Digest: Calalang vs Williams 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon theconstitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., well-being and economic security of all the people? G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 Doctrine: Social Justice LAUREL, J.: Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In Facts: enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to of Public Works and Communications that animal- promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic: all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent 2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. toEchague Street from 7 am to 11pm 2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, roads. constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra- constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex. of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of recommendations on August 10, 1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents Calalang v Williams (Labor Standards) pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? Calalang v Williams State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. GR No. 47800 : the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent December 2, 1940 elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, FACTS: constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra- constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year from the : must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective Among others, the petitioner Calalang, concerned citizen, aver that the rules of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of and regulations complained of: bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to RATIO: insure the well being and economic security of all people; (1) Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be and that it constitutes unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. (2)The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice. his mind through education and personal discipline so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and HELD: happiness of all. YES, it still promotes social justice. In enacting the said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group (e.g. the poor - because social justice is bringing the greatest good to the greatest number, not necessarily just the poor like the drivers of the animal-drawn vehicles). Social justice: : "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the EN BANC The Facts [G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996] JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his RAUL R. LEE, respondents. Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, [G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996] filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate FRIVALDO, respondents. of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following DECISION disposition:6 PANGANIBAN, J.: "WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of thePhilippines. should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled." (i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second repatriation; Division. (ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the election returns and a Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or Governor of Sorsogon: (iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060 voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440 of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"? RaulR.Lee 53,304 In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925 elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms. On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) G.R. No. 123755. petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial on December 19,19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of reconsideration. Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition." on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 The Issues in G.R. No. 123755 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 the following propositions":15 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that "First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with should occupy said position of governor. the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the cognizance of and deciding said petition; herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, and to hold the Office of Governor; 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus: Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore Office of Governor; and RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition. Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon." R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his G.R. No. 120295 proclamation. This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows: Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as 1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of thePhilippines"; June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon. 2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo. President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately The Facts and the Issue upon the due implementation thereof." The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"? is reproduced hereinunder: 4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in "Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of light of existing jurisprudence? candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground 5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in that any material representation contained therein as required under Section promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty- assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"? election." (Italics supplied.) The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the before the election." threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this. Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of Resolutions null and void. provincial governor, thus: By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. "Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon. panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda. day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. The Consolidated Issues From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the as follows: sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty- three (23) years of age on election day. 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from xxx xxx xxx when? Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; 2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold (R. A. 7160). the governorship of Sorsogon? Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects. unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26 Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the that henot Leeshould have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well. of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship. Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim. 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," with the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of was reactivated only onJune 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re- a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her processing of his application. memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23 March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996. hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. * In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day." fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural- of age on election day). born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization he insists was made elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people. proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue ofwhen an aspirant in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up question we shall now directly rule on. being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected must be: official and at the start of his term. * a citizen of the Philippines; But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral * a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed x x where he intends to be elected; at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also * a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, the day of the election; under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he * able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or was not a citizen at the time of such registration. dialect." The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, no longer ineligible. then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter application on August 17,1994. requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative votingis the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else. statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement.They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing disputed that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36 existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended." was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take on May 8,1995.37 away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of intended to be elected. a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43 There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re- At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re- 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994? acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation. While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. The Solicitor General44 argues: 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted "By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041). even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural- events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of curative." any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation. a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45It is obvious Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it prevail.47 effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional after the same were filed.48The fact that such interregna were relatively guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein. of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case. Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification whether Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements become moot. of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a Philippines." registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is We do not agree. considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying validated as of said date. Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would Resolution:55 disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was "The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final judgment' wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50 was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in 1995:51 connection with the 1992 elections." "By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government." modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held: These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not abuse.52 considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands." The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification? The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317 that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer." Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows: he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day "The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the either an election protest or aquo warranto action." realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected." provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus: suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's "But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such ruled: fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office "The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be subject to the final outcome of this case." entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)" others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was. Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is notoriety", in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same. knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labohas any The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo: the following reasons: "The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. deemed elected to the office." argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re- whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected. the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory? repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects follows: of such previous rulings. "Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial that any material representation contained therein as required under Section of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty- therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. election" (italics supplied.) 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus: like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period "SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not decided even after thefifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict. inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive supplied) effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the supervening repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or 1992, word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as but only in the 1995 elections. well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was in this Decision. stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule! own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or case law, such finding is binding and final. liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First, there sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still Court's conscience. deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge? EPILOGUE Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly "candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was governor, mayor, etc. stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment application therefor. of proclamations. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life "x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."67 his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in choice. order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing: possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will (1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED. be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly (2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and academic. In any event, it has no merit. and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect No costs. to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and SO ORDERED. laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed. Davide, Jr., J. dissenting opinion Puno., J. concurring opinion In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, JJ., concur. his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of Padilla, Regalado, Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice. his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his Melo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur in the result. citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part. it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal 1 technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role Composed of Pres. Comm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm. of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and dissenting. sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice 2In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation Lee, respondent; Rollo, pp. 110-129. approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought 3Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted on official travel at the time of the deliberation and resolution of this case. for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to 20 See footnote no. 6, supra. submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171. 21In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 4 Rollo, pp. 46-49. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow 5 his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63 Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship may be concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on official business"). reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation." 6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. 22 Supra, p. 794. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo 23 Petition, p. 27; Rollo, p. 29. "not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as 24 Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On February 28, 1992, the Regional The full text of said memorandum reads as follows: Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. "MEMORANDUM However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al, 232 SCRA 785 (June 6,1994), overturned this grant, and TO : The Solicitor General Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and ordered to vacate The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec The Director-General disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028. National Intelligence Coordinating Agency 7Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar- Decree or any other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative Femando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F. authority thereof, poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; Rollo, pp. 56-57. present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution. 8. Rollo, p. 60. In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special 9 Rollo, pp. 61-67. Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from 10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of "stray votes," and thus Lee was held as having garnered the "highest number responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, of votes." as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to 11 Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case. the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, 12 issuances and rules and regulations. 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989). 13 (Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino Rollo, pp. 110-128. 14 Manila, March 27, 1987. " Rollo, pp. 159-170. 25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines. 15 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15. 26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al, G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995). 16 Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5. 27 Petition, p. 28; Rollo p. 30. 17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7. 28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows: 18Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec Commissioners "MANIFESTATION 19 Republic Act No. 7160. The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following persons have been by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995: order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine 1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900 citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by 2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901 applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the 3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902 necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The 4. Terry Herrera and Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their Antonio Ching 903 certificate of registration. 5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904 The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the 6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905 effective implementation of this Decree. 7. Samuel M. Buyco 906 This Decree shall take effect immediately. 8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907 Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, 9. Samuel Villanueva 908 nineteen hundred and seventy-five. " 30 See footnote no. 6, supra 10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909 31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992). 11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910 32 "The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of 29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below: this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such "PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 date as may be provided for by law, x x x." Sec. 43, Local Government Code. PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST 33 96 Phil. 447,453 (1955). THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF 34 NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS. The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral argument held on March 19, 1996: WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; "JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be a citizen at the time of proclamation? WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such at the time of proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes the provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen. married aliens before said constitution took effect; JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election? of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital be reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of status; and qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53 it says that for WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine purposes of residence it must be reckoned x x x from the time of the filing of citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship; the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date of the election. But when we go over all the provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor, there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say that if 36 Comment, p. 11; Rollo, p. 259. there is no provision under any existing law which requires that you have to be 37 a citizen of the Philippines on the date of the filing or on the date of election See footnote no. 33. then it has to be equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified 38 Section 253 reads as follows: at the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume the office. "Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn Code the candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a registered petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the voter one must be a citizen? proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC). a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the ground of ineligibility or of disloyally to the Republic of the Philippines shall file Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995. or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC)." citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice. 39Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been (May 25,1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2,1984). twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is 40Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states: a registered voter was likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was a ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by the Regional Trial Court "Exceptions to Rule. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following and he was sustained as a valid voter, so he voted. cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your and (5) in case of laws creating new rights." contention that citizenship should be determined as of the time of proclamation 41 id., p. 25. and not as of the time of the election or at the time'of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. 42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271. ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor. 4373 Am Jur 2d, sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208,210 JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, (1953). particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when 44 Memorandum, p. 9. citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct? 45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488. ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision. 46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; italics supplied. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other local positions should be a voter 47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines. and to be a voter one must be a citizen? 48Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by Solicitor ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an General, it appears that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval issue here because he was allowed to vote and . he did in fact vote and in fact, between date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was he was a registered voter." (TSN, March 19. 1996.) three months and ten days; the swiftest action was a same-day approval. 35Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus 49"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from Election Code of the Philippines," as amended, provides for the various running for any elective local position: qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino citizenship xxx xxx xxx 66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld, (d) Those with dual citizenship"; despite his not being of the required age on the day of the election, although 50 P. 11; Rollo, p. 259. he celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in 1990, this Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May 25, 1990) 51 Resolution, p. 12; Rollo, p. 121. that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmena held an Alien Certificate of Registration as 52 an American citizen, he was still not disqualified from occupying the local Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, elective post of governor, since such certificate did not preclude his 1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992). being "still a Filipino." The holding in Aquino was subsequently nullified by the 53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads: adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the "WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly 1991 ) which took effect on January 1, 1992 , provides that those with dual respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled." citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position, and 54 Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 21. effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have 55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; Rollo, p. 116 always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will. 5642 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. 67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994). Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971. 68This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving 57 Art. IX, Sec. 2. Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6. 58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer: "WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after due notice and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/ Decision be issued as follows: a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law; b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon; xxx xxx xxx 59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994). 60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992), 61 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995. 62 Supra, at p. 312. 63 See footnotes 2 and 3. 64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23,1959). 65 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239. Republic of the Philippines employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to SUPREME COURT account. Manila Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated EN BANC by fairly prosaic transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995 Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his Integrated Bar of the Philippines. own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, RESOLUTION the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who PER CURIAM: at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review his own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, proceeding at bench, at least. and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions. The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some ROYAL BANK (TRB) superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, him competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and owners. quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2 April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. 7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . the highest bidder, for P73,529.09. shall be entertained . . . ." Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his 2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750; intention to redeem the properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas CA-G.R. SP No. 22356 C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as initiated another civil action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which aforestated. he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB- 8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the A. CIVIL CASES defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990, 3 on the ground ofres judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to 1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R. redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306 No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein. On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties SP No. 22356. only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. 3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485; Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of CA-G.R. SP No. 28221 the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question." act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank TRB. despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata(being identical with Civil Case Nos. For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot). November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th Division 4 on October 6, 1992, for Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint. the reason that the proper remedy was appeal. 5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452 4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368; CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that event the occasion for another new Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz, 1991, still another civil action for the same cause against TRB, its Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB- "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, 10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. the RTC (Branch 14 5) on the ground of litis pendentia. 22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and The RTC ruled that — when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506." Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, 6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236 namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders "merit" of his cause against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the difference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB- members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in 9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and apparently they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly case. . . . rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those 22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for — sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and . . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against 28275. deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts defendants TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY did not show that there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14 VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held liable under said laws. Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral Resolution dated March 23, 1994. damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated a. Clarificatory Communications to November 7, 1989, 9 dismissed the case. Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions" 7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069 He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . . It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on subject of two (2) prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15 CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the 1994, and with some patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356. 12 reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually 8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344; adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928 stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause — On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. this Court dated. _________, CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His signed the resolutions." Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded Borromeo. The record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second of merit. These were: Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19 a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution B. CRIMINAL CASES dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as shown by of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from here. the transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and 1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188 b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990. Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints 2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207 (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," property registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more. bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was dismissed the complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso. between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the title by TRB over the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification. Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234 statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in accommodations he had obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo order. failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB. 3. OMB-VIS-89-00136 Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but 15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings — was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property. 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows: This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available against Lao, but also against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he under the Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal is not the prerogative of this Office to make a review of Decisions and Bank. Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents. 1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R. No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273 In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that (1) the initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;" docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with not have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary. Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application. II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB) Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denying consolidation because the transaction between As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retrobeing in law borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, transaction (P10,497.50). 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB. Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals A. CIVIL CASES dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto. The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the Division) in a four-page Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated nature and purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise: motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of against officials of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed Resolution dated November 27, 1989. of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively). "unconstitutional, null and void." a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679 xxx xxx xxx Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the executory, as were a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No. are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with the CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or No. 82273." Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . . . Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). These processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in . . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual, or no Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court." the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679. refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof"). For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB- sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the 6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case — Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon). G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions. judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Division) on April 27, 1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . . error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501) of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by 6740; G.R. No. 84054 the Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra(or the earlier communications to him administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of the cases adversely to him. of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full- blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action to the parties concerned. action for damages against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042 and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508). What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. yet another in an already long series, was to commence a suit against Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. litigation expenses of P1,000.00. Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 — Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment — as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment. February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being which they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and without stating Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he Division) said: was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00. The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case motion having been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, transmitted to the Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28 been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not Court to "rectify the injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the there is a special and important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a record (Resolution, July 19, 1990). petition for review may be dismissed summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the question 2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R. raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897 that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with a decision, and has no application to aresolution as to which said section Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of June 26, the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons(UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and resolution denying the petition for review and consequently bringing about a litigation expenses (P1,000.00). review of the decision of the Court of Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that reproducing and restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of of Appeals. the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF . . . order." JUDGMENT. Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Clerk of Court of the Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF- respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter findings of fact and law, was denied. to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178 his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then promulgated on December 13, 1989. Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), 3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R. and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999 case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another — in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of action to invalidate the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses. Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen. time represented Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other actual resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit. dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 29, et al., wherein the Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this 1989. Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of 4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R. this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248 functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in the action taken on their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the Very truly yours, theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. JULIETA Y. CARREON Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court B. CRIMINAL CASES of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986. Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable. docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; 1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181 and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other Resolution dated June 3, 1987. attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the adverse resolutions through various motions and letters, all of which were Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows: the Revised Penal Code. Dear Mr. Borromeo: By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987). the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for Wilfredo Navarro. complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ." Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of 2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418 P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta favor of the highest bidder, SBTC. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection default, but the same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on correctness of judicial resolutions." 33 December 26, 1990. III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC) in light of his history of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of A. CIVIL CASES actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo. 1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA- G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769 2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267 The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty.Wilfredo consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process, the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection. deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by well as litigation expenses. By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to who precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible would be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert." needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and 2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458; leniency it probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, CA-G.R. CV No. 39047 by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 severity. still another suit against the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered IV. OTHER CASES the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB- 10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R, Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929 Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him Lao is pertinent. This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the and embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code." security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. 36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction. over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00. Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA- G.R. CV No. 39047. Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The motions were denied by by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1993. 35Said the Court: 1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a can, or cannot, be considered res judicata under the circumstances. Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment." xxx xxx xxx Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was resolutions sent to him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution November 15, 1994. therein mentioned. V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433 B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528 A. Complaint Against Lawyers What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against of his Court Adversaries Borromeo, at least as of date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18), Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third lawyers who had appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was — in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them, the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter aliadismissing Borromeo's complaint docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a following pertinent observations: genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; . . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath has indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo order of the Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of alleged that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the title to his property in favor of Lao. highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued by The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the baseless and nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directed 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made directly Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there lawyers made the following observations: was such violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain with deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before degree as a show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without the might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the courts. authority and name of the courts. And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non- Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters lawyer who uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who ("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite crosses his path more especially if their actuations do not conform with his unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against whims and caprices. him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following: Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . other members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent (which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to and contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts." the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, the country's judicial system and administration of justice. corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc. . . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" legal profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by as regards the reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan Borromeo against this Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court afforded the court with all the respect and esteem due them. persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated his letter in the Supreme Court. Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members." He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to C. Decision of the IBP render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court." case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, complaints against lawyers." 37 sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999). stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first facts or laws (during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and that resolving the motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny "you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most and abuse of power for the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ." (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit" — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt trampling on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so to fool people!" he mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and doing? (GR No. 82273). contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!! nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the IMPEACH NARVASA admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38 • ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL "MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, One other "circular" reads: Constitution SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!! • VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING — CODDLERS OF CROOKS! CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE — VIOLATOR OF LAWS LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO • CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION in the judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for • CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself. COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR • BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND PREDICTABLY FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake • DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his circular. Mabolo, Cebu City The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 Te. 7-56-49. (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR already passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those arguments. A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter IBP, dated June 21, 1992 Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved: Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, 1) to REQUIRE: dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other (a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2) City Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act." dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and B. Resolution of July 22, 1993 (b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, requiring comment by Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to Cebu City; and him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows: 2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to xxx xxx xxx file a comment on the letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Capitol, Cebu City. Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the SO ORDERED. relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. 1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989 Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice 5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other with pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: Chief Justice and members of the High Court to either refute said charges or the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. dispense the justice that they are duty bound to dispense. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May D. Resolution of September 30, 1993 19, 1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and opportunity to explain his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43 promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993 . . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment the Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of dated August 27, 1993 in which he alleged the following: President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court 1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) Constitution which requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of days from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise members of the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such further arguments in is respectfully requested;" addition to or in amplification of those set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded. 2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . SO ORDERED. . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and independent body;" E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment 3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said of October 15, 1992 (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, libelous and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has reiterating the arguments and allegations in his Comment of August 27, authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the "libelous circular;" 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.: 4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom 1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in ordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be accordance with the accountability of public officials;" the circular merely cited in contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the precious states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint; encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and lies; 2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH and the LAW", namely: a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution; on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appelate conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption price, since promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self- no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption; and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved. c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's 1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses frauds and defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999. The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an November 26, 1993 impartial and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his an argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the baseless and false charges." prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold A. Respondent's Liability persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment for Contempt of Court by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of private person. . . ." 46 Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by justice. 44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment. has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect. v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, B. Basic Principles Governing however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a the Judicial Function court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles governing finality of judgments and of the 3. Judgments of Supreme Court paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down Not Reviewable definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be provided by law from court judgments or orders. reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any 1. Reason for courts; Judicial other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by Hierarchy error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of and traditional principle. courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts. In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the 204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution" review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . — courts. the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50 2. Paramount Need to end Litigation at Some Point . . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound 4. Final and Executory Judgments of practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments Lower Courts Not Reviewable of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at Even by Supreme Court some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion available under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317) whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts. 51 Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground xxx xxx xxx that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. subject to review by higher tribunals — become final and executory before, 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it Government. 52 was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal; separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our Proscribed by Law and Logic democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 regrettable increase in the resort to administrative prosecution — or the Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to SCRA 1). appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency, powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court alone to discharge their duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court. mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers 1. Common Basis of Complaints presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the Against Judges government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287). Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable vexatiously repetitive. injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54 fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability. Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an 2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and Correction of Judgments and Orders even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article not in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt criminal remedies. Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question xxx xxx xxx submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and any contrary postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335). impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after xxx xxx xxx more fully explored. To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences. destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes. Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the be established by law. Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme become final and executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority. most certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or 3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders question — despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels Erroneous or Unjust — and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable. order is unjust — or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained. executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the 4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices and Leads to Absurd Consequences of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction. Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or interlocutory modified, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order. 5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held Criminal Prosecution administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged Court. judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the "judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil trial court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged. action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." 58 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction." charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or providing that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the; impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final, that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that "unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite. mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue. D. Judges Must be Free from Influence or Pressure E. Afterword Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions well be asked why it took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the in good faith. unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self- evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he 2 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 7, Infra. suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the 3 Per Judge Benigno G. Gaviola, Branch 9, RTC, Cebu. power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect on him. 4 Ramirez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Francisco (Cezar) and Vailoces, JJ. Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible 5 Judge Renato C. Dacudao, presiding. audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the 6 Judge Celso M. Gimenez, Branch 5. extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of 7 Guingona, J., ponente, with whom concurred Javellana and Imperial, JJ. personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves 8 Branch 24, Hon. Priscila S. Agana, presiding. notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely 9 Per Judge Jose P. Burgos, Branch 17. impose such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country. 10 Per Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Godardo Jacinto. WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and 11 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 1, supra. instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their 12 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 2, supra. authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of 13 SEE Sub-Head I, supra. which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions. 14 Decision dated May 21, 1993: Austria-Martinez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Puno and Ramirez, JJ. IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 As every lawyer knows, the Clerk of Court of a Division or of the Court En Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Banc is, of course, not a "mere clerk," but the highest administrative officer in Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., the Division or Court, next only to the Justices. concur. 16 Sub-Head II, A, 1, infra. Puno, J., took no part. 17 Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1,c, infra. Footnotes 18 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively. 1 Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, 106; Peo v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 407. 19 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra. 34 Judge Jacinto has, to repeat, since been promoted to the Court of Appeals. 20 See sub-head I, A, 3, supra —Because TRB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables during the pendency of Civil Case No. R- 35 Rollo, Vol. VII, p. 115. 22506, Borromeo filed criminal complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers, which were however, and 36 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 5, supra. quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office. 37 During the entire period that the administrative case was pending (1990 to 21 Per 3rd Assistant Fiscal Enriqueta Roquillano-Belarmino. 1994), Borromeo wrote an unceasing stream of letters, leaflets, flyers to IBP, harshly critical of the courts and the lawyers who had in one way or-another 22 See sub-head I, A, 1, supra. taken measures adverse to him. One of the last was an "OPEN LETTER to IBP Prexy Manuel Legaspi" dated April 19, 1994. 23 See sub-head I, supra. 38 There are at least ten (10) other such."circulars, flyers, or letters in the record, all amounting more or less the same errors and defamatory 24 By resolution of Fiscal Rodulfo T. Ugsal, approved by City Fiscal Jufelinito imputations. R. Pareja. 39 Sub-Head II; A, 1, infra. 25 Per Investigator Mario E. Camomot, recommended for approval by Director IV V. V. Varela, and approved by Juan M. Hagad, Deputy Ombudsman, Visayas. 40 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1 c, infra, respectively. 26 In the third paragraph of this opinion. 41 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra. 27 Like the letter written to Borromeo, dated July 10, 1987, Sub-head A, 1, 42 Sub-Head II, A, 1, a, infra. 5, supra. 43 Sub-Head I, A, 7, supra. 28 Rollo G.R. 82273. 44 Rule 71, Sec, (c) and (d), Rules of Court. 29 This concerned a fourth bank, the Philippine Bank of Communications. 45 SEE Sub-head II, A, 1, a, supra. 30 Sub-head II, A ,3, supra. 46 Peo v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211, cited in Gavieres v. Falcis, 193 31 Written by Felicito C. Latoja, Asso. Graft Investigation Officer II, and SCRA 649, 660 (1991); see also Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140. approved by Juan M. Hagad, DOMB. 47 Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 100474, September 32 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 1, supra. 10, 1993; GSIS v. Gines, 219 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 85273, March 9, 1993; Gesulgon v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993; Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japson, 211 SCRA 879, G.R. No. 33 SEE also sub-head II, A, 2, supra. 68073, July 29, 1992; Cachola v. CA, 208 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 97822, May 7, 1992; Enriquez v. CA, 202 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 83720, October 4, 1991; 53 Articles 204-206 of the Revised Penal Code define and penalize offenses Alvendia v. IAC, 181 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990; which have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, G.R. No. L-51626, April 30, 1980; Lee element. Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, G.R. No. L-30523, April 22, 1977. 54 148 SCRA 283, 418, 419, 420-42155 Rodrigo v. Quijano, etc., 79 SCRA 48 20 SCRA 441, 444. 10 (Sept. 9, 1977). 49 Against judgments of the Supreme Court since obviously no appeal to a 56 Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 (Alug. 31, 1977); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona- higher court or authority is possible, the only remedies are those set forth in Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 (Oct. 18, 1990). the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 56 in relation to Rules 52 and 53, with regard to civil cases and proceedings, and Rule 125 in relation to Rule 124, in respect of criminal cases. SEE Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 57 Quizon v Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293 (July 25, 1975). 215, G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992; Tan v. Court of Appeals 199 SCRA 212 G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991; Church Assistance Program v. Sibulo, 171 58 Alzua, et. al v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326. SCRA 408 G.R. No. 76552, March 21, 1989; Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80, G. R. No. 77526, June 29, 1988 Ang Ping v. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 75860, September 17, 1987; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, 59 The old Code of Civil Procedure. Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577, G.R. Nos. L-58011-2, November 18. 1983; Tugade v. CA 83 SCRA 226; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, G.R. No. L- 31589, July 31, 1970; Albert v. CFI, 23 SCRA 948, G.R. No L-23636, May 29 1968; Shoji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333(1922); SEE also Concurring Opinion of Gutierrez J. in Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990. 50 148 SCRA 382, 417-418. 51 Against a final and executory judgment, the extraordnary, equitable remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 may be availed of, or in extreme situations, an action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud. 52 Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 302, G.R. No. L-59370, February 11, 1986, citing Malia v. IAC, 138 SCRA 116, G.R. No. L-66395, August 7, 1985; Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210, G.R. No. L-70230, June 24, 1985; Bethel Temple, Inc. v. General Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 136 SCRA 203, G.R. No. L-35563, April 30, 1985; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984 and the cases cited therein pertaining to "immutability of judgments;" Heirs of Pedro Guminpin v. CA, 120 SCRA 687, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21, 1983; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, G.R. No. L-24921, March 31, 1967; Daquis v. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913; Sawit v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310.