini, the determining power in the li e o nations 1 November 1 93 6. and the driving orce o their history B oth are based on young people, whom we This vertical line between Rome and B erlin train in discipline, courage, resistance, lo ve is an axis around which all the European o the atherland, and co ntempt or easy states animated by the will or collaboration living Germany and Italy ollow the same and peace can collaborate. It is not a matter goal in the sphere o economic autarky. o surprise that today we hoist the fag o Without economic independence the political anti-B olshevism independence o a nation is doubt ul. We have in common many elements o our Weltanschauung [world view] . Not First question, part a 3 marks only have National S ocialism and Fascism According to this source, what key actors do everywhere the same enemies, in the service Mussolini s Italy and Hitler s Germany have o the same master, the Third Internatio nal, in common? but they have many co nceptio ns o li e and The end of Italian participation in Collective Security Third International Italy joined the Anti- C omintern Pact in November 1 93 7, with Germany This was also known as the and Japan. The Pact was directed against the C ommunist International, Communist International or and stated that in the case o an attack by the S oviet Union the Comintern. It was an association signatories would consult on measures to sa eguard their common of national Communist Parties interests . B y j oining the Pact, the member states now ormed the group founded in 1919. that would become the Axis Powers. Although Italy had drawn closer to Germany during the mid- 1 93 0s, the Axis Pact is seen by some historians as a key turning point or Italian oreign policy. Indeed, in D ecember 1 93 7 Italy le t the League o Nations. Italy s new relationship with Germany was most starkly apparent with regard to Austria. As you have already read, Mussolini had promoted and protected Austrian independence since the end o the First World War. Indeed, he had success ully warned Hitler o in 1 93 4. However, in 1 93 6 Mussolini told the Austrian government to deal directly with Germany, thus implying that Italy would no longer protect it, and in 1 93 8 he accepted when Hitler invaded Austria. This represented a maj or shi t in the Italian position on Austria. The creation o Austria had been a key strategic gain or Italy at Versailles, and Mussolini s shi t in policy was not popular domestically. 143 Source skills Source A suppressed, Italian military support could be D enis Mack S mith. Mussolini (1 983 ) . relied upon to prevent a German invasion. A ter the Nazis won power in January 1 93 3 , Source B Mussolini had ideological as well as pragmatic The German Ambassador to Italy rep orts reasons or closer ties with Germany. The back to the German Foreign Ministry his victory o Hitler is also our victory was his conversation with Mussolini in January immediate comment: a victory he had helped 1 93 6. with arms and money and which raised the [Mussolini] thought it would now be possible possibility o creating a new Rome- B erlin to achieve a undamental improvement in axis. Hitler sent him messages o homage German- Italian relations and to dispose o the and admiration, and other Germans were only dispute, namely, the Austrian problem ready with positive encouragement or Italy The simplest method would be or B erlin to replace France as the dominant power and Vienna themselves to settle their relations in North A rica and the Mediterranean. I in the orm o a treaty o riendship this encouragement was sincere, here was a which would in practice bring Austria into basis or agreement. Tentative eelers were Germany s wake, so that she could pursue no there ore put out to see whether the Germans other oreign policy than one parallel with would agree to confne their ambitions to that o Germany. I Austria, as a ormally quite Poland and the B altic, leaving Italy ree in independent state, were thus in practice to the Mediterranean and the B alkans One become a German satellite, he would raise no obstacle to such an axis was Hitler s ideas obj ection. about racial inequality A more serious obstacle to an entente with Germany was Source C the Nazi ambition to annex Austria, whereas A cartoon by D avid Low, E urop ean clothes- Mussolini had confdently promised to de end line , p ublished in the UK newsp ap er, the his country against Prussian barbarism Evening Standard on 9 May 1 93 3 . Three times in 1 93 3 , D oll uss was brought to Italy and given a clear promise that, i both the Nazi and socialist parties in Austria were C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 First question, part a 3 marks Second question 4 marks According to S ource A, what were the key areas With re erence to the origin, purpose and content o dispute between Italy and Germany? o S ource B , assess the values and limitations o this source or a historian studying Mussolini s First question, part b 2 marks position on Austria in the 1 93 0s. What is the message o S ource C ? ATL Thinking and self-management skills 1 In pairs, discuss the reasons for the change in Mussolini s position towards Austria by 1938. 2 How far was the alliance between Mussolini and Hitler an alliance of equals? What was Italy s role during the Sudetenland See page 178 for a full account of the Sudetenland Crisis. crisis in September 1938? D uring the Munich crisis in September 1 93 8, Mussolini assumed a high profle. He wanted to be seen as a great broker o peace, helping to avert a general war. Following C hamberlain s ailure to gain a peace, deal over the Sudetenland a ter two meetings in Germany, Mussolini stepped in as a peacemaker at Munich. He was hailed in E urope as the architect o peace. However, it was clear by this time that Mussolini was now subservient to Hitler; in act, he had simply put orward Hitler s own plan or the S udetenland. In March 1 93 9, Hitler broke the Munich Agreement and invaded the rest o C zechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement highlighted the weakness o Britain and France, and Mussolini was now determined to take advantage o this. In November 1 938, he instructed the Italian parliament to demand the annexation o C orsica, Nice and Tunis rom France. Mussolini believed that he could win a war against France, and do so with German support. B ritain had shown itsel desperate to prevent a war, at almost any price. Source skills Source A The bars o the prison are C orsica, Tunisia, Mussolini s sp eech to the Fascist Grand Malta, C yprus; the guards o this prison are C ouncil, February 1 93 9. Gibraltar and Suez. C orsica is a pistol pointed at the heart o Italy; while Malta and C yprus Italy is surrounded by an inland sea which is are a threat to all our positions in the central connected to the oceans by the S uez C anal and western Mediterranean. Greece, Turkey, and by the straits o Gibraltar, dominated by Egypt are all states ready to link up with Great the guns o Great B ritain. B ritain and complete the political and military Italy there ore does not have ree access to the encirclement o Italy oceans; Italy there ore is actually a prisoner in From this situation, you can draw the the Mediterranean and the more populated ollowing conclusions: and power ul she becomes the more she will su er rom her imprisonment. 145 1. The task o Italian policy, which cannot presented by Western weakness to change and does not have territorial aims in the map o the world , to make Italian policy continental Europe except or Albania, is genuinely independent o the approval o the initially to break the bars o the prison. West. B ut at the same time he knew that Italy was not yet strong enough to risk war with 2. O nce the bars have been broken, Italian a maj or state. Tied down militarily in A rica policy has only one direction: to march to and S pain, with a weakened economy, Italy the ocean. did not pose the same threat as Germany. Which ocean? The Indian Ocean, connecting C hamberlain con essed that i he could get Libya to Ethiopia through the Sudan, or the a German settlement he would not give a Atlantic Ocean through French North A rica. rap or Musso . O n the other hand Mussolini In both cases, we come up against Anglo- was aware that B ritain and France were not French opposition. It is stupid to try to resolve the powers they had been in the 1 92 0s. His this problem without covering our backs analysis o the old empires as decadent and on the C ontinent. The policy o the Rome- spineless, frst ormulated in 1 93 5 , seemed B erlin Axis thus caters or this undamentally truer a ter Munich. important historical question. First question, part a 3 marks Source B What, according to S ource A, are key oreign Richard O very and Andrew Wheatcroft, policy aims or Mussolini s Italy? B ritish p rofessors of history, in an academic Second question 4 marks book The Road to War: The Origins of World War With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, II (2009) . assess the values and limitations o Source B or A ter Munich Mussolini s options became historians studying Mussolini s oreign policy in narrower still. The German success ed his the 1 93 0s. desire to share with Hitler the opportunity Class discussion Why did Italy invade Albania in April 1939? Hitler broke the terms o the Munich Agreement in March 1 93 9 when Read Source A again. he invaded the rest o C zechoslovakia. Nazi Germany had now gone Discuss the following beyond revision o the Treaty o Versailles and had seized control o a questions: sovereign state. Mussolini had not been consulted by Hitler. He was only 1 What continuity was there in in ormed o the conquest a ter the act. Mussolini now wanted to regain Mussolini s foreign policy in the initiative and emulate Hitler s success. the 1930s? O n 7 April 1 93 9, Italy made a punitive assault on Albania. The invasion 2 What changes had occurred o Albania was rather meaningless as the country had been or some by 1939 in Mussolini s time a satellite state ( see page 1 01 ) . However, Mussolini wanted to foreign policy objectives? assert Italian strength in order to imitate Hitler s success ul expansion, intimidate Yugoslavia, and pursue his ambition o dominating the Adriatic. D ino Grandi claimed that the conquest o Albania would open the ancient paths of the Roman conquests in the east to the Italy of Mussolini and threaten B ritain with the loss of its naval bases, and our complete domination of the Eastern Mediterranean . 146 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 Italian forces landing at Durazzo, Albania How did Italy take over Albania? King Zog o Albania had attempted to assert some independence rom Italy when in 1 9 34 he signed trade agreements with Greece and Yugoslavia. He had also re used to be intimidated when Mussolini sent warships to the region. When, on 2 5 March, Mussolini sent an ultimatum to the capital, Tirana, demanding agreement to the Italian occupation o Albania, King Zog re used. Zog had attempted to keep the Italian ultimatum secret. However, the news was leaked and even the distraction o the birth o a royal baby, his heir, on 5 April did not prevent widespread anti-Italian demonstrations on 6 April. Mussolini sent 1 00 planes to y over Tirana dropping lea ets telling the Albanians to submit but the demonstrators demanded weapons to fght the Italians. Then, although a mobilization o the Albanian reserves was issued, many Albanian o fcers and government o fcials ed the country. Nevertheless, King Zog broadcast a public address to his people stating he would resist Italian occupation. 147 Source skills Source A consideration be given to an outright invasion G. B ruce S trang. On the Fiery March: Mussolini o Albania as a means o securing Italian prepares for war (2 003 ) . domination o the Adriatic. D etermined to secure some orm o immediate gain rom their C iano had been considering annexing Albania. developing, i tricky, relationship with B erlin, The Anschluss, while disquieting or Italy, Mussolini and C iano ordered the operation to also threatened Yugoslavia. He mused that go ahead in early April. The invasion, which [Yugoslav Prime Minister] S toyadinovic s need included a naval bombardment o the port o or Italian riendship might mean that the D urazzo, brought widespread condemnation, Yugoslavian prime minister would be prepared and precipitated yet another crisis in Whitehall. to sacrifce Albania s independence in order to It also poured scorn on Mussolini s declaration secure an Italo-Yugoslav alliance. Mussolini o peace ul Italian intentions during his later agreed, saying that he was prepared to meeting with C hamberlain in January. ace a war, as long as we get Albania . C iano s tour o Albania, preceding Hitler s visit to Italy, Third question 6 marks had represented a kind o reconnaissance C ompare and contrast the views expressed in mission; Mussolini and C iano needed better S ource A and S ource B regarding Italian motives in ormation to determine whether or not or invading Albania in April 1 93 9. their proj ect was desirable or easible. Upon E xaminer s hint: Take a copy o the above his return, C iano submitted a report that sources. Using di erent coloured pens to underline or encouraged Mussolini s expansionist desire. highlight the text, identi y the ollowing comparisons Albania had excellent agricultural potential, and contrasts. C iano wrote, and had very extensive deposits o coal, though no one had yet completed a Comparisons ull list o Albania s potential mineral wealth. Mussolini had been considering annexing On the strategic side, there were several Albania or some time. advantages. In the wake o Anschluss, German economic, cultural, and political tentacles There were strategic reasons or annexing Albania. would reach into the ormer Austrian sphere The Italian relationship with Germany o in uence. A frm warning rom Italy and infuenced Italy s decision to invade. subsequent annexation o Albania would C ontrasts prevent any urther German penetration there. Source A highlights the role o the Italian Foreign Source B Minister Ciano in the decision to invade, whereas Robert Mallet. Mussolini and the Origins of the Source B highlights the role o the Italian Navy. Second World War (1 983 ) . Source B ocuses on the motive o dominating Less than a month a ter Hitler took Prague, the Adriatic, whereas Source A ocuses on the the regime in Rome ordered the invasion o economic gains to be made in Albania. Albania. The idea o an outright annexation o the B alkan state had been under consideration Source A suggests the invasion was to prevent by Mussolini since the time o Hitler s visit Germany increasing infuence in the area, to Rome. It had also been the subject o whereas Source B suggests that it was motivated some discussion by the naval sta and the by Italy attempting to gain rom its developing chie s o sta as a whole. As we have already relationship with Germany. seen, C avagnari had urged B agoglio to give Source A only considers the reasons or the invasion, the Italian strategic position in the Adriatic whereas Source B also considers the results, greater ocus rom his very frst days in charge speci cally the impact on relations with Britain. o the navy. Subsequently, the naval sta had demanded, in the immediate a termath o the Mediterranean crisis o 1 93 5 , that C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 On 7 April, led by General Al redo Guzzoni, Italy invaded Albania with a orce o 1 00, 000 men and 600 aircra t. The Albanian army that Class discussion aced them had only 1 5 , 000 badly equipped troops which had been In small groups, discuss the trained by the Italians. King Zog had hoped to fght a war o resistance impact of Fascism on Italian in the mountains, but Italian agents sabotaged the Albanians limited foreign policy up to April 1939. equipment. B y the a ternoon o the very frst day o fghting, all ports Does everyone in your group were in Italian hands. The King and his amily ed to Greece. agree on the impact of fascism on foreign policy? On 8 April, Italian orces entered Tirana and seized control o all government buildings. Then, on 1 2 April, the Albanian parliament What conclusions can be drawn deposed King Zog in absentia and voted to unite with Italy in personal from your discussions? union . Albania withdrew rom the League o Nations on 1 5 April 1 93 9. The Italians then set up a Fascist government under S he qet Verlaci. The Albanian oreign o fce was merged with the Italian oreign ministry and the Albanian army was put under Italian command. Mussolini declared the o fcial creation o the Italian E mpire and King Victor E mmanuel, already E mperor o Ethiopia, was crowned King o Albania. Mussolini would later use Albania as a base rom which to launch an invasion o Greece on 2 8 October 1 940. Italy and the Second World War Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1939 The Pact o S teel, or Pact o Friendship and Alliance, was signed between Italy and Germany on 2 2 May 1 93 9. The Pact comprised two sections: the frst was a declaration o trust and cooperation between the two nations; the second, a secret protocol, ostered a union o military and economic policies. The original intention had been to include Japan in the Pact but Japan had wanted the ocus to be anti- S oviet, whereas Italy and Germany wanted the agreement aimed at B ritain and France. (S ee pages 1 81 1 82 or more discussion o the Pact o Steel.) D espite the Pact o S teel s apparent show o unity, Hitler and his oreign minister, Ribbentrop, negotiated the Nazi S oviet Pact in August 1 93 9 between the S oviet Union and Germany ( see page 1 83 ) . Mussolini was only told about the agreement two days be ore it was signed. Source skills Richard O very and Andrew Wheatcroft. The dangerous commitments; public opinion was Road to War: The Origins of World War II (2009) . strongly anti- German. Secret police reports showed a growing wave o opposition to war, Now that Mussolini had restored his prestige economic crisis and the link to Germany in Albania by matching German with Italian Mussolini knew that he was increasingly dynamism , he began to contemplate a on his own and resented the humiliating unilateral approach to Germany with the o er evidence o anti- German sentiment. No doubt o an alliance which he was to call the Pact o honour had something to do with his decision B lood . There was strong resistance to such an In May he sent C iano to B erlin with idea inside Italy, even rom the ranks o senior authority to sign an immediate agreement Fascists. The generals were hostile to urther 149 with Hitler pledging ull military assistance might neutralize the threat rom the West in the event o German involvement in war. over Poland. On 2 2 nd May the agreement was signed; Mussolini changed its name to the more First question, part a 3 marks teutonic Pact o S teel . German leaders were According to Overy and Wheatcro t, why was surprised and suspicious at Mussolini s move, there resistance in Italy to the idea o a Pact o though pleased enough that Italian promises S teel with Germany? TOK Why did Italy remain a non-belligerent in 1939? When Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1 93 9, he unleashed a In pairs consider how the general European War. D uring negotiations over the Pact o S teel, Pact o Steel may have been Mussolini had suggested that Italy would not be ready or a general perceived internationally war until 1 943 . Thus, when Hitler ignited war over Poland, Mussolini when it was signed. Why might declared Italy a non- belligerent. historians view the agreement diferently to contemporaries? It would seem that Mussolini s response to the outbreak o war in Europe in September 1 939 was against his aims o creating a warlike militarized society and his view that war strengthened a nation. It was also against the terms o the Pact o Steel with Hitler. Some historians have argued Thinking skills that rom 1 936 Mussolini had sealed the ate o Italy, and rom then on he was on a path directed by Nazi Germany. However, the Italian historian Italian government Renzo De Felice asserts that this was not the case and that Mussolini expenditure for had continued to consider an alliance with Britain and France against defence, 1931 40 Germany until 1 940. (D e Felice has been criticized by le t-wing historians in Italy, such as Paolo Alatri, or being too sympathetic to Mussolini and Year Lire (millions) an apologist or ascism.) However, it could be argued that Mussolini was being realistic in not joining the war. Italy had been waging war or 1931 4,890 several years, in A rica and in Europe, and the country was war weary 1932 4,880 and could not a ord to j oin a general European con ict. 1933 4,300 Why did Italy join the war in June 1940? 1934 5,590 D espite having declared Italy non- belligerent, it was di fcult or 1935 12,624 Mussolini to keep Italy out o the war or several reasons: 1936 16,573 Not to j oin the war was something o an embarrassment or the 1937 13,272 Fascist leader; it was contrary to his Fascist doctrine and at odds with his portrayal o confdent and decisive leadership as Il Duce. 1938 15,028 Mussolini did not want Italy to become a lesser rank power by 1939 27,732 staying neutral; he did not want to be another Switzerland . In 1940 58,899 April 1 940, he said: To make a people great [the country] must be sent into battle . Overy, R and Wheatcro t, A. 2009. The war could give Mussolini the opportunity to radicalize the In pairs discuss what the table regime and to remove the in uence o conservatives and the C hurch. above suggest about Italy s I Italy remained neutral and Germany won the war, Europe would de ence spending. be dominated by a Germany that would be hostile towards Italy because it had remained neutral. The war could bring territorial gains and perhaps control over the Mediterranean. 150 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 However, in the end, the Italian motives for joining the Second World War in June 1 940 were predominantly economic. Germany had been a principal buyer of Italy s food and textiles, and by August 1 939 it owed Italy US $40 million. Italy received German coal in return and became dependent on it. This German coal two thirds of the Italian supply had to be delivered by sea. In March 1 940, B ritain blockaded all German coal ports. In June 1 940, Mussolini declared war on B ritain and France. Source skills Source A Source B Mussolini s declaration of war on B ritain and A 1 941 p oster showing Italian, Jap anese, France, June 1 940. German and Italian soldiers attacking. The text reads Victory! For the new social order, After having solved the problem of our for civilization . land frontiers, we are taking up arms in establishing our sea frontiers. We want to break the territorial and military chains that are strangling us in our own sea. A nation of 45 million souls is not truly free unless it has free access to the ocean. This gigantic struggle is only one phase of the logical development of our revolution it is the struggle of young and fertile peoples against sterile ones who stand on the verge of decline; it is the struggle between centuries and two ideas. Delzell, C. 1971. First question, part a 3 marks What are the key points made by Mussolini in S ource A? First question, part b 2 marks What is the message conveyed by Source B ? 151 Perspectives support. Mussolini continued to ollow this plan until his decision to enter the Second World War in June 1940. Italian historiography In general, le t-wing historians in Italy assert that The British historian AJP Taylor Mussolini had an overtly aggressive oreign policy and Taylor suggests that Mussolini had expansionist goals, expansionist aims. The right-wing historians, such as but that there was a lot o confict between the oreign Renzo De Felice (Mussolini s Italian biographer) , argue policies o Hitler and Mussolini. He argues, however, that that Italy did not have large-scale expansionist plans. De Mussolini thought Hitler would agree to leave Austria Felice views Mussolini s oreign policy in the context o independent and that Italy could then play France and the policies pursued be ore 1914 by the liberal Italian Germany o against each other while gaining concessions government. He argues that, rom the 1920s up to at least rom both. The problem was that Hitler intended to achieve 1935, Mussolini wanted to get France s agreement to Anschluss. establish Italy as a great power with an expanded empire The German historian Gerhard Schreiber in North A rica. To this end, he was advised to pursue the policy o the pendulum or, in other words, to be the Schreiber sees Mussolini s oreign policy as dependent decisive weight in European relations. In addition, the on socio-economic domestic policy. In his view, oreign right-wing historians generally claim that the alliance policy was used or propaganda purposes, and its real with Hitler s Germany was not sealed in order to pursue aim was to gain domestic consensus and limited imperial imperialist objectives. Britain s pressure on France to expansion. He claims that Mussolini had no clear strategy ollow sanctions over Abyssinia may have ostered a aligned to Nazi Germany, and was more a victim o his new course. Felice suggests that Mussolini remained own public promises to his people that he would create a equivocal about Hitler, and hoped to attain his objectives Fascist empire. By the summer o 1940 he there ore had by making one side and then the other pay or his no choice but to join Germany in a general European war. TOK Mussolini s actions in the war up to 1941 Following Mussolini s declaration of war, there were some limited air In small groups review the raids and skirmishes between Italy and France before an armistice came sources by historians in this into effect on 2 5 th June 1 9 40. chapter and investigate other historians who have written Mussolini expanded the war in E urop e in the Mediterranean and on Italian oreign policy in the into No rth Africa. Italian forces invaded E gypt from the Italian colony 1930s. Where possible, nd of Libya, whilst another Italian force invade d Greece from Albania. historians writing in di erent However, both of these Italian offensives failed due to the B ritish languages and at di erent times. response. Mussolini s failures meant Hitler s fo rces were drawn into What di erent viewpoints can both the B alkans and North Africa. German forces took Yugoslavia you nd? and Greece in April 1 9 41 , and forced an evacuation o f B ritish forces. Hitler s fo rces, under General Rommel, had pushed the B ritish back Consider the origin and purpose and advanced as far as E l Alamein in E gyp t by June 1 9 42 . o the publications you gather. Discuss the extent to which the historian s views seem to be Self-management skills infuenced by preoccupations Consider Mussolini s oreign policy aims: at the time o writing. Do you agree with the idea that increase national pride dominate the Mediterranean historical accounts are developed consolidate domestic support or build an empire, gain spazio by individual historians rather his regime vitale(living space) , and expand than through collaboration revise the settlement o 1919 20 territories in A rica between historians? How oster the spread o Fascism. does this compare with the dominate the Balkans methodology in other subjects For each o these aims, identi y the extent to which it had been achieved by 1941 such as the natural sciences? and give evidence or your conclusions. 152 C H APT E R 2 . 3 : I TALI AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 4 0 Full document question: Italy s invasion of Abyssinia Source A will be no need whatsoever o fcially or a La domenica del C orriere, weekend declaration o war and in any case we must sup p lement of the Italian newspaper always emphasise the purely de ensive Corriere della Sera, dep icting Italian character o operations. No one in Europe B lackshirts in action against Abyssinian would raise any di fculties provided the forces, January 1 93 6. prosecution o operations resulted rapidly in an accomplished act. It would su fce to declare to E ngland and France that their interests would be recognised. Source C Ruth Henig. The Origins of the Second World War 1 93 3 41 (1 985 ) . Since his ascension to power in 1 92 2, the Fascist leader had made no secret o his ambition to raise Italy s status as a European power by increasing its in uence around the Mediterranean and by expanding its empire. Unlike Japan, however, Mussolini lacked a strong economic base and well- equipped, e ective military orces, and the onset o the D epression made it even harder or him to secure them. Thus he aimed in the short term to seek glorious expansion on the cheap, possibly in A rica at the expense o Abyssinia, but or that he needed the agreement, or at least tacit consent, o B ritain and France Mussolini was inclined more and more towards the prospect o a glorious, short, triumphant war o conquest. Source D Martin B linkhorn. Mussolini and Fascist Italy, (1 984) . Source B The conquest o E thiopia represented Memorandum from Marshal B adoglio, C hief Musso lini s accomplishment o what had of General S taff to Mussolini, D ecember 1 93 4. been an Italian nationalist dream or hal The problem o Italian- Abyssinian relations a century. Neither the p roblems o the has very recently shi ted rom a diplomatic depression nor the A rican interests o certain plane to one which can be solved by orce industrial pressure groups were su fcient to alone The obj ect is nothing more or dictate it. E xisting colonies were ailing to less then the complete destruction o the attract the millio ns o potential emigrants Abyssinian army and the total conquest o beloved o ascist propaganda, and were Abyssinia. In no other way can we build proving unrewarding to the ew tho usand the Empire The speedier our action the who actually settled there; mo reover, their less likely will be the danger o diplomatic administration, p olicing and economic complications. In the Japanese ashion there in rastructures constituted a considerable drain on the Italian treasury. The explanation or the attack on E thiopia thus lies in First question, part b 2 marks ascism and its D uce. The ascist need or What is the message o the artist in S ource A? excitement, con ict and dramatic success was per ectly p ersonifed in Mussolini himsel Second question 4 marks and sanctifed by the puerile machismo o the With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, D uce cult. O ther dictators such as Franco in assess the values and limitations o Source B or S pain and S alazar in Portugal constructed historians studying the Italian invasion o Abyssinia. personal cults on the ap peal o stability and lack o excitement. Neither Mussolini s Third question 6 marks personality no r the psychology o ascism C ompare and contrast the views expressed in rendered such a thing co nceivable. S ource B and S ource C regarding Mussolini s motives or invading Abyssinia. First question, part a 3 marks According to S ource B how should an Italian Fourth question 9 marks invasion o Abyssinia be executed? Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the reasons or the Italian invasion o Abyssinia. Class discussion References B linkhorn, M. 1 984. Mussolini and Fascist Italy. Methuen. London, UK Source B was written in 1934. Which events does it refer to C alvitt C larke, J and Foust, C . 1 991 . Russia and Italy against Hitler: The when it says: in the Japanese Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1 930s. Greenwood Press. New York, fashion there will be no need for USA a declaration of war... What links D e Felice, R. 1 981 . Mussolini il duce: Lo Stato totalitario (1 936 40). E inaudi. are suggested here between Turin, Italy events in Asia and Japanese expansionism and Italian D elzell, C . 1 971 . Mediterranean Fascism, 1 91 9 45: Selected Documents. expansionist plans? Macmillan. London, UK Henig, R. 1 985 . The Origins of the Second World War 1 933 41 . Routledge. London, UK Knight, P. 2 003 . Mussolini and Fascism. Routledge. London, UK Lowe, C and Marzari, F. 1 975 . Italian Foreign Policy, 1 870 1 940. Routledge. London, UK Mack Smith, D . 1 983 . Mussolini, page 2 1 0. Paladin B ooks. London, UK Mallet, R. 1 983 . Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1 933 40. Palgrave Macmillan. London, UK O very, R and Wheatcro t, A. 2 009. The Road to War: The Origins of World War II. Random House. London, UK S teiner, Z. 2 01 1 . The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1 933 1 999. O x ord University Press. New York, USA S trang, G. 2003 . On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares for War. Praeger. Westport, C T, USA 154 2.4 German expansion, 1933 1938 Causation Consequence Continuity Examine the ways in which Hitler challenged the post-war settlement. Discuss the consequences of Hitler s actions for the international situation. Adolf Hitler, taken in 1933 Hitler becomes German Chancellor 1933 January February Hitler introduces a programme of Hitler leaves the Disarmament Conference rearmament and announces the intention to withdraw October Germany from the League of Nations 1934 January Germany signs a non-aggression pact with Poland Saar Plebiscite 1935 January March Stresa Agreement Anglo German Naval Treaty June Italian invasion of Abyssinia 1936 March Germany remilitarizes the Rhineland Hitler sends military support to Franco s July nationalists in Spain August Hitler s Four Year Plan is drafted Anti-Comintern Pact is made with Japan Rome Berlin Axis November 1937 Hossbach Memorandum 155 As we have seen, Hitler s main foreign policy aim after achieving power was to destroy the Versailles Peace S ettlement, which had to be carried out alongside rearmament. This was achieved between 1 93 3 and 1 93 8 and, in the process, the stage was set for further territorial claims and the outbreak of general war in Europe in 1 93 9. Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1933 The response of B ritain and France to his actions after 1 9 33 would be key for Hitler and his goal of overturning the Treaty of Versailles; Germany s position in E urope was still vulnerable and it remained under the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles. Fortunately for Hitler, the international situation after 1 93 3 worked to his advantage. Britain B ritain was pre- occupied not o nly with the economic crisis but also by events in the Far E ast, where it was worried about Japanese expansion. Its resources were already overstretched, with its main prio rity being the safety of the B ritish E mpire. Many B ritish politicians also considered the Treaty of Versailles to be unfair and supported some redress of legitimate grievances . Many right- wing politicians in B ritain were also afraid of the communist dictato r, S talin, and had sympathy with Hitler, who they also saw as a buffer to the spread of communism from the E ast. The Little Entente France This was a series of France was very concerned by the possible German threat but was too treaties between Romania, weak to act on its own, especially after the failure of its 1 923 intervention Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in the Ruhr. It was also politically divided, following a series of weak which were concluded from governments, and had major economic problems. Lacking support from 1920 to 1921, and aimed to the USA or B ritain in the task of preserving the Versailles settlement, it prevent Austria and Hungary built a defensive line of fortresses along the Maginot Line between 1 92 9 from regaining territory lost and 1 93 8. It also developed alliances with countries on Germany s eastern after the First World War. borders: Poland and The Little Entente countries Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. The USA The economic depression meant that the US A was focused on domestic concerns and was unlikely to change its isolationist stance. O ther factors also worked in Hitler s favour: The international economic situation was encouraging national insularity rather than collective security. The memories of the First World War were still acute, and the horror of this war made many determined to take any measures necessary to prevent another war. 156 C H APT E R 2 . 4 : G E R M AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 3 8 The need to avoid another war was rein orced by the military weakness o B ritain and France at this time. B ritain and France were unable to agree on a common policy or dealing with Hitler. The League o Nation s perceived ailure to deal e ectively with Japanese expansion in Manchuria was a blow to both the Washington System and to the League itsel . The revision o the Treaty o Versailles had already begun; B ritain and France evacuated the Rhineland in 1 92 9 3 0 and German reparation payments were e ectively cancelled at the Lausanne C on erence o 1 93 2 . However, as the historian Zara Steiner writes, even allow in g forthebreakdow n ofthein tern ation alregim e, H itlerm oved w ith a speed an d ultim atepurposethat clearly distin guished him from his predecessors S teiner, 2 01 1 : 95 Germany s challenges to the post-war settlements, 1933 38 Although the international situation avoured Hitler s aims, he still had to be care ul to avoid an international backlash. He thus ollowed a cautious policy. Publicly, Hitler claimed that he desired only peace, and he worked care ully to de use any potential opposition. However, his actions over the next fve years undermined collective security: he worked to withdraw Germany rom multilateral commitments that might limit his action, he isolated France by undermining existing alliances, and, at the same time, he negotiated alliances with B ritain and Italy. Alongside these actions, Hitler was able to e ectively challenge the Treaty o Versailles and to increase the prestige and power o his own dictatorship and o Germany within E urope. Ch allen gin g th e Treaty ofVersailles:With draw alfrom th e Disarm am en tCon feren ce Article 8 o the C ovenant o the League o Nations had demanded that national armaments be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national sa ety . However, the di fculties in implementing an international disarmament policy meant that it took until 1 9 3 2 or an international con erence to be organized. When the D isarmament C on erence fnally convened in Geneva in 1 93 3 , there was still little consensus on how disarmament could be achieved. France, in particular, was unwilling to disarm with the new threat o Nazism on its borders. The events un olding at the same time in Manchuria were also not conducive to thinking about disarmament. Furthermore, it was clear that B ritain and France did not agree about the way that Germany should be treated, with B ritain indicating that it was prepared to make concessions to Germany. German governments prior to Hitler had requested parity o armaments, arguing that Germany would participate only i other countries reduced 157 their armaments to Germany s level, or allowed Germany to rearm to theirs. When France re used this at the D isarmament C on erence in 1 93 3 , Hitler pulled out o both the C on erence and the League o Nations, claiming that these organizations were part o a French conspiracy to keep Germany weak and incapable o sel - de ence. In November 1 93 3 , a plebiscite gave Hitler 95 % approval or his actions, with Germans rej oicing that Germany had at last stood up to the victors . Hitler s withdrawal rom the talks and the League gave him the reedom he needed to launch an assault on the rest o the Treaty o Versailles. Source skills Source A in the month, the lack o an intention to A sp eech by Hitler, broadcast disarm on France s part must be seen to be on 1 4 O ctober 1 93 3 . the cause . Germany cannot tolerate the deliberate In the end, Hitler e ected his purpose by degradation o the nation by the perpetuation using tactics that oreshadowed those he o a discrimination which consists in would employ in the S udeten a air fve years withholding the rights which are granted as a later: he made demands at Geneva that he matter o course to other nations The men was reasonably sure that the other powers who are at present the leaders o Germany would not accept. He insisted that equality have nothing in common with the traitors o o status was not enough and that, since the November 1 91 8. Like every decent Englishman other powers were reluctant to reduce their and every decent Frenchman, we all had our orces to Germany s level, all controls must be duty to our Fatherland and placed our lives at li ted so that it could seek actual equality in its service. We are not responsible or the war its own way. To this kind o intransigence the but we eel responsible or what every honest French, supported by the B ritish government, man must do in the time o his country s re used to yield, insisting on a waiting period distress and or what we have done. We have in which Germany could prove its good such infnite love or our people that we aith and give some indication o what its desire wholeheartedly an understanding with intentions were. This gave Hitler the excuse other nations but, as men o honour, it is he needed and, brushing aside an Italian impossible or us to be members o institutions attempt to fnd a compromise, he announced under conditions which are only bearable to on 1 4 O ctober 1 93 3 that Germany was ending those devoid o a sense o honour both its participation in the con erence and its membership o the League o Nations, an S ince it has been made clear to us rom the institution that he had always regarded as a declarations o certain Great Powers that they symbol o Germany s second class status and were not prepared to consider real equality o or whose members, including the German rights o Germany at present, we have decided ones, he privately elt contempt. that it is impossible, in view o the indignity o her position, or Germany to continue to orce First question, part a 3 marks her company upon other nations. What, according to Source A, is Germany s attitude towards international cooperation? Source B Gordon A. C raig, writing in an academ ic Third question 6 marks book Germany 1 866 1 945 (1 978) . C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ource A and S ource B regarding Hitler and the It was necessary to avoid appearing the D isarmament C on erence. villain o the piece. When the rupture came, [Hitler s] oreign minister told Nadolny later C H APT E R 2 . 4 : G E R M AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 3 8 E xaminer s hint: Highlight the comparisons and in Source A, where the language deliberate contrasts in the sources as shown below. Then write degradation , indignity , devoid o a sense o two ull paragraphs showing clear linkage between the honour shows Hitler s eelings or Germany s sources and giving brie quotes to support your points. treatment. S imilarities C ontrasts In Source A, Hitler talks about degradation and Source A blames certain great powers or the ailure perpetuation o a discrimination and Source B o the Disarmament Con erence, but Source B says re ers to Germany seeing itsel as a second class that Germany was doing this only so that it would not member o the League o Nations. appear to be the villain o the piece . Source A talks about equality o rights or Source A claims that Germany is the victim o other Germany. Source B also says that Germany was countries actions, whereas Source B talks o the looking or equality . intransigence o Germany and claims that Hitler was looking or an excuse to leave the League o Source A blames certain great powers or not Nations. allowing Germany to be on an equal ooting and Source B specifcally names France as a country that In Source A, Hitler says he wants an understanding re used to yield . with other nations , whereas Source B implies that he did not want an understanding but was putting Source B talks o the contempt that Hitler had orward demands that the other powers would not or the League o Nations and this tone is present accept . Undermining collective security: The Non-Aggression Pact with Poland Germany s withdrawal rom the League was a setback or the concept o collective security. Poland, on Germany s eastern border, was particularly vulnerable and, alarmed at the West s ailure to stop Germany rearming, entered into a 1 0-year Non- Aggression Pact with the German government in January, 1 93 4. The Non- Aggression Pact took the world by surprise. The clauses o the Versailles Treaty that had given German land to recreate Poland were particularly resented in Germany; at Locarno, S tresemann had been unwilling to guarantee the eastern borders o Germany even though he had accepted the western border with France as part o the 1 92 5 Locarno Treaty. For the moment, however, this pact suited Hitler. He was unable to take any action against Poland at this stage and, by signing the pact, he was securing his eastern rontier. It also weakened France s security system in Eastern Europe. France had signed an alliance with Poland in 1 92 1 and had hoped that this would keep pressure on Germany s eastern borders. Germany had now broken out o the diplomatic encirclement that the French had attempted to impose on it. The pact also ended any chance o rapprochement between C zechoslovakia and Poland, thus urther undermining the collective security system. Moreover, as this was an unpopular move in Germany, the Non-Aggression Pact looked to the Class discussion international community like an act o statesmanship; it could be used to What do Hitler s actions in convince Britain and others that Germany was a peace ul nation. the years 1933 34 over disarmament and Poland reveal O course, Hitler had no intention o keeping to this agreement. Hitler about his tactics for achieving pre erred bilateral agreements to collective security agreements, as his foreign policy objectives in these could more easily be broken. He declared privately that All our agreements with Poland have a temporary signifcance . these years? 159 Changing diplomatic alignments: Mussolini and Austria In June 1 93 4, Hitler and Mussolini met. However, the meeting was not a success; Mussolini was unimpressed by Hitler and would not agree to Hitler s positio n on Austria. Anschluss, the unifcation o Germany and Austria, had always been an important p art o Hitler s oreign po licy aims, and Hitler tried to persuade Mussolini that Austria should become a satellite o Germany. Mussolini rej ected this, however, as he wanted to keep Austria as a bu er state between Germany and Italy. He was also aware that S outh Tyrol, which had been gained by Italy as part o the Versailles S ettlement, had a substantial German minority. Meanwhile, in Austria, Hitler was supporting the Austrian Nazi Party led by Al red Eduard Frauen eld. The Austrian Nazis organized a campaign o intimidation and terrorism, which culminated in the assassination o the Austrian C hancellor E nglebert D oll uss. This was intended to be the frst step o a coup d tat that would orce the union with Germany. The attempted coup caused international concern. Mussolini immediately mobilized 1 00, 000 troops and moved them to the Hitler and Mussolini meet in Venice in 1934 B renner pass, Italy s border with Germany, in a show o strength in July, 1 93 4. Hitler was orced to back down and to disown the actions Coup d tat o the Austrian Nazis. The right- wing politician Kurt von Schuschnigg This is a sudden and violent took over and stabilized the Austrian regime. take over of government, At this point, there ore, Hitler was orced to play a waiting game usually by a small group of regarding unifcation with Austria. He did not want to alienate Mussolini, people. A putsch is another whose support he would need against the Western democracies, and he word for a coup (for example, reassured Mussolini that Austria would not be annexed. Hitler s attempted Munich putsch in 1923) The growing strength of Germany: The Saar plebiscite, January 1935 In accordance with the Treaty o Versailles, the Saar, a small coal- rich territory, held a plebiscite in 1 93 5 . This area o Germany had been under French control since 1 91 9 and was now given the opportunity to return to Germany. The result o the plebiscite was an overwhelming agreement (9 0.9 % o the vote) that the S aar should return to Germany. This was a triumph or Hitler. The voting was supervised by the League and so done airly, and the result was not surprising given that the entire population o the territory was German. It was nevertheless a great opportunity or Nazi propaganda to rein orce the growing power and strength o Germany and the popularity o the Nazi regime. Historian Gordon C raig writes: This success, with which the other Powers made no attempt to interfere, marked the beginning of a new phase in his policy. He had survived the period of extreme vulnerability unscathed, and, thanks to the distractions and differences of the other Powers, his own tactical skill, and a good deal of luck, had been able in the course of two years to free himself from the restraints of the European security system. C raig, 1 978 160 C H APT E R 2 . 4 : G E R M AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 3 8 Source skills A p oster from 1 93 4, in the lead up to the Saar p lebiscite. The words at the foot read To Germany . Communication skills Go to http://www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-acclaimed-in-saar- news-in-a-nutshell. Watch the Path News clip showing Hitler s arrival in the Saar. How does Hitler use this event to show his growing power? Thinking and self-management skills Look back at Craig s assessment o Hitler s situation by the end o 1935. He identifes several reasons or Hitler s success: Hitler s tactical skill luck the distractions and di erences o the other powers. Find examples rom the period 1933 35 to support each o these actors. Which o these actors do you consider to be the most signifcant in explaining Hitler s success? (You may want to review your answer to the question on page 159, identi ying the di erent tactics that Hitler used.) First question, part b 2 marks What is the message o this poster? Challenging the Treaty o Versailles: Rearmament Joachim von Ribbentrop As early as February 1 93 3 , Hitler told his generals that rearmament was Ribbentrop started o as the most pressing priority: the next fve years must be devoted to the de ence Hitler s adviser on oreign capacity o the Germany people . In act, Germany had always ignored the policy. In 1935 he negotiated rearmament clauses o the Treaty o Versailles. With the cooperation o the Anglo German Naval the Soviet Union under the Rapallo Treaty (see page 1 2 1 ) , Germany had Agreement, and in August 1936 continued to build aircra t and to train and expand its army. In this sense, he was appointed ambassador Hitler was continuing what had already been started by previous German to Britain. He hoped to arrange governments. However, he now increased the pace o rearmament an alliance with Britain but dramatically. ultimately ailed in this goal; he B y 1 93 5 , the army had increased rom 7 to 2 1 divisions. C onscription was not helped by his arrogant was introduced in the same year; the army increased to 3 6 divisions and behaviour. A ter this, he became over hal a million men. In March 1 93 5 , Hermann G ring, one o Hitler s negative towards Britain, seeing ministers, revealed the existence o the Lu twa e, which by this time it as weak. In 1938 he became had around 2 , 5 00 planes. Hitler justifed this level o rearmament on the oreign minister, a post he kept grounds that B ritain and France had ailed to disarm and that Germany until 1945. needed to be able to protect itsel against the growing Soviet Army. 161 Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: The remilitarization of the Rhineland Early in 1 936, Hitler turned his attention to the Rhineland. This area had been demilitarized East under the terms o the Treaty o Versailles. In Prussia order to provide security or France, no military installations or garrisons were permitted on the le t bank or within 50 kilometres o the right Poland bank o the River Rhine. Germany Belgium For Hitler, the remilitarization o the Rhineland would be an important step in his Rhineland France C ze c plans or strengthening Germany; he would h os l Saar a va k be able to build ortifcations there to prevent ia an attack rom France. Rhineland Austria Austria The timing o Hitler s actions in 1 93 6 was Hungary Sudetenland led both by domestic and international Danzig Free City Italy considerations. In Germany, rising prices and Disputed territories around Germany, 1935 38 ood shortages were causing unrest among the population and Hitler needed to distract attention rom economic problems. Internationally, the Abyssinian crisis provided an ideal opportunity to take action. Mussolini s break with the B ritish and French over this crisis meant that he was now seeking closer ties with Hitler, and so he agreed not to oppose Hitler s takeover o the Rhineland. Hitler also knew that he could take advantage o the act that B ritain and France were distracted by both this crisis and the allout rom the Hoare Laval Pact (see page 2 04) . Hitler s excuse or moving troops back into the Rhineland was the Franco Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty ( see page 2 1 4) , which was ratifed on 4 March 1 93 6. He argued that this violated the spirit o the Locarno Pact and threatened Germany with encirclement. Source skills A sp eech by Hitler, March 7 1 93 6. B ut should this happen then this new B olshevik state would be a section o the To this [the Locarno] Pact Germany made B olshevik International, which means that a a contribution which represented a great decision as to aggression or non- aggression sacrifce because while France ortifed would not be taken in two di erent states her rontier with steel and concrete and , but orders would be issued rom one armaments, and garrisoned it heavily, a headquarters, not in Paris but in Moscow. condition o complete de encelessness was imposed upon us on our Western Frontier. This gigantic mobilisation o the East against C entral E urope is opposed not only to the France had not concluded this Treaty with a letter but to the spirit o the Locarno Pact. E uropean power o no signifcance S oviet Russia is the exponent o a revolutionary C ited in Norman H. B aynes. 1 969. political and philosophical system Its political creed is world revolution. First question, part a 3 marks It cannot be oreseen whether this philosophy According to Hitler, how has France gone against will not be victorious in France as well. the spirit o the Locarno Pact? 162 C H APT E R 2 . 4 : G E R M AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 3 8 B oth Hitler s generals and the German Foreign O ce were hesitant about marching into the Rhineland, viewing it as a dangerous action likely to provoke a response rom B ritain and France. However, Hitler decided to take a gamble, hoping that the diplomatic disarray caused by the Abyssinian crisis would prevent B ritain and France rom taking any e ective action. However, he later said, the 48 hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-wracking of my life. If the French had marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs. German troo ps moved into the Rhineland on 7 March 1 93 6. In act, this was not a surprise to the B ritish and the French, who had received intelligence warnings that this was about to hap pen. However, no action was taken by either the B ritish or the French to stop the remilitarization, despite the act that the Germans invaded with a relatively weak military orce. The success ul invasion was acco mpanied by a peace o er, which was again intended to make Hitler look as though he was a man o peace and to divert the attentio n o B ritain and France away rom his challenge to the post- war settlement. The o er included demilitarizing the Rhineland, providing B ritain and France created similar zones on their sides o the rontier as well. He also suggested that he was interested in negotiating new security pacts with his neighbours and returning to the League o Nations. Source skills E xaminer s hint: How many marks would you give the following answer? The overall message here is that both the German troops and the occupants o the Rhineland were happy about the German action. This can be seen by the expressions on the aces o both the soldiers and the citizens who are also giving fowers to the troops. The Nazi fags that are fying rom every building would also First question, part b 2 marks indicate support or the What is the message o this photograph? remilitarization. Thinking and communication skills Read the views o historians Kershaw and Craig on the Source B impact o the remilitarization o the Rhineland. Identi y and Gordon A. Craig. Germany 1 866 1 945 (1 978) , make notes on: p age 691 . why this success was important to Hitler s position in With the [invasion o the Rhineland] Hitler Germany had e ectively destroyed the post-First World why it changed the international situation. War security system. The German remilitarisation Source A o the Rhineland was a victory not merely in the sense that it enhanced German prestige. Its Ian Kershaw, Hitler (1 991 ) , p age 1 2 4. psychological e ect was to reveal the exclusively The remilitarisation o the Rhineland was important in de ensive nature o French strategical thinking, the context o rearmament; it matched the revisionist and this had devastating consequences among expectations o the traditional conservative-nationalist France s allies. Be ore the year was out, the elites; and it was hugely popular among the masses King o the Belgians was seeking release rom o the population even in circles otherwise distinctly the obligations incurred by the treaties o 1920 cool about the Nazi regime. As the re-establishment o and 1925, and his government had abandoned German sovereignty over territory which no one disputed the intention o extending the Maginot Line into was Germany, it would have been on the agenda o any Belgium and had set a course back towards strict nationalist German government. And given the well- neutrality. There were tremors in the Little Entente known divisions between Britain and France in their as well, where politicians with an eye to the main stance towards Germany, it was an issue which more chance began to weigh the advantages o getting than most stood a likely chance o success. But precisely on to Hitler s bandwagon. All in all, the F hrer had the manner in which Hitler achieved his notable triumph good reason to exult, as he viewed the disarray o was guaranteed to give a massive boost to his leadership French ortunes, The world belongs to the man position. He had been proved right again, in the teeth o with guts! God helps him . Foreign O ce hesitancy and military anxiety. And his popularity among the masses had never been higher. Communication Increasing the infuence o Nazism: The Spanish Civil War Spain became the battlefeld or a European-wide struggle between the orces skills o communism and socialism on the one hand and the orces o Fascism on the Go to http://www.britishpathe. other. Henig, 1 985 com/video/scraps-o -paper. Mussolini and Hitler were pushed closer together when they both Watch the Path News clip intervened in the S panish C ivil War on the side o Franco. showing Hitler s invasion o the Rhineland. What As you will have read in the previous chapter, the S panish C ivil War impression does the ootage began in 1 93 6 with a nationalist revolt led by the army against the and the commentary give about republican Spanish government. Germany at this time? B oth sides appealed to the international community or help in this confict. General Franco led the Nationalists and he asked or help rom Germany and Italy, while the Republican government hoped to get TOK support rom B ritain, France and the Soviet Union. Review the historian s accounts Germany did not send ground troops but played a key role in transporting in Source A and Source B above. Franco s troops rom Morocco to Spain at the start o the confict, and Discuss the use o in German bombers o the C ondor Legion caused havoc by attacking civilian the accounts given by each centres, most notoriously Guernica in April 1 93 7. German submarines historian. To what extent are also attacked government ships in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, in their views infuenced by contrast to Mussolini ( see page 1 41 ) , Hitler placed limits on the extent o and hindsight? German involvement. 164 C H APT E R 2 . 4 : G E R M AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 3 8 Hitler had several reasons or intervening in this civil war: He wanted a riendly government in S pain that would supply Spanish mineral resources and also provide military bases or German submarines. He would be able to test out his air orce and see the e ects o air attacks on civilian populations. Sel -management Refer back to Chapter 2.3. He was able to pose as the de ender o E uropean civilization against Compare and contrast the the C ommunist threat. importance of involvement in A pro-Fascist government in Spain would urther undermine the Spanish Civil War for the French security. foreign policies of Mussolini and Hitler. What were the results o this confict or Hitler s position in Europe? The war dragged on or three years, polarizing opinion in Europe. It rein orced suspicions between B ritain and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, thereby preventing a strong anti- Fascist alliance. It distracted the West, and B ritain s ailure to take any strong action ( see page 2 1 7 ) led Hitler to believe that he would not ace urther opposition to expansion in Eastern Europe. Changing diplomatic alignments: The Rome Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact The most important result o the S panish C ivil War on diplomatic alignments was the improved relations between Hitler and Mussolini. Hitler recognized King Victor Emmanuel III o Italy as the E mperor o Abyssinia and worked with Italy to prevent a B ritish initiative to update the Locarno Treaties. O n the Italian side, opposition to German infuence in Austria was now removed. In July 1 93 6, with Mussolini s approval, Hitler signed an agreement with C hancellor S chuschnigg o Austria, whereby S chuschnigg promised to pursue a policy based on the principle that Austria acknowledges herself to be a German state in return or a German commitment to non- intervention. The new atmosphere o cooperation between Germany and Italy culminated in the signing o the Rome B erlin Axis between Hitler and Mussolini in O ctober 1 93 6. It consisted o a series o secret protocols setting out their mutual interests ( see page 1 43 ) . This was ollowed up in November o the same year by an agreement with Japan; the Anti- C omintern Pact was directed against the C ommunist International and Class discussion stated that, in the case o an attack by the S oviet Union, the signatories would consult on measures to sa eguard their common interests . The To what extent had Hitler militant nature o this agreement indicated the beginning o the openly succeeded in removing the aggressive phase o Hitler s oreign policy. most important restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles by the Hitler was delighted, as these agreements demonstrated that Germany end of 1936? was no longer isolated but an important player on the world stage. 165 Source skills The impact o the economy on Hitler s oreign policy: Ruth Henig. The Origins The Four Year Plan of the Second World War, B y 1 9 36, rearmament was not progressing ast enough or Hitler. Indeed, page 30 (1985 ). the consumer economy was starting to struggle: there were shortages o butter and meat, as well as shortages o vital imports o raw materials In the process [o and o oreign exchange. The economics minister, D r. Hj almar S chacht, the Four Year Plan] , avoured spending less on armaments in order to enable more exports to Germany was to make be produced, thus encouraging oreign trade. every e ort to become However, Hitler believed that Germany s economic problems could only be more sel - supporting by solved by the acquisition o more land and living space. He decided to go all developing a wide range out or autarky, bringing the economy more closely under party control, in o synthetic materials, order to prepare or war. This was to be done via a Four Year Plan, which by stockpiling essential Hitler introduced in September 1 936 under the leadership o G ring. raw materials, and by concluding bilateral B elieving that this would make the pace o rearmament too ast and that trade agreements with it would cause an economic crisis, S chacht resigned. However, there is states in eastern and no doubt that Hitler was now in a strong position. As the historian Ian south-eastern Europe Kershaw writes: whereby ood and By the end o the year [1 936], with the German-Italian axis secured the raw materials were creation o the anti-Comintern pact with Japan, the Spanish Civil War all supplied to Germany providing renewed evidence o the passivity and uncertainty o the western in exchange or democracies, and the German economy committed ull tilt to preparation or war, manu actures and the contours o growing international tension and an escalating arms race in the armaments. Romania latter 1 930s were all set. And out o the various interwoven crises o 1 936, Hitler s was a particular target own power position had emerged buttressed and rein orced. Kershaw, 1 991 or German advances because she could The impact o Nazism on Germany s oreign policy: supply vitally needed supplies o oil. The Hossbach Memorandum The con erence marks the point at which the expansion o the Third Reich First question, part a ceased to be latent and became explicit. Wiliamson, 1 995 3 marks On 5 November, Hitler called a special meeting that was attended by his According to Henig, in top generals and his war ministers: Hermann G ring ( air) , Werner von what ways did Hitler plan Fritsch ( army) , Erich Raeder ( navy) , Werner von B lomberg ( de ence) and to make Germany prepared Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath. Hitler told the meeting that or war? what he was to say was to be regarded as his last will and testament . We know about this meeting because the main points were compiled and written down fve days later by Hitler s military assistant, C olonel Hossbach, rom notes that he made at the time. The document was fled Communication, thinking without having been seen by Hitler. and social skills At the con erence, Hitler gave an overview o Germany s international Read the ull text o the situation and proposed several actions that now needed to be taken. The Hossbach Memorandum at: ollowing extracts are taken rom Hossbach s memorandum: avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/ The aim o German oreign policy was to make secure and to preserve the hossbach.asp. racial community and to enlarge it. It was there ore a question o space. The question or Germany was: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the Make bullet point notes on the lowest cost? German policy had to reckon with two hate inspired antagonists, key points made. Britain and France, to whom a German colossus in the centre o Europe was In pairs or small groups, discuss a thorn in the fesh Germany s problem could only be solved by the use the signifcance o this meeting. o orce. I the resort to orce with its attendant risks is accepted there then 166 C H APT E R 2 . 4 : G E R M AN E X PAN S I O N , 19 3 3 19 3 8 remains still to be answered the questions When ? and How ? In this matter there were three contingencies to be dealt with. Source skills C ase 1 : Period 1 943 5 Second question A ter that date only a change or the worse or our point o view could be 4 marks expected Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament With re erence to its origin, which would then have been carried out by the rest o the world. I the purpose and content, F hrer was still living it was his unalterable determination to solve Germany s assess the values and problem o space by 1 943 5 at the latest limitations o the Hossbach Memorandum as evidence C ase 2 o Hitler s oreign policy I internal stri e in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to plans a ter 1 93 7. absorb the French army completely and render it incapable o use or war against Germany, then the time or acting against the Czechs would have come. C ase 3 I France should be so embroiled in war with another state that she could not proceed against Germany. For the improvement o our political-military position our frst objective, in the event o our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our plan in any possible operation against the West. I Germany made use o this war to settle the Czech and Austrian question, it Class discussion was to be assumed that Britain hersel at war with Italy would decide not to act against Germany. Refer back to Hitler s foreign policy ideas in Mein Kampf While none o the military leaders obj ected to the planned destruction (see pages 117 118) . What o C zechoslovakia, B lomberg and Fritsch were unhappy about a policy continuities are there in his that could lead to war with B ritain and France be ore Germany was aims as set out in 1923 in Mein su fciently prepared. However, all those who were hesitant about Kampf and those as they appear Hitler s aims ( B l mberg, Fritsch and Neurath) were ruthlessly removed in the Hossbach Memorandum? rom power in February 1 93 8 when Hitler appointed himsel S upreme What change in attitude do you C ommander o the German army. These changes were accompanied by see concerning Britain? the retirement o 1 6 high- ranking generals and the trans er o 44 others, thus removing anyone who might be less than committed to Hitler s In pairs, review Italy s position goals. As Kershaw writes, Following the Reichstag Fire and the Rohm crisis on a potential naval war with [Night o the Long Knives], the Bl mberg-Fritsch a air was the third great Britain. What would be the milestone on the way to F hrer absolutist power ( quoted in D arby, 2 007) . Italian view of the cases discussed in this meeting? How signifcant is the Hossbach Memorandum as evidence o Hitler s oreign policy objectives? A copy o Hossbach s minutes o this meeting were used at the Nuremberg The Nuremberg Trials Trials as evidence o Hitler s planning or war. However, AJP Taylor points A series of military tribunals, out that the memorandum is only a copy and indeed only a ragment o held by the Allied forces after a copy o the original, which has disappeared. Taylor also argues that the World War II. Key members purpose o the meeting was not actually to discuss oreign policy aims but to of the political, military, and convince conservative military and fnancial experts o the need to continue economic leadership of Nazi with the rearmament programme, and to isolate Schacht, who opposed it. Germany were put on trial Taylor states that Hitler s exposition was in large part day-dreaming and unrelated charged with crimes against to what ollowed in real li e (Taylor, 1 969) . peace and crimes against However, other historians would still argue that, while it cannot be used humanity. as a road- map or war, the Hossbach Memorandum did clearly set out Hitler s central goal: to make secure and to preserve the racial community and enlarge it . It also made clear Hitler s war- like and expansionist intentions and Hitler s sense o urgency; this was all taken seriously by those present. 167 TOK Think about what a historical act actually is. Write a brie de nition o what a act in history is. Share your de nition with a partner. How is this similar to or diferent rom a act in the natural sciences. Discuss as a class what could be considered the historical acts in this chapter. Does your discussion suggest anything about the methods o , and challenges aced by, historians? Full document question: Hitler s remilitarization of the Rhineland Source A Source B A B ritish rep ort by the heads o the three A cartoon p ublished in Punch magazine on armed services on their ability to fght a war 1 8 March 1 93 6. against Germany in 193 6. We wo uld at o nce emphasise that any questio n o war with Germany while we were as at prese nt heavily committed to the po ssib ility o hostilities in the Medite rranean wo uld b e thoro ughly dangero us. As re gards naval op eratio n against Germany, our minimum require me nts could only be carrie d o ut b y weakening naval o rces in the Mediterranean to an extent which wo uld j eop ardise o ur p o sitio n there vis- - vis Italy As regards the Army and the Air F orce, the purely de ensive provisio ns already made in the Me diterranean have drawn u po n the reso urces o these two S ervices to such an e xtent that until those re in o rcements have returne d to this cou ntry we sho uld b e quite incapable o dispatching a Fie ld F orce o r p ro viding any proper de ence in the air. To b ring ho me the se orces with their equip ment would take in the case o the army two months and even longer in the case o the Air Fo rce . At the moment our coast de ence artillery requires modernisation to a large extent, we have no anti- submarine de ences or a Source C number o our most important ports, and Ruth Henig, a B ritish academic historian, in the number o our anti- aircra t guns and an academic book, The Origins of the Second searchlights is quite inadequate to deal with World War (1 985 ) . the air threat rom Germany. On 7 March 1 936, token German orces marched into the Rhineland and Hitler announced that the German government was remilitarizing it because o the threat to Germany posed by the Franco-Russian alliance which had just been ratifed by the French Senate The remilitarization was a urther challenge to the Versailles settlement and to the 168 C h apt e r 2 . 4 : G e r m an e x pan s i o n , 19 3 3 19 3 8 B ritish government s wish to secure peace ul In order, however, to avoid any misinterpretation and orderly revision. For the British government o its intentions and to establish beyond doubt had already gone out o its way to indicate to the purely de ensive character o these measures, Hitler that ministers were willing to agree to as well as to express its unalterable longing or German remilitarization o the Rhineland as part a real pacifcation o Europe between states in o a more general package o measures which equal rights and equally respected, the German might include an air-pact, German return to the government declares itsel ready to conclude League o Nations, some peace ul revision o new agreements or the creation o a system o Germany s eastern rontiers and the return o peace ul security or Europe A ter three years, ormer German colonies. Now Hitler had shown I believe that today the struggle or German once again, in his rearmament policies that he equality o rights can be deemed concluded pre erred to achieve his objectives by unilateral We have no territorial claims to make in military action rather than by participating Europe. Above all, we are aware that all the in multilateral diplomatic discussions. In tensions resulting either rom erroneous retrospect, many politicians and commentators territorial provisions or rom the disproportion claimed that this was the point at which Hitler between the size o its population and should have been challenged, and that a ter Lebensraum can never be solved by wars. March 1 936 he could not be stopped rom plunging Europe into war. First question, part a 3 marks According to S ource A, why would it be di fcult Source D or B ritain to resist German aggression in 1 93 6? A sp eech by Hitler to the Reichstag following the remilitarization of the First question, part b 2 marks Rhineland, S aturday 7 March 1 93 6. What is the message o S ource B ? The German government has continuously Second question 4 marks emphasised during the negotiations o the last C ompare and contrast the views expressed in years its readiness to observe and ulfl all the Source C and Source D regarding Hitler s motives obligations arising rom the Rhine Pact so long or his actions in 1 93 6. as the other contracting parties were ready on their side to maintain the pact. This obvious Third question 6 marks and essential condition can no longer be With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, regarded as being ulflled by France. France assess the value and limitations o S ource C has replied to Germany s repeated riendly or a historian studying the reasons or the o ers and assurances o peace by in ringing remilitarization o the Rhineland. the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the S oviet Union directed exclusively Fourth question 9 marks against Germany. In this manner, however, Using these sources and your own knowledge, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner examine the reasons or Hitler s remilitarization o meaning and ceased to exist the Rhineland in 1 93 6. B aynes, N. 1 969. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler: April 1 922 August 1 939. H. Fertig. New York, USA Craig, G. 1 978. Germany 1 866 1 945. Ox ord University Press. New York, USA D arby, G. 2 007. Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War. Hodder, UK Henig, R. 1 985 . The Origins of the Second World War. Routledge. London, UK Kershaw, I. 1 991 . Hitler. Longman. London, UK. Steiner, Z. 2 01 1 . The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1 933 1 999. Ox ord University Press. New York, USA Wiliamson, D G. 1 995 . The Third Reich. Longman. London, UK 2.5 German expansion, 1938 1940 Causation Change Perspective Examine the ways in which Hitler went further than challenging the post-war settlement after 1937. To what extent was Hitler successful in carrying out his foreign policy aims? German troops march into Poland Discuss the consequences of Hitler s actions for the international situation. following the start of hostilities on 1 September 1939 declared with Austria after 1938 March German troops march into Austria September The Sudeten crisis Germany occupies the rest of Czechoslovakia 1939 March Lithuania gives up the port of Memel to Germany 31 March Anglo French guarantee of Poland Conscription introduced in Britain 27 April May The Pact of Steel Anglo-French mission to Moscow 12 August 24 August Nazi-Soviet Pact Anglo-Polish Treaty 25 August 1 September Germany invades Poland Britain and France declare war on Germany 3 September Following the shake- up o his military command in 1 93 7 a ter the Hossbach C on erence, Hitler was in a position to start taking more risks in his oreign policy. The frst o these was the takeover o Austria; the next was the takeover o Sudetenland. These actions completed the revision o the post- war settlement and also put Hitler in a position to pursue his goal o in the East. 170 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 1938 B etween 1 93 8 and 1 93 9, Hitler was able to achieve the aims that he Class discussion had set out at the Hossbach C on erence in 1 93 7: the annexation o Austria and the dismemberment o C zechoslovakia. However, this was Discuss the events that were not achieved in the way that Hitler had anticipated; indeed, historian happening in Asia at this time. Alan B ullock sees Anschluss as a striking example o Hitler s ability What expansionist moves had to combine consistency in aim, calculation and patience in preparation with Japan made by early 1938? Do opportunism, impulse and improvisation in execution ( B ullock, 1 967: 2 04) . you think events in Asia had any infuence on the international D espite his ailure to take Austria in 1 93 4, Hitler had already made response to German expansion? much progress in establishing Nazi infuence in the country. In July 1 93 6, an Austro German agreement had been signed, which agreed the ollowing: Germany rea rmed its recognition o Austria s independence. B oth powers agreed not to inter ere in each other s internal a airs. Austria would conduct a oreign policy consistent with it being a German state . In addition, secret clauses gave prominent Austrian Nazis, such as Arthur Seyss- Inquart, a role in the government. However, in 1 93 8 the opportunity to take over Austria directly arose due to the actions o Austrian C hancellor Kurt S chuschnigg. Schuschnigg was alarmed by the activities o the Austrian Nazis and he requested an interview with Hitler. However, when Schuschnigg arrived at the meeting in B erchtesgaden on 1 2 February 1 93 8, Hitler launched into an attack on Austria: Hitler: The whole history o Austria is just one interrupted act o high treason. That was so in the past, and is no better today. The historical paradox must now reach its long-overdue end. And I can tell you here and now, Herr Schuschnigg, that I am absolutely determined to make an end o all this. The German Reich is one o the Great Powers, and nobody will raise his voice i it settles its border problems Who is not with me will be crushed I have chosen the most di fcult road that any German ever took Schuschnigg: Herr Reichkanzler, I am quite willing to believe it We will do everything to remove obstacles to a better understanding, as ar as possible Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria Hitler: That is what you say, Herr Schuschnigg. But I am telling you that I am going to solve the so-called Austrian problem one way or the other I have only to give the order and your ridiculous de ence mechanism will be blown to bits Chancellor Schuschnigg s recollection o the conversations at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938, written shortly a terwards rom memory 171 Source skills Second question 4 marks With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, assess the value and limitations o S chuschnigg s account o his meeting with Hitler or historians studying the Austrian crisis o 1 93 8. Examiner s hint: Here are some points that you could consider in your answer: Values A value o the origin is that Schuschnigg was present at the meeting and so would have frst-hand knowledge o what was said. Schuschnigg wrote the conversation down soon a ter the meeting so it would have been resh in his mind. The purpose is o value as S chuschnigg made a record o the meeting which he saw as important. Limitations Schuschnigg s account was written a terwards rom memory, so he is unlikely to have been able to remember the conversation so precisely as it is here. His purpose would be to gain sympathy or his treatment, so it is possible that he might want to exaggerate Hitler s attack on Austria. C ertainly, the language used by Hitler here is very aggressive in contrast to Schuschnigg s very reasonable tone which could support the idea that he is exaggerating. A ter being submitted to two hours o abuse, S chuschnigg was orced to agree to a list o demands that included releasing all imprisoned pro-Nazi agitators, li ting the ban against the Nazi Party and appointing Seyss- Inquart as interior minister. Pro- Nazis were also to be made the ministers o war and o fnance, and the economic systems o the two countries were to be assimilated. These demands would e ectively end Austrian independence; S chuschnigg was told that i he did not agree, Hitler would march into Austria. S chuschnigg attempted a desperate last action: he announced a plebiscite or 1 3 March 1 93 8, in which Austrians were to vote on whether or Communication skills not they wanted a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria . Austrians could only answer yes or no ; given the In pairs review Chapter 2.3 wording, along with the act that Schuschnigg s own political party and then discuss the reasons was in charge o the plebiscite, there was a good chance that a Yes vote for the change in Mussolini s could be secured. This would then give him a chance to break ree o his position on Anschluss by 1938. agreement with Hitler. Hitler, there ore, decided to act be ore this could happen. Mussolini gave his assurances that he would not obj ect to Anschluss and Hitler mobilized his army. When S chuschnigg ound that no help was coming rom Italy, B ritain or France, he resigned. Hitler marched into Austria on 1 2 March 1 93 8. 172 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 On 1 3 March, apparently in a spur o the moment decision ollowing an emotional visit to his home town o Linz, Hitler announced the incorporation o Austria into the Reich. This was subsequently confrmed by 99% o the population in a plebiscite on 1 0 April. Historian Klaus Fischer sums up the impact o Anschluss: The Anschluss and the methods that brought it about had ar-reaching consequences. Hitler had gambled success ully again. He became convinced that his strategy o ruthless power politics had been vindicated and that it was the only e ective policy against his war- weary and vacillating opponents. Aside rom rein orcing Hitler s belie in the e ectiveness o international blackmail and intimidation, the Anschluss also had ar-reaching consequences in the feld o diplomacy. It promoted the Austrian crowds greeting Hitler after riendship o the two Fascist tyrants Hitler and Mussolini, and this urther polarised European powers. Another consequence o the Anschluss was that Germany s strategic position was greatly enhanced. With Vienna at his disposal Hitler had acquired direct access to the whole o south-eastern Europe. From Vienna it was only a ootstep to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Fischer, 1 995 Thinking and communication skills Use Fischer s analysis of to add detail to your own copy of this mind map. Germany's Hitler s position strategic in Germany position The impact of Changing international Hitler s tactics alignments Communication skills Go to www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-annexes-austria. Watch this Path News clip of Hitler entering Austria. According to the commentary, what made it hard for anyone (inside or outside of Austria) to oppose this move? 173 The Sudeten crisis Hitler s action against Czechoslovakia was a virtuoso performance, diminished only by the fact that his antagonists made things easier for him than he deserved. C raig, 1 978 After the success of annexing Austria, Hitler turned his attention to C zechoslovakia. There were several reasons for this: Annexed by Hitler considered Germany (1 938) S lavs to be SUDETENLAND POLAND untermenschen Terezin ( racially and socially Lidice Prague Annexed by Poland (1 938) inferior) . BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA (Germany protectorate, 1 939) CZECHOSLOVAKIA Many C zechs had 1 933 BOUNDARY resisted Austrian SLOVAKIA rule in the old (1 939) Uzhgorod Austro Hungarian Annexed by Germany Bansk Bratislava Munkacs Empire and had (1 938) Bystrica fought for Russia Annexed by Hungary during the First (1 938 39) World War, GREATER GERMANY HUNGARY 0 1 00 rather than for MILES Austria. Partition of Czechoslovakia, 1938 39 C zechoslovakia was the only successful independent state created by the Versailles S ettlement; it consisted of many different peoples and had therefore proved that ethnically diverse people could live together. One of the ethnic groups in the new C zechoslovakia was German. These Germans had formally lived in the Austro Hungarian E mpire and now lived in the area known as the S udetenland, which bordered Germany ( see its location on the map above) . C zechoslovakia was an enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations. C zechoslovakia was allied to France and Russia. Thin kin g an d s ocials kills In pairs, consider how each of the bullet points above would contribute to Hitler s hostile attitude towards Czechoslovakia. TheSud eten Germ an s The S udetenland a mountainous area, rich in mineral resources had been given to C zechoslovakia in order to give the new state a strong frontier and to ensure its prosperity. The C zechs had then further strengthened this frontier by building defences. In addition, C zechoslovakia had a strong arms industry and a well- organized army. 174 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 However, the S udeten Germans themselves, some 3 .5 million people, had not accepted their position in C zechoslovakia. As part o the ormer Austrian Imperial ruling nation, they resented their loss o status and regarded themselves as victims o C zech discrimination. With the impact o the Great D epression and high unemployment, their sense o grievance grew. The leader o the S udeten Germans, Konrad Heinlein, became the mouthpiece or Sudeten discontent and or demands to the C zech government or sel - government. He led the Sudeten German Party, which, rom 1 93 5 , was unded by Nazi Germany. Hitler encouraged Heinlein to make continual demands on the C zech government and to keep up a relentless programme o agitation and subversion. On 2 4 April 1 93 8, Heinlein presented the C zech government with his E ight D emands in the orm o the Karlsbad Programme; these demands included autonomy and various special rights. Initially, however, Hitler was reluctant to use orce against C zechoslovakia. He told Heinlein that he would solve the S udeten issue in the not too distant uture , but did not commit himsel to any clear plan on how this was to be achieved. In addition, many o Hitler s Konrad Heinlein, leader of the generals warned him that Germany was not ready or a war at this stage. Sudeten German Party The May Crisis, 1938 Hitler changed his mind with regard to taking action against C zechoslovakia as a result o the so- called May C risis. O n 2 0 May, rumours started circulating that the Germans were making military preparations near to the C zech border. As a result, the C zech government ordered partial mobilization, and B ritain and France sent warnings to Germany. In act, the rumours were un ounded and Hitler had to tell the powers involved that no such preparations to attack C zechoslovakia were underway. He ound this action humiliating, as it looked as though he had responded to B ritish and French threats. On 2 8 May, in what was known as O peration Green, Hitler told his generals: It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future . Throughout the summer o 1 93 8, tensions increased in the S udetenland as the Sudeten Germans, on instructions rom Hitler, increased their violence against the C zech government. O n 5 September, the C zech President E dvard B ene agreed to all demands o the Sudeten Germans or sel - government. However, Heinlein was told by Hitler to rej ect this o er, thus proving that Hitler was interested only in conquest and not in j ustice or the S udeten Germans. Meanwhile, the German press whipped up a renzy o anti- C zech eeling by showing pictures and flm ootage o the apparent ill- treatment o Sudeten Germans. Thinking and communication skills S p eech made by Hitler on 1 2 S ep tember This may be a matter o indiference to the democracies 1 93 8 at the annual Nuremberg Rally. but I can only say to the representatives o the democracies that it is not a matter o indiference to us, I am speaking o Czechoslovakia. This is a democratic and I say that i these tortured creatures cannot obtain State ounded on democratic lines by orcing other rights and assistance by themselves they can obtain nationalities without asking them into a structure both rom us manu actured by Versailles. As good democrats they began to oppress and mishandle the majority o the We can quite understand that the French and British inhabitants de end their interests in the world. I can assure the statesmen in Paris and London that there are also I this were a matter oreign to us we would German interests which we are determined to de end regard the case as so many others, merely as an in all circumstances You will understand that a interesting illustration o the democratic conception Great Power cannot suddenly submit to such a o sel -determination, and simply take note o it. base attack What the Germans demand is the right But it is something most natural which compels o sel -determination which other nations possess us Germans to take an interest in this problem. i the Democracies, however, should be convinced that Among the nationalities being suppressed in this they must in this case protect with all their means the State there are 3,500,000 Germans. That is about oppressors o the Germans, then this will have grave as many persons o our race as Denmark has consequences. inhabitants That conditions in this nation are unbearable is generally known. 3 ,500,000 people In pairs, read Hitler s speech and consider what evidence were robbed in the name o a certain Mr Wilson o this document provides o : their right to sel -determination. Economically these Hitler s political views people were deliberately ruined and a terwards Hitler s tactics with regard to taking over the handed over to a slow process o extermination. The Sudetenland misery o the Sudeten Germans is without end. They are being oppressed in an inhuman and intolerable the nature o Nazi propaganda. manner and treated in an undigni ied way Hitler s speech at the Nuremberg Rally caused more unrest in the S udetenland, but this was brought under control by the C zech government, which declared martial law. Communication skills Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=hprV2nQRvbc, or search or The German people persecuted at Sudetenland . Watch this German propaganda lm. According to the lm, how are the Sudeten Germans being persecuted? 176 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 Chamberlain s intervention It was at this point that B ritain decided to act. The ull reasons and nature o this involvement are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. However, C hamberlain desperately wanted to avoid a war, and so now few three times to meet Hitler to try to make a deal over the Sudetenland. Berchtesgaden, 15 September 1938 At this meeting, it was agreed that the Sudeten German areas o C zechoslovakia should be trans erred to Germany. C hamberlain persuaded his C abinet and the French to agree to this deal. The Czechs nally agreed a ter two days o persuasion. Chamberlain arriving at Berchtesgarden Godesberg, 22 23 September 193 8 C hamberlain few to Godesberg to tell Hitler the good news, but Hitler was urious. He wanted an excuse or a war with C zechoslovakia, not a peace ul handover o the Sudetenland. He insisted that the demands o the Hungarians and the Poles or territory in C zechoslovakia should also be met, and that German troops Chamberlain leaving Godesberg should be allowed to occupy the Sudetenland on 2 8 September. It now seemed as though war was inevitable. The C zechs rejected Hitler s terms and the French said they would support Czechoslovakia. As mentioned previously, the C zechs had good de ences and a strong army. They hoped that with the help o their allies, France and the Soviet Union, they could resist a German attack. Munich, 29 September 1938 With B ritain and France now showing that they were prepared to fght, and with his own generals pointing out that Germany was not yet ready or war, Hitler agreed to a urther con erence. Mussolini stepped in as a mediator to prevent war, and a Four Power C on erence was held in Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Munich. Here, a plan presented Mussolini at the Munich Conference by Mussolini (though written by Hitler! ) was agreed on. The plan included the following points. The German occupation o the Sudetenland would take place by 1 October and an international commission would determine a provisional new rontier by 1 0 October. The international commission would also supervise plebiscites in areas o dispute. Czechs would be allowed to leave and Germans allowed to join the Sudeten territories (neither the plebiscites nor the trans er o populations actually happened) . Poland was to be given Teschen. Hungary was to get South Slovakia. Germany, along with the other powers, guaranteed the independence o the rest o Czechoslovakia. Neither the C zech President, Bene nor the Soviet leader, Stalin were invited to the Munich C on erence. The C zechs were told that i they resisted this agreement they would receive no help rom Britain or France, even though France had guaranteed the Czech borders at Locarno. The Czechs there ore had no option but to agree. B ene resigned a ew days later. Following the con erence, C hamberlain got Hitler to sign a statement in which he agreed to settle all matters o international interest through consultation. Hitler, however, was determined not to be deprived o his war against C zechoslovakia. O n 2 1 October, he gave orders or the liquidation of the remainder of the Czech state . Source skills Gordon A. C raig. Germany 1 866 1 945 the country s readiness or war was as good (1 990) . as it could be without measures o domestic discipline that he was disinclined to take; and Munich seemed to convince Hitler that it seemed possible, in any case, that conquests he could do no wrong, and his policy might repair defciencies. Moreover, the now betrayed an impatience that had not acceleration o Hitler s campaign against the characterised it earlier. In his search or new Jews at the end o 1 93 8 contributed to the triumphs, economic actors no longer had the mounting pace o his external policy. One power to restrain him, or it was clear that C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 o the complaints that he made against the and the destruction o Jewry were inextricably government o C zechoslovakia was that the connected in his thoughts. Jews in C zechoslovakia were still poisoning the nation against Germany and would First question, part a 3 marks have to be dealt with. As he turned to new According to C raig, what was the impact o the obj ectives, it is clear that the conquest o space Munich C on erence on Hitler? Beyond the Treaty of Versailles: The liquidation of ATL Thinking and social skills Czechoslovakia 1 According to Craig in the source above, what factor ATL Communication skills linked Hitler s domestic and foreign policies? 2 With a partner, discuss what conclusions Hitler might now draw as to the attitude of the West regarding any future action he might take. German troops enter Prague in March 1939 What does this photo suggest about the attitude of the citizens of Prague towards the takeover of the rest of Czechoslovakia? As a result o the Munich C on erence, C zechoslovakia lost 70% o its heavy industry, a third o its population and both the natural mountainous de ences and the man- made ortifcations o the Sudetenland. Slovakia and Ruthenia were given sel - government or internal a airs, though were still ultimately controlled rom Prague. C learly, Hitler saw the Munich Agreement as a stepping stone to the liquidation of the Czech state ( S tackelberg, 1 999: 1 73 ) . From early 1 93 9, Hitler encouraged the S lovaks to cause disruption and to ask or complete independence. He was willingly helped in this by Father Joze Tiso, who was head o the ascist Slovak People s Party. As with Austria, Hitler was given the excuse to directly get involved when the new C zech President, Emil Hach , moved troops into Slovakia to crush this agitation. Prompted by Hitler, Tiso proclaimed ull independence or Slovakia and asked or German protection. 179 In the hope of saving C zechoslovakia, Hach now asked to see Hitler. This, of course, was a mistake; Hach was forced to sign over B ohemia and Moravia to Hitler. O n 1 5 March 1 93 9, German troops occupied the rest of C zechoslovakia. O n 1 6 March, B ohemia and Moravia were declared a protectorate of Germany; Slovakia was to be an independent state under the protection of Germany and Ruthenia was occupied by Hungarian troops. This action led to a change in B ritish policy towards Germany. On 1 8 March, C hamberlain told the B ritish C abinet that no reliance could be placed on any of the assurances given by the Nazi leaders ( see page 2 2 3) . German expansion: Poland It was now cle ar that Hitle r s next MEMEL target wo uld be Po land. Poland had been dismantled as a co untry in the Baltic Sea LITHUANIA 1 8 th century and p artitio ned be tween DANZIG Prussia, Russia and the Au strian E mp ire. EAST PRUSSIA Ho wever, fo llo wing Wilson s aims o f se lf- determination at Versailles, it had ALLENSTEIN been recreated as a nation. It was this N part of the Treaty o f Versailles that was MARIENWERDER pro bably most rese nted by the Germans, POZNANIA as We st Pru ssia had been given to Poland to allow it access to the se a, there by GERMANY POLAND sp litting E ast Prussia o ff from the re st of Germany. This p ie ce of land, known WEST UPPER as the Polish C o rridor, also included the Transferred to SILESIA Poland by Treaty city o f D anzig, which be came a fre e of Versailles city run by the League o f Nations, EAST Voted to become allowing both Po land and Germany to 0 50 1 00 mi UPPER Polish (1 921 ) use it as a se a p ort. SILESIA Voted to remain 0 50 1 00 km German (1 921 ) Less than a week after the occupation The Polish Corridor after the of Prague, the Germans proposed to First World War Poland that D anzig should be returned to Germany, and that Germany sho uld have direct access to E ast Prussia via a Ge rman- co ntro lled road and rail link. This was actually a mo re legitimate demand than the German claim to the S udetenland, which had not bee n part o f Ge rmany be fo re the First World War. However, Poland s foreign ministe r C olonel B eck refused, see ing this as the start of an attack on Polish territo ry. Britain s guarantee to Poland In March 1 9 3 9 , Hitler asked the Lithuanian go vernment to hand over Me mel. Lithu ania was a B altic state that had be en made indep endent fro m Russia in 1 9 1 9 ; Memel was a city and strip of land bordering E ast Pru ssia that had a substantial German p opu latio n. Lithuania was in no po sition to stand up to Hitler and the land was handed over fou r days later. 180 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 B ritain now decided to act and, on 3 0 March, a guarantee was o ered to Poland to give help in the event o a German attack: You have already refected In the event o any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and on the role o the individual which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with in history when considering their national orces, His Majesty s Government would eel themselves bound Italy s oreign policies under at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have Mussolini. In pairs consider given the Polish Government an assurance to this e ect. the role o Hitler in shaping and I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that directing events. Intentionalist they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty s Government. historians view the role o The Anglo Polish Treaty ailed to make Hitler more cautious in his individuals and personalities as actions. Indeed, he was urious about this opposition to his plans, key orces o historical change. commenting, I ll cook them a stew that they ll choke on . Two days a ter the To what extent do you agree B ritish guarantee to Poland, Hitler responded by declaring the Anglo with this idea. Re er to your German Naval Agreement invalid and ending the 1 93 4 Non- Aggression study o German expansion in Pact with Poland. He then ordered his C hie o S ta , Keitel, to prepare the 1930s. Other historians, and or the attack on Poland. This was known as Operation White, and particularly Marxist historians the plan was or a limited war on Poland rather than or a wider war argue that economic orces involving B ritain and France. are the key actor. Investigate historians views on German expansion in the 1930s. How Changing international alignments: The Pact of ar can you identi y political or cultural perspectives o the Steel, May 1939 historians rom their accounts? Pact o Steel International tensions continued to rise with Mussolini s invasion o Albania ( see p age 1 47 ) . Although this action was cau sed by Mussolini s attemp t to show his indepe nde nce o Hitler and to increase his own international imp o rtance, to B ritain and France this lo o ked like a co ordinate d actio n b etween the dictato rship s. Thus, B ritain and France immediately issued guarantee s to bo th Greece and Romania. The Germans supported Mussolini s action in Albania, and Mussolini ound that he needed Hitler s support given the hostile reaction o B ritain and France. He thus agreed to sign the Pact o Steel with Germany, whereby each power agreed to come to the aid o the other i it became involved in hostilities contrary to its wishes and desires . However, Mussolini was wary o getting involved in a ull- scale confict, and privately he made it clear to Hitler that Italy would not be ready or war or another three or our years. Nevertheless, Hitler was intent on an immediate war with Poland. The day a ter the signing o the Pact o Steel, he told his generals: we are le t with the decision: to attack Poland at the rst suitable opportunity . As Kershaw writes, War or [Hitler] was no conventional military confict. It represented the decisive step towards the ul lment o his idea , the accomplishment o his mission (Kershaw, 1 991 : 1 3 4) . 181 Source skills Source A C ontracting Party will afford the threatened The Italo German Alliance, 2 2 May 1 93 9 Party its full political and diplomatic support (the Pact of S teel) . in order to remove this threat. The German Reich C hancello r and His ARTIC LE III. Maj esty the King o f Italy and Albania, If it should happen, against the wishes E mp e ro r o f E thio p ia, co nsider that the time and hopes of the C ontracting Parties, that has co me to co nfirm thro ugh a so le mn p act one of them becomes involved in military the clo se relatio n o f friendship and affinity complications with another power or other which e xists b e twee n Natio nal S o cialist Powers, the other C ontracting Party will Ge rmany and Fascist Italy. immediately step to its side as an ally and will Firmly bound together through the support it with all its military might on land, inner unity of their ideologies and the at sea, and in the air. comprehensive solidarity of their interests, the Berlin 22 May 1 93 9 in the XVII year of the German and the Italian people are determined Fascist Era. also in future to stand side by side and to strive with united effort for the securing Source B of their Lebensraum [living space] and the A p hotograp h taken in B erlin, May 1 93 9, maintenance of peace. In this way, prescribed following the signing of the Pact of S teel. for them by history, Germany and Italy wish, in a world of unrest and disintegration, to carry out the assignment of making safe the foundations of E uropean culture have agreed upon the following terms: ARTIC LE I. The C ontracting Parties will remain in permanent contact with each other, in order to come to an understanding of all common interests or the European situation as a whole. ARTIC LE II. In the event that the common interests of the C ontracting Parties be j eopardized through First question, part a 3 marks international happenings of any kind, they According to Source A, what common factors will immediately enter into consultation unite Italy and Germany? regarding the necessary measures to preserve these interests. S hould the security or other First question, part b 2 marks vital interests of one of the C ontracting What is the message of Source B ? Parties be threatened from outside, the other Thinking skills Look at the articles o the agreement. Who do you consider would beneft the most rom this alliance? 182 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 The Nazi Soviet Pact A cartoon by Herblock, 1 93 9, called Little In the summer o 1 93 9, both the Western Goldilocks Riding Hood . democracies and Hitler approached the S oviet Union or an alliance. D espite Hitler s loathing o communist Russia and his plans or in the East, an alliance with the Soviet Union at this stage was highly desirable. It would prevent the S oviets orming an alliance with B ritain and France, and would secure Soviet neutrality in a war with Poland, thus preventing a two- ront confict. In act, the S oviet Union had initially avoured an alliance with B ritain and France. In 1 93 4, the S oviet Union had j oined the League o Nations and, alarmed by the growing power o Hitler, had hoped that collective security would work to prevent Hitler s aggression. However, the Western democracies were still suspicious o a communist government and had worked to appease Hitler. The French alone had signed a de ensive pact with the S oviet Union in response to German rearmament in 1 93 5 , but this collapsed a ter the Munich Agreement. Despite the Munich Agreement and what seemed to Stalin a capitulation to the Nazis, he renewed a proposal o a military alliance with the West ollowing Hitler s occupation o Prague. However, negotiations with the democracies dragged on, both sides Communication and ultimately distrusting each other (see C hapter 2.7) . Meanwhile, Stalin had social skills also made it clear to the Germans that he would welcome an agreement and as a result, on 2 4 August 1 939, Germany pulled o one o the most In pairs or small groups, controversial and cynical alliances in modern history: the Nazi Soviet Pact. discuss the meaning of the cartoon above. Under this Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany Why was an agreement each pledged to remain neutral in the event o either nation being between the Soviet Union and attacked by a third party. In addition, the pact included a secret protocol Nazi Germany so surprising and dividing Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres o shocking to Poland, and also to infuence: the B altic states and B essarabia in Romania were to be in the the rest of the world? Russian sphere, and Poland was to be divided between the two powers. Source skills Source A Article I. B oth High C ontracting Parties The Nazi S oviet Pact, 23 August 1 93 9 obligate themselves to desist rom any act o violence, any aggressive action, and any attack The Go ve rnme nt o the Ge rman Reich and on each other, either individually or j ointly The Go ve rnme nt o the Unio n o S o viet with other Powers. S o cialist Rep ub lics de siro us o strengthening the cau se o p eace b e twe en Ge rmany and Article II. Should one o the High the U. S . S . R. , and p ro ce eding ro m the C ontracting Parties become the obj ect o undame ntal p rovisio ns o the Ne utrality belligerent action by a third Power, the other Agre eme nt co ncluded in Ap ril, 1 9 2 6 High C ontracting Party shall in no manner betwee n Germany and the U. S . S . R. , have lend its support to this third Power. re ache d the o llo wing Agreement: 183 Article III. The Governments o the two High The question o whether the interests o both C ontracting Parties shall in the uture maintain parties make desirable the maintenance o continual contact with one another or the an independent Polish S tate and how such a purpose o consultation in order to exchange state should be bounded can only be de nitely in ormation on problems a ecting their determined in the course o urther political common interests. developments. Article IV. Neither o the two High In any event both Governments will resolve contracting parties shall participate in any this question by means o a riendly agreement. grouping o powers whatsoever that is Article III. With regard to S outheastern directly or indirectly aimed at the other party. E urope, attention is called by the S oviet side Article V. Should disputes or conficts to its interest in B essarabia. The German side arise between the High C ontracting Parties declares its complete political disinterest in over problems o one kind or another, both these areas. parties shall settle these disputes or conficts Article IV. This protocol shall be treated by exclusively through riendly exchange both parties as strictly secret. o opinion or, i necessary, through the establishment o arbitration commissions. Moscow, August 2 3 , 1 93 9. Article VI. The present Treaty is concluded Source B or a period o ten years, with the proviso that, in so ar as one o the High C ontracting Parties does not advance it one year prior to the expiration o this period, the validity o this Treaty shall automatically be extended or another ve years. Article VII. The present treaty shall be rati ed within the shortest possible time. The rati cations shall be exchanged in B erlin. The Agreement shall enter into orce as soon as it is signed. The section below was not published at the time the above was announced. S ecret additional p rotocol Article I. In the event o a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the B altic S tates ( Finland, E stonia, Latvia, Lithuania) , the northern boundary o Lithuania shall represent the boundary o the spheres o infuence o Germany and U. S . S . R. In this connection the interest o Lithuania in the Vilna area is The signing of the Nazi Soviet Pact recognized by each party. Article II. In the event o a territorial and First question, part a 3 marks political rearrangement o the areas belonging According to Source A, what measures were to to the Polish state, the spheres o infuence o be ollowed to maintain peace between the two Germany and the U.S .S .R. shall be bounded countries? approximately by the line o the rivers Narev, First question, part b 2 marks Vistula and S an. What is the message o Source B ? C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 For Hitler, this alliance meant that he could have a ree hand in Poland and that he could avoid fghting a war on two ronts. He could also get valuable raw materials rom the Soviet Union. He clearly regarded it as a short-term expedient due to his long-term plans or attaining in the East. For Stalin, there were also considerable advantages, as ollows. It would keep the Soviet Union out o a war. This was important as it aced a threat in the East rom Japan, and the army was weakened a ter S talin s p urges ( see glossary box) . There was always the hope that Germany and the West would weaken each other in the war and that the Soviet Union would emerge as the strongest nation. Stalin s purges During the 1930s, Stalin killed He got considerable territorial gains rom the pact: hal o Poland and or purged anyone considered the opportunity to take over Finland and the B altic S tates. to be a threat. This included The S oviet Union could keep trading with Germany: Germany was peasants, workers, political to send mechanical goods to the S oviet Union in return or raw opponents and even senior materials and oodstu s ( see S ource B below or the importance o military ofcers. In act, approx this to Germany) . 35,000 ofcers were either shot or imprisoned. Two contrasting views of the Nazi Soviet Pact Thinking and communication skills Source A Source B Molotov s comments to the Supreme Soviet on the Comment by Dr Julius Schnurre, Head o the Economic ratifcation o the Non-Aggression Pact, 31 August 1939. Policy Division o the German oreign ministry, The chie importance o the Soviet-German non- 24 October 1939. aggression pact lies in the act that the two largest The Agreement means a wide open door to the East or States o Europe have agreed to put an end to enmity us. The raw material purchases rom the Soviet Union between them, to eliminate the menace o war and to and rom the countries bordering the Soviet Union can live at peace one with the other still be considerably increased. But it is essential to Only the instigators o a general European war can meet the German commitments to the extent required. be dissatis ed with this position o a airs In view o the great volume this will require a special e ort. I we succeed in expanding exports to the East It is really difcult or these gentlemen to understand in the required volume, the e ects o the English the purpose o the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, blockade will be decisively weakened by the incoming on the strength o which the USSR is not obliged to raw materials. involve itsel in war either on the side o Great Britain against Germany, or on the side o Germany against Questions Great Britain. 1 What do Sources A and B indicate about the di erent Is it really difcult to comprehend that the USSR ways in which the Soviet Union and Germany viewed is pursuing and will continue to pursue its own this pact? independent policy based on the interests o the 2 Does this pact support the idea that Hitler did in peoples o the USSR and only these interests? act, have a clearly planned oreign policy, but was taking advantage o situations as they arose? 3 Which country do you consider gained most rom this pact? 185 Source skills A cartoon by D avid Low, Rendezvous , p ublished in the Evening Standard newsp aper on 2 0 S ep tember 1 93 9. The text reads: ( Hitler to Stalin) The scum of the Earth, I believe? ; (Stalin to Hitler) The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume? . First question, part b 2 marks What is the message of this source? E xaminer s hint: Note The outbreak of war that the cartoonist is making D espite B ritain s and France s assurances to Poland, Hitler did not believe two key points here. What do that they would take any action at all, let alone declare war. As historian the greetings that Hitler and Roderick S tackelberg writes: Stalin are giving one another Hitler could not conceive that Britain and France, having ailed to fght indicate about the true nature or a militarily strong and democratic Czechoslovakia a year be ore despite o their relationship? What the assurance o Soviet aid, would now fght to save a militarily weak and is the signifcance o the dead undemocratic Poland without the prospect o Soviet aid . Stackelberg, 1 999 body on the ground, which has come about as a result o the meeting or rendez-vous between the two dictators? C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 Hitler was therefore taken back when he heard that B ritain and Poland had signed a full military alliance on 2 5 August. At the same time, Mussolini informed him that he was not ready for war. Hitler thus delayed his attack on Poland planned for 2 6 August until 1 September. Hoping to cause a division between B ritain and Poland, he also gave a last-minute proposal to Britain. This involved guaranteeing the British Empire and trying to reach an agreement on disarmament on the condition that Britain give Germany a free hand in D anzig and the Polish Corridor. However, this was not taken up by B ritain. The Poles also refused further negotiation. On 31 August, Mussolini proposed that a conference should be held to resolve the crisis. However, Hitler wanted war and was not prepared to wait for any peace initiatives. That same evening, Germany claimed that one of its wireless stations near the Polish border had been attacked by Poles. In reality, SS soldiers dressed in Polish uniforms had staged the attack. To make it appear authentic, they left behind the bodies of convicted criminals who had been dressed in Polish uniforms, killed by lethal injection and shot. This so-called Polish attack was used as the excuse for war. At 4.45am on 1 September 1 939, German troops invaded Poland and German planes bombed Warsaw. On 3 September, the B ritish government presented an ultimatum to Germany to call off the attack by 1 1 .00am. When no response had been received by this time, Britain and France declared war. Hitler hoped that the war on Poland would remain a localized affair; in fact, he had unleashed the most destructive war of all time. As historian Donald Watt concludes: What is extraordinary in the events which led up to the outbreak of the Second World War is that Hitler s will for war was able to overcome the reluctance with which everybody else approached it. Hitler willed, desired, lusted after war, though not the war with France and Britain, at least not in 1 939. No one else wanted it, though Mussolini came perilously close to talking himself into it. Watt, 2 001 H itlers actions afterthe d eclaration ofwar Following the B ritish declaration of war, Hitler launched an attack on Poland. S ubj ected to a blitzkrieg style of war, the Poles were quickly defeated, and Germany and the US SR divided up Poland along the so-called Ribbentrop Molotov line as had been agreed in the Nazi- S oviet Pact of 1 93 9. The Germans were now able to transfer most of their forces to the west. The phoney war In October 1 93 9, Hitler offered peace proposals but very few people in B ritain now trusted Hitler, and these were not taken up. However, there was no direct action from Hitler against the West for the next few months. This was the period known as the phoney war . H itlertakes overEu rope The calm of the phoney war was broken in April 1 940. These are the key events, 1 93 9 40: Hitler s troops occupied D enmark and landed at the Norwegian ports in April 1 940. 1 87 1 0 May, Germany attacked Holland, B elgium and France simultaneously. Again, Hitler achieved swi t victories. The D utch surrendered a ter our days; B elgium at the end o May. B ritish troops had to evacuate rom D unkirk in June 1 940 as the invading German troops swept through France. A ter the B ritish had le t, the Germans moved southwards; Paris was captured 1 4th June and France surrendered 2 2 nd June. The Germans occupied northern France and the Atlantic coast; unoccupied France was allowed its own government under Marshal Petain; however it had no real independence To secure the de eat o B ritain in the planned invasion called O peration S ea lion , the Germans needed control o the air over the English C hannel. This led to the B attle or B ritain during the summer and autumn o 1 940 as the B ritish Royal Air Force ought Lu twa e planes in the skies above the coast o B ritain. Although on the verge o de eating the RAF, Hitler switched to the bombing o London and other B ritish cities. This marked the start o the B litz. Hitler hoped that this would break the morale o the B ritish, however by the middle o 1 941 , this was still not the case. It was at this point that Hitler decided to turn back to one o his main oreign policy aims: achieving lebensraum in the E ast. Thus, Hitler launched Operation B arbarossa against the S oviet Union in June 1 941 with B ritain still unde eated. Hitler anticipated that the attack against the Soviet Union would end in a speedy S oviet de eat, a ter which he would be able to return to fnish o B ritain. However, ar rom ensuring a victorious fnale, the invasion o the Soviet Union would ensure that the war would go on or much longer and that Hitler would eventually be de eated. Self-management and thinking skills Task one Task three Return to the question on page 161. How ar had Hitler ul lled his oreign policy aims? What new examples to explain Hitler s success in In Chapter 2.2, we identi ed Hitler s aims were to: achieving his aims can you add to these headings? destroy the Treaty o Versailles Hitler s tactical skill unite all Germans Luck gain more (living space) or the Germans The role the distractions and diferences o the other gain Britain and Italy as allies. powers played For each o these aims, identi y the extent to which it was What other actors played a role? achieved and give evidence or your conclusions. Task two Task four Review Hitler s actions between 1933 and 1939. You have read about the pacts and treaties signed by Decide how ar you agree with Bullock s claim that Japan, Italy and Germany between 1933 and 1939. Copy Hitler was able to combine consistency in aim with and complete the ollowing table to consolidate your opportunism and improvisation in how he conducted understanding o these agreements. his oreign policy. 188 C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 Agreement Countries involved Efect/impact o this Reasons or the outcome treaty Non-Aggression Pact, 1934 Stresa Front, 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty, 1935 Rome Berlin Axis, 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact, 1936 Pact of Steel, 1939 Nazi Soviet Pact, 1939 Anglo Polish Treaty, 1939 Task fve Comparing and contrasting case studies. a In pairs, compare and contrast the aims and methods c In small groups compare and contrast the aims, of Mussolini s and Hitler s foreign policies in the 1930s. methods and results of the foreign policies of the b In pairs, compare and contrast the successes and expansionist states in Europe and Asia. failures of Mussolini s and Hitler s foreign policies in the 1930s. Full document question: The outbreak o war, September 1939 Source A to both sides would certainly have been Germany s rep ly to B ritain s ultimatum, ound between Germany and Poland. received at 1 1 .2 0am, 3 Sep tember 1 93 9. For Germany did not have the intentio n nor had she raised the demands o The German Government and the German annihilating Poland. The Reich demanded people re use to receive, accept, let alone only the revisio n o tho se articles o the ulfl, demands in the ultimatum made by the Versailles Treaty which already at the B ritish Government. time o the ormulation o that D ictate 1 . O n our eastern rontier there has or had been described by understanding many mo nths already reigned a conditio n statesmen o all nations as being in the o war. S ince the time when the Versailles long run unbearable, and there ore Treaty frst to re Germany to pieces, impossible or a great nation and also or all and every p eace ul settlement was the entire political and economic interests re used to all German Governments. o E astern E urope. The blame or The National S ocialist Government also having prevented this peace ul revision has since the year 1 9 3 3 tried again and lies with the B ritish C abinet policy again to remove by peace ul negotiations 2 . The German people and their Government the wo rst breaches o j ustice o this do not, like B ritain, intend to dominate the treaty. The B ritish Government have been world, but they are determined to de end among those who, by their intransigent their own liberty, their independence, and attitude, took the chie part in rustrating above all their li e we shall there ore every practical revision. Without the answer any aggressive action on the part intervention o the B ritish Government o E ngland with the same weapons and in a reasonable solution doing j ustice the same orm. 189 Source B The relationship with Poland has become A cartoon by D avid Low published in the unbearable My proposals to Poland were UK newsp ap er, the Evening Standard, on rustrated by E ngland s intervention. Poland 2 1 O ctober 1 93 9. has changed her tone toward us. A permanent state o initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others The probability is still great that the West will not intervene. We must take the risk with ruthless determination [S] pecial reasons orti y me in my view. E ngland and France have undertaken obligations which neither is in a position to ulfl The West has only two possibilities or fghting against us: 1 . B lockade: it will not be e ective because o our autarky and because we have sources o supply in E astern E urope. 2 . Attack in the West rom the Maginot Line: I consider this impossible. Source D Hitler s sp eech to p arty leaders at O bersalzberg, 22 August 1 93 9. O ur strength lies in our quickness and in our brutality; Genghis Khan sent millions o women and children to death knowingly and with a light heart. History sees in him only the great ounder o S tates. I have given the command and I shall shoot everyone who utters one word o criticism. And so or the present only in the East I have put my death- Source C head ormations in place with the command relentlessly and without compassion to send Hitler s sp eech to his commanders-in-chief, into death many women and children o 2 2 August 1 93 9. Polish origin and language. O nly thus we can I have called you together to give you a picture gain the living space that we need o the political situation, in order that you may To be sure a new situation has arisen. have some insight into the individual actors I experienced those poor worms D aladier and on which I have based my decision to act and C hamberlain in Munich. They will be too in order to strengthen your confdence cowardly to attack. They won t go beyond a It is easy or us to make decisions. We have blockade. Against that we have our autarchy nothing to lose, we have everything to gain and Russian raw materials. [O ] ur economic situation is such that we Poland will be depopulated and settled with cannot hold out more than a ew more years Germans. My pact with the Poles was merely We have no other choice, we must act. Our conceived o as a gaining o time. As or the opponents will be risking a great deal and can rest, gentlemen, the ate o Russia will be gain only a little. B ritain s stake in a war is exactly the same as I am now going through inconceivably great. O ur enemies have leaders with in the case o Poland. A ter Stalin s death who are below average. No personalities. No he is a very sick man we will break the Soviet masters, no men o action Union. Then there will begin the dawn o the German rule o the earth. C H APT E R 2 . 5 : G E R M AN E XPAN S I O N , 1 9 3 8 19 4 0 First question, part a 3 marks Third question 6 marks According to S ource A, how had B ritain caused C ompare and contrast Sources A and C regarding the outbreak of hostilities in S eptember 1 93 9? Hitler s motivations for the attack on Poland. First question, part b 2 marks Fourth question 9 marks What is the message of S ource B ? Using the sources and your own knowledge examine the reasons for Hitler s attack on Poland Second question 4 marks in S eptember 1 93 9. With reference to its origin, purpose and content assess the values and limitations of using S ource A as evidence of Hitler s aims in 1 93 9. B ullock, A. 1 96 7. Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK C raig, G. 1 978. Germany 1 866 1 945. O xford University Press. Oxford, UK Fischer, K. 1 9 95 . Nazi Germany: A New History. C onstable. London, UK Stackelberg, R. 1 999. Hitler s Germany. Routledge, UK Watt, D . 2 001 . How War Came. Pimlico. London, UK 2.6 The in tern ation alrespon se toItalian aggression ( 1935 1940) Consequence Change Signifcance Discuss the reasons or the British and French policy o appeasement. Examine the response o the international community to Italian aggression. Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister of Britain 1935 37 The League o Nations ormally comes 1920 Jan uary into being Japanese invasion o Manchuria: 1931 Septem ber condemned by the League o Nations; weak sanctions are imposed World Disarmament Con erence 1932 34 Franklin D Roosevelt is elected 1932 Nov em ber president in the USA Hitler becomes Chancellor o Germany 1933 Jan uary Italy sends troops to its border with 1934 July to prevent Hitler s attempts at The Stresa Con erence 1935 April The Neutrality Act passed (expires in August Italy invades Abyssinia six months) Roosevelt invokes the Neutrality Act, October preventing the supply o arms to either country 7 October The Council o the League declares Italy to be the aggressor in Abyssinia The League s Assembly votes to impose 11 October sanctions Nov em ber Limited sanctions are applied The Hoare Laval Pact Decem ber 192 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) 1936 January The French Popular Front wins the election. The USA passes new Neutrality Acts February May Italy conquers Abyssinia The League ends sanctions on Italy Italy and Germany intervene in the July Spanish Civil War Britain and France set up Non-Intervention August Committee The USA passes a joint resolution 1937 January outlawing the arms trade in Spain Neville Chamberlain becomes Prime May Minister of Britain Italy withdraws from the League of Nations December In an Italian and British agreement, Britain 1938 April recognizes Italian Abyssinia Mussolini now accepts May The Munich Conference: Mussolini, Hitler, September Chamberlain and Daladier meet Hitler invades areas of Czechoslovakia, 1939 March breaking the Munich Agreement April Italy invades Albania Italy declares itself a non-belligerent when 1 September Germany invades Poland Mussolini attempts to set up a conference 3 September to avoid war Mussolini declares war on Britain and 1940 June France September October Italy invades Egypt and Greece USA passes the Lend Lease Act 1941 March 193 What was the policy of appeasement and why was it pursued by Britain in the 1930s? Appeasement, in this political and historical context, was a diplomatic policy o making concessions to nations in order to avoid con ict. The policy is most closely associated with B ritain s oreign policy in the late 1 93 0s, in particular the Munich crisis o 1 93 8. Appeasement ailed to prevent the outbreak o war and came to be seen as a weak and dishonourable policy. It allowed both Mussolini and Hitler to get away with territorial demands, which encouraged Hitler to ask continuously or more, resulting in the outbreak o war in 1 939. However, or most o the inter-war years, appeasement was seen as a positive idea, and as part o a long-standing tradition o trying to settle disputes peace ully. In B ritain, there were many reasons to ollow a policy o appeasement in the 1 93 0s: Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of Britain, 1937 40 1 Public opinion The Franchise Act o 1 91 8 had increased the number o voters in B ritain rom 8 million to 21 million; or the frst time, women over the age o 30 were given the vote, and rom 1 928, this was lowered to the age o 2 1 . This huge increase in the electorate meant that politicians were more likely to take notice o public opinion, which was against war and in avour o collective security. The horror o the First World War had created a widespread eeling that this should be the war to end all wars . This anti- war eeling was seen clearly in February 1 93 3 , when the Ox ord Union debating society voted that This House would not fght or King and C ountry . The destruction by German bomber aircra t o Guernica in S pain in 1 93 7 showed the vulnerability o London to attack rom the air and highlighted the need to prevent another war that would clearly have a devastating e ect on civilians on the B ritish mainland. As S tanley B aldwin told the House o C ommons in 1 93 2 , I think it is as well for the man in the street to realise that no power on earth can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through . It was widely believed that there would be 1 5 0, 000 casualties in London in the frst week o war. The B ritish public put aith in the League o Nations to maintain peace through collective security. There was even a League o Nations Union in B ritain, which had more than 400, 000 supporters in 1 93 5 . The Union carried out a peace ballot in 1 93 5 , which appeared to show that the B ritish public ully supported the League and its principles. 2 The demands o the dictators seen as justifed Many B ritish politicians elt that the Treaty o Versailles was too harsh and that Hitler had genuine grievances relating to the First World War. Increasingly, there was a belie that the First World War had been caused by all the powers, not j ust by Germany and her allies, and thus there was support or the idea o revising the more punitive clauses o the treaty. In particular, C hamberlain believed, mistakenly, that it was possible to do business with Mussolini and Hitler, and to sort out the grievances o these countries rationally and without recourse to war. C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) In addition, many conservative politicians saw the threat o communism as more dangerous than the threat o ascism. 3 The lack of an alternative policy Support or appeasement was ound in all political parties and there was no clear anti- appeasement party to provide a coherent political alternative. The Labour Party, which was the political party in opposition, supported collective security but did not support rearmament. 4 Economic pressures There were also economic reasons or ollowing a policy o appeasement. Already weakened severely by the First World War, the Great D epression worsened B ritain s economic situation urther still. B y the 1 93 0s, B ritain was acing competition rom other countries that were overtaking its industrial production. It also aced high unemployment: 3 million people were unemployed in the early 1 93 0s. These economic di fculties made it hard to spend money on armaments; no government would be able to maintain support i it cut wel are benefts in order to fnance rearmament. It was also eared that rearming too quickly would cause a balance o payments crisis, with too many imports o machinery and raw materials. For these reasons, although rearmament started again in 1 93 2 , it was not until 1 93 7 that de ence spending increased dramatically. The Anti-Appeasers Some individuals did speak out against appeasement: Foreign Secretary Anthony Winston Churchill called Eden resigned in or rearmament to be February 1938 because stepped up and he disagreed with vehemently opposed Chamberlain s policy concessions to Germany o appeasement o Italy. (though he did not oppose the appeasement o Mussolini over Abyssinia) . He supported the idea o a Grand Alliance o the Anti-Fascist powers. Duf Cooper was You will have seen Secretary o State or plenty o David Low s War (1935 1937) and cartoons in this book. then First Lord o the These appeared Admiralty in Chamberlain s in the Evening Standard government until he newspaper and were resigned in protest at consistently critical o the Munich Agreement appeasement throughout in September 1938. the 1930s. Low was attacked in the right-wing press as a war-monger and his cartoons were banned in Germany. 195 B ritain was in a weak military position and, by 1 93 7, with threats rom TOK Japan, Italy and Germany, this position was becoming increasingly There have been many critics o dangerous. As a result, the B ritish C hie s o Sta concluded that, until the policy o appeasement as rearmament was urther advanced, it should be the main aim o oreign pursued by Britain and France policy to reduce the number o B ritain s enemies. This was reiterated in in the 1930s. As you have read January 1 93 8 in this statement: We cannot foresee the time when our defence here, those involved at the time forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests seem to have had a di erent against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously . view and this perspective was supported by public opinion. 5 Global commitments In pairs discuss the extent to B ritain had to consider its worldwide commitments alongside its which history looked di erent obligations to European countries and the League o Nations. Indeed, in the past. Create a poster: most politicians considered B ritish interests to be more global than History itsel looked di erent European. Preservation and de ence o the E mpire was held to be in the past outlining your essential i B ritain was to remain a great world power, which was its ideas. Include re erences to the priority. However, B ritain s imperial commitments were now so vast that material you have covered in they were becoming increasingly di fcult to administer and de end. this book. In addition, the D ominions ( the sel -governing parts o the B ritish Empire, such as C anada, Australia and New Zealand) made it clear at the 1 93 7 Imperial C on erence that they were not prepared to help B ritain in another E uropean war. 6 Defence priorities Thinking skills Worried about the cost o its expenditure, the Treasury was also putting What does the oreign pressure on the Foreign O fce. In 1 93 7, the Treasury put orward a report ofce report on de ence on de ence expenditure in which the priorities or de ence were to be, in expenditure show about order o importance: Britain s expectations or a military preparation su fcient to repulse air attacks uture war? How might France the preservation o trade routes or the supply o ood and react to this report? raw materials the de ence o the E mpire the de ence o B ritain s allies. 7 The impact of Neville Chamberlain C learly, the fnancial pressures, the commitments o E mpire and the comments rom the C hie s o Sta meant that C hamberlain, when he became Prime Minister in 1 937, would have little choice but to ollow a policy that looked or conciliation rather than con rontation with Germany and Italy. However, C hamberlain s own personal views also had an impact. He detested war and was determined to resolve international tension and to use negotiation and diplomacy to bring about a peace ul settlement o Europe. C hamberlain ran oreign policy very much alone, with the aid o his chie adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, but without consulting his C abinet. He had little aith in the League or in B ritain s allies, France and the US A; he distrusted the S oviet Union, and he believed that B ritain should take the lead in negotiating with Hitler. Right up to the moment that war broke out, C hamberlain continued to hope that he could achieve a general settlement o Europe to maintain peace. 196 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) Communication Class discussion skills How might the policy o Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=gR8lSozEbcs, or search or Why Appeasement? appeasement encourage expansionist states? Watch a summary o the reasons or Britain s policy o appeasement. Make notes on the frst 10 minutes o this video clip. Add notes to the points above on the reasons behind Britain s policy o appeasement. Why did France align its oreign policy to Britain s policy o appeasement in the 1930s? France certainly did not agree with many o B ritain s views regarding Germany and the Treaty o Versailles, and there was no indication in the 1 92 0s that it would ollow a policy o appeasement. It aced huge debts a ter the First World War and, unlike B ritain, had su ered economically rom the impact o the fghting on its land; about 1 0% had been laid to waste, which had an impact on industrial and agricultural resources. The huge loss o li e, and the resultant trauma to French society, meant that the French population wanted Germany punished and permanently weakened to prevent any uture German attack. France had been invaded twice by Germany between 1 870 and 1 91 4 and the French wanted to prevent a resurgent Germany at all costs. When the USA ailed frst to rati y the Treaty o Versailles and then to j oin the League o Nations, the French elt abandoned. When B ritain also showed some sympathy with the view that Germany had been treated too harshly at Versailles, the French were appalled at this apparent collapse o the Anglo American guarantee o the post- war settlement. The French subsequently attempted to uphold the terms o the treaty by orce when they occupied the Ruhr in 1 92 3. However, the occupation ended in de eat or France and was ollowed by a period o appeasement under Foreign Minister Aristide B riand; this can be seen in the D awes Plan o 1 924, the Locarno Agreements o 1 925 and the evacuation o French troops rom the Rhineland in 1 93 0. In an attempt to strengthen its position, France also tried to fnd other allies and signed a series o bilateral agreements through the 1 92 0s with B elgium (1 92 0) , Poland ( 1 92 0 and 1 92 5 ) , C zechoslovakia ( 1 92 4) , Romania ( 1 92 6 ) and Yugoslavia ( 1 92 7) . C zechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia had signed a mutual de ence agreement in what became known as the Little Entente . France supported this alliance. However, the requent changes o government and ideological con icts in France in the 1 93 0s meant that it was unable to take any action against Germany. German reparations ended and, coupled with the impact o the Great D epression, the French economy stagnated. The ranc had been overvalued, exports ell and unemployment increased. In 1 93 2 , a coalition o socialists and radicals won the general election. E douard Herriot was initially elected Prime Minister, but due to his ailure to redress the economic issues he was orced to resign and was Edouard Daladier, the French replaced by E douard D aladier. D aladier did not bring stability, however, Prime Minister in 1938 197 and there were six di erent C abinets in less than two years. E conomic problems ostered the growth o right- wing leagues, some o whom emulated Mussolini s Fascists. Right- wing activity galvanized le t- wing unity and led to the ormation o the Popular Front, an alliance o le t- wing parties. In January 1 93 6, the Popular Front won a resounding victory in the general elections under the leadership o Prime Minister Leon B lum. However, B lum s government was criticized by the right ATL Thinking and social skills or expensive domestic re orms when they believed France should In pairs compare and contrast have been rearming. B lum was also criticized or his attempts to take a the British and French reasons frm stance against internal Fascist threats. D aladier returned as Prime or pursuing a policy o Minister in May 1 93 8 and managed to establish some political stability appeasement towards the as he moved to the right and supported a huge in arms spending. These aggressor states in the 1930s. continual changes in government meant that there was little continuity Are there more similarities or in how to deal with Hitler. more diferences? In addition, there was a con ict between France s oreign policy and its military planning. D espite a series o guarantees to the states o Eastern Europe, which would have required France to demonstrate ATL Self-management skills some o ensive capability, its military planning in the 1 93 0s was entirely Review Chapter 2.3 on de ensive. This was in contrast to its o ensive action in the 1 92 0s, Mussolini s expansion in the and most clearly seen in the building o the Maginot Line, a chain o 1930s. Consider the extent to ortresses along the Franco German border. Furthermore, France s air which a policy o appeasement orce was ine ectual and its army limited. As a result, the French became would have encouraged increasingly dependent on B ritain. When B ritain decided on a policy o Mussolini s aggression. appeasement in the 1 93 0s France had to ollow its strongest ally s line. How was the international response to aggression in the 1930s afected by the weaknesses o the League o Nations? Re er back to Chapter 1.3, The international response to acts o expansion and aggression in the 1 93 0s page 62, to review the aims should have been dealt with through the mechanism to acilitate collective o the League. security: the League o Nations. However, the League had many limitations: It lacked the credibility and economic power o its ounding nation, the US A. Its key organ o power was the C ouncil, which was led by B ritain, France, Italy and Japan, with Germany j oining in 1 92 6. The latter three countries were revisionist powers who wanted to revise the Treaty o Versailles. The Soviet Union was not a member until S eptember 1 93 4. The League s structure and organization was ine fcient. It was impotent in the ace o the aggressive military ascist states, and each time it ailed to act e ectively it lost more authority. Without the economic and diplomatic power o the USA, it was up to B ritain and France to uphold the League s resolutions and en orce its decisions. However, B ritain was inclined to look a ter its own interests frst, while France had little aith in the League s ability to contain Mussolini s Italy or Hitler s Germany. 198 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) What was the impact of US foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist powers? As has been discussed in C hapter 1 .3 , the US A did not j oin the League o Nations in 1 9 1 9 and it pursued a policy o isolationism in the inter- war period. The USA wanted to be ree to engage in trade and investment globally and wished to avoid being drawn into con icts that were not in its own interests. This policy continued during the 1 9 30s and was strengthened by the impact o the Great D epression and by public opinion, which was staunchly anti- war. Memories o the First World War also remained resh in the minds o Americans. US isolationists advocated a policy o non- involvement in the a airs o both Europe and Asia. In 1 935 , the USA passed the Neutrality Act designed to keep the US A out o a possible European war by banning the sale o armaments Franklin D Roosevelt, US president from 1933 to belligerents. Source skills A.J.P. Taylor. The Origins of the Second World supply. President Roosevelt could provide only War (1 961 ) . moral exhortation; and this was the very thing which Western statesmen eared. It would tie American isolationism completed the isolation their hands in dealing with Hitler and Mussolini; o Europe. Academic commentators observed, it would work against the concessions which rightly, that the problem o the two dictators they were ready to make. Great B ritain and would be solved , i the two World Powers, France had already too much moral capital; Soviet Russia and the United States, were what they lacked was material strength. None drawn into European a airs. This observation was orthcoming rom the United States. was a desire, not a policy. Western statesmen would have grasped eagerly at material backing First question, part a 3 marks rom across the Atlantic. This was not on o er. What, according to AJP Taylor, was the impact o The United States were unarmed except in the USA s policy o isolationism? the Pacifc; and neutrality legislation made it impossible or them to act even as a base o What was the impact of Soviet foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist powers? Western hostility towards the Soviet Union also a ected its response to Italian and German aggression. The Western democracies had cut o all diplomatic and economic ties with the B olshevik government in 1 91 7 and had invaded Russia in an attempt to overthrow the new regime. This ailed, but the US S R was not included in the Paris Peace talks and the Russian B olshevik leader, Vladimir Lenin, had called the League o Nations, on its oundation, a band o robbers . Relations remained hostile until the end o the 1 92 0s when some diplomatic links and economic agreements were made. B ritain remained particularly concerned with the potential threat rom communism and, ollowing a red scare in 1 92 7, did not restore diplomatic links until 1 93 0. Source skills A S oviet p oster by D . Melnikova, p roduced in Moscow, in the S oviet Union, June 1 93 0. The text reads Proletarians of all countries, Unite! . First question, part b 2 marks What is the message o the artist in this poster? Thinking and social skills Look at the details o this Soviet poster. In pairs or groups, discuss how the Western democracies o the 1930s might have reacted to this Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union under Stalin ( rom 1 929) wanted to build socialism in one Communication country , which meant that it would not commit to exporting the revolution and social skills until the process was complete in the USSR. Nevertheless, the activities o Work in pairs. Create a diagram the Communist International in Europe and Asia alarmed the democracies. to show the actors infuencing Stalin s oreign policy began to shi t away rom hostility towards the West the policy o appeasement that when the Soviet Union became threatened by the expansionist policies o France and Britain took towards Japan in Asia, and by Hitler s stated aim o acquiring in the East Mussolini and Hitler in the 1930s. o Europe at the expense o the Soviet Union. Between 1 931 and 1 932, Stalin signed non-aggression pacts with A ghanistan, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and France. There was a tangible shi t in Soviet oreign policy towards the pursuit o a Popular Front against ascism. To this end, the Soviet Union joined the League o Nations in 1 934 and signed mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1 935. Class discussion However, the aim o orming a Popular Front against ascism ailed Should the Western because B ritain and France were ollowing a policy o appeasement. democracies have worked with It was clear to the Soviet Union during the Spanish C ivil War that the USSR to orm a Popular B ritain in particular eared communism more than ascism. The fnal Front against Fascism ? What catalyst or the S oviet Union to abandon its attempts to work with the advantages would this have B ritish and French in order to contain the ascist aggressors came at the had? Why were the Western Munich C on erence in S eptember 1 93 8. D espite its assistance pact with democracies reluctant to ally C zechoslovakia and the territorially strategic importance o that country with the USSR? to the Soviet Union, S talin was not invited to the Munich C on erence. 200 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) What was the international response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 36? B oth the French and the B ritish had attempted to keep Mussolini on side as a key guarantor o the post- war settlement, specifcally to contain German ambitions to unite with Austria. As previous chapters have described, the three countries had come together to orm the Stresa Front in March 1 935 . At this meeting, the French gave Mussolini the impression that they would tolerate an Italian expansion in East A rica. French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval had suggested that Italy could go ahead and acquire political in uence in Abyssinia, as the French interests there were only economic. Although the French had not condoned a military takeover o the country, Mussolini believed at this point that they would not resist. B ritain had been silent on the matter o Abyssinia when Mussolini mentioned his plans during the S tresa C on erence. Mussolini hoped this meant B ritain would have the same attitude as the French. The Italians were concerned about the potential B ritish response to military action, particularly as the B ritish could threaten to attack the Italian navy. The B ritish demonstrated that they wanted to appease Italian expansionist plans when Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden went to Rome in June 1 935 , with a plan that would give Italy the Ogaden region o Abyssinia and compensate Emperor Haile Selassie s Abyssinia with access to the sea via B ritish Somaliland. The Italians now saw that B ritain wanted to accommodate them, and so they rejected the plan. This perception was urther rein orced by a report Italy had acquired rom the B ritish oreign o fce, stating that B ritain would not resist an Italian invasion o Abyssinia. When Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in October 1 93 5 , there was widespread international public outrage and condemnation rom the League o Nations. B ritish public opinion was against the invasion and in avour o action by the League. As there was a general election in B ritain in November 1 93 5 , public opinion at the time was all the more important; a pro-League stance had helped the National government to secure power in November 1 93 5 . However, as you will see rom the sequence o events below, the League proved ine ective in dealing with the crisis. Source skills Source A convey a warning to Mussolini , as he recalls Laura Fermi, Jewish-Italian writer and in The Gathering S torm: To cast an army o p olitical activist, who emigrated to the US A nearly a quarter- million men, embodying the in 1 93 8 to escap e from Mussolini s Italy, in ower o Italian manhood, upon a barren (1 966) . shore two thousand miles rom home, against the goodwill o the whole world and without In England, in view o the coming elections, command o the sea, and then in this position the peace ballot , and public opinion, the embark upon what may well be a series o government embraced an all- out policy campaigns against a people and in regions in avor o the League o Nations and the which no conqueror in our thousand years imposition o economic sanctions on aggressor ever thought it worthwhile to subdue, is to nations. At the end o S eptember Winston give hostages to ortune unparalleled in all C hurchill spoke in London and tried to history. It is te mpting to sp eculate what e ect While taking up a position against the the se words may have had on Mussolini, Ethiopian war and or the League s policies, i he read them, as C hurchill b elieved he Great B ritain was uno fcially assuring France did. The chance se ems ne gligib le that at that she would try to water down the sanctions this late date, co mmitted as he was to the on Italy, i imposed, and connived with France E thiop ian war b y bo th the atalistic drive in an embargo on arms to Ethiopia through o his o wn determination and the amo unt the control o the port o D j ibouti, the only o mone y he had sp ent in the u nde rtaking, access to Abyssinia rom the sea. It is said that Musso lini would have allo wed this warning Haile Selassie, placing pathetic confdence in to dissuade him. ( To an inte rviewer ro m traditional B ritish j ustice, could not understand the Morning Po st, he said that the cost o why it was so di fcult to procure the modern prep aratio n was already 2 b illio n lire 1 00 arms and equipment he needed and was trying millio n p re - war do llars and aske d C an so desperately to buy. B ut then, during the yo u b elieve that we have spent this sum war, the uno fcial embargo was li ted, in part or no thing? ) at least. Source B A cartoon by D avid Low, p ublished in the UK newsp ap er, the Evening Standard, on 2 4 July 1 93 5 . The text reads On the throne of justice. See no Abyssinia; Hear no Abyssinia; Speak no Abyssinia . First question, part b 2 marks Second question 4 marks What is the message o the cartoonist in With re erence to its origin, purpose and content S ource B ? assess the values and limitations o Source A or historians studying the international response to the Abyssinian crisis in 1 93 5 3 6. C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) Thinking and social skills In pairs or groups, discuss the key points made in Source A regarding British policy in the lead up to the Abyssinian crisis. The response of the League, Britain and France On 6 D ecember 1 93 5 , ollowing the Wal Wal incident ( see page 1 3 7) , Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selassie asked the League o Nations to arbitrate; however the League s arbitration committee ound neither side responsible. On 7 January 1 93 5 , a Franco Italian agreement was made. In return or Italian support to contain Hitler, France gave Italy parts o French Somaliland, improved the o fcial status o Italians living in Tunisia and tacitly allowed Mussolini to do as he pleased in Abyssinia. On 1 7 March 1 93 5 , ollowing a large build- up o Italian orces in East A rica, E mperor Haile S elassie appealed directly to the League, as a member state, or its support. The Italian mobilization continued and on 1 1 May S elassie appealed to the League again. On 2 0 May, the League held a special session to discuss the crisis and on 1 9 June S elassie requested League observers be sent to the region. Talks between o fcials rom Italy and Abyssinia broke down at The Hague. D espite Anglo French e orts to appease Mussolini and B ritish attempts via Anthony E den to fnd a peace ul resolution, it was clear rom the beginning o July that Italy wanted a war o conquest. The B ritish declared an arms embargo on both sides on 2 5 July, perhaps in response to Mussolini s assertion that sales o arms to Abyssinia would be seen as un riendliness towards Italy. It also removed its warships rom the Mediterranean, an act which enabled Mussolini to have ree movement o supplies to East A rica. At the end o September, S elassie again asked or neutral observers, but on 2 8 September he also began to mobilize his poorly equipped and outdated army. Without a declaration o war, Italian orces invaded Abyssinia on 3 October. On 7 October, the League duly ound Italy the aggressor and began the process o imposing sanctions; however, this process was slow and the sanctions were limited. They did not embargo key war materials, such as coal, steel and oil, and the sanctions were not carried out by all members o the League. The British government had not wanted to implement harsh sanctions as Britain wanted to revive the Stresa Front and to maintain good relations with Mussolini. However, the B ritish government was also under pressure to uphold the authority o the League. Nevertheless, B ritain decided not to close the Suez C anal, a signifcant route or Mussolini s troops and or supplies to East A rica, to Italian shipping. Austria, Hungary and Nazi Germany ignored the sanctions completely. The US A actually increased exports to Italy. The sanctions, there ore, did little to impede the Italian war e ort and, as discussed in the previous chapter, they in act rallied Italian domestic support behind Mussolini. 203 E ven when the Italians used chemical weapons in Abyssinia, the League ailed to take urther action. The Hoare Laval Pact In their attempt to maintain the S tresa Front against a resurgent Germany, the French and B ritish came up with an appeasing plan to end the confict and the tension it had caused. In D ecember 1 93 5 , French oreign secretary, Pierre Laval and B ritish counterpart, S amuel Hoare drew up the Hoare Laval Pact, which sought to paci y Mussolini by giving him most o Abyssinia. Selassie would receive access to the sea. However, the plan was leaked in the French press. Public opinion in both B ritain and France was outraged by this apparent duplicity and demanded support or the League s policy. The B ritish and French governments were orced to denounce the pact and sanctions continued. Laval and Hoare resigned. Abyssinia (1 935) and bordering countries The Hoare Laval proposal RE t e ANGLO- ra DS to EGYPTIAN te c e ) o ra EA ot H SUDAN ct Pr I TI S I TA te I TA YEMEN n e BR LI A YEMEN P ro LI A Ad ( NE NE en RI T RI T RE Ad RE A Adowa A Aden Adowa Asab Aden FRENCH Djibouti Djibouti (French) SOMALILAND BRITISH Addis Ababa BRITISH Addis Ababa SOMALILAND SOMALILAND ABYSSINIA Ogaden ABYSSINIA Desert ND ND A I LA LI L AL A M SO M SO N IA N L LI A I TA Mogadishu I TA UGANDA Mogadishu KENYA KENYA 0 300 km TANGANYIKA TANGANYIKA BRITISH FRENCH ITALIAN Assigned Italian sphere of to Italy economic in uence 204 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) Thinking and communication skills Read this source. Discuss the key impact o the Hoare Laval Pact on domestic politics in Britain and France. Using this source, identi y political opposition to appeasing Mussolini that existed in Britain and France. A.J.P. Taylor. 1961. The Origins of the Second World War (1961) pages 126 127. Early in December Hoare took the plan to Paris. Laval welcomed it. Mussolini, warned by his equally erring experts that the war was going badly, was ready to accept it. The next step was to present it at Geneva; then, with the League s concurrence, to impose it on the Emperor o Abyssinia a beauti ul example, repeated at Munich, o using the machinery o peace against the victim o aggression. But something went wrong. Hardly had Hoare le t Paris on his way to Geneva than the so-called Hoare-Laval plan appeared in the French press. No one knows how this happened. Perhaps Laval doubted whether the National government were solidly behind Hoare and there ore leaked the plan in order to commit Baldwin and the rest beyond redemption. Perhaps Herriot, or some other enemy o Laval s, revealed the plan in order to ruin it, believing that, i the League were efective against Mussolini, it could then be turned against Hitler. Maybe there was no design at all, merely the incorrigible zest o French journalists At any rate the revelation produced an explosion in British public opinion. The high-minded supporters o the league who had helped to return the National government elt cheated and indignant Baldwin rst admitted that the plan had been endorsed by the government; then repudiated both the plan and Sir Samuel Hoare. Eden took Hoare s place as Foreign Secretary. The Hoare-Laval plan disappeared. Otherwise nothing was changed. The British government were still resolved not to risk war. The results o the international response to the Abyssinian crisis The Hoare Laval pact sealed the fate of the League of Nations in 1 93 5 . It had been exposed as a sham. The attention of B ritain and France was drawn away from East Africa and closer to home when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1 936. France was prepared to let Mussolini complete his conquest in return for his support against Hitler, and the French would not support any further action regarding sanctions. Source skills Telegram from Haile S elassie to the League its efforts to secure respect for the covenant, of Nations, 6 May 1 93 6. and that it should decide not to recognize territorial extensions, or the exercise of an We have decided to bring to an end the most assumed sovereignty, resulting from the illegal unequal, most unj ust, most barbarous war of recourse to armed force and to numerous our age, and have chosen the road to exile in other violations of international agreements. order that our people will not be exterminated and in order to consecrate ourselves wholly First question, part a 3 marks and in peace to the preservation of our What, according to Haile Selassie, should the empire s independence ... we now demand League of Nation s do in response to Italian that the League of Nations should continue aggression in Abyssinia? 205 S elassie ed on 2 May, and the Abyssinian capital, Addis Ababa, ell to Thinking and Italian orces. However, there was no o fcial surrender by Abyssinia and social skills a guerrilla war continued against the Italians. S elassie made pleas or Go to www.youtube.com/ support rom the League and on 3 0 June, despite the jeering o Italian watch?v=oyX2kXeFUlo, or j ournalists, he made a power ul speech criticizing the international search for Emperor Haile community or its inaction. He moved or a resolution to deny Selassie of Ethiopia addresses recognition o the Italian conquest. He concluded with the ominous and League of Nations . prophetic statement, It is us today. It will be you . Watch Haile Selassie s speech D espite Selassie s impassioned speech, his resolution ailed; on 4 July, the at the League of Nations, League voted to end its sanctions, which were li ted on the 1 5 July. The June 1936. new Italian Empire was recognized by Japan on 1 8 November 1 936 in return or recognition o its own occupation o Manchuria. In 1 93 8, B ritain and France recognized Italian control o Abyssinia, although the USA and USSR re used to recognise the Italian Empire. Source skills Source A raised the curtain on his A rican adventure Article from the UK newsp ap er, The with a speech on Wednesday a ternoon Guardian, 3 O ctober 1 93 5 . rom the balcony o his o fce in the Palazzo Venezia, in Rome. A solemn hour is about Mussolini s long- expected invasion o to break in the history o our atherland, he Abyssinia began at dawn yesterday, with said. The wheel o ate had begun to turn and thousands o young Italian in antrymen could not be stopped. cheering as they crossed the border rom E ritrea and began the heavy slog up the In Londo n, the B ritish cabinet held a two- valleys. hour meeting on the crisis in the morning, and in the a ternoon key ministers and Italian bombing planes roared overhead, service chie s were called to D owning S treet. striking frst at the border town o Adowa, It is being stressed that any action by B ritain scene o Italy s humiliating de eat at the must be coordinated with France. B ut the hands o the Abyssinians in 1 896. Two o French are saying they will not do anything the bombers were reported to be piloted by to upset the accord they recently reached Mussolini s sons, Vittorio, aged 1 9, and B runo, with Italy. aged 1 8, while a third had his son-in- law, C ount Galeazzo C iano, as pilot. Source B Tonight the Italian orce, under General S p eech by S ir S amuel Hoare, B ritish Emilio de B ono and numbering 1 00, 000 men, Foreign S ecretary, to the League at Geneva, including Eritrean soldiers, is reported to be 1 1 S ep tember 1 93 5 . advancing on a 40-mile ront and to be within I do not suppose that in the history o the 1 2 miles o Adowa. Another army, commanded Assembly there was ever a more di fcult by General Graziani, is mounting a drive north moment or a speech O n behal o the rom Italian Somaliland, but is reported to be government o the United Kingdom, I can held up by rain-soaked tracks say that they will be second to none in their The Abyssinian Ministry o Foreign A airs has intention to ulfll within the measure o their telegraphed the League o Nations in Geneva, capacity, the obligations which the C ovenant denouncing the Italian aggression as a breach lays upon them. The League stands, and o the League C ovenant. The Abyssinians my country stands with it, or the collective claim that the frst bombs on Adowa struck maintenance o the C ovenant, especially to all a hospital bearing the Red C ross. Mussolini acts o unprovoked aggression. 206 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) Source C Article 1 6 o the Covenant and o collective E xtract from sp eech by Haile S elassie to the security? It is collective security: it is the very League of Nations, June 1 93 6. existence o the League o Nations. It is the value o promises made to small states that their I, Haile Selassie, Emperor o Abyssinia, am here integrity and independence be respected and today to claim that justice which is due to my ensured it is the principle o the equality o people and the assistance promised to it eight states In a word, it is international morality months ago when f ty nations asserted that that is at stake. aggression had been committed in violation o international treaties What real assistance First question, part a 3 marks was given to Ethiopia by the f ty-two nations What key criticisms o the League s response to the who had declared the Rome Government guilty Abyssinian Crisis are made in Source C? o breach o the C ovenant and had undertaken to prevent the triumph o the aggressor? Second question 4 marks I noted with grie , but without surprise that With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, three powers considered their undertakings assess the values and limitations o S ource B or under the C ovenant as absolutely o no value historians studying the international reaction to What, then, in practice, is the meaning o the Abyssinian crisis. Without doubt, the international response to the Abyssinian crisis had a pro ound e ect on European diplomacy. It had atally undermined the Thinking and social skills League o Nations as a credible body or dealing with aggressor states. It In pairs or small groups, read also ended the S tresa Front. B oth France and B ritain believed a ter this Source A and discuss the key con ict that appeasement was the only route they could take to avoid a points it makes. Discuss the con ict with Hitler s Germany. Thus the crisis had shi ted the balance o reasons it gives for British power to Germany s advantage. Mussolini would now move towards a hesitation. To what extent do ull alliance with Hitler. you agree that France s position held Britain back? Source skills A cartoon by D avid Low, p ublished on 4 O ctober 1 93 5 , Research and The man who took the lid off . communication skills In pairs, research headlines and press reports on the invasion of Abyssinia from around the world in October 1935. Make sure you reference your sources appropriately and include a correctly formatted works cited list. Present your headlines and press reports to the class and assess whether there was international consensus against the Italian action. First question, part b 2 marks What is the message o the cartoon? 207 TOK How did the USA respond to the invasion of In small groups explore a range of Abyssinia? historians accounts on the Abyssinian President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal message on 1 8 August Crisis. Discuss what distinguishes a 1 935. He stated that the US government and people believed that better account from a more limited one. the ailure to arrive at a peace ul settlement in East A rica would be Is it the range and quality of the sources a calamity and would lead to adverse e ects or all nations. used in the account and the depth of However, the United States would not take any direct action, as supporting evidence? Is it the time was made clear in a radio address by Secretary o State Hull on 6 and context it was written in? Is it the November 1 93 5 . In this broadcast, he said it was the USA s duty language and expression used by the to remain aloo rom disputes and con icts with which it had no historian? Does your group agree on direct concern. which accounts are better? Source skills The S ecretary of S tate to the United peace, whereas a ter hostilities began our chie S tates D elegation at Geneva, by telegram, obj ect is and will be to avoid being drawn into Washington, O ctob er 1 7 1 93 5 , 6.00p m. the war O ctober 1 5 , 8 p.m. It is important that, i First question b 3 marks possible, daily newspaper rumors and reports What key points are made in this source with rom Europe about the attitude or policy o regards to the US response to the Italian invasion this Government toward some phase o the o Abyssinia? Italo- E thiopian controversy, and especially reports that oreign governments or agencies Second question 4 marks are j ust about to inquire o this Government With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, whether it can or will cooperate with oreign assess the values and limitations o this source or Governments or peace agencies in one way historians studying the international response to or another, shall be minimized to the greatest the Italian invasion o Abyssinia. possible extent Every leading o fcial abroad knows that prior to the outbreak o the war our chie purpose was to aid in preserving The end of the appeasement of Mussolini s Italy How did Britain and France respond to the Italian invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939? Britain, along with France, condemned the Italian invasion o Albania and, as Italy had previously guaranteed the sovereignty o the B alkans, this was a turning point or Chamberlain. He no longer trusted the dictators and now went as ar as to guarantee Greek borders with British military support. Churchill had urged a more direct response by sending in the Royal Navy, but Chamberlain did not agree. Mussolini was, however, surprised at the appeasers commitment to Greece. 208 C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) Thinking skills G. Bruce Strang. On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares Axis aggression was eroding. Chamberlain wrote to For War, page 247 (2003) . his sister, Mussolini has behaved like a snake and Italian leaders were ignorant o the real British a cad. Chamberlain thought the invasion showed reaction. Despite the comparatively muted protests, Mussolini s complete cynicism . The Prime Minister the aggressive nature o Italian policy did provoke a had reached the conclusion that any chance o response. The oreign policy committee decided on uture rapprochement with Italy has been blocked 10 and 11 April to issue a guarantee to Greece, and, by Mussolini just as Hitler has blocked any German under intense French pressure, agreed to extend rapprochement . Mussolini s decision to invade one to Romania, while making a concerted e ort to Albania may have brought potential gains in Italy s bring Turkey into an eastern Mediterranean security strategic situation but at the cost o urther alienating arrangement. Greece accepted its guarantee, although the Chamberlain cabinet and urthering the division it re used in the rst instance to join in guaranteeing o Europe into two competing blocks. By the middle o other countries independence. In Turkey, the Inonii April, British strategic intelligence listed Italy amongst government cited constitutional di culties, and, Britain s likely enemies. British planners also shi ted more seriously, concerns about its own security in the emphasis in war planning to concentrate the British the absence o a British guarantee. Nevertheless, on feet in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense o 13 April both Chamberlain and Daladier issued public the commitment to the Far East, a clear signal that statements in their respective parliamentary chambers resistance to Axis aggression had assumed a higher guaranteeing Greece and Romania against aggression. priority a ter Mussolini s attack. Although the issuing o guarantees would in the end Question be signi cantly less than an ironclad, interlocking In pairs, and with re erence to the source above, discuss security system against Axis aggression, it did signal the extent to which the invasion o Albania in 1939 that the patience o the Western democracies with marked a turning point in British policy towards Italy. What was the reaction o Britain to Italian expansion in 1940? As you have read in C hapter 2 .3 , when Italy j oined the war in June 1 940 Mussolini s orces invaded Egypt and invaded Greece rom Albania. The B ritish then counter- attacked Italian orces in North A rica in Operation C ompass and pushed them out o Egypt, de eating them at B eda Fomm in Libya in February 1 941 . The B ritish Navy, which had been eared by the Italian navy ( as you have read earlier) , had sunk hal the Italian feet in harbour at Taranto on the 1 1 th November, 1 940. The B ritish then occupied C rete. Communication and thinking skills From Andrew Roberts. The Storm of War: A new History of against a orce our times his size, concentrating on the Second World War, (2009) page 120 121. each orti ed area in turn. Operation Compass had In mid-September Mussolini, ancying himsel a second close support rom the Navy and RAF, and, aided Caesar, sent [his] Tenth Army to invade Egypt with by a collapse in Italian morale, by mid-December ve divisions along the coast, taking Sidi Barraini. He O Connor had cleared Egypt o Italians and 38,000 stopped 75 miles short o the British in Mersa Matruh, prisoners were taken. while both sides were rein orced. It was a nerve-wracking Question time or the British in Egypt On 8th December 1940, In pairs discuss what this source suggests about how Lieutenant-General Richard O Connor, commander o the the Italians were pushed back in North A rica in 1940. Western Desert Force [numbering only 31,000 men, 120 guns and 275 tanks] , counter-attacked ercely 209 There ore, the initial military response by the B ritish led to reversals or the Italians. However, the B ritish were in turn pushed back when German orces arrived. The B ritish evacuated Greece in May 1 941 and had been pushed back by German orces to El Alamein in E gypt by June 1 942 . Full document question: The international response to Italian aggression, 1935 36 Source A Source C E xtract from the C ovenant of the League of S ir Samuel Hoare s resignation speech, Nations, 1 91 9. delivered in the House of Commons in London, 19 December 1935 . Article 1 6 S hould any member o the League resort to war in disregard o its covenants It was clear that Italy would regard the under Articles 1 2 , 1 3 or 1 5 , it shall be deemed oil embargo as a military sanction or an act to have committed an act o war against all involving war against her. Let me make other members o the League, which hereby our p osition quite clear. We had no ear undertake immediately to subj ect it to the whatever, as a nation, o any Italian threats. severance o all trade or fnancial relations, I the Italians attacked us we sho uld the prohibition o all exchange between their retaliate with ull success. What was in our nationals and the nationals o the covenant- mind was something very di erent, that an breaking state, and the prevention o all isolated attack o this kind launched upon fnancial, commercial or personal business one Po wer would almost inevitably lead to between the nationals o covenant- breaking the dissolution o the League. state and the nationals o any other state, It was in an atmosphere o threatened whether a member o the League or not. war that the conversations began, and the It shall be the duty o the C ouncil in totality o the member States appeared to be such cases to reco mmend to the several opposed to military action. governments concerned what e ective [It] seemed to me that Anglo- French military, naval or air orce the members o co- operatio n was essential i there was to the League shall contribute to the armed be no breach at Geneva. Fo r two days M. orces to be used to protect the covenants o Laval and I discussed the basis o a possible the League. negotiation Source B These proposals are immensely less A p hotograp h of US p rotesters, 1 93 6. avourable to Italy than the demand that Mussolini made last summer. I believe that unless these acts are aced either the League will break up, or a most unsatis actory p eace will result ro m the con ict that is now taking place. It is a choice between the ull co- ope ratio n o all the member S tates and the kind o unsatis actory compromise that was contemplated in the suggestions which M. Laval and I put up. C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) Source D amongst other weapons, and proclaim the Ruth Henig, a B ritish academic historian, in Italian conquest o a League member state. an academic b ook The Origins of the Second The League o Nations had su ered its second World War (1 985 ) . serious setback in fve years, and this time had ailed to prevent aggression much nearer The bargain they tentatively struck was to E urope. immediately leaked in the French press, and reports o the Hoare- Laval pact caused an Once again, the great powers had shown their uproar in B ritain. The government was orced inability to work together to resolve serious to repudiate Hoare s negotiations in Paris, threats to peace or to protect the interests o and Hoare himsel resigned, to be replaced by weaker League members. These lessons were Anthony E den, who was perceived as a strong not lost on Hitler. League supporter. The B ritish government First question, part a 3 marks now led the way at Geneva in calling or In Source A, what key points are made about the economic sanctions against Mussolini, and League regarding its response to a member state dragged a reluctant French go vernment resorting to war? behind it. B ut the French would not support oil sanctions, whilst the B ritish were reluctant First question, part b 2 marks to agree to the closure o the Suez C anal, What is the message o the photograph in Source B ? both measures which would have caused maj or problems or the Italian war e ort. Second question 4 marks The French had not abandoned hopes o With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, restoring the S tresa ront, and the B ritish did assess the values and limitations o S ource C or not want to run a serious risk o unleashing historians studying the international response to a naval war in the Mediterranean even the Abyssinian crisis. though B ritish naval commanders there were confdent that the outcome would be a B ritish Third question 6 marks victory. For such a war would threaten vital C ompare and contrast the views expressed in imperial communications, and Japan would Source C and D regarding the Hoare Laval Pact. not be slow to exploit the situation to urther its own expansionist ambitions in C hina. S o Fourth question 9 marks League action was muted, with the result that Using the sources and your own knowledge, Italian troops were able to overrun Abyssinia, examine the impact o the Anglo French response crush resistance by the use o poiso n gas to the Abyssinian crisis. Fermi, L. 1 96 6. Mussolini. University o C hicago Press. C hicago, US A Henig R. 1 985 . The Origins of the Second World War. Routledge. London, UK Roberts, A. 2 009. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. Allen Lane, UK. S trang, GB . 2 003 . On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares for War. Praeger. Westport C T, US A Taylor, AJP. 1 961 . The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin. Harmondsworth, UK US D epartment o State. 1 943. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1 931 1 941 . Government Printing O fce. Washington D C, USA Warner, G. 1 968 . Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France. Eyre and S pottiswoode. London, UK The international reaction to the actions o Germany, 1 93 5 3 9, has been the subj ect o much criticism and debate amongst historians. A cartoon by David Low, What s Czechoslovakia to me, anyway? As you read this next section, consider the 18 July 1938 options available to B ritain and France at each stage o German expansion, and the extent to which the decisions that B ritain and France took encouraged German aggression. What was the international reaction to German rearmament? As we have seen, there was sympathy in B ritain towards Germany s desire to reverse certain aspects o the Treaty o Versailles. Following Germany s withdrawal rom the D isarmament C on erence and the League o Nations in 1 93 3 ( see page 1 5 7) , B ritain worked hard to get Germany back into the con erence. It proposed that Germany should be allowed to have an army o 2 00, 000 (rather than the 1 00,000 stipulated in the Treaty o Versailles) , that France should also reduce its army to 2 00, 000, and that Germany should be allowed an air orce hal the size o the French air orce. However, the realization in 1 93 5 that Germany was introducing conscription and already had an air orce ended attempts by the B ritish and French to bring Germany back into the League o Nations and to establish new conditions or rearmament. Germany s actions blatantly contravened the terms o the Treaty o Versailles. This was obviously a concern to the other powers, who could see that Germany was now catching up militarily. German military expenditure increased rom 2 .7 billion marks in 1 93 3 to 8 billion marks in 1 93 5 ; while this was still a relatively low proportion o the gross national product ( GNP) , it was nonetheless a worry to B ritain and France. It was clear that such rearmament would strengthen German demands or urther treaty modifcations and that, indeed, Germany would be able to achieve these by orce i it could not get them by peace ul means. In respo nse to Ge rman rearmament, and ollowing Hitler s threatening mo ves o ver Austria in 1 9 3 4, a con erence was held at S tresa in Italy, and was attended by the p rime ministers and oreign ministers o France, B ritain and Italy. The ministers dre w up a ormal pro test at Hitler s disregard o the Versaille s provisio ns regarding disarmament, and they rea rmed their co mmitment to Locarno and to Austrian indep ende nce. This collective action, as you have read in C hapter 2 . 3 , was known as the Stresa Front, and it could have acted as a deterrent to Hitler s plans. However, three developments now took place that undermined this united ront. First, France concluded the Franco Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty with Russia, in 1 93 5 . This coincided with Russia s entry into the League o Nations; with Poland in a pact with Germany (see page 1 5 9) , it was important to keep Russia on side. However, Italy was unwilling to conclude any pact with a communist government. B ritain was also worried about using a communist country to contain Germany and opposed France s idea o surrounding Germany with alliances, believing that this would lead to Germany eeling encircled. The second development was initiated by B ritain and it o ended both the French and Italian governments. B ritain was unwilling to enter a naval race with Germany at a time when its naval strength was already stretched to capacity; there was also a concern that Japan might want to renego tiate the terms o the naval treaties o Washington and London ( see page 2 2 ) . This made it tempting to resp ond to Hitler s o ers to limit the German feet to 3 5 % o the B ritish feet, which in act gave the opportunity or the German navy to triple its size. O n 1 8 June, this percentage was agreed in the Anglo German Naval Agreement. The agreement also allo wed a German submarine feet equal to B ritain s. The Versailles restrictions on the German navy had thus been completely set aside. Ruth Henig summarises the e ect o this treaty in S ource A below. Source skills Source A eld o arms limitation. B ut they had, in the Ruth Henig. The Origins of the Second World process, condoned German violation o the War (1 985 ) . Treaty o Versailles by agreeing to a German navy considerably in excess o that stipulated While such an agreement may have been by the treaty, and they had not attempted to militarily desirable rom a B ritish point secure the prior agreement o the other major o view, it was politically inept. It drove a signatories, France and Italy. What was now wedge between B ritain on the one hand to stop Hitler repudiating other provisions and the French and Italians on the other, at o the treaty, orti ed by the knowledge that a time when it was vitally important or the the B ritish government was, i not tacitly three powers to work together. The B ritish supporting him, most unlikely to o er government could claim that it was possible strenuous opposition? to do business with Nazi Germany in the C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 Source B A cartoon by D avid Low, 2 4 June 1 93 5 (with added annotations) , dep icting French p rime minister Pierre Laval, Italian p rime m inister B enito Mussolini and B ritish p rime minister Ramsay MacD onald in a boat labelled Collective isolation . The text reads 3 wise men of Stresa went to sea in a Barrel. If the Barrel had been stronger, my story would have been longer. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement Mussolini furious Germany watching: Rough also a seas reference indicating to the tricky terms of international the Anglo- situation naval Treaty? Collective The Stresa boat isolation totally inadequate for opposite of the rough seas collective security First question, part a 3 marks First question, part b 2 marks According to Source A what were the key What is the message o the cartoon in Source B ? limitations o the Anglo German Naval agreement? The third development which undermined the Stresa Front was E xaminer s hint: Use the Mussolini s invasion o Abyssinia in October 1 93 5 . In act, this le t annotations on the cartoon to the S tresa Front in ruins. A ter this, Hitler was able to pursue his help you write your answer. aims with greater confdence. Here is a starting sentence: What was the international reaction to the remilitarization The overall message of this cartoon is that the Stresa of the Rhineland? Front is weak and unlikely When Hitler marched into the Rhineland in 1 93 6, violating both the to last long. This is shown Treaty o Versailles and the Locarno Treaties, he aced no opposition by the fact that (use the rom either B ritain or France. details of the cartoon to back up your points) 215 The French government at the time was only a caretaker government and thus was not in a position to consider war. The divisions in French society made a clear response impossible and neither le t nor right wanted to propose a war against Germany with orthcoming elections. In addition, the general sta o the French army had exaggerated the number o German orces marching into the Rhineland, putting them at 2 65 ,000 when in act there were only 3 0, 000. To deal with an invasion o such supposed size, the French would have to mobilize its army and General Gamelin, the C hie o Sta , told French ministers that this would lead to a long, drawn-out war or which there was little support in France. The French thus looked to B ritain or a response, but Prime Minister S tanley B aldwin s government made it clear that they, too, were unwilling to contemplate war over the Rhineland. O ne reason or this was B ritain s overstretched military commitments, and in 1 93 6 the C hie o the Imperial General S ta made it clear that the armed orces were not in any position to fght a success ul war against Germany ( see page 1 68) . Signifcantly, the B ritish also did not see Hitler s action as particularly threatening. As the B ritish politician Lord Lothian put it, The Germans are only going into their own back garden . Hitler o course, had also o ered negotiations at the same time as invading ( see page 1 63 ) , a move that historian William Craig calls a diplomatic smokescreen ; this made it easier to aim or a settlement rather than to con ront Hitler directly. Foreign Minister Anthony E den wrote: It seems undesirable to adopt an attitude where we would either have to fght or the [demilitarized] zone or abandon it in the ace o a German reoccupation. It would be pre erable or Great Britain and France to enter into negotiations or the surrender on conditions o our rights in the zone, while such a surrender still has got a bargaining value. Eden, 1 93 6 The ailure to stop Hitler at this point, especially given that his troops had instructions to turn back i con ronted, is o ten seen as a turning point: the last chance to stop Hitler without war. Harold Macmillan, a C onservative politician, wrote in the Star newspaper, There will be no war now. But unless a settlement is made now a settlement that can only be made by a vigorous lead rom this country there will be war in 1 940 or 1 941 . However, at the time, this was the view only o a minority. The reality is that it would have been hard or the B ritish government to act given that political and public opinion were frmly in avour o peace and o negotiating with Germany. Source skills A.J.P. Taylor. The Origins of the Second World French had a great army, and the Germans War (1 964) . had none. Psychologically it was the reverse o the truth The French army could march It was said at the time, and has o ten been said into Germany; it could extract promises o since, that 7 March 1 936 was the last chance good behaviour rom the Germans, and then when Germany could have been stopped it would go away. The situation would remain without all the sacrifce and su ering o a great the same as be ore, or, i anything, worse war. Technically, on paper, this was true: the C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 the Germans more resent ul and restless than point. It opened the door or Germany s success. ever. There was in act no sense in opposing It also opened the door or her ultimate ailure. Germany until there was something solid to oppose, until the settlement o Versailles was First question, part a 3 marks undone and Germany rearmed. Only a country According to Taylor, why was opposing Germany which aims at victory can be threatened with in the Rhineland a good idea. de eat. 7 March was thus a double turning The international reaction to the Spanish Civil War: The Non-Intervention Committee In France, a Popular Party government with similar views to the republican government in S pain was elected in June 1 93 6. The new prime minister, Leon B lum, wanted to support the S panish government; it was not in French interests to have on its border a right- wing regime that could j oin with Italy and Germany to encircle France. However, B lum eared opposition i he directly intervened and knew that B ritain was unlikely to support such a move. He there ore came up with the idea o non- intervention, whereby all o the European countries would commit to keeping out o the confict. B aldwin s government in B ritain wanted to prevent the S panish C ivil War becoming a wider confict and so agreed with the French plan. However, B ritish motives were di erent rom those o the French. B aldwin s largely C onservative government believed that the nationalists would probably win the war and so did not want to make an enemy o the S panish nationalist leader, General Franco. In addition, the B ritish government did not want to upset Mussolini. It also viewed the Republican government as communist ( an impression rein orced by the act that it received aid rom the S oviet Union) . There were many B ritish business interests in S pain, and investors believed that they aced nancial risks i Franco lost resulting in a socialist or communist government in S pain. They also supported Franco s tough anti- union position. A total o 1 6 countries signed the Non- Intervention Pact. However, three o the key members o the Non- Intervention C ommittee ( NIC ) Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union ignored the NIC commitment TOK completely and, as we have seen, sent substantial aid into Spain. In small groups investigate a In addition, B ritain s policy o non- intervention avoured the nationalists: current civil war or confict and nd out how the international It ocused on preventing aid to the Republic and allowed the community has responded. Nationalists, rather than the Republicans, to use Gibraltar as a How does your understanding communications base. o the international response In D ecember 1 93 6, B ritain signed a trading agreement with the to the Spanish Civil war in the Nationalists that allowed B ritish companies to trade with the rebels. 1930s help you to make sense o the complexity o responding Franco, not the S panish republicans, was able to get credit rom to civil conficts today? B ritish banks. 217 The policy o non- intervention thus played a key role in allowing Franco to win the civil war in Spain. Non- intervention worked against the Republicans, while Hitler and Mussolini continued to give e ective aid to the Nationalists. The ailure o non- intervention urther discredited the appeasement policies o B ritain and France. Hitler had ignored non- intervention, which was also the policy o the League o Nations, and had success ully helped a right- wing government to power. The Western democracies thus appeared weak to Hitler, and this encouraged him urther in his actions. What was the international response to ? With Anchluss in May 1 93 8, Hitler had again violated the Treaty o Versailles which specifcally orbade the union o Germany and Austria. He invaded an independent state and was in a stronger position to attack C zechoslovakia. Yet, apart rom B ritish and French protests to B erlin, there was limited international response. Why was this? France was paralysed by an internal political crisis and did not even have a government at the time o Anschluss. Ministers threatened to call up reservists to strengthen France s army but needed B ritain s support, which was not orthcoming. Italy was now increasingly dependent on German riendship and re used to respond to C hancellor S chuschnigg s appeals or help. The League o Nations was discredited a ter the Abyssinian a air and Anschluss was not even re erred to the League or discussion. In B ritain, there was a eeling that Germany s union with Austria was inevitable. C hamberlain made a statement in the House o C ommons in which he condemned Germany s actions and the way in which Anschluss had taken place, but also stated, the hard fact is that nothing could have arrested this action by Germany unless we and others with us had been prepared to use force to prevent it . Source skills Source A speak up now or S chuschnigg. Even the D avid Faber. , (2008). Archbishop o C anterbury appealed to the House o Lords or calmness and balance O n 1 4 March The Times newspaper told its o j udgement . The union o Germany and readers that our correspondent leaves no Austria sooner or later was inevitable he room or doubt about the public j ubilation told his ellow peers, and fnally, may bring with which [Hitler] and his army were greeted some stability to E urope . At the Foreign everywhere . The Labour Party, recalling the O fce too, the general eeling was one brutality o D oll uss a ew years earlier against o relie . Austrian socialists, had little inclination to 218 C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 Source B A cartoon by D avid Low, Not only the Austrians voted , p ublished in the UK newsp ap er, the Evening Standard, on 1 2 Ap ril 193 8. First question, part a 3 marks First question, part b 2 marks According to S ource A, what actors infuenced What is the message o S ource B concerning B ritain s attitude towards Anschluss? Anschluss? What was the international reaction to German aggression E xaminer s hint: Don t in Czechoslovakia? forget to use the details of the cartoon to support your two France s reaction points. Start by annotating it in Following Anschluss, it was clear to B ritain and France that the same way as we annotated C zechoslovakia would be the ocus o Hitler s next oreign policy moves. the cartoon on page 21 5. Make France had two treaties with C zechoslovakia, signed in 1 92 4 and 1 92 5 , sure you look at the title to give which committed France to assisting C zechoslovakia in the event o you a hint as to the meaning of a threat to their common interests. However, the French also saw the cartoon. that they were in no position to keep to these treaty obligations. They argued that C zechoslovakia could not be de ended, and French Prime Minister D aladier and Foreign Minister B onnet were only too happy to ollow B ritain s lead in nding a way out o a military showdown with Germany. 219 Britain s reaction Many B ritish politicians had sympathy with C zechoslovakia, as it had survived as a democracy or a longer period than the other new states in central and eastern E urope. However, C hamberlain did not believe that C zechoslovakia was worth ghting or. He saw C zechoslovakia as a highly arti cial creation and one that was ultimately unsustainable. He had some sympathy with the S udeten Germans and believed that he could organize a peace ul and negotiated handover o the Sudetenland to Germany. In any case, B ritain was not in a position to o er military help to C zechoslovakia. C hamberlain wrote in his diary that, We could not help Czechoslovakia she would simply be a pretext for going to war with Germany I have therefore abandoned the idea of giving guarantees to Czechoslovakia, or the French in connection with her obligations to that country. Given their determination to avoid a confict over C zechoslovakia, B ritain and France worked hard to nd a diplomatic solution. Following Hitler s speech o 1 2 S eptember 1 93 8 at the Nuremberg Rally ( see page 1 76) , C hamberlain decided to seize the initiative and to fy to meet Hitler in Germany. This was a radical move in the world o diplomacy, as at this time prime ministers did not fy abroad to meet other leaders one to one. This was the rst time that C hamberlain had fown; as historian D avid Reynolds has pointed out, it also marked the rst o the 2 0th century summits between world leaders. At the meeting, Hitle r demanded that all areas o C zechoslo vakia in which Germans comprised over 5 0 % o the p opulation sho uld j o in Ge rmany. This wo uld be sup ervised by an internatio nal commissio n. C hamberlain agreed, but said that he wo uld have to get the agreeme nt o the C zechs and the French rst. C hamberlain p rivately re marked that, In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word. O ver the ollowing week, C hamberlain was able to get agreement or this deal rom the B ritish C abinet and the French government, despite the act that this would mean ignoring their alliance with C zechoslovakia. The C zechoslovakian government, led by President Edvard B ene , was told that, i these proposals were rej ected, the C zechs would have to ace Germany on their own. C zechoslovakia accepted the plan on 2 1 S eptember 1 93 8. O n 2 2 September, C hamberlain few back to Germany, expecting to have a discussion at B ad Godesberg about the proposals that had previously been discussed and were now agreed upon. However, Hitler now said that the previous proposals did not go ar enough. He wanted the claims o Hungary and Poland to C zech territory met and he wanted to occupy the Sudetenland no later than 1 October. C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 B ack in B ritain, many of C hamberlain s colleagues rej ected the Godesberg proposals. France now said it would honour its commitments to C zechoslovakia; the C zechs said that the new proposals were unacceptable. All countries started preparing for war. In B ritain, trenches were dug in London s parks and 3 8 million gas masks were distributed. On 2 7 September, C hamberlain made the following radio broadcast: How horrible, antastic and incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks because o a quarrel in a ar-away country between people o whom we know nothing. I would not hesitate to pay even a third visit to Germany i I thought it would do any good. Armed confict between nations is a nightmare to me; but i I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by ear o its orce, I should eel it must be resisted. Under such a domination, li e or people who believe in liberty would not be worth living, but war is a terrible thing, and we must be very clear, be ore we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake. Thinking and Communication skills Task one In what way does the cartoonist Low in the cartoon at the start o this chapter disagree with Chamberlain? Task two Go to www.britishpathe.com/video/the-crisis-latest/query/Sudeten. Watch Chamberlain s broadcast on this Path News clip. What is the British attitude towards Chamberlain as shown in the clip? Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPoOTNPYKnQ, or search or Peace in our time? (1938 Munich Crisis) Part 2 o 11 . Watch part o the video Peace in our Time? What point is the narrator making about Czechoslovakia and the British attitude towards Czechoslovakia? How use ul is this documentary or a historian investigating the Munich Crisis? Task three Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=BFlsYfrTF0, or search or Hitler and Chamberlain: The Munich Crisis 1938 . Watch this documentary by historian David Reynolds on the Munich Con erence. How does this compare to the documentary Peace in our Time? in terms o presentation and content? (You will need to watch the rest o Peace in our Time? to answer this question.) 221 Hitler agreed to a third con erence, which was to be chaired by Mussolini. TOK As you can see in the Path News clip below, this last hope or peace Investigate primary sources was greeted with much enthusiasm in B ritain. Neither the C zech responding to the Munich president, Edvard B ene , nor the Soviet leader, S talin, was invited to Agreement rom around the the con erence, which agreed to give the Sudetenland to Germany (see world in September 1938. page 1 78 or ull details o the Munich Agreement) . For C hamberlain, Share the key points made in however, the highlight o the con erence, was securing rom Hitler each source in small groups. a j oint declaration that B ritain and Germany would only deal with Highlight the language used in problems through negotiation and would not attempt to use orce. For the sources and identi y where C hamberlain, this meant peace in our time ( though this was a phrase there may be bias. Discuss that he later said he regretted using) . whether the meaning o the words and expressions used Communication in 1938 has changed over skills time. Consider the ollowing question: I language changes Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=SetNFqcayeA, or search Neville Chamberlain in meaning, what efect might returns rom Germany with the Munich Agreement . this have on our understanding Watch the Path News clip showing Chamberlain returning to Britain. o the past? Can we really What exactly has Hitler agreed to according to the signed declaration? understand the past through primary sources? What in ormation concerning the agreement is given in this clip? There was much relie in B ritain that war had been averted. The B ritish press mostly supported C hamberlain s policy and C hamberlain had support rom the majority o his party. However, even at the time, there was criticism o the agreement. Winston C hurchill called B ritish policy a total and unmitigated disaster , and D u C ooper, First Lord o the Admiralty, resigned rom the government. The Labour and Liberal Parties both opposed the agreement. C lement Attlee, leader o the Labour Party, said: We have been unable to go in for carefree rejoicing. We have felt that we are in the midst of a tragedy. We have felt humiliation. This has not been a victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for brute force We have today seen a gallant, civilised and democratic people betrayed and handed over to a ruthless despotism. Class discussion In pairs, discuss the extent to which you agree with the historian Richard Overy s appraisal o the Munich Agreement that it represented a realistic assessment of the balance between Western interests and Western capabilities (Overy, 2008) . The invasion o Czechoslovakia: The end o appeasement Hitler s takeover o the rest o C zechoslovakia in March 1 93 9, caused great shock and outrage in B ritain. It was now clear that Hitler s aims were not limited; he had broken a signed agreement and his invasion o C zechoslovakia could not be j ustifed by any claim to be uniting Germans. There was a shi t o opinion in B ritain, and C hamberlain was put under pressure to take a frmer stand against Hitler. He made his new stance clear in a speech on 1 7 March 1 93 9: 222 C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 Is this the last attack upon a small state or is it to be ollowed by others? Is Communication skills this, in e ect, a step in the direction o an attempt to dominate the world by orce? . .. While I am not prepared to engage this country in new and What does Chamberlain s unspecifed commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be speech reveal about his change oreseen, yet no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that because in policy towards Hitler? it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fbre that it will not take part to the utmost o its power in resisting such a challenge i it were ever made. What was the international reaction to Hitler s demands regarding Poland? Given Hitler s actions over Memel, and German demands over D anzig, on 3 1 March 1 93 9, B ritain o ered a guarantee to Poland which said that, i it was the victim o an unprovoked attack, B ritain would come to its aid. France gave a similar assurances. These guarantees were controversial. Poland was a right- wing military dictatorship and anti- S emitic; it had also accepted Japanese and Italian expansion, and had taken territory rom C zechoslovakia as part o the Munich Agreement. Moreover, actually sending military aid to Poland would be even more di fcult than acting to support C zechoslovakia. Nevertheless, B ritain s guarantee to Poland did act as a warning to Hitler, and it did allow B ritain to eel that it was taking more direct action against Hitler to deter urther aggression. In act, C hamberlain still believed that he could use diplomacy to get Hitler to negotiate. When Mussolini invaded Albania on 7 April, B ritain and France also gave guarantees to Greece and Romania. In May, B ritain urther strengthened its position in the Eastern Mediterranean by negotiating an agreement with Turkey or mutual assistance in case o war in the Mediterranean area. Meanwhile, both B ritain and France stepped up military preparations. The Pact o S teel confrmed that Italy could not now be detached rom Germany and this strengthened military collaboration between the two countries. In March, the B ritish government announced that it was doubling the territorial army, and in April conscription was introduced. In act, by 1 93 9, it was clear that B ritain and France were in a much stronger military position than they had been in 1 93 8, and this act, too, allowed them to take a frmer stand against Hitler. In B ritain, air de ence and the introduction o radar was near completion. The rearmament programme was also set to reach a peak in 1 93 9 40, by which time it was estimated that B ritain would, militarily, be on roughly equal terms with Germany. Negotiations with the Soviet Union I B ritain and France were to be able to assist Poland in the event o a German attack, then help rom the Soviet Union would be key. The French were more enthusiastic about this than the B ritish as they had 223 a long tradition o Franco Soviet/Russian cooperation. Many B ritish politicians on the le t also elt that such an alliance had to be established quickly; however, there was still a reluctance on the part o the B ritish government to ollow this line o action. It had ignored the S oviet Union s approaches during the Austrian and S udeten crises, and S talin had not even been invited to the Munich C on erence. Even in 1 939, C hamberlain was unenthusiastic about an alliance with the Soviets, con essing to the most profound distrust of Russia . There were also other, more practical, reasons to be concerned about such an alliance: The Soviet army was militarily weak a ter Stalin s purges. An alliance could alienate other Eastern European countries that B ritain hoped to win over to orm a diplomatic ront against Germany. I Germany elt hemmed- in this could actually push it towards war. An alliance might push Poland, where Stalin was also distrusted, and Spain into an alliance with Hitler. In April 1 93 9, despite these misgivings, C hamberlain fnally bowed to pressure and agreed to start negotiations. However, the expectations o what should be included in such an agreement were di erent or the S oviets on the one hand, and the French and B ritish on the other. B ritain and France j ust wanted the Soviets to join in the guarantees to Poland, but the Soviets proposed instead a mutual assistance treaty by which B ritain, France and Russia would all come to one another s aid in the event o an attack. This was to prevent the Soviet Union being le t to deal with Germany in the E ast alone. In addition, S talin demanded that the S oviet Union should have the right to intervene militarily in neighbouring states i they were threatened internally by local ascist orces. This was rej ected outright by the B ritish and French, who saw this as an excuse to inter ere with, or even take over, other countries. There were other reasons or the ailure o the negotiations as explained by historian Richard Overy in S ource A, below. Source skills Source A S oviet negotiators, all top military and political Richard O very. Origins of the Second World War fgures, ound that the B ritish had sent a (2 008) . j unior representative, who had no powers to negotiate and sign an agreement. This slight Talks continued throughout the summer, deeply o ended S oviet leaders. It was soon though both sides complained endlessly about discovered that the western delegations had the obduracy and deviousness o the other. In no real plans or the military alliance, and had August the Soviet side insisted on ull military not even secured agreement or the passage discussions be ore any more progress could be o Soviet orces across Poland to fght the made. Again the west showed what Molotov German army. The discussions, which had later condemned as a dilatory attitude. The begun on 1 2 August 1 93 9, broke up a ter B ritish delegation was sent on a long trip three days and were not revived. by sea instead o by air. When it arrived the C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 Source B A cartoon by D avid Low, p ublished in the UK newsp ap er the Daily Mail, 5 Ap ril 1 93 9. First question, part a 3 marks First question, part b 2 marks What, according to Source A, were the reasons What is the message of S ource B ? for the failure of the Anglo-S oviet talks? Self-management and communication skills Review the relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies and Germany between 1933 and 1939. Re er back to the discussion o the reasons or the Nazi Soviet Pact (see page 224; also pages 183 184). Make notes under the ollowing headings: the view o the British and French concerning an agreement with the Soviet Union the view o the Soviets on an agreement with the Western democracies the view o Germany on an agreement with the Soviet Union the view o the Soviets on an agreement with Germany. TOK Imagine that you are advising Stalin on whether to make an agreement with either Britain and France or with Germany. You have used your imagination in the task here as an adviser Prepare a presentation to Stalin on the advantages and disadvantages o each to Stalin. How do historians use course o action. Make sure you give evidence to support your points. their imagination when writing What is your fnal advice on the course o action that Stalin should take? their accounts? 225 The international reaction to the invasion o Poland: The outbreak o war C hamberlain continued to hope or a negotiated settlement but, as you have read in C hapter 2 .6, last- minute attempts at diplomacy ailed. Hitler invaded Poland on 1 S eptember 1 93 9. O n 3 S eptember, at 9.00am, C hamberlain issued an ultimatum to Germany. Germany did not reply and so war was declared at 1 1 .00am that same day. Communication skills Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=rtJ_zbz1NyY, or search Neville Chamberlain - Britain s declaration o war 1939 . Watch Chamberlain s broadcast to the British that war has been declared. What emotions is Chamberlain attempting to rouse in his speech? Source skills Richard O very. Origins of the Second World War reason be ore it did the late summer o (2 008) . 1 939 was a good time to declare it. This was particularly so given the nature o the Allied [Hitler ailed] to see that the western powers strategy o blockade and economic war are, had reached their limit in 1 93 9. Hitler was which could be made to bite across the winter right to judge that Poland was not in itsel o months when Hitler would be unable to mount much intrinsic interest in British and French a major land o ensive. The only incalculable calculations, but he ailed to see that both element was the possibility o German bomb powers assessed the Polish crisis not on its own attacks in an e ort to achieve the knock-out merits, but in terms o their global interests and blow dreamed o by air theorists. Great e orts great-power status. To fght or Poland was a were made over the summer to complete the means to assert B ritish and French power in the necessary civil de ence preparations, to arrange B alkans, the Mediterranean and the Far East the evacuation o women and children, and to as well. Given avourable Allied intelligence prepare or gas attack. on the military balance, and the threat o severe economic crisis i war preparations First question, part a 3 marks were continued at such a high level into the According to this source, why was S eptember uture, the Polish crisis was viewed as an 1 93 9 an opportune time or B ritain and France to unrepeatable opportunity to challenge German make a stand against Germany? expansionism. I war had to come and the Allies ervently hoped that Hitler would see Research skills Research the response o the international press to Hitler s invasion o Poland. Can you nd headlines and articles about this act o aggression that are: negative positive neutral. Communication skills I possible, try to nd newspapers rom diferent regions and countries, and rom Present your ndings to diferent political backgrounds. You should spend no more than two hours on this the class in a 5 10-minute task. Make sure your sources are appropriately re erenced and that you make a presentation. list o works cited. 226 C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 What were the reactions of Britain and France to Hitler s actions, 1939 1940? Despite the British and French promises o aid to Poland, they could o er no help to Poland against the Nazi onslaught which began in September. During the phoney war , B ritain prepared or the inevitable air attack. It also debated whether it should send aid to Finland which had been invaded by the Soviet Union. However, just as an Allied orce was about to move, Finland capitulated. The Allies then decided to lay mines in Norwegian territorial waters in order to block Swedish iron ore getting to Germany. However the day a ter the Allies began mining, the Nazis occupied Denmark and invaded Norway. Allied troops were sent to help Norway, but the campaign was poorly planned and the Allied orces driven out. The ailure o the Norway campaign contributed to C hamberlain s decision to resign. The result was that C hurchill took over as head o a coalition government in B ritain. With the de eat o France in 1 940 and the evacuation o the B ritish rom D unkirk, B ritain stood alone against the German army. At this point, Hitler put orward another peace o ensive . It is possible that C hamberlain or other members o the B ritish government would have been prepared to consider these proposals. However, C hurchill was determined to continue fghting. His leadership was to prove key in the ensuing B attle o B ritain and the B litz where the Lu twa e attacked London and other cities over the next ew months. D uring 1 940, B ritain attempted to fnd allies. However, the US A continued with its isolationist stance. Roosevelt persuaded C ongress to amend the Neutrality Acts so that B ritain could buy arms on a cash and carry basis. However, even when B ritain stood alone against Nazi Germany at the end o 1 940, most Americans were not in avour o getting involved in the war. B y the end o 1 940, B ritain was also su ering rom Germany s U- boat campaign. Nevertheless, as explained at the end o chapter 2 .5 , Hitler s invasion o the S oviet Union was to ensure Germany s ultimate de eat. As Zara S teiner writes, Each o the Axis powers were encouraged to embark on aggressive policies which were to bring the Soviet Union and the United States into what became in 1 941 a global confict. While the survival o Britain prevented a total German victory, only the entry o the Soviet Union and the United States ensured the destruction o Nazi Germany and, or the most part, dictated the outcome o the world war and the shape o the post-war settlement. Steiner, p. 1 064 The Second World War: The historical debate How important was appeasement as a cause of the Second World War? In the years ollowing the end o the S econd World War, there was much debate among historians as to the ro le o appeasement in causing the war. S ir Winston C hurchill called the S econd World War the unnecessary war that would not have taken place had Hitler been 227 stop ped earlier, or example in 1 9 3 6 over the Rhineland or in 1 93 8 over C zechoslovakia. The appeasers were seen as weak, rightened men who had been a raid to stand up to Hitler and who had ailed to realize that they were dealing with a calculating and ruthless dictator. B y consistently giving in to Hitler s demands they had encouraged his aggression and alienated the S oviet Union. Appeasement also meant that Hitler had gambled on that policy continuing when he invaded Poland, which was the trigger or war. AJP Taylor argued that Hitler did not have a clear plan or ho w he would carry out his oreign policy aims, and that he in act reacted to the actions o the E uropean leaders: the Fascist dictators would not have gone to war unless they had seen a chance o winning .. . the cause o war was there ore as much the blunders o others as the wickedness o the dictators themselves Taylor, 1 961 Clas s di s cu s s i o n Those who argue that appeasement was a weak policy suggest that other actions could have been taken by Britain and France. In pairs, consider the advantages and disadvantages o these alternative routes o action: using the League o Nations more efectively to stop the actions o the dictators being prepared to use orce against Hitler when he marched into the Rhineland standing up to Hitler over the Sudetenland spending more on armaments in the early 1930s ollowing Churchill s idea o establishing a Grand Alliance o the anti-Fascist countries against Hitler. When B ritish C abinet minutes and government papers became available Co m m u ni cat i o n and 3 0 40 years a ter the end o the S econd World War, it became clear s o ci als ki lls that C hamberlain had been dealing with a complex situation. Given Divide the class into two teams. the di fculties and constraints on C hamberlain which included the The motion that you will be realities o the B ritish economy, B ritish imperial commitments, as well as debating is: public opinion concerning the horror o another war and the inj ustices o the Treaty o Versailles on Germany it becomes easier to see the Appeasem ent w a s both the orces that shaped appeasement as a policy. Richard O very argues that w rong policy orthe 1930 s a nd C hamberlain s policy was, in act, the right one or B ritain at the time a faw ed policy . and paid o in the sense that Hitler was orced into a general E uropean You will need three speakers on war earlier than he had planned, and at a date when B ritain was in a each side. The rest o the team stronger military position than it had been in 1 93 8. should help research and write the speeches, and also prepare Indeed, most historians would now agree that it was the ambitions o questions or the opposing team. Hitler that were the key cause o the Second World War. Ruth Henig sums up the debate: We cannot be certain o the extent to which Hitler might have been encouraged in his expansion course by the lack o opposition he received. The view he already held that Britain and France were powers in serious decline, who would not put up any serious resistance to his eastern expansion was rein orced and this may have speeded up his plans. But historians are now in no doubt that Hitler was intent on expansion and was prepared to fght a war, or series o wars, to achieve his objectives. 228 C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 The other powers ultimately had two choices: they could acquiesce in his Communication skills plans or try to resist them. And whenever resistance came whether over Nazi demands for the return of the Sudetenland, or Danzig and the Polish Draw up your own timeline rom Corridor it was likely to provoke war. Henig, 1 999 1933 40. the timeline write the Self-management actions o Hitler and the actions skills o Mussolini (use a diferent colour or each dictator) . Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eu78iaVsBEE, or search World War II Germany Road To War . the timeline, write the actions o the Western Watch the documentary Germany: Road To War to review the key actions taken democracies. by Hitler and the responses o the Western powers. (Hitler s oreign policy starts 15 minutes into the clip.) Make your timeline detailed and use ul as a revision tool. Full document question: The Munich Conference, 1938 Source A leaders, cause peace to prevail in a crisis; but E xtract from The Times, a UK newsp ap er, that the threat o ruin to civilisation will recur 1 O ctober 1 93 8. unless inj ustices are aced and removed in quiet times, instead o being le t to ester until No conqueror returning rom a victory on it is too late or remedy. the battle eld has come home adorned with nobler laurels than Mr. C hamberlain rom Source B Munich yesterday; and the King and people A cartoon, Still Hope , published in Punch, a alike have shown by the manner o their UK magazine, 2 1 Sep tember 1 93 8. reception their sense o this achievement Had the Go vernment o the United Kingdom been in less resolute hands, it is certain as it can be that war, incalculable in its range, would have broken out against the wishes o every people concerned. The horror o such a catastrophe was no less in Germany. S o much is clear rom the immense popular enthusiasm with which Mr. C hamberlain was greeted on each o his three visits Indeed, these visits seem to have increased the F hrer s understanding o his own people s sentiments, with a de nite e ect upon his policy. Let us hope that he may go on to see the wisdom o allowing them at all times to know the sentiments o other peoples instead o imposing between them a smoke- screen o ignorance and propaganda. For our nation it remains to show our gratitude to Mr. C hamberlain, chiefy by learning the lessons taught by the great dangers through which we have been so nely led that only a people prepared to ace the worst can, through their 229 Source C Source D S p eech by Winston Churchill in the House of Zara S teiner. The Triumph of the Dark: C ommons, 5 O ctob er 1 93 8. European International History 1 933 1 999 (2 01 1 ) . I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or orget but which C hamberlain understoo d that his must nevertheless be stated, namely, that intervention was a high- risk strategy. Not we have sustained a total and unmitigated only did he believe that Hitler might go de eat, and that France has su ered more to war, he also agreed with his civilian than we have and military advisers that B ritain was in no position to fght. There was virtual No one has been a more resolute and consensus in Whitehall that little co uld uncompromising struggler or peace than the be done to p rotect C zechoslovakia against Prime Minister. Everyone knows that. Never attack and that no p eace treaty, even a ter a has there been such intense and undaunted terrible war, could restore Prague to its 1 9 1 9 determination to maintain and to secure po sitio n. The p rime minster was co nvinced peace. That is quite true. Nevertheless, I am that no state, certainly no democratic state not quite clear why there was so much danger ought to make a threat o war, unless it was o Great B ritain or France being in a war with both ready to carry it o ut and p repared to Germany at this j uncture i , in act, they were do so . S ignifcantly, under crisis co nditions, ready all along to sacrifce C zechoslovakia. The B ritain s leaders assumed a worst- case terms that the Prime Minster brought back scenario. The expectatio n o a uture German with him could easily have been agreed, bombing campaign, the number o aircra t I believe, through the ordinary diplomatic and bombs, and the resulting casualty channels at any time during the summer fgures were all grossly exaggerated it All is over. S ilent, mourn ul, abandoned, was assumed that B ritain was at least two broken, C zechoslovakia recedes into darkness. years behind the corresponding German air S he has su ered in every respect by her programme. Little was exp ecte d rom the association with the Western democracies and C zech army there was no substantive with the League o Nations o which she has planning with the French always been an obedient servant C hamberlain undo ubte dly re le cte d the When I think o the air hopes o a long peace o p inion o mos t B ritish me n and wo men, which still lay be ore Europe at the beginning whe n o n the eve ning o 2 7 th S ep temb er, o 1 93 3 when Herr Hitler frst obtained power, he sp o ke o a quarrel in a ar- away and o all the opportunities o arresting the co untry b e twee n peo p le o who m we growth o the Nazi power which have been kno w no thing . While ackno wledging the thrown away, when I think o the immense hardening o p o litical and p ublic mo od, he combinations and resources which have been still believe d that the co u ntry wanted neglected or squandered, I cannot believe that p e ace. There was no credible war p arty in a parallel exists in the whole o history B ritain and no p o ss ible le ade r who co uld I do not grudge our loyal, brave people, who re p lace him. were ready to do their duty no matter what First question, part a 3 marks the cost I do not grudge them the natural, According to S ource A, why was C hamberlain spontaneous outburst o j oy and relie when greeted so enthusiastically on his return rom they learned that the hard ordeal would no Munich? longer be required o them at the moment; but they should know the truth and do not First question, part b 2 marks suppose that this is the end. This is only the What is the message o Source B ? beginning o the reckoning. C H A P T E R 2 . 7 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 1 9 3 3 1 9 4 0 Second question 4 marks Fourth question 9 marks With re erence to its origin, purpose and content, With re erence to the sources and your own assess the values and limitations o Source C or knowledge, examine the reasons or C hamberlain s historians studying the Munich C on erence. decision to agree to Hitler s demands at Munich. Third question 6 marks C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources A and C regarding the outcome o the Munich C on erence. Eden, A. 1 962 . Facing the Dictators: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Houghton Mi fin. B oston, USA Faber, D . 2 008. Munich, 1 938. Simon & Schuster. London, UK Henig, R. 1 99 9. Modern History Review, pages 2 9 3 1 Overy, R. 2 008. Origins of the Second World War. Routledge. London, UK Steiner, Z. 2 01 1 . The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1 933 1 939. O x ord University Press. New York, USA Taylor, AJP. 1 964. The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin. Harmondsworth, UK Writing the internal assessment or IB History copy o the IA. In total, completing the IA should Key concepts take a p p ro x im a te ly 2 0 h o u rs. This chapter is Causation Change designed to give both students and teachers some Consequence Perspective guidance or approaching these tasks. Continuity Signi cance Class discussion Key questions How does the place and the time you live in a ect the What is the purpose o the internal assessment in topics you might be interested in, or curious about? history? How might where and when you live a ect the evidence How is the internal assessment structured and and sources you have access to? Which topics could assessed? you investigate that students in other places could not? What does this tell us about the nature o history? What are some suggested strategies or choosing a topic and getting started? What are some common mistakes students make? What does the IA look like? The IA is d iv id e d in to th re e m a in se ctio n s. What are good criteria or selecting sources? E ach o these sections will be explained and What are the challenges acing the historian? approached in more detail later in this chapter. B elow is an overview o each section: Doing history : Thinking like a 1. Identi cation and evaluation o sources historian (6 marks) The in te rn a l a ssessm e n t (IA ) is an engaging, inquiry- based 2 2 0 0 w o rd in v e stig a tio n Clearly state the topic in the orm o an appropriate inquiry question. that provides teachers and students with the opportunity to personalize their learning. You will Explain the nature and relevance o two o the select, research and write on a historical topic o sources selected or more detailed analysis o individual interest or curiosity. values and limitations with re erence to origins, purpose and content. The IA is an essential component o the IB History course. Students in both standard level ( 2 5 % ) and higher level ( 2 0% ) will complete the same task 2. Investigation (15 marks) as part o their course mark. Your teacher will evaluate your fnal dra t, but only a small, random Using appropriate ormat and clear organization, sample o your class IAs will be submitted to the provide critical analysis that is ocused on the IB or moderation. question under investigation. Include a range o evidence to support an argument The purpose o the historical investigation is to and analysis, and a conclusion drawn rom the engage students in the process o thinking like analysis. historians and doing history by creating their own questions, gathering and examining evidence, analyzing perspectives, and demonstrating rich 3. Refection (4 marks) historical knowledge in the conclusions they draw. Given its importance, your teacher should Refect on the process o investigating your provide considerable time, guidance, practice o question and discuss the methods used by skills and eedback throughout the process o historians, and the limitations or challenges o planning, dra ting, revising and submitting a fnal investigating their topic. 232 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY Your history teachers can use the IA or whatever purposes best suit the school context, syllabus Beginning with the end in mind: design or the individual learning o students. what does success look like? Nevertheless, you should be encouraged to select ATL Self-management skills and develop your own question. The IA can be started at any point during the course, however the Throughout the process o planning, researching, task is most e ectively introduced a ter students dra ting and revising your investigation, you should be have been exposed to some purpose ul teaching continually checking the criteria. Ask your teacher and and practice in historical methods, analysis and other students to provide speci c eedback using the writing skills. criteria. Continually ask yoursel i your work meets the criteria. The IA is designed to assess each o the ollowing History obj ectives: B e ore getting started, you should look care ully Assessment objective 1: Knowledge and at the assessment criteria to appreciate what each section o the IA demands. Teachers will use understanding the same criteria for both S L and HL. It is Demonstrate understanding o historical sources. important to have a clear understanding o what Assessment objective 2: Application and success will look like be ore you invest the time and hard work that this task will require. Teachers analysis will use the criterion ound in the IB History Guide Analyse and interpret a variety o sources. to provide eedback to teachers and to assess the Assessment objective 3: Synthesis and fnal dra t. The assessment is based on positive achievement , meaning that teachers will try to evaluation fnd the best ft according to the descriptors in Evaluate sources as historical evidence, recognizing each criterion. Students do not have to write a their value and limitations. per ect paper to achieve the highest descriptors, Synthesize in ormation rom a selection o relevant and teachers should not think in terms o pass/ ail sources. based on whether scores are above or below 5 0% o the 2 5 marks in total. Assessment objective 4: Use and application of appropriate skills To simpli y the criterion and to provide some fxed targets or what success looks like, consider using Refect on the methods used by, and challenges the assessment tool provided on the next page. acing, the historian. Formulate an appropriate, ocused question to guide a historical inquiry. Demonstrate evidence o research skills, organization, re erencing and selection o appropriate sources. 233 Teach er , Peer and Self-As s es s m ent To o l Criterion A: Identi cation and evaluation o sources (6 marks) Suggested word count: 500 Improvements Criteria or success Strengths needed Does the in vestigation have an appropriate question clearly stated? H as the stu den tselected,iden ti ed,an d re eren ced ( u sin g a con sisten t orm at) appropriate and relevant sources? Is there a clear explanation o the relevance o the sou rces to the in vestigation ? Is there detailed an alysis an d evalu ation o two sources w ith exp licit discu ssion o the value and limitations,w ith re eren ce to theirorigins, purpose and content? Criterion B: Investigation (15 marks) Suggested word count: 1,300 Improvements Criteria or success Strengths needed Is the in vestigation clear, coherent and efectively organized? Does the in vestigation con tain well-developed critical analysis clearly ocused on the stated question? Is there eviden ce rom a range o sources u sed e ectively to support an argument? Is there evaluation o diferent perspectives ( argu m en ts,claim s, exp erien ces etc.) on the top ic an d/orqu estion ? Does the in vestigation p rovide a reasoned conclusion thatis consistent with the evidence and arguments provided? Criterion C: Refection (4 marks) Suggested word count: 400 Improvements Criteria or success Strengths needed Does the stu den t ocus clearly on w hatthe in vestigation revealed abou t the methods used by historians? Does the refection dem on strate clearawareness o the challenges acin g historian s an d/orthe limitations o the methods u sed by historian s? Is there an explicit connection betw een the refection an d the resto the in vestigation ( qu estion ,sou rces u sed,evalu ation an d an alysis) ? 234 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY Bibliography & formatting (no marks applicable) Suggested word count: Not included in total Improvements Criteria for success Strengths needed Is the word count clearly stated on the cover? (2200 maximum) Is a single bibliographic style or format consistently used? Is the bibliography clearly organized and include all the sources you have referenced or used as evidence in the investigation? Getting started: Approaches to C o-develop good questions and carry out an investigation o a historical event as a entire class. learning history Read an excerpt rom a historian s work and ATL Thinking skills identi y which parts are analysis, evidence and narrative. To start generating ideas or a topic and to help you ocus your question, use a research-based thinking routine I students better understand that history is more such as Think-Puzzle-Explore (see Ritchhart, Church and than simply memorizing and reporting on acts, Morrison, 2011. Make Thinking Visible, Jossey-Bass) . dates and chronological narratives, then they are Think: What topics do you think might interest you? more likely to be curious, engaged and motivated learners o history. Accordingly, they will more Puzzle: What puzzles you about these topics? likely develop appropriate questions or their Explore: How can you explore more about each o investigation and have a better understanding o these topics? how to organize and write e ective analysis. Ideally, you will have opportunities throughout the IB History course to explore and develop Selecting a topic and appropriate questions understandings about the methods and the ATL nature o history. This will prepare you to better Self-management skills develop the skills necessary or the IA and the Be ore beginning, ask your teacher to fnd some other assessment papers in the IB History course. examples o student IAs with examiner s eedback. Additionally, these kinds o learning activities These can be ound on the IB Online Curriculum Centre provide clear links to TO K. or in the Teachers Support Materials or History. Debate controversial historical events and claims. Examine the ormatting and layout o each component to visualize in advance what your IA might look like, and the C ompare and corroborate conficting sources o steps that will be required to complete them. evidence. Once you have some general understanding o the Take on, role play or de end di erent IA components and are amiliar with the assessment perspectives or experiences o an event. criteria, it is time to select a topic ocus. Students D iscuss the value and limitations o historian s o ten do not know how to begin selecting a topic. arguments and evidence. Identi y a historical topic o interest and get to know it well by conducting some background reading D evelop criteria or selecting and comparing rom a general history textbook or an online historical sources. encyclopaedia. You may nd some in ormation Gather and analyze a variety o di erent kinds that will help you narrow the topic ocus quickly. o sources (photos, artwork, j ournal entries, These kinds o sources o ten outline the di ering maps, etc. ) ocused on the same event or issue. perspectives, interpretations and controversies 235 that make or an engaging investigation. Well- or sources. Whatever the topic that you select, it is written textbooks and articles will also include essential to ormulate a good question. re erences, annotated bibliographies and ootnotes O ne o the most common errors students make o additional, more detailed sources that will help in when planning and writing the IA is ormulating the research stage. a poor question about their topic. Formulating A ter selecting a topic, ormulating an appropriate a good question is essential or success and research question can also be very challenging. It is helps ensure that the IA is a manageable and essential that you take the time to care ully think researchable investigation. C onsider the ollowing about what kinds o topics help produce good criteria when ormulating a good question: questions or investigations. B e ore you begin any writing, you should submit a p rop osal to your There is an adequate variety and teacher to ensure that the investigation will be availability o sources related to 1 The your topic. success ul. question is Some teachers recommend that students write about The sources are readable, researchable. available and in a language that a topic related to their course syllabus, but there are a countless number o possible topics and you is accessible. are better o choosing topics that interest you and Questions that are vague or too motivate you to learn. The topic must be historical broad make it difcult to write a however, so students may not investigate any ocused investigation limited to topic that happened within the last ten years. 2 The 2200 words. All investigations will take one o three orms: question is Questions that are too broad focused. make it difcult to manage the 1 An investigation o a historical theme, issue, p erson or event based on a variety number o sources needed to o sources. adequately address the topic. 2 An investigation based on feldwork o a Interesting, controversial or historical building, p lace or site. challenging historical problems 3 The make better questions. 3 An investigation o a local history. question is Questions with obvious answers When selecting a historical topic, students o ten (i.e. Did economic actors play a engaging ail to select a topic that is manageable. For role in Hitler s rise to power?) do example, examining all o the causes o the Second not make good investigations. World War is too broad or the purposes o a 2 2 00 word investigation. Many students also select topics that cannot be researched in depth because there are not enough readily available primary Using the concepts to formulate good and/or secondary sources. questions Investigating a historically- themed flm or piece The IB History course is ocused on six key o literature can be very engaging; but many concep ts: change, continuity, causation, students write better papers when they ocus the consequence, signifcance and p ersp ectives. investigation on a particular claim, portrayal or E ach o these concepts shape historians thinking perspective contained in the work, rather than about the kinds o questions they ask and the entire work itsel . S tudents who choose to investigate. There ore, they are help ul to students investigate a historical site, or to investigate local as a ramework or ormulating good IA questions. or community history, o ten have an opportunity Using the historical thinking concepts, you may be to engage in experiences that are more authentic able to generate several good questions about any to the work o pro essional historians, but these historical topic that can be eventually ocused into can also produce a lot o challenges when looking success ul investigations. 236 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY Concepts Possible investigation prompts What changes resulted rom this topic? change To what extent did this event, person or issue cause change? To what extent did the topic remain the same? continuity Did this event, person or issue cause progress or decline? What were the long term, short term and immediate causes? causation What were the actors that caused the event related to the topic? Student s topic How has this topic had immediate and long-lasting e ects? consequence How signifcant were the e ects o this topic? To what extent is this topic signifcant? Is the signifcance o this signifcance topic justifed? What events, people or issues are important to know about this topic? What di erent perspectives or interpretations are there about this perspectives topic? How did people experience this topic? To illustrate, a student interested in the Russian question is ocused on the signifcance o a specifc, Revolution might use the concepts to brainstorm singular cause. For good examples o historical the ollowing possible investigations: questions, you should consult past Paper 2 or Paper 3 examination questions. : In what ways did the Russian Revolution change Russian society? You should notice that many o the questions above include more than one concept. Most good : To what extent did Stalin s regime historical investigations will require students resemble the Tsarist system? to think about perspectives because there will : How signifcant were long term actors likely be multiple accounts o the issue under in causing the February Revolution? investigation, or there will be some controversy : To what extent did Stalin s purges between historians. Here are some question a ect military preparedness? exemplars showing how they capture more than one key historical concepts: : How important was Lenin s role in the October Revolution? How signifcant was Allied area bombing in reducing German industrial capacity during the Second World : To what extent did Doctor Zhivago War? (signifcance; consequence) capture the experience o upper class Russians during the Revolution? To what extent did Gandhi s leadership achieve Indian independence? (signifcance; perspectives; A ter generating some possible questions, students causation) can bring greater ocus to their topic. For example, a student interested in how women experienced All success ul IAs begin with a well- developed, Stalinism may narrow the ocus to a particular thought ul and ocused question that is based on place or event. A student investigating long- term one or more o the historical concepts. causes o an event may have more success i the 237 Internal Assessment skills 2 Researching Gather in ormation sources and Categorize the following questions (Good Needs evidence. Improvement Poor) according to their suitability as a Care ully read and evaluate historical investigation according to the criteria provided in ormation. above. Suggest ways the questions might be improved. 3 Organizing Create notes. 1 Which Second World War lm is the most accurate? and Record re erences using a 2 To what extent did nationalism play a role in causing processing standard citation ormat. the First World War? Create a bibliography. 3 How did women win the right to vote in the United Organize ideas into an outline. States? Formulate an argument. 4 Did Hitler use lm or propaganda? 4 Drafting Write each section o the IA. 5 In what ways did Stalin start the Cold War? Revise and edit. 6 To what extent was the infuenza epidemic a actor in the collapse o the Central Powers in 1918? Check assessment criteria. 5 Sharing Submit a dra t or eedback. Common problems when selecting a topic and question: 6 Revising Revise based on eedback rom Poorly ocused question too broad and your teacher. unmanageable. 7 Publishing Submit nal copy to your teacher. Obvious question. Evaluate using criteria. Question is not researchable. Getting organized: researching Getting organized: making a plan Communication skills o investigation When supporting historical claims, it is important to make Self-management skills your evidence visible to your reader. Make sure you use Create your own plan or completion with target dates a standard bibliographic ormat to show the reader where and goals. Submit this with your proposed topic and your evidence was ound. In the discipline o history, the question. Include some initial sources o in ormation you University o Chicago style or MLA style is most commonly will use. used because it provides signi cant in ormation about the origins o the source, and the endnotes or ootnotes C ompleting the IA successfully requires that ormat allows the historian to insert additional in ormation students create a plan for comp letion that about the source where necessary. includes several important steps of the inquiry process. Some of the steps may overlap, but it is Take good notes during the research stage. important that you organize your tasks and stay Post- it notes are helpful to record thoughts and on track for completion by setting goals and due ideas next to key passages as you read and think dates. Your teacher should read at least one draft about the information in relation to the question. and give some feedback to ensure that the IA is not Using different coloured highlighters to identify plagiarised. A plan of investigation should include different perspectives on the question as you read the following steps: can also be helpful. If using borrowed books, take a photo of important pages on a tablet device and 1 Planning Select a topic and ormulate a use a note taking application to highlight and question. write notes on the page. S tudents who make their Submit a proposal to your teacher. thinking visible as they read will have a easier time writing later in the process. C reate a timeline Identi y in ormation sources. of the event you are researching to ensure the chronology is clear in your mind. 238 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY It is strongly recommended that you record the most common ormats used or bibliographies in bibliographic in ormation and page numbers university history departments. where you fnd important evidence and analysis. Many students wait until the very end o the Common problems when planning and organizing an IA: writing process to compile their bibliography, Lack o general background knowledge o the topic. but this is much more easily accomplished i the No eedback on proposed topic and question. in ormation is recorded throughout, instead o as an a terthought when the dra t is fnished. There are No plan or completion. several easily accessible web sites that provide the Inaccurately recording page numbers and re erences. most up-to-date versions o MLA ( www.mla.org) , Poorly organized notes; or no notes at all. and C hicago Manual of S tyle ( www. chicagomanualo style. org) , which are the two Internal Assessment skills Create a proposal for the IA using the template shown. Topic: Student: Research question: Proposed sources: Sources (2) proposed or evaluation in Section A: Section A: Identifcation and Common problems with Section A: evaluation o sources Question is not clearly stated. Section A is worth 6 o the 2 5 total marks. It is Relevance or signifcance o selected sources not recommended that the word count does not exceed explained. much more than 5 00 words. While this section Student summarizes the content o selected sources. does not count or a substantial portion o the Limited analysis. marks, most students will not be success ul without a strong Section A. There are three key aspects o Discussion o origins, purpose and content is in this section. isolation to value and limitations. 1 Clearly state the topic of the investigation. Poorly chosen sources. (This must be stated as a question) . Speculates vaguely about the values and limitations 2 Include a brief exp lanation of the two o sources. sources the student has selected for Re erence to origins, purpose and content is not detailed analysis, and a brief exp lanation of explicit. their relevance to the investigation. 3 With reference to their origins, p urp ose and Thinking about evidence: origins, content, analyse the value and limitations of the two sources. purpose, value and limitations B ecause it is built on a oundation o evidence, history is by nature interpretive and controversial. 239 This is not something many people understand have poor reasons in support o this beyond the act to them history is simply a long list o dates that it is a primary source. and dead people. While there are a great many It is important that you understand how to things historians agree upon, there are countless evaluate the value and limitations o sources with historical questions that are enshrouded in debate re erence to the origins, purpose and content o and controversy. S ince relatively ew people the source. D iscussing the origin, purpose and personally witness the events they study, how one content outside the context o the value and understands the past depends largely on which limitations will result in a poor assessment. sources o evidence are used, and how they are interpreted. Even acts that historians generally Origins Where did the source come from? agree upon can change over time. Philosopher Who wrote or created it? Ambrose B ierce once said, God alone knows the future, but only a historian can alter the past. Though Whose perspectives are represented? the past cannot actually be changed, historical Whose are not? memory and understanding is always changing Purpose Why was this created? as each generation brings orward new questions, What purpose might this document have new evidence and new perspectives. This process served? o changing historical interpretations is re erred to Content What does the source mean? as r e v is io n is m . Revisionist historians are those who challenge o r th o d o x , or generally accepted What does it reveal or contain? arguments and interpretations. How useful is the information? Is it reasonable to believe it is accurate? Can B esides revisionism, another reason why history it be corroborated? is controversial is that accounts or evidence rom the same events can di er drastically. People record Generally, the closer in proximity ( place and time) events rom di erent o r igin s a n d p er s p ectiv es , the origin o a primary source is, the more v a lu e and or di erent p u r p o s es . Historical evidence it has to historians. I students can fnd ways to might come rom a limitless number o possible co r r o b o r a te ( support, confrm) a source by other kinds o sources. Sources that all originate rom sources, then the source likely has greater value the same time and place that we are investigating to the investigation. L im ita tio n s may include are typically re erred to as p r im a r y s o u r ces . any actors that cause someone to question the The interpretations and narratives that we fnd truth ulness, validity or value o a source. in documentaries, articles and books created by Keep in mind, that using the term b ia s is not historians are called s eco n d a r y s o u r ces . always use ul in history it is important to be able Students o ten make the error o thinking that to identi y bias, but bias does not necessarily limit primary sources are more authentic and reliable, the value o a source. S tudents o ten make the and there ore have more v a lu e, and ewer error o assuming a source is unreliable because lim ita tio n s than secondary sources. This isn t they detect bias. Remember that most people will always the case. B eing there does not necessarily have biased perspectives that are unique to their give greater insight into events, and indeed, own experiences, time and place. This does not sometimes the opposite is true. Historians can look mean that you should blindly dismiss the evidence at events rom multiple perspectives and use a wide they o er us. You should ensure that you explain range o evidence not available to the eyewitness. clearly how the bias a ects the value o the Students o ten speculate that a primary source is content in the source used. valuable and signifcant to their investigation, but 240 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY Internal Assessment skills Use this template for taking notes from each of the sources used in the investigation. Research Question: Source (bibliographic in ormation) : Primary or How is the source relevant/signifcant to the Origins/Purpose? secondary investigation? source? Value/Limitations? Page#: What evidence does the source provide? What is your interpretation? How does the content o (quote, paraphrase, describe) the source relate to your question? What perspective does it add? Selecting sources or the IA S elect sources or excerpts o sources that have clear signifcance to the question. You should One o the challenges to students writing a be able to clearly, and explicitly explain why success ul S ection A is making sure that they the content o the source is important to the choose two appropriate sources to evaluate. investigation. S ome students choose sources You should be able to clearly and e ectively that are largely irrelevant or vaguely related to explain why the chosen sources are relevant and the question. important to the investigation. The investigation should include an appropriate O ten students make the mistake o relying range o sources. As a general rule, you should too heavily on non- scholarly sources such as include both primary and secondary sources, online encyclopaedia articles and general history but this may not work with some types o textbooks. As stated, these are good starting points investigations. While secondary sources on a or fnding a topic, but they are not good sources to topic are likely to be easily obtained, they o ten build your investigation upon. They are especially provide less to discuss in S ection A. poor choices to use or detailed analysis in this Interviews, personal correspondence, section. B e ore selecting sources consider the newspaper articles, j ournals, speeches, letters, ollowing: and other primary sources o ten provide You will be expected to discuss as much detail students with much more meaning ul material about the origins and purpose o the source to evaluate in S ection A. Ideas about origins as possible. B e sure to choose sources where and purpose come more readily with primary you can identi y as much o the ollowing as sources than they might when using secondary possible: when it was created; who created sources which generally, but not always, it; why it was created; where it was created. strive to present balanced arguments and I much o this in ormation is not readily perspectives. identifable, you will have di fculty evaluating C hoose secondary sources that re erence the value and limitations with explicit re erence to evidence the historians used to support their the origins and purpose. arguments. You will fnd it less di fcult to 241 assess the validity o the evidence the historian the investigation, the largest portion o Section A uses, or how the evidence is interpreted in the should ocus on analysing the two sources. arguments, i the historian has documented the D epending on the sources chosen, they can be evidence clearly. discussed simultaneously and comparatively, or they can be discussed separately. D iscussing them C onsider using periodical articles. Many separately is o ten more advantageous because historians write excellent, concise articles on you can make the origins, purpose, value and historical topics or peer- reviewed j ournals. limitations more explicit. These articles o ten have rich ootnoting and bibliographies that you can use to fnd It is important that any arguments about the additional sources or the investigation. value and limitations make specifc re erences to the content, origins and purpose. B e care ul about relying too heavily on general web- based sources. Many online sources are B e care ul that the value o a source is not not re erenced or ootnoted properly so it is dismissed on the basis o bias without a strong di fcult to validate in ormation about the argument about why the bias limits the validity origins, purpose and authorship. O n the other or reliability o the content. hand, a great number o rich primary sources You should avoid summarizing the content can be ound online, as well as articles written too much. S ummarize and describe content by respected historians. only to the extent necessary to construct a C onsider using interviews. Some students strong analysis about the source s value and have written exceptional IAs based on people s limitations. experiences, or by interviewing historians or You should be thorough in examining all other people with extensive knowledge and aspects o the source s origins including date o experience. When using interviews, record them origin, cultural context, author s background, as an audio fle or re erence and accuracy. publisher or other important details. I little in ormation about the origins is identifable, it Analysing the selected sources is likely a poorly chosen source or analysis. A ter stating the research question and explaining the two selected sources and their relevance to Internal Assessment skills Use the Section A assessment criteria to discuss and Source 1 : Prisoner of State: the secret journal of evaluate this excerpt of a student s work. Identify Zhao Ziyang1 where the student has explicitly discussed origins and The origin o the source is o great value because the purpose, and value and limitations. author is Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary o the This investigation will seek to answer the question What Communist Party during the Tiananmen Square Protest did the Tiananmen Square protest reveal about the (the Protest). Zhao attempted to use a non-violent democratic sentiments in China between 1980 and 1989? approach to resolve the protest and spoke against the Democratic sentiments are de ned as people s attitudes party s hardliners. A ter a power struggle, Zhao was toward democratic ideals. This investigation will analyze dismissed and put under house arrest until his death actors that infuenced democratic sentiments rom multiple in 2005. The content o the journal is translated rom perspectives, but will not assess the ethics and justi cation thirty audiotapes recorded secretly by Zhao while he was o the Chinese governments response to the protest. under house arrest between 1 999 and 2000. The book In order to take into account the opposing views on this is published in 2009 by Simon & Schuster, one o the event and keep the scope o the investigation manageable, largest and most reputable English-language publishers. I have made use o a variety o care ully selected sources. The reputation o the author and publisher increases the Two primary sources will be evaluated reliability o this source. 242 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY Zhao s purpose for recording these tapes is to publicize within the Communist Party through the lens of the his political opinions and express his regret for failing to progressive bloc. prevent the massacre. This is valuable because Zhao was However, its exclusivity may limit its value because there not allowed to publicize his opinions while under house are no counterparts to compare with and to verify its claims. arrest, so this source is the only surviving public record As a translated material, the source may not accurately of Zhao s opinions and perspectives on the Protest. This present Zhao s intentions and may have lost some cultural source is also valuable because its author, Zhao, was expressions. In addition, this source may be biased in that directly involved in the government s decision-making Zhao speaks in favour of political reform and democracy, process during the protest. It reveals the power struggle which does not represent the Party s position 1 Zhao, Ziyang, Pu Bao, Renee Chiang, Adi Ignatius, and Roderick MacFarquhar. Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. Section B: Investigation commentary should be care ully planned to ensure that there is logic and fow to the Common problems with Section B: section, and that your argument is very clear. Too much narrative. The type o question you pose or the Poor re erencing o sources. investigation will determine how you organize your writing. For example, a question that Limited awareness o di erent positions or invites comparisons ( or example: whether a perspectives. lm portrays an event accurately) will require Listing o evidence instead o integrating analysis you to discuss both similarities and di erences. and evidence. To what extent questions will require you Overuse o quotations. to discuss both perspectives o ways no and Plagiarism. ways yes . Poor organization and arguments that are difcult As you gather evidence and document your to ollow. thinking in your notes, keep in mind you may need to adj ust or change your question. You Few connections to the question and purpose o the should give some consideration to planning investigation. and writing S ection B be ore writing S ection A. Conclusions are not evidence-based. Where appropriate, discuss di erent It is essential that you keep S ection B ocused on perspectives o the topic. Historians may o er the purpose o the investigation and construct an di erent interpretations, or there may be argument using all o the sources you have listed multiple experiences o an event. in the bibliography. No marks are awarded or Quotes should be used sparingly. Most o your the bibliography, but an incomplete treatment writing should summarize and paraphrase the o your sources, or inaccurate re erencing evidence collected and explain explicitly how it will cost you marks in this section. E vidence relates to the investigation. Too many student must be integrated with very clear critical papers read as long lists o quotes rom sources. commentary that leads the reader to an eventual Quotes must be explained, or integrated as evidence-based conclusion that addresses the evidence in support o an argument, and add question posed in Section A. Students o ten make something speci cally and convincingly to your the error o simply listing acts they researched, argument. without explaining how they are relevant or relate Any re erences to sources, or ideas that are not to their question. The ollowing points should be your own, should be re erenced appropriately considered when writing this section. using endnotes or ootnotes. I this is not The investigation should be care ully organized. completed care ully, you risk plagiarizing The synthesis o evidence and critical others ideas as your own. 243 You should avoid writing signifcant amounts a limited numbers o sources. Interviews or o narrative. Retelling a historical narrative or community archives that this kind o IA might sequence o events is not the purpose o the require could yield ewer, but very rich primary investigation. O n the other hand, you should sources. Wherever possible your sources should demonstrate a clear understanding o the be varied and specifc, rather than ew and chronology and historical context o the events general. you are analyzing. Your conclusion is essential. The conclusion Submitting your bibliography must o er possible answers or solutions to the The bibliography an alp habetically ordered question identifed in S ection A. It should not list of sources should be inserted at the very read simply as a summary o points, but rather end o your paper. It is mentioned here with as a well- reasoned, convincing, evidence- based S ection B because it should be created as part o closure to the investigation. the writing process, not simply thrown together at the last minute be ore submitting the paper. There is no suggested number o appropriate This bibliography is not worth any marks but it is sources required or your investigation. an essential component o the paper that is o ten The number o sources you should use overlooked or poorly completed. Any sources depends entirely on your topic and the kind re erenced as evidence in S ection B must be o investigation you are doing. Local or included in your bibliography. community history, or example, might o er Internal Assessment skills Us e the SectionB as s es s m ent criteria to evalu ate power gave people an optimistic belie in democracy, and anexcerpt o this s tu dents inves tigation. H as the encouraged other progressives to act more openly. s tu dent ef ectively integrated evidence and critical However, contrary to the revolutionary attitudes later com m entary? in the protest, the democratic sentiment under Zhao s Sentimentality played a key role in the events leading leadership was relatively constructive. Based on the up to the protest in 1 989. Western democracy and Seven Demands3 dra ted by the protesters, it was clear parliamentary system were believed to be the panacea that, in the beginning o the Protest, protesters did not or China s social problems. As Zhao Ziyang stated in his intend to be anti-governmental or anti-communist; they memoir: in act, it is the Western parliamentary democratic merely demanded that the Party take actions to end system that has demonstrated the most vitality. It seems corruption and grant citizens more political reedom. 4 that this system is currently the best one available. 1 As the leading gure behind the Party s progressive The death o Hu Yaobang, the ormer General Secretary bloc, Zhao was generally in line with the protestors. o the Party who advocated strongly or democratic Internally, he attempted to persuade hardliner party re orm, created a uni ed sense o democratic sentiments ofcials, particularly Deng, into making concession with that united both ideological and practical groups. 2 Hu s the protestors. 5 He also allowed the media, such as the successor, Zhao Ziyang, an even more progressive leader, People s Daily and the China Central Television to bypass spoke publicly in avour o political re orm. Zhao s rise in censorship and broadcast the protest 1 Zhao, Ziyang, Pu Bao, Renee Chiang, Adi Ignatius, and Roderick MacFarquhar. Pre ace. In Prisoner o the state: the secret journal o Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. xv. 2 Meaning the intellectuals and the working class. 3 Liang, Zhang. The Tiananmen Papers. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/books/frst/l/liang-tiananmen.html (accessed May 26, 2014) . 4 Ziyang, op. cit. 5 Zhao, Dingxin. The power o Tiananmen state-society relations and the 1 989 Beijing student movement. Chicago: University o Chicago Press, 2001. 156. 244 WR I T I N G T H E I N T E R N AL A S S E S S M E N T FO R I B H I S TO RY Section C: Refection What is history? Is it more creative and interpretive as opposed to scienti c and objective? In S ection C ( approx. 400 words) you have the opportunity to refect on what the investigation How did the nature o your investigation revealed to you about the methods used by present speci c challenges to nding reliable historians and the challenges they ace when evidence? investigating topics like your own. This section What methods did historians use? How were is worth the ewest marks ( 4) , but it could make they limited by time and place? How are they the di erence between a good and an outstanding limited by ideology or world views? paper. You should no doubt already have an understanding that the study o history is beset Is it possible to capture the entirety o an event? with a number o challenges and limitations, What are the challenges o causation? How some o which have been discussed earlier in ar back in time should the historian search this chapter. Section A is designed to give you an or causes? C an immediate causes ever be opportunity to refect on this understanding, but separated rom long term causes? it must be ocused speci cally on the nature o your topic and/or the kind o investigation you How might national identity, cultural norms, undertook, rather than a refection on the nature values or belie s a ect one s ability to reason o history in general. and arrive at an understanding o history? How might mass culture, the entertainment Com m on pr oblem s withSection C: industry or other power ul orces infuence Lim ited und er stand ingo the natur e o histor y and historical understanding? the challenges acinghistor ians. Who decides what topics and issues are Lim ited und er stand ingo the m ethod s histor ians important to record and study? use to exam ine and stud y histor y. How does bias and editorial selection impact what Poor ly ocused on the challenges specifcto the is recorded and reported on, and what is not? stud ents topic. In what ways does the outcome o an event Throughout your IB History course, your TO K and determine how it is recorded in history? History teachers should provide opportunities or How does technology a ect understanding o you to think about and discuss the challenges o history, or the methods the historian uses? determining historical truth and understanding. How are value j udgements in history History can o ten be determined largely by who determined? For example, how are terms like writes it, his or her purpose, and the methods he atrocity, terrorism or revolution treated now or she decides to use. C onsider also that where compared to the period under investigation? there is scant evidence, historians o ten make very Should historians make moral j udgements? authoritative sounding essentially educated guesses where they ll in gaps in the In what ways does the idea o progress and historical record with j udgments they think are decline a ect our treatment o some historical reasonable to believe. B ut o ten we cannot with events? absolute certainty veri y or prove beyond doubt What is the role o the historian? C an the that their accounts are correct. historian ever be obj ective? Many o the inherent challenges o history stem Are all perspectives o history equally valid? I rom problems related to its evidence- based nature. not, how do we determine which have greater History is also challenging because o how it is used value? or so many di erent purposes including political slogans, national narratives, personal and group How might knowledge o your investigation be identity, entertainment, advertising and countless used to solve complex problems in the present? other ways. The past the historian studies is not a How might it be abused? dead past. History is living, changing and visible In would be ar too ambitious or you to co nsider in the present. There ore, there is no shortage o all o these questions in S ection C . It is essential questions to consider in your refection section. however that you give considerable thought 2 45 to what yo u learned ab o ut history rom your process o topic selection, research, planning and investigatio n. You should demo nstrate clear writing. B e ore submitting to your teacher or fnal awareness o the challenges acing histo rians, assessment, make sure you have completed the and the limitations o specifc methods used ollowing: in investigating top ics like your own. In other S elect and thoroughly research a question o words, there should b e a clear connection personal interest. between the nature o history as a way o C omplete all sections ully, according to the thinking, and yo ur own investigation. For a criteria. greater understanding o the nature o history, the ollowing books are very use ul. C ompare your IA to examples posted on the OC C or in the Teacher Support Materials. E.E. Carr, 1961. What is History? Penguin Books. London, UK Include all relevant sources in your bibliography. M . MacMi an, 2008. The Uses and Abuses o History. Viking. Toronto. Re erence all sources using a consistent, standardized citation ormat. J. l. Gaddis, 2004. The Landscape o History. New York, Oxford University Press. E dit and proo read your work care ully. S ubmit a dra t or e ective eedback rom your teacher. Final touches: Wrapping up the IA Include a title page with your question, name, The Internal Assessment is arguably the best candidate number and total word count clearly opportunity IB History students have to maximize listed. their overall course mark. The fnal assessed mark is entirely in your hands because you control the Include a table o contents. Internal Assessment skills Discuss and evaluate the student example below using on June 4th . These sources, although highly valuable to the criteria for Section C: historians, can be biased and unreliable. There ore, historians Ever since Deng declared martial law on May 20th, 1 989, should exercise caution when evaluating these sources. the Tiananmen Square Protest had been a taboo topic in In order to counterbalance the a orementioned dilemma, Mainland China. There are no public records o the Protest, I purposely limited the number o sources originated and any discussion regarding the Protest is immediately rom the protestors. I also took advantage o my Chinese censored. In the educational system, particularly, the pro ciency by looking through Chinese newspaper Protest was considered non-existent . The Party s archives and talking with ormer protestors and ormer illegitimate historical revisionism illustrates the extent Party ofcials during the protest. These methods o to which history can be manipulated to in uence public acquiring evidence should have helped me gain a more opinions. There ore, historians have the morally imperative balanced understanding o the democratic sentiments role to present a balanced account o the Protest. during the protest. However, historians hoping to investigate the Protest ace Apart rom balancing di erent perspectives, historians who a dilemma: most primary sources are not made public by investigate this issue are under social and ethical pressures. the Chinese government, and most available sources are I they suggest that there were democratic sentiments rom the protestors perspectives. Historians either have no within the Party and the Army executing the martial law, primary sources to work with, or have a disproportionate many ormer protesters (especially amilies o victims who number o pro-protest sources. This dilemma is a common were killed during the June 4th incident) would accuse the problem caused by illegitimate historical revisionism, historians o downplaying the Party s crime. In addition, the which made it difcult or historians to remain objective. Western world almost unanimously agrees that the June Government records are not available. Media coverage during 4th incident was a massacre and that the Party was the the Protest is censored. Government and military ofcers who antagonist. Historians who propose otherwise are under gave orders during the Protest are not permitted to publicize signi cant ideological pressure. There ore, historians should their narratives. On the other hand, a large number o sources prevent these pressures rom in uencing the investigation. originate rom political dissidents, protesters who sought Any conclusions should be re-examined by other historians asylum overseas, and amilies o protestors who were killed to ensure a higher degree o objectivity. 246 C hiang Kai- shek Jiang Jieshi Franco, Francesco 1 2 9 , 1 5 5 C hina 1 4 Futurism 8 6 actions ollowing the Marco Po lo B ridge incident Abyssinia 1 02 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 0, 1 9 2 , 1 9 3 6 0, 8 3 5 events o invasion o Abyssinia 1 3 7 8, 1 5 3 4 establishment o the S econd United Front 6 0, 6 7 Galeazzo C iano, Gian 1 3 2 , 1 43 how did the US A respo nd to the invasion o Manchuria 1 9 Germany 3 7 , 8 3 , 1 2 9 Abyssinia? 2 0 8 Nationalist Party 3 1 , 3 7 8 , 6 7 , 6 8 9 B eer Hall Pu tsch 1 1 0 international response to Italian invasion 2 01 9 , political instability in C hina 2 3 4, 3 1 changing diplo matic alignments in E urop e a ter 210 11 results o the Manchuria crisis or Manchuria and 1 933 1 56 7 results o the Abyssinian War 1 3 9 C hina 3 7 changing international situation 1 2 1 results o the international response to the Italian results o the Manchuria crisis or the Natio nalist D awes Plan 1 1 0 invasion 2 05 7 Party 3 7 8 did Hitler have a clear ore ign policy plan when he why did Mu ssolini invade Abyssinia in O ctober Twenty- O ne D em ands 1 5 , 2 0 to ok power in 1 9 3 3 ? 1 2 5 6 1 935? 1 35 6 warlo rds 3 1 economic recovery in the 1 9 2 0s 1 2 1 Albania 8 3 , 1 01 , 1 8 1 C hou E n Lai 6 7 Hitler appointed C hancellor o Germany 1 1 1 , 1 2 9 , how did B ritain and France respond to the invasion C hurchill, Winsto n 6 0, 7 5 , 1 9 5 , 2 2 2 , 2 2 7 1 5 5, 1 92 o Albania, 7 April 1 9 3 9 ? 2 09 C lemenceau, Ge orges 1 1 3 1 4 hyp erinfation 1 1 0, 1 2 0 how did Italy take over Albania? 1 47 9 C o mmunist International ( C om intern) 2 00 im pact o First World War and de eat on Germany why did Italy invade Albania in April 1 9 3 9 ? 1 46 7 C o mmunist Party ( C hina) 3 1 , 3 7 8 , 6 7 , 6 9 , 6 9 111 13 Anglo- German Naval Agreement 1 9 3 5 1 3 3 , 1 5 5 , C o mmunist Party ( Italy) 9 1 , 9 2 im pact o S trese mann 1 2 1 1 81 , 21 4 C o mmunist Party ( S oviet Union) 1 9 9 2 0 0 im pact o the F irst World War on Hitler s oreign Anglo- Jap anese Alliance 1 5 , 1 9 , 2 1 , 2 2 co ncepts 1 2 , 2 3 6 8 po licy 1 1 6 1 9 Anglo- Polish Treaty 1 7 0, 1 8 1 co nsequence 2 3 7 im pact o the Great D epression on the Nazi Party Anti- C o mintern Pact 2 9 , 40 1 , 1 2 9 , 1 43 , 1 5 5 , 1 6 5 co ntinuity 2 3 7 121 2 anti- S emitism 9 7 , 1 1 8 , 1 3 0 C o r u 83 , 1 00 1 im pact o the M unich Putsch o 1 9 2 3 on the success appeasem ent in the 1 9 3 0s 1 9 4 7 co rroboration 2 40 o Nazism 1 2 0 1 anti- appeasers 1 9 5 co up d tat 1 6 0 im pact o the Treaty o Versailles 1 1 3 1 5 B ritain s de e nce priorities 1 9 6 C roatia 8 3 , 1 01 invasion o Poland 1 7 0, 2 2 6 B ritain s glo bal commitm ents 1 9 6 C zechoslovakia 1 45 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 Japan seizes German posse ssions in S hantong 1 5 , demands o the dictato rs se en as j usti ed 1 9 4 5 C hamb erlain s inte rvention 1 9 3 5 20, 21 economic p re ssures 1 9 5 6 liqu idation o C zechoslovakia 1 7 9 8 0 Kapp Putsch 1 1 0, 1 1 9 end o ap peasement 2 2 2 3 May C risis 1 9 3 8 1 7 5 6 Kellogg B riand Pact 1 1 1 France 1 9 7 8 S udetenland C risis 1 45 6 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 4 5 Rapallo Treaty 1 9 2 2 1 2 1 , 1 6 1 how important was appe asement as a cause o the Ruhr 1 1 0, 1 2 0, 1 5 6 S econd Wo rld War? 2 2 7 3 1 S A and the S S 1 2 0 impact o Neville C hamberlain 1 9 6 d Annunzio, Gab riele 8 3 , 9 1 S p artacist uprising 1 1 0, 1 1 9 lack o an alternative p olicy 1 9 5 imp act o D Annunzio and the Fiume a air on Third Reich 1 1 8, 1 2 0 public opinion 1 9 4 Fascism 9 1 2 timeline 1 1 0 1 1 Arab natio nalism 8 3 D aladier, E douard 1 9 7 8 u nemployment 1 1 1 Attlee, C lement 2 2 2 D almatia 9 0 1 Wall S tree t C rash 1 1 1 Austria 1 2 9 , 1 3 3 , 1 43 , 1 6 0, 1 6 5 D awes Plan 1 1 0 Weimar Repu blic 1 1 9 2 0 Anschluss 1 7 0, 1 7 1 3 , 2 1 8 1 9 D isarmament C on erence 1 5 5 , 1 5 7 9 , 1 9 2 what actors allowed Hitler to become a dictator? Austro- Hungarian E m pire 83 , 8 6 , 8 8 9 , 9 0 D u C ooper, Al red 1 9 5 , 2 2 2 123 5 autarky 1 3 1 why did sup port or Nazism grow a ter the First authoritarianism 1 05 World War? 1 1 9 2 3 Axis 46 8 , 6 0, 1 2 9 , 1 3 0, 1 43 , 1 5 5 , 1 6 5 E den, Anthony 1 9 5 , 2 01 , 2 0 3 Yo ung Plan 1 1 1 E gypt 1 3 0, 1 5 2 Germany 1 9 3 3 3 8 1 5 5 6 changing diplo matic alignments with M ussolini and B aldwin, S tanley 1 9 2 Austria 1 6 0 B alkans 1 00 1 Fascism 8 2 3 , 89 9 0, 2 00 changing diplo matic alignments with M ussolini and B eer Hall Putsch 1 1 0 how did Mussolini consolidate his power? 9 6 7 Japan 1 5 5 , 1 6 5 bias 2 40 impact o D Annunzio and the Fium e a air on Fo ur Year Plan 1 5 5 , 1 6 6 bibliographies 2 3 9 , 2 44 Fascism 9 1 2 Germany s challenges to the post- war settlements B ismarck, O tto von 1 1 2 impact o economic actors on the rise o Fascism 1 933 38 1 5 7 69 B ritain 3 6 , 8 2 , 8 3 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 0, 1 3 3 , 1 81 92 3 Hossbach Mem orandum 1 5 5 , 1 6 6 7 appeaseme nt in the 1 9 3 0s 1 9 4 7 impact on Italy s oreign policy in the 1 9 3 0s 1 3 0 1 international reaction to German aggre ssion in B ritain s gu arantee to Poland 1 80 1 March on Rome, O cto ber 1 9 2 2 9 4 5 , 1 2 0 C zechoslovakia 2 1 9 2 3 conscriptio n 1 7 0, 2 2 3 relationship betwee n Fascist Italy and Nazi international reaction to German rearm ament declaratio n o war on Germany 1 7 0, 1 8 7 Germany 1 43 21 3 1 5 Germany 1 9 3 3 3 8 1 5 6 why did support or Fascism grow in Italy a ter the Non- Aggression Pact with Po land 1 5 9 , 1 8 1 Hoare Laval Pact 2 04 5 First World War? 9 0 1 rearmament 1 5 5 , 1 6 1 , 2 1 3 1 5 how did B ritain respond to the Italian invasion o First World War 1 4 remilitarization o the Rhineland 1 5 5 , 1 6 2 4, Albania, 7 Ap ril 1 9 3 9 ? 2 09 Germany 1 1 0, 1 1 1 1 3 1 68 9, 21 5 1 7 outbreak o war 1 8 6 9 1 , 2 2 6 Italy 82 3 , 8 6 9 Rome B erlin Axis and the Anti- C omintern Pact reaction o B ritain and F rance to Hitler s actions Japan 2 0 , 2 1 1 5 5, 1 65 1 9 3 9 1 9 40 2 2 7 Fium e 8 3 , 9 0 1 , 1 01 S aar plebiscite January 1 9 3 5 1 5 5 , 1 6 0 1 reaction to Ge rman aggression in C ze choslovakia impact o D Annunzio and the Fium e a air on S p anish C ivil War 1 6 4 5 220 3 Fascism 9 1 2 timeline 1 5 5 relations with Italy 1 9 3 3 40 1 2 9 , 1 3 0, 1 3 3 , 1 3 7 , Four Po wer Pact 1 9 3 3 1 2 9 , 1 3 2 3 withdrawal rom the D isarm ament C on erence 1 3 9 , 1 45 , 1 5 1 France 8 2 , 83 , 1 1 0, 1 3 0, 1 45 , 1 8 1 1 55, 1 57 9 response to Italian invasion o Abyssinia 2 03 4 declaration o war o n Germany 1 7 0, 1 8 7 Germany 1 9 3 8 40 1 7 0 what was the reaction o B ritain to Italian Franco -S o viet Mutual Assistance Tre aty 1 6 2 , 2 1 4 Anschluss 1 9 3 8 1 7 1 3 expansion in 1 9 40? 2 0 9 1 0 Germany 1 9 3 3 3 8 1 5 6 challenging the p ost- war settlement a ter 1 9 3 7 B urma Road 6 0, 7 4 Hoare Laval Pact 2 0 4 5 1 71 9 how did France resp ond to the Italian invasion o C hamberlain s interventio n in S udetenland crisis Albania, 7 April 1 9 3 9 ? 2 09 1 77 9 C atholic C hurch 8 5 , 8 7 , 9 3 , 9 7 invasio n o the Ruhr 1 9 2 3 1 2 0, 1 5 6 changing international alignments and the Pact o C atholic Party 8 3 , 8 5 , 9 1 outbreak o war 1 86 9 1 S teel, May 1 9 3 9 1 8 1 2 causatio n 2 3 7 reaction o B ritain and France to Hitler s actio ns German expansion into Poland 1 8 0 1 C hamberlain, Neville 1 8 0, 1 9 4, 2 2 6 , 2 2 7 1 9 3 9 1 9 40 2 2 7 international reaction to Anschluss 2 1 8 1 9 appeaseme nt in the 1 9 3 0s 1 9 6 reaction to German aggression in C zechoslovakia liquidation o C zechoslovakia 1 7 9 8 0 B erchtesgarde n, 1 5 S eptember 1 9 3 8 1 7 7 21 9 May C risis 1 9 3 8 1 7 5 6 Godesberg, 2 2 2 3 S ep tember 1 9 3 8 1 7 7 relations with Italy 1 9 3 3 40 1 3 0, 1 45 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 2 Nazi S oviet Pact 1 83 6 Munich C on erence, 2 9 S eptember 1 9 3 8 1 7 8 9 , response to Italian invasion o Abyssinia 2 03 4 outbreak o war 1 86 9 1 , 2 2 6 229 31 why did France align its oreign po licy to B ritain s reaction o B ritain and France to Hitler s actions change 2 3 7 policy o ap peasement in the 1 9 3 0 s? 1 9 7 8 1 9 3 9 1 9 40 2 2 7 S u detenland crisis 1 7 4 end o the appeasement o Mussolini s Italy 2 09 1 0 1 32 S u detenland Germ ans 1 7 4 5 German aggression in C zechoslovakia 2 1 9 2 3 why did Italy invade Albania in April 1 9 3 9 ? 1 46 7 time line 1 7 0 German rearmam ent 2 1 3 1 5 why did Italy j oin the war in Ju ne 1 9 40? 1 5 0 2 Giolitti, Giovanni 8 2 , 8 5 , 87 , 9 1 historical deb ate on S e co nd World War 2 2 7 3 1 why did Italy remain non- belligerent in 1 9 3 9 ? 1 5 0 G ring, Herm ann 1 6 1 , 1 6 6 Hitler s dem ands regarding Poland 2 2 3 why did Mussolini invade Ab yssinia in O ctober Grandi, D ino 1 3 2 , 1 46 impact o S oviet oreign p olicy on the international 1 935? Great B ritain see B ritain re sponse to the expansionist powers 1 9 9 2 00 Great D epression 1 1 1 impact o US oreign policy on the international impact o the Gre at D epressio n on the Nazi Party re sponse to the expansionist powers 1 9 9 Japan 1 4, 8 2 , 1 49 1 21 2 invasion o Poland 2 2 6 democracy 2 2 , 40 Greece 1 3 0, 1 5 2 , 1 8 1 Italian invasion o Abyssinia 2 01 9 , 2 1 0 1 1 economic crisis in the 1 9 2 0s 2 3 Guo mindang ( GMD ) 3 1 , 6 0 , 8 3 4 negotiations with S oviet Union 2 2 3 5 First S ino Japane se War 1 8 1 9 see C hina: Nationalist Party reaction o B ritain and France to Hitle r s actions oreign policy 2 3 1 9 3 9 1 9 40 2 2 7 how did Japan bene t rom the First World War? remilitarization o the Rhineland 2 1 5 1 7 20 Haile S elassie o Abyssinia 1 3 7 , 2 01 , 2 03 , 2 04, 2 06 S panish C ivil War 2 1 7 1 8 how pe ace ul was Japan in the 1 9 2 0s? 2 1 2 hegem ony 1 3 1 timeline 1 9 2 3 Japan a ter 1 9 00 1 9 2 0 Heinlein, Konrad 1 7 5 weaknesses o the Leagu e o Nations 1 9 8 Japanese immigratio n to the US A 2 1 Himm ler, Heinrich 1 2 0 Inukai Tsuyoshi 2 9 , 40, 41 Manchu ria, C hina 1 9 Hirohito o Jap an 1 5 , 2 3 , 3 4, 5 3 investigation 2 43 4 nationalism and militarism 1 5 1 7 , 1 8 1 9 , 1 9 2 0, histo rical evidence 2 3 9 41 Italy 3 7 , 8 2 3 2 3 5 , 3 1 2 , 3 4 6 , 3 9 42 , 46 Hitler, Adol 8 2 , 9 7 , 1 1 0 1 1 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 0, 1 5 5 6 , 1 7 0 am bitions in the B alkans 1 00 1 Peace Preservation Law 1 5 , 2 2 Anglo- Polish Tre aty 1 81 B attle o C apo retto 8 3 , 1 0 5 results o the First World War or Japan 2 1 Anschluss 1 9 3 8 1 7 1 3 , 2 1 8 1 9 B attle o Vittorio Veneto 8 3 , 1 05 S hogu nate 1 6 C ham be rlain s intervention in S u detenland crisis how did M ussolini consolidate his po wer? 9 6 7 timeline 1 8 5 3 1 9 2 6 1 4 1 5 1 93 5 how success ul was Musso lini s oreign policy in the what problems did Japan ace in the 1 9 2 0s? 2 2 4 changing diplomatic alignments in E urope a ter 1 9 2 0s? 1 00 4 Japan 1 9 3 1 41 3 0, 5 6 , 1 9 2 1 933 1 56 7 impact o D Annunzio and the Fiume a air on cause s o expansion 3 0 4 changing diplomatic alignments with Mussolini and F ascism 9 1 2 descent into the D ark Valley 3 9 Austria 1 6 0 impact o dom estic econom ic issues o n oreign economic concerns le ading up to Pearl Harbo r Fo ur Year Plan 1 5 5 , 1 6 6 p olicies 9 8 1 00 49 5 4 Hitler takes ove r E urope 1 87 9 impact o economic actors o n the rise o Fascism economic crisis 3 2 4 Hitler s actions a ter the declaration o war 1 87 92 3 Gre ater E ast Asia C o - Prosperity S phere 2 9 , 47 Hossb ach Memorandum 1 5 5 , 1 6 6 7 impact o First World War 88 9 impact o nationalism and militarism on Japan s how signi cant is the Hossbach M emorandum as Italian Nationalist Association 8 6 oreign policy 3 4 6 evidence o Hitler s oreign p olicy obj ectives? lack o national identity 8 5 impact o the war in E urope 46 1 67 long- term causes o exp ansion 84 Imperial Rule Assistance Associatio n 2 9 , 46 impact o the First World War on Hitler s oreign long- term weaknesses o Liberal Italy 8 5 6 invasio n o Indo -C hina 2 9 , 46 , 47 , 49 5 0, 5 2 , 6 0 policy 1 1 6 1 9 M arch on Rome, O ctober 1 9 2 2 9 4 5 , 1 2 0 Kodo-ha 2 9 , 3 1 , 40 impact o the Gre at D epression on the Nazi Party relations with the S oviet Union 1 02 3 Kwantung Army 1 4, 3 1 , 3 4 6 , 3 8 , 41 1 21 2 relations with western E u ro pean powers 1 01 2 Leagu e o Nation s response to events in Manchuria impact o the Munich Putsch o 1 9 2 3 on the success S ocialist Party ( PS I) 8 2 , 8 3 , 8 5 , 8 6 7 1 931 3 6 61 6 o Nazism 1 2 0 1 Triple E ntente 83 , 8 6 7 Manchu ria crisis 3 4 9 international reaction to Hitler s demands re garding what actors infuenced Mu ssolini s oreign policy? militarists take control 1 9 40 46 Poland 2 2 3 97 8 Minse ito Party 2 9 , 3 8 liquidation o C zechoslovakia 1 7 9 8 0 why did su pport or F ascism grow in Italy a ter the Mukden incident 3 4 5 , 42 , 6 0 , 6 3 5 May C risis 1 9 3 8 1 7 5 6 F irst World War? 9 0 1 Natio nal Mobilization B ill 1 9 3 8 2 9 outb reak o war 1 8 6 7 , 2 2 6 working- class protest 8 5 Neutrality Pact with the S ovie t Union 2 9 , 46 7 rearm ament 1 5 5 , 1 6 1 Italy 1 9 3 3 40 1 2 9 Pearl Harbor and the outbreak o war 49 5 4 remilitarization o the Rhineland 1 5 5 , 1 6 2 4, changing diplomatic alignm ents in E uro pe a ter perspectives o Japanese historians 5 3 1 68 9, 21 5 1 7 1 933 1 32 4 political crises and the growing infuence o the S p anish C ivil War 1 6 4 5 changing diplomatic alignm ents in E uro pe a ter military 3 1 2 , 3 9 42 steps to dictatorship 1 2 3 5 1 9 3 6 1 43 political instability in C hina 3 1 S ude te nland crisis 1 7 4 5 changing diplomatic alignm ents in E uro pe a ter Rape o Nanking 43 4 withdrawal rom the D isarmament C on erence 1 9 3 9 1 49 5 0 reaction o the US A to the attack o n Pearl Harbor 1 55, 1 57 9 domestic economic issues 1 3 1 2 75 6 Hitler, Adol Mein Kampf 1 1 7 , 1 2 0 , 1 2 5 6 domestic infu ences on Italian oreign p olicy resp onse o C hina to events a ter 1 9 3 2 83 5 Gro ss D eutschland 1 1 7 1 935 39 1 34 resp onse o the League o Nations and E uro pe to race and living space ( Lebensraum ) 1 1 7 1 8 end o Italian participation in collective se curity events a ter 1 9 3 2 6 7 natural enemies and allies 1 1 8 1 9 1 43 5 resu lts o the S ino- Japanese War or Japan 44 6 Hitler, Adol Zweites Buch 1 2 5 6 events o invasion o Abyssinia 1 3 7 8 , 1 5 3 4 S ino Japanese War o 1 9 3 7 2 9 , 42 3 Hoare- Laval Pact 1 3 7 , 1 6 2 , 1 9 2 , 2 04 5 o reign po licy 1 9 3 5 3 9 1 3 4 41 timeline 2 9 3 0, 6 0 Hossbach C on ere nce 1 7 0, 1 7 1 o reign po licy in the 1 9 3 0s 1 3 0 4 Tosei-ha 3 9 , 40 , 41 Hossbach Memo randum 1 5 5 , 1 6 6 7 how did B ritain and France respond to the invasion trade em bargoes 6 0, 7 4 5 how signi cant is the Hossbach M emorandum as o Albania, 7 April 1 9 3 9 ? 2 09 Tripartite Axis Pact 46 8, 6 0 evidence o Hitler s oreign po licy obj ectives? how did Italy take over Alb ania? 1 47 9 US p re ssure on Japan 7 4 5 1 67 how did the US A respond to the invasio n o US A s actions with regard to Japan 1 9 3 0 41 7 0 1 , hyperinfation 1 1 0, 1 2 0 Abyssinia? 2 0 8 9 77 8 intervention in the S panish C ivil War 1 9 3 6 3 9 US A s response to events 1 9 3 7 3 8 7 1 2 1 41 5 US A s response to Japanese actions 1 9 3 1 3 7 7 0 1 imperialism 1 5 invasion o Abyssinia 2 01 9 , 2 1 0 1 1 why did the US A change its p olicy towards Japan internal assessm ent 2 3 2 3 Italy and the S econd World War 1 49 5 2 a ter 1 9 3 8 ? 7 2 4 nal to uches 2 46 Italy s role during S udetenland crisis in S eptember Jiang Jieshi 3 1 , 3 4, 3 7 8, 44, 45 , 47 , 6 7 , 6 8, 6 9 , 7 3 getting started 2 3 5 1 9 3 8 1 45 6 ( C hiang Kai- shek) identi cation and evaluation o sources 2 3 9 43 M ussolini s actions in the war up to 1 9 41 1 5 2 investigation 2 43 4 p erspectives o E uropean historians 1 5 2 plan o investigation 2 3 8 results o intervention in the S panish C ivil War 1 42 Kapp Putsch 1 1 0, 1 1 9 refection 2 45 6 results o the Abyssinian War or collective security Ke llogg- B riand Pact 6 1 , 7 1 , 1 02 , 1 1 1 , 1 3 2 research 2 3 8 9 1 3 9 41 Korea 1 6 , 1 9 sele cting a topic and appropriate questions 2 3 5 6 results o the Abyssinian War or Italy 1 3 9 anne xation by Japan 1 5 , 2 0, 2 3 , 2 7 submitting your b ibliography 2 43 results o the international response to the Kuo mintang 3 1 , 6 0, 6 7 8 teacher, peer and sel - assessme nt tool 2 3 4 5 Abyssinian crisis 2 05 7 see C hina: Nationalist Party using thinking concepts to ormu late good timeline 1 2 9 3 0 Kwantung Army 1 4, 3 1 , 3 4 6 , 3 8 , 41 questions 2 3 6 8 what was the re action o B ritain to Italian international re spo nse to aggre ssion 1 9 3 5 40 1 9 2 expansion in 1 9 40? 2 09 1 0 Anschluss 2 1 8 1 9 who controlle d Italian oreign policy in the 1 9 3 0 s? League o Nations 3 6 , 3 7 , 6 0, 6 1 , 1 9 2 3 Germany 1 1 0, 1 5 5 o Nazism 1 2 0 1 Italy 1 05 9 international response to aggression in the 1 93 0s 1 98 Night o the Long Knives 1 2 0, 1 2 4 Japan 2 5 8 Italy 1 3 0, 1 3 7 , 1 3 9 , 1 43 relationship betwee n Fascist Italy and Nazi Japan 1 9 3 1 41 5 7 8 , 7 8 8 0 organization and aims o the League o Nations 62 3 Germany 1 43 sources 2 3 9 41 response to events in Manchuria 6 1 6 , 1 9 2 S A ( S turmabteilung) 1 2 0, 1 2 4 analysing so urce s 2 42 3 response to Italian invasion o Abyssinia 2 03 4 S S ( S chutzsta el) 1 2 0, 1 2 4 selecting source s 2 41 2 response to Japan s po licies a ter 1 9 3 2 6 7 steps to dictatorship 1 2 3 5 values and lim itations asso ciated with seco ndary response to the Mukden incident 6 3 5 why did support or Nazism grow a ter the F irst sources 5 8 liberal democracy 8 5 World War? 1 1 9 2 3 S oviet Unio n 2 9 , 46 7 , 1 6 5 Liberal Italy 1 8 7 0 1 9 2 3 85 Nurem berg Trials 1 6 7 Franco- S oviet Mutual Assistance Treaty 1 6 2 , 2 1 4 Libya 1 02 , 1 2 9 , 1 5 2 im pact o S oviet oreign policy on the international Lithuania 1 7 0, 1 8 0 re spo nse to the expansionist powers 1 9 9 2 00 Little E ntente 1 01 , 1 5 6 orthodox viewp oints 2 40 Nazi S oviet Pact 1 9 3 9 1 49 , 1 7 0, 1 83 5 Lloyd Ge orge, D avid 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 negotiations with S oviet Union 2 2 3 5 Locarno Treaties 8 3 , 1 01 2 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , 1 6 5 relations with Italy 1 02 3 , 1 3 0 Low, D avid 1 9 5 Pact o S teel 1 9 3 9 1 3 0, 1 49 5 0, 1 7 0, 1 8 1 2 S panish C ivil War 1 9 3 6 3 9 1 2 9 , 1 41 Lytton C o mmission 6 0 Pape r 1 2 3 im pact on Hitler s positio n in E urope 1 6 5 docum ent analysis 1 3 Italy s intervention 1 9 3 6 3 9 1 41 5 how sho uld I distribute my time in the Nazi Germany 1 6 4 5 Macedonia 8 3 examinatio n? 1 2 1 3 Non- Interventio n C ommitte e 2 1 7 1 8 Maginot Line 1 5 6 how to approach so urce questio ns 4 1 2 S partacist u prising 1 1 0, 1 1 9 Manchuria 1 9 , 3 1 , 3 2 3 markb ands 1 0, 1 1 S talin, Jo se 1 5 6 , 2 00, 2 2 4 Manchuria crisis 3 4 5 what can you expe ct on Pape r 1 ? 3 4 S timson No n- Recognitio n D octrine 6 0, 7 0 1 impact o League o Natio n s ailure to take action Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 2 9 , 6 0 , 6 9 S tresa C on e rence 1 2 9 , 1 3 3 4, 1 5 5 , 1 9 2 , 2 1 4 1 5 66 reactio n o the US A to the attack on Pearl Harb or S tresemann, Gustav 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 League o Nations response to eve nts in Manchu ria 75 6 S udetenland C risis 1 45 6 , 1 7 0, 1 7 4 61 6 why did Japan attack Pearl Harbo r on 7 D ecem ber C hamberlain s interventio n 1 9 3 5 Manchuku o 2 9 , 3 7 , 45 1 9 41 ? 49 5 2 S u detenland Germans 1 7 4 5 results or Japan s international relations 3 6 7 Perry, Matthew 1 4, 1 6 , 2 4 results or Manchuria and C hina 3 7 perspectives 2 3 7 results or the Japanese government 3 8 9 Italy 1 9 3 3 40 1 5 2 Third International 1 43 Mao Ze dong 3 1 , 3 7 , 45 Japan 1 9 3 1 1 9 41 5 3 Third Re ich 1 1 8 , 1 2 0 Marco Polo B ridge , B eij ing 2 9 , 42 3 , 44, 5 3 Poland 1 3 0, 1 5 0, 1 5 5 totalitarianism 9 6 7 C hina s actions ollowing Marco Polo B ridge international reaction to Hitler s demands regarding Treaty o Kanagawa 1 4, 1 6 incident 6 0 , 6 7 9 Poland 2 2 3 Treaty o London 8 3 , 8 6 , 9 0, 2 1 4 Marinetti, Filippo 8 6 international reaction to the invasion o Poland 2 2 6 Treaty o Portsmouth 1 5 Matteotti, Giacomo 9 6 , 1 03 Non- Aggression Pact with Germany 1 5 9 , 1 8 1 Treaty o Tie ntsin 1 4 May C risis 1 9 3 8 1 7 5 6 Treaty o Versailles Memel, Lithuania 1 7 0, 1 8 0 Germany 1 1 0, 1 1 3 1 5 , 1 5 6 , 1 5 7 6 9 militarism 1 5 , 1 05 Rapallo Treaty 1 9 2 2 1 2 1 , 1 6 1 Italy 8 3 , 9 0 1 Monro e D octrine 3 8 re erences Japan 1 5 , 2 1 Morocco 1 02 Germany 1 2 8 Triple E ntente 83 , 8 6 7 Mukden incident 3 4 5 , 42 , 6 0 Germany 1 9 3 3 3 8 1 6 9 response o the League o Nations 6 3 4 Germany 1 9 3 8 40 1 9 1 why did the League not take stronger action against international respo nse to aggression 2 1 2 , 2 3 1 UK see B ritain Japan? 6 4 5 italy 1 0 9 US A 3 6 , 1 3 0 Munich C on erence 1 9 3 8 1 3 0, 1 45 6 , 1 7 8 9 , 2 00, italy 1 9 3 3 40 1 5 4 Germany 1 9 3 3 3 8 1 5 6 7 2 2 4, 2 2 9 3 1 Japan 2 8 ho w did the US A respond to the invasion o Munich Pu tsch 1 2 0 1 Japan 1 9 3 1 41 5 9 , 8 1 Ab yssinia? 2 08 9 Mussolini, B enito 8 2 3 , 8 4, 8 5 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 0, 1 3 2 , 1 8 1 refection 2 45 6 im pact o US oreign policy on international Anschluss 1 2 9 , 1 3 3 , 1 43 , 1 6 0, 1 6 5 , 1 7 2 revisionism 2 40 respo nse to e xpansionist po wers 1 9 9 changing diplomatic alignme nts in E urop e a ter Rhine land 1 5 5 , 1 6 2 4, 1 6 8 9 , 2 1 5 1 7 Japanese immigration to the US A 2 1 1 933 1 32 4 Ribb entrop, Joachim von 1 49 , 1 6 1 Neutrality Acts 7 2 , 1 9 2 , 1 9 3 , 1 9 9 changing diplomatic alignme nts with Hitler and Rom ania 1 5 6 , 1 8 1 reaction o the US A to the attack on Pearl Harbor Austria 1 6 0 Rom e B erlin Axis 1 3 0, 1 43 , 1 5 5 , 1 6 5 75 6 did Musso lini create a totalitarian state? 9 6 7 Rom me l, E rwin 1 5 2 US pressure o n Japan 7 4 5 end o the ap peasement o Mussolini s Italy 2 09 1 0 Roo se velt, Franklin D . 1 9 2 , 1 9 9 , 2 08 US A s actions with regard to Japan 1 9 3 0 41 5 4 5 , how did M ussolini conso lidate his power? 9 6 Ru hr 1 1 0, 1 2 0, 1 5 6 77 8 how success ul was Mussolini s ore ign policy in the Ru ssia 1 4 US A s response to events 1 9 3 7 3 8 7 1 2 1 9 2 0s? 1 0 0 4 see S oviet Union US A s response to Japanese actions 1 9 3 1 3 7 7 0 1 Il Popolo d Italia 8 2 Ru sso- Japanese War, 1 9 04 0 5 1 5 , 1 9 why did the US A change its policy towards Japan impact o domestic issues on the oreign policies o a ter 1 9 3 8? 7 2 4 Italy 9 8 1 00 USS Pan ay 6 0, 7 2 international response to Italian invasio n 2 01 9 , S aar p lebiscite 1 9 3 5 1 5 5 , 1 6 0 1 US S R see S oviet Union 21 0 1 1 S chuschnigg, Kurt 1 6 0, 1 6 5 , 1 7 1 2 Italy s role during S udetenland crisis in S eptembe r S eco nd World War 6 9 1 9 3 8 1 45 6 Hitler takes over E u rope 1 8 7 9 Victor E mmanuel III o Italy 8 6 , 9 5 , 9 7 , 1 3 4, 1 49 , 1 6 5 March on Ro me, O ctober 1 9 2 2 9 4 5 , 1 2 0 how im portant was appeasement as a cause o the Vietnam 2 9 Mussolini s actions in the war up to 1 9 41 1 5 2 S econd World War? 2 2 7 3 1 S ocialist Party ( PS I) 8 2 , 86 7 Italy 1 9 3 3 40 1 49 5 2 what actors infuenced Mu ssolini s ore ign policy? outbreak o war 1 86 9 1 , 2 2 6 Wall S treet C rash 1 1 1 97 8 outco me or Japan 5 4 Washington C on erence 1 9 2 1 1 5 , 2 1 why did Italy j oin the war in June 1 9 40? 1 5 0 2 phoney war 1 87 Washington Treaty S ystem 2 1 2 , 2 3 , 3 6 , 2 1 4 why did Italy remain non-b elligerent in 1 9 3 9 ? 1 5 0 reactio n o the US A to the attack on Pearl Harb or Weimar Re pub lic 1 1 9 2 0 why did Mussolini invade Abyssinia in O ctober 75 6 Wilhelm II o Germany 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 1 935? 1 35 6 S hanghai 2 9 , 3 7 , 3 8 Wilson, Woodrow 1 1 3 S hidehara Kij uro 2 1 , 2 2 Wilson s 1 4 points 1 1 3 oppo sition to S hidehara s internationalism 2 3 Nanj ing ( Nanking) , C hina 43 4 S ibe rian E xpedition 1 5 nationalism 1 5 , 1 05 signi cance 2 3 7 Young Plan 1 1 1 Nazi S oviet Pact 1 9 3 9 1 49 , 1 7 0, 1 8 3 5 S ino- Japanese War 1 4, 1 6 1 7 , 1 8 1 9 , 2 4 Yugoslavia 8 3 , 1 01 , 1 5 2 , 1 5 6 two contrasting views o the Nazi S o viet Pact Rape o Nanking 43 4 1 85 6 S ino Jap anese War o 1 9 3 7 2 9 , 42 6 Nazism 1 1 0 1 1 S ocial D arwinism 1 05 , 1 1 7 1 8 Zhang Zuolin 3 1 , 3 4, 6 7 imp act o the Great D epre ssion on the Nazi Party S ocial Unity 1 05 Zhou E nlai 6 7 121 2 source help and hints Zog o Alb ania 1 01 , 1 47 9 imp act o the M unich Putsch o 1 9 2 3 on the success Germany 1 2 7 8 Laura Fermi: Mussolini (University of Chicago Press, 1966), Kenneth B. Pyle: The Making of Modern Japan (DC Heath and copyright 1961 by The University of Chicago, all rights Company, 1996), copyright Houghton Mif in College Division, reserved, reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. permission via Copyright Clearance Center. Klaus Fischer: Nazi Germany: A New History, copyright Klaus Mark Robson: Italy: Liberalism and Fascism 1870-1945, Fischer 1995, reprinted by permission of Little, Brown Book copyright Mark Robson 2006, reprinted by permission of Group and Continuum Publishing US, an imprint of Bloomsbury Hodder Education. Publishing Inc. Jonathan D. Spence: The Search for Modern China, copyright Max Hastings: Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1 944-45, copyright 1990 by Jonathan D. Spence, reprinted by permission of W. W. 2007 by Max Hastings, reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Norton & Company, Inc. Knopf, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a Roderick Stackelberg: Hitler s Germany (Routledge), copyright division of Penguin Random House LLC, and by permission of 1999 Roderick Stackelberg, reprinted by permission of Taylor & HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., all rights reserved. Any third party Francis Books UK. use of this material, outside of this publication, is prohibited. Zara Steiner: The Triumph of the Dark: European International History Interested parties must apply directly to Penguin Random House 1 933 1 999 (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011 ), reprinted by LLC for permission. permission of Oxford University Press. Ruth Henig: The Origins of the Second World War 1 933-1 939 Zara Steiner: The Lights that Failed: European International (Routledge), copyright 1985 Ruth Henig, reprinted by History 1 91 9-1 933, copyright Zara Steiner 2005, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. permission of Oxford University Press. Ruth Henig: in Modern History Review, reprinted by permission of Richard Storry: Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1 894-1 943 Philip Allan (for Hodder Education). (Macmillan), copyright Richard Storry, 1979, reprinted by Immanuel C. Y. Hs : The Rise of Modern China (OUP, 2000) permission of Pan Macmillan. reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. A. J. P. Taylor: The Origins Of The Second World War (Hamish Saburo Ienaga: The Pacifc War: 1 931 -1 945, translation copyright Hamilton 1961, Penguin Books 1964, 1987, 1991), copyright 1978 by Random House, Inc., reprinted by permission of 1961 by A. J. P. Taylor, copyright renewed 1989 by A. J. P. Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Taylor, all rights reserved, reprinted by permission of Scribner, a Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, all rights division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. and Penguin Books UK. reserved. Donald C. Watt: How War Came (Pimlico, London, 2001), Akira Irive: The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and reprinted by permission of Peters Fraser & Dunlop (www. the Pacifc, copyright 1987, Taylor & Francis, reprinted by petersfraserdunlop.com) on behalf of D. C. Watt permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. Although we have made every effort to trace and contact all Ian Kershaw: Hitler: A Biography (Penguin Books 2008), copyright copyright holders before publication this has not been possible 1998, 2000, 2008, by Ian Kershaw, reprinted by permission of in all cases. If noti ed, the publisher will rectify any errors or Penguin Random House UK and W. W. Norton & Company Inc. omissions at the earliest opportunity. Patricia Knight: Mussolini and Fascism (Routledge), copyright Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith 2003, Patricia Knight, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for Books UK. the materials contained in any third party website referenced in Stephen J. Lee: European Dictatorships 1 91 8-1 945 (Routledge), this work. copyright 1987, 2000, 2008, Stephen J. Lee, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari: Italian Foreign Policy 1 870-1 940 (Routledge, 1975), copyright Cedric Lowe and the Estate of Frank Marzari 1975, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. David J. Lu: Japan: A Documentary History, M.E. Sharpe Armonk, NY, USA, reprinted by permission of the author. Denis Mack Smith: Modern Italy A Political History (Yale University Press, 1997), reprinted by permission of Yale University Press and Denis Mack Smith. Denis Mack Smith: Mussolini, extracts reprinted by permission of Denis Mack Smith. Robert Mallett: Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1 933-1 940 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), copyright Robert Mallet, 2003, reprinted with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Thomas Meakin: Thomas Meakin asks to what extent Italian Fascism represented a triumph of style over substance , published in History Review, Issue 59, December 2007, www. historytoday.com, reprinted by permission of History Today Ltd. R. J. Overy: The Origins of the Second World War, copyright 1987, 1998, 2008 Taylor & Francis, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. Gordon W. Prange: At Dawn We Slept (Penguin Books), copyright Anne R. Prange 1981 , reprinted by permission of the David Grossman Literary Agency. TH E MO VE TO GLOBAL WAR Equipping learners to critically explore historical concepts, the student-centred Authors approach of this text enables big picture understanding and strengthens results. 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